Category: ADA

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Offers Updated Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Guidance Q&A’s Pertaining to Cancer, Diabetes, Epilepsy and Intellectual Disabilities

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In a measure to keep up with the changes made by the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) in relation to what employees and applicants must show to establish that they have a “disability,” the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has revised its informal “Question and Answer” guidance forms pertaining to four categories of medical conditions – cancer, diabetes, epilepsy, and intellectual disabilities– to provide clarification as to how employers should address such conditions and to confirm that individuals having each of the types of conditions discussed “should easily be found to have a disability” within the ADA’s initial prong of the definition of a disability. These revised forms can be found by clicking on the links above.

The revised guidance materials include not only a general discussion of each type of condition and discuss prohibitions against discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against individuals with such conditions, they further discuss the means by which employers can obtain, use and disclose medical information relating to such conditions and possible accommodation scenarios for such conditions. In addition, the EEOC explicitly states its position as to why individuals with each type of medical condition at issue should be found to have a disability under the ADA/ADAAA:

1.    “[P]eople who currently have cancer, or have cancer that is in remission, should easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition of disability because they are substantially limited in the major life activity of normal cell growth or would be so limited if cancer currently in remission was to recur . . . Similarly, individuals with a history of cancer will be covered under the second part of the definition of disability because they will have a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity in the past . . .  Finally, an individual is covered under the third (“regarded as”) prong of the definition of disability if an employer takes a prohibited action (for example, refuses to hire or terminates the individual) because of cancer or because the employer believes the individual has cancer.”

2.    “[I]ndividuals who have diabetes should easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition of disability because they are substantially limited in the major life activity of endocrine function . . . Additionally, because the determination of whether an impairment is a disability is made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, diabetes is a disability even if insulin, medication, or diet controls a person’s blood glucose levels. An individual with a past history of diabetes (for example, gestational diabetes) also has a disability within the meaning of the ADA . . . Finally, an individual is covered under the third (“regarded as”) prong of the definition of disability if an employer takes a prohibited action (for example, refuses to hire or terminates the individual) because of diabetes or because the employer believes the individual has diabetes.”

3.    “[I]ndividuals who have epilepsy should easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition of disability because they are substantially limited in neurological functions and other major life activities (for example, speaking or interacting with others) when seizures occur . . . Additionally, because the determination of whether an impairment is a disability is made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, epilepsy is a disability even if medication or surgery limits the frequency or severity of seizures or eliminates them altogether . . . An individual with a past history of epilepsy (including a misdiagnosis) also has a disability within the meaning of the ADA . . . Finally, an individual is covered under the third (“regarded as”) prong of the definition of disability if an employer takes a prohibited action (for example, refuses to hire or terminates the individual) because of epilepsy or because the employer believes the individual has epilepsy.”

4.    “[I]ndividuals who have an intellectual disability should easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition of disability because they are substantially limited in brain function and other major life activities (for example, learning, reading, and thinking) . . . An individual who was misdiagnosed as having an intellectual disability in the past also has a disability within the meaning of the ADA . . . Finally, an individual is covered under the third (“regarded as”) prong of the definition of disability if an employer takes a prohibited action (for example, refuses to hire or terminates the individual) because of an intellectual disability or because the employer believes the individual has an intellectual disability.”

The guidance provided by the EEOC also contains multiple examples and fact patterns for employers to consider in making decisions in their workplaces when faced with situations involving employees and applicants having the identified conditions.

“Essential Functions” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Can Include Job Functions that are Infrequently Performed

Poyner Spruill

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires covered employers generally to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified employees with disabilities. The ADA provides, however, that the employee must be able to perform the “essential functions” of the job with the accommodation, and that the accommodation cannot prove to be an “undue hardship” on the employer.

In the recent case of Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Service, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a job requirement can be an “essential function,” even if the employee is not required to perform the function on a regular basis.

In this case, Mr. Knutson was a manager for Schwan’s Home Service, which delivers frozen food. Managers for Schwan’s are required to maintain DOT driving certification.  In March 2008, Mr. Knutson sustained an eye injury.  Because of the eye injury, Mr. Knutson was required to undergo a medical exam and be recertified.  In December 2008, an eye doctor refused to give Mr. Knutson a DOT certification or a waiver.  Schwan’s then gave Mr. Knutson 30 days to find a job within the company that did not require DOT driving certification.  Mr. Knutson was unable to find such a job within the company and was terminated by Schwan’s.

Following his termination, Mr. Knutson filed suit against Schwan’s pursuant to the ADA.  He argued that since he was able to successfully manage his terminal without driving a truck that maintaining the DOT certification was not an “essential function” of his position.  The evidence before the court showed that Mr. Knutson was DOT qualified at the time of his injury; he admitted to delivering product in his personal vehicle; and he testified that since November 2007 that he had driven a truck less than 50 times while working as a manager.

The court disagreed with Mr. Knutson and held that “essential functions” of a job are determined based on the written job description, the employer’s judgment, and the experience and expectations of all individuals working in the same position.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Schwan’s.

The court’s ruling in this case is good news for employers.  Employers should use this case as a reminder of the importance of having a carefully analyzed comprehensive written job description for all positions, clearly identifying essential functions of the position.  In addition, if essential functions of a position change over time, it is important to make appropriate revisions to the written job description for the position.

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Seventh Circuit Addresses Obligations Regarding the Interactive Process under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

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A common scenario often faced by employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) involves an employee’s request for time off as a reasonable accommodation. In Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., No. 11-2880 (7th Cir, May 8, 2013), the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals provides guidance in this area. There, the court explained that the employer was not liable under the ADA, even though it failed to engage in the interactive process, because the employee failed to show that the requested accommodation (a 30-day leave) would have resulted in her ability to perform the essential functions of the job.

Employee Two Weeks Shy of Leave Entitlement

Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI) provides 24-hour ground transportation services. Terri Basden was hired as a dispatcher in June, 2007. After numerous absences in 2007 and early 2008, she received a verbal warning for absences in March 2008 and a written warning for further absences in April 2008.

Basden provided doctors’ notes reflecting that she had been referred to a neurologist with a possible diagnosis of multiple sclerosis after emergency room tests showed brain abnormalities indicative of the disease. After several job transfers, Basden was granted a request for a part time position on May 1, 2008. She incurred additional absences in May which resulted in suspension. While on suspension, Basden submitted a request for a 30-day leave of absence due to “complications due to medical illness (MS).” PTI policy provides employees with one year of service may be eligible to take a 30-day, unpaid leave of absence. However, Basden had not been employed for one year. PTI denied her request for leave, and thereafter terminated Basden when she failed to return to work following her suspension.

Employee Could Not Show Leave Would Enable Her to Perform Essential Functions

Basden sued PTI, claiming that PTI violated the ADA by terminating her instead of accommodating her request for 30 days leave, that PTI failed to engage in the interactive accommodation process required by the ADA, and that PTI did not show that the requested leave was unreasonable. The district court granted summary judgment for PTI.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first observed that an employee’s request for an accommodation under the ADA requires the employer to engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. In this case, the employee requested a 30-day leave that, according to the employer’s policy, she would have been eligible for with two weeks’ additional seniority. The court noted that PTI’s response to this request, specifically, failing to engage in an interactive process, denying the leave, and terminating her, was not an appropriate employer response under the ADA.

However, the court held that PTI’s actions did not violate the ADA. The failure to engage in the interactive process is not an independent basis for liability under the statute, and in any event, such a failure is actionable only if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation. Thus, even if an employer fails to engage in the interactive process, that failure need not be considered if the employee fails to show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.

Here, PTI cited regular attendance as an essential function of Basden’s job. Yet, Basden did not demonstrate that she was able to come to work regularly at the time of her termination, or that her regular attendance could have been expected either following the requested leave or with any other accommodation. Therefore, the court held, summary judgment for PTI was appropriate on the ADA claim despite any shortcomings in PTI’s response to Basden’s request. (Basden also alleged violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which the court also affirmed summary judgment on because Basden had not worked for PTI for 12 months at the time of her leave request and thus was not eligible for leave under the statute.)

Identify and Document Essential Functions

Of course, employers should continue to comply with their obligations to engage in the interactive process. However, as this case suggests, the obligation to explore and provide accommodation does not necessarily extend to accommodations that are or would be futile and would not enable the employee to perform essential functions. This case highlights the importance of well-written job descriptions that clearly set forth essential job functions. An employer’s identification of and ability to prove essential functions of the job can be used to guide the interactive process and its obligations to provide accommodation under the ADA, and can play a key role in defending a lawsuit under the ADA.

2013 ADA Pool Lift Compliance Deadline: Has Your Business Complied?

The National Law Review recently published an article by Tara L. Tedrow with Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. regarding, Pool Lifts:

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January 31, 2013 marks the date for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Standards for Accessible Design related to installing fixed pool lifts for swimming pools, wading pools and spas.  Though the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) previously changed its hard deadline for compliance with the installation requirements from March 15, 2012 to January 31, 2013, entities covered by Title III of the ADA should not rely on any more extensions.  If complying with the new ADA requirements fell off your to-do list, it’s time to start planning.

Here are a few questions to ask yourself when understanding how these rules could affect you:

Are you a Title III entity?

Whether you even have to worry about the fixed pool lift requirements depends on whether you are a Title III entity.  Title III prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by places of public accommodation, including many private businesses, and places with accessibility requirements on such businesses.  Title III entities are businesses such as a hotel and motel, health club, recreation center, public country club or other business that has swimming pools, wading pools and spas.  If you fall under that category, the 2010 Standards apply.

What is this pool lift requirement? 

The 2010 Standards require that newly constructed or altered swimming pools, wading pools, and spas have an accessible means of entrance and exit to pools for those people with disabilities.  However, providing accessibility is conditioned on whether providing access through a fixed lift is “readily achievable.”  The technical specifications for when a means of entry is accessible are available on the DOJ website. Other requirements, based on pool size, include providing a certain number of accessible means of entry and exit, which are outlined in Section 242 of the Standards.  However, businesses should consider the differences in application of the rules depending on whether the pool is new or altered, or whether the swimming pool was in existence before the effective date of the new rule.  Full compliance may not be required for existing facilities; Section 242 and 1009 of the 2010 Standards outline such exceptions.

What exactly is a “fixed pool lift”?

A fixed lift is one that is attached to the pool deck or apron in some fashion.  Conversely, a non-fixed lift is not attached in any way.  Many businesses with pools have purchased or own portable (i.e. non-fixed) pool lifts.  If that portable lift is attached to the pool deck, then it could be considered a fixed lift and compliant under the rules.  Thus, owners of a portable lift may be able to comply with the ADA requirements by affixing lifts to the pool deck or apron.  Moreover, owners of such portable lifts will be required to affix the lifts as a means of compliance if it is readily achievable.  This exception for certain non-fixed lifts stemmed from confusion over the new regulations, spurring the DOJ to grant exceptions to certain entities that purchased an otherwise compliant non-fixed lift before March 15, 2012.  Those exceptions apply only if the non-fixed lifts comply with the 2010 Standards and if the owners keep the portable lifts in position for use at the pool and operational during all times that the pool is open to guests.

What is the “readily achievable” standard?

The ADA does not require providing access to existing pools through a fixed lift if it is not “readily achievable,” meaning that providing access is easily accomplishable without much difficulty or expense.  The DOJ has specified that this standard is a flexible, case by case analysis, so that the ADA requirements are not unduly burdensome.  However, businesses cannot simply claim that installing a fixed pool lift is not readily achievable.  Rather, factors such as the nature and cost, the overall financial resources of the site and the effect on expenses and resources are all considered and evaluated when determining the application of the standard. Though for some businesses immediate compliance may seem impossible because of issues such as the backorder on pool lifts, it is not a valid excuse for non-compliance.  Businesses are still required to comply with the 2010 Standards through other means, as specified in the Standards.

Should I shut my pool down if I haven’t complied?

If accessibility is not readily achievable, businesses should develop plans for providing access into the pool when it becomes readily achievable in the future.  Businesses that are worried about their current status of compliance should consult with legal counsel or call the ADA Information Line to speak with an ADA Specialist regarding any further questions.

Though compliance to the pool lift requirements may seem onerous, it is necessary to prevent legal and financial liability on the part of a Title III covered business.  These requirements also potentially affect tax breaks under the IRS Code, insurance coverage, ongoing maintenance and accessibility obligations and staff training requirements, all of which are even more of a reason to take compliance seriously.

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA

Seventh Circuit Reverses Course on Reassignment Accommodation, Leaving United Airlines Grounded

An article by R. Holtzman Hedrick of Barnes & Thornburg LLP regarding Reassignment Accommodations, recently appeared in The National Law Review:

 

In arguably its most significant decision under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in years, the Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., reversed its own previous holdings regarding the viability of competitive transfer policies for disabled employees. The case can be found here.

For over a decade, employers in the Seventh Circuit have been able to rely onEEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000), to adopt perfectly valid policies allowing for disabled employees who can no longer perform the essential functions of their current jobs to be considered for reassignment on a competitive basis.  In other words, if a more qualified candidate sought the same position as the disabled candidate, the employer could select the best-qualified candidate without running afoul of the ADA.  No longer, says the Seventh Circuit.

The circuit court held that under the Supreme Court precedent of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (requiring an employee to show that an accommodation is reasonable on its face, which then shifts the burden to the employers to demonstrate case-specific undue hardship), reassignment of a disabled but qualified employee to a vacant position is mandatory in the absence of an undue hardship.  Despite reaffirming its best-qualified candidate rule even after Barnett was decided (reasoning that that ADA does not require preferential treatment and that violating facially-neutral employment policies creates an undue hardship), the Seventh Circuit decided last week that it had been wrong all along:  the “ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer.”

The importance of this new automatic reassignment interpretation cannot be overstated.  Indeed, questions about an employer’s reassignment obligations are among the most frequently received inquiries by attorneys under the ADA.  United Airlines, whose policy in question provided for preferential treatment of disabled employees, although not for automatic reassignment for those who were qualified – meaning the company actually went beyond what the Seventh Circuit required it to do before last week – must feel blindsided by the court.  Indeed, this Seventh Circuit panel issued an earlier version of an opinion in this case dismissing the lawsuit under Humiston-Keeling before vacating that decision and issuing a new opinion.

Obviously, employers in the Seventh Circuit (and likely beyond, as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits provide for automatic reassignment, and the Eighth Circuit relied onHumiston-Keeling in deciding that competitive transfer policies were legal) will need to adjust their reassignment policies for disabled employees.  In light of this new ruling, it is critical to consult with experienced counsel to navigate what is likely uncharted territory.

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