Tag: SEC

Government Brings First Cryptocurrency Insider Trading Charges

In a series of parallel actions announced on July 21, 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated criminal and civil charges against three defendants in the first cryptocurrency insider trading case.

According to the criminal indictment, DOJ alleges that a former employee of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange used his position at the exchange to obtain confidential information about at least 25 future cryptocurrency listings, then tipped his brother and a friend who traded the digital assets in advance of the listing announcements, realizing gains of approximately $1.5 million. The indictment further alleges that the trio used various means to conceal their trading, and that one defendant attempted to flee the United States when their trading was discovered. The Government charged the three with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy. Notably, and like the Government’s recently announced case involving insider trading in nonfungible tokens, criminal prosecutors did not charge the defendants with securities or commodities fraud.

In its press release announcing the charges, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Damian Williams said: “Today’s charges are a further reminder that Web3 is not a law-free zone. Just last month, I announced the first ever insider trading case involving NFTs, and today I announce the first ever insider trading case involving cryptocurrency markets. Our message with these charges is clear: fraud is fraud is fraud, whether it occurs on the blockchain or on Wall Street. And the Southern District of New York will continue to be relentless in bringing fraudsters to justice, wherever we may find them.”

Based on these facts, the SEC also announced charges against the three men in a civil complaint alleging securities fraud. In order to assert jurisdiction over the matter, the SEC alleges that at least nine of the cryptocurrencies involved in the alleged insider trading were securities, and the compliant traces through the Howey analysis for each. The SEC has not announced charges against the exchange itself, though in the past it has charged at least one cryptocurrency exchange that listed securities tokens for failure to register as a securities exchange. Perhaps coincidentally, on July 21 the exchange involved in the latest DOJ and SEC cases filed a rulemaking petition with the SEC urging it to “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods, including potential rules to identify which digital assets are securities.”

In an unusual move, Commissioner Caroline Pham of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) released a public statement criticizing the charges. Citing the Federalist Papers, Commissioner Pham described the cases as “a striking example of ‘regulation by enforcement.’” She noted that “the SEC’s allegations could have broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.” Commissioner Pham continued, “Major questions are best addressed through a transparent process that engages the public to develop appropriate policy with expert input—through notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” She concluded by stating that, “Regulatory clarity comes from being out in the open, not in the dark.” The CFTC is not directly involved in either case, and it is atypical for a regulator to chide a sister agency on an enforcement matter in this fashion. On the same day, another CFTC Commissioner, Kristin Johnson, issued her own carefully-worded statement that seemed to support the Government’s actions.

Article By Scott H. Kimpel of Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

What Public Comments on the SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Rules Reveal—and the Impact They May Have on the Proposed Rules

On March 21, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published for comment its much-anticipated proposed rules on climate disclosures, entitled “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”[1]  The SEC invited public comments on these rules, and the response was overwhelming—nearly 15,000 comments were published on the SEC’s website over the course of three months, from individuals and organizations representing all aspects of modern American society.  Few, if any, of the SEC’s rule proposals have ever received such voluminous, significant, and diverse comments.  And the comments themselves range from brief statements to complex legal arguments either in support or in opposition, as well as detailed proposals for further changes to the proposed climate disclosures.  The comment period closed on June 17, 2022, and further action by the SEC to finalize the proposed rule is anticipated this fall.

This article provides a brief summary of the comments, and analyzes and summaries the key points the comments conveyed.

Statistical Analysis of Form and Individualized Submissions

Since the beginning of the public comment period, the SEC has received 14,645 comments on the proposed climate disclosure rules.[2]  To provide some context for how massive that figure is, the SEC has only received 144 comments on its proposed cybersecurity risk management rules, which were announced two weeks before the proposed climate disclosures and have also been the subject of extensive commentary in the press.  Yet despite the prominence of the SEC’s cybersecurity proposal, it has received fewer than 1% of the comments offered on the climate disclosure rule.

Of the 14,645 comments, approximately 12,304, or 84% of the total, are form letters.  This includes 10,589 comments that the SEC itself identified as form letters, and another 1,715 apparently individualized comments that were actually form letters.  However, even when removing these form letters from consideration, fully 2,341 individualized comment letters remain—a substantial number, and a significant percentage (16%) of the volume.[3]

The form letters are worth exploring in more detail.  Of the 12,304 comments, fully 10,861 (88%) broadly express support for the proposed climate disclosure rule, and only 1,443 (12%) are in opposition.  This disparity in the level of support for the two positions is best conveyed by the chart below.

Positions for and against the new SEC Disclosures

Notably, it has been possible to identify some, although not all, of the organizations that sponsored the form letter writing campaign.  In particular, form letters proposed by the Union of Concerned Scientists in support of the proposed climate disclosures were submitted 6886 times—more than 55% of the total volume of form letters.  Additionally, the form letters proposed by the Climate Action Campaign and the National Wildlife Federation in support of the SEC’s proposed disclosures were also quite voluminous among the submissions—1208 and 956 comment letters, respectively.  The most frequent form letters submitted in opposition to the proposed climate disclosure rules—e.g., those proposed by FreedomWorks (348 letters) and the Club for Growth (172 letters)—did not achieve nearly the same volume of submissions.

But the apparent overwhelming majority in favor of the proposed SEC climate disclosure rules, as conveyed by the form letters, is belied by the individualized submissions, which were far more closely divided.  Of the 2341 individualized comment letters submitted, approximately 53% (1238 comment letters) expressed support, about 43% (1015 comment letters) were opposed, and a handful—around 4% (88 comment letters)[4]—did not express a position.  The below chart demonstrates the levels of support expressed by the individualized submissions:

Individual submissions supporting, opposing, and neutral to the new SEC Disclosures

Besides the mere volume of submissions, however, the most noteworthy aspect of the individualized submissions are the substantive arguments—both factual and legal—that these comment letters articulate, whether in support or opposition to the proposed rules, as well as the identity of those making these submissions.

Arguments in Support of the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

The organizations and individuals that chose to offer support for the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures represent a wide swathe of society.  Broadly speaking, these proposed climate disclosures attracted support from, among others: Democratic politicians, civil society organizations (such as environmental NGOs), individual corporations, professional services organizations, and academics. While the rationales offered by these different groups varied considerably, in part due to their varying perspectives (e.g., environmental NGOs were more concerned with the impact on the transition to a clean-energy environment, while corporations often focused on the consequences of particular aspects of the rules), the individualized comments in support of the proposed disclosures nonetheless shared some common features.

Specifically, there are a number of common arguments that are frequently featured among the 1239 individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.  Six arguments appear in over 10% of the submissions.  In order of prevalence, these are:

  1. Environmental Protection (347 submissions, 28%): that the proposed rules will help protect the environment
  2. Investor Choice (280 submissions, 23%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to make more informed choices
  3. Investor Protection (263 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to protect themselves and their investments from climate-related risk
  4. Standardization of Climate Disclosures (259 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable the standardization of climate disclosures, making data comparable
  5. Increased Transparency (171 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will increase transparency and hold companies accountable for their emissions
  6. Alignment with International and Foreign Regulatory Frameworks (169 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will bring the United States into alignment with both international frameworks and other countries (e.g., the EU)

No other argument appeared in more than 6% of the individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.

Notably, the most common arguments in favor of the proposed climate disclosures share a common feature: these are all policy arguments, focusing on the benefits to investors and the broader economy from the adoption of the SEC’s proposed disclosures.  Only a single argument among the top ten most frequent arguments in support was a legal argument—namely that the proposed rules fall within the SEC’s statutory authority—and that argument appeared in only around 3% of the submissions (41 submissions).[5]  This focus on policy benefits among supporters of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures is unsurprising, as these public policy rationales were a key factor in encouraging the Biden Administration to pursue this regulatory agenda.  However, the reluctance to engage with critics of the proposed climate disclosures on a legal basis may signal the difficulties that the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures may encounter in future court challenges.

Arguments in Opposition to the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

Those entities and individuals that submitted individualized comment letters opposing the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures also represent a broad range of American society, albeit with a somewhat different focus.  Generally, individualized letters in opposition to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures tended to be submitted by, among others: Republican politicians, individual corporations, trade industry groups, and NGOs. (Unsurprisingly, the fossil fuel industry and extractive industries were particularly well-represented among the commenters.)  These individualized submissions—frequently lengthy and extensively analyzing the SEC’s regulatory practices and authority—shared a number of common themes.

In particular, there are a number of common arguments that featured frequently among the 1014 individualized submissions to the SEC in opposition to these proposed climate disclosures.  Three (3) arguments appeared in more than ten (10) percent of these submissions:

  1. Ultra vires (322 submissions, 32% ): that the SEC lacks the ability to issue these disclosures as the proposed rule is beyond the scope of the SEC’s legal authority
  2. Compliance Costs (218 submissions, 21% ): that compliance with the proposed rule will impose unreasonable and extensive costs on businesses
  3. Climate Science Skepticism (123 submissions, 12%): that the science concerning climate change is unsettled and therefore the proposed rule is inappropriate

Although no other common argument appeared in more than 7% of the individualized letters in opposition, it should still be noted that there were a large number of letters that objected to the increased burdens placed on particular types of businesses, whether farmers (53 submissions, 5%), fossil fuel companies (49 submissions, 5%), or small businesses (36 submissions, 4%).

Overall, it is striking that around a third of the comments submitted in opposition stated that the SEC had acted beyond its authority (ultra vires) in proposing this new rule.  While this critique is hardly novel—it has been a frequent refrain of the Republican SEC Commissioners ever since this topic was first broached—the prevalence of this argument among the individualized comments suggests that both the public and sophisticated market actors perceive this issue as a key vulnerability in the SEC’s proposal, and that this legal argument will likely be emphasized in the inevitable legal challenge to this SEC rule.  And, based on recent decisions by the Supreme Court, it is altogether likely that this line of attack may find a sympathetic audience in the courts.

Potential Changes to the SEC Climate Disclosure Rules Resulting from Public Comments

Despite the differences between the advocates and opponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, both sides submitted proposals to the SEC to change or adjust the proposed rules.  Although there was often substantial disagreement about the content of these proposed changes, there were also significant areas of convergence.

Some of the changes to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures frequently submitted by supporters of the rule included:

  1. ISSB: that the SEC should further align its proposal with the ISSB and help create a global standard (76 comments);
  2. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (72 comments);
  3. Alignment with International and Foreign Standards: that the SEC should further align its proposal with international and foreign standards, such as the EU or TCFD (66 comments);
  4. Enhance Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to eliminate exemptions so that all companies must disclose Scope 3 GHG emissions (55 comments);
  5. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (53) comments;
  6. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (36 comments);
  7. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (26 comments).

Although certain proposed changes by proponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule are undeniably expected (e.g., removing exemptions for disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions), there are others that seem somewhat surprising on initial review (e.g., extending the phase-in period or removing Scope 3 GHG emissions entirely).  This can most easily be explained by the fact that supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule include corporations and other business interests, which will resist certain burdensome regulations even if generally offering support for the overall thrust of the proposal.  There are also academics and others who continue to express skepticism concerning the utility of disclosing Scope 3 emissions, or even whether it can be adequately measured.

It should be emphasized that these changes proffered by supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule, many of which are designed to render the proposed rule less onerous, may indicate that the support for the proposed rule—or at least the most stringent aspects of it—is relatively weak (or at least among the corporate interests nominally aligned with the SEC).

The most frequent changes suggested by opponents of the rule included:

  1. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (69 comments);
  2. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (35 comments);
  3. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (25 comments);
  4. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (18 comments).

These proposed changes (and others) advanced by opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule are generally designed to make the rules less stringent and also to reduce costs and potential legal liability.

As can be seen by comparing the above lists, there are certain areas where suggested changes to the proposed rule converged.  In particular, there are issues where both opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule and some of its supporters would try to render it less intrusive or impactful, particularly with respect to the elimination of the requirement to report Scope 3 GHG emissions and to extend the phase-in period further.  (Although, as noted, this apparent convergence between opponents and supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule may be due to divergent interests among the supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule with respect to its implementation.)

But, regardless of the specific content of the particular proposed changes, what is undoubtedly significant is that these proposed changes have highlighted the aspects of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule that are likely most sensitive to regulated corporations.  Such an insight reveals not only the areas where active lobbying is most likely to take place, but also previews probable priorities for corporate compliance departments.  In effect, focusing on the aspects of the proposed rule where changes were proposed is a means to identify the key issues from the perspective of the regulated entities and the public at large.

Conclusion

The level of engagement with the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, as demonstrated by the number and detail of the public comments offered, is extraordinary. This degree of attention indicates the significant impact that is expect to result from the ultimate promulgation of these rules (or a revised version thereof).

Of course, the key question here is what changes, if any, are likely to be made to the SEC’s proposed rule based upon the public comments submitted to the SEC.  In this context, it is noteworthy that a handful of key issues have been identified by both proponents and opponents of the proposed disclosures as especially ripe for potential revision.  As noted above, these include, among others, the length of the phase-in period and the disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions.  If any changes are to be made to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule, it is likely that such changes will be related to these issues.

However, given the relative lack of forward momentum with respect to other aspects of the Biden Administration’s climate agenda, there may well be political pressure not to weaken or otherwise rollback the SEC’s proposed rule, as this is one of the few areas where significant—and publicly-recognized—progress has been made with regulations designed to address the issue of climate change.  Further, the Biden Administration’s SEC has certainly recognized the inevitability of a legal challenge to these proposed climate disclosures, and, since no degree of alteration would suffice to preempt such a lawsuit, the SEC may conclude that it is better to seek to implement all aspects of the proposed regulation for the political benefit that can be achieved in the short term, since the substantive aspects of the proposed disclosure may not ultimately survive judicial scrutiny.  The SEC may also prefer to send a strong signal to the market by maintaining its original proposed rule.  Recognizing these pressures, it seems unlikely that the public comments submitted to the SEC will have a significant impact on the final rule promulgated in the coming months—and improbable that the SEC will make the proposed disclosures less robust.

FOO​TNOTES

[1] These proposed rules are discussed more fully in our prior publication:  https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2451/2022-03-30-brief-summary-secs-proposed-climate-related-rules

[2] Although the total number of comments, when including both form letters and individualized letters, is 14,739, there are 94 comment letters on the SEC website that are duplicates, and have thus been removed from the calculation.

[3] For comparison, the proposed SEC rule on disclosing compensation ratios drew about 300,000 form letters and around 1500 individualized comment letters.  In this case, the individualized comment letters represented only about 0.5% of the total volume.  https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml

[4] The eighty-eight comment letters that did not adopt an express position on the proposed climate disclosure rules instead conveyed a number of different points, including proposing narrow changes to the proposed rule without taking a stance on the rule as a whole, or offering further context for the SEC’s actions (e.g., comparing the SEC to other regulators, whether domestic or international).  This category also includes a number of early comments that simply requested that the SEC extend the deadline for submitting comments.

[5] There are public comments in support of the proposed rule that focus on the legal issues.  In particular, the submission of Prof. John Coates of Harvard Law School, a former SEC official, is devoted exclusively to defending the legal authority of the SEC to issue the proposed climate disclosure rule. https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130026-296547.pdf

Article By Jacob H. Hupart, Megan N. Gates, William F. Weld, Douglas P. Baumstein, Jennifer B. Rubin, and Courtney O. Taylor of Mintz. Luke Haubenstock also contributed to this article.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

A Fool in Idaho; SEC Sues Idahoans for Insider Trading Scheme

In July 1993 two brothers, David and Tom Gardner, and a friend, Erik Rydholm, founded a private investment advisory firm in Alexandria, Virginia. They named that firm Motley Fool after the court jester in “As You Like It,” a play written by William Shakespeare (it is believed in 1599). The Motley Fool, or Touchstone as he is known in the play, was the only character who could speak the truth to Duke Frederick without having his head cut off. Similarly, Motley Fool, the advisory firm, sought to give investors accurate advice, even if it flew in the face of received wisdom. For example, in advance of April Fool’s Day 1994, Motley Fool issued a series of online messages promoting a non-existent sewage-disposal company. The April Fool’s Day prank was intended to teach investors a lesson about penny stock companies. The messages gained widespread attention including an article in The Wall Street Journal.

Over time Motley Fool grew into a worldwide subscription stock recommendation service. It now releases new recommendations every Thursday, and subscribers receive them through computer interfaces provided by Motley Fool. The terms of service in a Motley Fool subscription agreement (in the words of the May 3, 2022 Complaint brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [“SEC”] in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York) “expressly prohibit unauthorized access to its systems.”  David Lee Stone of Nampa, Idaho (southwest of Boise), is a 36-year-old computer design and repair person with a degree in computer science.  Since June 2021, he and his wife have lived periodically in Romania, a fact cited in the Complaint, suggesting, perhaps, some involvement with Romania-based computer hackers. In any event, Stone is alleged in the Complaint to have used deceptive means beginning in November 2020 to obtain pre-release access to upcoming Motley Fool stock picks. Using that information, Stone and a co-defendant made aggressive investments, typically in options, which generated more than $12 million in gains. Stone, his codefendant, and his family and friends all benefited financially from knowing in advance the Motley Fool picks.

The SEC seeks injunctions against Stone and his co-defendant, as well as disgorgement with interest and civil penalties, for violating the antifraud provisions of federal law. The Commission also seeks disgorgement with interest from the family and friends. In addition, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has filed criminal charges against Stone.

This case is in many ways reminiscent of the 1985 federal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (who happened to be Rudolph Giuliani at the time) of R. Foster Winans. Winans was, from 1982 to 1984, the co-author of “Heard on the Street,” a column in The Wall Street Journal. Winans leaked advance word of what would be in his column to a stockbroker who then invested with the benefit of that information, sharing some of the profits with Winans. Winans argued that his actions were unethical, but not criminal. He was found guilty of insider trading and wire fraud and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He appealed his conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court rulings.

Attempting to profit on market sensitive information can be both a civil and a criminal offense. The SEC Enforcement Division and the relevant U.S. Attorney are prepared to introduce a perpetrator to those consequences.

Article By Peter D. Hutcheon of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.1  Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole.  Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence.  The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”2

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission.  There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct.  Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders.  Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003.  Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast.  SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.3  Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”4  The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”5 including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.6  To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.7

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.8  Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.9  Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.10  The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.11  Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.12

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission.  Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”13 and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”14

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.15  The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws.  When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.16  If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”17  Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.18  To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission.  Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,19 a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole.  The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”20  Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence.  Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.21  Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public.  Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system.  Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable.  This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice.  According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions.  Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance.  Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters.  Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.22  Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307.  Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

  • Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
  • Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
  • Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
  • Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
  • Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
  • Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
  • Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants.  She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel.  Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy.  Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.”  As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”23  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”24

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority.  Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards.  The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy.  Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003.  Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.25  But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted.  Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”26  Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”27 a standard that has been left undefined to date.28  In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”29  At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.30  Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner.  In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement.  The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.31  The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”32  As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course.  If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties.  First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”33  Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege.  Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice.  In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.34  The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances.  Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.35  That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.36  In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries.  The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices.  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed.  Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets.  Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession.  It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021).  In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions.  The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct.  Id. at *51.  Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right.  Id.  Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion.  Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures.  The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100.  The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper.  At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission.  To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association,  (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2  (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more Securities & SEC, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

How Changing Beneficial Ownership Reporting May Impact Activism

The SEC in February proposed amendments to Regulation 13D-G to modernize beneficial ownership reporting requirements. Adoption of the amendments as proposed will accelerate the timing – and expand the scope – of knowledge of certain activist activities. The deadline for comments on the proposed rules was April 11 and final rules are expected to be released later this year.

The current reporting timeline creates an asymmetry of information between beneficial owners on the one hand and other stockholders and issuers on the other. The SEC proposal is seeking to eliminate this asymmetry and address other concerns surrounding current beneficial ownership reporting. The accelerated beneficial ownership reporting deadlines will result in greater transparency in stock ownership, allowing market participants to receive material information in a timely manner and potentially alleviating the market manipulation and abusive tactics used by some investors.

The shortened filing deadlines should benefit a company’s overall shareholder engagement activities. The investor relations team at a company will have a more accurate and up-to-date picture of its institutional investor base throughout the year, which should result in more timely outreach to such shareholders.

INVESTOR ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BEFORE DISCLOSURE

Although issuers will likely view the proposed rules as beneficial, many commentators have predicted a negative impact on shareholder activism. Under the current reporting requirements, certain activist investors may benefit by having both additional time to accumulate shares before disclosing such activities and potentially more flexibility in strategizing with other investors.

Many commentators have argued that the proposed shorter timeline for beneficial ownership reporting will negatively impact an activist shareholder’s ability to accumulate shares of an issuer at a potentially lower price than if market participants had more timely knowledge of such activity and intent. In many cases a company’s stock price is impacted once an investor files a Schedule 13D with clear activist intent. This can even occur in some cases once a Schedule 13G is filed by a known activist investor without current activist intent.

If the shorter reporting deadlines reduce such investors’ profit, it is expected that an investor’s incentive to accumulate stock in order to initiate change at a company will also be reduced. Activists instead may be encouraged to engage more with management. In other words, the shorter reporting period may deter short-term activists and encourage more long-term focused activism.

TIMING OF ISSUER RESPONSE

The shorter reporting deadlines are also expected to result in management having earlier notice of any takeover attempt and to give a company the opportunity to react more quickly to any such attempt. There is potential for this to lead to increased use of low-threshold poison pills. But the SEC stated in the proposed rules release that it believes the risk of abundant reactionary low-threshold poison pills is overstated due to scrutiny of such poison pills from courts and academia, limitations imposed by state law and the unlikelihood that the beneficial ownership would trigger the low-threshold poison pills.

Companies that have low-threshold poison pills – such as one designed to protect a company’s net operating losses – may want to review them to confirm that the proposed rules would not be expected to have any impact. For example, such poison pills may link the definition of beneficial ownership to the SEC rules, including Schedule 13D and 13G filings.

‘GROUP’ REPORTING

Another proposed change expected to affect shareholder activism is the expanded definition of ‘group’ for the purposes of reporting under Schedule 13D. The current rules require an explicit agreement between two or more persons to establish a group for purposes of the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds.

Commentators believe that under the current rules, certain investors seeking change at a company may share the fact that they are accumulating shares of a company with other shareholders or activists, which can then act on this information before the general public is aware; in other words, before public disclosure in and market reaction to the Schedule 13D filing. This activity may result in near-term gains for the select few involved before uninformed shareholders can react.

Under the SEC’s proposed amended Rule 13d-5, persons who share information with another regarding an upcoming Schedule 13D filing are deemed to have formed a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) regardless of whether an explicit agreement is in place, and such concerted action will trigger reporting requirements. This proposed change is expected to benefit companies and shareholders overall by preventing certain investors from acting in concert on information not known to a company and its other shareholders.

The full impact of the proposed rule changes on shareholder activism cannot be accurately predicted, but we believe that at a minimum, issuers will find it beneficial to have more regularly updated information on their institutional investor base for, among other things, their shareholder engagement efforts.

Article By Alexandra Clark Layfield and Rachel Solino of  Jones Walker LLP

For more Securities and SEC news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP

Preparing to Testify in Response to an SEC Subpoena

When investigating companies, brokerage firms, investment advisors, and other entities and individuals, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies heavily on its subpoena power. Once the SEC launches a formal investigation, it can issue administrative subpoenas to the company executives, brokers, and others. These subpoenas may be a subpoena duces tecum which compels the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents in his possession or control, or a subpoena ad testificandum which compels the person to whom it is addressed to appear at a specific time and place and testify under oath or affirmation. Crucially, while these subpoenas do not require judicial approval, they are subject to judicial enforcement.

With this in mind, receiving an SEC subpoena is not a matter to be taken lightly. Individuals who have been subpoenaed to testify must thoroughly prepare their testimony, and they need to make sure they know what to expect when the day arrives.

Testifying before the SEC is fraught with potential risks. It is imperative that subpoena recipients devote the necessary time to their preparations, and that they work with their counsel to proactively identify and address all potential areas of concern.

Understanding Why You Have Received an SEC Subpoena

When preparing to testify before the SEC, a key first step is to understand why you have been subpoenaed. Broadly speaking, the SEC focuses its enforcement efforts on two areas: (i) protecting U.S. investors, and (ii) preserving the integrity of U.S. capital markets. As a result, most SEC investigations target allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy, and other offenses in one (or both) of these areas.

The SEC’s subpoena should provide at least some insight into the focus and scope of the SEC investigation. However, gathering the information you need to make informed decisions may require examination of other sources as well. For example, it will be helpful if you can identify anyone else who has received a subpoena or Wells Notice related to the investigation, and it may be prudent to conduct an internal compliance audit focused on uncovering any issues that could come to light.

Questions You Should Be Prepared to Answer During Your SEC Testimony

When preparing SEC testimony, it is important to keep in mind that you could easily be fielding questions for six hours or longer. While this can seem overwhelming, SEC subpoena recipients can generally expect to be asked questions in seven main categories. These main categories are:

  • Preliminary Matters
  • Background and Personal Information
  • Your Role Within Your Company or Firm
  • The Scope of Your Duties
  • Investors
  • Due Diligence
  • Clarifying and Closing the Record

1. Questions Regarding Preliminary Matters

SEC subpoena recipients can initially expect a series of questions that are designed to provide the SEC with insight into the steps they took to prepare their testimony. While these questions are largely procedural, some can present traps for the unwary. At the beginning of the session, you should be prepared to succinctly and confidently answer questions such as:

  • Did you get the opportunity to review the Formal Order associated with this matter?
  • Do you have any questions regarding the Formal Order?
  • Did you complete the Background Questionnaire by yourself?
  • Are the contents within the Background Questionnaire truthful and accurate?
  • Is there any information you wish to add to the Background Questionnaire?
  • Do you understand the rules and procedures of the SEC testimony process?
  • Do you have any questions on the rules and procedures of the SEC testimony process?

2. Questions Regarding Background and Personal Information

After dispatching these preliminary matters, the focus will shift to the SEC subpoena recipient’s background and personal information. Keep in mind that the SEC likely has much (if not all) of this information already—so if you omit information or provide misleading answers, this will not go unnoticed. During this phase of your testimony, you can expect to be asked questions such as:

  • What is your educational background?
  • Do you hold any professional or financial licenses?
  • Have you ever worked for a financial firm or investment advisory firm?
  • When did you first meet the other individual(s) involved in this matter?
  • Who introduced you?
  • What was the purpose of your first meeting (e.g., social meeting or business planning)?
  • Do your families know each other?
  • Where are you employed now?

3. Questions Regarding Your Role Within Your Company or Firm

If the SEC is investigating your company or firm (perhaps in addition to investigating you personally), you can expect several questions regarding your role within the organization. Depending on your position, the SEC’s investigators may ask you questions regarding the company or firm itself. Some examples of the questions you should be prepared to answer (as applicable) include:

  • When did you start working at the company?
  • What is your position at the company?
  • Can you describe the company’s corporate structure?
  • What are your title and position at the company?
  • Have your title and position changed over time?
  • What are the duties at the company?
  • Have your duties changed over time?
  • How is the company funded?
  • What is your salary at the company?
  • Who makes the majority of the decisions for the company?
  • Does the company sell securities?
  • Does the company pay dividends?
  • Does the company have voting rights?

4. Questions Regarding the Scope of Your Duties

After gaining an understanding of your role within your company or firm, the questioning will likely shift toward examining the scope of your duties in greater detail. In most cases, this is where the questions asked will begin to focus more on the substance of the SEC’s investigation. During this phase of your testimony, potential questions may include:

  • Can you describe your access to investor funds, financial statements and records, and investor details?
  • Are you aware of or do you have access to the sources of the company´s income?
  • What are the sources of the company´s revenue and projected revenue?
  • Can you describe or do you have access to the sources of the company´s expenses?
  • Who is responsible for preparing the company´s financial statements?
  • Do you have any role in preparing or compiling the company´s financial statements?
  • Who is responsible for preparing the company´s projected financial statements, including projected capital contributions, projected expenses, and projected revenues?
  • Do you have any role in preparing or compiling the company´s projected financial statements?
  • Does the company have its financial statements audited on an annual basis?
  • Did you ever act as a point of contact or intermediary between the company and third parties, such as investors or banks?
  • Do you ever serve as a representative of the company?
  • Are you involved in any of the company’s promotional efforts to the public?
  • Do you know or do you have access to details of the company’s anticipated monetization plans?
  • Are you aware of any complaints against the company?

5. Questions Regarding Investors

Once the scope of your duties has been established, the SEC’s investigators may next focus on your company’s or firm’s communications and relationships with investors. Here too, the investigators’ questions are likely to be tailored to the specific allegations at issue—and you could get yourself into trouble if you aren’t careful. To the extent of your knowledge, you should be prepared to accurately answer questions such as:

  • Does the company have investors?
  • Who are the investors?
  • What types of customers and/or investors do the company target or appeal to?
  • Do you communicate with investors?
  • How did the company attract capital contributions for its formation, project funding, and subsequent business plans?
  • Does the company adopt targeted marketing strategies, or does the company engage in general advertising?
  • What is the average contribution of the company’s investors?
  • Did you create, or do you have access to, a cap table?
  • Did you assist in the preparation of a cap table?
  • Did the company issue stock certificates or provide any other proof of equity ownership to investors?
  • Did the company register any of its investments?
  • Did the company issue a private placement memorandum or file a Form D?
  • Do you know if any investors already knew the company´s directors and officers before investing?
  • Does the company solicit investors or advertise to the general public (e.g., retail investors)?
  • Are you aware of what the company does with investor funds?
  • Can you describe your role in preparing any promotional or marketing materials?
  • Has the company distributed any investor documents or marketing/solicitation materials to the public?
  • Does the company have any plan to show, or did it show, promotional documents to investors?
  • Does the company hold regular investor calls?

6. Questions Regarding Due Diligence

Due diligence is often a key topic of discussion. SEC investigators are well aware that many company executives, brokers, and others are not sufficiently familiar with their companies’ and firms’ due diligence obligations, and charges arising out of due diligence violations are common. With this in mind, you should be prepared to carefully navigate inquiries such as:

  • Does the company have any identity verification procedures in place?
  • What kinds of identity verification procedures does the company use for its investors?
  • Can you describe the company´s know-your-customer (“KYC”) policies?
  • Do you assist with verifying investors or capital contributions?
  • Does the company maintain a compliance program?

7. Questions to Clarify and Close the Record

Finally, at the end of the session, the SEC’s investigators will ask if you want to clarify or supplement any of the answers you have provided. It is important not to let your guard down at this stage. While your testimony is nearly over, you need to remain cognizant of the risk of providing unnecessary information (or omitting information) and exposing yourself to further scrutiny or prosecution. With this in mind, it is best to consult with your counsel before answering questions such as:

  • Is there anything you wish to clarify from today´s testimony?
  • Is there anything you wish to add to your testimony before we close and go off the record?

Practicing your answers to these questions (among others) in a mock interview with your legal counsel or SEC defense attorney will help ensure that you are prepared for the SEC as possible.

Article By Dr. Nick Oberheiden of Oberheiden P.C.

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2022

SEC Awards Whistleblower Whose Tip Led to Opening of Investigation

On May 19, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a whistleblower award to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information that led to a successful enforcement action.

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to an award of 10-30% of the sanctions collected by the government in the enforcement action connected to their disclosure.

The SEC awarded the whistleblower approximately $16,000.

According to the award order, the whistleblower “helped alert Commission staff to the ongoing fraud and his/her tip was a principal motivating factor in the decision to open the investigation.”

In determining the exact percentage of an award, the SEC weighs a number of factors including the significance of the whistleblower’s information, the law enforcement interest in the case, the degree of further assistance provided by the whistleblower, the whistleblower’s culpability in the underlying violation, and the timelines of the disclosure.

According to the award order, the SEC considered that the awarded whistleblower “provided continuing assistance by supplying critical documents and participating in at least one subsequent communication with Commission staff that advanced the investigation.”

The SEC notes that the whistleblower did not initially make their disclosure via a Form TCR. However, the whistleblower qualified for an award because they filed a Form TCR within 30 days of learning of the filing requirement.

Since issuing its first award in 2012, the SEC has awarded approximately $1.3 billion to over 270 individuals. In the 2021 fiscal year, the program set a number of records. The SEC issued a record $564 million in whistleblower awards to a record 108 individuals.

In addition to monetary awards, the SEC Whistleblower Program offers confidentiality protections to whistleblowers. Thus, the SEC does not disclose any identifying information about award recipients.

Individuals considering blowing the whistle to the SEC should first consult an experienced SEC whistleblower attorney to ensure they are fully protected and qualify for the largest possible award.

Article By Mary Jane Wilmoth of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

For more white collar business crime legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

SEC Issues Three Whistleblower Awards Totaling Over $1 Million

On April 18, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three separate whistleblower awards totaling over $1 million. Each of the awarded whistleblowers voluntarily provided the SEC with original information that contributed to the success of an enforcement action.

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to awards of 10-30% of the funds collected by the SEC in the relevant enforcement action. The SEC has awarded over $1.2 billion to over 250 individual whistleblowers since issuing its first award in 2012.

One of the awards issued by the SEC on April 18 was a $700,000 award granted to joint whistleblowers. The whistleblowers provided the SEC with original information and the SEC subsequently passed this information along to another agency. The whistleblowers’ information led to the successful enforcement of actions by both the SEC and the other agency. Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s related action provisions, the whistleblowers were entitled to awards based on the sanctions collected in both actions.

According to the award order, in determining the exact percentage to award the whistleblowers, the SEC considered the following: “(i) Claimants’ information prompted Commission staff to begin an examination that led to the Covered Action, (ii) Claimants’ assistance helped focus the examination; (iii) some of the charges in the Commission’s Order were based, in part, on the information submitted by Claimants; and (iv) there was substantial law enforcement interest in the information provided, as it related to an ongoing fraud involving the misappropriation of investor funds.”

The second award from April 18 was for $450,000. The whistleblower in this case first reported the misconduct internally before providing information to the SEC. According to the award order, the whistleblower’s information “significantly contributed to an existing investigation” and “helped streamline the staff’s investigation and saved the staff time and resources.” The whistleblower also provided the SEC with additional assistance including identifying witnesses and specific events of interest.

The final award, a $45,000 award based on sanctions collected to date, was issued to a whistleblower whose information prompted the SEC to open an investigation. According to the award order, the whistleblower “participated in a voluntary interview with Commission staff” and “suffered hardships as a result of the underlying misconduct.”

On April 18, the SEC also issued a whistleblower award denial. The denial covers award claims submitted by two individuals for the same enforcement action which stemmed from an investigation based on a self-report by a company. The SEC found that the individuals did not contribute to the success of the enforcement action.

According to the denial, “[t]he staff responsible for the Covered Action credibly declared, under penalty of perjury, that it neither received nor used any of the information provided by either Claimant during the Investigation or in the Covered Action, nor did it have any communications with the Claimants. Moreover, the information the Claimants provided did not relate to the matters considered in the Investigation.”

Individuals considering blowing the whistle to the SEC should first consult an experienced SEC whistleblower attorney in order to ensure they are fully protected and qualify for the largest possible award.

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about whistleblower awards, visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

The SEC’s Proposed Rules on Climate-Related Disclosures – What to Do Now: A Guide for In-House Counsel Facing the Proposed Rules

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s recently proposed rules governing climate-related disclosures, if adopted as proposed, would represent a sea change to the existing public-company disclosure regime.  The rules would require that public companies include the following, among other disclosures, in reports and registration statements filed with the SEC:

  • disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data covering Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for all companies and Scope 3 emissions for companies1 (other than those that qualify as “smaller reporting companies”) for which Scope 3 emissions are material or that have set emissions reduction targets that include Scope 3 emissions, with third-party attestation being required for Scope 1 and Scope 2 data for companies that qualify as “large accelerated filers” or “accelerated filers”;
  • extensive and detailed disclosures regarding climate-related risks, including physical risks and transition-related risks, to a company’s financial statements, business operations or value chain (i.e., upstream and downstream activities of third parties related to the company’s operations);
  • disclosure in the notes to audited financial statements of quantitative and qualitative information regarding financial impacts of climate-related risk, including disaggregated quantitative information with respect to impacts of physical risks or transition activities on specific financial statement line items if the impact is 1% or more of the line item;
  • extensive and detailed disclosures regarding climate-related governance, strategy and risk management; and
  • to the extent relevant to a particular company, disclosures regarding the company’s transition plan, climate-related targets or goals, use of scenario analyses or other analytical tools in evaluating climate-related risk and use of an internal carbon price.

For many companies, the rules would require enterprise-wide changes to how the company collects, assesses and reports climate-related data and other information, as well as changes to their governance structures and systems of controls.  Changes may be driven both by the need to comply with the disclosure requirements and by a company’s view of how its disclosures will be received by investors or the public generally.

The tasks of understanding the implications of the proposed rules for a particular company and preparing for eventually complying with the rules are monumental, and, unfortunately, public companies currently find themselves in the difficult position of possibly needing to act with some urgency in order to be prepared to comply with rules of uncertain substance on an uncertain timeline.  At this point, the proposed rules are just that – proposed and not final.  The period for public comment on the proposed rules will run until May 20 at the earliest and could be extended by the SEC, and public comments are likely to reflect the controversial nature of the proposed rules and strong opinions by both supporters and detractors.  After the comment period, whether and when the SEC releases final rules, and the extent to which any final rules largely follow or reflect significant changes from the proposed rules, will remain to be seen.  Like the proposed rules, any final rules should provide for phase-in periods for compliance.  Further, any final rules are almost certain to face legal challenges that could delay implementation of the rules even if such challenges ultimately are unsuccessful.  It is therefore very difficult to predict when companies will need to comply with new rules and precisely what information they will be required to disclose under new rules.

Despite that uncertainty, it appears very likely that the SEC will adopt final climate-related disclosure rules in the not-too-distant future and that those rules will include in some form most, if not all, of the big buckets of disclosure requirements reflected in the proposed rules.  Because of the significant effort and degree of organizational change that compliance with the rules likely will require, companies may not be able to wait until final rules are released to begin assessing the impacts of the proposed rules on their organizations.  And, if the SEC were to adopt final rules later this year in the proposed form, companies that are large accelerated filers with a calendar fiscal year would be required to include information for 2023, including Scope 1 and 2 emissions data, in their annual reports filed in early 2024, meaning that they would need to have the systems in place to track and record the relevant information by the end of this year.

Assessing the potential impact of the proposed rules on a company and preparing the company for eventually complying with the rules will require participation from many different parts of the organization, but we expect that, at many companies, the task of setting the company on a course to do those things will fall on the general counsel and other in-house counsel with responsibility for relevant substantive areas.  With that in mind, we have prepared the following guide for in-house counsel with respect to near-term actions their companies should be taking or should consider taking, depending on their circumstances.  Bracewell will expand on a number of the topics noted below in future alerts, webinars or other similar communications.

1.   Engage senior management, the board of directors and relevant board committees and begin assessing governance, oversight and management of climate-related risks.

In-house counsel likely will be hearing from their CEOs and board members, if they haven’t already, asking what the proposed rules mean for their company.  In any case, in-house counsel should ensure that top-level management and board members understand the potential challenges and changes their companies may face with the proposed rules and encourage the level of board and senior management oversight and engagement that is appropriate for their situation.  The proposed rules would require companies to provide detailed disclosures concerning their boards’ oversight of climate-related risks and management’s role in assessing and managing those risks. Although many companies already have robust board oversight of ESG matters and include related disclosures in their SEC filings, the proposed rules are far more granular in dictating the type of information that would need to be disclosed.

In that regard, in-house counsel may be asked what changes, if any, should be made to board or committee composition and structure in light of the proposed new disclosure requirements.  Among other matters, consideration should be given to whether the creation of a new ESG committee – or a purely climate-focused committee – is appropriate or whether responsibility reasonably can be shouldered by an existing committee, such as the audit committee.

2.   Establish organizational responsibility for assessing the implications of the proposed rules for your company.

As noted above, this is a huge task that will require input from a multidisciplinary team, including legal, accounting, operations and possibly other personnel.  Identifying the right team and setting clear responsibilities and timelines are critical near-term tasks.

3.   Understand the potential timeline for compliance with the proposed rules as it relates to your organization.

As noted above, there is considerable uncertainty regarding, among other matters, whether final rules will require compliance on the timelines contemplated in the proposed rules, which would have the compliance requirements phased in over several years based on a company’s status as a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer or a smaller reporting company.  This fact sheet on the proposed rules published by the SEC provides helpful tables (on page 3) detailing the phase-in periods contemplated by the proposed rules for companies with a calendar fiscal year, assuming the proposed rules were adopted as final with an effective date in December 2022.

Despite the uncertainty, it is certainly possible that the SEC could adopt final rules later this year with compliance dates as contemplated by the proposed rules, and companies therefore would be ill-advised to assume that they will have a longer ramp-up period than they would under the proposed rules and the assumption of a December 2022 effective date.

4.   Understand the proposed rules and the disclosures they will require for your company based on its specific circumstances, including with regard to differences between what the company is disclosing now and what would be required by the proposed rules.

The proposed rules are highly prescriptive and are intended to produce consistent and comparable disclosures across the public-company spectrum.  With limited exceptions (e.g., that smaller reporting companies would be exempted from the requirement to disclose Scope 3 emissions), all public companies will need to assess required disclosure under all provisions of the rules.  That assessment, however, will need to be made in light of the company’s specific circumstances, and there will be categories of required disclosures that are very relevant to some industries or companies but of no or limited relevance to other industries or companies.  Additionally, many companies have been voluntarily disclosing information that is similar to some of the information that may be required to be provided under the proposes rules, but there may be gaps between or differences in required disclosures and a company’s current practices.

As companies begin to digest the proposed rules, it will make sense for them to drill down on the specific types of disclosures they would need to make if the proposed rules were adopted as proposed.  Questions that companies might ask themselves include the following:

  • Will we need to disclose Scope 3 emissions data based on materiality or having set targets or goals including Scope 3 emissions?
  • What, if anything, have we done with respect to the following topics such that disclosure regarding those topics would be required?
    • Adoption of a transition plan
    • Setting of climate-related goals or targets
    • Use of carbon offsets or renewable energy credits in setting goals or targets
    • Use of scenario analyses or other analytical tools in evaluating climate risk
    • Use of an internal carbon price
      • Note that, with respect to goals or targets, the proposed rules refer to a company’s having “set” such goals or targets and not to its having publicly disclosed them.  Similarly, with respect to all of these topics, it is not clear that the related disclosure would be triggered only by some level of formality or organizational scope in the adoption, setting or use of the applicable item.  Companies therefore should assess the relevance of these topics broadly, including informal use or discussion within the organization.
  • What information that we are not currently disclosing would the proposed rules require us to disclose?
  • For information that we are currently disclosing, would the proposed rules require that information to be established, assembled or disclosed differently, or disclosed more expansively or granularly, from how we are doing it now?  If so, how?
  • Which required disclosures might be particularly challenging for our company, such that they might merit special or prioritized focus?

5.   Begin to evaluate existing systems and resources related to climate-related information and identify changes that will need to be made.

Companies in some industries, such as energy or manufacturing, likely already have systems in place to collect much of the data called for by the proposed rules, and many public companies have been publishing voluntary disclosures in the form of ESG reports for years.  However, smaller companies in such industries may not currently have the resources necessary to devote to compliance with the new rules.  Likewise, companies in non-GHG intensive industries, such as financial services, previously may not have had the need, or a more limited need, for such systems.  And even those companies that are experienced in collecting and disclosing climate-related data and other information likely would, under the proposed rules, need to expand their systems to cover a much broader universe of information and ensure that controls and procedures meet standards for disclosures in SEC-filed documents and are appropriate for enhanced scrutiny and potential liability that will come with including such disclosures in SEC-filed documents.  Companies may need to invest significantly in new personnel with appropriate expertise and in new technology, and they will need to expand their disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting to cover new sets of information that are wide-ranging, voluminous and highly detailed.  Accordingly, public companies should begin to assess their existing capabilities and identify the changes they would need to make to comply with proposed rules to ensure that the changes can be effected in time to comply with new rules.

Additionally, the climate-related risk disclosures contemplated by the proposed rules may require that companies devote significant resources to expanding the process by which they identify and assess climate-related risk.  Further, the need for companies to evaluate climate-related risks to upstream and downstream – value chain – activities, and potentially to disclose Scope 3 emissions associated with those activities, may pose significant challenges and likely will require many companies to develop new processes to address disclosure requirements that relate to matters that are largely outside of the company’s control and access.  These are areas that companies may want to focus on in the near term.

6.   Evaluate needs and strategy for retaining third parties to assist with disclosures, including for attestation of GHG emissions data.

As noted above, for large accelerated filers and accelerated filers, the proposed rules would require attestation regarding Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions data by an independent third party meeting certain minimum qualifications, which may be a public accounting firm if it meets the minimum qualifications but need not be an accounting firm.  The market for providing these attestation services is evolving and will continue to evolve as accounting firms and others develop their ability to provide these services.  Some observers have raised concerns that the supply of emission-attestation services may not initially meet the demand for such services that the proposed rules would create.  Companies may wish to begin thinking about their options for third-parties to handle the attestation, particularly large accelerated filers who could be subject to the attestation requirements as soon as in their 2024 annual reports filed in early 2025. Additionally, it is important for companies to have conversations around attestation ahead of their information gathering efforts to ensure that the disclosure information being developed and gathered will be sufficient for attestors to provide the required assurance.

In addition to attestation services, companies should consider their potential need for and access to other third-party advisors with the necessary expertise and experience, including attorneys, accountants/auditors and firms providing consulting and other services to assist companies with climate-related disclosures.

7.   Consider whether the disclosures contemplated by the proposed rules warrant any changes to your current, planned or contemplated climate-related activities, such as setting or disclosing of climate-related goals or targets.

As noted above, the proposed rules contemplate detailed disclosures regarding several matters that may or may not be relevant to a particular company depending on things that the company may or may not have done in advance of the initial compliance date for the proposed rules.  These include whether a company has:

  • adopted a climate transition plan,
  • set climate-related goals or targets,
  • included Scope 3 emissions in its goals or targets,
  • used carbon offsets or renewable energy credits in setting its goals or targets,
  • used scenario analyses or other analytical tools in assessing climate-related risk, or
  • used an internal carbon price.

Companies may wish to reassess their existing, planned or contemplated activities in these areas in view of the proposed rules.  It may be the case that a company would want to modify its activities in one or more of these areas when viewed through the lens of what the company’s disclosures regarding such activities would look like under the proposed rules.  For example, if your company is planning to set or announce new GHG emissions goals, should the company modify the goals as they relate to Scope 3 emissions or otherwise before doing so, or would it be preferable for the company to delay any such setting or announcement of goals until there is clarity on the content of final rules?

8.   Determine whether to submit comments on the proposed rules.

The proposed rule release includes over 200 requests for comment.  Comments are due by the later of 30 days after the date the proposing release is published in the Federal Register (which had not happened as of the date of this update) or May 20, 2022.  (As noted above, it is possible that the comment period could be extended beyond that date, but, unless and until the SEC actually does that, parties desiring to submit comments should proceed with the expectation that they will need to submit them by the applicable current deadline.)  Although the SEC will not agree with all comments received and may adopt final rules despite strong and widely-held opposing views reflected in the comments, the SEC and its staff will consider the comments received in adopting final rules and likely will make at least some changes to the proposed rules based on comments.  If your company would like to have its voice heard on the proposed rules, you may consider doing so by submitting comments directly or through an industry association or similar group.

9.   Monitor developments.

As noted above, we are in the early stages of the process through which the proposed rules could, in their current form or with changes, become final rules with which public companies actually would need to comply.  In-house lawyers should continue to monitor developments and advise others in their organizations of such developments as appropriate so that preparations for compliance with new climate-related disclosure rules can be adjusted as necessary.

10. Don’t forget that climate-related disclosures may be required under existing SEC rules and interpretations.

With the anticipation of a massive new disclosure regime for climate-related matters and preparation for compliance with that regime, it might be easy to overlook that fact the existing SEC rules and interpretations may require climate-related disclosures in SEC filings, and the SEC staff may issue comments on climate-related disclosures, or the absence thereof, in a company’s SEC filings, as they did for a number companies in the fall of 2021 with respect to the companies’ 2020 annual reports on Form 10-K.  Pending the adoption and implementation of final new rules, companies should continue to assess their disclosures in view of the SEC’s 2010 guidance on climate-related disclosures.

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1. Scope 1 emissions are direct GHG emissions from operations that are owned or controlled by a company.  Scope 2 emissions are indirect GHG emissions from the generation of purchased or acquired energy that is consumed by a company’s operations.  Scope 3 emissions are all indirect GHG emissions not otherwise included in a company’s Scope 2 emissions, which occur in the upstream and downstream activities of a company’s value chain.

© 2022 Bracewell LLP
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The Gensler SEC: What to Expect in 2022

Since Gary Gensler became chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in April 2021, his agency has signaled an active agenda that many expect will be aggressively enforced. Cornerstone Research recently brought together distinguished experts with SEC experience to share what they expect the SEC will focus on in 2022. The expert forum, “The Gensler SEC: Policy, Progress, and Problems,” featured Joseph Grundfest, a former commissioner of the SEC and currently serving as the W. A. Franke Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School; and Mary Jo White, senior chair, litigation partner, and leader of Debevoise & Plimpton’s Strategic Crisis Response and Solutions Group who previously served as chair of the SEC and as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Moderated by Jennifer Marietta-Westberg of Cornerstone Research, the forum was held before an audience of attorneys and economists and explored the major regulatory and enforcement themes expected to take center stage in the coming year.

ESG Disclosures and Materiality

In its Unified Regulatory Agenda first released in June of last year, the SEC indicated that it will propose disclosure requirements in the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) space, particularly on climate-related risks and human capital management. However, as documented by the numerous comments received as a result of the SEC’s March 15, 2021, request for input on climate change disclosures, there is substantial debate as to whether these disclosures must, or should, require disclosure only of material information. During the expert forum, Grundfest and White agreed that ESG disclosures should call for material information only. However, they have different predictions on whether ESG disclosures actually will be qualified by a materiality requirement.

White emphasized that materiality is a legal touchstone in securities laws. “If the SEC strays far from materiality, the risk is that a rule gets overturned,” she said. “Not every single rule needs to satisfy the materiality requirement, but it would be a mistake for the SEC not to explain what its basis for materiality is in this space.”

Grundfest added, “There is a spectrum of ESG issues, and while some are within the SEC’s traditional purview, others are new and further away from it. For example, to better ensure robust greenhouse emissions disclosure, the Environmental Protection Agency should be the one to require disclosure rules that would not be overturned.”

Gensler has indicated that investors want ESG disclosures in order to make investment and voting decisions. For instance, in his remarks before the Principles for Responsible Investment in July 2021, Gensler stated that “[i]nvestors are looking for consistent, comparable, and decision-useful disclosures so they can put their money in companies that fit their needs.” White predicts that some but not all ESG disclosure requirements in the proposed rules the SEC is working on will call for material information.

Grundfest, however, believes that the rules the SEC eventually adopts will require disclosure only of material information. “The SEC’s proposal on ESG disclosures will ask for everything, from the moon to the stars,” he said. “But public comments will sober the rules. The SEC staff will take into account the Supreme Court standard and the Chevron risk. It will settle on adopting materiality-based disclosure rules.”

There is also debate over the potential definition of materiality in the context of any proposed ESG disclosures. The panelists were asked whether the fact that large institutional investors assert various forms of ESG information are important to their investment decisions is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the information is material. Neither White nor Grundfest believes the Supreme Court as currently composed would accept this argument, but they differ on the reasons.

Grundfest believes the Supreme Court will stick with its approach of a hypothetical reasonable investor. “The fact that these institutional investors ask for this information doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s material,” he said. “If the SEC wants to have something done in this space, it has to work within the law.”

White said an important aspect of the rule will be the economic analysis, though she, too, does not think materiality can be “decided by an opinion poll among institutional investors.” For example, a shareholder proposal requesting certain information that has not received support does not necessarily make the information immaterial. “The Supreme Court will be tough on the survey approach,” she said.

Digital Assets and Crypto Exchanges

In several statements and testimonies, Gensler has declared the need for robust enforcement and better investor protection in the markets for digital currencies. He has publicly called the cryptocurrency space “a Wild West.” In addition to bringing enforcement actions against token issuers and other market participants on the theory that the tokens constitute securities, the SEC under his leadership has brought enforcement actions against at least one unregistered digital asset exchange on the theory that the exchange traded securities and should therefore register as securities exchange.

“The crypto space is the SEC’s most problematic area,” Grundfest said. “Franz Kafka’s most famous novel is The Trial. It’s about a person arrested and prosecuted for a crime that is never explained based on evidence that he never sees. Some recent SEC enforcement proceedings make me wonder whether Kafka is actually still alive and well, and working deep in the bowels of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.” In support of this literary reference, Professor Grundfest  noted that, in bringing enforcement actions against crypto exchanges alleging that they traded tokens that were unregistered securities, the SEC never specified which tokens traded on these exchanges were securities. “This is almost beyond regulation by enforcement. It’s regulation by FUD—fear, uncertainty, and doubt,” Grundfest said.

White predicted that, of the 311 active crypto exchanges listed by CoinMarketCap as of December 1, 2021, the SEC will bring cases against at least four in the coming year.

Gensler has publicly argued for bringing the cryptocurrency-related industry under his agency’s oversight. “We need additional congressional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from falling between regulatory cracks,” he said in August at the Aspen Security Forum. But neither White nor Grundfest believes the current Congress will enact legislation giving the SEC authority to regulate crypto transactions that do not meet the definition of an investment contract under the Howey test.

In November 2021, a federal jury in Audet v. Fraser at the District Court of Connecticut decided that certain cryptocurrency products that investors purchased were not securities under Howey. Neither Grundfest nor White believes this finding will cause the SEC to become more cautious about asserting that some forms of crypto are securities.

“One jury verdict is hardly a precedent,” White said. “The facts of the case didn’t have many of the nuances under Howey that other cases have. It will not deter the SEC.”

The panelists agreed that SEC enforcement activity will be aggressive in the crypto space. A report by Cornerstone Research, titled SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2021 Update, found that, under the new administration, the SEC has continued its role as one of the main regulators in the cryptocurrency space. In 2021, the SEC brought 20 enforcement actions against digital asset market participants, including first-of-their-kind actions against a crypto lending platform, an unregistered digital asset exchange, and a decentralized finance (DeFi) lender.

Proxy Voting

With the 2022 proxy season on the horizon, people will be watching the SEC closely, as Gensler’s Commission recently adopted new rules for universal proxy cards, and it has revisited amendments adopted under the former chair of the SEC, Jay Clayton.

Last November, the SEC adopted universal proxy rules that now allow shareholders to vote for their preferred mix of board candidates in contested elections, similar to voting in person.  These rules would put investors voting in person and by proxy on equal footing. “Universal proxy was proposed at the time when I was the chair of the SEC, and the logic for the rule is overpowering,” White said. “In adoption, some commissioners had reservations on the thresholds of voting power a dissident would be required to solicit, but voted in favor anyway based on its logic. It was a 4 to 1 vote.”

Grundfest and White expect the number of proxy contests that proceed to a vote will go up as a result. From 2019 to 2020, the incidence of proxy contests increased from 6 to 13. Looking ahead to the coming year, Grundfest predicts the rule change will increase the incidence of proxy contests by somewhere between 50% and 100%. White predicts a more modest increase of about 50%.

Regarding rules on proxy voting advice, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L (CF) last November to address Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which permits exclusion of a shareholder proposal that “deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”

The bulletin puts forth a new Staff position that now denies no-action relief to registrants seeking to exclude shareholder proposals that transcend the company’s day-to-day business matters. “This exception is essential for preserving shareholders’ right to bring important issues before other shareholders by means of the company’s proxy statement, while also recognizing the board’s authority over most day-to-day business matters,” the bulletin said.

Both White and Grundfest believe a modest number of issuers will go to court in the 2022 proxy season seeking to exclude Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals as “transcending” day-to-day operations. “I think companies will challenge shareholder proposals in court but not a lot,” White said. “It depends on the shareholder proposal.”

Grundfest believes any such cases would be driven as much by CEOs as by any other factor. “Companies may challenge a shareholder proposal in court if they have a CEO who is offended by a certain proposal or for First Amendment reasons,” he said. Grundfest cited a hypothetical example of a software company in Texas with a shareholder proposal on gun rights or abortion rights, which have nothing to do with the cybersecurity software the company produces. “It would be hard to force a company to put forth a politically charged proposal that is not related to that company’s business,” he said. “If it’s a First Amendment right, the company will go to court.”

Article By Jennifer Marietta-Westberg and Simona Mola of Cornerstone Research

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