Tax Archives - Page 6 of 18 - The National Law Forum

Better Care Reconciliation Act – Key Takeaways for Employers and Plan Sponsors

On June 22, 2017, the Senate released its much anticipated health care reform legislation – the Better Care Reconciliation Act (“BCRA”) (linked to amended version released June 26, 2017). In many respects the BCRA is similar to the House of Representatives’ American Health Care Act (which was described in our March 9, 2017 and May 4, 2017 blog entries). However, the BCRA differs from the AHCA in several important respects.

As of the date of this blog entry, the BCRA does not have sufficient support to pass a vote in the Senate and House GOP members have indicated that they would reject the bill. Therefore, Senate leadership has delayed a vote on the BCRA until after the July 4^th holiday recess. Nevertheless, as we provided for the AHCA, below are key takeaways for employers and plan sponsors and a few comparisons between the AHCA and BCRA. A more detailed comparison between key provisions of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the AHCA, and the BCRA is provided at the end of this blog.

1. Individual and Employer Mandates. Like the AHCA, the BCRA would essentially repeal the ACA’s individual and employer mandates effective after December 31, 2015. Both bills do this by “zeroing-out” the penalties for not having minimum essential coverage (individual mandate) or for not offering adequate minimum essential coverage to full-time employees (employer mandate). Outside of the effective repeal of the employer mandate, the AHCA’s and BCRA’s impact on group health plans appears to be minimal. However, if either the AHCA’s 30% surcharge or the BCRA’s 6-month waiting period becomes law, it is likely that plan sponsors will be required to provide notices similar to the certificates of creditable coverage required in the pre-ACA era

In the absence of an individual mandate, the AHCA and BCRA have different methods of incentivizing individuals to maintain continuous health coverage. Under the AHCA method, insurance carriers would be required to charge a 30% premium surcharge to those who fail to have continuous coverage (i.e., a break in coverage of 63 days or more would trigger the surcharge). The BCRA would require insurance carriers to apply a 6-month blanket coverage waiting period to any individual with a 63-day or more break in continuous coverage during the prior 12 months.

Outside of the effective repeal of the employer mandate, the AHCA’s and BCRA’s impact on group health plans appears to be minimal. However, if either the AHCA’s 30% surcharge or the BCRA’s 6-month waiting period becomes law, it is likely that plan sponsors will be required to provide notices similar to the certificates of creditable coverage required in the pre-ACA era.

2. BCRA Retains ACA’s Subsidy and Tax Credit Program. The Senate appears to have rejected AHCA’s elimination of cost-sharing subsidies and premium tax credits available only for coverage purchased on the Marketplace. The AHCA would have replaced the ACA’s program with an advance tax credit program available to individuals purchasing individual market insurance (not just Marketplace coverage) or enrolled in unsubsidized COBRA coverage. Under the AHCA, the amount of the tax credit would be based on age and would be available only to individuals with income less than $75,000 (individual) or $150,000 (jointly with a spouse).

The BCRA, however, maintains the ACA’s cost-sharing subsidies and premium tax credit program, albeit with some modifications. Under the BCRA, cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance would be determined based on age, with younger individuals getting more assistance than older individuals, and income. Household income in excess of 350% of the federal poverty line would disqualify an individual from cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance, in contrast to the ACA’s 400% threshold. Additionally, under the BCRA, the premium tax credit would be based on a benchmark plan that pays 58% of the cost of covered services (in contrast to the ACA’s use of the second-lowest cost silver (70%) plan). This lower value of coverage effectively reduces the amount of premium assistance an individual can get.

3. Employer Reporting Obligations to Continue. Although the individual and employer mandates would be repealed, it is likely that the ACA reporting obligations (Forms 1094-B/C and 1095-B/C) would remain in place, at least in some forms. As noted above, the BCRA retains the ACA’s cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance, the availability of which is conditioned on an individual not being enrolled in employer-sponsored coverage. Therefore, the IRS would likely still need to obtain coverage information from employers.

4. Cadillac Tax Repealed Subject to Reinstatement. Like the AHCA, the BCRA effectively delays the so-called Cadillac Tax until 2025. The Cadillac Tax was originally slated to be effective in 2018, but it was delayed until 2020 in prior budget legislation.

5. Most ACA-Related Taxes Repealed. The BCRA would also repeal most of the tax reforms established under the ACA. Most relevant to employers and plan sponsors would be the elimination of the contribution limit on health flexible spending accounts (HFSAs), the ability reimburse over-the-counter costs under HFSAs and health savings accounts (HSAs), the increase in HSA contribution limits, and elimination of the Medicare surcharge applied to high-earners.

6. Popular ACA Reforms Remain. As was the case under the AHCA, the BCRA would keep many popular ACA market reforms and patient protections in place. These include:

• The requirement to cover dependent children until age 26;

• The prohibition on waiting periods in excess of 90 days;

• The requirement for individual and small group plans to cover essential health benefits;

• The prohibition against lifetime or annual dollar limits on essential health benefits;

• The annual cap on out-of-pocket expenditures on essential health benefits;

• Uniform coverage of emergency room services for in-network and out-of-network visits;

• Required first-dollar coverage of preventive health services;

• The prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions;

• Enhanced claims and appeals provisions; and

• Provider nondiscrimination.

7. ERISA Preemption for “Small Business Health Plans.” The BCRA would add a new Part 8 to ERISA for “small business health plans.” Currently, some states have enacted insurance laws that prohibit small employers from risk-pooling their employees in a single, large group insurance plan. New Part 8 of ERISA would preempt these state laws and allow the formation of “small business health plans,” which, generally, are plans sponsored by an association on behalf of its employer members. Small business health plans must meet certain organizational and financial control requirements and apply to the Department of Labor for certification.

8. Employee Tax Exclusion Remains Intact. Like the AHCA, the BCRA does not currently include a limitation on the employee tax exclusion that would result in imputed taxes to employees if the value of health coverage exceeds a certain amount. This absence, however, does not necessarily mean that such a limit will not eventually be imposed. It is possible that Congress will consider limiting tax incentives for both retirement and health and welfare plans when broader tax reform is considered.

9. HFSA/HSA Expansion. As mentioned above, the BCRA includes the same modifications to the HFSA and HSA rules as the AHCA. The BCRA would remove the annual contribution cap on HFSAs. Additionally, HFSAs and HSAs would now be able to reimburse on a non-taxable basis over-the-counter medication without a prescription. The annual contribution limit to HSAs would be equal to the out-of-pocket statutory maximum for high-deductible health plans. Spouses would both be able to make catch-up contributions to the same HSA.

It is still too early to tell whether the BCRA will fare better than the AHCA. In any event, we will continue to monitor legislative efforts and will provide updates as substantive developments occur.

Health Care Reform Legislation Comparison
Shared Responsibility	ACA	AHCA	BCRA
Employer Mandate	Applicable large employers (those with 50 or more full-time employees and equivalents) face penalties if minimum essential coverage not offered to 95% of full-time employees (and dependents) or if coverage is not minimum value or affordable.	No penalties for failing to provide adequate coverage.	No penalties for failing to provide adequate coverage.
Individual Mandate	Individuals subject to tax if not enrolled in minimum essential coverage unless exception applies.	No tax for failing to enroll in minimum essential coverage. However, effective for plan years beginning in 2019, a 30% premium surcharge would be charged by insurance carriers to an individual who purchases insurance coverage following a lapse in coverage of 63 days or more.	No tax for failing to enroll in minimum essential coverage. However, individuals who have a lapse in coverage of 63 or more days in the prior 12-month period will be subject to a 6-month coverage waiting period.
Reporting	IRC §§ 6055 and 6056 require reporting from issuers of minimum essential coverage and applicable large employers.	No change to ACA reporting requirements under IRC §§ 6055 and 6056. Additional Form W-2 reporting required.	No change to ACA reporting requirements under IRC §§ 6055 and 6056.
Market Reforms	ACA	AHCA	BCRA
Dependent Coverage	If dependent children covered, coverage must continue until age 26.	No change.	No change.
Essential Health Benefits	Small group and individual market plans must cover 10 essential health benefit categories, as defined by benchmark plan established by state.	No change, but states can apply for waiver to establish separate definition of essential health benefit.	No change, subject to relaxed waiver rights under ACA § 1332 (State Innovation Waivers).
Annual/Lifetime Dollar Limits	No annual or lifetime dollar limits can be applied to essential health benefits.	No change, but states can apply for waiver to establish separate definition of essential health benefit.	No change, subject to relaxed waiver rights under ACA § 1332 (State Innovation Waivers).
Out-of-Pocket Maximums	Out-of-pocket maximum applied to essential health benefits.	No change, but states can apply for waiver to establish separate definition of essential health benefit.	No change, subject to relaxed waiver rights under ACA § 1332 (State Innovation Waivers).
Preexisting Condition Exclusions	Preexisting condition exclusions prohibited.	No change, but insurance providers must apply a 30% premium surcharge if individual has a gap in coverage of 63 days or more.	No change, but 6-month waiting period applied if individual has a gap in coverage of 63 days or more.
Preventive Care	Preventive care covered without cost-sharing.	No change.	No change.
Emergency Coverage	Emergency room visit at an out-of-network hospital must be covered at in-network rate.	No change.	No change.
Rescissions	Coverage cannot be retroactively terminated except in cases of fraud or misrepresentation or for premium nonpayment.	No change.	No change.
Summaries of Benefits and Coverage	Short (8-page) disclosure of plan terms and glossary distributed on an annual basis.	No change.	No change.
Enhanced Claims Procedures	Claims procedures now require additional claims procedures and voluntary external review.	No change.	No change.
Provider Nondiscrimination	Cannot discriminate against a health care provider acting pursuant to state license.	No change.	No change.
Section 105(h) Nondiscrimination	Fully-insured employer-sponsored health plans cannot discriminate in favor of highly compensated individuals (not yet effective).	No change.	No change.
Medical Loss Ratio	Individual and small group plans must spend 80% of premium income on claims and quality improvement. Large group insurance plans must spend 85% of premium income on claims and quality improvement.	No change.	Applicable ratio determined by the state (effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2019).
Tax Reforms	ACA	AHCA	BCRA
Cadillac Tax	40% excise tax applied to cost of group health coverage exceeding threshold (effective January 1, 2020).	Delayed until January 1, 2025.	Repealed effective December 31, 2019, but to be reinstated effective January 1, 2025,
Small Business Tax Credit	Tax credit for premiums paid toward group health coverage available to small businesses.	Not available for plans that cover abortion for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017; repealed for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2020.	Same as AHCA.
Health FSA Limit	Maximum contribution to health FSA set at $2,500 (subject to annual increases for inflation).	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Repealed effective January 1, 2018.
HSA Distribution Penalty	Penalty for HSA distributions used for non-qualifying medical expenses increased to 20%.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017. Penalty would go back to 10% for HSAs and 15% for Archer MSAs.	Same as AHCA.
HSA Contribution Limits	No change.	Increased to match statutory out-of-pocket maximum for high-deductible health plans (effective January 1, 2018).	Same as AHCA.
FSA/HSA Over-the-Counter	Health FSAs and HSAs cannot reimburse over-the-counter products without a prescription (excluding purchase of insulin).	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Same as AHCA.
Medical Expense Deduction	Itemized deduction under IRC § 223 available for medical expenses in excess of 10% of adjusted gross income.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017. Threshold would return to 7.5% adjusted gross income.	Same as AHCA.
Medicare Surcharge	Additional 0.9% hospital insurance (Medicare) tax applied to high-earners.	Repealed effective January 1, 2023.	Same as AHCA.
Medicare Investment Income Tax	Medicare tax of 3.8% applied to unearned income.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Same as AHCA.
Health Insurance Tax	Tax applied to insurance carriers based on premiums collected.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Repealed effective January 1, 2018.
Health Insurer Compensation Deduction	No compensation deduction available to certain health insurance providers for compensation in excess of $500,000 paid to applicable individuals.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Same as AHCA.
Medical Device Tax	Excise tax of 2.3% imposed on manufacturer, producers and importers of medical devices.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Repealed effective January 1, 2018.
Branded Prescription Drug Fee	Manufacturers and importers of branded prescription drugs are subject to an annual fee.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Repealed effective January 1, 2018.
Retiree Drug Subsidy	Amount received under Retiree Drug Subsidy must be taken into consideration when determining prescription drug cost business deduction.	Repealed effective January 1, 2017.	Same as AHCA.
Marketplace	ACA	AHCA	BCRA
Marketplace Structure	Individuals can purchase insurance coverage on risk-pooled Marketplace established by Federal or state government. Individuals purchasing coverage on the Marketplace may be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance. Plans available on Marketplace (“qualified health plans”) must meet certain cost-sharing and actuarial value levels (i.e., gold, silver, bronze plans). Qualified health plans must cover essential health benefits.	Effective January 1, 2020, cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance are repealed. Additionally, Marketplace plans are no longer required to meet cost-sharing and actuarial value requirements. Limited-scope, or catastrophic plans would be available.	No structural changes from ACA. Marketplaces, including cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance, remain intact with modifications.
Cost-Sharing Subsidies and Premium Assistance	Available to individuals with household income between 100% and 400% of federal poverty line. Age is not a factor in amount of subsidies or assistance available.	For plan years beginning in 2018 and 2019, basic structure remains the same except that age and income are factors in the amount of cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance that is available. No subsidies or assistance is available for qualified health plans that cover abortion. Cost-sharing subsidies and premium assistance repealed for plan years beginning in 2020. Instead, advance tax credit available based solely on age.	Available to individuals with household income between 100% and 350% of federal poverty line. Age is a factor in amount of subsidies or assistance available.
Premium Rate Setting	Small group and individual insurance markets may vary rates based only on certain factors, including individual or family coverage, community rating, age (3:1 ratio) and tobacco use.	Age ratio increases to 5:1 beginning January 1, 2018. States may apply to waive ACA requirements and base premiums on health factors.	Age ratio increases to 5:1 beginning January 1, 2018. State Innovation Waiver Program (ACA § 1332) requirements relaxed, giving states ability to waive many of the ACA’s market reforms.

This post was written by Damian A. Meyers and Steven D. Weinstein of Proskauer Rose LLP.

2016 Tax Court Opinions – A Year In Review

Several notable tax court opinions were issued 2016 dealing with a variety of substantive and procedural matters. In our previous post – Year in Review: Court Procedure and Privilege – we discussed some of these matters. This post addresses some additional cases decided by the court during the year and highlights some other cases still in the pipeline.

Transfer Pricing

Transfer pricing remains a hot topic in litigation. As discussed here, here and here the Tax Court accepted and rejected taxpayer arguments in several high-profile cases.

We have also written frequently on the 3M case, which involves whether the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) blocked income regulations are valid. That case has been submitted fully stipulated to the Tax Court and all briefs have been filed. For prior coverage, see here, here, and here.

Point: Transfer pricing is a point of emphasis with the IRS. Given that slight changes to a taxpayer’s transfer pricing methodologies can produce substantial adjustments, taxpayers need to continue to monitor judicial developments in the area. This includes not only how courts view the arm’s length standard, but also taxpayer challenges to the IRS’s rulemaking authority.

The Administrative Procedures Act and Deference to IRS Interpretations

Following the Supreme Court’s 2011 Mayo opinion, taxpayers have increasingly turned to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to challenge IRS actions. In addition to the posts linked above regarding APA challenges in transfer pricing cases, we have written about the QinitiQ and Ax cases dealing with whether an explanation provided in a notice of deficiency is insufficient under the APA. See here and here]. Additionally, the Supreme Court provided guidance in a non-tax case regarding the proper application of the APA in the analysis of the validity of agency regulations.

Another area we have frequently posted on is the level of deference afforded to IRS interpretations. Discussions of general deference principles and cases decided in 2016 can be found here, here, here, here, and here]. Additionally, as we noted here, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide the limits of Auer deference.

Practice point: Whether the IRS’s position in published or unpublished guidance is afforded deference, and, if so, the appropriate level of deference, is important to taxpayers both in planning their transactions and defending them before the IRS and the courts. This area continues to evolve, particularly in the area of Auer deference, and taxpayers need to be aware of new developments.

Information Reporting Requirements

The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program remains a tool for noncompliant taxpayers to come to the IRS to resolve outstanding tax reporting matters. For an update on this subject, see here. The release of the Panama Paper in April 2016, which we wrote about here received considerable attention. A recent opinion out of a district court in California also provided more guidance on the willful standard for failure to file foreign information reporting forms. See here.

Practice point: OVDP remains open, but it could be closed by the IRS at any time. Noncompliant taxpayers need to consider all options in this area, and should consider which option might be best depending on their specific situation.

Penalties

The IRS has been increasingly asserting penalties in cases. We recently discussed here some of the penalty procedural rules at issue in the Graev case. We also discussed the substantial authority defense, as applied by the Fifth Circuit in Chemtech Royalty Associates. See here.

Point: Taxpayers who are facing penalty determinations and assessments should consider whether they may have any procedural challenges to the IRS’s method of approval and assessment of penalties, in addition to considering the more standard, substantive defenses like reasonable cause and substantial authority. It is important to adequately document your position prior to taking a tax return position to avoid any initial assertion of penalties by the IRS.

ARTICLE BY Todd Welty, P.C., Laura L. Gavioli, P.C., Elizabeth Erickson, Andrew R. Roberson & Kevin Spencer of McDermott Will & Emery

US Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl

This morning, the US Supreme Court announced that it denied certiorari in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, which was on appeal from the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The denied petitions were filed this fall by both the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) and Colorado, with the Colorado cross-petition explicitly asking the Court to broadly reconsider Quill. In light of this, many viewed this case a potential vehicle to judicially overturn the Quill physical presence standard.

Practice Note: Going forward, the Tenth Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of Colorado’s notice and reporting law stands, and is binding in the Tenth Circuit (which includes Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma as well). While this development puts an end to this particular kill-Quill movement, there are a number of other challenges in the pipeline that continue to move forward.

In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court recently decided that the Ohio Commercial Activity Tax, a gross-receipts tax, is not subject to the Quill physical presence standard. A cert petition is expected in this case, and could provide another opportunity for the US Supreme Court to speak on the remote sales tax issue. In addition, litigation is pending in South Dakota and Alabama over economic nexus laws implemented earlier this year. A motion hearing took place before the US District Court for the District of South Dakota last week on whether the Wayfair case should be remanded back to state court. If so, the litigation would be subject to the expedited appeal procedures implemented by SB 106 (2016), and would be fast tracked for US Supreme Court review. Tennessee also recently adopted a regulation implementing an economic nexus standard for sales and use tax purposes that directly conflicts with Quill that is expected to be implemented (and challenged) in 2017. While Governor Bill Haslam has praised the effort, state legislators have been outspoken against the attempt to circumvent the legislature and impose a new tax. Notably, the Joint Committee on Government Operations still needs to approve the regulation for it to take effect, with the economic nexus regulation included in the rule packet scheduled for review by the committee this Thursday, December 15, 2016.

All this action comes at a time when states are gearing up to begin their 2017 legislative sessions, with many rumored to be preparing South Dakota-style economic nexus legislation for introduction. While DMA is dead as an option, the movement to overturn Quill continues and the next few months are expected to be extremely active in this area.

ARTICLE BY Stephen P. Kranz, Mark Yopp & Eric Carstens of McDermott Will & Emery

Base Erosion Profit Shifting Multilateral Agreement

The most recent element of the ongoing global dispute resolution process is the late November 2016 release of the so-called multilateral instrument (MLI), a cornerstone of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project. It is an ambitious effort of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to impose its will on as many countries as possible. The explanation comprises 85 single-spaced pages and 359 paragraphs. The MLI draft itself is 48 similar pages. The purpose of the MLI is to facilitate implementation of the BEPS Action items without having to go through the tedious process of amending approximately two thousand treaties.

In essence, the MLI implements the BEPS Action items in treaty language. While consistency is obviously an intended result, the MLI recognizes the reality that many countries will not agree to all of the provisions. Accordingly, countries are allowed to sign the agreement, but then opt out of specific provisions or make appropriate reservations with respect to specific treaties. This process is to be undertaken via notification of the “depository” (the OECD). Accordingly, countries will be able to make individual decisions on whether to update a particular treaty using the MLI.

There are a variety of initial questions to be addressed by each country, including:

Does it intend to sign the MLI?
Which of its treaties will be covered?
Will treaty partners agree?
What provisions will be included or opted out of? If there is an opt out, the country is supposed to advise the depository of how this impacts each of its treaties. This will be a time-consuming process.
How will it negotiate with specific treaty partners with respect to the various technical provisions of the MLI?

The arbitration provisions are intended to implement the BEPS Action 14 recommendations, focused on mandatory binding arbitration. These provisions would apply to a bilateral treaty only if both parties agree. The arbitration articles provide an outline of arbitration procedures, allowing the competent authorities to vary the procedures by mutual agreement. The form of the proceeding provides a default for “last best offer” (or “baseball style”). The parties may also agree to a “reasoned decision” process, which is stated to have no precedential value. If the parties do not agree on either of these forms of proceeding, the competent authorities should endeavor to reach agreement on a form. If there is no agreement, then the arbitration provisions are inapplicable.

Whether the US or other countries will sign the MLI, it seems apparent that the net result will be a period of chaos in treaty relationships, as there will inevitably be: (1) signers and non-signers; (2) reservations; (3) opt outs; etc.

In a world in which the list of countries zealously seeking to protect their tax bases and making proposals to increase domestic tax revenues (following BEPS and related guidance), continually expands, it seems apparent that dispute resolution processes will need to evolve to resolve the tsunami of disputes that are expected to materialize. If this is not the case, then countries and MNEs alike will incur prejudice to their respective interests.

Accordingly, these dispute resolution issues should be on the agenda for consideration as effective tax rate strategies are revisited in the post-BEPS world.

ARTICLE BY Cym H. Lowell of McDermott Will & Emery

Cost of Living Adjustments for 2017 from Internal Revenue Service

The Internal Revenue Service has announced the 2017 cost of living adjustments to various limits. The adjusted amounts generally apply for plan years beginning in 2017. Some of the adjusted amounts, however, apply to calendar year 2017.

Employee Benefit Plans
Plan Year	2017	2016
401(k), 403(b), 457 deferral limit	$18,000	$18,000
Catch-up contribution limit (age 50 or older by end of 2016)	$6,000	$6,000
Annual compensation limit	$270,000	$265,000
Annual benefits payable under defined benefit plans	$215,000	$210,000
Annual allocations to accounts in defined contribution plans	$54,000 (but not more than 100% of compensation)	$53,000 (but not more than 100% of compensation)
Highly compensated employee	Compensation more than $120,000 in 2016 plan year	Compensation more than $120,000 in 2015 plan year

Health Savings Accounts
Calendar Year	2017	2016
Maximum contribution Family Self	$6,750 $3,400	$6,750 $3,350
Catch-up contribution (participants who are 55 by end of year)	$1,000	$1,000
Minimum deductible Family Self	$2,600 $1,300	$2,600 $1,300
Maximum out-of-pocket Family Self	$13,100 $6,550	$13,100 $6,550

Social Security
Calendar Year	2017	2016
Taxable wage base	$127,200	$118,500
Maximum earnings without loss of benefit
Under full retirement age	$1,410/mo. ($16,920/yr.)	$1,310/mo. ($15,720/yr.)
Year you reach full retirement age	$3,740/mo. up to mo. of full retirement age ($44,880/yr.)	$3,490/mo. up to mo. of full retirement age ($41,880/yr.)

Social Security Retirement Age
Year of Birth	Retirement Age
Prior to 1938	Age 65
1938	65 and 2 months
1939	65 and 4 months
1940	65 and 6 months
1941	65 and 8 months
1942	65 and 10 months
1943 – 1954	66
1955	66 and 2 months
1956	66 and 4 months
1957	66 and 6 months
1958	66 and 8 months
1959	66 and 10 months
1960 and later	67

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey A. DeVree, Thomas H. Bergh, Larry J. Titley, John D. Arendshorst, Katie K. Wilbur & Kristy L. De Vos of

Varnum LLP

IRS Provides Benefit Plan Relief to Louisiana Flood Victims

On August 14, 2016, President Obama declared a major disaster in the State of Louisiana due to the severe storms and flooding that took place in several State parishes (“Louisiana Storms”). Following the declaration, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued guidance postponing certain tax filings and payment deadlines for taxpayers who reside or work in the disaster area. The relief also provides qualifying individuals with expanded access to their retirement plan assets to alleviate hardships caused by the Louisiana Storms. Below is a summary of the filing extension for the Form 5500 series and administrative changes that employers can make to expedite plan loans and hardship distributions to Louisiana Storm victims.

Extension of Filing Deadlines

Plan sponsors in the affected parishes listed below now have until January 17, 2017, to file Form 5500 series returns, provided the return had an original or extended due date falling on or after August 11, 2016, and before January 17, 2017.

Relaxation of Hardship Distribution and Plan Loan Requirements

IRS Announcement 2016-30 (“Announcement”), issued on August 30, 2016, modifies certain verification procedures that may be required under retirement plans with respect to loans and hardship distributions. This relief allows qualifying individuals to quickly access assets in their “qualified employer plan” to alleviate hardships caused by the Louisiana Storms. Qualifying individuals include employees and former employees who have a principal residence or place of employment on August 11, 2016, located in one of the parishes identified below or who have a son, daughter, parent, grandparent, or other dependent with a principal residence or place of employment in one of the listed parishes on that date (“Qualifying Individuals”).

Acadia
Ascension
Avoyelles
East Baton Rouge
East Feliciana
Evangeline
Iberia
Iberville
Jefferson Davis
Lafayette
Livingston
Pointe Coupee
St. Helena
St. Landry
St. Martin
St. Tammany
Tangipahoa
Washington
West Feliciana
Vermilion

Other parishes may be added based on damage assessment by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The amount available for a hardship distribution is limited to the maximum amount permitted under the retirement plan and the IRS rules. However, Qualifying Individuals are permitted to use hardship proceeds for any hardship arising from the Louisiana Storms, for example, to repair or replace a home and to acquire food and shelter. Also, a Qualifying Individual may continue to make elective deferrals into the plan (the usual requirement to suspend deferrals for six months does not apply). Plan administrators may rely on the Qualifying Individual’s representations as to the need for and amount of the hardship distribution, unless the plan administrator has actual knowledge to the contrary. As soon as practicable the plan administrator can obtain any required documentation from the participant. Hardship distributions are includible in gross income and subject to the 10 percent excise tax that normally applies to a payment made before age 59-1/2 (unless Congress provides relief).

The IRS is also relaxing procedural and administrative rules that may apply to plan loans for a need arising from the Louisiana Storms. For example, if spousal consent is required for a plan loan or distribution and the employee claims his or her spouse is deceased, the plan may make the loan in the absence of a death certificate if it is reasonable to believe, under the circumstances, that the spouse is deceased, and the plan administrator makes reasonable efforts to obtain a copy of the death certificate as soon as practicable.

For purposes of the Announcement, a “qualified employer plan” includes a plan that meets the requirements of Code sections 401(a), 403(a), and 403(b), or a plan described in Code Section 457(b). Defined benefit plans and money purchase pension plans qualify, but only with respect to in-service hardship distributions from separate accounts, such as employee contributions or rollover amounts.

To qualify for relief, the plan loan or hardship distribution must be made no earlier than August 11, 2016, and no later than January 17, 2017.

If your retirement plan does not provide for loans or hardship distributions but you would like to allow storm victims to obtain loans or hardships, or if you would like to add flexibility to existing plan provisions, the plan must be amended no later than the end of the first plan year beginning after December 31, 2016 (December 31, 2017, for calendar year plans).

ARTICLE BY Timothy Brechtel, Susan Chambers & Ricardo X. Carlo of Jones Walker LLP

The Impact of Recently Proposed Regulations on Ineligible Nonqualified Plans Under Internal Revenue Code § 457(f)

The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service recently issued comprehensive proposed regulations governing nonqualified plans subject to tax under Internal Revenue Code § 457. Code § 457 prescribes the tax rules that apply to “eligible” and “ineligible” nonqualified deferred compensation plans. Code § 457(b) defines the requirements to be an “eligible” nonqualified plan; a deferred compensation plan that does not satisfy the requirements of Code § 457(b) is an “ineligible” plan under Code § 457(f). Eligible and ineligible plans may be maintained only by state or local governments or organizations exempt from tax under Code § 501(c). The proposed regulations make the following changes:

Eligible plans (Code § 457(b))

The proposed regulations would amend the final regulations issued in 2003 to reflect subsequent statutory changes made to Code § 457.

Ineligible plans(Code § 457(f))

The proposed regulations make good on the Service’s promise, made in Notice 2007-62, to issue “guidance regarding a substantial risk of forfeiture for purposes of § 457(f)(3)(B) under rules similar to those set forth under § 1.409A-1(d).” This promise prompted much concern amount ineligible plan sponsors and their advisors. Notice 2007-62 was aimed squarely at the interaction between Code § 457(f) and the then recently issued final regulations under Code § 409A. It was clear to many that the latter would have some consequences for the former. To what extent would Code § 409A force unwelcome changes to the rules governing ineligible plans of deferred compensation? When maintained by private sector tax-exempt entities, these plans are restricted to covering only senior management (or, in the parlance of ERISA, the “top-hat group”), which in many institutions, meant the chief executive officer. In particular, sponsors and their advisors worried about three, broad issues:

Will the narrower definition of ‘substantial risk of forfeiture” set forth in Code § 409A be applied to arrangements governed by Code § 457(f)?
Will elective deferrals continue to be allowed?
Will a non-compete agreement continue to operate to defer vesting (and hence the imposition of tax)?

Though not addressed in Notice 2007-62, sponsors of ineligible plans had the following additional worries relating to the interaction between Code § 457 and Code § 409A:

Code § 457 includes a carve-out for bona fide severance plans; Code § 409A similarly includes a carve-out for severance plans, but only for terminations based on an involuntary termination. It was only a matter of time they surmised, before the regulators intervened to “harmonize” the two provisions of the Code.
The final Code § 409A regulations contained detailed rules governing what constitutes an “involuntary termination of employment.” Whether a termination of employment is also (critically) important for purposes of Code §457, since only an involuntary termination can defer vesting. Will the same definition apply in each case?
How “constructive termination” actions (often referenced as “good reason” provisions) would operate as a basis for vesting of benefits for ineligible plans?

In this post, we examine the impact of the proposed regulations on ineligible plans under Code § 457(f) with a particular emphasis on the issues raised above. As a result—or at least it so appears—of comments received in response to Notice 2007-62, the worst fears of sponsors and advisors alike have not materialized. Once these rules are made final, however, there will be a “new” far more constrained “normal.” These regulations will introduce a new level of rigor into the design, maintenance and operation of ineligible deferred compensation plans.

Background

A “plan” for purposes of Code § 457 includes “any plan, agreement, method, program, or other arrangement, including an individual employment agreement, of an eligible employer under which the payment of compensation is deferred. There are, however, certain plans that are not subject to Code § 457. These include bona fide vacation leave, sick leave, compensatory time, severance pay, disability pay, and death benefit plans, plans paying solely length of service awards to bona fide volunteers (or their beneficiaries), and bona fide severance pay plans. While these exceptions apply to eligible and ineligible plans alike, the exception for bona fide severance pay plans is of particular interest to sponsors of ineligible plans…

ARTICLE BY Alden J. Bianchi, Tyrone P. Thomas & David R. Lagasse of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Tax Treatment of Bitcoin Has Many Open Questions

It has been over two years since the IRS came out with its initial position on the tax treatment of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, but there has yet to be any follow-up on questions that this initial position has raised. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has written a letter to the IRS urging the Service to publish additional guidance to provide more certainty on these open issues.

IRS Notice 2014-21 stated that virtual currencies are to be treated as property, not as currency. This was potentially good news to Bitcoin investors, since it would allow them to pay the lower long-term capital gains tax rate on profits if they held the Bitcoin for over a year. On the other hand, this position was inconvenient for consumers and merchants who use and accept virtual currencies as a means of exchange, because each transaction, no matter how small, must be reported in order to determine the amount of gain or loss every time a consumer uses the virtual currency as a means of exchange, and every time the merchant converts the virtual currency received in a transaction into U.S. currency.

In the two years since the IRS published Notice 2014-21, this classification of virtual currencies as property rather than a currency, many other questions have been raised, but have not been addressed. The letter from the AICPA sets them out:

(1) Determining Fair Market Value of the Virtual Currency: The IRS should publish guidance on whether a taxpayer can use any published exchange rate to determine the fair market value of virtual currencies, and whether the taxpayer must use the same published exchange rate for all other transactions. The letter notes that there are wide variance in the fair market value of Bitcoin on four Bitcoin published rates (Google, Bitcoin exchange rate, Bitstamp, CEX and Winkdex), citing an example selected at the same time, reflecting a range of value from a low of $227.84 to a high of $231.14.

(2) Expenses of Obtaining Virtual Currencies: Are the expenses to mine virtual currencies currently deductible, or are they to be added to the basis of the mined currency? This would normally be an easy call – costs would normally be added to the basis of the property that is manufactured – but the 2014 guidance intimates that this might not be the case.

(3) Tracking Basis of Virtual Currency: Because virtual currencies are treated as property, the taxpayer must track the cost of purchasing each unit acquired, in order to determine the taxable gain when it is sold (including every time a consumer uses it to purchase goods and services). The AICPA letter says that tracking the basis for virtual currency is virtually impossible when it is used in everyday commerce, and asked for the IRS to consider alternative means to determine basis.

(4) General Transaction Rules Applicable to Property: The AICPA letter asks whether the general tax rules applicable to property (rather than currencies) would apply to virtual currencies. For example, the letter asks whether a taxpayer would be able to take advantage of the tax free like-kind exchange rules of section 1031 if one type of virtual currency is exchanged for a different type of virtual currency (for example, a Bitcoin for Ethereum exchange).

(5) Character of Virtual Currencies Held By Merchants: How should virtual currencies that are accepted by a merchant be classified for tax purposes – as a capital asset or as an ordinary income asset?

(6) Charitable Contributions: Does a contribution of virtual currencies to a charitable organization require a formal appraisal? The general rule is that if a taxpayer donates property worth more than $5,000 to a charitable organization, the taxpayer must obtain a formal appraisal to support the amount to be deducted as a charitable contribution. There is an exception, where an appraisal is not needed for the donation of securities that are traded on a published exchange. The letter asks whether the donation of virtual currency should be subject to the same exception, since they are traded on published exchanges.

(7) Is Virtual Currency a Commodity: If virtual currencies are treated as a commodity, would it be subject to the mark-to-market rules for commodity traders?

(8) How About a De Minimus Exception For Small Transactions: The letter asks the IRS for an exception to the rule requiring a taxpayer to report each virtual currency transaction as a taxable sale of property when used to make small consumer purchases.

(9) Retirement Accounts: Can virtual currencies be held as an investment in a qualified retirement plan (like a 401(k) plan)? The rules for eligible investments in such plans limit the types of property than can be held in a qualified retirement plan.

(10) Foreign Reporting Requirements: Are virtual currencies subject to Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBAR) and/or Foreign Bank Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) reporting?

As these issues get worked out, others are likely to arise. Until they are addressed by the IRS, the uncertainty will likely inhibit the growth of virtual currencies in the U.S. economy.

To see a copy of the AICPA letter to the IRS, please click here.

ARTICLE BY Marvin A. Kirsner of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

In Wake of Panama Papers Scandal Obama Calls for Stricter Bank Regulations, Tax Rules

In a news conference today President Obama addressed rules and proposed regulations announced Thursday intended to help the U.S. fight tax evasion and other crimes connected to anonymous offshore companies and accounts. The announcements come after a month of intense review by the administration following the first release of the so-called Panama Papers, millions of documents stolen or leaked from Panamanian law firm Mossack, Fonseca. The papers have revealed a who’s who of international politicians, business leaders, sports figures and celebrities involved with financial transactions accomplished through anonymous shell corporations.

The new regulations include a “customer due diligence” rule requiring banks, mutual funds, securities brokers and other financial institutions to determine, verify and keep records about the actual ownership of the companies with whom they do business. The administration has also proposed regulations requiring owners of foreign-owned “single-member limited liability companies” to obtain employer identification numbers from the IRS. In an effort to increase transparency and address “the problem of global tax avoidance,” both rules are intended to make more easily discoverable the actual ownership of offshore companies and accounts, allowing for easier investigation of suspected fraud, tax evasion and money laundering. Currently, companies can do business in the U.S. anonymously by registering in states that do not require full disclosure of actual ownership.

The new rules create regulatory obligations for a broad array of financial institutions, and potential new obligations for off-shore investors. A further release of Panama Papers is expected on Monday, with the identities of many U.S. companies and individuals involved in such “anonymous” shell corporations likely to be revealed, and greater scrutiny of such transactions and the financial institutions involved with them likely to follow.

Article By Raymond C. Marshall & David S. Cannon of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

The Proposed Political Subdivision Regulations: A Puzzling Reference Impacts Legal Framework of Official Legal Signals

Treasury recently issued proposed regulations that tell us whether an entity is a “political subdivision” that can issue tax-exempt bonds on its own behalf. One requirement is that an entity must serve a “governmental purpose” to be a political subdivision. The proposed regulations say that an entity is only organized for a governmental purpose if the entity operates “in a manner that provides a significant public benefit with no more than incidental benefit to private persons.” As support for this statement, the proposed regulations contain this citation: “Cf., Rev. Rul. 90–74 (1990–2 CB 34).”

This year marks the 90th anniversary of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, and last year, the 20th edition of the text was published. The Bluebook is written by law review editors at several top-tier law schools. Depending on your perspective, it is either what it purports to be (a uniform system of citation) or a loathsome testament to the “reflex desire of every profession to convince the laity of the inscrutable rigor of its methods.”[1] (Or both.) There have been several pretenders to the throne, including the Maroonbook, created at the University of Chicago law school years ago, which has faded away, and the ALWD Citation Manual, created by teachers of legal writing in law school as a more user-friendly alternative. The ALWD manual has been adopted by a few jurisdictions, but the Bluebook still reigns. Each text provides for the usage of “citation signals” that introduce the citation and explain its relevance to the point that the author is making; the “Cf.” signal in the proposed political subdivision regulations is an example.

The signal “cf.” is an abbreviation for the Latin word “confer,” which translates to “compare.” It depends on which edition of The Bluebook you’re reading, but the 18^th Edition (we work on a shoestring budget here at The Public Finance Tax Blog), like most modern editions, says this about the “cf.” signal: “Cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. . . The citation’s relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained.” Among the signals that an author can use to show that the cited authority supports the position the author asserts, “cf.” is the weakest.

But because the proposed political subdivision regulations offer no other support for the position that an entity cannot provide more than incidental private benefits and remain a political subdivision, one can only believe that Treasury must have meant something entirely different and that, at long last, the lowly “cf.” signal might be taking on new prominence.

And now, members of the legal citation community are scrambling to react to what could be a revolution in citation signal usage.

“Just as Darwin had his finches and Mendel had his peas, we now have these proposed regulations from Treasury,” said one editor of ALWD. “I guess ‘cataclysm’ is probably too strong of a word to describe it,” she told The Public Finance Tax Blog. “But oh yeah, we definitely noticed.”

She told us that “we at ALWD consider ourselves more describers of ‘what is’ in legal citation practice, rather than dispensers of ‘what ought to be’ like those silverspoons over at The Bluebook.”[2]

“The fact is,” the ALWD editor continued, “the meaning of ‘cf.’ has changed many times over the years, [3] and we may be witnessing the latest evolution of the phrase here. Who says that a government agency can’t be on the cutting edge of social change in important areas like citation policy?”

“It’s certainly true that ‘cf.’ has always been the signal that gives courts and lawyers the hardest time to understand,”[4] another editor told us. “But who says that regulations – particularly tax regulations – are supposed to be easy to understand?”

Over at The Bluebook, the editors were a bit less perturbed. “Look, we make the rules here,” said one editor, swatting away a fair trade soy latte offered up by a cowering 2L line-slugger. “We are mindful of the actual – I SAID NO FOAM! GET IT RIGHT, OR WE’RE CANCELING THE 5-HOUR BLUEBOOK EXAM FOR TOMORROW – usage of these terms, though,” she said, “and we’re obviously going to resist changing our minds based on a single usage, even if it comes from the federal government.”

“In the past, we’ve resisted changing our minds based on some of the more fatuous uses of the cf. signal,[5] so we want to wait and see whether this is some kind of joke or mistake or just a passing fad, using ‘cf.’ to introduce the sole source of authority for a proposition.” She continued, “but it appears that this might be a good-faith attempt to finally give ‘cf.’ the rightful place it deserves instead of leaving it buried at the bottom of the pile of citation signals that show support.”

“But we’ve really got our hands full with preparations for the 21st edition, and dealing with those maniacs over at Baby Blue ripping off our work to worry about this, though. And no, all you weisenheimers; cf. does not stand for ‘couldn’t find,’ and no you’re not funny.”

It’s obviously easy to criticize the furor over the potential elevation of the status of the lowly “cf.” signal to something more as a tempest in the world’s nerdiest teapot. It’s not as though these mundane citation signal questions are literally[6] a matter of life and death.[7]

Calls to Judge Richard Posner, eminent judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and a frequent critic of the inanity of the world of legal citation, were left unreturned, although I think I heard the crackling of a bonfire in the background.

Article By John W. Hutchinson of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

^{[1] Richard Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 Yale L. J. 850, 860-61 (2011).}

^{[2] Cf. (not really) Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools Can Cure our Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of Open and Equal Access to the Law, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 491, 500, at n. 48 (2007) (citing Alex Glashausser, Citation and Representation, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 59, 78 (2002), as “praising the ALWD Manual as a populist instrument that promulgates citation rules predicated upon a consensus among legal professionals, rather than “the judgment of student editors at elite law schools”).}

^{[3] Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting our Signals Uncrossed, 48 Duke L.J. 1043, 1050 (March 1999) (“The authors of The Bluebook altered its definition – albeit subtly – almost every time the manual was printed between 1947 and 1996.”)}

^{[4] See A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-uniform System of Citation: Surviving with the new Bluebook (Including Compendia of State and Federal Court Rules Concerning Citation Form), 26 Stetson L. Rev. 53, 221, at n. 90 (1996) (citing Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 938 n.14 (2d Cir. 1984); Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 881 n.5 (1st Cir. 1980); Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1977); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864, 867 n.4 (7th Cir. 1976); Givens v. United States, 644 A.2d 1373, 1376 (D.C. App. 1994) (Mack, S.J., dissenting); Connell v. Francisco, 89a P.2d 831, 838 (Wash. 1995) (Utter, J., dissenting); see also Givens, 644 A.2d at 1374 n.3 (concerning the “but cf.” signal)). Dickerson goes on: “As one reviewer observed: ‘The introductory signals approved by the Bluebook have been the source of dispositive judicial debate. A single “cf.” signal in a Supreme Court decision fostered extensive scrutiny among the circuits, and, with singular irony, the Bluebook was the source of ultimate authority in settling the legal questions raised in the cases.’ Peter Phillips, Book Note, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 199, 199-200 (1987) (reviewing the Fourteenth Edition) (footnotes omitted). The case at issue was Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.36 (1976). See Phillips, supra, at 200 n.8.”}

^{[5] See, e.g., Peter Lushing, Book Review, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 599, 601 (1967) (providing a review of The Bluebook’s Eleventh Edition) (“Use cf. when you’ve wasted your time reading the case.”); Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 312 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., joined by Scalia, Starr, Silberman, & Buckley, JJ., noting that the use of the cf. signal means that the cited authority is “probably inapposite”).}

^{[6] Oxford English Dictionary, Third Ed., Sept. 2011, item I(1)(a), (b), but not (c). (available online at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/109061?redirectedFrom=literally).}

^{[7] Gallacher, supra n. 2 at 536, n. 38 (“At least one capital punishment appeal appears to have been decided based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a bibliographical signal, “cf.,” and the signal’s meaning in the context of the prisoner’s brief. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1997).”). The language from the Lambrix opinion: “And it introduced that lone citation with a “cf.”–an introductory signal which shows authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that “controls” or “dictates” the result.” 520 U.S. at 529.}

Tag: Tax

Better Care Reconciliation Act – Key Takeaways for Employers and Plan Sponsors

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