Not Ship Shape: SEC Sues Retired Chief Petty Officer for Fraudulent Offerings to Navy-Related Victims

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (“OIEA”), which dates from last century, is concerned with explaining aspects of the capital markets for “Main Street” investors and warning them against potential risks and fraud schemes. On Sept. 25, 2017, the Commission announced the formation of the Retail Strategy Task Force (“RSTF”) in its Division of Enforcement. Its purpose is to consider and implement “strategies to address misconduct that victimizes retail investors,” according to the SEC Press Release issued that day. A primary focus area of the OIEA and RSTF is so-called “affinity investments,” i.e., investment offerings aimed at groups such as churches, ethnic communities, college alumni groups, etc.

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022, the SEC filed suit in the Federal Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against Robert F. Murray, 42, a retired U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer residing in North Canton, Ohio, for conducting an unregistered offering of securities in Deep Dive Strategies, LLC, an Ohio private pooled investment fund (the “Fund”). Murray controlled the Fund and acted as investment adviser, telling investors the fund would invest in publicly traded securities. Murray marketed the offering through a Facebook group “with over 3500 active duty, reservists and veterans of the U.S. Navy who shared an interest in investing,” according to the Complaint. Most certainly an “affinity” group. Murray also created “a channel on the Discord social media platform where he live-streamed his trading activity and posted trading advice with a focus on options.”

The Fund was organized in September 2020 and solicited investors through February 2021. Although Murray told investors they could change their minds within 15 days and get their money back, in fact he “almost immediately began spending Fund money on personal expenses.” He transferred monies to his personal checking account and even withdrew cash from the Fund, so by February 2021, $148,000, or approximately 42% of the $355,000 invested by the unsuspecting “Goats” (a nickname for the Navy affinity group), had been “misappropriated” (i.e., stolen) by Murray. By March 2021 he had ceased regular communication with the Goats and failed to respond to requests to redeem “invested” dollars. Some of that misappropriated money was lost gambling at casinos in Cleveland and elsewhere in the Midwest.

Murray provided potential investors with both a Disclosure Statement and a copy of the Fund’s Operating Agreement, and the Complaint identifies several material misstatements and omissions in the two documents. In addition, Murray made oral material misstatements and omitted material information when speaking with potential and actual investors. In fact, Murray lost most of the Fund’s brokerage account on Jan. 13, 2021, when GameStop options purchased in the account saw their value plummet. In that connection see my Feb. 2, 2021, Blog “Rupture Rapture: Should the GameStop?” When the SEC began investigating Murray and the Fund, he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and declined to answer questions.

In the Complaint, the Commission charges Murray with seven different securities law violations, each set out in a separate Count as follows:

  1. Violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder by using devices, making untrue statements, and misleading omissions, and engaging in a business which operate as a fraud on securities purchasers.
  2. Violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “33 Act”), by offering and selling securities by means of interstate commerce using devices to defraud.  Violations of the 33 Act can be proven without the need to prove scienter (broadly, intent).
  3. Violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the 33 Act by obtaining money or property in connection with the sale of securities by means of untrue statements of material facts and making misleading omissions, engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on the purchaser, where Murray was at least negligent in engaging in these activities.
  4. Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 33 Act by selling securities without the offering being registered (or exempt from registration), and with the use of a prospectus where the offering was not registered.
  5. Violation of Section 206(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “40 Act”) by acting as an investment adviser using devices to defraud clients and prospective clients.
  6. Violation of Section 206(2) of the 40 Act by acting as an investment adviser engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on clients and prospective clients.
  7. Violation of Section 206(4) of the 40 Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder by acting as an investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle, making untrue statements of material fact and making misleading omissions and engaging in acts that are fraudulent with respect to investors in the pooled investment vehicle.

The SEC seeks entry of findings by the Court of the facts cited in the Complaint and of conclusions of law that concur with the Commission’s assertions of violations. In addition, the SEC seeks entry of a permanent injunction against future violations of the cited securities laws; an order requiring disgorgement of all Murray’s ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest; an order imposing a civil penalty of $1,065,000; and an order barring Murray from serving as an officer or director of any public company.

Murray preyed on his fellow Naval servicemen in violation of the unspoken understandings of the “Goats,” that a fellow Navy NCO would not seek to take financial advantage of them. That is why the SEC’s July 28, 2022, Press Release reporting this matter includes an express warning from the OIEA and the RSTF not to make “investment decisions based solely on common ties with someone recommending or selling the investment.” One wonders whether, if the Goats were to catch up with Murray, he would be keelhauled.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

SEC Awards $825,000 to Whistleblower

On October 11, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a $825,000 whistleblower award issued to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information about securities fraud.

The SEC Whistleblower Program offers monetary awards to qualified whistleblowers whose disclosures contribute to the success of enforcement actions. SEC whistleblower awards are for 10-30% of the funds collected by the government in the relevant enforcement action.

According to the SEC award order, the whistleblower “expeditiously provided detailed information that prompted the opening of the investigation.” Furthermore, the whistleblower “thereafter met with Commission staff in person and provided additional information after submitting the initial TCR.”

In addition to monetary awards, the SEC Whistleblower Program offers anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers, including confidentiality. Thus, the SEC does not disclose any information that could identify a whistleblower.

Since the whistleblower program was established in 2010, the SEC has awarded more than $1.3 billion to over 280 individual whistleblowers. In August 2021, SEC Chair Gary Gensler stated that the program “has greatly aided the Commission’s work to protect investors” and noted that “the SEC has used whistleblower information to obtain sanctions of over $5 billion from securities law violators” and “return over $1.3 billion to harmed investors.”

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

The “Iron Curtain” has Fallen: A Radical Shift in Lawyers Representing Whistleblowers

Whistleblower Network News (WNN) recently revealed, for the first time, that major corporate law firms specializing in representing defendants before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have, in some cases, switched sides and are now representing whistleblowers who are turning in corporate fraudsters.  All but one of the firms identified by the SEC did not call public attention to their new-found client base – most likely because they did not want to upset their bread-and-butter corporate clients.  It appears that major corporate law firms now understand that the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower reward provisions are incredibly effective in incentivizing corporate insiders to report fraud, even when those insiders are executives usually on the other side of a whistleblower issue.  Lawyers who traditionally represent whistleblowers understand that Dodd-Frank is well designed and is being professionally implemented by the SEC.  Corporate lawyers and their firms have apparently caught on to this new reality and are now representing whistleblowers.

That defense firms are now actively engaged in representing whistleblowers cannot be denied.  Lists of law firms that have prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases, disclosed in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed with the SEC, document that 9.3% of firms that have obtained rewards on behalf of whistleblowers were traditional defense firms.  These firms include some of the largest defense firms in the United States that represent numerous corporations subjected to SEC enforcement actions for violating securities laws as well as firms that have defended corporations against whistleblowers in retaliation cases.

If that statistic holds, it is clear hundreds of corporate defense firms or their attorneys are representing whistleblowers in confidential investigations.  Why are these cases still under review?  Dodd-Frank is still a young law, and the vast majority of cases have not yet resulted in formal reward determinations.  Cases often take five years or more to be finalized, and as of the end of Fiscal Year 2021 over 51,000 whistleblower cases had been filed with the SEC.  Furthermore, under the FOIA requests the SEC only released the names of law firms that prevailed in a whistleblower case.  The names of firms that did not prevail in a claim, or firms that represent whistleblowers in ongoing investigations, were not disclosed.

Time will tell whether defense firms’ representation of whistleblowers who accuse their employers (or other corporate wrongdoers) of fraud is a good or bad development.  But unique issues will arise whenever a firm that primarily generates its profits from representing corporations accused of wrongdoing switches sides and represents a whistleblower who has accused an executive of engaging in fraud.  Although such representations may be permitted under the attorney’s rules of ethics, this does not mean that such representations are always in the best interest of a lawyer’s clients.  There are inherent potential conflicts whenever a defense firm switches sides and decides to represent a whistleblower reporting major corporate crimes.

Regardless of where you stand on this issue, one thing is clear: the ethical, policy and legal implications of defense firms representing whistleblowers is a dramatic shift in legal practice and must be carefully evaluated.  Defense firms must understand that whenever they represent a whistleblower, they must zealously advocate on their behalf, even when the precedents set by their cases may be used against their corporate clients.  Likewise, whistleblowers need to be aware of the implications of choosing a lawyer whose primary practice is representing corporate crooks.  Conflicts of interest may not initially be visible but can unfold as a case progresses.

The Revelation

In August of 2022, Bloomberg Law and a draft non-peer-reviewed article published by University of Kansas Professor Alexander Platt raised the issue of which law firms represent whistleblowers.  Bloomberg and Platt obtained lists of law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases.  They used the lists to identify a small number of firms, all of which could be classified as pro-whistleblower firms.  These firms’ practices are centered on fighting corporate fraud and speculated whether these firms were being given preferential treatment by the SEC. Neither publication offered proof of any wrongdoing.  But Platt and Bloomberg did not list all the law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank cases.  Significantly, neither even mentioned the fact that major defense law firms had already filed and won Dodd-Frank cases on behalf of whistleblowers.  Additionally, the two authors did not explore the special issues that could arise when firms dedicated to defending white-collar criminals quietly switch sides.

In response to Platt and Bloomberg, WNN filed its own Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain access to the documents relied upon in the two articles.  The SEC released over 1000 pages of documents to WNN, including all its correspondence with Platt and all the records provided to Platt (and Bloomberg) that identified law firms that successfully represented whistleblowers.

On September 27, 2022, WNN revealed, for the first time, that the SEC had identified 64 law firms that successfully obtained a reward on behalf of a whistleblower.  Among those firms were six that primarily represent corporations and individuals accused of corporate crimes.  These defense firms included industry giants such as Winston & Strawn and Akin Gump.  Together, the defense firms have already obtained over $56 million in rewards on behalf of whistleblowers.  In response to the Platt, Bloomberg, and WNN FOIA requests, the SEC only identified firms that had already prevailed and obtained a reward on behalf of their clients. Approximately 50,000 cases are pending within the SEC’s reward program, and there is a long delay in processing whistleblower cases.  Therefore, one can assume that numerous other pending cases where these or other defense firms are actively representing whistleblowers that were not disclosed by the SEC.

It is important to note that the Dodd-Frank provisions only apply to large fraud cases.  No reward is available unless the SEC issues sanctions against the entity being investigated in excess of $1 million.  Thus, the cases previously targeted by the defense firms and currently under investigation by the SEC would implicate major frauds.

The defense firms identified by WNN as being listed in the SEC-released materials were:

Winston & Strawn, LLP:  Winston advertises itself as defending “companies and individuals in SEC enforcement and regulatory matters related to allegations involving securities fraud.”  But not mentioned on its webpage is that it also represented a securities law whistleblower who obtained a $2.2 million reward.

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP: Akin Gump also describes its practice as representing “companies and individuals” under investigation by various regulatory agencies, including the SEC.  Akin’s attorneys obtained a Dodd-Frank reward of $800,000 award.

Haynes and Boone, LLP: This 600-lawyer defense firm’s website explained that it has “represented employers” in “whistle blowing.”  However, the SEC documents revealed the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a “20%” award against a corporate fraudster.

Levine Lee LLP:  Although this firm markets itself as successfully representing clients accused of violating anti-fraud laws, like the other defense firms, it has apparently started a whistleblower practice and obtained a reward of $10 million on behalf of a whistleblower.

Leader Berkon Colao & Silverstein LLP:  This defense firm prevailed in cases filed on behalf of two separate whistleblowers and had considerable success.  Their whistleblower clients obtained $15 million and $27 million in awards.

Sallah Astarita & Cox, LLC: Although this firm “regularly represents financial institutions” in “fraud” cases, the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a $1.8 million award.  Sallah Astarita was the only firm that listed its Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower case on its website as among the victories achieved by one of its partners.

The SEC’s Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program

Professor Platt and Bloomberg Law criticized the SEC’s Dodd-Frank program as having a bias in favor of a small number of whistleblower-rights law firms that had employed former SEC lawyers.  However, the information revealed by WNN completely refuted this negative implication raised by Platt and Bloomberg.  Instead, the FOIA documents support a finding that the SEC program is a paradigm of fairness and openness.  The extensive correspondence between Platt and the SEC demonstrates that the Commission freely disclosed the names of the firms that had won cases while carefully balancing the confidentiality needs of the whistleblower clients.  These numbers illustrate a program open to law firms regardless of their reputation or whether they employ former government lawyers.  They also reveal a program open to working directly with whistleblowers and rewarding them even if they had no lawyer.  Not one document produced provided any evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing, bias, or unprofessionalism.  The numbers speak for themselves:

  • Over 50 pro se whistleblowers won cases on their own behalf.  This high percentage of unrepresented applicants who successfully navigated the SEC’s program is remarkable.  In other legal programs, pro se whistleblowers (and other unrepresented persons) lose the vast majority of their cases.  Not so under Dodd-Frank. This demonstrates a high level of commitment by the SEC to helping individual whistleblowers who could not afford or obtain lawyers.
  • Of the 64 law firms that prevailed in a Dodd-Frank reward claim, only 12 had hired former SEC lawyers to assist in the cases.  Thus, the vast majority of successful law firms (52 of the 64) had no “insider” connection to the SEC.   This fact demonstrates the Commission’s staff’s willingness to work closely with attorneys who had no “friends” in the agency and whose information was solely merit-based. Moreover, a significant percentage of the firms that did employ former SEC or Justice Department lawyers were the very defense firms that Bloomberg Law and Platt did not discuss or analyze.
  • The Commission’s staff demonstrated no bias against firms based on their practice areas.  The Commission’s enforcement staff and Whistleblower Office worked with law firms that were defense-based (6) and law firms that traditionally represent whistleblowers or employees in lawsuits against companies (many of the remaining 58).

The FOIA documents support a finding that the Commission’s staff is open to whistleblowers, regardless of whether they represent themselves or whether or not the firms raising the concerns have any “insider” connections.   Organizations such as the National Whistleblower Center, which regularly works with whistleblowers, have widely praised the program, as have the last three Chairs of the SEC, appointed by Presidents ObamaTrump, and Biden.  The Commission itself confirmed that as of September 2021, it returned over $1.3 billion to harmed investors based on whistleblower cases.

The Future Role of Defense Firms in Dodd-Frank Cases

The SEC cannot implement special rules that would be prejudicial to traditional defense firms that file whistleblower cases.   Likewise, whistleblowers have the right to hire counsel of their choice and, in most cases, can knowingly waive potential conflicts of interest.  But the mere fact that traditional defense firms can lawfully represent whistleblowers without violating any SEC or local Bar rules does not address the special problems that may exist when a defense firm represents a whistleblower.  For example, such representations can result in significant conflicts of interest that may not be apparent at the commencement of a case. This may result in the whistleblower’s attorneys not advocating for legal precedents that could harm their other corporate clients.

Traditional defense firms should implement internal procedures to guard against potential problems based on the obvious conflicts that can arise when they represent clients on both sides of whistleblower-disclosure cases.  More significantly, it is absolutely crucial that whistleblowers fully understand the potential for conflicts of interest when deciding on the best attorneys to hire.  Attorneys working for defense firms must clearly spell out these issues and ensure that when representing a whistleblower, their prospective client is fully aware of all the risks and limitations.

Among the rules, procedures, and practices that defense firms should implement or carefully consider are:

  1. At the very least, defense firms representing whistleblowers should identify this on their websites.  Corporate clients should know that the firm also represents whistleblowers and should be able to question counsel on these matters so they feel comfortable that no conflicts would arise.
  2. Whistleblower clients need full disclosure of how the defense firm’s primary practice may impact the representation.  This is particularly true whenever a case would require advocacy on behalf of a whistleblower that could expand legal interpretations benefiting whistleblowers.  It is hard to reconcile how a law firm defending some clients against whistleblowers can effectively argue before administrative agencies or courts of law legal precedents that could expand the rights of whistleblowers.  These expanded rights could and would ultimately not be to the advantage of corporate clients accused of wrongdoing.
  3. Similarly, defense firms need to reconcile how they can advocate for a whistleblower who engaged in tactics, such as removing documents or one-party tape recording, that their corporate clients may find offensive.  This is particularly true when the zealous representation of a whistleblower requires expanding the ability of whistleblowers to obtain evidence of wrongdoing, and the precedent this advocacy establishes may be used against the firm’s current or future corporate clients.
  4. The potential for a conflict of interest needs to be fully explored in every case.  One issue that firms and clients may not be fully aware of is how the “related action” provisions of the laws impact potential conflicts.  Once the SEC obtains a sanction of over $1 million in any case, all “related actions” become eligible for a reward.  Sanctions issued by other law enforcement or regulatory agencies based on “related” claims can form the basis of a reward.   When examining whether a conflict exists, law firms need to look beyond the SEC action and determine witnesses, parties, and issues that may be implicated in a “related action.” This determination is critical even if the related action is not based on any securities law violation.
  5. Defense firms can also explore ways to refer potential whistleblower clients to attorneys whose practices are based solely on representing whistleblowers.  These referrals would help ensure that the defense firm is not conflicted (either as a matter of ethics or marketing) and that the client can obtain the best counsel.

Conclusion: The Iron Curtain has Fallen

Whistleblower representation is entering a new world.  The “iron curtain” that formerly separated law firms that represent corporate crooks from those that represent whistleblowers has fallen. This new reality is not without serious risks to whistleblowers (and corporate clients).  Whistleblowers must be fully aware of the dangers of having a corporate law firm represent them.  Corporate law firms must institute procedures to guard against conflicts of interest and to ensure they can zealously represent whistleblowers.  Zealous representation is needed even when the precedents established in these cases may create trouble for their other client base.

At the end of the day, the fact that defense law firms are now representing whistleblowers affirms the success of Dodd-Frank.  It is an affirmation of the critical nature of the information whistleblowers provide to the government and the role of this insider information in stopping otherwise hard to detect corporate crimes.  The “iron curtain” has fallen, but it has fallen in the direction that helps whistleblowers.  It has fallen in the direction that affirms the quality of their disclosures. It refutes the often-repeated slander that whistleblowers are somehow simply disgruntled employees.

Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring fairness in the markets, holding wrongdoers accountable, and deterring future wrongdoing.  The SEC has publicly recognized this, and now leading corporate defense attorneys have quietly recognized it. Defense firms like Akin Gump, Winston and Strawn, and Hayes and Boone got it right when they advocated for paying whistleblowers substantial rewards.  Whistleblowers whose information holds corporate criminals accountable deserve large rewards. These rewards are in the public interest, and the SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower program must be protected, enhanced and expanded.

Sources:

  1. Whistleblower Network News, “WNN Exclusive: SEC FOIA Documents Reveal Big Law Defense Firms are Confidentially Representing Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers,” (September 27, 2022)
  2. List of Law Firms that Obtained Rewards in Whistleblower Cases as of 2021
  3. List of Awards Obtained by the Six Defense Law Firms
  4. List of pro se Cases where Whistleblowers Obtained a Reward
  5. FAQ on the SEC’s Dodd-Frank Act program
  6. FAQ on Confidentiality of Dodd-Frank Act claims
Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

Accounting Cases Involving SPACs

The Accounting Class Action Filings and Settlements—2021 Review and Analysis report features a spotlight section on accounting-related SPAC cases.

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) have become an increasingly popular way for private companies to become publicly traded. The process typically proceeds through four phases:

  1. The SPAC initial public offering (IPO), when the SPAC becomes public as a shell company;
  2.  the search for a merger target, which typically involves a definitive time period (e.g., two years);
  3. the merger closing, during which time the SPAC sponsor and target company announce the merger, file a proxy statement, and solicit shareholder approval; and
  4. the period when the equity of the combined company becomes publicly traded, often referred to as the “De-SPAC” period.

Commentators have cited various reasons for the popularity of SPACs, including the perception of market participants that a private company may have more certainty as to pricing and control over the deal terms through a SPAC as compared to a traditional IPO.1 During 2021, there were 613 SPAC IPOs—nearly twice the number of traditional IPOs—and the $144.5 billion of capital raised was record-setting.2

SPAC filings that include accounting allegations tripled in 2021 as compared to the prior year.

SEC Statements Regarding Financial Accounting and Reporting

The increased popularity of SPACs has led to certain concerns from regulators. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an investor bulletin on SPACs highlighting that the increased number of SPACs seeking to acquire an operating business may result in fewer attractive initial acquisitions.As of December 31, 2021, 575 SPACs were still searching for a merger target.4

The SEC has also highlighted concerns related to financial accounting and reporting issues that SPACs may face. For example, the SEC’s Acting Chief Accountant, Paul Munter, issued a statement on March 31, 2021, that raised questions about whether private company targets have the people and processes in place and the time that is needed to successfully transition to public company reporting requirements. Mr. Munter highlighted examples of complex financial accounting and reporting issues, including accounting for complex financial instruments and the need to comply with public company requirements for reporting on internal controls.5

Shortly after his March 31 statement, Mr. Munter and John Coates, the Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, issued a statement on April 12, 2021, that addressed accounting and reporting considerations for warrants issued by SPACs.6 The statement resulted in almost 500 SPACs restating their accounting for warrants by June 22, nearly all of which identified a material weakness in internal controls.7

Recent Trends in SPACs Involving Accounting Issues

During 2019 and 2020, only a handful of federal securities class actions involving SPACs were filed, but in 2021, federal filings involving SPACs became the dominant filing trend.8 Consistent with that overall trend, SPAC filings that include accounting allegations tripled in 2021 as compared to the prior year.

There are several trends in SPAC cases involving accounting issues over the past three years:

  • Approximately one in three initial complaints involving SPACs from 2019 through 2021 included accounting issues.
  • Three law firms—The Rosen Law Firm, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, and Pomerantz LLP—were associated with almost 80% of accounting case filings involving SPACs from 2019 through 2021.
  • Short-seller reports were commonly cited in cases involving SPACs. However, those reports were cited over one and a half times more often in accounting cases as compared with non-accounting cases filed during 2019 through 2021.
  • The median filing lag after a De-SPAC transaction was much greater in 2019–2020 (450 days) than it was in 2021 (106 days) for accounting case filings from 2019 through 2021 involving SPACs.
  • Inappropriate revenue recognition and weaknesses in internal controls were the most common allegations in SPAC accounting cases, followed by allegedly omitted disclosures of related-party transactions.

Because filings of SPAC cases have largely occurred very recently, based on our research only one of these cases had reached settlement as of the end of 2021, and this case included accounting allegations. As more of these cases progress, SPAC cases may play a role in future accounting case settlement trends.


1     “What You Need to Know About SPACs – Updated Investor Bulletin,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, May 25, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/what-you-need-know-about-spacs-investor-bulletin.

2     Jay R. Ritter, “Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics,” Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, p. 48, https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf, accessed April 8, 2022.

3   “What You Need to Know About SPACs – Updated Investor Bulletin,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, May 25, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/what-you-need-know-about-spacs-investor-bulletin.

4   SPACs still searching for a target are those that have completed their IPO but not yet announced a De-SPAC transaction target. See SPAC Insider.

5  Paul Munter, Acting Chief Accountant, “Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations of Companies Merging with SPACs,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, March 31, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/munter-spac-20200331.

6  John Coates, Acting Director, Division of Corporation Finance, and Paul Munter, Acting Chief Accountant, “Staff Statement on Accounting and Reporting Considerations for Warrants Issued by Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (‘SPACs’),” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, April 12, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/accounting-reporting-warrants-issued-spacs.

7   See Will SPAC Restatement Wave Trigger Shareholder Litigation?, Cornerstone Research (2021), for further discussion.

8   See Securities Class Action Filings2021 Year in Review, Cornerstone Research (2022), for further discussion.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

The SEC Remains in Search of and Is Looking for Finders

Much has been written on the topic of finders and arrangers of securities transactions, including when a person or entity acting as a finder (i.e., someone who merely makes an introduction) has crossed the line and engaged in activities or conduct that requires registration as a broker-dealer. Shortly before the end of Jay Clayton’s term as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), he issued a proposed order providing an exemption from broker-dealer registration requirements for certain “finders” who limit their activities in accordance with the conditions set forth in the proposed order.1 Ultimately, the proposal was not adopted. Today, finders and unregistered securities transaction activity continue to be on the SEC’s radar. The states also closely regulate unregistered securities activities.

Recently, the SEC brought several actions in the federal courts against unregistered finders, confirming that the activity of unregistered persons and entities participating in capital raising remains squarely on the SEC agenda. In SEC v. Sky Group USA, LLC, et al.,2 the SEC brought suit against Sky Group, a payday loan firm, and four of its employees in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging numerous violations of the federal securities laws arising out of a Ponzi scheme in which sales agents sold Sky Group securities to retail investors, collecting millions of dollars in commissions on their sales, even though the sales agents were not registered as broker-dealers. The SEC found indicia of activities requiring registration because, among other actions, the sales agents engaged in the sale of securities in the form of unregistered promissory notes and “earned a commission of one percent of each dollar the investors they recruited invested in the [promissory notes].” Many of the more than 500 alleged victims were low-income members of the South Florida Venezuelan-American community.

The allegations in the complaint are salacious and include charges of fraudulently selling $25 million of unregistered promissory notes and misappropriating at least $2.9 million of investor funds for personal use, “several hundred thousand dollars” of which were used to pay for a wedding of one of the defendants at a chateau on the French Riviera. The complaint alleges that additional amounts were used to pay personal credit card debt of one of the principals and diverted to friends and relatives for “no apparent legitimate business purpose.” The relief requested in the SEC’s complaint includes permanent injunctions, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, civil penalties and an officer and director bar against one of the defendants. Although it appears that there was a flurry of early motion practice after the complaint was filed, the defendants consented to entry of a final judgment on June 29, 2022, which includes disgorgement, interest and civil penalties totaling $39,288,990. The other related defendants also consented to entries of final judgement resulting in disgorgement, interest and civil penalties totaling $8,391,676, and a permanent injunction and officer and director bar against one of the defendants.

In SEC v. Richard Eden, et al.,3 the SEC brought suit against Richard Eden and an affiliated company in the US District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that Eden violated the federal securities laws by engaging in conduct that requires registration with a qualified broker-dealer. The complaint alleges that Eden is a recidivist and the conduct at issue in the present lawsuit occurred while Eden was subject to a previously imposed associational bar arising from his participation in multiple unregistered securities offerings. According to the complaint, Eden started as an “opener” and eventually morphed into a “finder/closer” role. The SEC alleges that Eden engaged in broker-dealer activity requiring registration because he was “responsible for both identifying potential investors and attempting to secure their investments in the [offering],” and was paid on a success fee basis. The relief requested includes a permanent injunction restraining Eden and his affiliated company from soliciting any person or entity to purchase or sell any security, disgorgement and civil penalties. As of this writing, the defendants have yet to file answers to the complaint.

It is not surprising that the factual allegations in these cases would attract regulatory attention. The fact that the SEC remains vigilant in its monitoring of firms and individuals engaged in capital raising requires firms and agents to learn the rules and stay within the permissible boundaries. In addition, they must be mindful of the less-than-crystal clear regulatory guidance on unregistered finders, and more specifically, at what point is a person or entity “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” Persons in this business must understand that no-action letters in this subject area are fact-specific and often tailored to narrow and unique fact patterns. Finders in violation of broker-dealer registration requirements may be subject to severe penalties under federal securities laws. Courts and the SEC have looked to certain factors when determining whether a finder has violated the federal securities laws by failing to register as a broker-dealer. Each determination is very fact-specific, but in general, the SEC will consider:

  • Does the person’s compensation depend on the outcome or size of the transaction (i.e., transaction-based compensation)?
  • Does the person participate in important parts of a securities transaction, including solicitation, negotiation or execution of the transaction or assistance in structuring payments?
  • Does the person actively engage in the marketing of the securities?
  • Does the person give advice on the investment’s structure or suitability?

1 Notice of Proposed Exemptive Order Granting Conditional Exemption from the Broker Registration Requirements of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for Certain Activities of Finders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-90112 (Oct. 7, 2020) (available here).

SEC v. Sky Group USA, LLC, et al., SEC Docket No. 21-cv-23443 (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2021/comp25234.pdf.

SEC v. Richard Eden, et al., SEC Docket No. 22-cv-04833 (July 14, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2022/comp25444.pdf.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Draft SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan Emphasizes Importance of Climate Disclosures

Recently, the SEC issued its five-year strategic plan for public comment.  This strategic plan covers a wide variety of topics, ranging from adapting to new technology to plans for increasing internal SEC workforce diversity.  Significantly, this draft strategic plan stated that “the SEC must update its disclosure framework,” and highlighted three areas in which it should do so: “issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people.”

The SEC has already undertaken steps to enact these proposed updates to its disclosure requirements for public companies.  Notably, this past March it proposed draft climate disclosure rules, which provoked a significant response from the public–including widespread criticism from many companies (as well as praise from environmental organizations).  The fact that the SEC chose to highlight these rules in its (draft) five-year strategic plan indicates the depth of the commitment it has made to these draft climate disclosures, and further suggests that the final form of the climate disclosures is unlikely to be significantly altered in substance from what the SEC has already proposed.  This statement reinforces the commitment of Chairman Gensler’s SEC and the Biden Administration to financial disclosures as a method to combat climate change.

The markets have begun to embrace the necessity of providing a greater level of disclosure to investors. From time to time, the SEC must update its disclosure framework to reflect investor demand. Today, investors increasingly seek information related to, among other things, issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people. In order to catch up to that reality, the agency should continue to update the disclosure framework to address these areas of investor demand, as well as continue to take concrete steps to modernize the systems that support the disclosure framework, to make public disclosures easier to access and analyze and thus more decision-useful to investors. . . . Across the agency, the SEC must continually reassess its risks, including in new areas such as climate risk, and document necessary controls.”

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

SEC Proposes to Clear-Up Clearing Agencies’ Governance to Mitigate Directors’ Potential Conflicts of Interest

Clearing agencies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will have to make governance changes to their boards of directors under a new rule proposed by the SEC on August 8, 2022.

The SEC proposed the new rule1 to mitigate the conflicts of interests inherent in clearing agency relationships. The rule follows episodes of market volatility in 2021 that included large fluctuations surrounding COVID-19 and the meme stock craze.

The new rule would amend Section 17Ad-25 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to require additional management and governance requirements for clearing agencies that register with the SEC. The proposed rules provide specific new governance requirements on clearing board composition, independent directors, nominating committees and risk management committees. The rule also requires the board to oversee relationships with critical service providers and includes a board obligation to consider various stakeholder views and inputs.

Rationale

The SEC’s rationale for proposing Rule 17Ad-25, titled Clearing Agency Governance and Conflicts of Interest, is to reduce the risk that conflicts of interest inherent in various clearing agency relationships substantially harm the security-based swaps or larger financial market. The SEC is proposing this rule to mitigate conflicts of interest, promote the fair representation of owners and participants in the governance of a clearing agency, identify responsibilities of the board, and increase transparency into clearing agency governance.

The SEC noted that those episodes of increased market volatility revealed certain vulnerabilities in the US securities market and the essential role clearing agencies play in managing the risk if securities transactions fail to clear.

The SEC observed three potential sets of conflicts of interest that the proposed rule attempts to address.

  1. The proposed rule addresses the different perspectives the various stakeholders involved in clearing agencies might have. In particular, a clearing agency owner’s potential interest in protecting the equity and continued operation of the clearing agency diverges from a participant’s potential interest in avoiding the allocation of losses from another defaulting participant. For instance, in the event of a loss, clearing agency participants might prefer to limit access to clearing, while owners may choose to expand the scope of products offered to collect fees.

  2. Larger clearing agency participants’ priorities may diverge significantly from the interests of smaller clearing agency participants. In particular, when a small number of dominant participants exercise control over a registered clearing agency concerning services provided by that clearing agency, those participants might promote margin requirements that are not commensurate with the risks they take, thereby indirectly limiting competition and increasing profit margins for themselves. In other words, a registered clearing agency dominated by a small number of large participants might make decisions designed to provide them with a competitive advantage.

  3. Certain participants may exert undue influence to limit access to the clearing agency based on their own interests, and thus could limit the benefits of the clearing agency to indirect participants.

Rule Requirements

The proposed rule would impose these seven requirements:

  1. define independence in the context of a director serving on the board of a registered clearing agency and require that a majority of directors on the board be independent, unless a majority of the voting rights distributed to shareholders of record are directly or indirectly held by participants of the registered clearing agency, in which case at least 34 percent of the board must be independent directors;

  2. establish requirements for a nominating committee, including with respect to the composition of the nominating committee, fitness standards for serving on the board, and documenting the process for evaluating board nominees;

  3. establish requirements for the function, composition, and reconstitution of the risk management committee;

  4. require policies and procedures that identify, mitigate or eliminate, and document the identification and mitigation or elimination of conflicts of interest;

  5. require policies and procedures that obligate directors to report potential conflicts promptly;

  6. require policies and procedures for the board to oversee relationships with service providers for critical services; and

  7. require policies and procedures to solicit, consider, and document the registered clearing agency’s consideration of the views of its participants and other relevant stakeholders regarding its governance and operations.

The proposing release will be published on SEC.gov and in the Federal Register. The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following publication of the proposing release on the SEC’s website or 30 days following publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register, whichever period is longer.


FOOTNOTES

https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/34-95431.pdf

Article By Susan Light of Katten. Jacob C. Setton, an associate in the Financial Markets and Funds practice and candidate for admission to the New York State bar, also contributed to this advisory.

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

5 Keys to SEC Compliance Success

The best way to avoid the scrutiny from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that can lead to significant legal liability is to strictly comply with all of the agency’s rules and regulations. Unfortunately, given the complexity of these regulations and the constantly changing legal landscape of securities laws, such as the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, this is much easier said than done.

Here are five keys to SEC compliance.

1. Identify Your Particular Needs

It should be an obvious first step, but many compliance attorneys treat all clients the same and offer a one-size-fits-all approach to complying with the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While this might not be a terrible approach – so long as it is all-encompassing, it will keep your company in line with the SEC across the board – it can saddle your firm with concerns and extraneous internal rules that have no bearing on how you conduct business.

A great example is a cryptocurrency. The SEC is, belatedly, beginning to issue rules and regulations for financial firms that focus on and trade in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. If your brokerage firm is not buying or selling securities in crypto-assets and has no plans to do so soon, then implementing compliance measures for cryptocurrency regulations has no benefit to your company. Those measures will, however, make the regulated securities professionals who work for your firm jump through pointless hoops in the ordinary course of their business.

Adopting a compliance strategy that more precisely meets your company’s needs will let your workers perform to their full capacity while still insulating your firm from legal liability or SEC scrutiny. It will just have to be updated if you choose to expand into new forms of securities trading.

2. Craft an All-Encompassing Compliance Strategy

Based on your firm’s precise regulatory needs, the next key to success is to come up with a compliance strategy that takes into account all of the SEC’s rules that could impact your company. Given the breadth of the SEC’s jurisdiction and the sheer number of regulations that it has put forth, this can take a while.

Once your firm’s legal requirements have been ascertained, the next step is to come up with ways that you can satisfy them during the day-to-day business activities at your firm. This is another reason why every compliance strategy should be tailored to your business – a compliance technique that works well and is easy for one firm may be onerous and inconvenient for another one.

As Dr. Nick Oberheiden, founding partner of the SEC compliance law firm Oberheiden P.C., often tells clients, “All SEC compliance measures should protect the securities firm from SEC liability. However, those measures should also be judged by how burdensome they are on the firm that is employing them. The least inconvenient method to adequately insulate your firm from liability is the best. Learning about a brokerage firm and understanding its strengths and weaknesses and its capabilities help compliance lawyers craft the best solutions for their clients. Unfortunately, one of the most common complaints that securities professionals have about attorneys is that they do not listen to their particular concerns. We strive to do better.”

3. Train, Train, and Retrain Your Workers

No compliance strategy is effective if it is not implemented. Training your employees and workers in the intricacies of the compliance strategy, explaining why it is important for them to follow it strictly, and describing the penalties for noncompliance is the next key to success.

Even here, though, it is not a matter of simply giving your employees a handbook of rules, policies, and procedures to memorize. Just like how the compliance strategy should be tailored to your firm, so too should the instruction materials be tailored to each type of worker at your company. While it can help to train non-regulated administrative staff how to detect the signs of financial misconduct or fraud, there is no reason to bog them down in the details of SEC regulations that only pertain to traders – doing so can overload them with irrelevant information and make them lose sight of what they need to know.

It is also important to remember that training is not a one-time ordeal. New hires must be onboarded and taught the rules of internal compliance. Existing workers should be retrained to keep them apprised of any updates and to ensure that they remember their roles in the compliance protocol.

4. Keep Your Compliance Strategy Updated

Keeping your compliance strategy updated is also essential when it comes to compliance inspections. An out-of-date compliance protocol may still cover many of the bases for SEC compliance. However, there will be gaps in the compliance requirements that you will be unaware of, giving you a false sense of security.

The compliance strategy should not just be updated to account for new SEC regulations, though: It should also get updated whenever your brokerage firm branches out into new types of trading or adds a new kind of financial service to its portfolio. With that new line of business will likely come new SEC regulations to abide by.

5. Audit Yourself Regularly

Even if you have a good compliance program or plan, have trained workers to follow it, and keep the protocols updated, you are still moving forward blindly if you do not regularly conduct internal audits of your company to make sure that those compliance rules are working. Many compliance programs and strategies check off all of the boxes, only to lead to an SEC investigation that finds problems because a single worker did not actually understand how to correctly perform a job task.

These situations of compliance issues are incredibly frustrating. They can also be detected, identified, and corrected through a compliance strategy that includes internal auditing by outside counsel or an SEC compliance attorney with prior experience investigating securities fraud.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2022

Government Brings First Cryptocurrency Insider Trading Charges

In a series of parallel actions announced on July 21, 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated criminal and civil charges against three defendants in the first cryptocurrency insider trading case.

According to the criminal indictment, DOJ alleges that a former employee of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange used his position at the exchange to obtain confidential information about at least 25 future cryptocurrency listings, then tipped his brother and a friend who traded the digital assets in advance of the listing announcements, realizing gains of approximately $1.5 million. The indictment further alleges that the trio used various means to conceal their trading, and that one defendant attempted to flee the United States when their trading was discovered. The Government charged the three with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy. Notably, and like the Government’s recently announced case involving insider trading in nonfungible tokens, criminal prosecutors did not charge the defendants with securities or commodities fraud.

In its press release announcing the charges, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Damian Williams said: “Today’s charges are a further reminder that Web3 is not a law-free zone. Just last month, I announced the first ever insider trading case involving NFTs, and today I announce the first ever insider trading case involving cryptocurrency markets. Our message with these charges is clear: fraud is fraud is fraud, whether it occurs on the blockchain or on Wall Street. And the Southern District of New York will continue to be relentless in bringing fraudsters to justice, wherever we may find them.”

Based on these facts, the SEC also announced charges against the three men in a civil complaint alleging securities fraud. In order to assert jurisdiction over the matter, the SEC alleges that at least nine of the cryptocurrencies involved in the alleged insider trading were securities, and the compliant traces through the Howey analysis for each. The SEC has not announced charges against the exchange itself, though in the past it has charged at least one cryptocurrency exchange that listed securities tokens for failure to register as a securities exchange. Perhaps coincidentally, on July 21 the exchange involved in the latest DOJ and SEC cases filed a rulemaking petition with the SEC urging it to “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods, including potential rules to identify which digital assets are securities.”

In an unusual move, Commissioner Caroline Pham of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) released a public statement criticizing the charges. Citing the Federalist Papers, Commissioner Pham described the cases as “a striking example of ‘regulation by enforcement.’” She noted that “the SEC’s allegations could have broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.” Commissioner Pham continued, “Major questions are best addressed through a transparent process that engages the public to develop appropriate policy with expert input—through notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” She concluded by stating that, “Regulatory clarity comes from being out in the open, not in the dark.” The CFTC is not directly involved in either case, and it is atypical for a regulator to chide a sister agency on an enforcement matter in this fashion. On the same day, another CFTC Commissioner, Kristin Johnson, issued her own carefully-worded statement that seemed to support the Government’s actions.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

What Public Comments on the SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Rules Reveal—and the Impact They May Have on the Proposed Rules

On March 21, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published for comment its much-anticipated proposed rules on climate disclosures, entitled “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”[1]  The SEC invited public comments on these rules, and the response was overwhelming—nearly 15,000 comments were published on the SEC’s website over the course of three months, from individuals and organizations representing all aspects of modern American society.  Few, if any, of the SEC’s rule proposals have ever received such voluminous, significant, and diverse comments.  And the comments themselves range from brief statements to complex legal arguments either in support or in opposition, as well as detailed proposals for further changes to the proposed climate disclosures.  The comment period closed on June 17, 2022, and further action by the SEC to finalize the proposed rule is anticipated this fall.

This article provides a brief summary of the comments, and analyzes and summaries the key points the comments conveyed.

Statistical Analysis of Form and Individualized Submissions

Since the beginning of the public comment period, the SEC has received 14,645 comments on the proposed climate disclosure rules.[2]  To provide some context for how massive that figure is, the SEC has only received 144 comments on its proposed cybersecurity risk management rules, which were announced two weeks before the proposed climate disclosures and have also been the subject of extensive commentary in the press.  Yet despite the prominence of the SEC’s cybersecurity proposal, it has received fewer than 1% of the comments offered on the climate disclosure rule.

Of the 14,645 comments, approximately 12,304, or 84% of the total, are form letters.  This includes 10,589 comments that the SEC itself identified as form letters, and another 1,715 apparently individualized comments that were actually form letters.  However, even when removing these form letters from consideration, fully 2,341 individualized comment letters remain—a substantial number, and a significant percentage (16%) of the volume.[3]

The form letters are worth exploring in more detail.  Of the 12,304 comments, fully 10,861 (88%) broadly express support for the proposed climate disclosure rule, and only 1,443 (12%) are in opposition.  This disparity in the level of support for the two positions is best conveyed by the chart below.

Positions for and against the new SEC Disclosures

Notably, it has been possible to identify some, although not all, of the organizations that sponsored the form letter writing campaign.  In particular, form letters proposed by the Union of Concerned Scientists in support of the proposed climate disclosures were submitted 6886 times—more than 55% of the total volume of form letters.  Additionally, the form letters proposed by the Climate Action Campaign and the National Wildlife Federation in support of the SEC’s proposed disclosures were also quite voluminous among the submissions—1208 and 956 comment letters, respectively.  The most frequent form letters submitted in opposition to the proposed climate disclosure rules—e.g., those proposed by FreedomWorks (348 letters) and the Club for Growth (172 letters)—did not achieve nearly the same volume of submissions.

But the apparent overwhelming majority in favor of the proposed SEC climate disclosure rules, as conveyed by the form letters, is belied by the individualized submissions, which were far more closely divided.  Of the 2341 individualized comment letters submitted, approximately 53% (1238 comment letters) expressed support, about 43% (1015 comment letters) were opposed, and a handful—around 4% (88 comment letters)[4]—did not express a position.  The below chart demonstrates the levels of support expressed by the individualized submissions:

Individual submissions supporting, opposing, and neutral to the new SEC Disclosures

Besides the mere volume of submissions, however, the most noteworthy aspect of the individualized submissions are the substantive arguments—both factual and legal—that these comment letters articulate, whether in support or opposition to the proposed rules, as well as the identity of those making these submissions.

Arguments in Support of the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

The organizations and individuals that chose to offer support for the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures represent a wide swathe of society.  Broadly speaking, these proposed climate disclosures attracted support from, among others: Democratic politicianscivil society organizations (such as environmental NGOs), individual corporationsprofessional services organizations, and academics. While the rationales offered by these different groups varied considerably, in part due to their varying perspectives (e.g., environmental NGOs were more concerned with the impact on the transition to a clean-energy environment, while corporations often focused on the consequences of particular aspects of the rules), the individualized comments in support of the proposed disclosures nonetheless shared some common features.

Specifically, there are a number of common arguments that are frequently featured among the 1239 individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.  Six arguments appear in over 10% of the submissions.  In order of prevalence, these are:

  1. Environmental Protection (347 submissions, 28%): that the proposed rules will help protect the environment
  2. Investor Choice (280 submissions, 23%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to make more informed choices
  3. Investor Protection (263 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to protect themselves and their investments from climate-related risk
  4. Standardization of Climate Disclosures (259 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable the standardization of climate disclosures, making data comparable
  5. Increased Transparency (171 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will increase transparency and hold companies accountable for their emissions
  6. Alignment with International and Foreign Regulatory Frameworks (169 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will bring the United States into alignment with both international frameworks and other countries (e.g., the EU)

No other argument appeared in more than 6% of the individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.

Notably, the most common arguments in favor of the proposed climate disclosures share a common feature: these are all policy arguments, focusing on the benefits to investors and the broader economy from the adoption of the SEC’s proposed disclosures.  Only a single argument among the top ten most frequent arguments in support was a legal argument—namely that the proposed rules fall within the SEC’s statutory authority—and that argument appeared in only around 3% of the submissions (41 submissions).[5]  This focus on policy benefits among supporters of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures is unsurprising, as these public policy rationales were a key factor in encouraging the Biden Administration to pursue this regulatory agenda.  However, the reluctance to engage with critics of the proposed climate disclosures on a legal basis may signal the difficulties that the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures may encounter in future court challenges.

Arguments in Opposition to the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

Those entities and individuals that submitted individualized comment letters opposing the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures also represent a broad range of American society, albeit with a somewhat different focus.  Generally, individualized letters in opposition to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures tended to be submitted by, among others: Republican politiciansindividual corporationstrade industry groups, and NGOs. (Unsurprisingly, the fossil fuel industry and extractive industries were particularly well-represented among the commenters.)  These individualized submissions—frequently lengthy and extensively analyzing the SEC’s regulatory practices and authority—shared a number of common themes.

In particular, there are a number of common arguments that featured frequently among the 1014 individualized submissions to the SEC in opposition to these proposed climate disclosures.  Three (3) arguments appeared in more than ten (10) percent of these submissions:

  1. Ultra vires (322 submissions, 32% ): that the SEC lacks the ability to issue these disclosures as the proposed rule is beyond the scope of the SEC’s legal authority
  2. Compliance Costs (218 submissions, 21% ): that compliance with the proposed rule will impose unreasonable and extensive costs on businesses
  3. Climate Science Skepticism (123 submissions, 12%): that the science concerning climate change is unsettled and therefore the proposed rule is inappropriate

Although no other common argument appeared in more than 7% of the individualized letters in opposition, it should still be noted that there were a large number of letters that objected to the increased burdens placed on particular types of businesses, whether farmers (53 submissions, 5%), fossil fuel companies (49 submissions, 5%), or small businesses (36 submissions, 4%).

Overall, it is striking that around a third of the comments submitted in opposition stated that the SEC had acted beyond its authority (ultra vires) in proposing this new rule.  While this critique is hardly novel—it has been a frequent refrain of the Republican SEC Commissioners ever since this topic was first broached—the prevalence of this argument among the individualized comments suggests that both the public and sophisticated market actors perceive this issue as a key vulnerability in the SEC’s proposal, and that this legal argument will likely be emphasized in the inevitable legal challenge to this SEC rule.  And, based on recent decisions by the Supreme Court, it is altogether likely that this line of attack may find a sympathetic audience in the courts.

Potential Changes to the SEC Climate Disclosure Rules Resulting from Public Comments

Despite the differences between the advocates and opponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, both sides submitted proposals to the SEC to change or adjust the proposed rules.  Although there was often substantial disagreement about the content of these proposed changes, there were also significant areas of convergence.

Some of the changes to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures frequently submitted by supporters of the rule included:

  1. ISSB: that the SEC should further align its proposal with the ISSB and help create a global standard (76 comments);
  2. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (72 comments);
  3. Alignment with International and Foreign Standards: that the SEC should further align its proposal with international and foreign standards, such as the EU or TCFD (66 comments);
  4. Enhance Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to eliminate exemptions so that all companies must disclose Scope 3 GHG emissions (55 comments);
  5. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (53) comments;
  6. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (36 comments);
  7. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (26 comments).

Although certain proposed changes by proponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule are undeniably expected (e.g., removing exemptions for disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions), there are others that seem somewhat surprising on initial review (e.g., extending the phase-in period or removing Scope 3 GHG emissions entirely).  This can most easily be explained by the fact that supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule include corporations and other business interests, which will resist certain burdensome regulations even if generally offering support for the overall thrust of the proposal.  There are also academics and others who continue to express skepticism concerning the utility of disclosing Scope 3 emissions, or even whether it can be adequately measured.

It should be emphasized that these changes proffered by supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule, many of which are designed to render the proposed rule less onerous, may indicate that the support for the proposed rule—or at least the most stringent aspects of it—is relatively weak (or at least among the corporate interests nominally aligned with the SEC).

The most frequent changes suggested by opponents of the rule included:

  1. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (69 comments);
  2. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (35 comments);
  3. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (25 comments);
  4. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (18 comments).

These proposed changes (and others) advanced by opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule are generally designed to make the rules less stringent and also to reduce costs and potential legal liability.

As can be seen by comparing the above lists, there are certain areas where suggested changes to the proposed rule converged.  In particular, there are issues where both opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule and some of its supporters would try to render it less intrusive or impactful, particularly with respect to the elimination of the requirement to report Scope 3 GHG emissions and to extend the phase-in period further.  (Although, as noted, this apparent convergence between opponents and supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule may be due to divergent interests among the supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule with respect to its implementation.)

But, regardless of the specific content of the particular proposed changes, what is undoubtedly significant is that these proposed changes have highlighted the aspects of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule that are likely most sensitive to regulated corporations.  Such an insight reveals not only the areas where active lobbying is most likely to take place, but also previews probable priorities for corporate compliance departments.  In effect, focusing on the aspects of the proposed rule where changes were proposed is a means to identify the key issues from the perspective of the regulated entities and the public at large.

Conclusion

The level of engagement with the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, as demonstrated by the number and detail of the public comments offered, is extraordinary. This degree of attention indicates the significant impact that is expect to result from the ultimate promulgation of these rules (or a revised version thereof).

Of course, the key question here is what changes, if any, are likely to be made to the SEC’s proposed rule based upon the public comments submitted to the SEC.  In this context, it is noteworthy that a handful of key issues have been identified by both proponents and opponents of the proposed disclosures as especially ripe for potential revision.  As noted above, these include, among others, the length of the phase-in period and the disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions.  If any changes are to be made to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule, it is likely that such changes will be related to these issues.

However, given the relative lack of forward momentum with respect to other aspects of the Biden Administration’s climate agenda, there may well be political pressure not to weaken or otherwise rollback the SEC’s proposed rule, as this is one of the few areas where significant—and publicly-recognized—progress has been made with regulations designed to address the issue of climate change.  Further, the Biden Administration’s SEC has certainly recognized the inevitability of a legal challenge to these proposed climate disclosures, and, since no degree of alteration would suffice to preempt such a lawsuit, the SEC may conclude that it is better to seek to implement all aspects of the proposed regulation for the political benefit that can be achieved in the short term, since the substantive aspects of the proposed disclosure may not ultimately survive judicial scrutiny.  The SEC may also prefer to send a strong signal to the market by maintaining its original proposed rule.  Recognizing these pressures, it seems unlikely that the public comments submitted to the SEC will have a significant impact on the final rule promulgated in the coming months—and improbable that the SEC will make the proposed disclosures less robust.


FOO​TNOTES

[1] These proposed rules are discussed more fully in our prior publication:  https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2451/2022-03-30-brief-summary-secs-proposed-climate-related-rules

[2] Although the total number of comments, when including both form letters and individualized letters, is 14,739, there are 94 comment letters on the SEC website that are duplicates, and have thus been removed from the calculation.

[3] For comparison, the proposed SEC rule on disclosing compensation ratios drew about 300,000 form letters and around 1500 individualized comment letters.  In this case, the individualized comment letters represented only about 0.5% of the total volume.  https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml

[4] The eighty-eight comment letters that did not adopt an express position on the proposed climate disclosure rules instead conveyed a number of different points, including proposing narrow changes to the proposed rule without taking a stance on the rule as a whole, or offering further context for the SEC’s actions (e.g., comparing the SEC to other regulators, whether domestic or international).  This category also includes a number of early comments that simply requested that the SEC extend the deadline for submitting comments.

[5] There are public comments in support of the proposed rule that focus on the legal issues.  In particular, the submission of Prof. John Coates of Harvard Law School, a former SEC official, is devoted exclusively to defending the legal authority of the SEC to issue the proposed climate disclosure rule. https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130026-296547.pdf

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.