It’s Protected: NLRB Finds “Black Lives Matter” Insignia on Employee Uniform Constitutes Protected Activity Under Circumstances

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), in a 3-1 decision, held that an employee’s display on their work uniform of “BLM,” an acronym for Black Lives Matter, constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”). Accordingly, the NLRB reversed an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision, and found that the employer (Home Depot) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing the employee to remove the BLM insignia because it violated the company’s uniform policy. The employee resigned instead of removing the insignia from their uniform.

Procedural History

In June 2022, an ALJ found that the employer did not violate the Act by requiring the employee to remove the BLM messaging, because the insignia lacked “an objective, and sufficiently direct, relationship to terms and conditions of employment.” The ALJ concluded that the BLM messaging was “primarily used, and generally understood, to address the unjustified killings of Black individuals by law enforcement and vigilantes … [and] while a matter of profound societal importance, is not directly relevant to the terms, conditions, or lot of Home Depot’s employees as employees.” (emphasis in original).

Further, the ALJ determined that the employee’s motivation for displaying the BLM message (i.e., their dissatisfaction with their treatment as employees) was not relevant. The petitioner sought review before the NLRB.

NLRB Finds Wearing BLM Insignia at Work Constitutes Protected Activity

On review, the NLRB concluded that the employee’s refusal to remove the BLM insignia was protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act because the activity was for “mutual aid or protection,” as it was a “logical outgrowth” of the employee’s and other employees’ complaints about race discrimination in the workplace that allegedly occurred over the preceding months.

According to the NLRB, an individual employee’s actions are a “logical outgrowth” of the concerns expressed by the group where “the record shows the existence of a group complaint,” even though “the employees acted individually and without coordination.” In this case, the fact that the group complaints post-dated the employee’s initial display of the BLM insignia was not dispositive. Instead, and contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the NLRB focused on whether the employee’s subsequent refusal to remove the BLM insignia was a “logical outgrowth” of the prior protected concerted activity.

Additionally, the NLRB found that no special circumstances existed, such that there was a sufficient justification for the company to preclude their employees from wearing such insignia. For instance, this was not a situation where display of the insignia might jeopardize employee safety, exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with the company’s public image. In this regard, the NLRB concluded that the company’s public image was not at issue because it encourages employees to customize their uniforms. Likewise, the NLRB held that the company failed to put forth evidence of any non-speculative imminent risks to employee safety from the public and/or any violent or disruptive acts or threats thereof by other employees connected to the BLM insignia.

The NLRB ordered the employer to, among other things, (1) cease and desist from prohibiting employees from taking part in “protected concerted activities,” such as displaying “Black Lives Matter” insignia on their uniform aprons; (2) reinstate the employee without prejudice and compensate him for lost back pay and any adverse tax consequences; and (3) post notice of the decision for 60 days at the store where the dispute arose. The company may still appeal the Board’s decision to a federal appeals court.

Significantly, the NLRB declined to adopt a broader objective advanced by the NLRB General Counsel that protesting civil rights issues on the job is “inherently concerted” activity that is protected by Section 7 of the Act. The fact-intensive reasoning behind the NLRB’s decision here reflects that the underlying circumstances in each situation will play a significant role in the legal outcome as to whether the conduct at issue is protected, and it is not advisable to adopt a broad, one-size fits all rule from this decision.

Employment Tip of the Month – February 2024

Q: Can my company treat employees adversely because of their personal political beliefs? If they wear a shirt of their favorite candidate? Or proselytize about their candidate?

A: The short answer: There exists no “First Amendment Right to freedom of expression” in a private workplace, and that extends to political expression. See Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019) (Only “State actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”)

So, yes, legally a private employer can refuse to hire Democrats or Republicans, and can fire an employee for wearing a shirt of their candidate or vocalizing a particular political position.

On the other hand, other laws can apply, such as the right to “concerted action” under the National Labor Relations Act. Overt adverse action also could be ripe for allegations of selective enforcement, such as “you only selectively enforce this rule against me because I am ___________”, where Title VII covers race, sex, religion, color and national origin; ADA covers disability; ADEA age, etc. Some political positions could easily bleed over into religious beliefs.

Even if legally permissible for a private employer to discriminate against holders of one particular political belief, from a practical management perspective, it cannot be recommended, and would be loaded with risk. Also, it could simply make for bad optics and make it harder to attract and retain the best talent.

Finally, this answer changes entirely for public employers and government employers, where employees do possess First Amendment rights, so long as, in general, they are speaking (1) as a private citizen, (2) about a matter of public concern, and (3) their speech does not interfere with the job. There are exceptions for high-ranking individuals, political appointees or someone trying to release classified information, though in many instances they would still be protected from retaliation.

New Year, (Potentially) New Rules?

SOMETIMES, THE ONLY CONSTANT IS CHANGE. THIS NEW YEAR IS NO DIFFERENT.

In 2023, we saw several developments in labor and employment law, including federal and state court decisions, regulations, and administrative agency guidance decided, enacted, or issued. This article will summarize five proposed rules and guidance issued by the Department of Labor (“DOL”), the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), which will or may be enacted in 2024.

DOL’s Proposed Rule to Update the Minimum Salary Threshold for Overtime Exemptions

In 2023, the DOL announced a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) recommending significant changes to overtime and minimum wage exemptions. Key changes include:

  • Raising the minimum salary threshold: increasing the minimum weekly salary for exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees from $684 to $1,059, impacting millions of workers;
  • Higher Highly Compensated Employee (HCE) compensation threshold: increasing the total annual compensation requirement for the highly compensated employee exemption from $107,432 to $143,988; and
  • Automatic updates: automatically updating earning thresholds every three years.

These proposed changes aim to expand overtime protections for more employees and update salaries to reflect current earnings data. The public comment period closed in November 2023, so brace yourselves for a final rule in the near future. For more information: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/09/08/2023-19032/defining-and-delimiting-the-exemptions-for-executive-administrative-professional-outside-sales-and

DOL’s Proposed Rule on Independent Contractor Classification under the Fair Labor Standards Act

The long-awaited new independent contractor rule under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) may soon be on the horizon. The DOL proposed a new rule in 2022 on how to determine who is an employee or independent contractor under the FLSA. The new rule will replace the 2021 rule, which gives greater weight to two factors (nature and degree of control over work and opportunity for profit or loss), with a multifactor approach that does not elevate any one factor. The DOL intends this new rule to reduce the misclassification of employees as independent contractors and provide greater clarity to employers who engage (or wish to engage) with individuals who are in business for themselves.

The DOL is currently finalizing its independent contractor rule. It submitted a draft final rule to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review in late 2023. While an exact date remains unknown, the final rule is likely to be announced in 2024. More information about the rule can be found here: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/13/2022-21454/employee-or-independent-contractor-classification-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act

NLRB’s Joint-Employer Standard

The NLRB has revamped its joint-employer standard under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The NLRB replaced the 2020 standard for determining joint-employer status under the NLRA with a new rule that will likely lead to more joint-employer findings. Under the new standard, two or more entities may be considered joint employers of a group of employees if each entity: (1) has an employment relationship with the employees and (2) has the authority to control one or more of the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment. The NLRB has defined “essential terms and conditions of employment” as:

  • Wages, benefits, and other compensation;
  • Hours of work and scheduling;
  • The assignment of duties to be performed;
  • The supervision of the performance of duties;
  • Work rules and directions governing the manner, means, and methods of the performance of duties and the grounds for discipline;
  • The tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and
  • Working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.

The new rule further clarifies that joint-employer status can be based on indirect control or reserved control that has never been exercised. This is a major departure from the 2020 rule, which required that joint employers have “substantial direct and immediate control” over essential terms and conditions of employment.

The new standard will take effect on February 26, 2024, and will not apply to cases filed before the effective date. For more information on the final rule: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/27/2023-23573/standard-for-determining-joint-employer-status

EEOC’s Proposed Enforcement Guidance on Harassment

A fresh year brings fresh guidance! On October 2023, the EEOC published a notice of Proposed Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace. The EEOC has not updated its enforcement guidance on workplace harassment since 1999. The updated proposed guidance explains the legal standards for harassment and employer liability applicable to claims of harassment. If finalized, the guidance will supersede several older documents:

  • Compliance ManualSection 615: Harassment (1987);
  • Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment(1990);
  • Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism (1990);
  • Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. (1994); and
  • Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors(1999).

The EEOC accepted public comments through November 2023. After reviewing the public comments, the EEOC will decide whether to finalize the enforcement guidance. While not law itself, the enforcement guidance, if finalized, can be cited in court. For more information about the proposed guidance: https://www.eeoc.gov/proposed-enforcement-guidance-harassment-workplace

OSHA’s Proposed Rule to Amend Its Representatives of Employers and Employees Regulation

Be prepared to see changes in OSHA on-site inspections. Specifically, OSHA may reshape its Representatives of Employers and Employees regulation. In August 2023, OSHA published an NPRM titled “Worker Walkaround Representative Designation Process.” The NPRM proposes to allow employees to authorize an employee or a non-employee third party as their representative to accompany an OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) during a workplace inspection, provided the CSHO determines the third party is reasonably necessary to conduct the inspection. This change aims to increase employee participation during walkaround inspections. OSHA accepted public comments through November 2023. A final rule will likely be published in 2024.

For more information about the proposed rule to amend the Representatives of Employers and Employees regulation: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/30/2023-18695/worker-walkaround-representative-designation-process

Preparing for 2024

While 2023 proved to be a dynamic year for Labor and Employment law, 2024 could be either transformative or stagnant. Some of the proposed regulations mentioned above could turn into final rules, causing significant changes in employment law. On the other hand, given that 2024 is an election year, some of these proposed regulations could lose priority and wither on the vine. Either way, employers should stay informed of these ever-changing issues.

       
For more news on 2024 Labor and Employment Laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

NLRB Issues Final Rule on Joint-Employer Status, Answering a Major Question No One Asked

On October 26, 2023, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) issued its Final Rule (the “Rule”) on Joint-Employer status under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Slated to take effect on December 26, 2023, the Rule returns to and expands on the Obama era Browning-Ferris test, scrapping the NLRB’s 2020 Joint Employer test for the sole reason that the current Board disagrees with the 2020 test, and setting up a potential showdown with the Supreme Court over the “major questions” doctrine and the scope of the NLRB’s administrative authority.

The Final Rule Summarized

 Under the new Rule, any entity that shares or codetermines one or more of a group of employees’ “essential terms and conditions of employment” will be considered a joint employer of the employees along with any other entity controlling that work, that is their “primary employer.” Those “essential terms and conditions of employment” as listed in a new NLRB Fact Sheet are:

  1. wages, benefits, and other compensation;
  2. hours of work and scheduling;
  3. assignment of duties to be performed;
  4. supervision of the performance of duties;
  5. work rules and directions governing the manner, means, and methods of the performance of duties and the grounds for discipline;
  6. tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and
  7. working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.

The Rule is purported to be grounded in common law agency principles and will apply where control – or potential control – over any of the above terms and conditions is reserved to an entity, irrespective of whether or not such control is actually exercised and whether such control is direct or indirect. The Rule is expected to allow the Board to rely on standard contractual terms, such as those typically found in agreements between temporary agencies and other suppliers of labor and their clients, to make sweeping declarations of joint employer status, regardless of the factual circumstances.  Such findings would obligate putative joint employers to engage in collective bargaining with employee representatives over any of those essential terms and conditions of employment over which they potentially exercise control, even if such control is indirect. While the NLRB’s press release about the Rule asserts that, to make a codetermination, the Board will conduct factual analyses on a case-by-case basis, it is clear that the Rule will effectively make it much easier for the Board to designate common business relationships as instances of joint employment.

Potential Concerns and Consequences

An expanded definition of joint employment is the latest indicator of the current NLRB’s efforts to cast a wider net across the nation’s workforce, organized or not. The effects remain to be fully realized but may place more businesses directly under the Board’s jurisdiction. For example, where a non-unionized business has a relationship with an organized shop that the NLRB deems to constitute a joint employment arrangement, that non-unionized business could find itself a responding party to an unfair labor practices charge brought by representatives of the shop workers.

Accordingly, employers and their vendors or other suppliers of services and/or labor must consider how their relationships may be viewed under the Rule. Agreements should be reviewed for any language that could be construed as establishing forms of worker control that would implicate an entity as a joint employer and might benefit from the addition of language explicitly providing that such arrangements do not create an employment relationship.

Legal challenges to the Rule are expected, and the NLRB’s position may be on shaky ground following the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA, which called into question the validity of agency action that the Court determines to be a “transformative expansion” of administrative authority and an attempt to answer a “major question” that is better left to elected representatives in Congress rather than to the Executive Branch’s administrative agencies. To be sure, if allowed to stand, the NLRB’s efforts to establish a Joint Employer rule will have significant ripples throughout the U.S. economy. We will keep you informed as this issue winds its way through the courts.

NLRB Issues Memo on Non-competes Violating NLRA

On May 30, 2023, Jennifer Abruzzo, the general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), issued a memorandum declaring that non-compete agreements for non-supervisory employees violates the National Labor Relations Act. The memo explains that having a non-compete chills employees’ Section 7 rights when it comes to demanding better wages. The ­theory goes that employees cannot threaten to resign for better conditions because they have nowhere to go. Non-compete agreements also prohibit employees from seeking better working conditions with competitors and/or soliciting coworkers to leave with them for a local competitor.

Experts have yet to weigh in, but ultimately this issue will be decided by the federal courts. As an employer, if you employ any non-supervisory employees that are subject to a non-compete agreement, an unfair labor practice charge could be filed, and it appears the NLRB would lean towards invalidating the agreement, though all evidence would have to be taken into consideration.

© 2023 Jones Walker LLP

For more Employment Legal News, click here to visit the National  Law Review.

NLRB Issues Complaint for Athlete Misclassification against NCAA, Pac-12, and USC

On May 18, 2023, the National Labor Relations Board’s (the Board) regional director in Region 31 issued a complaint against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the Pac-12 Conference, and the University of Southern California (USC), alleging they violated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by misclassifying college football and basketball players as “non-employee student-athletes.” The original charge was issued back in February 2022 and alleged all three entities were in violation of the Act as “joint employers” of these athletes.

While this issue is not necessarily new to higher education, the Board’s decision to issue a complaint—and issue that complaint against all three entities—is new ground, as it departs from a 2015 precedent and paves the way for student-athletes to unionize at potentially both private and now public institutions. Under the Act, the Board has authority over private-sector workers, while state labor boards have jurisdiction over employees at state institutions. However, because the students at issue in Thursday’s complaint would be considered employees of the private NCAA and Pac-12 as well as USC, all three entities would be subject to potential liability as “joint employers.” What this means for public institutions is that there is a real and likely potential that the “joint employer” doctrine will allow for an end run around the Act’s coverage exemption for public-sector entities. As such, all student-athletes could potentially seek to collectively bargain at the NCAA level.

Finding merit to the charge and issuing this complaint is a logical result of General Counsel (GC) Memorandum GC 21-08 issued by the Board’s GC Jennifer Abruzzo in late September 2021. At that time, we issued an alert detailing the GC’s desire to expand the definition of “employee” in order to bring scholarship collegiate athletes under the Act. In February 2022, we issued another alert detailing how USC was likely to be the test case for that endeavor.

Alleging the violation of Section 7 of the Act, Thursday’s complaint arises from charges filed by the National College Players Association, a nonprofit advocacy association founded by former UCLA football player Ramogi Huma. The charge and complaint asserted that USC, the Pac-12, and NCAA misclassified student-athletes in order to deny them their rights under the Act, including the right to speak about compensation and working conditions. In addition to the alleged misclassification issue, the complaint alleges that USC illegally obstructed athletes’ organizing by “maintaining unlawful rules and policies in its handbook, including restricting communications with third parties, in the media, etc.”

Colleges and universities may be tempted to minimize this issue by thinking that the shift to seeing student-athletes as employees would affect them only in the event their athletes attempt to form a union. That is not the case. While a Board determination that student-athletes are employees could lead to a renewed effort by college athletes to organize, the GC has already cautioned (and made good on that warning) that the Board will seek to issue unfair labor practice charges against colleges and universities that misclassify student-athletes as “non-employees” or engage in other violations of the Act. For example, the GC has previously made clear that protections afforded by the Act apply to concerted activity such as expressions of support for social justice issues and other advocacy. As such, higher education institutions would be wise to tread lightly into these waters when they arise, because where employee status exists, concerted efforts of those employees to speak their minds or speak out on certain issues will be viewed as protected under the Act.

The hearing on the Board’s complaint is set for November 7, 2023.

© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

For more Labor and Employment Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

NLRB Unleashes New Damages Against Labor Law Violators

On Tuesday, December 13, 2022 to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB”) issued a decision that that could have profound effect on employers in all industries, regardless if they have a union. In Thrryv, Inc., the NLRB ruled in a 3 to 2 decision that employers who have been found to have violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) can be assessed “consequential damages.” in addition to the more traditional remedies of back pay and reinstatement.   If this case is upheld following a likely appeal, it will rock the employer community in the automotive industry and elsewhere.

The case arises from a unionized marketing company that decided to have a layoff. In the course of negotiating with the company over the layoff, the union representing the employees made various requests for information from the company. The company never provided the requested data. The NLRB determined the company violated the NLRA by refusing to respond to the union’s request for information. The NLRB further found the company violated the act by implementing the layoff without engaging in collective bargaining with the union.

Normally, the NLRB would remedy a violation of this nature by ordering the company to engage in “make whole relief” for the affected workers. Typically, that would involve reinstatement and back pay for the period of time they were wrongfully laid-off. However, in this case, the NLRB boldly went where it has never gone before and ordered the company to compensate the employees for “all direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered as a result of the unfair labor practice.” The NLRB went on to say this would be the new normal to remedy employer violations of the NLRA. Determining the full extent of direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms will invariably require additional hearings in which the parties present evidence. Under this new standard, the type of damages potentially available to affected workers could include such things as out-of-pocket, medical expenses, credit card debt, and any other cause the light off employees incurred while trying to make ends meet.

The two Republican members of the NLRB, Marvin Kaplan, and John Ring filed a dissenting opinion.  The dissent believes that the new remedy laid-out in the majority decision is too broad.  They contend this new standard could subject employers to almost limitless, speculative damages.  The dissenting opinion also notes that this new form of damages goes further than those available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  They question how the NLRB could award such damages without specific statutory authority from Congress.

This case will almost certainly be appealed and it behooves all the employer community to closely follow its track and if the NLRB uses other cases to continue to try to implement these new form of damages.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Following the Recent Regulatory Trends, NLRB General Counsel Seeks to Limit Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace

On October 31, 2022, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) released Memorandum GC 23-02 urging the Board to interpret existing Board law to adopt a new legal framework to find electronic monitoring and automated or algorithmic management practices illegal if such monitoring or management practices interfere with protected activities under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”).  The Board’s General Counsel stated in the Memorandum that “[c]lose, constant surveillance and management through electronic means threaten employees’ basic ability to exercise their rights,” and urged the Board to find that an employer violates the Act where the employer’s electronic monitoring and management practices, when viewed as a whole, would tend to “interfere with or prevent a reasonable employee from engaging in activity protected by the Act.”  Given that position, it appears that the General Counsel believes that nearly all electronic monitoring and automated or algorithmic management practices violate the Act.

Under the General Counsel’s proposed framework, an employer can avoid a violation of the Act if it can demonstrate that its business needs require the electronic monitoring and management practices and the practices “outweigh” employees’ Section 7 rights.  Not only must the employer be able to make this showing, it must also demonstrate that it provided the employees advance notice of the technology used, the reason for its use, and how it uses the information obtained.  An employer is relieved of this obligation, according to the General Counsel, only if it can show “special circumstances” justifying “covert use” of the technology.

In GC 23-02, the General Counsel signaled to NLRB Regions that they should scrutinize a broad range of “automated management” and “algorithmic management” technologies, defined as “a diverse set of technological tools and techniques to remotely manage workforces, relying on data collection and surveillance of workers to enable automated or semi-automated decision-making.”  Technologies subject to this scrutiny include those used during working time, such as wearable devices, security cameras, and radio-frequency identification badges that record workers’ conversations and track the movements of employees, GPS tracking devices and cameras that keep track of the productivity and location of employees who are out on the road, and computer software that takes screenshots, webcam photos, or audio recordings.  Also subject to scrutiny are technologies employers may use to track employees while they are off duty, such as employer-issued phones and wearable devices, and applications installed on employees’ personal devices.  Finally, the General Counsel noted that an employer that uses such technologies to hire employees, such as online cognitive assessments and reviews of social media, “pry into job applicants’ private lives.”  Thus, these pre-hire practices may also violate of the Act.  Technologies such as resume readers and other automated selection tools used during hiring and promotion may also be subject to GC 23-02.

GC 23-02 follows the wave of recent federal guidance from the White House, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and local laws that attempt to define, regulate, and monitor the use of artificial intelligence in decision-making capacities.  Like these regulations and guidance, GC 23-02 raises more questions than it answers.  For example, GC 23-02 does not identify the standards for determining whether business needs “outweigh” employees’ Section 7 rights, or what constitutes “special circumstances” that an employer must show to avoid scrutiny under the Act.

While GC 23-02 sets forth the General Counsel’s proposal and thus is not legally binding, it does signal that there will likely be disputes in the future over artificial intelligence in the employment context.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Set to Decide Whether NLRA Preempts State Law Claims for Property Damage Caused During Strikes

The U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming term will include review of whether the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) preempts state court lawsuits for property damage caused during strikes, which could have significant implications for employers and unions.

Factual Background

The case – Glacier Northwest Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 – began over five years ago when the Union in Washington State representing the Employer’s truck drivers went on strike.  The Union timed their strike to coincide with the scheduled delivery of ready-mix concrete, and at least 16 drivers left trucks that were full of mixed concrete, forcing the Employer to rush to empty the trucks before it hardened and caused damage.  The Employer was able to do so, but incurred considerable additional expenses and, because it dumped the concrete in order to avoid truck damage, lost its product.

Employer Brings State Law Suit for Property Damage

After the incident, the Employer sued the Union under Washington State law for intentional destruction of property.  The Union argued that the suit was preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (“Garmon”).  In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that, although the Act does not expressly preempt state law, it impliedly preempts claims based on conduct that is “arguably or actually protected by or prohibited by the Act.”  The Supreme Court held in Garmon that conduct is “arguably protected” when it is not “plainly contrary” to the Act or has not been rejected by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).

State Court Holdings

The Washington State trial court dismissed the Employer’s suit for property damage because strikes are protected by the Act.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that intentional destruction of property during a strike was not activity protected by the Act, and thus, not preempted under Garmon.

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Act impliedly preempts the state law tort claim because the intentional destruction of property that occurred incidental to a work stoppage was at least arguably protected, and the Board would be better-suited to make an ultimate determination on this legal issue.

Question Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court will now determine whether the National Labor Relations Act bars state law tort claims against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property in the course of a labor dispute.

Under Garmon, the Act does not preempt suits regarding unlawful conduct that is plainly contrary to the NLRA, and the Employer argues that the strike at issue here was plainly unprotected because of the intentional destruction of property.  In other words, the conduct is not even arguably protected by the Act such that the Act would preempt – it was, rather, plainly unprotected conduct, and thus, the proper subject of a lawsuit.  The Employer also cited the “local feeling” exception to Garmon, which creates an exception to preemption where the States may have a greater interest in acting, such as in the case of property damage or violence.

The Union argued in opposition to the Employer’s certiorari petition that the Employer merely challenged the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the conduct was arguably protected by the Act, and not its reasoning.  Moreover, whether or not the conduct was protected should be decided by the Board, which is better-suited to decide the matter.

Takeaway

Employers should gain much greater clarity into whether they can seek relief from such conduct via a damages lawsuit.  If the Court finds that such conduct is not preempted and may be litigated in state court, such a ruling could go far in protecting employers’ interests in contentious labor disputes and potentially shift the balance of power towards employers during these disputes.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Students May Now Organize… For the Time Being – Flip Flops in the Summer

union, organize, National Labor Relations ActThe issue of whether students may be considered employees for purposes of organizing under the National Labor Relations Act has been a hotly contested issue over the past decade.  On August 23, 2016, the Board reversed itself again and held that certain students at Columbia University are able to organize under the NLRA.

For many years, students who provided teaching and other services to their college or university in the course of their studies were not considered employees for the purposes of organizing under the NLRA. Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 (1972);  The Leland Stamford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974).  The Board long held that the relationship between graduate students and their university was primarily that of a student and not a statutory employee.

In 2000, the Board reversed its position and held that students may in fact qualify as employees under the Act.  New York University, 332 NLRB 1205 (2000).  Four years later, holding that students have a “primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their university,” the Board reversed itself again and returned to holding that students were not employees under the Act.  Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004).

Yesterday, three members of the Board voted to reverse Brown University and held that students at Columbia University may organize under the Act.  In doing so, the Board observed that there were several public universities where students were represented by labor unions and that there was no empirical evidence that collective bargaining by student assistants would harm the educational process.

Who knows how long the Columbia University decision will remain the law.  Much will likely depend on who wins in November.  Stay tuned!

© Copyright 2016 Murtha Cullina