Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Has the Supreme Court Tamed or Empowered the CFPB?

On June 26, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,1 finally resolving the question that has dogged the new agency since its inception:  Is the leadership structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) constitutional?  Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts ruled that the CFPB structure—“an independent agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual who cannot be removed by the President unless certain statutory criteria are met”—violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.2  

For financial services companies regulated by the CFPB, the most important aspect of Seila Law is not the headline constitutional defect, but the remedy.  Choosing “a scalpel rather than a bulldozer,”3 the Court did not invalidate the CFPB.  The Court held 7-2 that the Director’s constitutionally offensive removal protection could be severed from the CFPB’s other authorities, thus bringing the Director (and with her, the CFPB) under Presidential control, while leaving the CFPB’s other powers in place.4

While Seila Law  is an important case in the evolving doctrine of separation of powers as applied to independent agencies, the case has three immediate consequences for financial services companies.  First, the CFPB is here to stay, and its broad authorities and other controversial aspects (such as its insulation from Congressional appropriations) remain intact.  Second, the CFPB’s Director is now directly accountable to the President, significantly raising the stakes in the 2020 election for the agency’s regulatory and enforcement agenda.  Third, the Court left one important question unanswered:  it declined to address the effect of its ruling on prior CFPB rules and enforcement actions.  While we believe the agency will attempt to cure the constitutional defect, we expect continued litigation—and uncertainty—on this issue.

Background

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), creating the CFPB as an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve System.5  The CFPB has expansive authority to “implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law,” which includes 19 enumerated federal consumer-protection statutes and the Dodd-Frank Act’s broad prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.6  The CFPB’s authority over consumer financial products and services includes rulemaking authority with respect to the enumerated statutes, the ability to issue orders, including orders prohibiting products and services which it concludes are “abusive” or substantively unfair, as well as the power to impose significant financial penalties on financial services companies.  The CFPB is funded through the Federal Reserve System, and thus is not subject to Congressional constraint through the appropriations process.  Although technically housed within the Federal Reserve System, the CFPB also is not subject to oversight or control by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  As a result, the CFPB was created to be an independent agency, largely unconstrained by Congress or the Federal Reserve System.  The CFPB is headed by a single Director appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.7  The Director may be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”8  

In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law LLC, a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal services to consumers.  Seila Law refused to comply, objecting that concentrating the CFPB’s authority in a single Director with for-cause removal protection violated the separation of powers doctrine.  The CFPB filed a petition to enforce its demand in federal district court.  The district court rejected Seila Law’s constitutional objection and ordered the law firm to comply with the demand.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.9

Case Analysis: Seila Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-Director structure.  That decision was telling in and of itself, given that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was in accord with PHH Corporation v. CFPB, the D.C. Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding the Director’s removal protection.10  As many had expected, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Congress’s restriction on the President’s power to remove the CFPB’s Director violated the separation of powers doctrine. 

The Court began its analysis from the premise that Article II of the Constitution gives the entire executive power to the President alone, “who must ‘take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”11  Lesser officers who aid the President in his or her duties “must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they wield.”12  The President’s power to remove these lesser officers at will is foundational to the President’s executive function and “has long been confirmed by history and precedent.”13  The Court held that “[w]hile we have previously upheld limits on the President’s removal authority in certain contexts, we decline to do so when it comes to principal officers who, acting alone, wield significant executive power.”14  The Court found that the CFPB’s Director fit that bill.  In creating the CFPB, Congress “vest[ed] significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual accountable to no one.”15  Such an agency “has no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure.”16 

Next, the Court turned to the remedy.  Seila Law argued that the Director’s unconstitutional removal protection rendered the “entire agency … unconstitutional and powerless to act.”17  The Court disagreed.  Relying on the Dodd-Frank Act’s severability clause, the Court’s severability precedent, and the proposition that “Congress would have preferred a dependent CFPB to no agency at all,” the Court ruled that the Director’s removal protection is severable from the CFPB’s other statutory authorities.18  “The agency may therefore continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the President at will.”19  

Finally, the Court expressly declined to address how its holding affects prior CFPB regulatory and enforcement actions.  The government had argued that the Court need not reach the constitutional question because the CFPB’s demand to Seila Law had since been ratified by an Acting Director accountable to the President.20  The Court remanded the question of ratification to the lower courts, noting that it “turns on case-specific factual and legal questions not addressed below and not briefed here.”21

Implications

Seila Law is an important case for the canons of administrative law and the separation of powers doctrine.  But for financial services companies regulated by the CFPB, it has meaningful (and immediate) practical consequences.

First, the CFPB has escaped Supreme Court review with its authorities basically untouched.  Absent Congressional action, the CFPB will (i) continue to be run by a single Director, (ii) continue to wield expansive rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authority over the multi-trillion dollar market for consumer financial products and services, and (iii) continue to be insulated from Congressional control via the appropriations process.

Second, the CFPB’s Director is now directly accountable to the President—whoever that person may be.  Typically, financial regulators have a measure of insulation from the political process to provide consistency and certainty to financial markets.  With this decision, the election of the next President—and the prospect of a Democratic administration—could result in significant and immediate changes to the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement agenda.

Third, while Seila Law secured the CFPB’s future, the Court left in place significant uncertainty as to its past.  This past includes major enforcement actions and rulemakings that have reshaped the market for consumer financial products and services over the last nine years.  Of course, it remains to be seen what appetite financial services companies have to challenge the CFPB’s prior rules and enforcement orders.  And, we expect the CFPB will attempt to remedy the constitutional defect by ratifying the agency’s past actions or perhaps invoking the de facto officer doctrine.22  Yet, the availability of either remedy is an open question.  Ratification in particular is a live dispute in both Seila Law and a pending en banc appeal before the Fifth Circuit, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. All American Check Cashing.23  Ratification of prior agency actions was also left unresolved in another thread of the Supreme Court’s recent separation of powers jurisprudence.  In Lucia v. SEC, the Court found that the SEC hired administrative law judges (ALJs) in violation of the Appointments Clause, but offered limited remedial guidance aside from instructions that Lucia was entitled to a “new hearing before a properly appointed” ALJ.24  While litigating Lucia’s challenge, the SEC issued an order purporting to ratify its past ALJ appointments by approval of the Commission itself.  The Court acknowledged that order, but declined to address its validity.25


1   Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ____ (2020) (June 26, 2020).

2   Id., Slip Op. at 2–3.

3   Id., at 35.

4   Id.,  at 3. 

5   Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., created the CFPB and defines its authorities. 

6   12 U.S.C. § 5511 (defining CFPB’s purpose); 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law”). 

7   Id. § 5491(b)(2), (c).

8   Id. § 5491(c)(3).  For a detailed discussion of the CFPB and its powers, see our Clients & Friends Memo, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: The New, Powerful Regulator of Financial Products and Services (March 06, 2012).

9   Seila Law, Slip Op. at 6–8 (discussing procedural history).

10 PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F. 3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (en banc).  Tellingly, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote the D.C. Circuit panel decision holding that the CFPB’s structure violated the separation of powers doctrine.  839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The en banc court vacated that decision, but now-Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority in Seila, reiterating his separation of powers analysis from the D.C. Circuit.    For further analysis of the PHH decision, see our Client & Friends Memo Federal Appeals Court Rules That CFPB Structure is Constitutional  (Jan. 31, 2018) (discussing the en banc decision); D.C. Circuit Brings CFPB under Presidential Control  (Oct. 13, 2016) (discussing the initial panel decision of the D.C. Circuit).

11 Seila Law, Slip Op. at 11 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1).

12 Id. at 12.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 36.  Specifically, the Court wrote that it has recognized two limited exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal power.  Seila Law, Slip Op. at 15–16.  First, in Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court upheld removal restrictions for Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission, which Roberts characterized as “a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.”  Seila Law, Slip Op. at 15.  Second, in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court permitted removal protections for certain inferior officers with narrow duties, such as an independent counsel appointed to investigate and prosecute specific crimes.

15 Seila Law, Slip Op. at 23.

16 Id. at 18.

17 Id. at 31.

18 Id. at 32–36 (emphasis in original).

19 Id. at 3.

20 Id. at 30.

21 Id. at 31. Justice Thomas viewed this theory as irrelevant, since the Acting Director could not have ratified the continuance of the action by Director Kraninger. Justice Kagan did not address this theory specifically.

22 See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995) (the de facto officer doctrine “confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.”).

23 No. 18-60302 (5th Cir.).

24 Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).

25 Id. at 2055 n.6.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

ARTICLE BY Rachel Rodman and Scott A. Cammarn and Nihal S. Patel at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

For more on the CPFB, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law section.

U.S. Supreme Court Issues Landmark Ruling in Favor of LGBTQ Employees in the Workplace

Yesterday, in a much-anticipated opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that federal anti-discrimination laws protect LGBTQ employees in the workplace. This ruling provides much needed clarity for employers and resolves a court split in which some federal courts recognized that federal law prohibited LGBTQ discrimination, while others (including those covering Florida, Georgia, and Alabama) stated that LGBTQ discrimination was not unlawful.

This landmark ruling, in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, arises out of three different appeals. In two of the cases, the employees were fired despite having long and successful careers after their employers learned that they were homosexual. In the third case, an employee who initially presented herself as a male announced several years later that she planned to transition to “living and working full-time as a woman.” The employer terminated her immediately.

The law at issue – Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) – prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin. However, the law makes no mention of sexual orientation.

Nevertheless, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that all three terminations were illegal. In doing so, the Court noted that “[a]n employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”

Although several states and municipalities have passed laws and rules prohibiting all or at least some forms of LGBTQ discrimination, this ruling clarifies that both sexual orientation discrimination and gender identity/transgender discrimination are prohibited by federal law throughout the United States.

The federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII provides the following examples of LGBTQ-related conduct that it considers to be unlawful:

  • Refusing to hire an applicant because she is a transgender woman.
  • Firing an employee because he is planning or has made a gender transition.
  • Denying an employee equal access to a common restroom corresponding to the employee’s gender identity.
  • Harassing a woman because she does not dress or talk in a feminine manner.
  • Harassing a man because he dresses in an effeminate manner or enjoys hobbies that are traditionally associated with women.
  • Harassing an employee because of a gender transition, such as by intentionally and persistently failing to use the name and gender pronoun that correspond to the gender identity with which the employee identifies, and which the employee has communicated to management and employees.
  • Denying an employee a promotion because he is gay or straight.
  • Paying a lower salary to an employee because of sexual orientation.
  • Denying spousal health insurance benefits to a female employee because her legal spouse is a woman, while providing spousal health insurance to a male employee whose legal spouse is a woman.
  • Harassing an employee because of his/her sexual orientation (e.g., derogatory terms, sexually oriented comments, or disparaging remarks for associating with a person of the same or opposite sex).
  • Discriminating against or harassing an employee because of his/her sexual orientation or gender identity, in combination with another unlawful reason, for example, on the basis of transgender status and race, or sexual orientation and disability.

The penalties for non-compliance can be significant, including potential for significant emotional distress and other compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

This ruling is particularly significant to employers in jurisdictions like Florida that did not recognize that LGBTQ discrimination was unlawful under federal law. In light of this decision, employers should immediately take the following proactive steps to prevent and prohibit LGBTQ discrimination in the workplace:

  • Review your handbooks and anti-discrimination policies to ensure that sexual orientation and other LGBTQ-related status are included in your list of legally protected categories.
  • Consider adopting policies and procedures protecting the rights of transgender employees. For example, a transgender woman must be allowed to use a common female restroom or locker room facility, and dress code policies should permit employees to follow the dress code matching their gender identity.
  • Update your discrimination and harassment training modules to ensure that LGBTQ-related discrimination and harassment is addressed. Such training should include specific examples of what types of conduct could constitute unlawful discrimination. Managers and human resources personnel in particular need to be made aware that LGBTQ discrimination is unlawful and will not be tolerated.

In addition, employers will need to closely follow EEOC guidance and case law that follows this ruling. For example, as Justice Alito mentioned in his dissenting opinion, it is unclear what impact this ruling will have on employees who want their employers to pay for sex reassignment surgery and treatment.


© 2007-2020 Hill Ward Henderson, All Rights Reserved

For more on SCOTUS’s recent decision, see the National Law Review Civil Rights law section.

Supreme Court of the United States Upholds DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals)

In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts on Department of Homeland Security et al vs. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was improper under the Administrative Procedures Act.

In the decision, Chief Justice Roberts concludes “that the acting secretary violated the [Administrative Procedure Act]” and thus the decision to end the DACA program must be vacated. Today, over 700,000 foreign nationals have availed themselves of the opportunities provided by DACA.

In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts writes:

“We do not decide whether DACA or its rescission are sound policies. ‘The wisdom’ of those decisions ‘is none of our concern.’ Chenery II, 332 U. S., at 207. We address only whether the agency complied with the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned explanation for its action. Here the agency failed to consider the conspicuous issues of whether to retain forbearance and what if anything to do about the hardship to DACA recipients. That dual failure raises doubts about whether the agency appreciated the scope of its discretion or exercised that discretion in a reasonable manner. The appropriate recourse is therefore to remand to DHS so that it may consider the problem anew.”

Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan and Sotomayor. Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh filed opinions that concurred with parts of the dissent and majority.

On June 15, 2012, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a memorandum creating a non-congressionally authorized administration program that allowed certain individuals who entered the United States as children and met various other requirements, namely lacking current lawful immigration status, to request deferred action for an initial period of up to two years, with the ability to renew thereafter, and eligibility for work authorization. This program became known as DACA – Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.

The program has faced continuous constitutional scrutiny since its creation, including the Department of Homeland Security’s order that ended the program in 2017. Lower court rulings enabled the DACA program to continue, ultimately leading to suit being brought before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s decision is not a final resolution on DACA, but instead rules that the Trump Administration’s total recession of DACA was “arbitrary and capricious” and that the administration failed to give adequate justification for ending the program. This decision keeps the DACA program in place.

The full ruling on the case can be found here.


©2020 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Rules Title VII Bars Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Today, June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender workers.  The Court held that employers who discriminate against employees based on sexual orientation or gender identity unlawfully intend to rely on sex in their decision-making. Justice Gorsuch, along with Chief Justice Roberts and the four liberal justices of the Court, wrote, in deciding the question of whether an employer can fire an individual for being homosexual or transgender: “the answer is clear.”  Specifically, “an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.  Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”  Ultimately, “an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.”

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia consisted of three individual employment cases, all of which involved an employer terminating the employment of a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed the he or she was homosexual or transgender.  Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare advocate for Clayton County, Georgia for over ten years and was fired shortly after participating in a gay recreational softball league.  The reason given for his termination was an allegation of misspent funds and “conduct unbecoming of a county employee;” however, Bostock argued that was pretense and the real motivation for his termination was his sexual orientation.  Both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII did not include protection against discrimination towards sexual orientation.

In Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, Donald Zara worked as a skydiving instructor for Altitude Express in New York.  Zarda worked for the company for several years and his employment was terminated shortly after mentioning to his employer that he was gay.  While the District Court ruled in favor of the employer, the Second Circuit ruled that Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Lastly, in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Aimee Stephens, a funeral home employee in Garden City, Michigan, who originally presented herself as a male upon hiring, revealed to her employer during her sixth year of employment that she would be transitioning and working and living full-time as a woman.  Shortly thereafter, she was dismissed from her job due to her transition.  Initially, the District Court found for the funeral home on two bases: (1) Title VII did not protect transgender persons nor gender identity, and (2) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permitted the funeral home to make employment decisions based on faith.  The Sixth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that Title VII’s “discrimination by sex” does include transgender persons and also that the funeral home had failed to show how Title VII interfered with its owner’s religious expression.

Given the split among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court took up this trio of cases to render a clear determination as to whether sexual orientation and gender identity are protected categories under Title VII.  This case of first impression signifies a key development in the interpretation and meaning of discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Title VII.  The opinion resolved the issue of whether those who drafted Title VII could have intended protection of these classes, with Justice Gorsuch explaining: “Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s con­sequences that have become apparent over the years, in­cluding its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination sup­ply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. When the ex­press terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”

Employers must ensure that their policies, including their equal employment opportunity, harassment, and discrimination policies, reflect this opinion and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  In addition to these policy matters, employers should take actions to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and communicate the development in the law to employees and key decision makers in the company.

The full opinion can be found here.


© 2020 Bracewell LLP

For more on the SCOTUS Title VII decision, see the National Law Review Civil Rights law section.

BREAKING: US Supreme Court Rules Title VII Protects LGBTQ Employees

In a highly anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act protects LGBTQ employees from being fired because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

The opinion, released on June 15, 2020, was a consolidation of three federal appellate court decisions—Bostock v. Clayton CountyAltitude Express v. Zarda; and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In each case, the employer terminated the plaintiff after learning that he or she was gay or transgender.

In Bostock, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held Title VII did not protect an employee against discrimination because of his or her sexual orientation, relying on circuit precedent. The 2nd Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Zarda, concluding an employer discriminated on the basis of sex (including gender stereotypes) when it terminated a long-time employee. In R.G. & G.R., the 6th Circuit held Title VII protected against discrimination based on an employee’s transgender or transitioning status because such discrimination is grounded in an employee’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the majority, analyzed whether discrimination because of sexual orientation or transgender status is fundamentally sex discrimination for failing to conform to gender stereotypes—an issue already determined to fall within Title VII’s scope.

In its analysis, the majority used the example of an employer who has a policy of firing any employee who is known to be gay. According to the Court, if a model employee brings a female spouse to an office holiday party and the employee is then fired due to also being female rather than male, the employer discriminated on the basis of sex, even if the intent was to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

Similarly, the Court reasoned that an employer cannot discriminate against one of two otherwise identical female employees because she was identified as a male at birth. In doing so “the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.” Accordingly, such discrimination is indistinguishable from sex discrimination.

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, authored one of two dissenting opinions. Justice Alito’s primary points of disagreement with the majority were: (1) the definition of “sex,” as understood by the legislators who authored Title VII, does not include sexual orientation or transgender status; and (2) Congress has had opportunities to amend Title VII to expressly include such protections but has failed to do so.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent relied on his interpretation of the “ordinary meaning” of Title VII, which he concluded does not include protections for sexual orientation or transgender status. As such, Justice Kavanaugh reasoned it was not the Court’s role to expand the scope of Title VII. Despite his disagreement with the majority, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent concluded with a congratulatory note to those he would deny Title VII’s protections, “Millions of gay and lesbian Americans have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact and law. They have exhibited extraordinary vision, tenacity, and grit—battling often steep odds in the legislative and judicial arenas, not to mention in their daily lives. They have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today’s result.”

The upshot of the Court’s Bostock decision is effectively an expansion of Title VII’s antidiscrimination protections to LGBTQ employees. While many employers already have policies prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation and/or transgender status, this decision presumably authorizes EEOC charges and Title VII claims for such discrimination.


© 2020 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

For more on discrimination protections see the National Law Review Civil Rights law section.

Hirst Spot Print Turned into Spots by MSCHF, Courtroom Artists Face New Challenge, Banksy Pays Homage to Hospital Workers

Still No LOVE in Robert Indiana’s Estate Battle

In the ongoing suit over the rights to Robert Indiana’s artworks, defendant Michael McKenzie, the founder of American Image Art, filed new counterclaims against the Morgan Art Foundation alleging that Morgan orchestrated “one of the most massive art frauds in history.” McKenzie argues that intellectual property rights were abandoned by Indiana decades ago and that the artist’s famous LOVE artwork is in the public domain. McKenzie further alleges that Morgan “fraudulently affixed” copyright to more than 1,000 sculptures worth more than $100 million and an additional million items valued at least $50 million in retail sales – Indiana did not affix a copyright symbol to his work when it was first published. McKenzie also seeks to invalidate two federal trademarks that Morgan registered for the design and reproduction of LOVE. Notably, several other counterclaims made by McKenzie and Indiana’s estate were dismissed in 2019. Morgan maintains that it has the rights to all images and sculptures that Indiana produced between 1960 and 2004, as well as the exclusive right to fabricate and sell certain sculptures, including LOVE, pursuant to agreements dating back to 1999. Morgan’s direct claim against McKenzie is over the sale of works it alleges were falsely attributed to Indiana.

As SCOTUS Moves Oral Arguments Online, Courtroom Artists Forced to Use Their Ears – and Imaginations – for Illustrations of Oral Arguments

The U.S. Supreme Court’s justices and their staffs are not the only people in the courtroom having to adapt. Court-appointed artists still capture the oral arguments, but must now rely on their ears and imaginations rather than their eyes to create the illustrations. The inability to be inside the courtroom during the arguments not only makes it difficult to paint a picture but also leaves lawyers in the dark as to the justices’ reactions to their arguments.

The Most Expensive Game of (Dis)Connect the Dots: A $30,000 Hirst Print Sold Off Spot by Spot

Damien Hirst created a spot print titled L-Isoleucine T-Butyl Ester. Now, MSCHF, a Brooklyn-based art collective, cut out each of the print’s 88 spots as part of the project called Severed Spots, created in protest against the practice of fractionizing the ownership of artworks. MSCHF sold off each of the spots for $480, generating a profit of about $12,000 over the $30,000 purchase price; in yet another example of an artwork’s value apparently growing as a result of its destruction (think Banksy’s Love Is in the Bin), they stand to gain even more as bidders line up to purchase leftover white paper. Our readers will remember MSCHF for auctioning off The Persistence of Chaos, a computer with the world’s most malicious viruses last year, among other news-making stunts/artworks. MSCHF also sold Jesus Shoes, custom Nike Air Max 97s with holy water from the River Jordan in the soles. Damien Hirst’s studio has not yet responded to this latest stunt by the collective.

Founder of Napster Involved in Suit Over Ownership of an Old Master Painting

Auction house Christie’s recent court filings to enforce an arbitration award reveal that art collector Sean Parker, founder of Napster and first president of Facebook, was embroiled in a dispute over a sale of Peter Paul Rubens’s A Satyr Holding a Basket of Grapes and Quinces with a Nymph (1620). In 2018, Parker acquired the artwork at a Christie’s auction for his foundation, after which the consignor of the artwork inexplicably sought to cancel the sale, despite making more than $1 million in profit. The consignor claimed that she tried to withdraw the painting before the auction took place. When the parties were unable to amicably resolve the dispute, it was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that Christie’s complied with its contractual obligations and that Parker lawfully acquired the painting. The case highlights the legal and financial responsibilities of the parties involved in consigning an artwork to an auction house.

Former Paddle8 CEO Sued for Alleged Misappropriation of Funds

A group of creditors brought suit in the Southern District of New York, accusing former Paddle8 CEO Valentine Uhovski of engaging in acts of gross mismanagement and disloyalty, including alleged misappropriation of funds from the auctions to pay the company’s operating expenses. Uhovski has denied the allegations. Paddle8 filed for bankruptcy in March, following a separate suit by a nonprofit cinema group that alleged misappropriation of funds from a charity auction.

Mail Art Experiencing Revitalization

In recent months, Mail Art – a 1950s art movement centered around sending small-scale artworks via the postal service – has regained popularity. Artists have been reaching out via social media for submissions, and to date, hundreds of individuals have answered the call. The original idea was to create a form of artistic production that bypasses the traditional channels of art dissemination. The reborn interest in Mail Art is “creating a sense of connectivity” while allowing for people stuck in their homes to take a break from their screens.

EUROPE

INTERPOL Recovers 19,000+ Artifacts in a Massive Operation Spanning 103 Countries

More than 300 INTERPOL investigations coordinated between 103 countries resulted in recovery of more than 19,000 artifacts. Recalling the work of the Monuments Men – unlikely World War II heroes who saved many of Europe’s art treasures – the investigations were focused on criminal networks that deal in artworks looted from war-torn countries as well as artifacts stolen from archeological excavations and museums. The success of the mission highlights the need for global cooperation in fighting the trafficking of cultural goods.

MoMA Voices Concerns Over Norway’s Handling of Picasso Murals

The Norwegian government is in the process of demolishing a government building in Oslo that features Pablo Picasso’s murals sandblasted onto the concrete walls. While plans have been made to relocate the artworks, many are concerned that once moved, the murals will crack. The MoMA letter, published in the Norwegian press, expresses grave concerns over the preservation of the murals and emphasizes their significance to the art community. In addition, the petition to preserve the building holding the murals has garnered more than 47,000 signatures.

Van Eyck Exhibition Organizers Argue Coronavirus Triggers Cancellation Policy

Organizers of the largest exhibition ever dedicated to the Flemish Old Master Jan Van Eyck will distribute refunds to 144,000 ticket holders who were unable to attend due to early closure following the coronavirus outbreak. The organizers are seeking coverage from their cancellation insurer for the refunds of more than €3.5 million.

Counterfeit Artwork Seized at Heathrow Airport Part of a Larger Problem

The British Museum’s inspection revealed that hundreds of what looked to be Middle Eastern artifacts intercepted last July by an officer at Heathrow Airport were fakes. While the items were discovered to be counterfeit, they had the potential to be sold for thousands of dollars to unsuspecting buyers.

Croatia Rushes to Save Valuable Pieces of Art

While the world deals with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, Croatia experienced a 5.4 magnitude earthquake in its capital, Zagreb. The earthquake damaged some 26,000 buildings, palaces, university buildings and hospitals. The Museum of Decorative Arts, which planned on celebrating its 140th anniversary, suffered a roof collapse during the earthquake. While the building has been classified as unsafe for use, the Museum has been expeditiously removing many fragile objects, even while the aftershocks continued. Many other pre–20th century buildings also sustained damage.

Banksy Pays Homage to Hospital Workers

As a tribute to the National Health Service and health care workers during this pandemic, renowned street artist Banksy created an artwork titled Game Changer (2020), which he donated to England’s Southampton General Hospital. The piece came with a note to the health care workers that read: “Thanks for all you’re doing. I hope this brightens the place up a bit, even if it’s only black and white.” Just days after the artwork was installed, an opportunistic thief wearing a hazmat suit and armed with a drill was caught attempting to steal it.

ASIA

Archaeologists Uncover Further Evidence of Vital Role of Women in Ancient Mongolian Society

Archaeologists discovered 1,500-year-old skeletons of women warriors in northern Mongolia, near China – recalling the story of Hua Mulan, originally described in the Ballad (Ode) of Mulan composed in the fifth or sixth century CE, and appearing as the main character in the 1998 animated Disney film. A study of the skeletons revealed the two women to be skilled in archery and horseback riding. The skeletons were found in a cemetery at the Airagiin Gozgor archeological site. Disney has been planning to release a live-action adaptation of Mulan, currently scheduled for July 24, social distancing guidelines permitting.

 

© 2020 Wilson Elser

TransUnion to Seek Supreme Court Review After Ninth Circuit Finds Class Members Had Standing and Partially Upholds Punitive Damages Award

A hotly contested ruling in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) class action case will soon be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Ninth Circuit in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, Case No. 17-17244, recently granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay the Mandate, seeking to stay the Ninth Circuit’s mandate pending TransUnion’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  The Motion to Stay comes soon after the court denied TransUnion’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020).

In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held for the first time that every class member in a class action lawsuit needs “standing” to recover damages at the final judgment stage.  The 8,185 member class alleged that TransUnion, knowing that its practice was unlawful, violated the FCRA by incorrectly placing terrorist alerts on the front page of consumers’ credit reports and later sending the consumers misleading and incomplete disclosures about the alerts and how to remove them.  The court held that each class member was required to, and did, have standing, even though the credit reports of over 75% of the class were not actually disclosed to a third party because TransUnion’s alleged violation of the consumers’ statutory rights under the FCRA, by itself, constituted a concrete injury.  The Ninth Circuit also found that the jury’s punitive damages award of 6.45 times the statutory damages award was unconstitutional, and reduced it to 4 times the statutory damages award.  The Ramirez decision is discussed in more detail here.

In its Petition for Rehearing, TransUnion claimed that the dissent had the correct view, and the majority’s decision “not only conflicts with Supreme Court teachings, but puts the Ninth Circuit on the wrong side of a lopsided circuit split.”  TransUnion argued that the class of consumers did not have standing for their FCRA claims unless their credit reports were disclosed to a third party.  TransUnion further alleged that the class should have been decertified because Ramirez, the named plaintiff, “was radically atypical of the class he purported to represent” since there was no evidence that any other class member’s credit report was disseminated.  Finally, TransUnion disputed the court’s punitive damages award because a reduction to 4 times the statutory damages award was not enough.  According to TransUnion, the Supreme Court requires, at a maximum, a punitive damages award “equal to compensatory damages . . . when compensatory damages are substantial.”

TransUnion concluded its Petition for Rehearing by stating:

It is no exaggeration to say that, for many class members, the first indication that they were injured at all will be when they receive a $4,925.10 check in the mail. That absurd result is the product of ignoring basic requirements of Article III, Rule 23, and due process.

As of the date this article is published, TransUnion has not yet filed its petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but we will continue to monitor the case for updates.


Copyright © 2020, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see the National Law Review Financial Institutions & Banking law page.

Supreme Court Rules That Certain, But Not All, Discharges to Groundwater May Require Permitting Under the Clean Water Act

In a 6-3 decision on Thursday, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and found that the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) regulated discharges from point sources “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.” The Supreme Court distinguishes its opinion from the Ninth Circuit by determining that the “fairly traceable” test established by the lower courts was too broad to require a permit under the CWA.

The case concerned the city of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility, which treats millions of gallons of sewage each day and injects the treated waste into wells deep underground. A study ordered by the United States Environmental Protection Agency demonstrated that the waste could be traced from the facility to the ocean.  As a result of the study, environmentalists argued that a permit under the CWA was required.

Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, both the federal district court and the court of appeals sided with environmental groups, and established a standard to require a permit under the CWA when pollutants are “fairly traceable” from the pipe to navigable waters, despite the fact that the discharge initially entered groundwater before entering a navigable water.

The Supreme Court found that the “fairly traceable” standard was too broad, citing the “power of modern science” to detect pollutants years after their release in minute quantities. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, stated that a permit is required only when the indirect pollution in navigable waters via groundwater is the “functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”

“If the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the permitting requirements likely do not apply,” he wrote.

In dissenting opinions, Justices Thomas, Gorsuch and Alito stated that the CWA mandated a permit only for direct discharges of pollutants into navigable waters and that the majority opinion was unworkable and incomprehensible.

“Instead of concocting our own rule, I would interpret the words of the statute, and in my view, the better of the two possible interpretations is that a permit is required when a pollutant is discharged directly from a point source to navigable waters,” Alito wrote.

The case is County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260.


© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

For more on SCOTUS’s Clean Water Act decision, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

Supreme Court Preserves Availability of Profits Award for Both “Willful” and “Innocent” Trademark Infringement

On April 23, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U.S. ___ (2020), that the Lanham Act does not impose a “willfulness” prerequisite for awarding profits in trademark infringement actions.

Disgorgement of a defendant’s profits has long been a critical remedy available to brand owners seeking remediation for the infringement of its trademarks.  A profits award can be a proxy for the actual damages suffered by the trademark owner, as actual damages are often very difficult to prove in trademark cases.  Profits awards also serve to deprive infringers of their unjust gains, and can be an important deterrent against infringing activities.  Some federal courts have considered an infringer’s intent as a factor, but not a prerequisite, to awarding a defendant’s profits to the prevailing plaintiff.  Other courts have required proof that the defendant’s infringement was willful before awarding damages measured by its profits, complicating the availability of this important trademark infringement remedy in certain jurisdictions.

The U.S. Supreme Court has resolved this split, finding that a categorical rule requiring a showing of willfulness cannot be reconciled with the statute’s plain language.  Accordingly, prevailing trademark owners do not have to prove willfulness to be awarded the infringer’s profits.

Background

The parties had an agreement allowing Fossil to use Romag’s fasteners in Fossil’s handbags and other products. Romag discovered that the factories Fossil hired in China to make its products were using counterfeit Romag fasteners. Unable to resolve its concerns amicably, Romag sued, alleging that Fossil had infringed its trademark and falsely represented that its fasteners came from Romag.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut found Fossil liable, and the jury awarded Romag $6.7 million of Fossil’s profits to “deter future trademark infringement.”  The trial court overturned the jury’s damages award because the jury found Fossil acted “callously,” rather than “willfully,” as required by the controlling Second Circuit precedent for a profits award. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Overview of Court’s Opinion

Section 15 U.S.C. §1117(a) of the Lanham Act, which governs remedies for trademark violations, states:

When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established . . . , the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. (Underlined emphases added).

Although acknowledging that a defendant’s mental state is a highly important consideration in determining whether a profits award is appropriate, the Court rejected the categorical rule applied in certain lower courts (including controlling Second Circuit precedent) that a plaintiff can win a profits award only after proving that the defendant willfully infringed its trademark.  The Court relied on the plain language in 15 U.S.C. §1117(a) to find that Congress intended to limit such willfulness precondition to a profits award in a suit under Section 1125(c) for trademark dilution. It rejected Fossil’s position that the phrase “subject to the principles of equity” in Section 1117(a) should be read as imposing a willfulness requirement, especially given that Congress prescribed a “willfulness” requirement elsewhere in the very same statutory provision. In no uncertain terms, the Court noted that “the statutory language has never required a showing of willfulness to win a defendant’s profits” in claims under Section 1125(a) for false or misleading use of trademarks (i.e., trademark infringement).

Conclusion

The Court’s decision resolves a split amongst the lower courts and preserves a critical deterrent against trademark infringement by clarifying that Congress intended to allow a trademark owner to recover a defendant’s ill-gotten profits, regardless of whether such infringement was willful.


©2020 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

ARTICLE BY Jonathan M. Gelchinsky and Michael C. Hernandez of Pierce Atwood LLP.

 

For more Trademark Cases, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property Law section.

A Registered Copyright is the Only Way to Guard Against Infringement

The legal world and the media closely monitor every move the Supreme Court makes or considers. However, some rulings attract more attention than others. One that the general public might have overlooked was a 2019 ruling involving infringement claims. Trying to clean up some inconsistent decisions in the Circuit Courts, the high court ruled unanimously that copyright infringement claims are valid only when there is a copyright registered with the United States Copyright Office.

This is a significant shift

Before this ruling, the courts were often more open to protecting copyrightable property even if it was not officially registered with the Copyright Office. For example, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit ruled that protection comes as soon as the owner applies for the copyright and pays the registration fee. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, ruled that protection was only valid when the application was approved. In the past, it was sometimes enough to say “patent pending” to dissuade infringers even if the application was later rejected. This phrase is now irrelevant.

What does this mean for applicants?

The processing time can vary but takes several weeks, which means that applicants will are vulnerable during the application process, which can important in fast-moving businesses like technology. Moreover, some thought the application was too long or too expensive. This ruling makes it clear that the only protection is when the companies, inventors, entrepreneurs, or content creators register their idea.


© 2020 by Raymond Law Group LLC.