New USPTO Obviousness Guidelines Seek to Refine Examiner Evaluations Likely Making Path to Patent Grant More Difficult and Potentially Opening Door to More Patent Challenges

On February 27, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) released new guidance aimed at enhancing the methodology used to assess the obviousness of patent applications. The updated USPTO guidance emphasizes the need for a clear articulation of a reasoned analysis, grounded in relevant facts, in determining whether a claimed invention meets the criteria of being obvious. The USPTO asserts that this initiative is in line with the directives of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., advocating for a flexible approach toward obviousness evaluations.

The USPTO suggests that this newly issued guidance will act as a practical manual for USPTO examiners, applicable to all utility patent applications under review or contestation. It allegedly aims to ensure a standardized application of the law of obviousness across various cases.

A brief synopsis provided from the USPTO’s updated guidance and garnered since the KSR decision of the Federal Circuit include:

  • In KSR, the Supreme Court instructed the Federal Circuit that persons having ordinary skill in the art also may glean suggestions from the prior art that go beyond the primary purpose for which that prior art was produced. “Thus, the Supreme Court taught that a proper understanding of the prior art extends to all that the art reasonably suggests and is not limited to its articulated teachings regarding how to solve the particular technological problem with which the art was primarily concerned.”
  • Since KSR, the Federal Circuit has confirmed that “the flexible approach to obviousness encompasses not only how to understand the scope of prior art, but also how to provide a reasoned explanation to support a conclusion that claims would have been obvious.”
  • However, a flexible approach to obviousness does not negate the need for articulated reasoning and evidentiary support, the USPTO said.
  • Obviousness decision-makers must examine all the evidence before them.
  • The USPTO states that, “there is no one-size-fits-all approach to crafting an obviousness rejection.”

Kathi Vidal, Director of the USPTO, expressed the agency’s commitment to issuing reliable patent rights while ensuring clarity and consistency across the board. “Our initiative aims at bolstering transparency and uniformity within our processes and across the innovation landscape,” Vidal remarked.

The implications of this USPTO guidance extend to design patents as well, with the USPTO keenly awaiting the Federal Circuit’s verdict in LKQ Corp. v. GM Global Technology Operations LLC.

Additionally, the USPTO makes notes that it is gearing up to explore the influence of artificial intelligence on the landscape of prior art and the competence of someone skilled in the art, particularly how these factors interplay with patentability assessments including obviousness determinations. The USPTO plans to invite public commentary on these topics soon.

The updated USPTO guidelines initially appear to increase the burden on the patent applicant or the patentee to show that a claimed invention is not obvious by allowing the obviousness decision-makers (e.g., USPTO examiners and judges of the Patent Trial and Appellate Board (PTAB)) more flexibility in rejecting claims and to go outside of the boundaries of patent documents used to reject claims as long as reasoning is articulated and evidentiary support is provided. To counter an obviousness rejection made by an obviousness decision-maker, patent applicants or patentees should review obviousness rejections for a clearly articulated obviousness reasoning, including evidentiary support (e.g., not purely the examiner or judge’s argument) that is sound (e.g., actually supports the examiners or judges’ positions). Patent applicants and patentees also may need to rely on more expert declarations or affidavits to help overcome obviousness rejections.

For more news on Patent Law Guidance, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

Does the “Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2023” Revive Diagnostic Claims?

On June 22, Senator Chris Coons, along with Thom Tillis introduced the “Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2023” (hereinafter “the Act”) to amend 35 USC s. 101 to clarify the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. Section 101(b) would be amended to delete “includes a new use of a known process” and insert “includes a use, application, or method of manufacture of a known or naturally occurring process.” A section (k) would be added to define the term “useful” as meaning that the invention or discovery has a “specific and practical utility” from the perspective of a POSA. So far, so good. The use of a naturally occurring process can be read to cover the use of a naturally occurring correlation, an “If A then B” claim. The recognition of the discovery of the utility of a naturally occurring correlation, which leads to a diagnostic conclusion would seem to be included in this broad language.

But now things get a bit sketchy. The Act would abolish all the current judicial, e.g. Chakrabarty, exclusions but would add a set of statutory exclusions that overlap the judicial exclusions in some places. The exclusions include “an unmodified human gene”—good-bye Myriad—and an unmodified natural material as that material exists in nature, e.g., water. This exclusion would not jeopardize diagnostic claims since a per se is not being claimed.

More troublesome, Section C of the exclusions would include a process that “occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity.” Diagnostic claims are process claims that are based on the recognition of the utility of a correlation that takes place in the body. The utility of the diagnostic claim lies solely in the recognition of the utility of the correlation. If a man has an elevated level of PSA he is at risk of developing, or may already have, prostate cancer. But isn’t the relationship between PSA levels and cancer/no cancer a process that occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity, such as sampling and measuring the level of PSA in the blood? Please read the Act and tell me why I am wrong.

© 2023 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Intellectual Property for the Metaverse

How do you use the patent system to protect inventions related to the metaverse?

What is the Metaverse?

Merriam-Webster defines the metaverse as “a persistent virtual environment that allows access to and interoperability of multiple individual virtual realities.” The term “metaverse” originates from dystopian science fiction novels in which it referred to an immersive, computer-generated virtual world. Today’s “metaverse” is now firmly integrated into the technology sector and can be thought of as a common virtual world shared by all users across a plurality of platforms. Examples of metaverse-related technology includes the software that generates these virtual environments, as well as virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) headsets and other devices that enable human interaction with the environment and representations of other humans within it.

The adoption of metaverse-related technology is expanding. In 2021 the company then known as Facebook rebranded to “Meta” in an effort to emphasize the company’s commitment to developing a metaverse. In Fall of 2022, Apple announced the development of its own VR/AR headset. 2022 also saw the launch of the first Metaverse Fashion Week.

These events are indicative of the growing emphasis on the metaverse and the expectation amongst technology companies that the metaverse will be the eventual successor to the internet, smartphones, and/or social media. Applications of the metaverse are not limited to socialization and gaming—as the metaverse expands there is increased acknowledgment of the benefits it may provide in other settings, including in education, finance, and medicine.

As patent attorneys and innovators, we ask: How do you use the existing framework of the patent system to best protect inventions related to the metaverse?

Using Patents to Protect Inventive Concepts in the Metaverse

In this blog post, we explore considerations for protecting inventions in and related to the metaverse. Because many of these technologies are new and the industry surrounding the metaverse is in its infancy, inventions made today may prove to be quite valuable in the coming years. Protecting these inventions today is likely to be well worth the investment in the future. Inventive concepts in the metaverse can be protected using both utility patents which focus on the functional benefits of an invention and design patents which focus on the ornamental aspects of an invention.

Utility Applications for Metaverse

Utility patents may be used to protect the functional aspects of hardware or software-based innovative technologies in the metaverse.

Innovators in the metaverse environment might pursue patent protection on technologies associated with headsets, displays, cameras, user control interfaces, networked storage and servers, processors, power components, interoperability, communication latency, and the like. These hardware-based inventions for the metaverse may be a natural expansion of those previously developed for augmented and virtual reality, video-game technology, or the internet. Accordingly, patent applicants may look to those fields for best practices in protecting their hardware-based inventions. As with any patent application, identifying a point of novelty early on in the process is essential to deciding whether and how to pursue patent protection.

Software-based inventions may include technologies associated with performing tasks in the metaverse, such as representation of virtual environments and avatars, speech/voice processing, and blockchain transactions (e.g., for purchasing virtual goods). These software-based inventions may face additional challenges at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), where the patent eligibility bar under 35 U.S.C. §101 prohibits the patenting of “abstract ideas” which may include methods of organizing human activity, mental processes, and mathematical concepts. It is typical for software-related patent applications to receive a patent eligibility rejection during the examination process.

One challenge in patenting software-based applications for the metaverse includes the fact that software that merely implements a process that is equivalent to a known process outside of the metaverse environment is unlikely to be allowed by the USPTO. However, a software-based invention that accounts for the changes introduced by being in a metaverse environment and addresses what specific problems were unique to the metaverse may be found patentable by the USPTO. Thus, best practices for drafting patent applications related to the metaverse may be to include details surrounding the considerations taken to account for the change in operating in the metaverse environment as opposed to a non-metaverse environment in any patent applications.

Additionally, while patent applicants may draft patent applications with the USPTO in mind, applicants should also consider the intricacies of claiming patent protection for software related technologies on a global basis. For example, patent applicants should consider that patents for software processes are more difficult to acquire in Europe unless clear indications of how a software-based invention provides a technical solution to a technical problem are included in the application.

Design Applications for Metaverse

Innovators in the metaverse may also use design patents to protect ornamental aspects of their invention. For example, fashion companies may seek protection of their branded objects within the metaverse. Technology companies may try to protect the ornamental features of their headsets or user interfaces.

The protection of objects within the metaverse presents an interesting avenue for patent protection. Objects displayed within the metaverse may be protected similarly to how innovations in video-game technology, web applications and graphical user interfaces are currently protected using design patents. For example, representations of physical items within a virtual environment can be considered computer-generated icons that can be protected so long as they are shown in an embodiment tying them to an article of manufacture such as a computer screen, monitor, other display panel, or any portion thereof in compliance with 35 U.S.C. 171. Similarly, movement of items within a multiverse environment can be protected similar to how changeable computer generated icons are protected today.

Again, while patent applicants may focus on the requirements of the USPTO, it is important to note that the metaverse is inherently global in its nature and that industrial design applications across the globe may have different requirements. For example, Europe does not require a display screen for industrial designs. Accordingly, comprehensive strategies for design protection of metaverse related technologies may consider the nuances of seeking industrial design protection in various jurisdictions.

Other Methods for Protecting Inventive Concepts in the Metaverse

As with any product or company, a comprehensive strategy for intellectual property protection includes not only patents but also trademarks and copyrights. As intellectual property attorneys consider the best ways to protect a client’s product, they may often turn to trademarks and copyrights in connection with design and utility patent applications to provide more holistic protection of intellectual property assets. For example, fashion-based companies may utilize a combination of trademark protection and design patent protection for their brands and the innovative designs for which they are known in the metaverse. Software-based companies may turn to a combination of copyright and utility patents to protect innovative functionality for the metaverse.

Concluding Thoughts

The growth in use of utility and design patent applications to protect concepts related to the metaverse is immense. One study conducted by IALE Tecnología found that “over the past five years, metaverse-related patent applications have doubled to more than 2,000.” This rapid expansion in patents for innovative concepts surrounding the metaverse is only expected to advance in the coming years.

Cohesive and comprehensive strategies involving utility patents, design patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets are likely to provide the best protection to innovators operating in the metaverse.

©1994-2023 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

For more Intellectual Property Legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys suffered from a conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was waived and, in any event, lacked merit because Pure Hemp presented no evidence to support the alleged conflict.

Finally, having sua sponte raised the issue of whether this was a frivolous appeal. The Federal Circuit determined that although it was “not pleased with how Pure Hemp has argued this appeal,” the appeal was nonetheless not frivolous because [Pure Hemp] properly argued that it was the prevailing party.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Intellectual Property: Understand It to Protect What You Own, Drive Value to Your Business and Positively Impact Your Bottom Line

Intellectual Property (or “IP”) is commonly defined as a group of legal rights that provide protection over things people and businesses create or invent. It might sound straightforward, but there is a lot of confusion over what can actually be protected and what cannot.

Who needs to be concerned with IP Protection?

We’ve all heard the phrase, “hindsight is 20/20”. That’s especially true when it comes to IP protection. So often people and businesses do not realize a new creation or innovation should be protected until it is too late. If you are creating or developing within your space, you need to have an IP strategy to avoid any unintentional disclosure missteps. And, when you are creating, be careful to:

  • Make records. They should be accurate, dated, and corroborated.
  • Research the competitive landscape early and identify both opportunities for protection and risks of infringement.
  • Use a non-disclosure agreement or contract before collaborating with another business or other people, such as consultants.

What are some of the biggest IP challenges business owners and employers need to overcome?

The goal for your IP strategy needs to be: Identify, Protect, Monetize.  The question business owners need to answer is how they can most effectively achieve this. The first step is understanding the applicable types of IP that are protectible and the steps needed to secure protection  of each.

Intellectual Property Type The Value

Trade Secret

No registration fees or costs. Goes into effect upon creation and can last forever. Protection available at the state and federal levels.

Non-Disclosure Agreement/Contract (or “NDA”)

Very affordable and flexible but, it only binds the contracting parties. An NDA should be used with your employees and other businesses you deal with concerning sensitive business information.

 

Copyright

 

Free and automatic upon creation, register for significant added value. Protection available only at the federal level and registration is required to enforce protection.

Trademark/Service

Commercial differentiation, quality identifier and price enhancement. Low cost and can last forever but must police others’ misuse.

How can an IP strategy affect your bottom line?

It’s important to understand there is no “one-size fits all” approach to IP. The correct IP strategy must be tailored to your unique business. While some businesses may be overspending on a scattered approach to protecting IP, other businesses may not be investing enough and potential losing out on what could have been an important revenue stream.

© 2022 Davis|Kuelthau, s.c. All Rights Reserved
For more articles about IP Law, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You: SCOTUS Rules Inadvertent Legal Errors Cannot Overturn Copyright Infringement Decisions

“No harm, no foul.” That was the message the U.S. Supreme Court delivered Feb. 24 in ruling that a copyright infringement verdict should not have been overturned because of inaccurate information in the copyright registration asserted. The Court’s 6-3 opinion vacates a Ninth Circuit decision that threw out an infringement verdict on the ground that the registrant should have known the law regarding filing multiple works within one registration, a practice referred to as group registrations.

In Unicolors Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz LP, a jury found that Unicolors’ fabric pattern copyrights were violated and the district court entered judgment for H&M to pay nearly $800,000 for selling jackets that infringed on Unicolors’ copyrights.  H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law that Unicolor’s copyright registration was invalid because for group registrations, all works in the applications must be published “in the same unit of publication.”  Unicolor released some of the garments containing the protected patterns to private customers, and released the others to the public at a different time.  Thus, the asserted registration did not technically satisfy the requirements.  The district court denied H&M’s motion and found that safe harbor provision of the Copyright Act allows for innocent mistakes of fact and law.  In this case, Unicolor was not aware that all works in a group registration had to be published “in the same unit of publication.”

The Ninth Circuit overturned this ruling, siding with H&M that Unicolors’ copyright registration was invalid because of legal errors in the application, saying a safe harbor provision for copyright registration errors only applies to factual mistakes, not unintentionally misreading the law. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, pushed back on this idea:

“In our view, however, §411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration,” he wrote.

Justice Breyer also noted that many copyright applicants are often “novelists, poets, painters, designers, and others without legal training” and said Congress never intended to make it more difficult for those non-attorneys to successfully apply for a copyright. “Given this history, it would make no sense if §411(b) left copyright registrations exposed to invalidation based on applicants’ good-faith misunderstandings of the details of copyright law,” he said.

The Supreme Court’s decision is s a victory for creators’ rights and provides some peace of mind for those creators filing copyright applications without the assistance of an attorney.  However, this decision will focus discovery on whether any errors in a registration—be them factual or legal—were made “with knowledge that [the error] was inaccurate.”

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about the U.S. Supreme Court, visit the NLR Litigation section.

China’s Supreme People’s Court Rules No Accounting for Profit for Joint Patent Ownership

In decision no. (2020)最高法知民终954号 dated November 25, 2021, China’s Supreme People’s Court ruled that if the co-owners of a patent or patent application right do not make an agreement on the exercise of the right and one of the co-owners independently practices the patent,  the other co-owner cannot claim the distribution of the proceeds from the separate practicing of the patent on the grounds of co-ownership of the patent right.

 

 

 

 

 

The appellant, the First Affiliated Hospital of Wenzhou Medical University 温州医科大学附属第一医院 (hereinafter referred to as Wenzhou Hospital) and the appellee Shenzhen Huilistong Information Technology Co., Ltd. 深圳市汇利斯通信息技术有限公司 (hereinafter referred to as Huilistong Company) were involved in a patent infringement litigation for CN Patent No. ZL 201210235924.0 entitled “a self-service terminal used in the lobby of a hospital.”

Wenzhou Hospital asserted that it co-owns the involved patent with Huilistong. Without its permission, Huilistong Company violated the rights of Wenzhou Hospital by practicing the patent involved in the case, and requested an order for Huilistong Company to stop the infringement and destroy inventory of infringing products and compensate Wenzhou Hospital for economic losses of 2.5098 million RMB and reasonable expenses for rights protection of 116,400 RMB.

The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province held that Huilistong Company could independently practice the patent involved in the case in accordance with the law, which does not constitute an infringement of the patent right of Wenzhou Hospital.

Wenzhou Hospital appealed to the Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court made a determination on the issue of “allocation of royalties,” and on September 24, 2020, it rejected the appeal and upheld the original judgment.

The Supreme People’s Court explained that Article 15 of the Patent Law stipulates that if the co-owners of the patent right have an agreement on the exercise of the right, such agreement shall prevail. If there is no agreement, the co-owners may practice the patent alone or permit others to implement the patent by way of ordinary licensing; if the patent is permitted to be practiced by others, the royalties collected shall be distributed among the co-owners.

Except for the circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph, the exercise of joint patent application rights or patent rights shall obtain the consent of all co-owners.

Therefore, without the consent of the co-owner of the patent, the co-owner of a patent may directly obtain economic benefits through the co-owned patent in two ways: first, to separately practice the co-owned patent, and second, to license others to exploit the patent in the way of ordinary license, and only in the latter circumstance may there be a requirement for distributing the profits to the co-owners, but under the circumstance of independent exploitation, there is no such requirement.

In this case, Wenzhou Hospital claimed that some of the self-service registration integrated machines involved in this case were marked with such words as the joint research and development by Huilistong Company and the hospital involved in this case. However, this does not prove that Huilistong Company licensed the hospital involved in this case to use the patent involved, and there was no evidence in this case that the hospital involved in this case paid any patent licensing fee to Huilistong Company.

Therefore, the claim of Wenzhou Hospital for sharing the economic proceeds obtained by Huilistong Company from the exploitation of the patent at issue was not valid.

Wenzhou Hospital separately claimed that, according to the provisions of the civil law on the sharing of proceeds by the co-owners with respect to the co-owned property, Wenzhou Hospital also had the right to share the economic proceeds obtained by Huillistong Company from the implementation of the patent in question.

In response, the Supreme People’s Court held that, although Article 78 (2) of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that “a co-owner enjoys the rights and assumes the obligations over the co-owned property,” this provision is a general provision on the co-owned property, and the aforesaid provision of the Patent Law falls under the special provisions on the distribution mechanism of the rights and interests of all co-owners under the circumstance of co-ownership of patents, and the special provisions of the Patent Law shall prevail.

Therefore, the Supreme People’s Court ruled for Huilistong Company.

The full text of the decision is available here (Chinese only).

© 2021 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

CosmoKey Gets a Duo-Over – Federal Circuit Panel Reverses Finding of Ineligibility

In CosmoKey Solutions GMBH & Co. KG v. Duo Security LLC, No. 2020-2043 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021), the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of ineligibility for claims directed to a computer authentication method.

CosmoKey’s patent is directed to an authentication method that requires a user to activate a timed authentication function on a mobile device to log into a computer. Duo Security moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court found the claims ineligible under § 101, specifically finding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of “authentication” at step one of Alice, and that the remaining elements were generic computer functionality at step two.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The majority first stated it was “not convinced” the claims were broadly “directed to” authentication, instead noting the focus of the claims and the specification on the activation of a timed authentication function. Nonetheless, according to the majority, answering this question at step one was “unnecessary” because the claims were eligible at step two for reciting a specific improvement to authentication that “increases security, prevents unauthorized access by a third party, is easily implemented, and can advantageously be carried out with mobile devices of low complexity.”

Judge Reyna concurred in the judgment, but did so by resolving the inquiry at step one, finding the claims directed to a “specific improvement to authentication.” He viewed the majority’s decision to skip step one and resolve the inquiry at step two as “turn[ing] the Alice inquiry on its head.” He noted that, without the step one analysis, it is difficult to determine whether “additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application” of an abstract idea.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

For more patent litigation, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

Reading the Supreme Court Tea Leaves in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP

On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP. Next term, the Court will determine whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.

The Dex Media case has traveled a long and tortuous path. Its journey began with the service of a complaint in 2001 which was dismissed without prejudice in 2003, and the filing of a new complaint in 2012. The petition for inter partes review was filed in May 2013, and a final written decision of the Board issued in October 2014 finding that the asserted claims are invalid. From there, the case visited the Federal Circuit twice, the Supreme Court once and is now on its way back for a second time. On appeal, the dispute has focused on whether the petition for inter partes review was time barred by § 315(b), and whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of that issue.

Facts of the Case

In 2001, Inforocket.com, Inc., an exclusive licensee to the patent-in-suit, filed a district court action against Keen, Inc. The complaint asserting infringement was served on September 14, 2001. While the case was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket as its wholly owned subsidiary and stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the district court action without prejudice in 2003. Keen later changed its name to Ingenio. Click-to-Call subsequently acquired the patent-in-suit, and on May 29, 2012, filed patent infringement lawsuits against multiple parties, one of which was Ingenio.

On May 28, 2012, just under one year after being served with the complaint in the Click-to-Call action, Ingenio and two other defendants filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent-in-suit. In its preliminary response, Click-to-Call contended, among other things, that § 315(b) statutorily barred institution of the IPR proceedings, noting that Ingenio’s predecessor-in-interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent-in-suit in 2001. Section 315(b) states, “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real part in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”

The Board instituted the proceeding, and based on Federal Circuit precedent found that dismissal of an infringement suit without prejudice nullifies the effect of the service of the original complaint against Keen. Therefore, service of the 2001 complaint did not bar the petition. Click-to-Call again argued that the petition was time-barred in its patent owner response; and in its final written decision, the Board reaffirmed its earlier conclusion on that point and found that the challenged claims were invalid.

In the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the § 315(b) time bar in light of § 314(d), which states, “No Appeal. – The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and unappealable.” The Federal Circuit, relying upon its en banc ruling in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018), held that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.

In Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit based its finding on the rationale that the time-bar determination “is not akin to either the non-initiation or preliminary-only merits determinations for which unreviewability is common in the law,” and the fact that the time bar “sets limits on the Director’s statutory authority to institute.” Id. at 1373-74. Having decided the question of appealability, the Click-to-Call court then held en banc that the time-bar decision applies to bar institution of an IPR when a petitioner was served with a complaint for patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but the action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Predictions for the Supreme Court

Often, even without the presence of a circuit court split, the Supreme Court takes cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit to reign in and overrule the Appellate Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has reversed 70 percent of the Federal Circuit cases it has heard since 2007. There are two important factors to suggest that the Supreme Court will for a second time reverse the Federal Circuit in this case.

  • First, in a prior appeal of this case to the Federal Circuit in 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on its prior precedent in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., which was subsequently overruled by Wi-Fi One. Click-to-Call petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in June 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert, and vacated and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. This suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court thought there was a clear path for the Federal Circuit to hold that § 315(b) rulings are appealable, as the Federal Circuit did in both Wi-Fi One and its ruling that is currently under review. Since then, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the confirmation of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. It seems now that at least four of the justices of the newly constituted Court may believe that the Federal Circuit’s decision is not consistent with § 314(d).
  • This contention also is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court declined to review both of the questions presented by the petition for cert. Dex Media, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Ingenio, also requested that the Supreme Court decide whether § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the IPR petition, had been dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court declined to hear that issue. One might suppose that if the Supreme Court believes the time-bar question is appealable, the Court also would want to rule on whether a dismissal without prejudice negates the effect of service of the complaint under the time bar statute. It is entirely possible that the Court declined to make that determination because the question will be moot once the Court determines there is no appellate jurisdiction over the time-bar issue.

Implications of the Ruling

If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit’s ruling and finds that § 315(b) questions are appealable, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding when the one-year period begins will remain binding, at least until the Supreme Court decides to hear that issue anew. This means that entities looking to file IPR petitions must be alert to the fact that a predecessor-in-interest may have been served with a complaint triggering the one-year time limit as well as whether to file a petition with other entities who (directly or through a predecessor-in-interest) may have been served with complaints that could bar the entire petition.

In contrast, what will happen if the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s ruling and Orders dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that § 314(d) prohibits appeal of the time bar issue? Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the Board had consistently found, as they did in this case, that dismissal of a complaint without prejudice constituted a nullity in terms of the time-bar statute. If the Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case is overruled, its opinion would not be precedential and the Board could either interpret the statute as they had previously or alter the interpretation in view of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, though they would be under no obligation to do so. It also is possible that this becomes one of the many issues that are panel-dependent, forcing petitioners who were served with complaints that have been dismissed without prejudice to “roll the dice” on the issue.

PTAB practitioners should be watching the outcome of this case closely and consider all of the implications of the ruling before filing a petition for inter partes review. As the facts of this case highlight, they also should perform a thorough due diligence review of all “real parties in interest” related to the contemplated petitioner.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Ericsson Offers FRAND – District Court Endorses Comparable Licenses, Rejects SSPPU Royalty Rate

On May 23, 2019, the court issued a declaratory judgment in the case of HTC v. EricssonNo. 18-cv-00243, pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (Judge Gilstrap). That judgment confirmed that Ericsson’s 4G standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) convey significant value to mobile handsets and held that Ericsson made an offer to HTC that complied with Ericsson’s obligations to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. The decision, published on the heels of Judge Koh’s recent opinion in FTC v. Qualcomm, provides much-needed clarity to SEP owners by definitively rejecting the smallest-saleable patent practicing unit (“SSPPU”) royalty theory in favor of a real-world, market-based approach.

The Dispute

Ericsson owns a large portfolio of cellular patents essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G standards that it licenses to handset makers worldwide. As a member of the ETSI standard setting organization, Ericsson agreed to license these patents on FRAND terms. Ericsson offered a license to HTC at a rate of $2.50 per 4G device, or 1% of the net device price with a $1 floor and $4 cap. HTC countered with a rate of $0.10 per 4G device. HTC sued Ericsson, claiming that Ericsson’s offered royalty rate was too high, and that Ericsson breached its FRAND commitment.

A jury trial was held in February 2019. HTC argued that a royalty base must be calculated based on the profit margin of the baseband processor (which HTC argued was the SSPPU) rather than the price of the device as a whole. Ericsson argued that HTC’s SSPPU approach dramatically undervalued 4G cellular technology and that Ericsson’s patents in particular were worth far more. After a five-day trial, the jury found that Ericsson’s offers did not breach Ericsson’s commitment to license on FRAND terms and conditions.

The Decision

Following the verdict, the district court also issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with ruling on Ericsson’s request for a declaratory judgment that it had complied with FRAND. This declaration reaffirmed the jury’s findings, while also addressing more fully some key questions.

First, the court stated unequivocally that the ETSI FRAND commitment does not require a company to license its SEPs based on the profit or cost of the baseband processor or SSPPU.The district court’s decision is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, such as Ericsson v. D-Link, which holds that “courts must consider the facts of record when instructing the jury and should avoid rote reference to any particular damages formula.”

Second, the order went further to conclude that Ericsson’s 4G portfolio is worth significantly more than a royalty rate based on the profit margin or cost of the baseband processor in HTC’s phones (HTC’s “SSPPU”). Looking to industry-wide evidence, the court held that the value of cellular technology far exceeded a valuation based on the price or profit of a baseband processor. The court found that “Ericsson established, and HTC’s own experts conceded, that there are no examples in the industry of licenses that have been negotiated based on the profit margin, or even the cost, of a baseband processor” and that credible evidence supported a finding that “the profit margin, or even the cost, of the baseband processor is not reflective of the value conferred by Ericsson cellular essential patents.”

Third, the court determined that both of Ericsson’s offers to HTC—(1) $2.50 per 4G device or (2) 1% with a $1 floor and $4 cap—were fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. The court found that Ericsson’s “comparable licenses provide the best market-based evidence of the value of Ericsson’s SEPs and that Ericsson’s reliance on comparable licenses is a reliable method of establishing fair and reasonable royalty rates that is consistent with its FRAND commitment.” At trial, evidence was presented regarding Ericsson’s licenses with Apple, BLU, Coolpad, Doro, Fujitsu, Huawei, Kyocera, LG, Panasonic, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, and ZTE. The court noted that several of Ericsson’s licenses contained express terms that were “similar or substantially similar” to Ericsson’s offers to HTC and rejected the argument that Ericsson’s offers to HTC were discriminatory.

Why It Matters

Judge Gilstrap’s declaration represents an important development in FRAND case law that looks to industry practice and market evidence rather than untested licensing theories. It affirms that basing a rate on comparable licenses is an acceptable FRAND methodology.

The decision also rejects the SSPPU royalty theory. Some have read the recent FTC v. Qualcommopinion to suggest that a FRAND royalty must be structured as a percentage rate on a baseband processor. Judge Gilstrap’s declaration demonstrates why such a reading is incorrect.  First, the declaration explains that the ETSI FRAND commitment simply does not require a SSPPU royalty base. Second, even if one were to indulge the SSPPU approach, the SSPPU for many standard-essential patents is not limited to a baseband processor. Third, a wealth of market evidence shows that Ericsson’s patents (and standard-essential patents generally) are far more valuable than a baseband processor-based royalty would reflect.

© McKool Smith
This article was written by Nicholas Mathews from McKool Smith.