Category: Administrative & Regulatory

Navigable Waters Protection Rule Substantially Narrows the Scope of Waterbodies Subject to Regulation under the Clean Water Act

On January 23, 2020, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) (collectively the “Agencies”) released a final rule re-defining the term “waters of the United States” as applied under the Clean Water Act (“Final Rule”).

The Final Rule substantially narrows the scope of waterbodies subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act—notably removing interstate streams as a separate jurisdictional category; excluding ephemeral streams and water features; requiring rivers, streams and other natural channels to directly or indirectly contribute flow to a territorial sea or traditional navigable water; and excluding wetlands that are not adjacent to another non-wetland jurisdictional water. Further, the Agencies confirm that groundwater is not subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act and, consequently, that surface water features connected only via groundwater likewise are not jurisdictional. In support of this narrower scope, the Agencies explain that states and tribes retain the authority to regulate non-jurisdictional waters within their authority, provided those states and tribes deem such regulation appropriate.

The Final Rule replaces the definition of “waters of the United States” adopted under a 2015 Obama-era “WOTUS Rule” (the “2015 WOTUS Rule”), which was formally repealed by the Agencies on October 22, 2019.  As explained in previous Van Ness Feldman alerts, the 2015 WOTUS Rule expanded federal control over several types of waterbodies, particularly with respect to tributaries, adjacent waters, and wetlands. 2015 WOTUS Rule has been subject to numerous legal challenges. These challenges resulted in a patchwork regulatory regime where application of the 2015 WOTUS Rule was enjoined from implementation in 28 states, while the remaining 22 states were subject to the more expansive regulatory definition of the “waters of the United States.”

The Agencies have described the Final Rule as providing “consistency, predictability, and clarity,” as well as appropriately recognizing state and tribal regulatory authority.  The Final Rule pulls from three Supreme Court opinions in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes (Riverside Bayview), Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States (SWANCC), and Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos) to adopt a unifying legal theory to define “waters of the United States” based on sufficient surface water connections with downstream traditional navigable waters and territorial seas.  In adopting a unifying interpretive approach, the Agencies explicitly eliminate the case-specific application of their previous interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test in what was called their “Rapanos Guidance.”

Under the Final Rule, the overall categories of jurisdictional and excluded waters, in many ways, are similar to the existing regulatory scheme.  As a practical matter, however, the Final Rule substantially narrows the scope of waterbodies subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act.  The Agencies classify jurisdictional and excluded waters as follows:

The Agencies will primarily rely on states and tribes to regulate non-jurisdictional waters within their authority, provided those states and tribes deem such regulation appropriate.

Among the Final Rule’s most significant changes from the 2015 WOTUS Rule’s definition of federally regulated waters of the United States are the exclusions of ephemeral streams and wetlands that are not adjacent to another non-wetland jurisdictional water.  Another notable element is the Agencies’ confirmation that groundwater is not subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act and, consequently, that surface water features connected only via groundwater likewise are not jurisdictional.

The Final Rule also provides definitions for key terms and offers guidance on their intended application of the regulated and non-regulated categories of waters.  Key issues addressed by the Agencies include:

  • “Tributary” is defined as a river, stream, or similar naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes surface water flow to a territorial sea or traditional navigable water in a typical year directly or through another jurisdictional water.  A tributary must be perennial or intermittent in a typical year.  The Agencies also explain that a tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a subterranean river, culvert, dam, tunnel or similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field or similar natural features.  Tributaries include ditches that relocate a tributary, were constructed in a tributary, or are constructed in an adjacent wetland and have surface flow to the downstream jurisdictional water.
  • Certain delineation determinations will require the presence of the necessary jurisdictional features in a “typical year,” i.e., defined as “when precipitation and other climatic variables are within the normal periodic range (e.g. seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of the applicable aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.”
  • Ditches are not included as a separate category of jurisdictional waters, but instead are included in the definition of tributary.  Ditches that are constructed in, or that relocate, a tributary or that are constructed in adjacent wetlands are included as a tributary and are jurisdictional if the flow in the ditch is perennial or intermittent during a typical year and that flow reaches a traditional navigable water or territorial sea.  The Preamble notes that the majority of ditches used to drain surface and shallow subsurface water from croplands are expected to be non-jurisdictional.
  • Lakes, ponds and other impoundments do not lose their jurisdictional status if they contribute surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water through a culvert, dike, pipe, spillway, tunnel or other artificial feature or through a natural feature such as a debris pile or boulder field.  However, lakes, ponds and impoundments that are connected downstream to jurisdictional waters only by diffuse stormwater runoff or directional sheet flow over upland areas are not jurisdictional.  An ecological connection between a lake, pond or impoundment is insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.
  • An impoundment must have a surface water connection to a downstream jurisdictional water in order to be regulated.  The downstream surface water connection does not need to be natural but may be through any manner of artificial features (tunnels, culverts, spillways, etc.).  However, lakes, ponds and impoundments that lose water only through evaporation, underground seepage or consumptive use are no longer considered jurisdictional waters.
  • Adjacent wetland are defined as wetlands that either:   (i) abut a territorial sea, traditional navigable water, or regulated lake, pond, or impoundment; (ii) are inundated by flooding from one of these jurisdictional waters; (iii) are physically separated from one of these waters by a natural berm, bank, dune or similar natural feature; or (iv) are physically separated from one of these waters by an artificial dike, barrier or other structure, including a road, that allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection with the regulated water in a typical year (such as through a culvert, flood or tide gate, pump or similar feature).  Application of these categories still requires further context to the relevant connections.  For example, the Agencies explain that a subsurface connection through porous soils is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over a wetland separated by an artificial structure, such as a dike.  Likewise, if the surface flow between the wetland and the abutting jurisdictional water across, or through, a dike or other artificial barrier only occurs after a 100-year storm event, this would not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction because the surface water connection would not occur once during a typical year.  Finally, the Final Rule eliminates the prior definition of “adjacent”—which had included the terms “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”  The elimination of the prior “adjacent” definition further limits the regulatory reach over wetlands under the Final Rule.

For each category of regulated waters, the Preamble in the Final Rule provides guidance on how the Final Rule will be implemented.  Issues of implementation also are addressed in an “Implementation Statement” that was concurrently issued by the Agencies.

Lawsuits challenging this Final Rule are expected, likely resulting in continuing uncertainty, and, potentially, a further state-by-state patchwork of regulation, until these cases ultimately are addressed by the Supreme Court.  For now, however, project and resource developers should carefully consider how the Final Rule may affect their permitting obligations for proposed development and work in or near waterbodies and wetlands.

© 2020 Van Ness Feldman LLP

For more on WOTUS & the Clean Water Act, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources page.

NEPA Overhaul? CEQ Proposes Significant Changes to Federal Environmental Review

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a division of the Executive Office of the President, today published in the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would make significant changes to its regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

CEQ’s efforts spring from a 2017 Executive Order that directed it to “enhance and modernize the Federal environmental review and authorization process” by, among other initiatives, ensuring “that agencies apply NEPA in a manner that reduces unnecessary burdens and delays as much as possible, including by using CEQ’s authority to interpret NEPA to simplify and accelerate the NEPA review process.”  Today’s publication, the first comprehensive update of the CEQ NEPA regulations since their promulgation in 1978, proposes noteworthy reductions in the scope of and timeline for federal environmental review.

Key proposed changes include:

  • Limiting the scope of the NEPA review.  CEQ proposes to exclude from NEPA review non-federal projects with minimal federal funding or minimal federal involvement such that the agency cannot control the outcome on the project, reasoning that “[i]n such circumstances, there is no practical reason for an agency to conduct a NEPA analysis because the agency could not influence the outcome of its action to address the effects of the project.”  The impact of this change on privately-funded (i.e., non-federal) projects is unclear, however, because major federal actions subject to NEPA review under the proposed rule include “actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as Federal and federally assisted activities.”
  • Eliminating cumulative impact analyses.  CEQ proposes to change how to address cumulative impacts, such that analysis of cumulative effects is not required under NEPA, finding that “categorizing and determining the geographic and temporal scope of such effects has been difficult and can divert agencies from focusing their time and resources on the most significant effects,” and “can lead to encyclopedic documents that include information that is irrelevant or inconsequential to the decision-making process.”
  • Requesting comments on GHGs.  The effect that elimination of cumulative impact analyses will have on NEPA review of the greenhouse gas (GHG) impacts of a proposed project is unclear.  Just last summer, in its proposed draft guidance on how NEPA analyses should address GHG emissions, “Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” CEQ stated that “the potential effects of GHG emissions are inherently a global cumulative effect.” CEQ has invited comment on this issue, noting that if it finalizes its proposed rulemaking, it would review the draft GHG guidance for potential revisions consistent with the regulations.
  • Establishing time limits of two years for completion of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) and one year for completion of Environmental Assessments.  Currently, the average time for federal agencies to complete an EIS is four and a half years.  A two-year presumptive time limit, measured from the date of the issuance of the notice of intent to the date a record of decision is signed, would bring the majority of EISs within the timeline achieved by only a quarter of EISs prepared over the last decade, according to the CEQ’s report on EIS Timelines.

Because the rulemaking proposes sweeping changes to NEPA, these changes likely will be challenged in court.  Nevertheless, the changes are indicative of a federal push to reduce the scope and time of environmental review, particularly related to highway and energy infrastructure projects.  In an op-ed piece, CEQ Chairwoman Mary B. Neumayr stated that the proposed changes “would modernize, simplify, and accelerate the NEPA process in order to promote public involvement, increase transparency, and enhance the participation of states, tribes, and localities. These changes would also reduce unnecessary burdens and delays and would make important clarifications to improve the decision-making process.”

Public comments are due March 10, 2020.  CEQ will host two public hearings on the proposed rule: in Denver, CO, on February 11, 2020 and in Washington, DC, on February 25, 2020.

©2020 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

More from The Council on Environmental Quality in the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources legal articles’ section.

Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board Tackles Wine Slushie Sales by Restaurant Licensees

Ever since beer distributors in Pennsylvania were permitted to sell growlers for off-premises consumption, which is loosely interpreted as a closed container by the Pa.L.C.B., there has been an influx of beer distributors installing slushie machines and selling malt beverage slushies. Now, are wine slushies fair game?

In a recent Legal Advisory Opinion from the Pa.L.C.B., a question was presented as to whether Pennsylvania restaurant licensees that hold an additional Wine Expanded Permit (“WEP”) can sell wine to go in a container with a sealed lid.

Specifically, the question related to whether a WEP permits the sale of wine slushies to go in a sealed container.

As a bit of background, a WEP can be obtained by any restaurant licensee in Pennsylvania and permits the sale of wine, or wine-based drinks, for off-premises consumption. The sales of wine cannot exceed 3,000 milliliters in a single transaction (typically 4 bottles of wine), similar to the 192-fluid ounce (two six-packs) limitation for off-premises beer sales by a restaurant licensee. The sale of wine and beer can occur during the same transaction so long as the respective volume limitations are met for each product. Interestingly, the statute authorizing the issuance of the WEP to restaurant licensees does not have any limitations on the sale of wine to go, other than that the sale prices must not be less than what the licensee paid for the product from the Pa.L.C.B.

Now that we have covered the law related to a WEP, what was the Pa.L.C.B.’s response to the question in the Legal Advisory Opinion?

The Pa.L.C.B. stated that, because there are no other limitations for a WEP other than selling 3,000 milliliters or less in a single transaction, a WEP holder can sell wine slushies to go in any container, and are not limited to sales of wine in the container it was purchased by the WEP holder. This would permit wine, or any other wine-based drinks without any other alcohol mixed in, to be poured in a cup with or without a lid and sold for off-premises consumption as long as the volume does not surpass 3,000 milliliters in a single transaction.

It is important to note, however, that your local municipality may have open container rules that the licensee or its consumers must follow. With the proliferation of malt beverage slushie sales at beer distributors, I have to imagine this is something the municipalities have dealt with and are aware of. As far as Pennsylvania state law, this legal opinion clearly permits WEP holders to serve wine or wine cocktails (without liquor) in “to go” containers.

Additionally, the Pennsylvania Liquor Code generally prohibits the fortification or adulteration of any liquor, which includes wine.

The Pa.L.C.B. will permit the mixing or infusing of liquor or wine, but such mixtures or infusions, which are mixed in large volumes, must be discarded at the end of the business day. The Pa.L.C.B. has issued numerous advisory opinions stating that adding ice or water to create malt beverage slushies in the slushie machine would be adulterating the original product, but it appears this Legal Advisory Opinion permits WEP holders to serve wine-based drinks for off-premises consumption. In fact, there have been previous opinions that Distributor licensees were not permitted to mix because they are not permitted to have on-premises sales, which restaurant licensees are permitted to do. Therefore, if a WEP holder must add ice or water to the slushie machine to freeze the wine to make wine slushies, it must be discarded daily at the end of the business day (11 p.m. for WEP sales). To the extent that the slushie, or wine cocktail, is a single-serve preparation, those products can be sold in any container for off-premises consumption to the extent permitted by local ordinance.

Finally, because slushie machines have been determined to be “dispensing systems” (like a malt beverage draft system) they must be cleaned in conformance with the Pennsylvania Liquor Code, which requires weekly cleaning depending on the system you are operating.

©2020 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

For more liquor licensing updates, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Redesigned 2020 IRS Form W-4

The IRS has substantially redesigned the Form W-4 to be used beginning in 2020.

New employees first paid wages during 2020 must use the new redesigned Form W-4.  In addition, employees who worked for an employer before 2020 but are rehired during 2020 also must use the redesigned 2020 Form W-4.

Continuing employees who provided a Form W-4 before 2020 do not have to furnish the new Form W-4.  However, if a continuing employee who wants to adjust his/her withholding must use the redesigned Form.

IRS FAQs for Employers

The IRS has issued the following FAQs for employers about the redesigned 2020 Form W-4:

  • Are all employees required to furnish a new Form W-4?

No, employees who have furnished Form W-4 in any year before 2020 do not have to furnish a new form merely because of the redesign. Employers will continue to compute withholding based on the information from the employee’s most recently furnished Form W-4.

  • Are new employees first paid after 2019 required to use the redesigned form?

Yes, all new employees first paid after 2019 must use the redesigned form. Similarly, any other employee who wishes to adjust their withholding must use the redesigned form.

  • How do I treat new employees first paid after 2019 who do not furnish a Form W-4?

New employees first paid after 2019 who fail to furnish a Form W-4 will be treated as a single filer with no other adjustments.  This means that a single filer’s standard deduction with no other entries will be taken into account in determining withholding.  This treatment also generally applies to employees who previously worked for you who were rehired in 2020 and did not furnish a new Form W-4.

  • What about employees paid before 2020 who want to adjust withholding from their pay dated January 1, 2020, or later?

Employees must use the redesigned form.

  • May I ask all of my employees paid before 2020 to furnish new Forms W-4 using the redesigned version of the form?

Yes, you may ask, but as part of the request you should explain:

 »   they do not have to furnish a new Form W-4, and

 »   if they do not furnish a new Form W-4, withholding will continue based on a valid form previously furnished.

For those employees who furnished forms before 2020 and who do not furnish a new one after 2019, you must continue to withhold based on the forms previously furnished.  You may not treat employees as failing to furnish Forms W-4 if they don’t furnish a new Form W-4. Note that special rules apply to Forms W-4 claiming exemption from withholding.

  • Will there still be an adjustment for nonresident aliens?

Yes, the IRS will provide instructions in the 2020 Publication 15-T, Federal Income Tax Withholding Methods, on the additional amounts that should be added to wages to determine withholding for nonresident aliens. And nonresident alien employees should continue to follow the special instructions in Notice 1392 when completing their Forms W-4.

  • When can we start using the new 2020 Form W-4?

The new 2020 Form W-4 can be used with respect to wages to be paid in 2020.

Additional Information

This Publication includes the income tax withholding tables to be used by automated and manual payroll systems beginning in 2020 regarding both (i) Forms W-4 from 2019 or earlier AND (ii) Forms W-4 from 2020 or later.

  • IRS FAQs on the 2020 Form W-4

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2020

More on IRS Forms & Regulations on the National Law Review Tax Law page.

Federal Court Issues Eleventh-Hour TRO to Enjoin Enforcement of California’s Controversial New Independent Contractor Law for 70,000 Independent Truckers

On January 1, 2020, California’s new independent contractor statute, known as AB 5, went into effect.  The law codifies the use of an “ABC” test to determine if an individual may be classified as an independent contractor.

The hastily passed and controversial statute has been challenged by a number of groups as being unconstitutional and/or preempted by federal law, including ride-share and delivery companies and freelance writers.

Just hours before AB 5 went into effect, a California federal court in San Diego enjoined enforcement of the statute as to some individuals – approximately 70,000 independent truckers, many of whom have invested substantial sums of money to purchase their own trucks and to work as “owner-operators.”

In the lawsuit, the California Trucking Association (“CTA”) has alleged that the “ABC” test set forth in AB 5 is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”).

The CTA asserts that the FAAA preempts the “B” prong because it will effectively operate as a de facto prohibition on motor carriers contracting with independent owner-operators, and will therefore directly impact motor carriers’ services, routes, and prices, in contravention of the FAAA’s preemption provision.

The CTA further contends that the test imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The CTA asserts that the test would deprive motor carriers of the right to engage in the interstate transportation of property free of unreasonable burdens, as motor carriers would be precluded from contracting with a single owner-operator to transport an interstate load that originates or terminates in California.  Instead, motor carriers would be forced to hire an employee driver to perform the leg of the trip that takes place in California.

©2020 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Limiting Junk Fax Class Actions: Online Fax Services Outside Scope of TCPA FCC Rules

 

On December 9, 2019, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued a declaratory ruling In the Matter of Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC (“Amerifactors”) concluding that modern faxing technologies are not within the scope of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  The Amerifactors ruling, which follows the express language of the TCPA, determines that faxes received via an online fax service as electronic messages are effectively email and therefore are not faxes received on a “telephone facsimile machine” under the statute. This narrows the scope of the TCPA to traditional fax machines and will make it more difficult for attorneys to certify classes of fax recipients under the TCPA, ideally curbing the plethora of TCPA Fax class action lawsuits.

Amerifactors Background

In 2017, Amerifactors filed a petition for an expedited declaratory ruling asking the FCC to “clarify that faxes sent by “online fax services” are not faxes sent to “telephone facsimile machines”[1] therefore, outside of the scope of the TCPA. While faxing has declined in usage significantly, many of those who still receive faxes do so through cloud-based services that send the document via an attachment to an email.  At the time of Amerifactors’ declaratory filing, they were defending a class action suit with claims that Amerifactors violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited fax messages, the bulk of which were sent to consumers from online fax services.

FCC Ruling and Logic

In the Amerifactors ruling, the FCC explained that faxes sent by online fax services do not lead to the “specific harms” Congress sought to address in the TCPA’s Junk Fax Protection Amendment and concluded that “a fax received by an online fax service as an electronic message is effectively an email.”

Unlike printed fax messages that require the recipient to supply paper and ink, the FCC concluded consumers can manage faxes sent by online fax services the same way they manage their email by blocking senders or deleting incoming messages without printing them, short-circuiting many of the specific harms envisioned by the original legislation.  With online fax services, there is no phone-line that is occupied and therefore unavailable for other purposes, and no paper or ink used that must be supplied by the recipient.  Clarifying legislative intent, the FCC stated:

“The House Report on the TCPA makes clear that the facsimile provisions of the statute were intended to curb two specific harms: “First, [a fax advertisement] shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient. Second, it occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.”

In many ways, the FCC ruling in Amerifactors demonstrates FCC recognition of the changes in faxing technology.  Steven Augustino of KelleyDrye[2], one of the attorneys who represented Amerifactors,  points out that the language we use now does not match the technology that has largely replaced traditional faxing technology, instead offering a short-hand that has roots in an earlier era—and that references dead technologies.  Augustino says:

“Amerifactors argued that the term “faxing” has outlived the actual technology of faxing, much in the same way that we still dial a telephone even though no one has a rotary telephone, or we “cc” people on emails but we aren’t using carbon copies.  In many ways, saying ‘I sent a fax’ is similar to that, the term has outlived the technology that has supported it.”

There is reason to believe that this is the first of many declaratory rulings on fax matters under the TCPA.  As of November 2019, there are thirty-six petitions in front of the FCC, and six of those petitions specifically address “junk” faxing rules.  These petitions represent a variety of faxing issues, such as consent and the definition of an advertisement.   The declaratory ruling in Amerifactors and the FCC’s reasoning related to technological changes will likely impact the FCC’s rule-making on similar issues.

Implications for Future TCPA Fax Class Action Lawsuits

According to Douglas B. Brown of RumbergerKirk, one of the attorneys who represented Amerifactors in the FCC’s declaratory ruling:

“While the traditional fax machine has faded out of today’s business communications, online fax services provide secure communications that are critical to providing consumers with secure information about their finances, health and other important matters. The FCC’s ruling allows for these communications to continue without interference from debilitating class-action lawsuits.”

Per Samantha Duke of RumbergerKirk who also represented Amerifactors:

“First, according to the Hobbs Act, federal district courts are bound to enforce the FCC’s rules, regulations, and orders relating to the TCPA. Thus, this declaratory ruling may impact all fax class actions filed in the district courts in the country.”

The Amerifactors ruling requires a closer look at how faxes are being received complicating how class actions are certified under the TCPA.  Per Duke:

“The Amerifactors ruling now makes the method by which the fax was received key to determining whether any particular unsolicited facsimile violates the TCPA. This individualized determination will most certainly complicate any attempt to certify a TCPA-fax class action as the question of whether the facsimile was sent to an online fax service will predominate over any common issue.”

In short, unless a fax comes through an old-school fax machine, it’s outside the reach of the TCPA per the FCC’s Amerifactors ruling.

[1] See Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling of Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC, CG Docket Nos. 02-278, 05-338, at 2 (filed July 13, 2017) (Petition).

[2] Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC was represented by Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, PA attorneys Douglas B. Brown and Samantha Duke, along with attorney Steven A. Augustino of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

For more on the TCPA and FCC Regulations, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law section.

Senate Introduces Bill to Formalize Joint Framework for Regulating Cell-Cultured Meat Products

Producers of cell-cultured meat – synthetic meat products derived from animal cell cultures that are intended to simulate the taste, appearance, and texture of traditional animal products – may soon receive regulatory direction from Congress. On December 16, 2019, Senators Mike Enzi (WY) and Jon Tester (MT) introduced legislation to codify a joint agreement between the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulating the development and sale of cell-cultured meat products. The legislation aims to address ongoing uncertainty over which federal agency should regulate the cell culture development process, and would assign authority to USDA to establish appropriate label terms for cell-cultured meat products. The bill arrives even as a number of states have recently acted to prohibit cell-cultured meat products from being labeled as “meat” – and are now facing lawsuits in federal court.

Cell-cultured meat, also called lab-grown meat or “clean meat,” is grown in a sterile laboratory environment. The cell cultures are drawn from either a live or slaughtered animal and grown in a complex multi-step process.[1] They are differentiated and matured to simulate traditional meat products while avoiding many of the environmental impacts associated with traditional animal husbandry. Technology advocates state that cell-cultured meat reduces feed costs, crop footprints, greenhouse gas emissions, and water consumption.

But cell-cultured meat products have not yet been able to offer these benefits at scale, owing in part to high costs currently associated with development and production. Regulatory uncertainty has also created challenges, as regulators have grappled over which federal agency should have primary oversight over the cell-cultured meat production process: while USDA regulates and inspects meat and poultry, FDA generally regulates all other food products to ensure that they are safe for human consumption and labeled accurately. This longstanding framework has prompted a challenging question for regulators and stakeholders alike: should cell-cultured meat products be regulated by USDA under its authority over traditional meat and poultry products, or by FDA, which has historically regulated the types of food manufacturing facilities and laboratories where cell-cultured meat will be grown and produced?

The agencies have already offered their commitment to work together. In November 2018, USDA and FDA issued a press release articulating a joint framework for robust collaboration, wherein FDA would oversee the stages of production from cell collection to differentiation, while USDA would regulate all subsequent processing, packing, and labeling of the products.[2] The agencies formalized their joint agreement in March 2018.

Responding to concerns from livestock industry groups and other stakeholders, a number of states (including Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, and Wyoming) subsequently passed laws to prohibit certain animal-derived food products from being labeled as “meat” or a “meat food product.” Several of those laws were subsequently challenged in lawsuits brought by public interest groups.

In the wake of these legal challenges, Senators Enzi and Tester introduced the “Food Safety Modernization for Innovative Technologies Act” (Senate Bill 3053) on December 16.[3] The bill draws from the Joint Agreement and aims to clarify that FDA will oversee the initial cell collection, proliferation, and culturing processes while transferring regulatory oversight of the harvested cells to USDA for regulation related to further processing and packaging. Significantly, the bill provides USDA with exclusive authority over labeling requirements for cell-cultured meat products derived from cell lines of livestock or poultry and assigns USDA with responsibility for establishing “appropriate nomenclature” for these product labels. The bill also requires the FDA and USDA to share information and collaborate during cell differentiation and harvesting. As of this date, the bill has been referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and has yet to face a vote.

[1] See Alan Sachs & Sarah Kettenmann, A Burger by Any Other Name, 15 SciTech Lawyer 19 (Winter 2019).

[2] U.S. Dept Agric., Statement from USDA Secretary Perdue and FDA Commissioner Gottlieb on the Regulation of Cell-Cultured Food Products from Cell Lines of Livestock and Poultry, Release No. 0248.18, Nov 16, 2018, available at https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/11/16/statement-usda-secretary-perdue-and-fda-commissioner-gottlieb.

[3] Food Safety Modernization for Innovative Technologies Act, S. 3053, 116th Cong. (2019).

© 2019 Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more on Cell-Cultured Meat, please see the Biotech, Food and Drug Law section of the National Law Review.

Apollo Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations: Aircraft Lessors Pay Attention

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury has broad delegated authority to administer and enforce the sanctions laws and related sanctions programs of the United States. As a key component of its enforcement authority, OFAC may investigate “apparent violations” of sanctions laws and assess civil monetary penalties against violators pursuant to five statutes, including the Trading with the Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.1

An “apparent violation” involves “conduct that constitutes an actual or possible violation of U.S. economic sanctions laws.”2 An OFAC investigation of an “apparent violation” may lead to one or more administrative actions, including a “no action” determination, a request for additional information, the issuance of a cautionary letter or finding of violation, the imposition of a civil monetary penalty and, in extreme cases, a criminal referral.3 Investigations of apparent violations by OFAC often lead to negotiated settlements where a final determination is not made as to whether a sanctions violation has actually occurred.4

Upon the conclusion of a proceeding that “results in the imposition of a civil penalty or an informal settlement” against or with an entity (as opposed to an individual), OFAC is required to make certain basic information available to the public.5 In addition, OFAC may release on a “case-by-case” basis “additional information” concerning the penalty proceeding,6 and it often does. Such additional information will sometimes include informal compliance guidance, cautionary reminders and best practices recommendations. Such information is routinely consumed by corporate compliance officers seeking fresh insight on ever-evolving compliance and enforcement trends, particularly in the context of proceedings relating to industries with which they are involved.

On November 7, 2019, OFAC released enforcement information that has caught the attention of the aircraft leasing community, particularly U.S. aircraft lessors and their owned or controlled Irish lessor subsidiaries.7 The matter involved a settlement by Apollo Aviation Group, LLC8 of its potential civil liability for apparent violations of OFAC’s Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) that existed in 2014–5.9 Although the amount of the settlement was relatively modest, the enforcement activity by OFAC in the proceeding has attracted scrutiny by aircraft lessors because, for the first time in recent memory, a U.S. aircraft lessor has paid a civil penalty to OFAC for alleged sanctions violations.

At the time of the apparent violations, Apollo was a U.S. aircraft lessor which became involved in two engine leasing transactions that came back to haunt it.

In the first transaction, Apollo leased two jet engines to a UAE lessee which subleased them to a Ukrainian airline with which it was apparently affiliated. The sublessee, in turn, installed both engines on an aircraft that it “wet leased”10 to Sudan Airways, which was on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons within the meaning of the “Government of Sudan.” Sudan Airways used the engines on flights to and from Sudan for approximately four months before they were returned to Apollo when the lease ended. Meanwhile, in a separate transaction, Apollo leased a third jet engine to the same UAE lessee, which subleased the engine to the same Ukrainian airline, which installed the engine on an aircraft that it also wet leased to Sudan Airways. Sudan Airways used the third engine on flights to and from Sudan until such time as Apollo discovered how it was being used and demanded that the engine be removed from the aircraft.

Both leases between Apollo and its UAE lessee contained restrictive covenants “prohibiting the lessee from maintaining, operating, flying, or transferring the engines to any countries subject to United States or United Nations sanctions.”11 Thus, by allowing the engines to be installed by its sublessee on aircraft that were eventually wetleased to Sudan Airways, and flown to and from Sudan during the country’s embargo, the lessee presumably breached the operating restrictions and covenants imposed by Apollo in the leases. Moreover, once Apollo learned that the first two engines had been used, and the third engine was being used, for the benefit of Sudan Airways, it demanded that the third engine be removed from the aircraft that the sub-lessee had wet-leased to Sudan Airways, and this was done.12

One might reasonably conclude from these facts that Apollo acted like a good corporate citizen. So what did Apollo do wrong from a sanctions compliance standpoint?

OFAC stated that Apollo may have violated section 538.201 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited U.S. persons from dealing in any property or interests in property of the Government of Sudan,”13 as well as section 538.205 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited the exportation or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, technology or services, from the United States or by U.S. persons to Sudan.”14

What are the takeaways and possible lessons to be drawn by aircraft lessors from this settlement based upon these alleged violations and the facts upon which they were based?

First, according to OFAC, Apollo did not “ensure” that the engines “were utilized in a manner that complied with OFAC’s regulations,” notwithstanding lease language that effectively required its lessee to comply.15 OFAC is clearly suggesting here that aircraft lessors have a duty to require sanctions compliance by their lessees. And, in view of the fact that many sanctions programs are enforced on a strict liability basis, OFAC’s comment that Apollo failed to “ensure” compliance by its lessee and sublessees makes sense. Apollo was not in a position to avoid civil liability by hiding behind the well-drafted language of its two leases. If a sanctions violation occurred for which Apollo was strictly liable, the mere fact that its lessee’s breach of the lease was the proximate cause of the violation would not provide a safe harbor.

As an example of Apollo’s alleged failure to “ensure” legal compliance, OFAC observed that Apollo did not obtain “U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees,”16 a comment which is somewhat puzzling. To our knowledge, there is nothing in the law requiring a lessor to obtain export compliance certificates, at least not in circumstances where an export or re-export license is not otherwise required in connection with the underlying lease transaction. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be difficult, at best, for an aircraft lessor to force the direct delivery of certificates from a sublessee or sub-sub-lessee with whom it lacks privity of contract. In view of the foregoing, one assumes that OFAC was looking for Apollo to install procedures by which its lessee would self-report on a regular basis its own compliance (and compliance by downstream sublessees) with applicable export control laws and the relevant sanctions restrictions contained in the lease.

Second, OFAC found that Apollo “did not periodically monitor or otherwise verify its lessee’s and sublessee’s adherence to the lease provisions requiring compliance with U.S. sanctions laws during the life of the lease.”17 In this regard, OFAC observed that Apollo never learned how and where its engines were being used until after the first two engines were returned following lease expiration and a post-lease review of engine records, including “specific information regarding their use and destinations,” actually conducted.

In view of the foregoing, OFAC stressed the importance of “companies operating in high-risk industries to implement effective, thorough and on-going, risk-based compliance measures, especially when engaging in transactions concerning the aviation industry.”18 OFAC also reminded aircraft and engine lessors of its July 23, 2019, advisory warning of deceptive practices “employed by Iran with respect to aviation matters.”19 While the advisory focused on Iran, OFAC noted that “participants in the civil aviation industry should be aware that other jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions may engage in similar deception practices.”20 Thus, according to OFAC, companies operating internationally should implement Know Your Customer screening procedures and “compliance measures that extend beyond the point-of-sale and function throughout the entire business of lease period.”21

As a matter of best practices, aircraft lessors should implement risk-based sanctions compliance measures throughout the entirety of a lease period, and most do. Continuous KYC screening by lessors of their lessees and sublessees is a common compliance practice. Periodic reporting by lessees as to the use and destination of leased aircraft and engines appears to be a practice encouraged by OFAC.22 Lessors can also make it a regular internal practice to spot check the movement of their leased aircraft through such web-based platforms as Flight Tracker and Flight Aware. If implemented by lessors, such practices may enable early detection of nascent sanctions risks and violations by their lessees and sublessees.

Finally, OFAC reminded lessors that they “can mitigate sanctions risk by conducting risk assessments and exercising caution when doing business with entities that are affiliated with, or known to transact business with, OFAC-sanctioned persons or jurisdictions, or that otherwise pose high risks due to their joint ventures, affiliates, subsidiaries, customers, suppliers, geographic location, or the products and services they offer.” Such risk assessment is an integral part of the risk-based sanctions compliance program routinely encouraged by OFAC, as outlined in its Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments on May 2, 2019.23 For aircraft and engine lessors, conducting pre-lease due diligence on the ownership and control of prospective lessees and sublessees, as well as the business they conduct, the markets they serve, the equipment they use and the aviation partners with whom they engage, are key to identifying and understanding the sanctions risks that a prospective business opportunity presents.

1 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, Final Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 27714, 27715 (June 14, 2019).

2 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section I.A.

3 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section II.

4 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section V.C.

5 31 C.F.R. §501.805(d)(1). Such information includes “(A) [t]he name and address of the entity involved, (B) [t]he sanctions program involved, (C) A brief description of the violation or alleged violation, (D) [a] clear indication whether the proceeding resulted in an informal settlement or in the imposition of a penalty, (E) [a]n indication whether the entity voluntarily disclosed the violation or alleged violation to OFAC, and (F) [t]he amount of the penalty imposed or the amount of the agreed settlement.” Id. OFAC communicates all such information through its website. 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(2).

6 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(4).

7 See OFAC Resource Center, Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Apollo Aviation Group, LLC (Nov. 7, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Page…) (the Settlement Announcement).

8 In December 2018, Apollo was acquired by The Carlyle Group and currently operates as Carlyle Aviation Partners Ltd. According to the Settlement Announcement, neither The Carlyle Group nor its affiliated funds were involved in the apparent violations at issue. See id. at 1 n.1.

9 See 31 C.F.R. Part 538, Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (7-1-15 Edition). Note that most sanctions with respect to Sudan were effectively revoked by general license as of October 2, 2017, thereby authorizing transactions previously prohibited by the SSR during the time period of the apparent violations by Apollo. However, as is true when most sanctions programs are lifted, the general license issued in the SSR program did not “affect past, present of future OFAC enforcements or actions related to any apparent violations of the SSR relating to activities that occurred prior to the date of the general license.” Settlement Announcement at 1 n.2. See also OFAC FAQ 532 (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#sudan_whole). 

10 A “wet lease” is “an aviation leasing arrangement whereby the lessor operates the aircraft on behalf of the lessee, with the lessor typically providing the crew, maintenance and insurance, as well as the aircraft itself.” See Settlement Announcement at 1 n.3.

11 Id. at 1.

12 Unfortunately, Apollo did not learn that the first two engines were used in violation of lease restrictions until they were returned following lease expiration and it conducted a post-lease review of the relevant engine records. 

13 The alleged application of section 538.201 to Apollo in the circumstances confirms the broad interpretive meaning that OFAC often ascribes to terms such as “interest,” “property,” “property interest” and “dealings,” which appear in many sanctions programs.

14 The alleged application of section 538.205 to Apollo in the circumstances suggests that a U.S. lessor of aircraft and jet engines may be tagged with the “re-export” of such goods and related services from one foreign country to another, notwithstanding the existence of a contractual daisy-chain of lessees, sub-lessees, and/or wetlessees that actually direct and control such flight decisions. In the context of U.S. export control laws, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) define the term “re-export” to include the “actual shipment or transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of an item to or from such countries in any manner.” 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(1). Thus, for export control purposes, the flight of an aircraft subject to the EAR from one foreign county to another foreign country constitutes a “re-export” of the aircraft to that country. 

15 Settlement Announcement at 1.

16 Id.

17 Id., at 1–2.

18 Id. at 3. (emphasis added).

19 Id. See OFAC, Iran-Related Civil Aviation Industry Advisory (July 23, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190723.aspx)

20 Id.

21 Id. (emphasis added).

22 In Apollo, OFAC reacted favorably to certain steps alleged to have been taken by Apollo to minimize the risk of the recurrence of similar conduct, including the implementation of procedures by which Apollo began “obtaining U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees.” Id.

23 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf.

© 2019 Vedder Price

ARTICLE BY John E. Bradley of Vedder Price.
More sanctions actions on the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation law page.

US Banking Agencies Issue Statement on Alternative Date in Credit Underwriting

On December 3, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the National Credit Union Administration (the Banking Agencies) released interagency guidance related to the use of alternative data for purposes of underwriting credit (the Guidance).

The Guidance acknowledges that alternative data may “improve the speed and accuracy of credit decisions,” especially in cases where consumer credit applicants have “thin files” because they are generally outside the mainstream credit system. In order to comply with applicable federal laws and regulations when using such alterative data, including those related to unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices, the Banking Agencies advise that lenders should responsibly use such information. Furthermore, the Guidance reminds lenders of the importance of an appropriate compliance management program that comports with the requirements of applicable consumer protection laws and regulations.

As a final recommendation, the Banking Agencies suggest that lenders consult with appropriate regulators when planning to use alternative data to underwrite credit.

The Guidance is available here.

©2019 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

‘ABC Test’ for Independent Contractors Set to Take Effect in California Jan. 1

As 2019 draws to a close, every business with a California presence should consider evaluating its workforce in the Golden State to ensure compliance with AB 5, which will be effective Jan. 1, 2020.

Through AB 5, the California legislature codified and expanded the reach of the so-called “ABC Test” for determining whether a worker should be classified as an independent contractor. This new law expands the reach of the California Supreme Court’s Dynamex decision which applied to coverage under the California Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders. AB 5 applies this new test to businesses under the California Labor Code and the California Unemployment Insurance Code.

Currently, California businesses are subject to a variety of tests of employee status, depending upon the law in question. Under most federal and California laws, the common law agency test applies. For workers’ compensation laws, the California Supreme Court adopted an “economic realities” test 30 years ago in S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations.

However, as of Jan. 1, 2020, the default standard for independent contractor treatment will be the ABC Test.

The ABC Test significantly narrows the scope of work for which businesses may classify workers as independent contractors, rather than employees, and expands the application of this new standard to nearly all employers doing business in California.

Businesses that do not adapt to the ABC Test may face an increased risk of claims from workers asserting that they were misclassified as independent contractors, on an individual and class or collective basis.

ABC Test Explained

Under the ABC Test, a worker is assumed to be an employee unless the business demonstrates:

A. That the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in performing the work, both in the contract for performance and in fact

B. That the worker performs work that is outside of the usual course of the hiring entity’s business

C. That the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity

It is Prong B of the test that will likely cause the most difficulty for companies that regularly engage independent contractors.

Prong B excludes from the assumption of employee status workers who perform duties outside the “usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” While AB 5 does not specifically define the phrase, many businesses use contractors to help them perform their regular business. California courts are expected to be tasked with interpreting the scope of this requirement.

Many industries lobbied hard to obtain exemptions from the ABC Test. The new statute excludes seven different categories of occupations or business, each with its own separate test for qualifying for the exclusion. These exclusions cover diverse occupations ranging from professionals such as architects and lawyers to non-professionals such as grant writers, tutors, truck drivers, and manicurists. Each category has a slightly different requirement to qualify for the exclusion from the ABC Test. However, qualifying for the exclusion from the ABC Test merely defaults the workers to a determination under the Borello test. Complicating matters further is that for all these occupations, a determination of employee status under federal law, such as under the National Labor Relations Act, likely remains under the common law agency test.

Application and Enforcement

While the California Labor Commissioner is officially tasked with enforcing many of the provisions of AB 5, claims of worker misclassification will more commonly be asserted in private civil actions either individually or on a class basis. In other words, companies will increasingly see independent contractors bring claims for wage and hour law lawsuits or class actions (i.e. overtime claims, meal and rest break claims, wage statement claims, etc.).

Employer Takeaways

Although several industry groups are expected to challenge the new law, businesses operating in California should review and update their practices relative to independent contractors before Jan. 1, 2020 – whether through potentially reclassifying independent contractors as employees or revising independent contractor agreements.

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP\

More on independent contractor compliance via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.