Last week, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission‘s Director of Enforcement celebrated a jury verdict in its insider trading case against Matthew Panuwat:
As we’ve said all along, there was nothing novel about this matter, and the jury agreed: this was insider trading, pure and simple. Defendant used highly confidential information about an impending announcement of the acquisition of biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc., the company where he worked, by Pfizer Inc. to trade ahead of the news for his own enrichment. Rather than buying the securities of Medivation, however, Panuwat used his employer’s confidential information to acquire a large stake in call options of another comparable public company, Incyte Corporation, whose share price increased materially on the important news.”
I disagree, many have described the SEC’s theory of shadow trading as “novel”. More importantly, you won’t find it in Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the ostensible bases for insider trading prosecutions. I have long decried the “make it up as you go along” aspect of insider trading jurisprudence:
Notably, Rule 10b-5 itself doesn’t explicitly mention insider trading. It would be more than a half century before the SEC finally adopted a rule, Rule 10b5-1 defining just one element of insider trading – when a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material non public information. It is no surprise then that federal courts have struggled to define who can be guilty of insider trading and why. The result is that the crime of insider trading has a decidedly “make it up as you go along” quality. Individuals don’t know where the lines are until the courts draw them and then convict. Consequently, people have gone to prison even as courts have adopted the theories for their convictions. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is still defining the crime more than seven decades after Mr. Freeman cobbled together Rule 10b-5 suggests that the definition of insider trading has been too inchoate to support criminal convictions. However “well tuned to an animating principle” a theory might be, I simply don’t think due process exists when a crime is only defined after a conviction.
If Congress truly believes that insider trading should be a crime, it should define the exact elements of the crime rather than leave it to the courts to make up the rules as they send people to prison. The California legislature has in fact done just that in Corporations Code Section 25402. For more on Section 25402, see my article, California’s Unique Approach to Insider Trading Regulation, 17 Insights 21 (July 2003).
Why Bassam Salman Should Not Have Been Convicted.
The willingness of federal courts to send people to prison based on a crime that isn’t expressed, much less defined, in any federal statute is at odds with the principle that only the people’s elected representatives in the legislature are authorized to make an act a crime. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 11 U.S. 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812). While the SEC’s case against Mr. Panuwat was civil, I expect that this novel theory will soon be applied in a criminal prosecution.
