How The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling On College Affirmative Action Programs May Impact Private Employers

The U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College decided that the race-based admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (the “Schools”) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court answered the question for publicly funded schools, it is an open question whether, and how, the Court’s decision will impact affirmative action and diversity programs for private employers, as discussed in more detail below.

Overview

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Among other things, the clause protects people regardless of their race. A limited exception that permits race-based action by the government is permissible if such action can survive a rigorous standard known as “strict scrutiny.” Under that standard, race-based conduct is permissible only if the government can establish a “compelling government interest” and the race-based action is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that established interest.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs failed strict scrutiny. In support of their race-based admissions programs, the Schools asserted the following educational goals as their compelling interests:

  • Training future leaders in the public and private sectors/preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.
  • Preparing graduates to adapt to an increasingly pluralistic society/broadening and refining understanding.
  • Better educating students through diversity/enhancing appreciation, respect, and empathy, cross-racial understanding, and breaking down stereotypes/promoting the robust exchange of ideas.
  • Producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks/fostering innovating and problem solving.
  • Preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.

The Court noted that although these goals were laudable, they were too amorphous to pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard. The Court recognized that a court would have no way to know whether leaders have been adequately trained; whether the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, or whether, and in what quantity, racial diversity leads to the development of new knowledge. In other words, the Court took issue with the fact that the asserted interests could not be measured in any meaningful, quantifiable way.

In addition, the Court found there was no meaningful connection between the Schools’ use of race in the admissions process and the claimed benefits. For example, the Court noted that while diversity may further the asserted interests, the Schools failed to establish that racial diversity would. The Court took particular issue with what it viewed as the overbroad and arbitrary nature of the Schools’ race considerations as they were underinclusive (for example, failing to distinguish between South Asians or East Asians, or define what Hispanic means, or account at all for Middle Eastern applicants). The Court reasoned that the overbroad, arbitrary, and underinclusive racial distinctions employed by the Schools undermine the Schools’ asserted interests—essentially noting that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs sought to “check the diversity box” rather than obtain a truly diverse (racially or otherwise) student body.

In addition to the School’s programs’ failure to survive strict scrutiny, the Court also recognized that the Schools’ race-based admissions processes promoted stereotyping, negatively impacted nonminority applicants, and, contrary to Court precedent, did not have a durational limit or any cognizable way in which to adopt a durational limit.

Supreme Court Precedent

The Court’s decision rested largely on two prior cases addressing race-based admission programs in higher education: Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As a guiding principle, the Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars admissions programs that use race as a stereotype or a negative.

In Bakke, while rejecting other asserted interests, the Court explained that obtaining the educational benefits associated with having a racially diverse student body was “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,” provided that certain guardrails were in place. This is despite the Court’s recognition that racial preferences cause serious problems of justice. The Court said that race only could operate as “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file” and the weight afforded to race must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.”

In Grutter, the Court decided “student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions,” provided that sufficient limitations were in place—notably, that under no circumstances would race-based admissions decisions continue indefinitely. The Court cautioned that, because the use of race was a deviation from the norm of equal treatment, race-based admissions programs must not result in “illegitimate . . . stereotyping,” must not “unduly harm nonminority applicants,” and must be “limited in time.”

The Court’s Additional Considerations

Of critical importance to the Court’s ruling was the fact that neither School’s race-based admissions program had an articulable end point. The Court noted that the Schools’ arguments to overcome the lack of a definite end point were, essentially, “trust us, we’ll know when we’re there.” Yet such arguments, the Court held, were insufficiently persuasive to offset the pernicious nature of racial classifications. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined the majority opinion, took additional issue with the Schools’ “trust us” arguments in separate concurrences, noting (1) their view of the Schools’ histories of harmful racial discrimination, and (2) that courts are not to defer to the morality of alleged discriminators.

Additionally, the Court took issue with the logical necessity that, in any instance when a limited number of positions are available, a race-based “plus factor” for applicants of a certain race is a negative for applicants who do not belong to the favored race. “How else but ‘negative’ can race be described if, in its absence, members of some racial groups would be admitted in greater numbers than they otherwise would have been?” In this, the Court recognized that equal protection is not achieved through the imposition of inequalities.

Impact on Private Employers

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have no direct legal impact on private employers. The Court based its decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the Schools under Title VI, which does not intrinsically apply to private companies; it is Title VII and analogous state and local laws that apply to private employers (not Title VI) and prohibit private employers from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of race (and other protected characteristics). In employment, the law has always prohibited any consideration of race in decision-making, such as who to hire or who to promote, except in extremely narrow and limited situations but, even then, quotas and set-asides are strictly prohibited.

While not directly applicable, it is highly likely that the Court’s decision will spawn new challenges to private employer diversity and inclusion programs, and the Court’s rationale will be referenced as an indicator of how the Court will view such programs under Title VII. Even before the Court’s decision, the legal landscape around an employer’s use of affirmative action plans to aid in making employment decisions was murky. Generally a private employer’s affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII in two scenarios: (1) if the plan is needed to remedy an employer’s past discrimination, and (2) if the plan is needed to prevent an employer from being found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact prohibitions (which operate to prohibit facially neutral policies that nevertheless disproportionately disadvantage certain groups).

Regarding the latter scenario, it is unlikely the Court’s ruling will have much if any impact. For an affirmative action plan to survive scrutiny on this basis, an employer must first prove a disparate impact case against itself: it must identify a specific policy, prove that such policy has a disparate impact on a certain group, and either show that the policy is not justified by business necessity or show that there is a viable alternative that both (a) accounts for the employer’s business necessity, and (b) has less of a disparate impact on the affected group. Then, the employer must prove how its affirmative action steps offset the disparate impact. There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that suggests an employer’s effort to remedy an ongoing Title VII violation would itself be a violation of Title VII.

However, there is language in the Court’s opinion that suggests an affirmative action plan implemented in the former scenario could be problematic, especially if it is not designed carefully. Indeed, a number of lower court decisions even before the Supreme Court’s recent ruling have struck down employer affirmative action programs. Permissible affirmative action programs are typically implemented to remedy past racial imbalances in an employer’s workforce overall, and are not tied to past discrimination against an identifiable employee or applicant. At the close of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion, it admonished Justice Sotomayor’s dissent wherein she proposed a world where schools consider race indirectly, through, for example, essays submitted alongside applications. The Court noted that such would nevertheless violate the Constitution, and clarified that admission decisions can rely on the content of application essays, but that such decisions must be based on an individual applicant’s character or experiences, and not based on the applicant’s race. Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, recognized that “[w]hatever their skin color, today’s youth simply are not responsible for instituting the segregation of the 20th century, and they do not shoulder the moral debts of their ancestors.” Accordingly, challenges to affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy past discrimination generally, by using race in its decision-making may find purchase in the Court’s closing sentiments and Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Although a standard less exacting then “strict scrutiny” is used to evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII, the sentiment expressed by Members of the Court could make the judiciary increasingly skeptical of affirmative action programs that resemble those used by the Schools. In any event, the possibility of being able to continue to use affirmative action plans in the strict sense to increase diversity in an employer’s workforce is likely little comfort to private employers, as few will want to prove a discrimination case against themselves to justify a diversity program.

Additionally, employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs may be the subject of challenges based on the Supreme Court’s skepticism of the benefits of “racial” diversity, as opposed to diversity on less-pernicious characteristics. For example, DEI programs that seek to increase racial diversity based on broad racial definitions may be subject to challenges because of their overbreadth or purportedly arbitrary nature. And DEI programs that highlight racial diversity, rather than, for example, diversity based on socio-economic, ideological, or experiential characteristics may suffer challenges to their legitimacy in reliance on the Supreme Court’s implication that there may be no identifiable tether between “racial” diversity and the purported benefits of diversity as a concept.

Of course, to the extent private employers with affirmative action plans have contracts with government entities and/or receive government funding, affirmative action plans under the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”), require targeted diversity recruiting efforts, aimed at increasing the diversity of applicant pools, although this also does not permit race (or other protected traits) to be used in decision-making.

Practical Tips For Employers

The Court’s decision applies to affirmative action programs in the college setting and applies an analysis under the Equal Protection Clause that does not directly apply to private employers. The decision also deals with very different scenarios where colleges and universities directly used race as a criteria for admissions. As noted, this has generally never been permitted in the employment context and, as a result, the rules of the road for implementing DEI programs have not changed, although they may evolve through future legal challenges in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. There are still countless ways that private employers can design and implement lawful DEI programs. Below are just a few examples employers may consider:

  • Reiterate D&I as a priority in meetings, conferences, and other communications.
  • Implement recruiting programs to diversify your talent pool.
  • Incentivize employees to refer diverse candidates for openings.
  • Support employee resource groups, mentoring programs, and leadership training.
  • Educate your managers and supervisors on unconscious bias.
  • Encourage diversity in suppliers and business partners.
  • Tie D&I efforts (not results) to managerial performance evaluations.
  • Under the privilege of working with counsel, monitor changes in workforce demographics and conduct pay audits.
  • Consider modifying the goal of DEI programs to seek diversity based on broader characteristics that do not involved protected classes, such as experiences, economic background, or worldview.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision is a landmark ruling that will alter the landscape of college and university admissions. And it will almost certainly spawn new challenges beyond the classroom and into the workplace.

However, the decision does not legally require private employers to make changes to their existing DEI programs if such practices comply with already-existing employment laws. Employers can still implement diversity and inclusion programs and promote diversity within their workplaces but, as has always been the case, employers should tread carefully in designing and implementing these programs. Employers would do well to engage counsel to review such programs and initiatives for possible concerns in light of the Court’s decision, as well as existing precedent in the employment context.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more Labor and Employment Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review. 

Supreme Court Rules Title VII Bars Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Today, June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender workers.  The Court held that employers who discriminate against employees based on sexual orientation or gender identity unlawfully intend to rely on sex in their decision-making. Justice Gorsuch, along with Chief Justice Roberts and the four liberal justices of the Court, wrote, in deciding the question of whether an employer can fire an individual for being homosexual or transgender: “the answer is clear.”  Specifically, “an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.  Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”  Ultimately, “an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.”

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia consisted of three individual employment cases, all of which involved an employer terminating the employment of a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed the he or she was homosexual or transgender.  Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare advocate for Clayton County, Georgia for over ten years and was fired shortly after participating in a gay recreational softball league.  The reason given for his termination was an allegation of misspent funds and “conduct unbecoming of a county employee;” however, Bostock argued that was pretense and the real motivation for his termination was his sexual orientation.  Both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII did not include protection against discrimination towards sexual orientation.

In Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, Donald Zara worked as a skydiving instructor for Altitude Express in New York.  Zarda worked for the company for several years and his employment was terminated shortly after mentioning to his employer that he was gay.  While the District Court ruled in favor of the employer, the Second Circuit ruled that Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Lastly, in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Aimee Stephens, a funeral home employee in Garden City, Michigan, who originally presented herself as a male upon hiring, revealed to her employer during her sixth year of employment that she would be transitioning and working and living full-time as a woman.  Shortly thereafter, she was dismissed from her job due to her transition.  Initially, the District Court found for the funeral home on two bases: (1) Title VII did not protect transgender persons nor gender identity, and (2) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permitted the funeral home to make employment decisions based on faith.  The Sixth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that Title VII’s “discrimination by sex” does include transgender persons and also that the funeral home had failed to show how Title VII interfered with its owner’s religious expression.

Given the split among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court took up this trio of cases to render a clear determination as to whether sexual orientation and gender identity are protected categories under Title VII.  This case of first impression signifies a key development in the interpretation and meaning of discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Title VII.  The opinion resolved the issue of whether those who drafted Title VII could have intended protection of these classes, with Justice Gorsuch explaining: “Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s con­sequences that have become apparent over the years, in­cluding its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination sup­ply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. When the ex­press terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”

Employers must ensure that their policies, including their equal employment opportunity, harassment, and discrimination policies, reflect this opinion and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  In addition to these policy matters, employers should take actions to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and communicate the development in the law to employees and key decision makers in the company.

The full opinion can be found here.


© 2020 Bracewell LLP

For more on the SCOTUS Title VII decision, see the National Law Review Civil Rights law section.

Third Thursdays with Ruthie: The Intersection of Religion and Labor Law [PODCAST]

In this episode of the Third Thursdays podcast, Ruthie Goodboe examines how religious discrimination and accommodation intersect with traditional labor law. She will cover religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, best practices for handling requests for religious accommodation when an employee is governed by a collective bargaining agreement, and how Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act comes into play with religious accommodation.


© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

For more labor law developments see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

U.S. Women’s National Soccer Team Wins Class Certification in Equal Pay Fight

A federal court has ruled that the U.S. Women’s National Soccer Team’s (USWNT) equal pay claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act can move forward as a class action, as opposed to myriad individual cases.

As part of its decision, the court also allowed the USWNT’s Equal Pay Act (EPA) case to proceed as a collective action.

Factual background

Earlier this year, the USWNT players filed a complaint in federal court against their employer, the USSF. The lawsuit alleges that USSF violated the EPA and Title VII by, among other things, paying the women’s team less than the men’s team for doing equal work.

Equal Pay Act and Title VII Legal Frameworks To Prove Wage Discrimination

To win their EPA case, the USWNT must first prove a prima facie case under the EPA. The team can do so by showing:

  • the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex;
  • the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and
  • the jobs are performed under similar working conditions

If the USWNT establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the USSF to establish one of four affirmative defenses: (1) that the pay difference is due to a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system that measures quantity or quality of production, or (4) “any factor other than sex.”

If the USSF makes this showing, the USWNT can still win if it shows that the USSF’s justification for the pay disparity was a pretext.

Title VII also makes it illegal to discriminate based on sex in pay and benefits, which is why the USWNT is also suing USSF under this law. Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation and other terms and conditions of employment, so it has a broader reach than the EPA (and also outlaws, among other things, discrimination based on race, religion, and other protected characteristics).

The USWNT Argues That, Despite Their Better Results, They Are Paid Less For Equal Work

The USWNT’s complaint contains evidence and statistics supporting their argument that the USSF has unlawfully paid them less than the men’s soccer team. For example, the complaint alleges:

The USWNT is the preeminent women’s soccer team in the world and has contributed to the finances and reputation of the USSF at least as much as the USMNT. The complaint lists three World Cup titles (which is now four titles), four Olympic gold medals, and asserts that the USSF revised its projected earnings for 2016 from a net loss of $429,929, to a net gain of $17.7 million, because of the successes of the USWNT, particularly at the 2015 World Cup.

The USSF pays the women’s team less than the men’s team, despite requiring players on both teams to perform the same job duties that require equal skill, effort and responsibilities performed under similar working conditions. The complaint states that the women’s team players spend more time practicing, playing, and promoting the USSF than the men’s team does; indeed, from 2015 to 2018, the USWNT played in nineteen more games than the USMNT.

In addition, the complaint asserts that from 2013 to 2016, the USSF paid USWNT players $15,000 for trying out and making the World Cup team. Yet the USSF paid USMNT players $55,000 for making the team.

Similarly, in 2014, the USSF paid the USMNT more than $5.3 million in bonuses after their World Cup loss in the Round of 16. While in 2015, the USSF paid the USWNT only $1,725,000 in bonuses after they won the World Cup.

Finally, the USWNT received less favorable training and travel conditions, as well as reduced marketing for their games. For example, in 2017, USSF chartered private planes for USMNT travel at least seventeen times, but zero times for the USWNT.

USSF’s Potential Defenses

To rebut these claims, the USSF might argue that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for paying USWNT players less than USMNT players is that the men’s team generates more revenue for USSF than the women’s team, which accounts for the difference in pay.  The USSF denies the allegations in the USWNT’s complaint.

According to a report, however, this may not be accurate. That is, between 2016 and 2018, USWNT games generated about $50.8 million, compared with $49.9 million for USMNT games.

Currently, player compensation is not directly linked to money generated by the team in ticket sales, brand deals, and other promotional activity. The USWNT’s complaint refers to 2016 negotiations with the USSF in which the USWNT’s union offered to enter a revenue-sharing model. Under this model, player compensation would increase in years in which the USSF derived more revenue from USWNT activities and decrease in years when it earned less from USWNT’s activities. USSF rejected the offer, according to the complaint.


© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more employment and other litigation outcomes, see the National Law Review Litigation & Trial Practice law page.

To Stalk or Not to Stalk . . . That Is the Question – Using Social Media for Applicant Review

Now more than ever, employers are using social media to screen job applicants. According to a 2018 survey, 70 percent of employers use social media to research candidates. Using social media to research job applicants can provide you with useful information, but it can also get you into trouble.

When you review an applicant’s social media account, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc., you may learn information regarding the applicant’s race, sex, religion, national origin, or age, among other characteristics.

As our readers are aware, a variety of state and federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit employers from choosing not to hire a candidate based on a number of legally protected classes. Just as it would be unlawful to ask an applicant if he or she has a disability during an interview and fail to hire that applicant based on his or her disability, it would also be illegal not to hire an applicant because you observed a Facebook post in which she expressed her hope to be pregnant within the next six months.

Consider the following best practice tips for using social media to screen applicants:

  1. Develop a Policy and Be Consistent – Implement a policy detailing which social media websites you will review, the purpose of the review and type of information sought, at what stage the review will be conducted, and how much time you will spend on the search. Applying these policies consistently will help to combat claims of discriminatory hiring practices should they arise.
  2. Document Your Findings – Save what you find, whether it is a picture or a screenshot of a comment the applicant made. What you find on social media can disappear as easily as you found it. Protect your decision by documenting what you find. In case the matter is litigated, it can be produced later.
  3. Wait Until After the Initial Interview – Avoid performing a social media screening until after the initial interview. It is much easier to defend a decision not to interview or hire an applicant if you do not have certain information early on.
  4. Follow FCRA Requirements – If you decide to use a third party to perform social media screening services, remember that these screenings are likely subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements because the screening results constitute a consumer report. This means the employer will be required to: 1) inform the applicant of the results that are relevant to its decision not to hire; 2) provide the applicant with the relevant social media document; 3) provide the applicant notice of his or her rights under the FCRA and; 4) allow the applicant to rebut the information before making a final decision.
  5. Do Not Ask for Their Password – Many states have enacted laws that prohibit an employer from requesting or requiring applicants to provide their login credentials for their social media and other internet accounts. Although some states still allow this, the best practice is not to ask for it. Further, while it is not illegal to friend request a job applicant, proceed with caution. Friend requesting a job applicant (and assuming the applicant accepts the request) may provide you with greater access to the applicant’s personal life. Many people categorize portions of their profiles as private, thereby protecting specific information from the public’s view. If you receive access to this information you may gain more knowledge regarding the applicant’s protected characteristics. If you are going to friend request applicants, you should include this in your written policy and apply this practice across the board.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

More information for employers considering job applicants on the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Can an Employee be Fired for Being Gay or Transgender?

HR Professionals will soon know the answer to this question.

The United States Supreme Court is preparing to settle a contentious debate on employee protections under federal employment discrimination laws.  On October 7th, the Court returned from its summer break to start the new term.  The Court did not have to wait long before it tackled a complex case because on October 8th, the Court heard two major oral arguments with potentially far-reaching implications for both employers and employees.  Both cases focus on the prohibitions in employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).  Under Title VII, Congress made it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”  The question that the Court will address is whether employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited employment discrimination “because of sex.”

The first case the Court heard was a consolidated matter involving cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia), both of which involve men who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.

Second Circuit: “Sex” is Necessarily a Factor in Sexual Orientation

The plaintiff in Zarda, Donald Zarda, was a skydiving instructor, who died in 2014.  Prior to his death, a female client complained that Zarda inappropriately touched her during a jump.  At some point, Zarda communicated to the client that he was a homosexual and “had an ex-husband,” a practice that Zarda stated he often did with female clients to put them at ease.  Altitude Express terminated Zarda in connection with the complaint; however, Zarda insisted he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

A federal district court granted summary judgment against Zarda, reasoning that his claim was not cognizable under Title VII.  However, the Second Circuit reversed, with a majority of the court believing that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated by sex and, therefore, a “subset of sex discrimination.”  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that federal law prohibits the firing of an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.  Notably, the court reached this conclusion by taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of the text “because of sex.”  Specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII must protect sexual orientation “because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”

Eleventh Circuit: Discharge for Homosexuality Not Prohibited by Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.  The plaintiff in Bostock, Gerald Bostock, was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator in Clayton County for over ten years.  Although Bostock had received good performance reviews for his work, an internal audit was conducted on his program’s funds.  Bostock, who is gay, claimed the audit was a “pretext for discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation.”  During an advisory meeting, where Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one person criticized Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in a gay softball league.

After his complaint was dismissed at the district court level, Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Referring back to a 1979 decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that it had already held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”  While hinting that this earlier ruling may have been wrong, the court held that it had no choice but to follow precedent and affirm the dismissal of Bostock’s claim.

Sixth Circuit: Discrimination on the Basis of Transgender and Transitioning Status is Necessarily Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The second case, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, presents a similar question to Zarda and Bostock.  That is, whether employees can be fired based on their status as transgender.

The case involves Aimee Stephens, who was a funeral director and embalmer for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes.  While working in this position for six years, Stephens dressed and presented herself as a man without issue.  However, once Stephens communicated that she wanted to live and work as a woman before having sex-reassignment surgery, she was terminated.  The owner of the funeral home, a devout Christian, admitted that Stephens was fired because she “was no longer going to represent himself as a man.  He wanted to dress as a woman.”  The owner believed this change would violate “God’s commands.”

After Stephens filed a discrimination charge, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursued a complaint on her behalf against the funeral home.  In ruling in favor of the employer, the district court reasoned that transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII in this instance as doing so would substantially burden the employer’s religious exercise.  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.”  The court further ruled that the RFRA did not apply to protect the funeral home’s actions because the funeral home was not a “religious institution,” and Stephens was not a “ministerial employee” excluded from Title VII’s protections.

Stakeholders: States, Federal Government, Employers, and Employees

The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, which is expected in the spring or summer of 2020, has the potential to be monumental because of the many stakeholders involved.  Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have barred sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by statute or regulation, as have a number of counties and municipalities.  While a few other states provide protection from this type of discrimination either by agency interpretation or court ruling, the remaining states in the country offer no protection under their state laws.  This means that LGBTQ individuals who live in states such as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and even North Carolina (at least with respect to private employers) may have no remedy to this type of employment discrimination outside of Title VII.

Additionally, states who have passed laws in this area may face challenges in enforcing those laws if the Supreme Court decides that Title VII does not protect gay and transgender status.  Many of these states lean on the EEOC’s authority to investigate claims of discrimination against companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and the EEOC has been successful in partnering with states to investigate discrimination claims and enforce such actions.  However, states would lose EEOC assistance should the Court decide that Title VII’s scope does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identification.

Although the EEOC traditionally has been on the side of expanding Title VII protections, the federal government in the most recent litigation has aligned itself with the employers.  In particular, United States Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” does not apply to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Accepting this interpretation, Title VII is limited to barring employers from treating women different from men in the same or similar position, and vice-versa.

Equally important to the states’ and federal government’s interest is the interest of employers.  Companies have lined up on both sides of the debate with over 36 briefs filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, and over 24 briefs filed in support of Clayton County and Altitude Express.  For example, one brief filed in support of Bostock and Zarda includes 206 companies representing businesses such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Uber.  These businesses argued that interpreting Title VII to “exclude sexual orientation or gender identity from protections against sex discrimination would have wide-ranging, negative consequences for businesses, their employees, and the U.S. economy.”  In contrast, the C12 group that represents “the largest network of Christian CEOs, business owners, and executives in the United States” filed a separate brief in support of the employers arguing that interpreting “because of sex” in Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity ignores the natural meaning of the law, “thereby bypassing the political process, shutting down debate, preventing any accommodation of divergent views, and precluding any compromise.”

Makeup of the Court: The Deciding Vote

Prior to his retirement, Justice Anthony Kennedy was the deciding vote in several gay rights cases.  However, Justice Kennedy is no longer on the bench, and these cases present the first opportunity for the public to see how his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will vote on these issues.  Also, Justice Neil Gorsuch, successor to Justice Antonin Scalia, may play a key role in deciding these issues.  Similar to Scalia, it is believed that Justice Gorsuch is more inclined to rule that courts should naturally interpret statutes as they were meant when enacted.  Should Justice Gorsuch hold firm to this view, then there is some thought that he may conclude sexual orientation and gender identity were not meant to be included as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.  The perspectives of these new Justices are likely to dictate the Court’s ultimate decision – a decision which may directly impact the employment landscape for years to come.


© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on Employment Protections, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment and Civil Rights law pages.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.


© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Cases Determining Extent of Title VII Protection for LGBT Workers

The Supreme Court of the United States announced three cases will be argued next term that could determine whether Title VII protects LGBT employees from workplace discrimination.

Title VII prohibits discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” but it does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity.  Federal courts have disagreed on whether discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination.  Differing opinions on this topic exist within the federal government as well:  the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, while the Department of Justice has argued it does not.  The Supreme Court’s decisions may ultimately decide these conflicts.

Two cases represent a split in federal appellate courts regarding the extent, if any, to which Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination.  In Altitude Express v. Zarda, a skydiving company fired Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, after Zarda informed a female client he was gay to assuage her concern about close physical contact during skydives.  The trial court dismissed Zarda’s sexual orientation discrimination claim.  In an opinion written by Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann on behalf of a full panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and held that sexual orientation discrimination is properly understood as a subset of discrimination on the basis of sex.  In other words, in the Second Circuit, sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.  The Second Circuit aligned its thinking with the Seventh Circuit’s April 2017 opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, which held that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Gerald Bostock v. Clayton County Georgia.  Gerald Bostock alleged he was terminated from his county job after the county learned of his involvement in a gay recreational softball league and his promotion of involvement in the league to co-workers.  The trial court dismissed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its own precedent that broadly held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  In other words, in the Eleventh Circuit, Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.

The Supreme Court consolidated the cases into a single case to determine whether the prohibition in Title VII against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation.

The third case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, focuses on whether Title VII applies to transgender employees.  In 2007, a funeral home hired Aimee Stephens, whose employment records identified her as a man.  Later, Stephens told the funeral home’s owner she identified as a woman and wanted to wear women’s clothing to work.  The owner fired Stephens, believing allowing Stephens to wear women’s clothing violated the funeral home’s dress code and “God’s commands.”  The EEOC filed suit on Stephens’ behalf.  The trial court dismissed a portion of the lawsuit because “transgender . . . status is not currently a protected class under Title VII,” but permitted other portions to proceed based on the claim Stephens was discriminated against because the funeral home objected to her appearance and behavior as departing from sex stereotypes.  The Sixth Circuit agreed that Stephens had viable claims.  The Supreme Court will review “[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping” under prior Supreme Court precedent.

All three cases will affect the employment rights of LGBT workers.  Dinsmore & Shohl lawyers will closely monitor the Court’s analysis of these cases.  Dinsmore’s Labor and Employment Practice Group stands ready to assist employers in navigating this developing area of law.  Dinsmore’s experience in this arena includes accomplished labor and employment lawyers, former law clerks to federal judges who have drafted orders on these very issues, former federal government attorneys, litigators and published scholars.

 

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
This post was written by Jan E. Hensel and Justin M. Burns of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Read more on the US Supreme Court  decision on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

Seventh Circuit Breaks New Ground: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Prohibited by Title VII

sex discrimination seventh circuitIn a landmark decision reflecting a potential turning of the tide for the LGBT community, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has become the first federal appeals court in the nation to hold that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, No. 3:14-cv-1791 (7th Cir. April 4, 2017).

Last July, a panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the sexual orientation discrimination claim of Kim Hively, a lesbian who claimed she was denied promotions and a full-time position due to her sexual orientation. (See Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination.) The Seventh Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. Yesterday’s decision followed.

The Seventh Circuit began by observing that the question is not whether the court can, or should, add a new category of protection to Title VII, as that is beyond its authority.  Instead, the court viewed itself as charged with interpreting the existing language of Title VII, specifically, whether discrimination based on “sex” includes sexual orientation.

The court considered a number of interpretive aids. It cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s blessings on expansion of traditional sex discrimination claims in such cases as Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), which expanded the law to include sexual harassment, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), expanding the law to include same-sex harassment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), expanding the law to include discrimination based on gender non-conformity, and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), upholding the right of same-sex couples to marry. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Congress that enacted Title VII in 1964 may not have envisioned the necessity of these protections at the time, but nonetheless, experience has since caused the Supreme Court to recognize them as forms of prohibited sex discrimination.

The court also cited other Supreme Court decisions favoring sexual orientation-based protections, including Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), holding that a provision of the Colorado Constitution forbidding state government from taking action designed to protect “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual” persons, violated the federal Equal Protection Clause; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), wherein a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sex between consenting adults violated the federal Due Process Clause; and United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), striking down the Defense of Marriage Act’s exclusion of same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse.”

Ivy Tech argued that Congress has repeatedly considered—and refused—to add “sexual orientation” to the language of Title VII, and that should be interpreted as Congress’ intent to exclude it. This argument has been recited by numerous federal appellate courts in denying Title VII coverage to such claims. However, the Seventh Circuit noted that the legal landscape has changed over the years, and the Supreme Court has shed more light on the scope of the statute through its decisions, and for these reasons, the court was unable to draw any reliable inference from the failed “truncated legislative initiatives” in Congress.

As to the existence of the significant contrary authority, the court stated: “[T]his court sits en banc to consider what the correct rule of law is now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretations, not what someone thought it meant one, ten, or twenty years ago.” The court reversed dismissal of Hively’s claim and remanded the case to the district court.

Inevitable Result, Uncertain Future

With the landslide of litigation in the courts seeking protections for the LGBT community, it may have been inevitable that one of the federal circuit courts hearing such a case would eventually rule in favor of Title VII protection from sexual orientation discrimination. Indeed, numerous recent decisions that have refused to recognize such protections have acknowledged the untenable results that have come to pass in so holding. The Seventh Circuit’s decision recognized: “It would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’ The effort to do so has led to confusing and contradictory results…”

Indeed, many courts in other jurisdictions continue to find creative ways to allow sexual orientation-based claims to proceed despite the legal roadblock, including most recently, the Second Circuit’s decision last week that allowed a gay advertising executive to proceed with his Title VII claims based on gender non-conformity as opposed to sexual orientation. Christiansen, et. al. v. Omincom Group, Inc., 2017 WL 1130183 (2nd Cir. March 27, 2017).

With yesterday’s ruling, the Seventh Circuit has created a split in the federal circuit courts, making this issue ripe for U.S. Supreme Court determination. The country likely will receive uniform interpretation of Title VII on this issue from the Supreme Court at some point. Until then, the law in this area is truly a mixed bag. Employees in the Seventh Circuit have an additional cause of action to bring under Title VII, and employers in this jurisdiction may see a rise in these claims in the near term. For most employers outside the Seventh Circuit, employees are barred from pursuing sexual orientation bias claims under Title VII.  However, alternate theories may be advanced, such as the plaintiff successfully did in the Second Circuit case. In addition, many state laws include sexual orientation protections.

While the law of the land is unsettled, one thing remains clear: employers that uphold principles of equal opportunity and fairness, and merit-based employment rewards, will fare the best.

© 2017 Schiff Hardin LLP

Seventh Circuit: Title VII Offers No Protection Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination

sexual orientation discriminationIn the midst of a legal, political and cultural landscape expanding the rights of LGBT individuals, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has held to prior precedent in reaffirming that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, __ S.Ct. __, No. 15-720 (July 28, 2016).  According to the court, though “the writing is on the wall” that sexual orientation discrimination should not be tolerated, because the writing is not in a Supreme Court opinion or Title VII, the court’s hands are tied.

In two 2000 opinions, Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.and Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit had previously held that Title VII offers no protection from sexual orientation discrimination. The court revisited the issue now in order to provide a more detailed analysis in light of recent trends and decisions advancing LGBT rights.

The court recognized the merits of many of Ms. Hively’s arguments, and acknowledged that in light of the recognition of other rights of LGBT individuals the current legal landscape does not make sense. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as unlawful (U.S. v. Windsor) and legalized gay marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). In 2015, the EEOC held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Baldwin v. Foxx (July 16, 2015). Many judicial decisions at the district court level have repeatedly recognized that sexual orientation discrimination cannot be tolerated. Yet, Congress has repeatedly rejected new legislation that would extend Title VII to cover sexual orientation discrimination, and it has not amended the language of Title VII to include sexual orientation.

This creates “a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.” The court observed, “From an employee’s perspective, the right to marriage might not feel like a real right if she can be fired for exercising it.”

Nonetheless, the court stated that Congress’ failure to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation cannot be due to its unawareness of the issue. Thus, Congress must have intended a very narrow reading of the term “sex” when it passed Title VII.

In excluding sexual orientation discrimination from the coverage of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit conveyed its apparent reluctance in doing so:

“Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that  our  society  can  continue  to  condone  a  legal  structure  in  which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled  out  for  undesirable  tasks,  paid  lower  wages,  demoted,  passed  over  for  promotions,  and  otherwise  discriminated  against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, … many of the federal  courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not  condone it …; and this court undoubtedly  does not condone it… . But writing  on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the  form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we  must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent[.]”

The Seventh Circuit went on to offer its further observations:

“Many citizens would be surprised to learn that under federal law any private employer can summon an employee into his office and state, “You are a hard‐working employee and have added much value to my company, but I am firing you because you are gay.” And the employee would have no recourse whatsoever—unless she happens to live in a state or locality with an anti‐discrimination statute that includes sexual orientation.”

Those states are currently California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Other states apply the prohibition to public employment only: Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio; Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Some local city and county ordinances contain similar anti-discrimination provisions.

The bottom line for both employers and LGBT individuals, in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, is that the employment protections afforded to individuals based on sexual orientation remains determined, for now, at the state and local level.

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP