Category: Administrative & Regulatory

Senate Immigration Bill To Impact Business, Technology and Defense Sectors

Barnes & Thornburg

On April 17, 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators known as the “Gang of Eight” introduced an immigration bill entitled the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.”

The bill includes provisions that substantially increase the number of visas for highly-skilled workers, creates a new visa category for lower-skilled workers, eliminates the backlog for employment-based immigration, and authorizes significant resources to achieve border security.

The bill aims to increase the annual cap of certain employment-based nonimmigrant visas (H-1B) from 65,000 to 110,000 and the number may increase up to 180,000 depending on labor demands and the unemployment rate. In order to ensure that American workers are not displaced by H-1B workers, employers will continue to be required to pay the prevailing wage to H-1B workers and it has been proposed that the prevailing wage system be strengthened. Also in fiscal year 2014, companies will be banned from bringing in additional workers if more than 75 percent of their workers are H-1B or L-1 employees. The bill also provides for dual intent visas for all students who come to the U.S. on a bachelor or advanced degree program.

To ensure the U.S. has sufficient lower-skilled workers, the bill creates a new nonimmigrant category known as the W-Visa. Eligible recipients would be immigrants who come to the U.S. to perform services or labor for a registered employer and for a registered position. Beginning April 1, 2015, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security extends the start date, the maximum cap for four years would be 75,000 visas.

The bill proposes to exempt from the annual numerical limits multinational executives and managers; immigrants of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics; and doctoral degree holders in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields.

The bill allocates a significant number of all employment-based visas to individuals holding advanced degrees in STEM fields, in particular. The bill also creates startup visas for foreign entrepreneurs seeking to establish a company in the U.S.

The bill provides $3 billion to implement the Comprehensive Southern Border Security Strategy for achieving and maintaining effective control in all high risk border sectors along the southern border. The funds will be used for acquiring, among other things surveillance and detection capabilities developed or used by the U.S. Department of Defense; fixed, mobile, and agent portable surveillance systems; and unmanned aerial systems and fixed-wing aircraft and necessary and qualified staff equipment to fully utilize such systems.

The bill permits undocumented immigrants, who entered the U.S. before December 31, 2011 and who do not have a serious criminal record, to apply for a Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status. This would permit an individual to work legally in the U.S. for any employer. RPI status would last for a 6-year term that is renewable if the worker has not committed any acts that would render the worker deportable.

The Senate bill is likely to undergo changes as other U.S. Senators and constituents weigh in on this important bill. A House bill is also expected to be unveiled soon. If the bills can pass their respective chambers, then bicameral negotiations would begin in an attempt to pass a final comprehensive immigration reform bill for the President to sign into law.

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Will Nonprofit Hospitals Disappear Under Obamacare?

LRLOGO

It seems everyone has an opinion on Obamacare, officially the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act. The good, the bad and the ugly have been exposed at the individual patient level. But as the January 1, 2014 implementation date approaches, how will the law affect hospitals, and what ramifications will it have on their patients and communities?

Some Wall Street analysts are now bullish on investing in hospital systems, betting that more people covered by insurance equates to more paying patients and thus more revenue, speaking, of course about for profit institutions.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 85 percent of people in the U.S. –over 260 million—were covered by insurance in 2011, with about 32 percent of that number on government health insurance such as Medicare or Medicaid. If, as planned, “everyone” will be covered under PPACA, another 46.5 million patients will obviously make a significant financial impact on the healthcare system.

How will this dynamic affect the nation’s roughly 2,900 nonprofit hospitals? These hospitals have long enjoyed tax exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service under 501(c)(3) relying on the common law definition of charity, where the promotion of health is considered a charitable endeavor. These nonprofit institutions provide charitable, or uncompensated care as well as a host of other services that qualify them as nonprofit, and hence, federal tax exempt entities.

Requirements and guidelines

Nonprofit hospitals have always been required to meet certain parameters to maintain their tax exempt status. Providing a certain level of charity care and using surplus funds to offer continuing education for healthcare professionals, conduct medical research and run preventive health outreach programs in their communities are a few examples.

Under the new law, a rigorous new provision in section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code called subsection (r) goes into effect regarding treatment of uninsured patients. Although not spelled out with specific IRS guidance as of yet, failure to comply can result in a new $50,000 annual excise tax.

Four new requirements must now be met in order for hospitals to maintain their tax exempt status with the IRS. Here is a brief synopsis of each:

1. Community health needs assessment
Hospitals must produce a community health needs assessment based on an assessment done every three years. Specific terms spell out everything that must be included in this document, such as the sources used to conduct the assessment and methods employed, input from community representatives, a prioritized description of the community’s health needs and of existing local healthcare facilities and other resources. This written community healthcare assessment must be widely available. A written implementation strategy to meet the needs identified in the community health needs assessment is also required.

2) Financial assistance policy
Hospitals must create a written financial assistance policy. It must be widely publicized and include eligibility criteria and whether assistance includes free or discounted care, how amounts charged are calculated, how to apply and what documentation will be used to determine qualification. It’s worth noting that there is no correlation between the community health needs assessment and the financial assistance plan requirements. In other words, a hospital does not have to tailor its financial assistance plan to the findings of the community health needs assessment.

3) Limitations on charges
In the past, it was common practice for hospitals to charge uninsured patients substantially more for care than their insured counterparts. They must now limit charges for emergency or medically necessary care to the rates generally billed to insured individuals. They cannot charge more than the gross charges for non-emergency care. One of two prescribed methods for determining amounts billed must be used: one based on past payments by Medicare fee-for-service or Medicare FFS plus private health insurers’ payments; or an estimate of the amount the hospital would be paid by Medicare and a Medicare beneficiary for the care if the patient was a Medicare FFS beneficiary.

Patients not eligible for financial assistance, or those who have not submitted an application for assistance, may still be charged gross charges for all (not just emergency) hospital care.

4) Billing and collections practices
The PPACA prohibits hospitals from engaging in extraordinary collections actions in certain instances. “Extraordinary collections actions” relate to obtaining payment of a bill for care covered under the hospital’s financial assistance plan that requires legal or judicial process. Hospitals cannot report adverse information to consumer credit reporting agencies if an individual qualifies for the financial assistance plan. And, selling debt of individuals on the financial assistance plan is prohibited.

Hospitals have to make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual qualifies under the financial assistance plan before engaging in extraordinary collections efforts, including notifying individuals about the financial assistance plan, providing assistance to an individual who submits an incomplete application and determining and documenting whether an individual qualifies for the plan. The hospital may use extraordinary collections actions if all of these requirements are met.

Nonprofit hospitals on the line

Some nonprofit hospitals are being consolidated and acquired by larger for profit systems. Although not tax exempt, it’s been shown that for profit systems typically provide a comparable amount of charity care as nonprofit hospitals do.

Nonprofit hospitals should be advised that the new PPACA requirements will play a significant role in how they operate and report, specifically when it comes to billing and collections for services provided to the uninsured. The new law leaves many gray areas and hospitals themselves will have to establish eligibility criteria for financial assistance. Following the new procedures as best they can will ensure the best chance of maintaining their tax exempt status.

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Supreme Court Finds Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Mooted By Offer Of Judgment

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In a traditional lawsuit, when a defendant offers a plaintiff the full amount the plaintiff seeks, that generally ends the litigation because the plaintiff no longer has a justiciable interest in the matter.  On April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court held in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk that a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) affords no exception to that rule.

Symczyk, a registered nurse, sued her former employer, Genesis Healthcare Corporation, a nursing home operator, for allegedly automatically deducting a half hour’s pay for lunch breaks irrespective of whether an employee took one.  Symczyk brought her claim as a collective action under the FLSA, which requires that similarly situated employees must opt in to the action in order to be represented by the plaintiff.

Two months after Symczyk filed her complaint, Genesis offered her full recovery on her claim, plus attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  The offer gave Symczyk 10 days in which to respond.  Symczyk failed to respond within 10 days, after which Genesis moved to dismiss on the ground of mootness.  The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that no other plaintiffs had joined the action and that Symczyk’s individual claim was moot because she could not recover more than Genesis had offered her.  The Third Circuit reversed.  Although it found that the settlement offer mooted Symczyk’s individual claim, it ruled that the defendant’s strategy nonetheless frustrated the FLSA’s goals by “short circuit[ing]” the collective action process.

On April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed.

In doing so, the majority declined to reach the question of whether Symczyk’s individual claim had been mooted by virtue of an unaccepted offer, finding that the question had been waived:

[W]e do not reach this question, or resolve the split, because the issue is not properly before us.  The Third Circuit clearly held in this case that respondent’s individual claim was moot….  Moreover, … [i]n the District Court, respondent conceded that “[a]n offer of complete relief will generally moot the [plaintiff ’s] claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.”  Respondent made a similar concession in her brief to the Court of Appeals, and failed to raise the argument in her brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.  We, therefore, assume, without deciding, that petitioners’ Rule 68 offer mooted respondent’s individual claim.

Relying on Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the majority concluded that the District Court properly dismissed the case because “respondent has no personal interest in representing putative unnamed claimants or any other continuing interest” and thus “respondent’s interest became moot when her individual claim became moot.”  Justice Thomas concluded by noting that the claims of employees other than Symczyk had not been extinguished:  “While settlement may have the collateral effect of foreclosing un-joined claimants from having their rights vindicated in respondent’s suit, such putative plaintiffs remain free to vindicate their rights in their own suits.  They are no less able to have their claims settled or adjudicated following respondent’s suit than if her suit had never been filed at all.”

Justice Kagan’s dissent took the majority to task for relying on legal errors that she believes the lower courts had committed and the plaintiff had not challenged below:

The Court today resolves an imaginary question, based on a mistake the courts below made about this case and others like it.  The issue here, the majority tells us, is whether a ‘collective action’ brought under the [FLSA] ‘is justiciable when the lone plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot.’  Embedded within that question is a crucial premise: that the individual claim has become moot, as the lower courts held and the majority assumes without deciding.  But what if that premise is bogus?  What if the plaintiff’s individual claim here never became moot? …. Feel free to relegate the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind: The situation it addresses should never again arise.

She then proceeded to offer her answer to the question the majority had declined to reach:

[A]n unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case. When a plaintiff rejects such an offer—however good the terms—her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before.  And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief.  An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect….  Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle….  So assuming the case was live before—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief—the litigation carries on, unmooted.

She concluded by complaining that allowing a defendant to “eliminate the entire suit by acceding to a defendant’s proposal to make only the named plaintiff whole … would short-circuit a collective action before it could begin, and thereby frustrate Congress’s decision to give FLSA plaintiffs the opportunity to proceed collectively.”

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Business Groups Applaud Expected Compromise on Comprehensive Immigration Reform

GT Law

The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC)*, a coalition of businesses, trade associations, and other industry organizations concerned with the shortage of lesser skilled and unskilled labor, and the TechServe Alliance, an industry group that represents IT & engineering interests before the U.S. Congress and other policymakers, have recently released statements applauding the bipartisan effort to craft a comprehensive immigration reform bill. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, which many expect will be formally introduced shortly, was spearheaded by the “Gang of Eight” – namely Senators Rubio, Flake, McCain, Graham, Schumer, Menendez, Bennet and Durbin – and includes proposals for granting legal status to undocumented immigrants, requiring all U.S. employers to use an electronic employment eligibility verification system, creating a new less-skilled worker visa program, and permitting IT staffing firms to retain access to the H-1B visa program.

To view a summary of the provisions included in The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, please click here. To read EWIC and TechServe Alliance’s statements about the new legislation, respectively, please click here and here.

* Laura Foote Reiff, Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig’s Business Immigration and Compliance practice, is a co-founder of EWIC.

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Final Rule for Physician Payments Sunshine Act Recently Released

McBrayer

The long-awaited final regulations for the Physician Payments Sunshine Act (“Sunshine Act” or “Act”) were finally released on February 1, 2013. I previously discussed the Sunshine Act (see Here Comes the Sun, Are you Prepared?,10/18/2012), but with the final rule now implemented, providers should take a second look at it and reconsider its implications.

The Act requires applicable manufacturers of drugs, devices, biological, or medical supplies covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) to report payments or transfers of value provided to physicians or teaching hospitals. Additionally, applicable manufacturers and group purchasing organizations (“GPOs”) must annually report to CMS certain information regarding ownership or investment interests held by physicians (or their immediate family members).

The Act was proposed in December 2011 and CMS had expected to issue the final rule by the end of 2012. However, due to the overwhelming number of remarks received during the comments period from concerned providers, manufacturers, and GPOs, the Act took considerably more time to become final.

The final rule addresses some of the concerns raised through the comments period, but certainly not all. One of the biggest revisions is to exempt speaker fees for accredited and certified CME programs from the reporting requirements. There are several other exemptions from the reporting requirements, including, but not limited to:

  • over-the-counter drugs and class I and II medical devices (such as elastic bandages and suture materials)
  • incidental items worth less than $10 (e.g., pens and note pads) as well as general food and drinks offered to all participants at conferences or large-scale events
  • gifts or payments valued at less than $10 — unless the aggregate amount paid to the physician exceeds $100 annually
  • educational materials and items intended for use by or with patients

Additionally, the final rule makes numerous changes to definitions included in the proposed rule and adds several new terms.

The estimated costs, as stated by CMS, for the manufacturers and GPOs to comply with the Act is $269 million for the first year, with costs thereafter estimated to be $180 million.  CMS estimates physicians will expend $250 during the first year for compliance, but many stakeholders have expressed the opinion that this is grossly underestimated.

The applicable manufacturers and group purchasing organizations are required to start collecting data on August 1, 2013. This data must be formalized in a report to CMS by March 31, 2014. The data is set to appear on a public website by September 30, 2014.

The final rule still creates a great deal of uncertainty. It is highly recommended that providers consider their existing relationships and revisit the Act when creating new ones. They should take time to review internal policies and examine all contacts for conflicts of interest.

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Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Capitalized Legal Fees Incurred by Pharmaceutical Company

 

McDermottLogo_2c_rgbIn a recently released Field Attorney Advice, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of Chief Counsel concluded that a pharmaceutical company must capitalize legal fees incurred to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval for marketing and selling generic drugs and to prevent the marketing and sale of a competing generic drug.  The IRS Office of Chief Counsel also concluded that it could impose an adjustment on audit to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer expensed in prior years, including years closed by statute of limitations.

In a recently published Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Field Attorney Advice (FAA 20131001F, March 8, 2013), the IRS Office of Chief Counsel concluded that a pharmaceutical company must capitalize legal fees incurred to obtain U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for marketing and selling new generic drugs and to prevent the marketing and sale of a competing generic drug.  The IRS also concluded that the Commissioner could change the taxpayer’s method of accounting for the legal fees and impose an adjustment on audit to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer expensed in prior years, including years closed by the statute of limitations.

NDA and ANDA

In order to market or sell a new drug in the United States, a New Drug Application (NDA) must be submitted to and approved by the FDA.  An NDA consists of clinical and nonclinical data on the drug’s safety and effectiveness, as well as a full description of the methods, facilities and quality controls employed during manufacturing and packaging.  An NDA also must disclose all the patents that cover the drug.

To market or sell a generic version of an existing FDA-approved drug, the maker of the generic drug must submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for FDA approval.  An ANDA generally is not required to include preclinical and clinical trial data to establish safety and effectiveness.  Instead, an ANDA applicant must show that its generic drug is bioequivalent to an existing drug.  In addition, an ANDA applicant is required to provide certification that the ANDA will not infringe on the patent rights of a third party.  Specifically, if an applicant seeks approval prior to the expiration of patents listed by the NDA holder, then a “paragraph IV certification” must be submitted by the applicant to certify that it believes its product or the use of its product does not infringe on the third party’s patents, or that such patents are not valid or enforceable.  The first generic drug applicant that files an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification is granted, upon approval, 180 days of marketing exclusivity.

For an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, the applicant must send notices to the NDA holder for the referenced drug and to all patentees of record for the listed patents within 20 days of FDA notification that the ANDA is accepted for filing.  If neither the NDA holder nor the patent holders bring an infringement lawsuit against the ANDA applicant within 45 days, the FDA may approve the ANDA.  If the NDA holder or the patent holders file a patent infringement lawsuit against the ANDA applicant within 45 days, a stay prevents the FDA from approving the ANDA for up to 30 months.  If, however, the patent infringement litigation is still ongoing after the 30 months, the FDA may approve the ANDA.

The Facts

The taxpayer is a pharmaceutical company engaged in developing, manufacturing, marketing, selling and distributing generic and brand name drugs.  In the process of filing ANDAs with a paragraph IV certification, the taxpayer incurred legal fees in lawsuits filed by patent and NDA holders for patent infringement.  In addition, the taxpayer as an NDA holder incurred legal fees in a lawsuit it filed against an ANDA applicant with a paragraph IV certification to protect its right to sell its branded drug until all patents expired.  The taxpayer sought to deduct its legal fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses.

The IRS Analysis

Legal Fees Incurred in the Process of Obtaining FDA Approval of ANDAs

The IRS concluded that the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer as an ANDA applicant to defend actions for patent infringement in the process of filing the ANDA with paragraph IV certification must be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4.  The IRS characterized the fees as incurred to facilitate the taxpayer obtaining the FDA-approved ANDAs with paragraph IV certification, which granted the applicant the right to market and sell a generic drug before the expiration of the patents covering the branded drugs, and by filing early, potentially with a 180-day exclusivity period.  As such, the IRS concluded, the fees are required to be capitalized as amounts paid to create or facilitate the creation of an intangible under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(5).  In so concluding, the IRS rejected the taxpayer’s argument that its fees did not facilitate obtaining FDA-approved ANDAs because it could have commercialized its generic drugs after the 30-month stay expired regardless of the outcome of the lawsuits.  The IRS reasoned that the filing of the ANDAs with paragraph IV certification and the defense of the patent infringement lawsuit were a part of a series of steps undertaken in pursuit of a single plan to create an intangible.

The IRS further concluded that the cost recovery of the capitalized legal fees incurred to obtain the FDA-approved ANDAs must be suspended until the FDA approves the ANDAs, and the capitalized fees must be amortized on a straight-line basis over 15 years as section 197 intangibles.

Legal Fees Incurred to Protect Its Right Against Other ANDA Applicants with Paragraph IV Certification

With respect to the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer as an NDA holder in the litigation against another ANDA applicant, the IRS characterized the fees incurred to defend the validity of the patents owned by the taxpayer as amounts paid to defend or perfect title to intangible property that are required to be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(9).  In contrast, the fees incurred by the taxpayer in the litigation relating to determining whether valid patents have been infringed are not required to be capitalized under Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(9).

The IRS further concluded that the capitalized fees incurred to protect the patents and the FDA-approved NDA must be added to the basis of the patents to be depreciated under section 167.  The cost recovery begins in the months in which the legal fees were incurred and is allocated over the remaining useful lives of the patents.

In characterizing the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer in defending the validity of its patents as costs of defending or perfecting title to intangible property, the IRS distinguished the legal fees at issue from the litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayers in defending a claim that their patents were invalid in Urquhart v. Comm’r, 215 F.2d 17 (3rd Cir. 1954).  In Urquhart, the taxpayers were participants in a joint venture that was engaged in the business of inventing and licensing patents.  The taxpayers obtained two patents involving fire-fighting equipment and, after threatening litigation against Pyrene Manufacturing Company, brought an infringement suit against a customer of Pyrene, seeking an injunction and recovery of profits and damages.  The case was dismissed, and Pyrene subsequently commenced an action against the taxpayers seeking a judgment that the taxpayers’ patents were invalid and that its own apparatus and methods did not infringe the patents.  A counterclaim was filed for an injunction against infringement, and an accounting for profits and damages.  Pyrene did not raise any questions as to title to, or ownership of, the patents and was successful in the lawsuit.  The patents held by the taxpayers were found to be invalid.  In holding that the legal fees incurred by the taxpayer were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the IRS’s contention that the litigation was for the defense or protection of title.

Distinguishing the FAA from Urquhart, the IRS focused on the fact that the taxpayers in Urquhart were professional inventors engaged in the business of exploiting and licensing patents, and that Urquhart involved the taxpayers’ claims for recovering lost profits.  By emphasizing that Pyrene did not raise any issue as to title to the patents in Urquhart, the IRS seemed to ignore the fact that, like the taxpayer in the FAA, Pyrene sought a judgment on the validity of the taxpayers’ patents and that the outcome of the litigation in Urquhart also focused on the validity of the patents.

Change of Accounting Method for Legal Fees Incurred by the Taxpayer 

The IRS also concluded that the taxpayer’s treatment of its legal fess associated with each ANDA or patent as either deductible or capitalizable is a method of accounting that the Commissioner can change on an ANDA-by-ANDA or patent-by-patent basis.  The consequence of this conclusion, if valid, is that the IRS can impose on audit an adjustment to capitalize legal fees that the taxpayer deducted in prior years, including years closed by the statute of limitations.  For example, the IRS can include in the taxpayer’s gross income for the earliest year under examination an adjustment equal to the amount of the legal fees the taxpayer previously deducted, less the amount of amortization that the taxpayer properly could have taken had the taxpayer capitalized the legal fees.

A taxpayer that voluntarily changes its method of accounting, however, receives more favorable terms and conditions than a taxpayer that has its method of accounting changed by the IRS on examination.  For example, a taxpayer that changes its method of accounting voluntarily can spread the adjustment resulting from the change over four taxable years, and the first year of the adjustment is the current taxable year as opposed to the earliest open taxable year.

The publication of this FAA likely will bring the attention of examining agents to this issue.  Therefore, if a taxpayer believes it is using an improper method of accounting for legal fees (or any other item), it should carefully consider whether to voluntarily change its method of accounting before the IRS proposes to change the taxpayer’s method of accounting on examination.

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SEC Staff Meets with IRS to Discuss Tax Implications of a Floating Net Asset Value (NAV)

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SEC staff recently met with staff members of the IRS to discuss the tax implications of adopting a floating net asset value (NAV) for money market funds. The discussion centered on the tax treatment of small gains and losses for investors in money market funds, and the IRS reportedly told the SEC there is limited flexibility in interpreting current tax law. A floating NAV could require individual and institutional investors to regard every money market fund transaction as a potentially taxable event.

Investors would have to determine how to match purchases and redemptions for purposes of calculating gains, losses and share cost basis. The SEC reached out to the IRS as it continues to consider measures, including a floating NAV, to enable money market funds to better withstand severe market disruptions.

For additional discussion of money market reform, please see “SEC Debates on Money Market Reforms Continue” in our January 2013 and October 2012 updates.

Sources: John D. Hawke, Jr., Economic Consequences of Proposals to Require Money Market Funds to ‘Float’ Their NAV, SEC Comment Letter File No. 4-619, November 2, 2012; Christopher Condon and Dave Michaels, SEC Said to Discuss Floating NAV for Money Funds with IRS, Bloomberg, March 7, 2013; Joe Morris, SEC Sounding Out IRS on Floating NAV, Ignites, March 7, 2013.

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U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Grants No-Action Relief for End Users from Swap Reporting Requirements

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On April 9, 2013, the Division of Market Oversight of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a no-action letter delaying the swap reporting compliance deadlines for end users and other swap counterparties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants (non-SD/MSP counterparties).  The relief provided to market participants is effective immediately.

The CFTC had issued regulations setting forth various reporting requirements for swap transactions (Part 43 — real-time reporting for swap transactions, Part 45 — transactional data reporting to a registered swap data repository, and Part 46 — historical swap data reporting) of the CFTC’s regulations. The rules had established a deadline of April 10, 2013 for swap counterparties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants (non SD/MSP counterparties). Citing implementation concerns involving technological and operational capabilities, a number of market participants requested that the Division of Market Oversight provide a six-month extension of the compliance deadline.  The CFTC’s April 9 no-action  letter does not grant the full six-month extension requested, but provides certain time-limited no action relief to nonSD/MSP swap counterparties as described below.

1.          No-Action Relief for Reporting of Interest Rate and Credit Swaps

The letter extends no-action relief for end users’ interest and credit swaps reporting untilJuly 1, 2013.  However, non SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), must comply with reporting requirements under Part 43 and 45 on April 10, 2013.

2.         No-Action Relief for Reporting of Equity, Foreign Exchange and other Commodity Swaps

The no-action relief for end users who engage in swaps in other asset classes (e.g., equity, foreign exchange, and other commodities) is extended until August 19, 2013.  For non-SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), the no-action relief extends until May 29, 2013.

3.         No-Action Relief for Historical Swap Data Reporting Under Part 46

The letter also extends no-action relief to end users’ Part 46 historical swap data reporting for all swap asset classes until October 31, 2013.  For non SD/MSP swap counterparties that are “financial entities,” as defined in Section 2(h)(7)(C), the Part 46 no-action relief extends until September 30, 2013.  Any pre-enactment or transition swap entered into prior to 12:01 a.m. on April 10, 2013 is reportable as a historical swap.

4.         Compliance Date for Recordkeeping Obligations has not been Extended

The letter also confirms that the no-action relief provided for reporting requirements doesnot impact any Dodd-Frank-related recordkeeping obligations applicable to SDs, MSPs or end users.  Thus, for historical swaps, end users must maintain records under the Part 46 rules for any such swaps entered into prior to April 10, 2013.   With respect to swaps entered into on or after April 10, end users must maintain records under the Part 43 and 45 rules, and obtain a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier for this purpose by April 10, 2013.

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Employee’s Deactivation Of Facebook Account Leads To Sanctions

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The latest Facebook case highlights how courts now intend to hold parties accountable when it comes to preserving their personal social media accounts during litigation.  Recently, a federal court ruled that a plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account during discovery constituted spoliation of evidence and warranted an “adverse inference” instruction against him at trial.  Gatto v. United Airlines and Allied Aviation Servs., et al. , No. 10-CV-1090 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).

The plaintiff, a ground operations supervisor at JFK Airport, allegedly suffered permanent disabling injuries from an accident at work which he claimed limited his physical and social activities.  Defendants sought discovery related to Plaintiff’s damages, including documents related to his social media accounts.

Although Plaintiff provided Defendants with the signed authorization for release of information from certain social networking sites and other online services such as eBay, he failed to provide an authorization for his Facebook account.  The magistrate judge ultimately ordered Plaintiff to execute the Facebook authorization, and Plaintiff agreed to change his Facebook password and to disclose the password to defense counsel for the purpose of accessing documents and information from Facebook.  Defense counsel briefly accessed the account and printed some portion of the Facebook home page.  Facebook then notified Plaintiff that an unfamiliar IP address had accessed his account.   Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff “deactivated” his account, causing Facebook to permanently delete the account 14 days later in accordance with its policy.

Defendants moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions, claiming that the lost Facebook postings contradicted Plaintiff’s claims about his restricted social activities.  In response, Plaintiff argued that he had acted reasonably in deactivating his account because he did know it was defense counsel accessing his page.  Moreover, the permanent deletion was the result of Facebook’s “automatically” deleting it.  The court, however, found that the Facebook account was within Plaintiff’s control, and that “[e]ven if Plaintiff did not intend to deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account,” which resulted in the permanent loss of  relevant evidence.  Thus, the court granted Defendants’ request for an “adverse inference” instruction (but declined to award legal fees as a further sanction).

The Gatto decision not only affirms that social media is discoverable by employers, but also teaches that plaintiffs who fail to preserve relevant social media data will face harsh penalties.  Employers are reminded to specifically seek relevant social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn accounts) in their discovery requests since such sources may provide employers with sufficient evidence to rebut an employee’s claims.  This case also serves as a reminder and a warning to employers that the principles of evidence preservation apply to social media, and employers should take steps very early in the litigation to preserve its own social media content as it pertains to the matter.

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Second Circuit Bars Criminal Defendant from Accessing Assets Frozen by Regulators

Katten Muchin

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld a district court’s refusal to release nearly $4 million in assets frozen by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to help a defendant fund his criminal defense.

Stephen Walsh, a defendant in a criminal fraud case, had requested the release of $3.7 million in assets stemming from the sale of a house that had been seized by regulators in a parallel civil enforcement action. In denying Walsh’s motion to access the frozen funds, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government had shown probable cause that the proceeds had been tainted by defendant’s fraud, and were therefore subject to forfeiture. Though Walsh and his wife had purchased the home in question using funds unrelated to the fraud, Walsh ultimately acquired title to the home pursuant to a divorce settlement in exchange for a $12.5 million distributive award paid to his wife, at least $6 million of which, according to the court, was traceable to the fraud.

Agreeing with the District Court, the Second Circuit found that although the house itself was not a fungible asset, it was “an asset purchased with” the tainted funds from the marital estate by operation of the divorce agreement and affirmed the denial of defendant’s request. Further, since Walsh’s assets did not exceed $6 million at the time of his arrest, under the Second Circuit’s “drugs-in, first-out” approach, all of his assets became traceable to the fraud.

U.S. v. Stephen Walsh, No. 12-2383-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2013).

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