Tag: North Carolina

Subpoenas Without Depositions: A Valuable Point From The North Carolina Business Court

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Can you send a subpoena duces tecum — which translated from Latin is “a writ commanding a person to produce in court certain designated documents or evidence ” —  without coupling it with a deposition?

Maybe that question has never puzzled you, but in an Order of the Business Court on February 12, 2015 in Harriott v. Central Carolina Surgical Eye Associates, P.A. Judge Bledsoe answered whether a subpoena duces tecum can be served without noticing a deposition in conjunction with the subpoena.

Plaintiff had served a subpoena duces tecum on several entities which were not party to the case. Those entities objected contending that a “subpoena duces tecum must be issued in conjunction with a proceeding in which testimony is to be received.”

Judge Bledsoe disagreed, ruling “a subpoena duces tecum . . . can . . . be used to compel a non-party to produce documents without a concurrent request to testify.”  Order at 1-2.

The governing Rule of Civil Procedure (NCRCP 45) is less than clear on this point. It says that a “command to produce records, books, papers, electronically stored information, or tangible things may be joined with a command to appear at trial or hearing or at a deposition, or any subpoena may be issued separately.” NCRCP 45(a)(2).

The federal rule, by contrast,  is explicit on being able to serve a subpoena for documents without a contemporaneous deposition.  It says that:

Combining or Separating a Command to Produce or to Permit Inspection . . . . A command to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or to permit the inspection of premises may be included in a subpoena commanding attendance at a deposition, hearing, or trial, or may be set out in a separate subpoena.

FRCP45(a)(1)(C).

So, if there was any doubt about this practical nuts and bolts issue, state law practice is now consistent with the federal rule.  Subpoena away.  At least in the Business Court.

Only two more weeks until the Retail Law 2014 Conference – October 15-17, 2014, Charlotte, NC

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Retail Law Conference:

Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law
Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law

Register Today!

When

October 15-17, 2014

Where

Charlotte, NC

The 2014 Retail Law Conference takes place October 15-17 in Charlotte, NC. This year’s program is stronger than ever with relevant, compelling and interactive sessions focused on the legal issues affecting retailers. In partnership with the Retail Litigation Center (RLC), RILA will host legal counsel from leaders in the retail industry for the fifth annual event.

This year’s Retail Law Conference will feature issues at the intersection of technology and law, how the two spaces interact and the impact that they have on retailers. Topics will likely include:

  • Anatomy of a Data Breach: Prevention & Response
  • Privacy: Understanding New Technologies & Data Collection
  • Advertising Practices: Enforcement & Social Media
  • ADA Implications for New Technologies
  • Legal Implications for Future Payment Technologies
  • Policies & Procedures of The “Omnichannel” Age
  • Patent Litigation “Heat Maps”
  • Union Organizing Campaigns
  • Wage & Hour Litigation
  • EEOC Enforcement
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
  • Corporate Governance & Disclosure
  • Election 2014
  • Dueling Views of The U.S. Supreme Court
  • Legal Ethics

The Retail Law Conference is open to executives from retail and consumer goods product manufacturing companies. All others, such as law firms and service providres, must sponsor in order to attend, and can do so by contacting Tripp Taylor at tripp.taylor@rila.org.

Attend the Retail Law 2014 Conference – October 15-17, 2014, Charlotte, North Carolina

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Retail Law Conference:

Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law
Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law

Register Today!

When

October 15-17, 2014

Where

Charlotte, NC

The 2014 Retail Law Conference takes place October 15-17 in Charlotte, NC. This year’s program is stronger than ever with relevant, compelling and interactive sessions focused on the legal issues affecting retailers. In partnership with the Retail Litigation Center (RLC), RILA will host legal counsel from leaders in the retail industry for the fifth annual event.

This year’s Retail Law Conference will feature issues at the intersection of technology and law, how the two spaces interact and the impact that they have on retailers. Topics will likely include:

  • Anatomy of a Data Breach: Prevention & Response
  • Privacy: Understanding New Technologies & Data Collection
  • Advertising Practices: Enforcement & Social Media
  • ADA Implications for New Technologies
  • Legal Implications for Future Payment Technologies
  • Policies & Procedures of The “Omnichannel” Age
  • Patent Litigation “Heat Maps”
  • Union Organizing Campaigns
  • Wage & Hour Litigation
  • EEOC Enforcement
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
  • Corporate Governance & Disclosure
  • Election 2014
  • Dueling Views of The U.S. Supreme Court
  • Legal Ethics

The Retail Law Conference is open to executives from retail and consumer goods product manufacturing companies. All others, such as law firms and service providres, must sponsor in order to attend, and can do so by contacting Tripp Taylor at tripp.taylor@rila.org.

North Carolina General Assembly Fails to Jump Start Our Businesses with Crowdfunding Legislation

Poyner Spruill Law firm

Crowdfunding is a relatively new capital raising tool, which was generally used in the past as a financing method for such ventures as films and music recordings.  To date, crowdfunding has not been a popular method for offering and selling securities because offering a share of financial returns or profits from business activities would subject the transaction to federal and state securities laws, requiring certain registrations with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state securities regulators. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (October 23, 2013).

In 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act).  The JOBS Act, among other things, added a new section, 4(a)(6), to the Securities Act of 1933, creating a new exemption for certain crowdfunding offerings from SEC and state law registration requirements.  However, before the law can become effective the SEC must promulgate and implement rules regulating the exemption.  For further information on the JOBS Act, please see The JOBS Act—An Overview and Some Recent Developments, written by Michael E. Slipsky and David R. Krosner.

As of this summer, the SEC has proposed rules for crowdfunding, but those rules are not final. A dozen states are making an effort to join Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Alabama, Maine, Washington, Wisconsin, and Indiana by developing their own regulations allowing crowdfunding within the states. States are growing frustrated and tired of waiting for the SEC to adopt federal regulations.  See Posting of Bill Meagher to TheDeal.com, States make own crowdfunding rules, rather than wait for SEC (May 5, 2014, 15:03 EST).

In response to the federal delay, Representative Tom Murry of Wake County sponsored state legislation attempting to allow and regulate crowdfunding in North Carolina, filing House Bill 680, the JOBS Act, on April 9, 2013.  House Bill 680 did not pass the Senate and was not eligible for consideration in the 2014 short session.  For that reason, in June the House added the crowdfunding provisions, titled, “Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act,” to the 32 page fifth edition of Senate Bill 734, Regulatory Reform Act of 2014. 

When compromise discussions between the House and Senate on Senate Bill 734 stalled, the Senate added to House Bill 1224 various provisions regarding modifications to the local government sales and use tax rate as well as other provisions including the crowdfunding provisions.  House Bill 1224 had been filed at the beginning of the short session as a bill modifying the Job Maintenance and Capital Development Fund.  The House rejected the Senate’s modifications of House Bill 1224.  As a result, the House and Senate appointed a conference committee, and the committee made its report on July 31, 2014.  The Proposed Conference Committee Substitute was passed by the Senate, however it failed in the House. 

The final version of House Bill 1224, the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute, would have allowed North Carolina residents to invest up to only $2,000 per purchaser – unless the purchaser is an accredited investor as defined by rule 501 of SEC regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 – in new in-state ventures through the crowdfunding mechanism.  It would have allowed most companies to raise up to $1 million in capital through unregistered securities without a financial audit and up to $2 million in capital if the issuer has undergone and made available to each prospective investor and the Secretary of State the documentation resulting from a financial audit.  Essentially companies would have been able to sell securities directly to the North Carolina public without having to incur the expense of conducting a registered securities offering.  The NC Secretary of State would have been tasked with the regulation of these types of transactions and would have collected quarterly reports.  See Posting of Mark Binker to WRAL TechWire, Crowdfunding bill clears N.C. Senate Committee,  (July 16, 2014 14:08 EST).

The General Assembly has adjourned sine die.  Although crowdfunding provision had an opportunity to become law during the 2014 short session in either Senate Bill 734 or the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute of House Bill 1224, the General Assembly did not pass the crowdfunding provision.  House Bill 1224 failed in the House and the compromise finally reached for Senate Bill 734 in the ratified bill excluded the crowdfunding provision.  There is a possibility the crowdfunding provision could again be considered before the 2015 session, scheduled for late January, if three-fifths of all members of the Senate and three-fifths of all members of the House vote to do so, as provided in Section 11(2) of Article II of the North Carolina Constitution.  However, the more likely scenario for the General Assembly to return would be for a “special session” by call of the Governor.  As provided in Section 5(7) of Article 3 of North Carolina Constitution, “[t]he Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, by and with the advice of the Council of State, convene the General Assembly in extra session by his proclamation, stating therein the purpose or purposes for which they are thus convened.”

ARTICLE BY

Jillian DeCamp
 
OF 
Poyner Spruill LLP

Attend the Retail Law 2014 Conference – October 15-17, 2014, Charlotte, North Carolina

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Retail Law Conference:

Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law
Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law

Register Today!

When

October 15-17, 2014

Where

Charlotte, NC

The 2014 Retail Law Conference takes place October 15-17 in Charlotte, NC. This year’s program is stronger than ever with relevant, compelling and interactive sessions focused on the legal issues affecting retailers. In partnership with the Retail Litigation Center (RLC), RILA will host legal counsel from leaders in the retail industry for the fifth annual event.

This year’s Retail Law Conference will feature issues at the intersection of technology and law, how the two spaces interact and the impact that they have on retailers. Topics will likely include:

  • Anatomy of a Data Breach: Prevention & Response
  • Privacy: Understanding New Technologies & Data Collection
  • Advertising Practices: Enforcement & Social Media
  • ADA Implications for New Technologies
  • Legal Implications for Future Payment Technologies
  • Policies & Procedures of The “Omnichannel” Age
  • Patent Litigation “Heat Maps”
  • Union Organizing Campaigns
  • Wage & Hour Litigation
  • EEOC Enforcement
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
  • Corporate Governance & Disclosure
  • Election 2014
  • Dueling Views of The U.S. Supreme Court
  • Legal Ethics

The Retail Law Conference is open to executives from retail and consumer goods product manufacturing companies. All others, such as law firms and service providres, must sponsor in order to attend, and can do so by contacting Tripp Taylor at tripp.taylor@rila.org.

The North Carolina Senate Passes Energy Modernization Act

Womble Carlyle

When I was a child, and daring, “frack” was my risky substitute cuss word; but not substitute enough…. Well it’s back at the General Assembly this summer as lawmakers set the stage for hydraulic fracturing “fracking” in North Carolina. Opponents claim there is not enough clarity regarding the rights of property owners under which the fracking might occur and not enough public disclosure regarding what chemicals are used in the fracking process. Proponents insist that the revenue and job creating opportunity is too good to delay further and that the state’s Mining Commission can adequately oversee the process.

SB 786 – Energy Modernization Act. Also known as An Act to

(1) Extend the Deadline for Development of a Modern Regulatory Program for the Management of Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production in the State and the Use of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing Treatments for that Purpose;

(2) Enact of Modify Certain Exemptions from Requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act Applicable to Rules for the Management of Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production in the State and the Use of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing Treatment for that Purpose;

(3) Create the North Carolina Oil and Gas Commission and Reconstitute the North Carolina Mining Commission;

(4) Amend Miscellaneous Statutes Governing Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities;

(5) Establish a Severance Tax Applicable to Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities;

(6) Amend Miscellaneous Statutes Unrelated to Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities; and

(7) Direct Studies on Various Issues, as Recommended by the Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy.

Attempts to amend the bill with stricter water quality and property protections failed. The latest version of the bill is here: http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S786v2.pdf

 

Environmental Review Commission Holds Final Meeting Prior to Start of 2014 Short Session

Poyner Spruill

It seemed fitting that the Environmental Review Commission (the Commission), met yesterday, Earth Day, for its last scheduled meeting before the start of the 2014 short session.  Yesterday’s meeting was chaired by Representative Ruth Samuelson.  The Commission heard presentations from Tom Reeder, Director of the Division of Water Resources at DENR, Paul Newton, North Carolina State President of Duke Energy, Edward Finley, Jr., Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, and Chris Ayers, Executive Director of the North Carolina Utilities Commission Public Staff.  At the close of the meeting the Chairwoman entertained public comment for close to an hour.

Duke Energy presented its support for a coal ash plan that could potentially incorporate several options into one solution and addresses, not only the Dan River, but other active and retired sites.  Duke Energy presented three scenarios to the committee.  The first plan, costing $2.0-2.5 billion, 1) incorporates the use of hybrid caps in places of the closure of some sites, 2) moves some sites to new lined structural fills or landfills, 3) continues the Asheville structural fill, and 4) converts some sites to dry fly ash.  The second plan, costing $6.0-8.0 billion, would incrementally excavate ash from 10 sites to landfills over a 20 to 30 year period.  The third plan, costing $7.0-10.0 billion, would incrementally move the ash to all-dry pneumatic bottom ash handling systems and include the thermally-driven evaporation of other process water.  Mr. Newton stated Duke believed the answer was somewhere between the first and second options.

The Sierra Club, the Roanoke River Basin Association, and the Catawba Riverkeeper, among several others, offered their comment.

The Sierra Club urged that the General Assembly set minimum standards for the closure of coal ash ponds such that Duke Energy could propose alternatives that adequately demonstrate effective protection of water supplies.  The Sierra Club also asked the legislature to bring coal ash under its waste management laws, since North Carolina is the only state that does not treat wet coal ash as solid waste.  Finally, the Sierra Club asked legislators to regulate structural fills and require liners and groundwater monitoring when coal ash is used as structural fill.

Other speakers asked the Commission to require the drainage and removal of coal ash from all open coal ash pits and the storage of all coal ash in dry, sealed above-ground containers or the reuse of the ash in products such as concrete.

The Commission did not take any votes and did not introduce any potential legislation.  The Commission had previously met on April 9th of this month and voted to approve its final report for the 2014 short session, which includes the Commission’s legislative proposals.

Article By:

Jillian DeCamp
Of:
Poyner Spruill LLP

Retirement Plan Fee Litigation Finds Its Way to North Carolina

Poyner Spruill

Over the last few years, we have seen a significant increase in litigation involving the fees paid by retirement plans. However, until recently, no major litigation had occurred in North Carolina.  On March 12, 2014, one of these cases was filed against Winston-Salem-based Novant Health, a large hospital system in the southeast.  This case and other recent litigation should serve as a reminder to retirement plan fiduciaries of the need to monitor their plans’ service provider arrangements.

The complaint against Novant Health alleges that Novant’s retirement plan paid unreasonable fees to the plan’s recordkeeper and to an investment advisor.  The plaintiffs argue that the fees paid by the plan were unreasonable because, among other things, plan expenses increased more than 10-fold in one year without a corresponding increase in services.  The plaintiffs also claim that the fiduciaries breached their duties by failing to leverage the size of the plan to negotiate lower fees and by selecting retail mutual fund share classes when cheaper, “institutional” share classes were available.

While this case is still a long way from being decided, it should serve as a pointed reminder to plan sponsors and other plan fiduciaries that they need to routinely monitor the reasonableness of plan fees and expenses.

If the plan document so provides, a plan can pay its own administrative expenses, but only if the appropriate fiduciary determines that those expenses are reasonable.  Before entering into a service provider relationship, the fiduciary must first make a determination that the services are necessary and the fees are reasonable.  The fiduciary then must monitor the arrangement over time to ensure that it remains reasonable.

The following fiduciary risk-management practices are worth considering for any plan committee or other fiduciary involved in the selection or monitoring of service providers:

  • Regularly identify all service providers that directly or indirectly receive fees from the plan.
  • Make sure each service provider has provided the plan fiduciaries with fee disclosures required by ERISA.
  • Regularly calculate the amounts that each service provider directly or indirectly receives from the plan.
  • Understand what services are provided to the plan for the fees paid.  If one vendor provides both services to the plan and non-plan services, make sure that the plan is not subsidizing any non-plan services.
  • Periodically confirm whether the service provider’s pricing is competitive.  This is particularly important as the size of the plan grows because the fiduciary will be expected to leverage the plan’s size to reduce fees.  Depending on the circumstances, it might be best to conduct a formal request for proposals from time to time.
  • If an advisor questions whether a fee arrangement is reasonable, take prompt action to investigate the issue and determine whether the arrangement is reasonable.
  • Make sure that participant communications accurately reflect how plan expenses are paid.
  • Document, document, document!  Document the decision-making process used to select a service provider, and document the fiduciary’s monitoring and review process.

These practices will assist the fiduciary in meeting its fiduciary duties and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrate fiduciary prudence to any inquiring party.

Article By:

Kelsey H. Mayo
David L. Woodard
 
Of:
Poyner Spruill LLP

Eastern District of North Carolina (E.D.N.C.) Bankruptcy Court Rules that Borrower Can Raise Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Claims Against Lender Based on Refusal to Modify Loan

Poyner Spruill

 

Does a lender have a duty to act in good faith when negotiating with a  borrower during a commercial loan modification?  In an order issued recently by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in In re: Burcam Capital II, LLC, the court denied a lender’s motion to dismiss a borrower’s claims against the lender.  The Borrower alleged that the lender’s failure to modify the terms of the loan constituted a breach of the lender’s obligation to deal with the borrower in good faith, as well as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.  This was because the borrower alleged that the servicer, as agent of the lender, wanted the loan to go into default as a means of acquiring the real property collateral.  While the court acknowledged that the lender had no obligation to modify the terms of the loan, the court still reasoned that the failure to modify the loan under the particular circumstances of this case could constitute a breach of the lender’s obligations to proceed in good faith, and could constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice under North Carolina law.

Burcam Capital II, LLC (Burcam Capital) is the owner of commercial real property containing retail and office units in Raleigh, NC.  The real property serves as collateral for two separate loans, with both loans administered by CWCapital Asset Management, LLC (CWCapital) as special servicer.  Burcam Capital defaulted on its note payments in 2011, and CWCapital initiated foreclosure as a result of this default.  On June 28, 2012, Burcam Capital filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code to stay the foreclosure.

In the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Burcam Capital filed a complaint against CWCapital alleging that after Burcam Capital’s default, CWCapital acted outside of its narrow role as special servicer of the debt.  In particular, Burcam Capital alleged that CWCapital concocted a scheme whereby CWCapital would position itself to either buy the debt from the lender whose loans it was servicing at an artificially low price, or would buy the real property collateral at the foreclosure sale for below market value in order to benefit itself at the expense of both Burcam Capital and the lender whose loans CWCapital was servicing.  Burcam Capital alleged that in furtherance of this scheme, CWCapital obtained a severely below market appraisal for the real property collateral and refused to deal with Burcam Capital in any meaningful way regarding any modification or work-out.

CWCapital moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that neither the lender nor CWCapital breached the loan contract, and that absent a breach of contract or allegations of deceit, there could be no liability for CWCapital under North Carolina Law.  CWCapital argued that because under the existing loan contract neither CWCapital nor the lender had any obligation to modify the existing loan, the complaint against CWCapital and the lender should be dismissed.

While the court acknowledged that a lender does not have to reach an agreement with its borrower to modify its loan, and it does not act improperly when enforcing its rights, such as initiating foreclosure when the loan goes into default, the court refused to dismiss the complaint against CWCapital and the lender.  The court reasoned that Burcam Capital’s complaint alleged facts that could constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is applicable to contracts in North Carolina, together with facts that could constitute deceptive trade practices.  Unfortunately, the court did not explain its reasoning in great detail.  In particular, the court did not specifically address CWCapital’s argument that CWCapital cannot be liable for failing to act in good faith if there was never any breach by CWCapital of the existing loan contract.  Nevertheless, the court agreed with Burcam Capital’s allegations that CWCapital’s negotiations were a sham and its appraisal of the property constituted a ruse that could rise to the level of a breach of the lender’s obligations to deal in good faith as well as a false and deceptive trade practice.

One of the primary lessons for lenders in this case is that when the lender agrees to entertain discussions regarding potential loan modifications it should take steps to ensure that it will be seen by any future court or jury as having considered a borrower’s loan modification proposals in good faith.  Burcam Capital’s complaint placed great emphasis on CWCapital’s refusal to provide any reasoning behind its rejection of Burcam Capital’s modification proposals, CWCapital’s representative in the negotiations having no actual authority to agree to the terms of any settlement or work-out agreement, and CWCapital never informing Burcam Capital of what types of offers it would agree to regarding any future modification or work-out of the existing loan.  Once negotiations with a borrower begin, the lender should take steps to ensure that its negotiations are conducted in good faith.  If there are credible allegations that the lender refused to negotiate in good faith, such allegations may be used to prevent an early dismissal of a borrower’s counter-claims against a lender.

One means of preventing such allegations may be for the lender to require that the borrower agree to a pre-negotiation agreement prior to entering into loan modification discussions with the lender.  A well drafted pre-negotiation agreement can help reduce misunderstandings and later claims by a borrower against a lender.  The pre-negotiation agreement can help establish the ground rules of the discussion, and should include, among other things, agreements that: (a) no oral or written statements made during the negotiation may be used against the other side (to encourage open discussion); (b) any statements made prior to or during the negotiations are not admissible in court for any reason; and (c) confirm the validity of the existing loan documents.  While lenders may encounter some resistance from borrowers in using such an agreement, if a borrower does agrees to its terms, a lender may negotiate more freely because the risk of any liability to the lender as a result of such negotiations is minimized.

In this case, the court did not agree that Burcam Capital’s claims against CWCapital should be dismissed, so not all is lost for CWCapital.  While Burcam Capital survives in its battle against CWCapital, it must now prove its allegations against CWCapital in court, which is a much higher hurdle than simply arguing that its claims have some legal merit and should not be dismissed.  CWCapital recently amended its answer to Burcam Capital’s complaint in light of the court’s refusal to dismiss CWCapital’s claims, and Burcam Capital will now bear the burden of proving that the actions alleged in its complaints are true and that those actions constituted a breach of CWCapital’s obligation to deal in good faith and an unfair and deceptive trade practice.

Article by:

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP

Hey Wait, What About North Carolina's Fancy New Quasi-Judicial Statute?

Poyner Spruill

 

In 2009, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 44, an act that codified the case law regarding quasi-judicial land use proceedings, including the proper standards and procedures for judicial review. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393. Quasi-judicial land use decisions include, among other things, decisions involving variances, special and conditional use permits, and appeals of administrative decisions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(b)(3).  The adoption of this new statute took the effort of many accomplished land use attorneys and interested stakeholders.  In fact, discussions regarding the need for this legislation originated before my legal career even began. So, when I read a recent Court of Appeals decision involving the denial of a special use permit by a quasi-judicial body, I was befuddled as to why the opinion did not contain a single citation to G.S. § 160A-393.

In Blair Investments, LLC v. Roanoke Rapids City Council, et al. (filed December 17, 2013), the petitioner sought a special use permit to construct a cell phone tower.  After considering the evidence presented by the applicant, planning department and concerned neighbors, the Roanoke Rapids City Council denied the special use permit on the grounds that the proposed tower would “endanger the public or safety” and would “not be in harmony with the surrounding area.”  The Superior Court affirmed the Council’s decision.  On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the Council’s decision on the grounds that the applicant had met its burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to the special use permit and the testimony of the concerned neighbors were speculative opinions, unsupported by any documentary or testimonial evidence.  Therefore, the Court held the Council’s decision was not supported by substantial, competent, and material evidence and remanded the case with instructions that the special use permit be granted.  

To be clear, I take no issue with the Court’s ultimate decision in Blair.  The Court appropriately reviewed the record and made the correct determination based on the facts and evidence that were before the Council.  I also take no issue with the overall legal principles and case law cited by the Court in Blair.  I do find it perplexing, however, that in discussing the appeal procedure, scope of review and its ultimate disposition of the case, the Court cited to a number of cases decided prior to the adoption of G.S. § 160A-393, but did not cite to or discuss 160A-393 at all.  As already discussed, the purpose of adopting 160A-393 was to codify prior case law and establish the black letter law governing the review of quasi-judicial decisions.  Perhaps the failure to recognize or cite to 160A-393 was an oversight by the lawyers who argued the case or perhaps it simply slipped by the law clerks working on the opinion.  I can’t imagine, however, the statutory framework for reviewing quasi-judicial decisions was completely ignored by the Court intentionally.

Many might consider this article to be a technical assault on an otherwise good appellate opinion.  While I believe it to be a substantive omission, my true reason for writing this article is to hopefully ensure that this fancy new statute at least gets dropped in a future footnote. Too many people worked too hard for it not to.

Article by:

Chad W. Essick

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP