Category: Administrative & Regulatory

Department of Labor (DOL) Issues Model Notices to Employees Describing Health Insurance Exchanges

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Deadline to Provide Notices is October 1, 2013

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the new health care reform law passed in 2010, requires many employers to notify their employees of the availability of health coverage under the new health insurance exchanges that are required to be operational effective January 1, 2014. All employers subject to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act must provide this notice, regardless of whether the employer currently offers health coverage to its employees. Employers must provide the notice to all full and part-time employees (but not to dependents).

On May 8, 2013, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued model notices for employers to use in satisfying these requirements. A copy of the notice for employers that offer health coverage is available here and a copy of the notice for employers that do not offer health coverage is available here.

Employers are free to modify the model notices provided that the notices, as modified, continue to satisfy the content requirements set forth in the PPACA. Employers must provide the notices to their existing employees no later than October 1, 2013. Employees hired on or after October 1, 2013 must receive the notice no later than 14 days after their hire date.

The notices may be provided by first class mail or electronically if the DOL’s electronic disclosure rules are met.

Model COBRA Notice

Additionally, the DOL updated its model COBRA notice for use by employers in notifying employees of their rights to continue (after certain losses of coverage) coverage under the employer’s health plan. The updated model notice contains information about the new health insurance exchanges. A copy of the updated model notice is available here.

Is Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Setting Its Sights on Hydraulic Fracturing Compounds?

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Agency implements rule requiring companies to disclose information regarding the use of certain industrial chemical substances commonly used in natural gas and oil well drilling.

On May 9, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a Direct Final Rule[1] identifying 15 chemical substances[2] that will require notice prior to manufacturing, importing, or processing for an activity designated as a significant new use. These chemicals were flagged pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) significant new use rules (SNURs). The notices, referred to as Significant New Use Notices (SNUNs), must be submitted to EPA 90 days before a listed chemical is manufactured, imported, or processed for an activity designated as a significant new use. EPA states that this will provide the agency with an opportunity to evaluate the intended use and determine whether it is necessary under TSCA to prohibit or limit the activity before it occurs.

While chemicals in the rule include those that can be employed in a broad range of uses, of particular interest is the listing of one compound[3] used in natural gas and oil well drilling and hydraulic fracturing to eliminate bacteria in the water that produce corrosive by-products. EPA included this compound due to its potential toxicity to aquatic life at concentrations above 11 parts per billion (ppb). Pursuant to the Direct Final Rule, 40 C.F.R. Part 721, Subpart E [Significant New Uses for Specific Chemical Substances] is expected to be amended to include section 721.10666, which would require reporting and associated recordkeeping obligations for the following significant new uses of this compound:

  • Industrial, commercial, and consumer activities other than as described in the original premanufacture notice (PMN) for this substance (PMN P-12-437)
  • Release to water resulting in surface water concentrations exceeding 11 ppb

EPA also recommended additional testing to help characterize the fate and environmental effects of the substance.

This is in line with EPA’s declared intent to use TSCA to require companies to disclose information regarding chemical substances and mixtures used in hydraulic fracturing. However, it has been nearly two years since the agency, partly in response to a petition filed by Earthjustice, stated that it would propose rules to require certain reporting requirements for chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing.

Under TSCA, SNUNs must contain the following:

  • Common or trade name of the chemical substance
  • The chemical identity and molecular structure of the chemical substance
  • The categories or proposed categories of use
  • The total amount of each chemical substance manufactured or processed per category or use
  • A description of by-products resulting from the manufacture, processing, use, or disposal of each such chemical substance or mixture
  • All existing data concerning the environmental and health effects of the substance
  • Estimates of the number of people exposed in their places of employment and the duration of such exposure
  • Changes in disposal methods
  • Any test data in the possession or control of the person giving the notice that is prescribed by EPA

Accordingly, while this rule does not implement a broad reporting requirement for hydraulic fracturing chemicals, it points to the likelihood of increased reporting for these substances. What is unclear, for the moment, is whether this new rule is a stopgap measure or a preview to a comprehensive proposal for TSCA reporting requirements for hydraulic fracturing chemicals.

The rule is effective on July 8, 2013, unless written “adverse or critical” comments on any of the SNURs, including potential alternatives and likely financial burdens, are received on or before June 10, 2013. Those chemical substance(s) and new use that receive comments or notice of intent to comment will be withdrawn before the effective date and a proposed SNUR for the specific chemical substance will be issued with a 30-day comment period. For purposes of judicial review, the rule is promulgated on May 23, 2013.

The rule highlights the need for firms using TSCA-listed chemicals for new and innovative technologies to bear in mind the PMN and SNUR implications for their applications. Additionally, the hydraulic fracturing industry should carefully watch for potential regulation of additional substances used in fracturing fluids.

[1]. View the Direct Final Rule here.

[2]. The chemical substances and associated PMNs subject to this Direct Final Rule are as follows:

  • Methylenebis[isocyanatobenzene], polymer with alkanedoic acid, alkylene glycols, alkoxylated alkanepolyol, and substituted trialkoxysilane (generic). PMN No. P-11-60.
  • Acetaldehyde, substituted-, reaction products with 2- butyne-1, 4-diol (generic). PMN No. P-11-204.
  • Functionalized multi-walled carbon nanotubes (generic). PMN No. P-12-44.
  • Alkenedioic acid dialkyl ester, reaction products with alkenoic acid alkyl esters and diamine (generic). PMN Nos. P-12-408, P-12-409, P-12-410, P-12-411, P-12-412, and P-12-413.
  • 2-Propenoic acid, (2- ethyl-2-methyl-1,3-dioxolan-4-yl)methyl ester. PMN No. P-12-414.
  • Quaternary ammonium compounds, bis(fattyalkyl) dimethyl, salts with tannins (generic). PMN No. P-12-437.
  • Slimes and sludges, aluminum and iron casting, wastewater treatment, and solid waste. PMN No. P-12-560.
  • Trisodium diethylene triaminepolycarboxylate (generic). PMN No. P-13-18
  • Tertiary amine alkyl ether (generic). PMN No. P-13-78.
  • Bromine, manufacture of, by-products from, distillation residues. PMN No. P-13-108.

A generic name was provided if the specific chemical substance named was claimed as confidential business information.

[3]. The “quaternary ammonium compounds, bis(fattyalkyl)dimethyl, salts with tannins (generic).”

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California Requires Many Foreign Corporations To Send Annual Financial Statements To Shareholders

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California is a net exporter of corporate charters, but it remains home to many corporations. As a result, the California Corporations Code has a preternatural concern with foreign corporations.

One example is Section 1501(a) which requires the board to cause an annual report to be sent to shareholders.  This report must include a balance sheet as of year end and an income statement and statement of cash flows for the year.  The statute doesn’t require that the statements be audited, but if an independent accountant has issued a report, then that report must be sent along as well.  If there is no report, then the report must include a certificate of an authorized officer that the statements were prepared without audit from the books and records of the corporation.  If the corporation has fewer than 100 holders of record (determined in accordance with Section 605), the financial statements need not be prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if the statements reasonably set forth the assets and liabilities and income and expense of the corporation and disclose the accounting basis used in their preparation.

The report must be sent not later than 120 days after the close of the fiscal year and must be sent at least 15 days (or, if sent by third class mail, 35 days) prior to the annual meeting of shareholders held during the following fiscal year.  Cal. Corp. § 1501(a)(1) & (2).

This requirement applies to domestic corporations, a term that embraces any corporation formed under the laws of California.  Cal. Corp. § 1501(g).  Thus, it includes corporations not formed under the General Corporation Law. See Cal. Corp. Code § 167.  However, a corporation with less than 100 holders of record (determined in accordance with Section 605) may include a bylaw provision that waives the annual report requirement.

The statute also applies to any foreign corporation if the corporation has its principal executive offices in California or it customarily holds meetings of its board in California.  Cal. Corp. § 1501(g).

Publicly traded companies are not exempted per se from this requirement.  However, corporations with an outstanding class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 will satisfy the annual report requirement if they comply with Rule 14a-16 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16).  Cal. Corp. § 1501(a)(4).  [Note that this statute purports to include future amendments and this may give rise to a constitutional problem, see Why Incorporation May Be Unconstitutional.]

Here is a flow-chart describing the application of the statute.  This is probably a good time to remind readers that this blog does not provide legal advice.  There are other requirements in Section 1501 (including possible quarterly reporting requirements) that are not covered in today’s post.  Moreover, there are other nuances that I’ve not mentioned.

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Second Circuit Certifies Smoking-Related Medical Monitoring Issue for Ruling by New York High Court

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In an effort to clarify the availability and scope of medical monitoring claims under New York law, the Second Circuit last week certified to the New York State Court of Appeals questions relating to whether smokers who have not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease may bring a stand-alone claim against a tobacco company for medical monitoring. The Court of Appeals’ decision will likely have broad implications for toxic tort cases involving allegations of potential health effects.

The action was brought by long-term smokers who had not contracted lung cancer. They alleged that Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc. knew that it was feasible to develop a less carcinogenic cigarette, but deliberately designed its product to deliver an excessive amount of carcinogens when smoked. As relief for their claims of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty, the plaintiffs sought funding for a medical monitoring program to address their increased risk of lung cancer.

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s motion to dismiss the smokers’ claims of negligence, strict liability and breach-of-warranty claims. Rather than dismiss the request for medical monitoring outright, however, the Circuit judges asked the Court of Appeals to consider whether, under New York law, a current or former heavy smoker not diagnosed with smoking-related disease may pursue an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a disease. If the court determines that an independent cause of action for medical monitoring exists, the Second Circuit asked the court to then consider what the elements of that cause of action would be, what statute of limitations would apply, and when the cause of action would begin to accrue.

Although several New York courts have allowed medical monitoring damages as a remedy in connection with other claims, the Second Circuit noted that no New York court has directly addressed the questions it certified, and invited the Court of Appeals to expand on or alter those questions as it sees fit. Regardless of the result reached by the Court of Appeals, its decision in this matter will likely have far-reaching effects on the availability and scope of medical monitoring claims and remedies under New York law.

Seventh Circuit Addresses Obligations Regarding the Interactive Process under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

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A common scenario often faced by employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) involves an employee’s request for time off as a reasonable accommodation. In Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., No. 11-2880 (7th Cir, May 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals provides guidance in this area. There, the court explained that the employer was not liable under the ADA, even though it failed to engage in the interactive process, because the employee failed to show that the requested accommodation (a 30-day leave) would have resulted in her ability to perform the essential functions of the job.

Employee Two Weeks Shy of Leave Entitlement

Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI) provides 24-hour ground transportation services. Terri Basden was hired as a dispatcher in June, 2007. After numerous absences in 2007 and early 2008, she received a verbal warning for absences in March 2008 and a written warning for further absences in April 2008.

Basden provided doctors’ notes reflecting that she had been referred to a neurologist with a possible diagnosis of multiple sclerosis after emergency room tests showed brain abnormalities indicative of the disease. After several job transfers, Basden was granted a request for a part time position on May 1, 2008. She incurred additional absences in May which resulted in suspension. While on suspension, Basden submitted a request for a 30-day leave of absence due to “complications due to medical illness (MS).” PTI policy provides employees with one year of service may be eligible to take a 30-day, unpaid leave of absence. However, Basden had not been employed for one year. PTI denied her request for leave, and thereafter terminated Basden when she failed to return to work following her suspension.

Employee Could Not Show Leave Would Enable Her to Perform Essential Functions

Basden sued PTI, claiming that PTI violated the ADA by terminating her instead of accommodating her request for 30 days leave, that PTI failed to engage in the interactive accommodation process required by the ADA, and that PTI did not show that the requested leave was unreasonable. The district court granted summary judgment for PTI.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first observed that an employee’s request for an accommodation under the ADA requires the employer to engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. In this case, the employee requested a 30-day leave that, according to the employer’s policy, she would have been eligible for with two weeks’ additional seniority. The court noted that PTI’s response to this request, specifically, failing to engage in an interactive process, denying the leave, and terminating her, was not an appropriate employer response under the ADA.

However, the court held that PTI’s actions did not violate the ADA. The failure to engage in the interactive process is not an independent basis for liability under the statute, and in any event, such a failure is actionable only if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation. Thus, even if an employer fails to engage in the interactive process, that failure need not be considered if the employee fails to show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.

Here, PTI cited regular attendance as an essential function of Basden’s job. Yet, Basden did not demonstrate that she was able to come to work regularly at the time of her termination, or that her regular attendance could have been expected either following the requested leave or with any other accommodation. Therefore, the court held, summary judgment for PTI was appropriate on the ADA claim despite any shortcomings in PTI’s response to Basden’s request. (Basden also alleged violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which the court also affirmed summary judgment on because Basden had not worked for PTI for 12 months at the time of her leave request and thus was not eligible for leave under the statute.)

Identify and Document Essential Functions

Of course, employers should continue to comply with their obligations to engage in the interactive process. However, as this case suggests, the obligation to explore and provide accommodation does not necessarily extend to accommodations that are or would be futile and would not enable the employee to perform essential functions. This case highlights the importance of well-written job descriptions that clearly set forth essential job functions. An employer’s identification of and ability to prove essential functions of the job can be used to guide the interactive process and its obligations to provide accommodation under the ADA, and can play a key role in defending a lawsuit under the ADA.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) EB-5 Engagement with Securities and Exchange Commission

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On April 3, 2013, representatives from the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) participated with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in an EB-5 stakeholder conference call opened by Rob Silvers, counsel to the USCIS Director Mayorkas.  Present from the Staff were representatives from four Divisions – Corporation Finance, Trading and Markets, Investment Management and Enforcement.  The call was intended to provide general information to stakeholders.

In general, the Staff members confirmed the application of various securities laws to EB-5 programs.  For many in the EB-5 industry, the views expressed will be unwelcome news, as many have been operating under the assumption that some or all of the securities laws that apply to other investment programs do not apply to EB-5 programs.  For experienced securities lawyers working on EB-5 programs, however, the call broke no new ground but did serve as a confirmation of the advice we have been giving our clients.

Some notes about SEC Staff Interpretations

The Staff members on the call provided the standard disclaimer given in every public talk — that the views expressed represented their own and not necessarily those of the Commission as a whole.  Despite this disclaimer, Staff members are careful in their public speaking, and generally speak only considered views that have been adopted by the senior leadership of the SEC.

When considering Staff interpretations, it is important to note the structure of United States securities laws.  Federal securities laws represent various statutes passed by Congress and amended from time to time.[1] These laws frequently call upon the SEC to adopt formal implementing regulations.  In addition, the SEC Staff routinely provides informal interpretations of the securities laws and the regulations through various means.  In addition, all fifty states have their own securities laws, known as blue sky laws, and except in limited instances of federal preemption, these blue sky laws apply in addition to the federal laws.  Experienced securities lawyers will advise clients based on all of these sources of law.  However, not all of these sources of law have the same legal weight, and in particular, the views of the Staff do not necessarily represent positions that would ultimately prevail in a civil lawsuit brought by the SEC or a private plaintiff, or in a criminal action brought by the Department of Justice.  Nonetheless, the Staff’s views are often persuasive in court, and at a minimum, one can expect substantial legal expenses and regulatory entanglement from operating in a manner contrary to Staff interpretations.

Various speaker notes

The Division of Corporate Finance representative confirmed that federal securities laws apply to transactions in securities.  The SEC noted that the definition of “securities” is very broad, and likely includes most if not all of the investment vehicles used in the EB‑5 program.  The Securities Act of 1933 provides that all offers and sales of securities must be registered with the SEC unless an exemption from registration applies.  EB-5 offerings are frequently conducted in accordance with two exemptions — Regulation D, applicable to private placements of securities, and/or Regulation S, applicable to sales to non-U.S. persons.[2] Each of these exemptions has a number of requirements that must be satisfied.  The representative discussed an important condition of Regulation D – the prohibition on general solicitation (for example, advertising, publicly accessible web sites or conducting seminars where the general public is invited).  The representative noted that the SEC has proposed regulations under the JOBS Act to lift the ban on general solicitation in certain circumstances, but until such regulations are adopted, general solicitation will disqualify an offering from Regulation D.  The representative could not predict when such regulations will be adopted.  The representative noted an important caveat that an exemption from registration requirements does not mean that the offering is exempt from other provisions of the securities laws.  In particular, exempt offerings are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.

The Trading and Market Division representative focused on the laws requiring persons engaged in the business of engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others to register as broker-dealers.  The representative expressed a broad view of the types of conduct that trigger the requirement to register as a broker-dealer.  The representatives stated that in general, if someone is involved in the sale and offering of EB-5 investments and is compensated based on the success of the offering – a “salesman’s interest” in the program – that person is most likely engaging in brokerage activities which trigger the obligation to register as a broker-dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).  The representative also provided a very broad view of the jurisdiction of the SEC to enforce broker-dealer requirements for persons soliciting foreign investments.  In the view of the SEC Staff, any activities using United States means of commerce, such as telephone calls made from the U.S., are likely sufficient to invoke U.S. jurisdiction for activities that require broker-dealer registration, regardless of whether the investors are foreign persons.  In response to questions, the Staff representatives noted that:

  • the Staff does not believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. limiting the extra-territorial application of another section of the 1934 Act is an impediment to their enforcement activities, and
  • the broker-deal registration laws apply equally to solicitation of issuers (as opposed to investors) from within the United States.

The Trading and Market Division representative also discussed the applicability of broker-dealer registration laws to persons employed by Regional Centers to conduct offerings for the account of the Regional Center, and the availability of Rule 3a4-1 as a non-exclusive exemption from registration requirements for such persons.

The Investment Management Division representative addressed applicability of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 to EB-5 programs.  The representative noted that individuals and entities that do not fall into the broker-dealer category will often be required to register under the Investment Advisers Act if they provide investment advice for compensation.  The representative noted that anti-fraud provisions apply to investment advisors, and investment advisers have fiduciary duties to their clients, including the duty to disclose all conflicts of interest.

The representative also stated that Regional Centers which pool investments for third parties and that hold securities likely are investment companies that need to register under the Investment Company Act absent an available exemption.  The representative discussed three exemptions that might be available to Regional Centers:

  • the 3(c)(1) exemption for an investment company with no more than 100 investors that is not making a public offering;
  • the 3(c)(7) exemption for qualified purchases, who must meet a significantly higher net worth standard than accredited investors; and
  • the 3(a)(2) exemption for government securities, which may apply if the Regional Center is sponsored by a governmental agency.

The Division of Enforcement representative discussed the February 2013 enforcement action brought against the Chicago Convention Center project.  The representative focused on the allegations in that case that the defendants made false representations to USCIS as part of a scheme to defraud investors.  He noted that false statements about the ability of a project to create jobs may be fraudulent under the securities laws.  He also noted that anti-fraud provisions apply not only to misstatements but also to omissions of material information.

[1] Examples of amendments include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act.

[2] The SEC did not speak about state blue sky laws, as those are outside the SEC’s jurisdiction.  However, we note that some states do not have any exemption for programs that are excluded from federal registration requirements under Regulation S.  This is currently a significant issue for programs that do not comply with Regulation D, such as by employing general solicitation in the offer and sale of the securities.

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The Legal Challenge to the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Reporting Regulations

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In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the United States Congress required, inter alia, the SEC to promulgate regulations requiring certain manufacturers to trace the sources of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold that are contained in products they manufacture or contract to manufacture to allow them to report yearly to the SEC whether the products are “not DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] conflict free.” Conflict free was defined by Congress as meaning the products do not contain minerals that finance or benefit violent armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries. Congress required the SEC action because “it [was] the sense of Congress” that the exploitation of conflict minerals from that region was financing armed groups that engaged in “extreme levels of violence” creating “an emergency humanitarian situation.”

Various industry groups lobbied heavily against the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and later submitted comments during the SEC’s rulemaking challenging the proposed regulations’ due diligence and reporting obligations as unduly burdensome and costly. After considering the comments, the SEC, where it would not run afoul of the Congressional mandate, did reduce some of the burdens that would be imposed on industry. However, the SEC acknowledged that compliance with Congress’s intent precluded reduction of other burdensome aspects of the regulations. The SEC promulgated the regulations in August 2012.

In October, 2012, the National Association of Manufacturers, along with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, commenced a legal challenge to the conflict minerals regulations. Since then, voluminous briefs have been filed by NAM and the SEC along with briefs by numerous interested groups. These briefs outline the parameters of the dispute and suggest that NAM faces an uphill battle.

The crux of the industry’s challenge is that the SEC failed to properly quantify the benefits and costs associated with the regulations and thereby acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating them. NAM claims the reporting requirements will not aid the DRC and could cripple the region economically. It also claims that the SEC failed to agree to certain revisions that would have lessened the burdens and costs on business, like carving out a de minimus exemption for manufacturers whose products used only trace amounts of conflict minerals and predicating a burdensome due diligence requirement on whether a manufacturer had “reason to believe” that their products contained conflict minerals that may have originated in the DRC as opposed to whether the products “did originate” there. NAM asks the court to strike the entire regulation and send the SEC back to square one.

The SEC responds that it was not its responsibility to quantify the benefits of the regulations, noting that Congress had made that calculation and had determined that the benefits justified the reporting requirement Congress mandated. In fact, the SEC admitted it could not quantify the benefits because it lacked data to do so. Rather it performed a qualitative analysis. It also defends its rejection of NAM’s proposed revisions that would have reduced the costs of compliance. The SEC noted, and various members of Congress agreed, that Congress had considered and rejected the de minimus exemption because it would defeat the purpose of the rule. Congress concluded that thousands or millions of trace amounts can add up to a significant amount, the trade in which would undercut the rule’s purpose of stopping the flow of money to armed insurgents in the region. The second NAM proposal was rejected because in the SEC’s view, it would encourage willful blindness by industry. That is, if a business encountered a red flag suggesting the sources of its minerals were not conflict-free, it would investigate no further, so as to avoid a determination that they did originate there.

An interesting issue concerns the regulation’s imposition of the reporting requirements not just on manufacturers but also to those who contract for the manufacture of goods. NAM believes that this extension of the reporting requirements is contrary to the express language of Dodd-Frank. It supports its position through application of rules of construction routinely used in interpreting statutes and its argument is logical. However, former and current members of Congress came to the SEC’s aid on this issue claiming in their brief that they intended to include those who contract for the manufacturer of goods, again to prevent exemptions that would significantly undercut what the regulations sought to achieve.

Oral arguments are scheduled for May 15, 2013. It will be very interesting to see how receptive the panel from the DC Circuit is to NAM’s arguments. Asking the court to scuttle the entire regulation, the parameters of which Congress as a matter of policy framed, makes NAM’s challenge all the more difficult.

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International Trade Commission Rules Lack of Domestic Industry Results in a Termination of Investigation

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The International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent, quasi-judicial agency that adjudicates the importation of products that allegedly infringe U.S. intellectual property rights. The ITC can halt the importation of goods that infringe U.S. patents and/or trademarks, and thus is an effective tool for obtaining a relatively rapid determination of infringement (one year) and an exclusion order. One of the requirements for such an order is to prove harm to a domestic industry. The following case (ITC investigation 337-TA-874) is an example of one way that such an investigation can be defeated.

In a recent decision, the ITC ordered an investigation into whether certain laminated products infringed the claims of a nonpracticing entity’s (NPE) patent. In initiating the investigation, the ITC ordered the administrative law judge (ALJ) overseeing the investigation to hold a preliminary hearing and to issue a decision as to whether the NPE has the required domestic industry in the United States to bring an investigation before the ITC. A finding of a lack of domestic industry would result in a termination of the investigation, as the NPE would not have standing with the ITC. This is a departure from current ITC practice, and it may provide an effective tool for preventing NPEs from bringing frivolous suits before the ITC.

Under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), the ITC has jurisdiction to hear matters in which a party alleging infringement (the complainant) has, or is in the process of establishing, a domestic industry in the United States. The determination of domestic industry is a two-prong test. The first prong, referred to as the “technical prong,” requires the complainant to show that it is practicing a valid claim of each asserted patent in a product sold in the United States. The analysis of the technical prong is similar to an infringement analysis, in which each claim is compared to the domestic product.1 The second prong of the test, referred to as the “economic prong,” requires the complainant to demonstrate “(a) a significant investment in plant and equipment, (b) significant employment of labor and capital, or (c) a substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing.”2

The complaint in the present investigation (337-TA-874) was brought by Lamina Packaging Innovations, an NPE, against a group of companies including Hasbro, John Jameson Import Company, Cognac Ferrand USA, Inc. and Camus Wines & Spirits Group. In the investigation, Lamina Packaging alleged that the respondents were infringing two of Lamina’s patents directed to a packaging material. In initiating the investigation, the ITC ordered the ALJ to issue an initial determination as to whether Lamina has satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Further, the ITC stated that the initial determination would become the ITC’s final determination 30 days after the date of service of the initial determination. Accordingly, a finding of no domestic industry by the ALJ would result in a termination of the investigation. The ITC ordered the ALJ to issue a decision on domestic industry within 100 days from the institution of the investigation.

Typically, lack of domestic industry is an affirmative defense presented by a respondent. The new ruling by the ITC may allow respondents to terminate ITC investigations early, opposed to the current practice that requires respondents to endure a summary judgment motion or a trial before a domestic industry decision is rendered. As more NPEs file complaints with the ITC in an attempt to “test run” future district court cases, this recent decision may greatly reduce the number of NPE cases filed with the ITC.

1 Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

2 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b).

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Replication without Human Intervention: Lessons from Monsanto v. Bowman

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Until now, the practicing of an invention needed some direct form of human action; someone was needed to “do something” to bring the invention into existence, as well as replicate it by making more (in the case of a physical object) or performing it again (in the case of a method). However, this may no longer be necessary in all instances. At least in the case of some biological technologies, once an invention has been created by a human, further human intervention may no longer be needed for replicating the invention. In these instances, does a patent owner lose the right to exclude future uses, sales, offers for sale or importations of such an invention?

In Monsanto v. Bowman, the Supreme Court is poised to bring some clarity to this question. Monsanto Company designs and manufactures herbicide-resistant soybean seeds and related technology. Monsanto sold patented seeds to farmers for growing and resale as commodity items to be used in such things as public-school lunches and animal feed. Such sales were made under license agreements that allowed the beans to be sold without any ongoing restrictions on the use of those beans.

Vernon Bowman is a soybean farmer. Bowman purchased these beans and replanted them as second-generation seeds, which were the products of seeds purchased from a licensed Monsanto technology distributor.

Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement, arguing that the beans were products of Monsanto’s patented herbicide-resistant seeds and that, by planting them instead of purchasing new seeds, Bowman violated the Monsanto Technology Agreement for the seeds. The U.S. District Court found that Bowman’s activities infringed upon Monsanto’s patent and awarded damages to Monsanto for violation of its patented technology. The Federal Circuit agreed and upheld the decision, holding that Monsanto’s patent covered both the original seeds and a product of the original seeds, such as those second-generation beans grown by Bowman.

Bowman appealed, arguing that, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, Monsanto’s patent rights were exhausted upon its initial sale of the seeds that Bowman later purchased from the licensed distributor, and that use of progeny seeds is an expected use of the product. In response, Monsanto argued that in the case of self-replicating technologies, such as seeds that grow and produce more seeds, the patent extends to the underlying technology (i.e., herbicide resistance) and not only to the seed itself.

The important question raised in this case is whether an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating technologies is needed and/or warranted. While this question is clearly important to the biotechnology and agricultural industries, it also has the potential to significantly affect the software and robotics industries. For example, as robotics and artificial intelligence become increasingly sophisticated in their abilities to adapt and “grow,” it does not seem too outlandish to think that, one day, these may also become self-replicating technologies.

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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Issues Guidance on Lawful Confidentiality Language

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On July 30, 2012, the NLRB (“Board”) issued a decision in Banner Health System dba Estrella Medical Center, 358 NLRB No. 93 holding, among other things, that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) (which prohibits employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights), by restricting employees from discussing any complaint that was then the subject of an ongoing internal investigation.

To minimize the impact of such a confidentiality mandate on employees’ Section 7 rights, the Board found that an employer must make an individualized determination in each case that its “legitimate business justification” outweighed the employee’s rights to protected concerted activity in discussing workplace issues.  In Banner Health, the employer did not carry its burden to show a legitimate business justification because it failed to make a particularized showing that:

  • Witnesses were in need of protection;
  • Evidence was in danger of being destroyed;
  • Testimony was in danger of being fabricated; or
  • A cover-up must be prevented.

The Board concluded that the employer’s one-size-fits-all rule, prohibiting employees from engaging in any discussion of ongoing internal investigations, clearly failed to meet these requirements.

More recently, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel clarified the limits of how such policies could be drafted without running afoul of Section 7 in an advice memorandum released on April 24, 2013 (dated January 29, 2013).   The Region had submitted Verso Paper, Case 30-CA-089350 (January 29, 2013) to the Office of the General Counsel for advice regarding the confidentiality rule at issue and whether it unlawfully interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights.  Specifically, the Verso Code of Conduct contained this provision prohibiting employees from discussing ongoing internal investigations:

Verso has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations.  In every investigation, Verso has a strong desire to protect witnesses from harassment, intimidation and retaliation, to keep evidence from being destroyed, to ensure that testimony is not fabricated, and to prevent a cover-up.  To assist Verso in achieving these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Reiterating that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss disciplinary investigations of their co-workers, the General Counsel’s Office found that the Verso Paper provision did not allow for a case-by-case analysis of whether or not the employer’s business justification for the restriction outweighed the employees’ Section 7 rights as required by Banner Health.  According to the General Counsel’s Office, the employer may establish this by presenting facts specific to a given investigation that give rise to a legitimate and substantial business justification for imposing confidentiality restrictions.

However, in footnote 7 of its advice, the General Counsel’s Office, after noting that the first two sentences of the Verso Paper rule lawfully set forth the employer’s interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations, surprisingly put forward a modified version of the remainder of the Verso Paper provision that it said would pass muster under Banner Health:

Verso may decide in some circumstances that in order to achieve these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence.  If Verso reasonably imposes such a requirement and we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Although this guidance is not binding, combining this language above with the first two sentences of the Verso Paper provision could certainly strengthen an employer’s argument that its intent was not to violate an employee’s Section 7 rights, but rather, to lawfully put employees on notice that if the employer “reasonably” imposes a confidentiality requirement, they must abide by it or face discipline.  However, employers must remain mindful that using a provision like this suggested does not obviate the need for the employer to engage in the particularized case-by-case determination of its substantial and legitimate business need that would permit it to impose confidentiality restrictions on the investigation.

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