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Weather & Climate Risk Management Part IV: Taxation of Weather Risk Management Products

Are there differences in the way in which weather derivatives and weather insurance are taxed?

Yes. Weather insurance products, including parametric insurance, are taxed as insurance; and derivatives are taxed in accordance with the tax rules applicable to the particular type of derivative product held by the taxpayer. A business needs to carefully consider these tax differences to determine the best product or products to meet its weather risk management needs.

How is insurance taxed to a policyholder?

When a business buys weather insurance, it pays a premium to the insurance company so that the company assumes the business risks set out in the policy. Assuring the policy is purchased to manage a business’s legitimate weather-related risk, the premium is deductible under Internal Revenue Code (Code) § 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense.

If insurance coverage is triggered and a policyholder receives a payout under the policy, the payout is not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis if the payment reimburses the policyholder for property damage or loss. In other words, payments under insurance policies are not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis because the payments simply restore (in whole or in part) the policyholder to the financial position it was in before it incurred the loss. If the reimbursement amount under the policy exceeds the policyholder’s tax basis, the amount it receives over its tax basis is treated as taxable income.[1]

Business interruption insurance covers losses (such as lost profits and ongoing expenses) from events that close or disrupt the normal functioning of the policyholder’s business. The payout amount is often based on past business results. Business interruption insurance proceeds are likely to be taxable to the policyholder because they compensate the policyholder for lost revenue.

To ensure that a policyholder receives the most favorable tax treatment, it must carefully document its business purpose for entering into the insurance, the amount of its tax basis, and receipt of the insurance proceeds.

How are derivatives taxed?

It depends on whether the taxpayer has entered into a futures contract, forward contract, option, swap, cap, or floor. The taxpayer must then consider its status in entering into each derivative: is it acting as a hedger, dealer, trader, or investor? The taxpayer must also determine whether it has made all the required tax identifications and elections. In dealing with derivatives, the taxpayer must go through this three-step process for each product it is considering. Hedgers and dealers receive ordinary income and loss on their derivative transactions, while traders and investors receive capital gain and loss.

Why might a taxpayer want to be treated as a hedger with respect to its weather derivatives?

A taxpayer seeking to use weather derivatives to manage its weather-related business risks typically wants to be treated as a tax hedger so that the gain or loss on its derivative transactions qualify as tax hedges. This would allow the taxpayer to match its derivative gains or losses with its weather-related income or losses. Because ordinary property generates ordinary income or loss, a business hedger typically wants to receive ordinary income or loss on its weather derivatives. In other words, a hedger wants to match the tax treatment it receives on its hedges with that of the items it is hedging. Many risk management transactions with respect to weather-related risks do not meet the hedge definition (see the discussed below). For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules, see the forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions.”

What is required for a weather derivative to be treated as a tax hedge?

To qualify as a tax hedge, the transaction must manage interest rate fluctuations, currency fluctuations, or price risk with respect to ordinary property, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.[2] In addition to meeting the definition of a tax hedge, the taxpayer must comply with the identification requirements set out at Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and the tax accounting requirements set out at Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.[3]

What is the tax analysis that a taxpayer should conduct to determine if its weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

When entering into a weather derivative, a taxpayer should conduct the following tax analysis: (1) is the transaction entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business (2) primarily (3) to manage price risk (4) on ordinary property or obligations (5) held or to be held by the taxpayer. If the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” then the taxpayer has a qualified tax hedge if—but only if—it complies with all of the required identification rules set out in Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and as explained in Treasury Regulation § 1.1221-2. If the taxpayer cannot answer all of these questions with a “yes,” then the weather derivative transaction is not a tax hedge, and it is subject to the tax rules that apply to capital assets.[4] The requirement that a taxpayer must be hedging ordinary property, borrowings, or obligations means that favorable tax hedging treatment is not available for many legitimate weather risk management activities.

What types of assets, obligations, and borrowings qualify as ordinary property and ordinary obligations for purposes of the tax hedging rules?

Weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges if they can be tied to price risk with respect to ordinary assets or ordinary obligations. In many situations, however, weather derivatives are entered into to manage a taxpayer’s anticipated profitability, sales volume, plant capacity, or similar issues. These risks are not the transactions that receive tax hedge treatment.

Ordinary property includes property that if sold or exchanged by the taxpayer would not produce capital gain or loss without regard to the taxpayer’s holding period. Items included in a taxpayer’s inventory—such as natural gas or heating oil held by a dealer in those products—are treated as ordinary property that can be hedged. Qualifying hedges can also include hedges of purchases and sales of commodities for which the taxpayer is a dealer, such as electricity, natural gas, or heating oil. If a utility agrees to purchase electricity at a fixed price in the future, for example, the utility is exposed to price risk if it cannot resell the fixed-price electricity for at least the amount it paid to purchase that electricity. Accordingly, the utility could agree to sell electricity under a futures contract (short position) that would qualify as a tax hedge.

On the liability side of a business, the hedge could relate to a taxpayer’s price risk with respect to an ordinary obligation. An ordinary obligation is an obligation the performance of which (or its termination) would not produce a capital gain or loss. For example, a forward contract to sell electricity or natural gas at a fixed price entered into by a dealer is treated as an ordinary obligation. In addition, a utility that enters into a fixed price forward sales contract agreeing to sell electricity at a fixed price has an ordinary obligation to deliver electricity at that fixed price.

What sorts of weather derivative transactions are not tax hedges?

Many legitimate risk management activities do not qualify as tax hedges. Weather derivative transactions that protect overall business profitability (such as volume or revenue risk) are not directly related to ordinary property or ordinary obligations. As a result, weather derivatives entered into to protect a business’s revenue stream or its net income against volume or revenue risk are not tax hedges.

Many taxpayers in the normal course of their businesses enter into weather derivatives to manage volume or revenue risks of reduced demand for their products or services. These transactions are not tax hedges. The taxpayer is not managing a price risk (either current or anticipated) attributable to ordinary assets, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.

Take, for example, a ski resort or amusement park operator that enters into a weather derivative to protect itself against adverse weather conditions that are likely to result in a reduction in the number of skiers or amusement park visitors. The taxpayer’s risk management efforts in these cases either relate to its investment in its facility (which for the most part consists of real estate and business assets that are not taxed as ordinary assets) or to its expected revenue. Similarly, a power generator that hedges its plant capacity or its revenue stream with a weather derivative tied to the number of Cooling Degree Days would not meet the definition of a tax hedge.

Why don’t more weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

As part of Congress’ efforts to modernize the tax rules with respect to hedging, it specifically authorized the Treasury to issue regulations to extend the hedging definition to include other risks that the Treasury sets out in regulations.[5] The Treasury, unfortunately, has not proposed or issued any regulations extending the benefits of tax hedging. This means that weather derivative transactions entered into to manage weather-related volume or revenue risks do not qualify as tax hedges. In this situation, the taxpayer receives capital gain or loss on the derivative product.

What are some examples of weather derivatives that can qualify as tax hedges?

A weather derivative qualifies as a tax hedge if it manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary assets or obligations. Thus, a taxpayer entering into weather derivatives primarily to manage its price risk with respect to increased supply costs will meet the definition of a hedging transaction. Such a transaction manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary property.

If, for example, a commodity dealer buys a put option (or sells a call option) on a designated weather event to protect it against price risks with respect to its existing inventories or future fixed-price commitments, the dealer has entered into a qualified tax hedge, provided it meets the identification requirements.

A heating oil distributor with heating oil inventory (or forward contracts to purchase heating oil at a fixed price) might enter into a weather swap to protect itself from the risk of an unseasonably warm heating season. This swap should qualify as a tax hedge because the swap manages the distributor’s risk of a decline in the market price for its heating oil inventories (or a decline in its fixed-price forward contract purchase commitments) due to unseasonably warm weather.

If an electric utility enters into forward commitments to sell electricity at fixed prices for delivery in the summer cooling months, it may buy a call option on a designated weather event that would qualify as a tax hedge to the extent the option protects the utility against the risk of being unable to acquire or generate the electricity at a low enough price if the demand for electricity in the cooling season is higher than expected because of unseasonably warm weather resulting in higher electricity prices.

Conclusion

All organizations face weather and climate risks. As part of their enterprise-wide risk management, they have available to them a number of weather risk transfer tools. This series on weather and climate risk provides a detailed review of weather risk management. Organizations can look to standardized futures and option contracts traded on regulated commodity exchanges; they can enter into customized OTC weather derivatives designed with their specific weather risks in mind; they can put in place indemnity insurance; they can purchase parametric insurance; or they can mix and match multiple derivative products and insurance coverages to meet their specific organization’s needs. In Part I of this Q&A series on Weather & Climate Risk Management, we considered the landscape and context within which weather and climate decision making takes place, along with the overarching risk management approaches and principles that apply. In Part II, we looked at the details on the various weather risk management products. In Part III, we addressed the regulation of these products; and in Part IV, we reviewed the taxation of these various classes of products.

[1] Taxability is subject to a nonrecognition provision at Code § 1033(a) if the taxpayer complies with the requirements to purchase “qualified replacement property.” https://irc.bloombergtax.com/public/uscode/doc/irc/section_1033

[2] Treas. Reg. § 1221-2 and Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2).

[3] For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules see my forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions” due out in Spring 2024.

[4] If the taxpayer is a dealer or a commodity derivatives dealer, the weather derivative would be an ordinary asset in the taxpayer’s hands.

[5] Code § 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii).

UNDER SURVEILLANCE: Police Commander and City of Pittsburgh Face Wiretap Lawsuit

Hi CIPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have an interesting filing that just came in the other day.

This one involves alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., and the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, et seq.

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:

(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication;

(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or

(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.

Seven police officers employed by the City of Pittsburg Bureau of Police team up to sue Matthew Lackner (Commander) and the City of Pittsburgh.

Plaintiffs, Colleen Jumba Baker, Brittany Mercer, Matthew O’Brien, Jonathan Sharp, Matthew Zuccher, Christopher Sedlak and Devlyn Valencic Keller allege that beginning on September 27, 2003 through October 4, 2003, Matthew Lacker utilized body worn cameras to video and audio records Plaintiffs along with utilizing the GPS component of the body worn camera to track them.

Yes. To track them.

Plaintiffs allege they were unaware that Lacker was utilizing a body worn camera to video and auto them and utilizing the GPS function of the body worn camera. Nor did they consent to have their conversations audio recorded by Lacker and/or the City of Pittsburgh.

Interestingly, Lackner was already charged with four (4) counts of Illegal Use of Wire or Oral Communication pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1) in a criminal suit.

So now Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, including actual damages or statutory damages, punitive damages, and reasonably attorneys’ fees.

This case was just filed so it will be interesting to see how this case progresses. But this case is an important reminder that many states have their own privacy laws and to take these laws seriously to avoid lawsuits like this one.

Case No.: Case 2:24-cv-00461

DOJ Plan to Offer Whistleblower Awards “A Good First Step”

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will launch a whistleblower rewards program later this year, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, announced today. Monaco stated that other U.S. whistleblower award programs, such as the SEC, CFTC, IRS and AML programs, “have proven indispensable” and that the DOJ plans to offer awards for tips not covered under these programs.

“This is a good first step, but the Justice Department has miles to go in creating a whistleblower program competitive with the programs managed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),” said Stephen M. Kohn.

“We hope that the DOJ will follow the lead of the SEC and CFTC and establish a central Whistleblower Office that can accept anonymous and confidential complaints. Such a program has been required under the anti-money laundering whistleblower law for over three years, but Justice has simply failed to follow the law,” added Kohn, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Whistleblower Center.

According to Monaco, “under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to pay awards for information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures” but this authority has never been used “as part of a targeted program.” The DOJ is “launching a 90-day sprint to develop and implement a pilot program, with a formal start date later this year,” she stated.

While the specifics of the program have yet to be announced, Monaco did state that the DOJ will only offer awards to individuals who were not involved in the criminal activity itself.

“The Justice Department’s decision to exclude persons who may have had some involvement in the criminal activity is a step backwards and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding as to why the Dodd-Frank and False Claims Acts work so well,” continued Kohn. “When the False Claims Act was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 it was widely understood that the award laws worked best when they induced persons who were part of the conspiracy to turn in their former associates in crime. Justice needs to understand that by failing to follow the basic tenants of the most successful whistleblower laws ever enacted, their program is starting off on the wrong foot.”

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Regeneron v Novartis and Vetter: Walker Process Client Update

In an appeal that attracted a dozen amici, including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, five states, and the District of Columbia, the Second Circuit gave the Walker Process antitrust doctrine a shot in the arm in a patent dispute related to pre-filled syringes (“PFSs”) used for injection of anti-VEGF biologic medicines into patients’ eyeballs (i.e., intravitreal injections).¹ Under Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), patentees who obtain patents through fraudulent behavior or inequitable conduct can be liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a complaint filed in the Northern District of New York, Regeneron alleged Novartis and Vetter committed a Walker Process violation by obtaining and asserting patents for PFSs. The Second Circuit held that the district court made a mistake by dismissing Regeneron’s suit because it focused on the functional similarities in the markets for anti-VEGF medicines in PFSs and vials. In reversing, the Second Circuit held that the correct approach must focus on an economic market analysis rather than a functional market analysis, and that Regeneron’s complaint plausibly alleged that anti-VEGF PFSs constituted their own economic product market. As the amicus interest signals, the decision may have significant implications, both for the blockbuster market for anti-VEGF medicines and, more broadly, for defining the markets for different pharmaceutical methods of administration.

In its complaint, Regeneron alleges that in 2005, it had contracted with Vetter, a company providing pharmaceutical filling services, to collaborate on a PFS for its blockbuster anti-VEGF product, EYLEA.² It alleges that its agreement with Vetter granted Regeneron ownership in any patent related to EYLEA PFSs. Id. Notwithstanding its agreement with Regeneron, Vetter later entered into a confidential agreement with Novartis to develop a PFS for anti-VEGF biologics, which are used to treat macular degeneration and other retinal conditions. Id. Indeed, both parties agree on the benefits of PFSs for patients and providers of anti-VEGF medicines—ease in administration, improved safety, and greater efficiency—compared to vials, which must be used to fill a separate syringe.³ Novartis has an anti-VEGF biologic, LUCENTIS, which Genentech markets in the United States.

Regeneron alleges that Vetter contributed to Novartis’s invention of U.S. Patent No. 9,220,631 (the “’631 Patent”) and that Novartis concealed Vetter’s contribution to inventorship from the PTO to avoid alerting Regeneron to its contractual violations. Id. Concealing inventorship from the PTO can constitute inequitable conduct and form the basis for a Walker Process claim. (Regeneron also alleges Novartis improperly withheld key prior art references from the PTO during prosecution.) Novartis’s resulting ’631 Patent specifically claims EYLEA’s active ingredient as a treatment for use in Novartis’s patented syringe.⁴ Regeneron contends that the defendants’ pattern of conduct delayed its entry into the PFS market, resulting in significant damages.⁵ Regeneron also alleges that, after the ’631 Patent issued, Vetter leaned on it in contract negotiations to enter a long-term deal and to agree not to challenge the validity of the ’631 Patent.⁶ Novartis sued Regeneron on the ’631 Patent in the ITC and the Northern District of New York in 2020, and there is a pending Federal Circuit appeal regarding the validity of the patent.⁷

The Second Circuit held that “the district court improperly concluded that Regeneron failed to plead adequately the existence of a distinct anti-VEGF PFS market because it… placed improper weight on the functional, rather than economic, similarities between anti-VEGF PFSs and vials.”⁸ Rather than look to the functional similarities in the markets for PFSs and vials (i.e., same drug, same medical condition), the Second Circuit held that the proper analysis was economic. That is, whether products are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,” as assessed by examining “sufficient cross-elasticity of demand.”⁹ Regeneron’s complaint alleges that physicians transferred 80% of patients from vials to PFSs when they were offered for LUCENTIS. The Second Circuit found Regeneron’s allegation adequately pled a hypothetical monopoly market by pleading that the physicians’ switching behavior showed that a “small, but significant, price increase in the PFS version would not cause physicians to substitute the vial version for PFS.”¹⁰

Second, the Second Circuit held that the district court was wrong to decide that an antitrust market cannot be coextensive with a patent’s scope. Instead, “once an antitrust plaintiff has demonstrated that [1] a patent was obtained through fraud, it must [2] separately explain how the fraudulently obtained patent enabled the defendants to achieve market power within the relevant market.”¹¹ Regeneron’s allegations regarding inventorship and improperly withheld prior art satisfied the “fraudulently obtained” prong of the test.¹² Next, the Second Circuit found that Regeneron’s complaint adequately pled the “market power” prong, crediting Regenoron’s allegation that Novartis and Vetter attempted to use the ’631 patent to coerce Regeneron into a long-term exclusive PFS filling relationship and demanding other modifications to Regeneron and Vetter’s 2005 agreement.¹³

Why the Decision Matters

The Second Circuit’s decision stands out for two reasons. First, anti-VEGF biologics are a big business for innovator companies, biosimilar makers, and government payers. EYLEA’s total revenue for 2023 was nearly $5.9 billion.¹⁴ Roche, which through its subsidiary Genentech commercializes LUCENTIS in the US, reported $460 million CHF in 2023 revenue, down from approximately $1 billion CHF in 2022 after entry from two biosimilars, with more pending.¹⁵ Biosimilars referencing EYLEA are also pending FDA approval or in clinical trials.¹⁶ Government payers are naturally interested in age-related macular degeneration (AMD) medications: among Americans over 65, the CDC estimates that approximately 1.3 million have vision-threatening AMD, with another 10.9 million having milder AMD.¹⁷ Indeed, the state amici’s brief supporting Regeneron noted the states’ interest in the markets for AMD drugs.¹⁸

Second, and more broadly, a product’s presentation or method of administration—pill vs. liquid; standard vs. extended release; IV vs. subcutaneous injection—has major implications for patients, providers, and product lifecycle. Different methods of administration may expand a product’s commercial reach and, as this case shows, provide additional patent protection (and possibly market exclusivity). Antitrust scrutiny directed to narrowly defined markets for methods of administration—here PFSs—is noteworthy. The amicus brief from the DoJ and FTC makes clear that it is supporting neither side and “take[s] no position as to whether the complaint adequately pleads a relevant antitrust market or states an antitrust claim.”¹⁹ However, the Federal government’s amicus brief also stated that the district court erred in its decision, and the brief’s analysis of the proper market definition parallels the reasoning ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit^.20

This decision relates to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court only looks for a plausible, well-pled complaint. Novartis will have its day in court at the summary judgment and trial stages, where Regeneron will owe a higher burden of proof. However, antitrust claims are powerful tools because they carry the monetary risk of treble damages as well as the possibility of scrutiny from regulators. These risks must be weighed, not just by outside counsel and CLOs, but by CEOs and boards of directors.

Footnotes

[1] See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG et al., No. 22-427, slip op. at 1 (March 18, 2024). As the Second Circuit explains, “[t]he products in question are prescription medications used to treat the overproduction of vascular endothelial growth factor (‘VEGF’), a naturally occurring protein that, if overproduced, can lead to various eye disorders and, in some cases, to permanent blindness.”

[2] Slip op. at 9

[3] Id. at 8-9

[4] See ’631 Patent at Claim 12

[5] See slip op. at 10-11.

[6] Id. at 13-14.

[7] Id. at 15-16.

[8] Id. at 19.

[9] Id. at 20-21 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and United States v. Am. Express. Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016)).

[10] Slip op. at 26; see, e.g., Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 199 (small but significant non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) may demonstrate that the proposed market is relevant market).

[11] Slip op. at 30(citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177).

[12] Id. at 30-31.

[13] Id. at 31-32. In addition to reversing the district court’s decision on the antitrust claim, the Second Circuit reversed the court’s dismissal of Regeneron’s claim for tortious interference with contract as time barred, crediting Regeneron’s equitable estoppel arguments.

[14] “Regeneron Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2023 Financial and Operating Results,” Feb. 2, 2024, https://investor.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/regeneron-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2023-financial (last visited March 20, 2024).

[15] “Roche Finance Report 2023,” at 16, https://assets.roche.com/f/176343/x/3b1fb647e2/fb23e.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[16] See, e.g., “New and Upcoming biosimilar launches,” at 6 https://www.cardinalhealth.com/content/dam/corp/web/documents/Report/cardinal-health-biosimilar-launches.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[17] See “Prevalence of Age-Related Macular Degeneration (AMD), at Table 1, https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/vehss/estimates/amd-prevalence.html (last visited March 20, 2024).

[18] See Brief of Amici Curiae Nevada, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case 22-427, Dkt. 106 at 2.

[19] See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Case 22-427, Dkt. 90 at 1.

[20] Id. at 12.

California PFAS Ban in Products: 6th Largest Global Economy Enters the Fray

We reported extensively on the landmark legislation passed in Maine in 2021 and Minnesota in 2023, which were at the time the most far-reaching PFAS ban in the United States. Other states, including Massachusetts and Rhode Island, have subsequently introduced legislation similar to Maine and Minnesota’s regulations. While we have long predicted that the so-called “all PFAS / all products” legislative bans will become the trend at the state levels, it is significant to note that California, the world’s sixth largest economy, recently introduced a similar proposed PFAS ban for consumer products.

The California proposed legislation, coupled with the existing legislation passed or on the table, will have enormous impacts on companies doing business in or with the state of California, as well as on likely future consumer goods personal injury lawsuits. The California PFAS ban must therefore not be overlooked in companies’ compliance and product development departments.

California PFAS Ban

California’s SB 903 in its current form would prohibit for sale (or offering for sale) any products that contain intentionally added PFAS. A “product” is defined as “an item manufactured, assembled, packaged, or otherwise prepared for sale in California, including, but not limited to, its components, sold or distributed for personal, residential, commercial, or industrial use, including for use in making other products.” It further defines “component” as “an identifiable ingredient, part, or piece of a product, regardless of whether the manufacturer of the product is the manufacturer of the component.”

While the effective date of SB 903’s prohibition would be January 1, 2030, the bill gives the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) the authority to prohibit intentionally added PFAS in a product before the 2030 effective date. It also allows DTSC to categorize PFAS in a product as an “unavoidable use”, thereby effectively creating an exemption to the bill’s ban, although California exemption would be limited to five years in duration. Similar carve outs were also included in the Maine and Minnesota bans. In each instance, certain information must be provided to the state to obtain an “unavoidable use” exemption. In California, an “unavoidable use” exemption would only be granted if:

There are no safer alternatives to PFAS that are reasonably available.
The function provided by PFAS in the product is necessary for the product to work.
The use of PFAS in the product is critical for health, safety, or the functioning of society.

If a company sells a products containing PFAS in the state of California in violation of the proposed law, companies would be assessed a $1,000 per day penalty for each violation, a maximum of $2,500 per day for repeat offenders, and face possible Court-ordered prohibition of sales for violating products.

Implications To Businesses From The Minnesota PFAS Legislation

First and foremost of concern to companies is the compliance aspect of the California law. The state continues to modify and refine key definitions of the regulation, resulting in companies needing to consider the wording implications on their reporting requirements. In addition, some companies find themselves encountering supply chain disclosure issues that will impact reporting to the state of California, which raises the concern of accuracy of reporting by companies. Companies and industries are also very concerned that the information that is being gathered will provide a legacy repository of valuable information for plaintiffs’ attorneys who file future products liability lawsuits for personal injury, not only in the state of California, but in any state in which the same products were sold.

It is of the utmost importance for businesses along the whole supply chain to evaluate their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate these compounds. One major point of contention among members of various industries is whether to regulate PFAS as a class or as individual compounds. While each PFAS compound has a unique chemical makeup and impacts the environment and the human body in different ways, some groups argue PFAS should be regulated together as a class because they interact with each other in the body, thereby resulting in a collective impact. Other groups argue that the individual compounds are too diverse and that regulating them as a class would be over restrictive for some chemicals and not restrictive enough for others.

Companies should remain informed so they do not get caught off guard. Regulators at both the state and federal level are setting drinking water standards and notice requirements of varying stringency, and states are increasingly passing PFAS product bills that differ in scope. For any manufacturers, especially those who sell goods interstate, it is important to understand how those various standards will impact them, whether PFAS is regulated as individual compounds or as a class. Conducting regular self-audits for possible exposure to PFAS risk and potential regulatory violations can result in long term savings for companies and should be commonplace in their own risk assessment.

Smart Lawyer Marketing: The Benefits of Becoming an Adjunct Professor or Guest Lecturer

If you’re a lawyer looking to stand out and grow your practice, here’s a strategy worth considering: becoming an adjunct professor or guest lecturer. This isn’t just about adding a title to your resume; it’s about enriching your professional credentials, elevating your personal brand, building connections with the community and opening doors to new opportunities. Here’s why venturing into academia could be a smart move for your legal career and how to do it.

A Spotlight on Your Expertise: Engaging in a teaching role will elevates your visibility within the academic and legal communities. Universities are vibrant ecosystems of learning, networking and professional exchange. By sharing your knowledge and experience in such settings, you not only enrich the learning environment but also spotlight your expertise to a broader audience. It’s an effective way to get noticed and remembered in the circles that matter.
Networking with Purpose: Teaching at a university isn’t just about imparting knowledge; it’s a dynamic platform for meaningful networking. Every semester offers a new opportunity to connect with ambitious students, fellow educators, and visiting professionals. These connections can lead to new business opportunities, collaborations and referrals. Building a network in such a rich environment can provide a steady stream of advantages for your legal practice.
Establishing Your Thought Leadership: There’s no better place to showcase your legal acumen than in a classroom or lecture hall. Teaching allows you to demonstrate your depth of knowledge and commitment to your field, helping to establish you as a thought leader among your peers and potential clients. Engaging with students and faculty on complex legal issues not only reinforces your standing but also keeps you at the cutting edge of legal developments.
The Dual Benefit of Learning: While teaching, lawyers often find themselves learning alongside their students. Because a professor and lecturer must stay current and deeply understand the subjects they teach acts as a catalyst for personal and professional growth. This continuous learning cycle not only enhances your legal practice but also ensures that your teaching is informed, relevant and highly valued.

How to Become an Adjunct Professor or Guest Lecturer

If you’re interested in becoming an adjunct professor or guest lecturer, here are some steps to get you started:

Get Your Credentials and Experience in Order: An advanced degree is usually required for adjunct positions, but if you’re eyeing more prestigious spots or specialized subjects, a PhD might be necessary. Beyond degrees, real-world experience in your field isn’t just icing on the cake—it’s another layer of cake. It shows you can apply what you teach outside the classroom, making your lessons more relevant and engaging.
Network Like a Pro: Building connections is key in academia, but think of it as making friends rather than networking. Attend events, engage in discussions and be active in online communities related to your field. It’s about finding your tribe—people who share your interests and can tip you off to opportunities you might not find on your own.
Bolster Your Teaching Credentials: If teaching isn’t something you’ve done a lot of, look for opportunities to get some practice. This could be anything from volunteer teaching gigs, leading workshops or even taking on a teaching assistant role. These experiences are valuable not just for what they teach you about instructing others, but they also give you stories and insights you can share when you apply for jobs.
Polish Your Application: Your application is your chance to shine. Make sure your CV is not only comprehensive but clear and engaging. Cover letters should be tailored to each application, showing why you’re excited about the position and what makes you a great fit. Don’t forget a teaching statement that reflects your unique approach and philosophy towards education.
Apply Thoughtfully: While casting a wide net could result in the kind of role you are seeking, aim for opportunities that truly resonate with your expertise and teaching style. Explore various institutions, from community colleges to universities, and don’t overlook less traditional teaching environments that might be in need of your particular skill set.
Stay Curious and Keep Growing: Staying informed and continually developing your skills is important. Seek out professional development opportunities, stay abreast of new research in your field and be open to new teaching techniques (including technology advancements) and methodologies. Your growth as a professional not only enriches your teaching but also makes you more attractive to potential employers.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Enhanced Visibility: Teaching roles at universities put you in front of an engaged audience, amplifying your professional visibility.
Strategic Networking: The academic environment offers unparalleled networking opportunities with future and current lawyers, colleagues and industry experts.
Thought Leadership: Sharing your expertise as a teacher reinforces your status as a knowledgeable and respected professional in your field.
Continuous Learning: The act of teaching encourages ongoing education, keeping you at the forefront of legal developments and practices.

Teaching as an adjunct professor or guest lecturer offers a lawyers strategic benefits beyond traditional networking and marketing efforts. It provides a platform for visibility, a hub for networking, a stage for establishing thought leadership and an opportunity for personal growth.

California’s Housing Overhaul Brings Significant Changes for Landlords and Tenants in 2024

California Senate Bill 567, i.e., the Homelessness Prevention Act, which goes into effect on April 1, 2024, seeks to cap rent hikes at 10% and prevents landlords from evicting tenants without a legal cause. California Assembly Bill 12, i.e., the new residential security deposit law, which goes into effect on July 1, 2024, limits the amount landlords can charge for security deposits. Both bills were signed into law in 2023 by Governor Newsom, and while they signal new protections and legal benefits for tenants, the potential financial exposure for landlords is elevated.

Senate Bill 567

SB 567 changes the rules by which California property owners may remove tenants in certain instances. Effectively, this new law directly impacts two sets of property owners:

Property owners and their close family members (i.e. spouse, domestic partner, children, grandchildren, parents, or grandparents) who plan to move into an occupied/leased property before the expiration of the lease term with the tenant.
“Fix and flip” investors planning on substantially remodeling or rebuilding an occupied/leased property for resale.

Under the current law (California Civil Code § 1946.2), after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential property for 12-months, the landlord is prohibited from terminating the tenancy without “just cause.” In fact, the “just cause” must be stated in the written notice to the tenant for the termination of the tenancy to be effectuated. Of note, existing law distinguishes between “at-fault just cause” and “no-fault just cause,” wherein “no-fault just cause” has nothing to do with the nonpayment of rent and/or criminal activity on premises, but rather is defined as:

the intent to occupy the premises by the owner and/or the owner’s spouse, domestic partner, children, grandchildren, parents, and/or grandparents;
the withdrawal of the residential real property from the rental market;
the owner complying with specific government orders that necessitate vacating the real property; or
the intent to demolish or to substantially remodel the residential real property.

Regarding an eviction based on an intent to occupy, the new law now requires the owner and/or the owner’s family member(s) under such a scenario to occupy (i.e., move into) the residential real property within 90-days for a minimum of 12 continuous months, and to use the property as the person’s primary residence. Historically, it was quite simple for property owners to use the “move in” provision under the law as an excuse to evict a tenant that they did not like or as a means to increase the rent by evicting the old tenant and moving in a new tenant who was willing to pay a higher rent. There were no specific guidelines and/or restrictions in this regard. But now, a strict timeline regarding personal occupancy has been codified into law, the violations of which could result in financial exposure for the property owner including, but not limited to, a civil monetary award to the tenant with potential for treble damages (3-times the actual damages amount) and punitive damages.

This new law also requires an owner who displaces a tenant in order to substantially remodel or demolish a unit to provide the tenant with written notice that includes a description of the substantial remodel to be completed and the expected duration of the repairs or the expected date by which the property will be demolished, as well as a copy of the permits required to undertake the substantial remodel or demolition. This means that the property owner must do more than just advise the existing tenant that they are being evicted due to the substantial remodeling of the property or because of the intent to demolish it. Under the new law, the property owner must provide the tenant with written notice and documents setting forth a construction timeline and copies of the permitting for said work.

Importantly, the new law prescribes new enforcement mechanisms, including making an owner who attempts to recover possession of a rental unit in material violation of this new law liable to the tenant in a civil action for damages up to three times the actual damages amount, as well as punitive damages and attorney’s fees/costs. Furthermore, the new law also authorizes the California’s Attorney General, and/or the City Attorney, and/or County Counsel within whose jurisdiction the rental unit is located, to bring actions for injunctive relief against the owner who is in violation of this new law. Also, many cities and counties throughout California have different (and often more restrictive) requirements when removing tenants. As such, it is always recommended for landlords to check the rules, regulations, and laws related to the jurisdiction where the property is located for any additional guidelines and requirements.

When using any of the “no fault” grounds for removing a tenant, the tenant is entitled to relocation costs equal to one month’s rent. However, landlords should be mindful that many cities and counties throughout California have even more stringent and/or more substantial relocations costs and requirements. As such, landlords should always check to see if there are any additional jurisdictional costs and/or requirements for removing a tenant.

Further, until January 1, 2030, the current existing law prohibits an owner of residential real property from, over the course of any 12-month period, increasing the gross rental rate for a dwelling or a unit more than 5% plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 10%, whichever is lower, of the lowest gross rental rate charged for that dwelling or unit at any time during the 12-months before the effective date of the increase, subject to specified conditions. This new law, however, makes an owner who demands, accepts, receives, or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum increase allowed liable in a civil action to the tenant from whom those payments are or were demanded, accepted, received, or retained for certain relief including, upon a showing that the owner acted willfully or with oppression, fraud, or malice, damages up to three times the amount by which any payment demanded, accepted, received, or retained exceeds the maximum allowable rent. This new law also authorizes the California attorney general and/or the city attorney or county counsel within whose jurisdiction the residential property is located to enforce the new law’s provisions and to bring action for injunctive relief.

Assembly Bill 12

Under AB 12, landlords are permitted to ask for security deposits equivalent to one month’s rent for both furnished and unfurnished dwellings. This is a notable shift given that under the current existing law, landlords can charge up to two months’ rent for an unfurnished dwelling and three months’ rent for a furnished one. This law does not take effect until July 1, 2024, allowing landlords time to make any necessary adjustments to their practices given this new approach on the security deposit amount.

Also, please note that this new law has an exception for “small landlords” (as defined), if they own no more than two residential rental properties that collectively include no more than four dwelling units that are offered for rent. Additionally, to qualify as a “small landlord,” the owner must hold the real estate as a natural person, as a limited liability company where all members are natural persons, or as a family trust. If all these conditions are met, then the “small landlord” is permitted to collect up to two months’ rent as a security deposit. Again, AB 12 does not take effect until July 1, 2024, which gives California landlords who do not qualify as “small landlords” to make necessary adjustments. In enacting this new law, the California state legislators are hoping to make housing more accessible and affordable, especially for those residents who are struggling financially. Ironically, the law also is effectuating at a time when landlords are facing multiple hardships including limited rent increases, financial risk in the form of potential damage to their property and/or unpaid rent for which there will be no compensation, increasing maintenance and operational costs, having to navigate the complexities of local and state-level regulations, and stalled and/or slowed evictions of tenants who owe back-rent since the COVID-19 pandemic. These factors, amongst others, could hamstring landlords financially and potentially lead to significant portions of the housing market to fall into disrepair, as well as to cause a slow-down of development projects and community engagement. It also may cause landlords to become stricter with the screening processes of their tenants, including adopting higher income requirements and/or charging higher application fees, which can result in an even more challenging housing landscape for high-risk and/or low-income tenants. At this juncture, only time will tell.

Now What?

If you are a landlord, these new laws may seem onerous and riddled with potentially damaging financial exposure. We recommend consulting with a trusted attorney before entering into a landlord-tenant relationship, and also before terminating an existing lease in both the “at-fault just cause” or “no-fault just cause” scenarios.

Lawsuit Challenges New USCIS Fee Rule

Significant increases to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) filing fees are set to go into effect on April 1, 2024. However, a lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado may delay that implementation. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit, the ITServe Alliance (a group that represents technology companies), the American Immigrant Investor Alliance, and a Canadian investor, have asked for a preliminary injunction to stop the planned fee increases.

As previously reported, the fee rule would require employers to pay 70% more for H-1B petitions, 201% more for L-1 petitions, and 129% more for individuals on O-1 petitions. One of the more controversial aspects of the new rule requires a $600 Asylum Program Fee to be charged to certain petitioners who are filing an I-129 Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker or an I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers, which are common forms employers use when filing employment-based nonimmigrant and immigrant visa petitions.

The lawsuit argues three things:

1. The fee rule was promulgated without following proper rule making procedures;

2. The fee rule doubles immigrant investor fees through the EB-5 program in violation of law. Specifically, the USCIS imposed new fees on immigrant investors and regional centers without completing the fee study that Congress required as part of the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022; and

3. The asylum-related fee “arbitrarily and without legal justification” shifts the burden to certain employers to fund the government’s handling of asylum cases.

The full complaint can be accessed here.

As of today, the fee increases are scheduled to go into effect on April 1.

Court Finds Corporate Transparency Act Unconstitutional and Unenforceable as to NSBA Members

On March 1, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled that the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) is unconstitutional.[1] The CTA requires many U.S. entities to disclose their individual beneficial owners in a report filed with the U.S. Treasury. The CTA statute was enacted in 2021.[2] Its implementing regulations require many entities formed in 2024 to report beneficial ownership information within 90 days of formation.[3] The CTA requires many entities formed prior to 2024 to report beneficial ownership information by January 1, 2025.[4]

The federal court’s ruling arose in the context of a constitutional challenge by plaintiffs the National Small Business Association (“NSBA”) and one of its individual members, Isaac Winkles. In granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the court held that:

the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper clause, the taxing power, and the U.S. government’s authority over foreign affairs and national security do not provide sufficient authority for the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), and the CTA is unconstitutional as a result; and
the U.S. government is enjoined from enforcing the CTA as to the NSBA and Isaac Winkles.

The court did not issue a nationwide injunction barring the U.S. government from enforcing the law against other entities within the scope of the CTA’s reporting requirements.

On March 11, 2024, the U.S. Government filed a notice of appeal of the court’s ruling.[5] The same day, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which is the U.S. Treasury bureau that administers the CTA, stated that it will continue to implement the CTA while complying with the court’s order.[6]

FinCEN clarified that it is not currently enforcing the CTA against two categories of persons:

individual plaintiff Isaac Winkles and reporting companies for which he is a beneficial owner; and
the NSBA and its members as of March 1, 2024.

FinCEN stated, “[o]ther than the particular individuals and entities subject to the court’s injunction [. . .] reporting companies are still required to comply with the law and file beneficial ownership reports as provided in FinCEN’s regulations.”[7]

[1] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-01448/pdf/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-01448-0.pdf.

[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, div. F, title LXIV, § 6403 (adding 31 § U.S.C. 5336), available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ283/pdf/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

[3] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380.

[4] Id.

[5] https://fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/54_Notice_of_Appeal.pdf

[6] https://fincen.gov/news/news-releases/updated-notice-regarding-national-small-business-united-v-yellen-no-522-cv-01448

[7] Id.

AI Got It Wrong, Doesn’t Mean We Are Right: Practical Considerations for the Use of Generative AI for Commercial Litigators

Picture this: You’ve just been retained by a new client who has been named as a defendant in a complex commercial litigation. While the client has solid grounds to be dismissed from the case at an early stage via a dispositive motion, the client is also facing cost constraints. This forces you to get creative when crafting a budget for your client’s defense. You remember the shiny new toy that is generative Artificial Intelligence (“AI”). You plan to use AI to help save costs on the initial research, and even potentially assist with brief writing. It seems you’ve found a practical solution to resolve all your client’s problems. Not so fast.

Seemingly overnight, the use of AI platforms has become the hottest thing going, including (potentially) for commercial litigators. However, like most rapidly rising technological trends, the associated pitfalls don’t fully bubble to the surface until after the public has an opportunity (or several) to put the technology to the test. Indeed, the use of AI platforms to streamline legal research and writing has already begun to show its warts. Of course, just last year, prime examples of the danger of relying too heavily on AI were exposed in highly publicized cases venued in the Southern District of New York. See e.g. Benajmin Weiser, Michael D. Cohen’s Lawyer Cited Cases That May Not Exist, Judge Says, NY Times (December 12, 2023); Sara Merken, New York Lawyers Sanctioned For Using Fake Chat GPT Case In Legal Brief, Reuters (June 26, 2023).

In order to ensure litigators are striking the appropriate balance between using technological assistance in producing legal work product, while continuing to adhere to the ethical duties and professional responsibility mandated by the legal profession, below are some immediate considerations any complex commercial litigator should abide by when venturing into the world of AI.

Confidentiality

As any experienced litigator will know, involving a third-party in the process of crafting of a client’s strategy and case theory—whether it be an expert, accountant, or investigator—inevitably raises the issue of protecting the client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. The same principle applies to the use of an AI platform. Indeed, when stripped of its bells and whistles, an AI platform could potentially be viewed as another consultant employed to provide work product that will assist in the overall representation of your client. Given this reality, it is imperative that any litigator who plans to use AI, also have a complete grasp of the security of that AI system to ensure the safety of their client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. A failure to do so may not only result in your client’s sensitive information being exposed to an unsecure, and potentially harmful, online network, but it can also result in a violation of the duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent the disclosure of or unauthorized access to your client’s sensitive information. Such a duty is routinely set forth in the applicable rules of professional conduct across the country.

Oversight

It goes without saying that a lawyer has a responsibility to ensure that he or she adheres to the duty of candor when making representations to the Court. As mentioned, violations of that duty have arisen based on statements that were included in legal briefs produced using AI platforms. While many lawyers would immediately rebuff the notion that they would fail to double-check the accuracy of a brief’s contents—even if generated using AI—before submitting it to the Court, this concept gets trickier when working on larger litigation teams. As a result, it is not only incumbent on those preparing the briefs to ensure that any information included in a submission that was created with the assistance of an AI platform is accurate, but also that the lawyers responsible for oversight of a litigation team are diligent in understanding when and to what extent AI is being used to aid the work of that lawyer’s subordinates. Similar to confidentiality considerations, many courts’ rules of professional conduct include rules related to senior lawyer responsibilities and oversight of subordinate lawyers. To appropriately abide by those rules, litigation team leaders should make it a point to discuss with their teams the appropriate use of AI at the outset of any matter, as well as to put in place any law firm, court, or client-specific safeguards or guidelines to avoid potential missteps.

Judicial Preferences

Finally, as the old saying goes: a good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge. Any savvy litigator knows that the first thing one should understand prior to litigating a case is whether the Court and the presiding Judge have put in place any standing orders or judicial preferences that may impact litigation strategy. As a result of the rise of use of AI in litigation, many Courts across the country have responded in turn by developing either standing orders, local rules, or related guidelines concerning the appropriate use of AI. See e.g., Standing Order Re: Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in Cases Assigned to Judge Baylson (June 6, 2023 E.D.P.A.), Preliminary Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence by New Jersey Lawyers (January 25, 2024, N.J. Supreme Court). Litigators should follow suit and ensure they understand the full scope of how their Court, and more importantly, their assigned Judge, treat the issue of using AI to assist litigation strategy and development of work product.

Tag: legal

Weather & Climate Risk Management Part IV: Taxation of Weather Risk Management Products

Are there differences in the way in which weather derivatives and weather insurance are taxed?