Tag: Nevada

Nevada Reaffirms Inquiry Notice Standards for Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations

Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (App. Feb. 22, 2024), concerned a prisoner who was transported to a hospital for medical treatment and died in the hospital after treatment began. At the time, the applicable statute of limitations contained in NRS 41A.097(2) was “1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury….” This also is known as inquiry notice.

Applied here, the prisoner’s mother obtained his complete hospital medical chart six weeks after the death. Approximately fourteen months after the death, a forensic pathologist the family hired concluded professional negligence contributed to the death. The family filed their lawsuit eight months after receiving the forensic pathologist’s report. The hospital and physician moved to dismiss, arguing the family’s one-year statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied the motion, concluding a genuine issue of material fact was present because the family filed suit within eight months of the pathologist’s report.

Nevada’s Court of Appeals reversed and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint. In Nevada, inquiry notice for potential medical malpractice begins when the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s representative receives “all relevant medical records.” Applied here, the only relevant medical records were the hospital records. Thus, the family had the information necessary to investigate the care and treatment and trigger inquiry notice just six weeks after the death. The date that the forensic pathologist provided his report was irrelevant.

Igtiben might provide greater certainty to providers and patients as they evaluate potential professional negligence claims. However, it underscores the importance of careful responses to requests for medical records because if other “relevant” records existed but were not provided, inquiry notice might not be triggered.

© 2024 Wilson Elser
For more news on Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations in Nevada, visit the NLR Professional / Malpractice section.

Supreme Court’s Decision In Famous Hale & Norcross Mining Case

Having read Professor Stephen Bainbridge‘s post about the origins of the judicial doctrine that directors must act on an informed basis, I passed along a reference to the California Supreme Court’s in Fox v. Hale & Norcross Silver Mining Co.,  108 Cal. 369, 41 P. 308 (1895).   The Hale and Norcross mine was a famous silver and gold mine in Nevada’s Comstock mining district.  Samuel Clemens (aka Mark Twain), who had worked in Virginia City, Nevada, even bought shares in the mine on margin, as he related in Chapter 15 of his autobiography:

“One day I got a tip from Mr. Camp, a bold man who was always making big fortunes in ingenious speculations and losing them again in the course of six months by other speculative ingenuities. Camp told me to buy some shares in the Hale and Norcross. I bought fifty shares at three hundred dollars a share. I bought on a margin, and put up twenty per cent. It exhausted my funds. I wrote Orion [his brother and the first and only Secretary of the Nevada Territory] and offered him half, and asked him to send his share of the money. I waited and waited. He wrote and said he was going to attend to it. The stock went along up pretty briskly. It went higher and higher. It reached a thousand dollars a share. It climbed to two thousand, then to three thousand; then to twice that figure. The money did not come, but I was not disturbed. By and by that stock took a turn and began to gallop down. Then I wrote urgently. Orion answered that he had sent the money long ago–said he had sent it to the Occidental Hotel. I inquired for it. They said it was not there. To cut a long story short, that stock went on down until it fell below the price I had paid for it. Then it began to eat up the margin, and when at last I got out I was very badly crippled.”

Samuel Clemens disappointing investment predated by a number of years the litigation that resulted in the California Supreme Court’s opinion.

The Hale and Norcross mine was located in Nevada, but the corporation that owned it was incorporated in California.  That is why the shareholders sued the directors in the Golden, rather than the Silver, state.  The Supreme Court’s decision was big news.  The day after the decision was issued, The San Francisco Call published this lengthy article that not only described the case, but also published the decision itself and a drawing of the plaintiff, M.W. Fox.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more Supreme Court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Privacy Hat Trick: Three New State Laws to Juggle

Nevada, Oregon and New Jersey recently passed laws focusing on the collection of consumer information, serving as a reminder for advertisers, retailers, publishers and data collectors to keep up-to-date, accurate and compliant privacy and information collection policies.

Nevada: A Website Privacy Notice is Required

Nevada joined California and Delaware in explicitly requiring websites and online services to post an accessible privacy notice. The Nevada law, effective October 1, 2017, requires disclosure of the following:

  • The categories of “covered information” collected about consumers who visit the website or online service;

  • The categories of third parties with whom the operator may share such information;

  • A description of the process, if any, through which consumers may review and request changes to their information;

  • A description of the process by which operators will notify consumers of material changes to the notice;

  • Whether a third party may collect covered information about the consumer’s online activities over time and across different Internet websites or online services; and

  • The effective date of the notice.

“Covered Information” is defined to include a consumer’s name, address, email address, telephone number, social security number, an identifier that allows a specific person to be contacted physically or online, and any other information concerning a person maintained by the operator in combination with an identifier.

Takeaway: Website and online service operators (including Ad Techs and other data collectors) should review their privacy policies to ensure they are disclosing all collection of information that identifies, can be used to contact, or that is combined with information that identifies consumers. Website operators should also be sure that they are aware of, and are properly disclosing, any information that is shared with or collected by their third-party service providers and how that information is used.

Oregon: Misrepresentation of Privacy Practices = Unlawful Trade Practice.

Oregon expanded its definition of an “unlawful trade practice”, effective January 1, 2018, to expressly include using, disclosing, collecting, maintaining, deleting or disposing of information in a manner materially inconsistent with any statement or representation published on a business’s website or in a consumer agreement related to a consumer transaction.The new Oregon law is broader than other similar state laws, which limit their application to “personal information”. Oregon’s law, which does not define “information”, could apply to misrepresentations about any information collection practices, even if not related to consumer personal information.

Takeaway: Businesses should be mindful when drafting privacy policies, terms of use, sweepstakes and contest rules and other consumer-facing policies and statements not to misrepresent their practices with respect to any information collected, not just personal information.

New Jersey: ID Cards Can Only be Scanned for Limited Purposes (not Advertising)

New Jersey’s new Personal Information and Privacy Protection Act, effective October 1, 2017, limits the purposes for which a retail establishment may scan a person’s identification card to the following:

  • To verify the authenticity of the card or the identity of the person paying for goods or services with a method other than cash, returning an item or requesting a refund or exchange;

  • To verify the person’s age when providing age-restricted goods or services to the person;

  • To prevent fraud or other criminal activity using a fraud prevention service company or system if the person returns an item or requests a refund or exchange;

  • To prevent fraud or other criminal activity related to a credit transaction to open or manage a credit account;

  • To establish or maintain a contractual relationship;

  • To record, retain, or transmit information required by State or federal law;

  • To transmit information to a consumer reporting agency, financial institution, or debt collector to be used as permitted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; or

  • To record, retain, or transmit information governed by the medical privacy and security rules of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

The law also prohibits the retention of information scanned from an identification card for verification purposes and specifically prohibits the sharing of information scanned from an identification card with a third party for marketing, advertising or promotional activities, or any other purpose not specified above. The law does make an exception to permit a retailer’s automated return fraud system to share ID information with a third party for purposes of issuing a reward coupon to a loyal customer.

Takeaway: Retail establishments with locations in New Jersey should review their point-of-sale practices to ensure they are not scanning ID cards for marketing, advertising, promotional or any other purposes not permitted by the New Jersey law.

Read more legal analysis at the National Law Review.

This post was written byJulie Erin Rubash of  Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Recreational Pot Comes to Nevada…But Why Are The Shelves Empty?

On July 1, 2017, Nevada became the fifth state in the United States to legalize the sale of recreational marijuana. The epicenter of “what happens here, stays here” tourism just added a new vice to its repertoire! So, what’s the problem?

Among other things, Nevada’s recreational marijuana dispensaries are facing the specter of empty shelves. Why? Because a wrinkle in the ballot measure that legalized recreational marijuana sales in Nevada gives licensed liquor wholesalers a temporary 18-month monopoly on marijuana distribution rights… “unless the [Nevada] Department [of Taxation] determines that an insufficient number of marijuana distributors will result from this limitation.” In order to fill its shelves, a Nevada-licensed recreational marijuana dispensary must use a licensed recreational marijuana distributor to transport the product from the cultivation facility to their stores (whereas dispensaries selling medical marijuana were allowed to move “medical-use” product from cultivation locations without an independent distribution network).

Despite efforts by marijuana dispensaries to stock up prior to July 1, overwhelming demand for recreational marijuana has resulted in dwindling supplies. And now, distributors are nowhere to be found. That is because very few liquor wholesalers have applied to become licensed marijuana distributors, and those that have made such application have failed to meet the requirements for licensure. The Nevada Department of Taxation (NDOT) reported that as of July 7, 2017, ZERO distribution licenses have been issued by NDOT.

Perhaps liquor wholesalers fear risking their federal alcohol permits issued by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau? It would appear that marijuana distribution licenses would have to be issued to persons other than liquor wholesalers – however, nothing is that simple. A small group of liquor wholesalers, known as the Independent Alcohol Distributors of Nevada, sued and, on June 21, won a temporary injunction against NDOT to prevent marijuana distribution licenses from being issued to persons other than liquor wholesalers.

In response, on July 7, Governor Sandoval endorsed emergency regulations that would give NDOT the authority to determine whether there are a sufficient number of marijuana distributors to service the market – a determination that would allow NDOT to open up distributor licensing to those other than licensed liquor wholesalers. The emergency regulations will be considered by NDOT on July 13. Stay tuned.

This post was written by  Kate C. Lowenhar-Fisher   Jennifer J. Gaynor   Jeffrey A. Silver and Gregory R. Gemignani  of Dickinson Wright PLLC.

Why October 1, 2014 Is An Important Date For Management Persons Of Nevada Entities

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Two years ago, the Nevada Supreme Court in an en band decision held that a state district court may exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident officers and directors of a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Spain.  Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 282 P.3d 751 (Nev. 2012).  The Supreme Court reasoned

When officers or directors directly harm a Nevada corporation, they are harming a Nevada citizen. By purposefully directing harm towards a Nevada citizen, officers and directors establish contacts with Nevada and “affirmatively direct [] conduct” toward Nevada.

At the time, Nevada, unlike Delaware, had no implied consent statute.  Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding was based on Nevada’s long-arm statute, NRS 14.065(1).

In the ensuing session, the Nevada legislature decided to address the issue as well by enacting an implied consent statute:

Every nonresident of this State who, on or after October 1, 2013, accepts election or appointment, including reelection or reappointment, as a management person of an entity, or who, on or after October 1, 2014, serves in such capacity, and every resident of this State who accepts election or appointment or serves in such capacity and thereafter removes residence from this State shall be deemed, by the acceptance or by the service, to have consented to the appointment of the registered agent of the entity as an agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings brought in this State by, on behalf of or against the entity in which the management person is a necessary or proper party, or in any action or proceeding against the management person for a violation of a duty in such capacity, whether or not the person continues to serve as the management person at the time the action or proceeding is commenced. The acceptance or the service by the management person shall be deemed to be signification of the consent of the management person that any process so served has the same legal force and validity as if served upon the management person within this State.

NRS 75.160(1).  Under the statute, an “entity” means a corporation, whether or not for profit; limited-liability company; limited partnership; or a business trust.  NRS 78.160(10)(b).  A “management person” means a director, officer, manager, managing member, general partner or trustee of an entity.  NRS 75.160(10)(c).

Apparently, the Nevada legislature did not consult with Professor Eric Chiappinelli who last year published an article arguing that Delaware’s implied consent statute was unconstitutional.  The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 783 (2013).

Why does the statute refer to October 1?  Pursuant to NRS 218D.330(1), each law and joint resolution passed by the Legislature becomes effective on October 1 following its passage, unless the law or joint resolution specifically prescribes a different effective date.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop
Of
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP