EU Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea

On 16 October, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted new EU autonomous measures reinforcing the sanctions on North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council, effective immediately. They include a total ban on EU investment in North Korea across all sectors, whereas previously the ban related to certain sectors, such as the arms industry and chemical industries. Also, there is a total ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil. The amount of personal remittances to North Korea has been lowered from €15,000 to €5,000 in light of suspicions that they are being used in support of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, three persons and six entities were added to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions.

This post was written by International Trade Practice at Squire Patton Boggs of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP., © Copyright 2017
For more Antitrust Law legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Sanctions Imposed for Failure to Preserve Call Recordings

Call RecordingsSec. Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Alarm Protection Tech., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00102-SLG, 2016 WL 7115911 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2016)

In this case, Plaintiff was sanctioned pursuant to Rule 37(e), as amended on December 1, 2015, for its failure to preserve relevant customer call recordings.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had “illegally ‘poached’” its customers and defamed the plaintiff. Defendant, in turn, alleged tortious interference with its contractual relationships and defamation by the plaintiff.  In the course of discovery, Plaintiff produced approximately 150 customer call recordings (out of “thousands”) that were “generally favorable” to it but, when asked, was unable to produce any others and claimed that the recordings were lost, apparently as the result of the “normal operation of a data retention policy.”  Defendant sought sanctions pursuant to amended Rule 37(e).

Taking up the motion, the Court first addressed whether the “newly revised or the former version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37” applied.  Concluding that the revised version was appropriate, the Court reasoned that it was “clearly not impracticable to apply the new rule” and that while it would be “unjust to apply a new rule retroactively when that rule governs a party’s conduct,” Rule 37(e) “does not govern conduct” but rather limits the Court’s discretion to impose particular sanctions, without changing the parties’ duty to preserve as it existed prior to the amendments.

Turning to whether Plaintiff had a duty to preserve, the Court noted that the recordings were destroyed after litigation was ongoing and reasoned that Plaintiff should have known and in fact knew of the calls’ potential relevance, citing its memorandum to employees asking them not to use certain words on calls with Alaskan customers (circulated around the time of the complaint and close in time to being accused by Defendant of defamation during contact with Alaskan customers) and—more importantly—the fact that Plaintiff “flagged the existence of the recordings” in its initial disclosures.

Regarding the threshold question of whether Plaintiff took reasonable steps to preserve, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that its “general litigation hold” was sufficient, despite not encompassing the recordings.  Moreover, the Court noted that “reasonable steps [to preserve] were available,” citing Plaintiff’s admission that the calls could have been extracted to avoid being overwritten and the fact that some recordings were saved.  Recognizing that sanctions are precluded when the information can be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the Court indicated that there was no suggestion that the calls were available elsewhere and thus turned to the question of appropriate sanctions.

First, the Court took up the question of whether the recordings were destroyed with the intent to deprive the other party of the information’s use in the litigation and indicated that based on the “relatively murky record before the Court” regarding the nature of the parties’ discussions surrounding the recordings and their treatment in discovery, it could not conclude that Plaintiff overwrote the recordings with the requisite intent to deprive.  Turning next to the question of prejudice, the Court considered whether the information was available through other means, but reasoned that the call notes and depositions of Plaintiff’s employees were “likely to be far inferior” compared to the calls themselves.  Thus, the Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to a remedy “no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice” as allowed by Rule 37(e)(1).

To address the prejudice suffered by Defendant, the Court ordered that Plaintiff pay Defendant’s reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing the motion, that neither party would be allowed to introduce recordings made to or from Plaintiff’s call center absent stipulation or a subsequent order, and that the parties may present evidence related to the lost recordings at trial (although Defendant was barred from arguing that the jury may or should presume that evidence would have been favorable to it). The Court also indicted that it would instruct the jury that Plaintiff was under a duty to preserve the calls, but failed to do so.

Copyright 2017 K & L Gates

President Obama Authorizes Additional Sanctions on Russian Individuals and Entities: Executive Order 13964

Originally, EO 13964 focused on cyber-enabled malicious activities that harmed or significantly compromised the provision of services by entities in a critical infrastructure sector. This included significant disruptions to the availability of a computer or network of computers, or causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain.

In light of Russia’s recent use of cyber means to undermine democratic processes, the president has amended the EO to cover additional activities, authorizing sanctions on individuals/entities who tamper with, alter, or cause misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions. Under this authority, the president has sanctioned nine entities and individuals, including two Russian intelligence services (the GRU and the FSB), four individual officers of the GRU and three companies that provided material support to GRU’s cyber operations.

These new sanctions highlight the importance of regular and diligent screening of transactions, as well as the need to periodically review existing screening practices to ensure that they are up to date. It is critical to remember that an individual who may have been an acceptable business partner one day may be on a sanctions list the next.

©2016 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Increased Sanctions on North Korea Focus on China and Russia

Last week, President Obama significantly increased sanctions on North Korea through Executive Order 13722, which implements the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (H.R. 757). The Executive Order’s prohibitions and blocking provisions, and designation criteria are substantially more expansive than that Act. Concurrently with the issuance of the Executive Order, OFAC announced the designations of 17 North Korean government officials and organizations, 15 entities, two individuals, and identified 40 blocked vessels under various sanctions authorities.

While neither Congress nor the President imposed secondary sanctions per se, China and Russia should  interpret the Executive Order as a clear warning about their economic ties with North Korea. In the Iran sanctions program, secondary sanctions require that a foreign financial institution “knowingly facilitate or conduct a significant financial transaction” for a particular individual or entity. This evidentiary standard greatly limited the use of those sanctions authorities. The new sanctions against North Korea are clearly aimed at foreign business interests, but unlike secondary sanctions, this new authority does not have an evidentiary impediment to its implementation.

Transportation, Mining, Energy, and Financial Services

Subsection 2(a)(i) of the Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to identify industries in the North Korean economy, the participants of which may be designated solely based on their operating within that industry. The Secretary of the Treasury determined that entities within the transportation, mining, energy, and financial services industries are subject to designation. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) then designated Ilsim International Bank and Korea United Development Bank for operating in the financial services industry.

OFAC’s authority to derivatively designate any bank that provides services to any identified North Korean bank creates de facto secondary sanctions. Executive Order 13722 authorizes OFAC to designate any individual or entity that provides services to any identified Korean bank. Therefore, any financial institution that provides an identified North Korean bank with an account, serves as an intermediary, confirms or advises a letter of credit, or provides any other service can be designated. The most likely targets of these derivative actions are Russian and Chinese financial institutions.

North Korean Slave Labor and Coal

The Executive Order authorizes OFAC to designate businesses that “have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for the exportation of workers from North Korea, including exportation to generate revenue for the Government of North Korea.” According to open source reporting, North Korea has between 50,000 and 100,000 “state-sponsored slaves” predominantly located in China and Russia. The North Korean regime earns between $1.2 and $2.3 billion annually in foreign currency through these slave laborers. Apart from the appalling human rights violations, this practice finances the North Korean nuclear and missile development programs.

In addition to companies that utilize North Korean slave labor, entities that deal in metal, graphite, coal, or software to or from North Korea are now subject to designation, “where any revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea.” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 of March 2, 2016 address the sale of coal and iron from North Korea, but in a very limited manner. Unlike the United States sanctions program, the prohibitions do not apply to transactions  “exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs.” As a result of these substantial limitations, any application of the sanctions on coal and iron are likely to be enforced unilaterally by the United States.

Chinese companies are clearly the most susceptible to this designation criteria. According to the press release announcing the Executive Order and designations, “coal generates over $1 billion in revenue per year for North Korea.” Open source reporting also indicates that in 2015, North Korea supplied China with 19.63 metric tons of coal.

Return to a Comprehensive Sanctions Program

In addition to the designation criteria highlighted above, Executive Order 13722 also transitions U.S. sanctions against North Korea back into a comprehensive sanctions program. All property and interests in property of the North Korean government are now blocked, and the Department of Commerce licensing requirements are now supplemented with a prohibition on the exportation of goods and services.

OFAC released a series of 9 General Licenses to address issues that commonly arise from comprehensive programs. These include authorization of certain legal services, certain services in support of nongovernmental organizations,  transactions related to intellectual property, and noncommercial personal remittances.

Article By Jeremy P. Paner of Holland & Hart LLP.
Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

The Day of North Korea Sanctions: the UN Imposes the Toughest North Korea Sanctions Yet While OFAC and State Designate More North Korean Entities

After weeks of negotiations and a Putin-backed delay, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, imposing new sanctions against North Korea. According to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the resolution imposes the strongest set of UN sanctions in over two decades. This article provides a summary of the new UN North Korea sanctions followed by an overview of the most recent developments in North Korea sanctions under US law.

New UN North Korea Sanctions

The new sanctions require:

  • An asset freeze on all funds and other economic resources owned or controlled by the North Korean government or the Worker’s Party of Korea, if associated with its nuclear or ballistic missile program or other prohibited activities
  • A ban on the opening and operation of North Korean banks abroad
  • A ban on foreign financial institutions opening new offices in North Korea under all circumstances, unless first approved by the Sanctions Committee, and a requirement for UN Member States to order the closing of existing branches if there is credible information indicating the associated financial services are contributing to North Korea’s illicit activities
  • Designation of 16 new individuals and 12 entities (including North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Reconnaissance Energy Bureau)
  • A ban all public and private financial trade support to North Korea if there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a link to proliferation
  • Sectoral sanctions on North Korean trade in natural resources banning the export of all gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore and rare earth metals and banning the supply of all types of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel
  • A ban on the export of coal, iron, and iron ore used for North Korea’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs
  • Inspection of all cargo going to and from North Korea, not just those suspected of containing prohibited items
  • Expanding the arms embargo to include small arms and light weapons
  • A ban leasing or chartering vessels or airplanes, providing crew services to North Korea, and registering vessels
  • Expanding the list of luxury goods (prohibited for export to North Korea) to include luxury watches, aquatic recreational vehicles, snowmobiles worth more than $2,000, lead crystal items and recreational sports equipment
  • A sweeping ban on the transfer of any item if a UN Member State has reason to believe the item can contribute to the development and capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, except for food and medicine

China, a permanent member of the Security Council, joined the unanimous vote despite prior reluctance to strengthen UN sanctions against North Korea. It remains yet to be seen how China will enforce the sanctions.

U.S. North Korea Sanctions

Separately, the United States took action earlier against North Korea. We speculate that this action helped align the UNSC members toward the unanimous vote on UNSCR 2270. On February 18, 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. The bill had easily passed through both Houses of Congress on the heels of the most recent nuclear test and rocket launch by North Korea.

Then on March 2, the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named two entities and 10 individuals to its list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. On the same day, the State Department designated three entities and two individuals for activities related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Over the next few months, OFAC is expected to issue new North Korea regulations to implement other provisions of the new statute.

The Act

The new statute provides for both mandatory and discretionary designations. These sanctions are directed at activities by U.S. Persons, which includes any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (foreign branches of U.S. companies, that means you too), and any person in the United States.

In addition, any transaction by any non-U.S. persons supporting any of the designated entities or prohibited activities must be carefully scrutinized, especially if the transactions involve the U.S. financial system in any way.

Mandatory Designations

The Act requires the designation and freezing of all assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of any person that engages in any of the following activities relating to North Korea:

  • Nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation
  • Dealings in North Korean metals and products tied to WMD activities, the Korean Workers’ Party, armed forces, intelligence, or the operation of political prison camps
  • “Significant financial transactions” related to weapons of mass destruction
  • Undermining cybersecurity
  • Internal repression
  • Forced labor
  • Censorship
  • Human rights violations

In addition, the Act requires the President to decide on the designation of North Korea as a Primary Money Laundering Concern in the coming months.

As a result, companies must ensure that no company activity supports the activities of entities designated under the above act provisions. Compliance programs, including those related to anti-money laundering, should be reevaluated as the sanctions are not simple reiterations of previous measures. These mandatory designations will make it all the more necessary that companies maintain reasonable and proportionate due diligence and screening procedures to prevent facilitating the enumerated activities.

Discretionary Designations

Before we reach the current regulation regime, we will leave you with the remaining provisions of the Act that have not yet been implemented. While no one holds the OFAC crystal ball, these provisions may rear their head and are worth considering in advance of promulgation.

1. Blocking sanctions

The Act explicitly codified the blocking of assets of the Government of North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea, and North Korean Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). While this sanction is essentially already in effect under the various executive orders, the explicit restrictions would prohibit the use of the U.S. financial system in connection with any transaction with the Government of North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea, or SDNs of North Korea.

2. UN Security Council resolutions

The Act also authorizes designation as an SDN of any person who supports a person designated pursuant to an applicable UN Security Council resolution. The potential implications of this Act provision deserve attention as the recent resolution imposed the toughest set of sanctions yet.

3. Bribery

If you thought the FCPA was the sole concern out of U.S. soil relating to bribery of foreign officials, think again. The Act also authorizes designation of any person who knowingly contributes to bribery of a North Korean official, or to misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, a North Korean official.

4. Sanctions grab bag

The Act also authorizes the President to prohibit any person already designated under the above three categories from transactions in foreign exchange or credit or payments subject to U.S. jurisdiction, procurement, and/or travel by the designated person’s officers and shareholders.

Refresher: Pre-Existing OFAC Regulations

The new Act builds upon the pre-existing U.S. sanctions against North Korea. For further background, see Trading Up: Newly Implemented North Korea and Libya Sanctions.

Blocking sanctions

The regulations provide for the continued the blocking of property and interests in property of certain persons with respect to North Korea that had been blocked pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) as of June 2000.Further, the regulations block property and interests in property of persons listed in the Annex to E.O. 13551 and of individuals and entities determined by Treasury in consultation with the State Department to have engaged in activities related to:

  • The import, export, or reexport of arms or related materiel from North Korea

  • The import, export, or reexport of luxury goods to North Korea

  • Money laundering, counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit economic activity supporting the Government of North Korea or its senior officials

  • Providing support for or goods or services of any of the above-listed activities or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13551

  • Owning, controlling, or acting on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13551

Vessels

The regulations prohibit U.S. persons from registering, owning, leasing, operating, insuring or otherwise providing support to North Korean vessels.

Imports to North Korea

Lastly in terms of prohibitions, the regulations prohibit imports of goods, services, and technology (including those used as components of finished products of, or substantially transformed in, a third country) from North Korea without an OFAC licenses or applicable exemption.

Authorizations

The preexisting regulations also provided authorization for the provision of certain legal services, emergency medical services, and entries in certain accounts for normal service charges by U.S. financial institutions.

The Takeaway

Interactions with North Korea are an increasingly dangerous minefield of sanctions. The new North Korea sanctions add to an already restrictive program. As a result, we recommend additional review and specialized controls as the new sanctions reach new heights (or depths, depending your level of preparation).

Copyright © 2016, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Cuba: Further Easing of the U.S. Sanctions

Following up on the historic changes in 2014 and 2015 to the five-decade U.S. trade embargo on Cuba, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) have announced new amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), effective January 27, 2016.

What U.S. Companies Need to Know About the Easing of Restrictions

  1. Payment Terms for Authorized Exports to Cuba No Longer Restricted
    OFAC restrictions have been lifted on payment and financing terms for authorized exports and reexports to Cuba, except for agricultural commodities and items. U.S. banks will be authorized to provide financing by third-country or U.S. financial institutions (e.g., letters of credit, payment of cash in advance, sales on an open account). Payment for agricultural exports will still be limited to cash in advance or financing by third-country banks only. “Authorized exports and reexports” include those authorized under a BIS license exception (e.g., products and materials exported to private sector entrepreneurs under License Exception “SCP” – Support for the Cuban People), as well as export transactions permitted by BIS under a specific license.

  2. Most Cuban Embargo Restrictions Remain in Place
    Although the amendments to the CACR and EAR signify further relaxing of Cuba sanctions, the U.S. embargo on Cuba remains largely in place; most transactions between the U.S. and Cuba continue to be prohibited.

    In addition, a general policy of denial will still apply to exports and reexports of items for use by state-owned enterprises, agencies, or other organizations of the Cuban government that primarily generate revenue for the state. Additionally, applications to export or reexport items destined to the Cuban military, police, intelligence and security services remain subject to a general policy of denial.

  3. More Favorable Licensing Policies for Certain Exports and Reexports
    The following transactions still require a license application, but the chances of approval for such licenses have improved:

Exports to Cuban Government Agencies Meeting the Needs of the People: BIS is now considering, on a “case-by-case” basis, license applications for exports and reexports to Cuban state-owned enterprises and government agencies that provide services and goods to meet the needs of the Cuban people. Previously, such license applications were subject to a policy of denial. The new case-by-case policy applies to items for construction of facilities for public water treatment, electricity or other energy; sports and recreation; agricultural production; food processing; disaster preparedness, relief and response; public health and sanitation; residential construction and renovation; public transportation; wholesale and retail distribution for domestic consumption by the Cuban people; and artistic endeavors.

  • New Policy of Approval for Certain Exports and Reexports: License applications for the following exports and reexports are now subject to a “general policy of approval,” an upgrade from “case-by-case” consideration:

  • Environmental protection items: U.S. and international air quality, water, or coastline

  • Telecommunications items: To improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people.

  • Civil aviation and commercial aircraft safety items: Those necessary to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation, including the export or reexport of civil aircraft leased to state-owned enterprises.

  • Agricultural items: Such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as other agricultural commodities (e.g., tractors and other farm equipment) not eligible for License Exception AGR

  • Commodities and software: To human rights organizations or to individuals and non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba; also to U.S. news bureaus in Cuba whose primary purpose is the gathering and dissemination of news to the general public.

4. Travel Authorized for Additional Purposes Including Film Making 
U.S. persons are still prohibited from traveling to Cuba for tourism, but OFAC now permits travel to Cuba for additional purposes as highlighted below.

  • Travel related to information and informational materials now includes travel for the filming of movies and TV programs, music recordings, and artwork creation.

  • Organization of professional meetings, public performances, clinics, workshops, and athletic and other competitions and exhibitions in Cuba, in addition to the previously authorized attendance at such events.

5. Air Carrier Services Expanded to Permit Code-Sharing and Leasing
U.S. companies can now enter into blocked space, code-sharing, and leasing arrangements to facilitate the provision of carrier services by air, in connection with travel or transportation between the U.S. and Cuba, including such arrangements with a Cuban national.

© 2016 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Switzerland Is the First Country to Lift Some Sanctions on Iran

Certain US sanctions on Iran may be lifted mid to late 2016 or even later.badge_button_switzerland_flag_800_2222

On August 13, Switzerland became the first country to formally lift certain sanctions on Iran, following the announcement of the Iran nuclear deal this past July. Switzerland is not a party to the Iran nuclear deal.

The Swiss Federal Council made the decision, which is a seven-member executive council that constitutes the federal government of Switzerland and serves as the Swiss collective head of government and state. This action nullifies a ban on precious metals transactions with Iranian governmental bodies and the requirement to report trade in Iranian petrochemical products to the Swiss government. It also eliminates an obligation to report to the Swiss government the transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products and certain rules on insurance and reinsurance policies linked to such transactions. In the financial sector, threshold values for reporting and licensing obligations in relation to money transfers from and to Iranian nationals were increased tenfold.

These Swiss measures had already been suspended since January 2014, but by lifting them on an apparently more formal or permanent basis, the Swiss government patently appears to be sending a far larger political message to sanctions compliance personnel. The Swiss government’s announcement stated, in part, the following:

Today’s decision by the Federal Council underlines its support for the ongoing process to implement the nuclear agreement, and its confidence in the constructive intentions of the negotiating parties. The Federal Council also wishes to signal that Switzerland’s positioning with respect to Iran, which was developed and maintained over a number of years, should be used to promote a broad political and economic exchange with Iran. In recent decades, Switzerland has pursued a consistent, neutral and balanced policy with regard to Iran . . . . Should implementation of the agreement fail, the Federal Council reserves the right to reintroduce the lifted measures.

It seems clear that the Swiss Federal Council is signaling that Switzerland is eager to resume normal business with Iran. Meanwhile, however, US Department of State spokesman Mark Toner said US sanctions continue to remain in place and penalties would still apply to any country or company that violates them. He told reporters that the United States wasn’t informed in advance of the Swiss move to drop its sanctions before Iran has taken the promised steps to curb its nuclear program and before the United States, European Union, and United Nations have removed their penalties.

It is also important to remember that for now, US secondary Iran sanctions will continue to remain in effect against foreign companies for probably the next 12 months or until the implementation day, no matter the consequence of this Swiss Federal Council action.

Moreover, “US Persons” are prohibited from entering into executory contracts for Iran-related transactions until US sanctions are lifted after implementation day. The US Department of State has recently suggested that that day may fall in summer or autumn of 2016, depending if and whether the International Atomic Energy Agency can certify that Iran has taken the required steps under the Iran nuclear deal.

“US persons” means US nationals, US permanent resident aliens (“Green Card holders”), entities incorporated in the United States, individuals or entities in the United States, or entities established or maintained outside the United States that are owned or controlled by a US person. For a US person to sign such an executory contract before implementation day would be a dealing in property or an interest in property involving Iran or a Specially Designated National, which is prohibited by current US regulations as applicable to US persons. The current Iran sanctions regulations expressly state that such executory contracts are property or an interest in property because they involve “contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.”

On the other hand, it appears that non–US persons (as defined above) that have no US nexus (e.g., not incorporated in the United States or owned or controlled by a US person), that do not act in or through the United States or a US person and that otherwise are not generally subject to US jurisdiction may enter into executory contracts with Iran without risk of exposure of an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) enforcement case for so doing. Even in these cases, potential non–US person investors in Iran are well advised to seek clearance from the relevant regulators that these contracts do not violate United Nations, European Union, or other non–US sanctions.

At this time, it is unclear to what extent entities established or maintained outside the United States that are owned or controlled by a “US person” will be able to engage in trade with Iran after implementation day occurs. OFAC has indicated that it will resolve this question in due course, and at that time, it will issue appropriate guidance.

ARTICLE BY Louis Rothberg & Margaret M. Gatti of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.