May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA’s Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA's Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

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B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

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40 Essential Apps For Trial Lawyers, Part Two

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As we noted in Part One of this post, iPads have become ubiquitous in courtrooms and depositions since lawyers use them for everything from keeping organized to presenting evidence. Since 2011, when BullsEye first surveyed some of the most popular apps for trial, the number of litigation-related apps has grown significantly.

When we recently decided to take another look at the best apps for trial lawyers, our list grew to 40. In Part One of this post, we covered apps for reviewing transcripts, conducting on-the-fly legal research, strategizing about settlement, and accessing dockets. In Part Two, we continue our look at 40 essential apps for trial lawyers.

Trial Presentation Apps

ExhibitView ($89.99). This app lets you organize and annotate exhibits and then present them wirelessly. Presentation tools include call-out features, highlight options, freehand pen tool, a laser pointer tool, and complete control of your output to a TV or projection device. Additional features include screenshot saving, creating alias names, and importing and exporting projects. For more functionality, there is a PC version of ExhibitView ($498, which includes the iPad app) in which you can prepare your exhibits and then transfer them to your iPad.

Keynote ($9.99). Although not designed specifically for trials, Apple’s Keynote is a popular presentation app among lawyers in the courtroom and elsewhere. You can use it to view, edit, and design presentations created in either Keynote ’09 or Microsoft PowerPoint. It allows video mirroring so that you can present on an HDTV while seeing a presenter view on your iPad that shows your slides and notes.

TrialDirector (free). This app enables you to create case folders on your iPad and then add exhibits, including video, through a Dropbox or iTunes account. Once you have added these exhibits, you can use the app to annotate and present them. If you have the TrialDirector 6 desktop application, which sells for an annual license of $695, you can prepare exhibits there and then export them to this app for presentation at trial.

TrialPad ($89.99). TrialPad is generally considered the leader among trial presentation apps. While it is also the priciest of these apps, it is comparable in its capabilities to far more expensive desktop applications. With TrialPad, you can highlight, annotate, redact, and zoom in on documents as you present them. You can also view and compare documents side-by-side, view and edit video, mark up an exhibit with annotations and call-outs and then save the mark-ups for your closing, and project wirelessly.

TrialTouch (free). TrialTouch provides on-the-go access to case materials including photographs, illustrations, 3D animations, medical imagery, video, and documents. It requires an account with the trial-graphics company DK Global.

Jury Selection and Monitoring Apps

iJuror ($29.99). This jury-selection app lets you record information about jurors, assign scores to jurors, assign color codes to jurors for visual reference, view juror demographics, and configure seating charts to match the courtroom. Information can be shared among multiple devices by exporting and importing via Dropbox. Information can also be shared via Bluetooth with someone else who is using iJuror.

iJury ($14.99). This app uses jurors’ responses to voir dire questions to assign them a score as negative or positive for your case. You start by creating a case profile and adding members of the jury pool. As they respond to the jury questionnaire, you tap a button to indicate whether each response is positive or negative to your case. The app records these responses and creates an overall grade.

JuryDuty ($39.99). Similar to other jury-selection apps, JuryDuty lets you add information and notes about each juror, prepare topics and questions for voir dire, create seating charts, and share information among members of your trial team via Bluetooth.

Jury Notepad ($4.99). From the same company that developed iJuror, Jury Notepad is designed specifically for creating, keeping, and organizing notes about jurors. It has a simpler interface that makes it easier to use on iPhones, but it can also be used on an iPad.

JuryPad ($24.99). This app is designed to make it easy for you to record, arrange, evaluate, and use juror information as well as create, edit, and reuse voir dire questions. A unique feature of JuryPad is its ability to take you on a “virtual tour” of jurors’ neighborhoods.

JuryStar ($39.99). Developed by a trial lawyer for use in selecting juries, JuryStar lets you enter and record voir dire questions and juror responses and demographic information. It uses color codes to help you rate jurors and make decisions about which jurors to strike.

Date Calculator Apps

Court Days Pro ($2.99). This is a legal calendaring app for the iPad and iPhone. It gives you the ability to calculate dates and deadlines based on a customizable database of court rules and statutes. Once you set a trigger event, the app displays a list of corresponding dates and deadlines. Dates appear within the app and can also be added to your device’s native calendar app.

DocketLaw (free). This app lets you calculate event dates and deadlines for free based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For additional monthly fees, you can add subscriptions to rules-based calendars for specific state and federal courts. The cost varies by state and court. By way of example, you can add all New York courts for a monthly fee of $49.95.

Smart Dockets (free). Calculate dates and deadlines directly on your mobile device using court rules. Choose your court rule set, determine the trigger event, and enter the trigger date to calculate deadlines automatically.

Trial Preparation Apps

Courtroom Objections ($2.99). This app is a quick, simple guide to common courtroom objections and responses.

eDepoze (free). This app allows you to present deposition exhibits using an iPad. Users are able to introduce, mark, and share exhibits in real time, and the app allows participants to review and annotate their personal copies. The app is free, but use of the system must be purchased through a network of resellers, most of which are court reporting companies.

iTestimony ($9.99). Use this app to keep track of witness information and notes before and during trial and depositions. Assign avatars to each witness for easier identification. Information about witnesses can be shared with others by email.

TabLit: Trial Notebook ($89.99). This app is designed to enable a lawyer to walk into court with nothing but an iPad. It includes case documents, examination outlines, examination checklists, evidentiary checklists, case contacts, and other features.

E-Discovery Apps

eDiscovery Assistant ($29.99). This app is intended to provide access to key e-discovery information. As purchased, it includes access to the FRCP for e-discovery, pilot projects, key case digests identified by the editors, sample checklists and templates, a resources database, and a glossary of terms. For an additional monthly subscription of $15.99, you can also get access to all state and U.S. district court e-discovery rules, more than 3,000 digests of e-discovery decisions, and more than 50 checklists and templates.

E-Discovery Project Calculator (free). This free app lets you calculate and estimate the size of your e-discovery project. This tool will estimate document and page count based on the size of the job. It will also calculate the time and cost required to complete the project.

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Recent Trends in ESOP Litigation — Employee Stock Ownership Plan

There has been a lot of attention in the world of employee ownership plans to the 2014 Supreme Court Decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. In that case, the Court ruled that “the law does not create a special presumption favoring ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) fiduciaries. Rather, the same standard of prudence applies to all ERISA fiduciaries, including ESOP fiduciaries, except that an ESOP fiduciary is under no duty to diversify the ESOP’s holdings.” This ruling overturns the so-called Moench rule that has been applied to plan fiduciaries for certain 401(k) plans investing in company stock and ESOPs. Moench gave a presumption of prudence to plan fiduciaries unless they knew or should have known the company was in dire financial circumstances.

As important as this ruling is, it actually has very little if any impact on the vast majority of ESOPs, over 95% of which are in closely held companies. The ruling is far more important for public companies with 401(k) plans or ESOPs that offer company stock as an investment choice.

First, it is important to distinguish between a statutory ESOP and what courts came, by a rather tortured logic, to call ESOPs—namely any defined contribution plan that had company stock in it. ESOPs were created as part of ERISA in 1974 and given not just the right but the requirement to invest primarily in employer securities. ESOPs were specifically created to encourage employers to share ownership with employees, and over the years Congress has given these plans a number of special tax benefits. Because fiduciaries are required to invest primarily in employer stock, standard fiduciary obligations concerning diversification in retirement plans would be impractical. The Moench presumption was created in a case involving a statutory ESOP.

The large majority of “stock drop” cases, however, have not involved statutory ESOPs, but 401(k) plans that either allowed employees to invest in company stock and/or matched in company stock. Some of these plans required fiduciaries to offer company stock; others made it optional. Defense attorneys argued that these plans were actually “ESOPs” too and were subject to the Moench presumption. Most district and circuit courts bought that argument, although some applied it only when company stock was required. That, I think, was unfortunate and inappropriate. 401(k) plans were never meant to be vehicles for sharing corporate ownership. They are intended to be safe, cost-effective retirement plans. ESOPs are a specific statutory creation with a specific set of rules and purposes.

When reading the Supreme Court decision, as well as the arguments made before the Court, it is also clear that the justices were thinking entirely of public companies. There is virtually no discussion of ESOPs in closely held companies, and the key tests that the Court now requires plaintiffs to meet in stock drop cases largely do not apply to privately held companies. Since the original Moench decision in 1995, we at the National Center for Employee Ownership have only found two cases in closely held companies that were decided even in part based on that presumption.

The Court’s decision in the Fifth Third case laid out three key hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome to prevail. The first states that it is insufficient to argue that fiduciaries should be able to outguess the market based on publicly available information. The second issue is whether decisions to sell company stock in light of inside information could be prudently taken in light of their potential impact on the prices of company stock. Fiduciaries are also not obligated to violate securities laws. Finally, the Court said plaintiffs must allege a reasonable alternative course of action.

In ESOPs in closely held companies, fiduciaries have few options that could form the basis for plaintiffs arguing a plausible course of action. First, the law requires that ESOPs be primarily invested in company stock. Second, the only liquidity options are a company buy-back of shares, which is probably impractical if the company is already in financial distress, or a sale of the company. But a fire sale like that would mean an even lower price for plan participants. As noted in more detail below, none of the presumption of prudence cases has concerned closely held companies, probably because of these issues. Also note that Dudenhoeffer distinguished between relying on inside information to sell company stock (which it classified as illegal insider trading and thus not required by the duty of prudence) and refraining from buying more company stock (which might be a fiduciary violation). The purchase of shares by an ESOP is already subject to substantial statutory and case law requirements, and this decision is unlikely to change the way these cases are contested.

As a result of all this, the prudence presumption has so far not been an issue for closely held ESOP companies in court, and it is likely to continue not to be as plaintiffs would have a hard time indicating what fiduciaries should have done. Instead, cases will continue to focus, as they have been before where there are alleged problems, on the initial sale price of the shares of the ESOP, which is determined by the trustee and relies on an outside appraiser. It is possible that the Dudenhoeffer decision may embolden the plaintiffs’ bar to initiate more lawsuits, but we would expect that to continue to be primarily in public companies.

Beyond Fifth Third—ESOPs Law for the 97%

Valuations

The 97% of ESOP companies that are closely held will not be much affected by the Supreme Court decision, but the last 25 years of litigation on ESOPs reveals some important trends that should be considered.

In an analysis by the NCEO of the 224 decisions courts have made on ESOPs in closely held companies between 1990 and 2014, we found that many of the suits involved plan management issues, such as failing to make distributions. The most significant issues, however, concerned valuation, indemnification, and fiduciary duties.

The valuation decisions are mixed. Courts have focused more on process than outcome. Some processes are clearly unacceptable, such as not hiring an independent appraiser or influencing an appraiser’s report. Several key best practices have emerged. A recent settlement between the Department of Labor and GreatBanc Trust in a valuation case (Perez v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 5:12-cv-01648-R-DTB (C.D. Cal., proposed settlement agreement filed June 2, 2014) set out terms for GreatBanc to follow in future engagements that does a good job of summarizing the trends in the courts.

Key points in the settlement included:

  • Trustees must be able to show that they vetted the independence and qualifications of appraisers carefully.
  • Trustees must show that they have assessed the reasonableness of financial projections given to the appraiser. Some valuation advisors include disclaimers in their engagement agreements that the DOL reads as too broad, in that read literally the valuation advisor can rely on any information it receives from the plan sponsor company without inquiring as to its reasonableness, no matter how unreasonable the information. The use of these disclaimers will not absolve the trustee of responsibility and the trustee should document how the appraisal firm has analyzed just how reliable projections are.
  • The trustee should consider how plan provisions, such as those relating to puts, diversification, and distribution policies, might affect the plan sponsor’s repurchase obligation.
  • The trustee should consider the company’s ability to service the debt if projections are not met.
  • Documentation should be detailed. While documentation of the valuation analysis may appear to be burdensome, making the effort to document the valuation review process at the time of the transaction can only benefit the valuation advisor and the trustee in later years.

Indemnification

The other significant legal development for closely held company ESOPs in recent years concerns indemnification, ironically also in the case involving Sierra Aluminum and GrratBanc. In Harris v. GreatBanc Trust Co., Sierra Aluminum Co., & Sierra Aluminum ESOP, No. 5:12-cv-01648-R (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013), a district court ruled that GreatBanc could be indemnified for its role as the ESOP fiduciary. The decision is significant in that it occurred in the one circuit (the Ninth) that has taken the position that indemnification should not be allowed, especially in a 100% ESOP.  In Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009), the court ruled that ESOP plan assets were not distinguishable from company assets. If plaintiffs prevailed but the company’s indemnification had paid out millions in legal fees to defendants (as was the case here), the plaintiffs would have a very hollow victory. In that same circuit, in Fernandez et al. v. K-M Industries Holding Co., No. C 06-7339 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009), a court that an indemnification agreement did not apply in the case of a 42% ESOP because if alleged ERISA violations concerning an improper valuation were sustained, the indemnification would harm the value of participant stock.

These decisions seemed to make indemnification largely moot, but in the GreatBanc case the court ruled that regulations (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(3)) of ERISA Section 410 state that in the case of an ESOP, the plan’s assets and the company assets are treated as separate.  In Couturier, the Harris court said, the company had already been liquidated and was thus no longer an operating company. The court also distinguished this case from Couturier in that in Couturier, plaintiffs had already shown likelihood to prevail on fiduciary charges, something that could not be said of this case. Finally, the Couturier case involved no exceptions for breaches of fiduciary duty, as was the case here, but only for “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct.”

Other courts in other circuits have not weighed in on this issue. Certainly a good argument can be made that if indemnification means that plaintiffs will lose a substantial amount of a settlement agreement because there is no money to pay, it seems compelling indemnification should not apply. That would not be the case if the company had other available assets. In any event, ESOP advisors now caution clients that indemnification may have limited value and that they should rely primarily on adequate fiduciary insurance.

Conclusion

In recent years, the Department of Labor has been more aggressive in pursuing what it perceives as valuation abuses in ESOP companies. While there have been a few more court cases and settlements per year than normal, a typical year finds only a handful of these out of the 6,500 or so ESOPs in closely held companies. A comprehensive study by the NCEO found that the default rate on leveraged ESOPs (those that borrow money to buy stock, which most do) is just .2% per year, way below other LBOs. If valuations really were routinely excessive, this number would be higher as the debt burden would be unrealistic.

Other ESOP litigation has been relatively mundane, focusing either on administrative errors or the occasional fraudulent behavior. Indemnification could become a more important issue, but companies can (and should) resolve that with proper fiduciary insurance.

The future for company stock in public company retirement plans, mostly 401(k) plan, is far less certain. There has been a steady decline in how many companies offer this and how much those that do rely on it.  Even for advocates of employee ownership, however, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Good ESOP companies have secondary diversified retirement plans—in fact, ESOP companies are more likely to have a diversified retirement plan than other companies are to have any plan. That is a best practice we strongly encourage.

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Apple Gets Another Bite At $368 Million Verdict

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You don’t get two bites at the apple, it is sometimes said, but Apple Inc. is getting a second bite at defending itself against a massive damages award after the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a $368 million jury verdict in a patent infringement case.

The court vacated the award because it found that the plaintiff’s damages expert improperly relied on a model known as the Nash Bargaining Solution to calculate reasonable royalty damages.

Federal district courts have split on whether to allow expert testimony using the Nash Bargaining Solution, but the Federal Circuit held that the expert failed to establish the tie between the Nash theorem and the facts of this case.

The underlying issue in the case was whether two of Apple’s products — FaceTime, which allows secure video calling between Apple devices, and VPN On Demand, which creates a virtual private network from an iOS device — infringed four patents owned by VirnetX, a Nevada software and licensing company.

A jury in federal court in Tyler, Texas, concluded that all four patents were valid and that Apple had infringed them. It awarded VirnetX damages of $368 million.

Proving Reasonable Royalties

On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict of infringement with regard to the VPN On Demand product but reversed and remanded aspects of the infringement verdict with regard to the FaceTime product.

The court then turned its attention to Apple’s challenges of the testimony of VirnetX’s damages expert. In a patent case, when infringement is found, a court is to award damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”

To establish a reasonable royalty rate in this case, VinetX’s expert offered three alternative methods of calculation. Apple challenged the admissibility of all three methods under Daubert, but over Apple’s objection, the trial court admitted the testimony.

On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit found problems with all three theories.

Smallest Salable Unit

The expert’s first theory was to apply a one percent royalty rate to the base. He derived the one percent rate from the royalty VirnetX typically sought in licensing its patents. For the base, he used what he called the “smallest salable unit” — the lowest sale price of each model of the iOS devices that contained the challenged features. With this theory, he calculated the total damages to be $708 million.

Apple argued that the expert erred by using the entire market value of its products as the royalty base without demonstrating that the patented features drove the demand for those products. The Federal Circuit agreed.

“The law requires patentees to apportion the royalty down to a reasonable estimate of the value of its claimed technology, or else establish that its patented technology drove demand for the entire product,” the court explained. “VirnetX did neither.”

The court went on to say that the expert “did not even try to link demand for the accused device to the patented feature, and failed to apportion value between the patented features and the vast number of nonpatented features contained in the accused products.”

The Nash Bargaining Solution

For both the expert’s second and third theories — each of which he used only with regard to FaceTime — he relied on the Nash Bargaining Solution, a so-called game theory developed in 1950 by John Nash, a mathematician and co-winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics.

In his first use of the Nash theorem, the expert began by calculating the profits associated with the use of FaceTime. He did this based on the revenue generated by Apple’s addition of a front-facing camera on its mobile devices. He then determined that, under the Nash theory, the parties would have split this revenue 50/50. However, after accounting for Apple’s stronger bargaining position, he concluded that Apple would have taken 55 percent of the profits and VirnetX, 45 percent. That amounted to $588 million in damages.

For his second use of the Nash theorem, the expert assumed that FaceTime “drove sales” for Apple’s iOS products. Eighteen percent of all iOS sales would not have occurred without the addition of the FaceTime feature, he concluded. Based on that, he calculated the amount of Apple’s profits that he believed were attributable to FaceTime and apportioned 45 percent of those profits to VirnetX. That amounted to $606 million in damages for FaceTime.

Apple challenged both these theories, arguing that the expert’s use of the 50/50 split as a starting point was akin to the 25 percent rule of thumb for royalties that the Federal Circuit had rejected in earlier cases. Here again, the Federal Circuit agreed with Apple’s argument.

The problem, the court explained, is that the Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain set of premises. Here, the expert never tied his use of the theorem to the facts of the case.

“Anyone seeking to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by the theorem only on those premises,” the court said. In this case, the expert never did that.

Based on these conclusions, the court vacated the damages award and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings.

Has an expert ever used the Nash Bargaining Solution, or other game theory, in one of your cases? If so, was the result positive?

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Only two more weeks until the Retail Law 2014 Conference – October 15-17, 2014, Charlotte, NC

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Retail Law Conference:

Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law
Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law

Register Today!

When

October 15-17, 2014

Where

Charlotte, NC

The 2014 Retail Law Conference takes place October 15-17 in Charlotte, NC. This year’s program is stronger than ever with relevant, compelling and interactive sessions focused on the legal issues affecting retailers. In partnership with the Retail Litigation Center (RLC), RILA will host legal counsel from leaders in the retail industry for the fifth annual event.

This year’s Retail Law Conference will feature issues at the intersection of technology and law, how the two spaces interact and the impact that they have on retailers. Topics will likely include:

  • Anatomy of a Data Breach: Prevention & Response
  • Privacy: Understanding New Technologies & Data Collection
  • Advertising Practices: Enforcement & Social Media
  • ADA Implications for New Technologies
  • Legal Implications for Future Payment Technologies
  • Policies & Procedures of The “Omnichannel” Age
  • Patent Litigation “Heat Maps”
  • Union Organizing Campaigns
  • Wage & Hour Litigation
  • EEOC Enforcement
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
  • Corporate Governance & Disclosure
  • Election 2014
  • Dueling Views of The U.S. Supreme Court
  • Legal Ethics

The Retail Law Conference is open to executives from retail and consumer goods product manufacturing companies. All others, such as law firms and service providres, must sponsor in order to attend, and can do so by contacting Tripp Taylor at tripp.taylor@rila.org.

Attend the Retail Law 2014 Conference – October 15-17, 2014, Charlotte, North Carolina

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Retail Law Conference:

Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law
Retail Law 2014: At the Intersection of Technology and Retail Law

Register Today!

When

October 15-17, 2014

Where

Charlotte, NC

The 2014 Retail Law Conference takes place October 15-17 in Charlotte, NC. This year’s program is stronger than ever with relevant, compelling and interactive sessions focused on the legal issues affecting retailers. In partnership with the Retail Litigation Center (RLC), RILA will host legal counsel from leaders in the retail industry for the fifth annual event.

This year’s Retail Law Conference will feature issues at the intersection of technology and law, how the two spaces interact and the impact that they have on retailers. Topics will likely include:

  • Anatomy of a Data Breach: Prevention & Response
  • Privacy: Understanding New Technologies & Data Collection
  • Advertising Practices: Enforcement & Social Media
  • ADA Implications for New Technologies
  • Legal Implications for Future Payment Technologies
  • Policies & Procedures of The “Omnichannel” Age
  • Patent Litigation “Heat Maps”
  • Union Organizing Campaigns
  • Wage & Hour Litigation
  • EEOC Enforcement
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
  • Corporate Governance & Disclosure
  • Election 2014
  • Dueling Views of The U.S. Supreme Court
  • Legal Ethics

The Retail Law Conference is open to executives from retail and consumer goods product manufacturing companies. All others, such as law firms and service providres, must sponsor in order to attend, and can do so by contacting Tripp Taylor at tripp.taylor@rila.org.

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Litigation Heating Up

Barnes Thornburg

The past few months have been busy for courts and the SEC dealing with securities whistleblowers. The Supreme Court’s potentially landmark decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC back in March already seems like almost ancient history.  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection provision (18 U.S.C. §1514A) protected not simply employees of public companies but also employees of private contractors and subcontractors, like law firms, accounting firms, and the like, who worked for public companies. (And according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, it might even extend to housekeepers and gardeners of employees of public companies).

Since then, a lot has happened in the world of whistleblowers. Much of the activity has focused on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because Dodd-Frank has greater financial incentives for plaintiffs, or because some courts have concluded that it does not require an employee to report first to an enforcement agency. The following are some interesting developments:

What is a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank?

This seemingly straightforward question has generated a number of opinions from courts and the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-protection provision, enacted in 2010, focuses on a potentially different “whistleblower” population than Sarbanes-Oxley does. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision focuses particularly on whistleblower disclosures regarding certain enumerated activities (securities fraud, bank fraud, mail or wire fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation), and it protects those who disclose to a person with supervisory authority over the employee, or to the SEC, or to Congress.

On the other hand, Dodd-Frank’s provision (15 U.S.C. §78u-6 or Section 21F) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).  It then prohibits, and provides a private cause of action for, adverse employment actions against a whistleblower for acts done by him or her in “provid[ing] information to the Commission,” “initiat[ing], testif[ing] in, or assist[ing] in” any investigation or action of the Commission, or in making disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Exchange Act or the Commission’s rules.  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1). A textual reading of these provisions suggests that a “whistleblower” has to provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.  If the whistleblower does so, an employer cannot discriminate against the whistleblower for engaging in those protected actions.

However, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC promulgated rules explicating its interpretation of Section 21F. Some of these rules might require providing information to the SEC, but others could be construed more broadly to encompass those who simply report internally or report to some other entity.  Compare Rule 21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3). The SEC’s comments to these rules also said that they apply to “individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”

Therefore, one issue beginning to percolate up to the appellate courts is whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions consider someone who reports alleged misconduct to their employers or other entities, but not the SEC, to be a “whistleblower.” The only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue (the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC) concluded that Dodd-Frank’s provision only applies to those who actually provide information to the SEC.

In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the “plain language and structure” of the statutory text, concluding that it unambiguously required the employee to provide information to the SEC.  Several district courts, including in Colorado, Florida and the Northern District of California, have concurred with this analysis.

More, however, have concluded that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous on this point and therefore have given Chevrondeference to the SEC’s interpretation as set forth in its own regulations. District courts, including in the Southern District of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Connecticut, have adopted this view. The SEC has also weighed in, arguing (in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit) that whistleblowers should be entitled to protection regardless of whether they disclose to their employers or the SEC.  The agency said that Asadi was wrongly decided and, under its view, employees that report internally should get the same protections that those who report to the SEC receive. The Second Circuit’s decision in that case (Liu v. Siemens AG) did not address this issue at all.

Finally, last week, the Eighth Circuit also decided not to take on this question. It opted not to hear an interlocutory appeal, in Bussing v. COR Securities Holdings Inc., in which an employee at a securities clearing firm provided information about possible FINRA violations to her employer and to FINRA, rather than the SEC, and was allegedly fired for it. The district court concluded that the fact that she failed to report to the SEC did not exclude her from the whistleblower protections under Dodd-Frank. It reasoned that Congress did not intend, in enacting Dodd-Frank, to encourage employees to circumvent internal reporting channels in order to obtain the protections of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.  In doing so, however, the district court did not conclude that the statute was ambiguous and rely on the SEC’s interpretation.

A related question is what must an employee report to be a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Thus far, if a whistleblower reports something other than a violation of the securities laws, that is not protected. So, for example, an alleged TILA violation or an alleged violation of certain banking laws have been found to be not protected.

These issues will take time to shake out. While more courts thus far have adopted, or ruled consistently with, the SEC’s interpretation, as the Florida district court stated, “[t]he fact that numerous courts have interpreted the same statutory language differently does not render the statute ambiguous.”

Does Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection apply extraterritorially?

In August, the Second Circuit decided Liu. Rather than focus on who can be a whistleblower, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not apply to conduct occurring exclusively extraterritorially. In Liu, a former Siemens employee alleged that he was terminated for reporting alleged violations of the FCPA at a Siemens subsidiary in China.  The Second Circuit relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank case in reaching its decision. In Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear direction from Congress.

The Second Circuit in Liu, despite Liu’s argument that other Dodd-Frank provisions applied extraterritorially and SEC regulations interpreting the whistleblower provisions at least suggested that the bounty provisions applied extraterritorially, disag
reed. The court concluded that it need not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of who can be a whistleblower because it believed that Section 21F was not ambiguous.  It also concluded that the anti-retaliation provisions would be more burdensome if applied outside the country than the bounty provisions, so it did not feel the need to construe the two different aspects of the whistleblower provisions identically.  And finally, the SEC , in its amicus brief, did not address either the extraterritorial reach of the provisions or Morrison, so the Second Circuit apparently felt no need to defer to the agency’s view on extraterritoriality.

Liu involved facts that occurred entirely extraterritorially. He was a foreign worker employed abroad by a foreign corporation, where the alleged wrongdoing, the alleged disclosures, and the alleged discrimination all occurred abroad. Whether adding some domestic connection changes this result remains for future courts to consider.

The SEC’s Use Of The Anti-Retaliation Provision In An Enforcement Action

In June, the SEC filed, and settled, its first Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation enforcement action. The Commission filed an action against Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., and its principal Candace Weir, asserting that they retaliated against a Paradigm employee who reported certain principal transactions, prohibited under the Investment Advisers Act, to the SEC. Notably, that alleged retaliation did not include terminating the whistleblower’s employment or diminishing his compensation; it did, however, include removing him as the firm’s head trader, reconfiguring his job responsibilities and stripping him of supervisory responsibility. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, both respondents agreed to cease and desist from committing any future Exchange Act violations, retain an independent compliance consultant, and pay $2.2 million in fines and penalties.  This matter marks the first time the Commission has asserted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions in an enforcement action, rather than a private party doing so in civil litigation.

The SEC Announces Several Interesting Dodd-Frank Bounties

Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who provide the SEC with “high-quality,” “original” information that leads to an enforcement action netting over $1 million in sanctions can receive an award of 10-30 percent of the amount collected. The SEC recently awarded bounties to whistleblowers in circumstances suggesting the agency wants to encourage a broad range of whistleblowers with credible, inside information.

In July, the agency awarded more than $400,000 to a whistleblower who appears not to have provided his information to the SEC voluntarily.  Instead, the whistleblower had attempted to encourage his employer to correct various compliance issues internally. Those efforts apparently resulted in a third-party apprising an SRO of the employer’s issues and the whistleblower’s efforts to correct them. The SEC’s subsequent follow-up on the SRO’s inquiry resulted in the enforcement action. Even though the “whistleblower” did not initiate communication with the SEC about these compliance issues, for his efforts, the agency nonetheless awarded him a bounty.

Then, just recently, the SEC announced its first whistleblower award to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions. The agency awarded the compliance staffer more than $300,000 after the employee first reported wrongdoing internally, and then, when the company failed to take remedial action after 120 days, reported the activity to the SEC. Compliance personnel, unlike most employees, generally have a waiting period before they can report out, unless they have a reasonable basis to believe investors or the company have a substantial risk of harm.

With a statute as sprawling as Dodd-Frank, and potentially significant bounty awards at stake, opinions interpreting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions are bound to proliferate. Check back soon for further developments.

 
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