lawsuit Archives - The National Law Forum

U.S. Supreme Court: Forced Transfers of Employees Without Loss of Pay or Rank Violate Title VII

Federal law prohibits employers from relying on certain protected statuses (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) when making employment decisions. Lower courts have required employees suing employers to point to a materially adverse harm caused by the alleged employer discrimination. But is a forced transfer of an employee to another department—with no loss of pay or rank—an “adverse employment” decision? On April 17, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in the affirmative.

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, a female police sergeant alleged she was transferred from one job to another because she is a woman, in violation of Title VII. While her rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities (moving from being a plainclothes intelligence officer to a more administrative role), perks (e.g., no longer having a take-home car), and schedule (fewer weekends off) did not. The District Court reiterated Title VII’s prohibition against basing employment decisions on a person’s gender, but further opined that because the female police sergeant did not demonstrate there was a “significant” change in working conditions producing “material employment disadvantage,” her discrimination claim failed as a matter of law. The District Court reached this conclusion because she suffered no “change in salary or rank,” and therefore, there was no harm and no foul. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, concluding that the plaintiff did not have a viable employment discrimination claim because her job transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.”

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Elena Kagan reversed the Eighth Circuit, ruling that an employee need not show “significant, serious” or “material” change in employment conditions to maintain a discrimination claim “because the text of Title VII imposes no such requirement.” More specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that there is nothing in Title VII that distinguishes “between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones.” All a plaintiff need show in a forced discriminatory transfer case is that the transfer left the employee “worse off,” but not “significantly worse” as numerous federal appellate decisions have previously held.

The Hidden Dangers: Long-Term Effects of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic brain injuries can have life-changing impacts on a person’s life, and understandably so because they result from injuries to the brain either through a massive blow to the head or injury by a penetrative object into the brain matter.

However, not all types of traumatic brain injuries have quite dramatic symptoms, and a mild TBI (traumatic brain injury) is one such injury. They result from a relatively minor blow to the head or a jerking of the head, causing injuries to the brain tissue.

While most mild TBIs resolve in a few weeks, some can affect the victim’s life in the long term.

Symptoms of a Mild TBI

If you have suffered a blow to the head in an accident, you need to pay attention to your symptoms, as it can help you identify signs of a mild TBI, also known as a concussion. Symptoms like passing out briefly, headache, memory loss, confusion, loss of balance, sensitivity to light and noise, problems keeping balance, tingling in your fingers, etc., are indicative of a concussion.

However, other injuries can present similar symptoms, so it is best to have a doctor make that determination. Also, it is important to note that concussions can go undetected for days because they tend to have delayed symptoms.

Unfortunately, taking too much time before seeking medical attention for a mild TBI can introduce treatment gaps, which can result in complications when seeking compensation for the long-term effects of a concussion. A timely hospital visit helps create a link between an accident and symptoms that could show days after the accident. Which is why personal injury lawyers always insist on seeking medical attention even when you feel okay.

Long-Term Effects of a Mild TBI

While most effects of a concussion will be gone after 90 days of suffering an accident, and this is for cases of severe injuries, there are situations where the effects of an injury can last years or a lifetime. Common long-term effects of a mild TBI on a person’s life include:

LONG-TERM MEMORY LOSS

Memory loss is pretty common after a concussion. However, it involves losing a recollection of the few minutes before and after an injury.

In some cases, the affected person can start remembering things once forgotten. However, in severe cases, memory loss can impact a person’s life in the long term.

DEPRESSION

Many people will develop symptoms of depression after a concussion, usually as a result of chemical changes resulting from the brain injury. While most symptoms will disappear as the brain recovers, some people may have to live with the symptoms for an extended period.

In some cases, symptoms of depression won’t show until some time after other symptoms are gone.

COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT

In most cases, the effect of a mild TBI on a person’s thinking and cognitive abilities resolves in a few months at most.

But there is no guarantee that your cognitive abilities will return to your pre-injury levels, especially with relatively severe concussions or injuries that went undetected for a long time.

Treatment and Support for Mild TBI

You may not need hospitalization after a TBI. Often, doctors focus on treating the symptoms and may prescribe cognitive and behavioral therapy to address the psychological and injury effects on a person’s mental well-being.

If the injuries resulted from an accident and another person’s negligence was to blame, you could consider talking to a personal injury lawyer to help recover damages.

Ninth Circuit Rules Against Apache in Dispute Over Sacred “Oak Flat” Site

On March 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sided with a lower court decision denying an Apache interest group’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the transfer of copper-rich federal land to private company Resolution Copper.

Oak Flat, a piece of land that the Ninth Circuit acknowledges is “a site of great spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians,” has been at the center of the dispute largely due to the significant copper ore deposits it sits on. Through the Land Transfer Act, Congress directed the federal government to transfer the land to Resolution Copper, which would then mine the ore. Apache Stronghold sued the government, seeking an injunction against the land transfer on the ground that the transfer would violate its members’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), and an 1852 treaty between the United States and the Apaches. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that Apache Stronghold was unlikely to succeed on the merits on any of its three claims before the court.

First, the Ninth Circuit found that under the Supreme Court’s controlling decision in Lyng. There, the Supreme Court held that while the government’s actions with respect to “publicly owned land” would “interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their religious beliefs,” it would also have no “tendency to coerce” them “into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.” The Ninth Circuit also found that the transfer of Oak Flat for mining operations did not discriminate against nor penalize Apache Stronghold’s members, nor deny them an “equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”

Second, Apache Stronghold’s claim that the transfer of Oak Flat to Resolution Copper would violate RFRA failed for the same reasons because “what counts as ‘substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion’ must be understood as subsuming, rather than abrogating, the holding of Lyng.”

Finally, the court ruled that Apache Stronghold’s claim that the transfer of Oak Flat would violate an enforceable trust obligation created by the 1852 Treaty of Sante Fe because the government’s statutory obligation to transfer Oak Flat abrogated any treaty obligation.

The case demonstrates the difficulty Tribes have in stopping major development projects on federal land on religious grounds.

PFAS MDL Settlements: Red Herrings For Downstream Companies

Leading up to the aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) MDL litigation bellwether trial in June 2023, questions circulated regularly about the end game for the water utilities that had filed lawsuits alleging PFAS contamination to drinking water. With several hundred utilities with pending lawsuits seeking the costs for technology needed to filter PFAS from drinking water, monitoring wells, testing equipment, disposal costs, etc., and potentially thousands of other water utilities with similar potential lawsuits, the damages seemed astronomical. So, too, did the amount of time it would take to litigate each case to get the water utilities monetary relief. These two competing forces, plus the pressure of an actual trial date looming, led Dupont and 3M to announce PFAS MDL settlements in June 2023. At $1.185 billion by Dupont and between $10.3 billion and $12.5 billion by 3M, with the intention of both settlement funds to resolve all pending and potential water utility claims in the United States, it seemed to many that a resolution had been achieved that would address PFAS in drinking water systems without burdening utility customers or the utilities themselves.

The issue, though, is that over 9,000 water utilities were estimated to be in need of treatment technology to meet the EPA’s newly proposed drinking water standards. The American Water Works Association (AMWA) reminded everyone that their own estimates of the costs of compliance to the EPA’s level would cost utilities over $3.2 billion annually. Even buying into the old joke that lawyers are horrible at math, it does not take long for one to realize the significant gap in the proposed settlement amounts and AMWA’s estimates. Water utilities accepting money under the Dupont and 3M settlement funds are not all going to receive 100% of the necessary funding for remediation. How then will this deficit be resolved?

Water utilities will be reluctant to pass on all of the costs to customers, although pricing increases could provide a stopgap measure for water utilities on top of the MDL settlement funds. State or even federal funding may be available under grant, loan or other programs that can also assist. However, when the dust settles, it is likely that water utilities are going to look to a particular group of parties to pursue damages from – companies that discharged PFAS into waterways that fed into the water utility facilities. Lawsuits already abound nationally filed by private citizens against such companies for property damage, bodily injury and medical monitoring. Why then would water utilities finding themselves in need of significant money to properly treat drinking water not take similar legal action? Couple this with pressure water utilities are starting to receive in the form of finding themselves sued in class action lawsuits by private citizens, and the legal notion of contribution begins to ring very true for water utilities looking to minimize their own damages in such lawsuits and find sources of funding for remediation technology.

Companies that have historically discharged effluent into waterways that feed drinking water supplies must therefore keep all of the above in mind and not be lulled into a false sense of complacency that the Dupont and 3M settlements in the MDL are going to mean the end of PFAS drinking water litigation. I predict quite the opposite.

It is of the utmost importance that businesses along the whole commerce chain that have or believe that they might have used PFAS in certain processes take steps now to understand their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate PFAS at an ever-increasing pace. Similarly, state level EPA enforcement action is increasing at a several-fold rate every year. Companies that did not manufacture PFAS, but merely utilized PFAS in their manufacturing processes, are becoming targets of costly enforcement actions at rates that continue to multiply year over year. Lawsuits are also filed monthly by citizens or municipalities against companies that are increasingly not PFAS chemical manufacturers. The only way to manage future risk is to fully understand what that risk picture looks like, and companies would be well-advised to invest in proper diligence for the PFAS risk question.

Non-Negotiable Arbitration Agreements May Be Required as a Condition of Employment

On February 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit struck down AB 51, a California statute that imposed criminal and civil penalties against employers who required employees to enter into an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, finding the statute to be an “unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 20-15291 (9th Cir. 2023).

As discussed in our prior post and articles (link here), in August 2022 the Ninth Circuit withdrew its prior decision, which had upheld portions of AB 51, following the United States Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana.

AB 51, embodied in California Labor Code §432.6 effective January 1, 2020, prohibited an employer from entering into a non-negotiable agreement that required the employee to waive “any right, forum, or procedure” for a violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act or the California Labor Code, including “the right to file and pursue a civil action.” Further, AB 51 imposed harsh penalties for employers who violated the statute, including a fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months’ imprisonment, as well as the potential for civil litigation by the State of California or by private individuals. In an effort to avoid Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws that improperly targeted arbitration agreements, the California legislature also created the confusing outcome that potentially criminalized the formation of non-negotiable arbitration agreements, but permitted their enforcement once executed.

Noting that arbitration agreements by their very nature require parties to waive their rights to bring disputes in court, and crediting the plaintiffs’ evidence that the possible imposition of civil and criminal penalties deterred employers from attempting to enter into non-negotiable agreements with employees, the court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction in favor of several trade associations and business groups who sought to block the implementation of the statute. Relying on principles of preemption and judicial precedent striking down similar state laws or judge-made rules that singled out executed arbitration agreements, the Court found AB 51 improperly “burden[s]” the formation of arbitration agreements in violation of the FAA.

Having written the previous 2-1 decision upholding AB 51, Judge Lucero now found himself dissenting. Arguing that the majority “misconstrue[d] the jurisprudence” of the Supreme Court, the dissent claimed that arbitration was permissible only if consensual and that AB 51 only applied to conduct occurring prior to the formation of the contract and thus was not an obstacle to the objectives of the FAA.

Employers may require their California employees to sign non-negotiable arbitration agreements to obtain or maintain their employment. Arbitration agreements may still be unenforceable however if they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable, if the agreement lacks mutual consent because a party was forced to sign by threats or physical coercion or “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Thus, employers should review their agreements to ensure they are in compliance with other California requirements, that the terms are not unfair or one-sided, and, the agreement presented is not unfair, surprising or oppressive.

Article By Sheryl L. Skibbe of Vedder Price

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Actual Malice in the Age of #fakenews

Public figures are fighting back against fake news.

In the most recent headline from the world of celebrity defamation cases, E. Jean Carroll is suing former President Trump for statements he made after she accused him of sexual assault. In a 2019 book and excerpt in New York magazine, Carroll, a longtime advice columnist for Elle magazine, accused Trump of sexual assault in the mid-1990s. Trump responded that Carroll was “totally lying” and not his “type.” Carroll sued Trump for defamation, claiming his statements had harmed her reputation. But Carroll—like all public figure defamation plaintiffs—has an uphill battle before her. To succeed, Carroll will have to prove that Trump’s statements were false, and—because Carroll is a public figure—she will also have to show that Trump acted with “actual malice.” The actual malice standard often proves to be too high a threshold for most public figures to cross, and most cases are lost on that prong—regardless of whether the statement was false. In fact, Johnny Depp was one of the few public figures in recent years to win a defamation suit.

So, what would it mean if the actual malice requirement was rescinded?

The seminal decision in New York Times Company v. Sullivan and its progeny are the backbone of defamation law in this country. These cases hold that public officials and public figures claiming defamation must prove that the allegedly defamatory statement was made, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” In other words, with “actual malice.” On the other hand, a private figure, or one who has not sought out the limelight, need only show the false statement was made negligently. Prior to Sullivan, all plaintiffs fell under the negligence standard.

Public figures who must meet this “actual malice” standard fall into two categories: (1) all-purpose public figures, with “pervasive fame or notoriety,” like Johnny Depp; and (2) limited-purpose public figures, like Carroll, who, in the words of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., achieve their status by “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” The Court rationalized that both categories of public figures have “invite[d] attention and comment.” Moreover, because “public figures enjoy “greater access to the channels of effective communication” than private individuals, they are better able to “contradict the lie or correct the error.”

In today’s age of social media, do these justifications still hold true? When Sullivan and its progeny came down, there was a clear delineation between public and private figures. Typically, public figures had media access, and private figures did not. Today’s social media landscape muddles that line. We are all just one post, tweet, or TikTok away from becoming public figures.

In 2019, in a case strikingly similar to Carroll’s, the Supreme Court declined to review a defamation case filed by Kathrine McKee against Bill Cosby. In 2014, McKee publicly accused Cosby of forcibly raping her 40 years earlier. In response, Cosby’s attorney authored and subsequently leaked an allegedly defamatory letter. Excerpts of the letter were disseminated via the Internet and published by news outlets around the world. McKee argued that the letter deliberately distorted her personal background to “damage her reputation for truthfulness and honesty, and further to embarrass, harass, humiliate, intimidate, and shame” her. Applying Sullivan and its progeny, the Court concluded because McKee had “‘thrust’ herself to the ‘forefront’” of the public controversy over “sexual assault allegations implicating Cosby,” she was a “limited-purpose public figure” who needed to show actual malice—regardless of whether the statements about her were false.

In a lone dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas noted that “in an appropriate case, [the Court] should reconsider the precedents” requiring public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard. Justice Thomas later double-downed on his proffer in his dissents in Berisha v. Lawson, and most recently in Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Southern Poverty Law Center. In Berisha, pointing to the shift in the media landscape since Sullivan, Justice Neil Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas in calling to review the Sullivan decision, noting our new media world “facilitates the spread of disinformation.”

According to these Justices, in recent years Sullivan has become less of a shield and more of a sword. The “actual malice” standard allows spreaders of conspiracy theories, false accusations, and fake news to be virtually untouchable. In an era where misinformation spreads like wildfire, has the actual malice standard allowed journalists to become sloppy and irresponsible? Under this legal standard a journalist is better off printing a story without fact-checking. In fact, failing to thoroughly investigate, standing alone, does not prove actual malice. If the Court abolished that standard, public figures would be like every other defamation plaintiff and would only need to show that the false statement was made carelessly. In other words, instead of the defendant knowingly printing misinformation, a plaintiff would only need to show that the defendant didn’t bother checking if the information was true or false before making it.

Under this precedent, for years reporters, and individuals alike have been shielded from consequences of publishing falsehoods about public figures. Removing the “actual malice” standard would have sweeping effects on journalists and news platforms, and would make reputable news organizations more vulnerable to attack and open to further scrutiny. But responsible journalists would still remain protected. Truth remains an absolute defense to a defamation claim.

Between 2018 and 2020 the number of defamation suits filed increased by 30%. With “fake news” on the rise, more individuals falling into the “public figure” category, and technology moving at warp speed, the Court may have no choice but to rethink Sullivan. While it is unlikely that that 50 years of settled precedent would be overturned, Sullivan just might, at the very least, be revisited.

Article By Melissa Sarsten Polito of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more litigation and legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Supreme Court Questions Whether Highly Compensated Oil Rig Worker Is Overtime Exempt

On October 12, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments in a case regarding whether an oil rig worker who performed supervisory duties and was paid more than $200,000 per year on a day rate basis is exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The case is especially significant for employers that pay exempt employees on a day rate. It could have a major impact on the oil and gas industry in the way that it recruits, staffs, and compensates employees who work on offshore oil rigs and at remote oil and gas work sites. In addition, depending on how the Supreme Court rules, its decision could have much broader implications.

During the arguments in Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, the justices questioned whether, despite the employee’s high earnings, he was eligible for overtime compensation because he was paid by the day and not on a weekly salary basis. There is no express statutory requirement that an employee be paid on a “salary basis” to be exempt from overtime requirements, but such a requirement has long been included in the regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) applicable to the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions. Notably, Justice Brett Kavanaugh suggested during the arguments that the regulations may be in conflict with the text of FLSA, although Helix did not raise this issue in its petition for certiorari.

Background

The case involves an oil rig “toolpusher,” an oilfield term for a rig or worksite supervisor, who managed twelve to fourteen other employees, was paid a daily rate of $963, and earned more than $200,000 annually. Between December 2014 and August 2017, when Michael Hewitt was discharged for performance reasons, he worked twenty-eight-day “hitches” on an offshore oil rig where he would work twelve-hour shifts each day, sometimes working eighty-four hours in a week. After his discharge, Hewitt filed suit alleging that he was improperly classified as exempt and therefore was entitled to overtime pay. The district court ruled in favor of Helix.

In September 2021, a divided (12-6) en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Hewitt was not exempt from the FLSA because his payment on a day-rate basis did “not constitute payment on a salary basis” for purposes of the highly compensated employee (HCE) exemption that is found in the FLSA regulations.

The Fifth Circuit further concluded that the employer’s day-rate pay plan did not qualify as the equivalent of payment on a salary basis under another FLSA regulation because the guaranteed pay for any workweek did not have “a reasonable relationship” to the total income earned. In other words, the court found that the employee was not exempt because the $963 he earned per day was not reasonably related to the $3,846 the employee earned on average each week.

Oral Arguments

Oral arguments at the Supreme Court focused on the interplay between the DOL’s HCE regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.601, and another DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b), which states that an employer will not violate the salary basis requirement under certain limited circumstances even if the employee’s earnings are computed on an hourly, daily, or shift basis.

At the time of Hewitt’s employment, the HCE exemption required an employee to be paid at least $455 per week on a “salary or fee basis” and to earn at least $100,000 in total annual compensation. Those threshold amounts have since been increased to $684 per week and $107,432 per year.

The other regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b), states that an employee whose earnings are “computed on an hourly, a daily or a shift basis” may still be classified as exempt if the “employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly required amount paid on a salary basis regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked, and a reasonable relationship exists between the guaranteed amount and the amount actually earned. The reasonable relationship test will be met if the weekly guarantee is roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual earnings at the assigned hourly, daily, or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled workweek.”

Hewitt earned double the minimum total compensation level for the HCE exemption. Since the minimum salary level for the exemption was only $455 per week, and Hewitt was guaranteed that he would be paid at least $963 per week for each week he worked at least one day, Helix argued that he was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements because the HCE exemption was completely self-contained and to be applied without regard to other regulations, including the “salary basis” test and the minimum guarantee regulation. Hewitt argued that the HCE exemption required compliance with either the “salary basis” test or the minimum guarantee regulation since he was admittedly paid on a day rate basis.

However, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson suggested that it was not that simple. Justice Jackson said the question of salary basis is more about the “predictability and regularity of the payment” for each workweek. “What he has to know is how much is coming in at a regular clip so that he can get a babysitter, so that he can hire a nanny, so that he can pay his mortgage,” Justice Jackson stated. Justice Jackson echoed the language of the salary basis test requiring that an exempt employee be paid a predetermined amount for any week in which she performed any work.

Similarly, Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked Helix, “so what you’re asking us to do is take an hourly wage earner and take them out of 604, which is the only provision that deals with someone who’s not paid on a salary basis.” Justice Sotomayor additionally raised the FLSA’s goal of “preventing overwork and the dangers of overwork.”

In contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that Hewitt’s high annual compensation relative to the average worker is a strong indication that he was paid on a salary basis and should be exempt. “The difficulty is just, for the average person looking at it, when someone makes over $200,000 a year, they normally think of that as an indication that it’s a salary,” Justice Thomas stated.

Justice Kavanaugh asked if the issue of whether the DOL regulations conflict with the FLSA is being litigated in the courts. He said, “it seems a pretty easy argument to say, oh, by the way, or maybe, oh, let’s start with the fact that the regs [sic] are inconsistent with the statute and the regs [sic] are, therefore, just invalid across the board to the extent they refer to salary.” He further stated, “if the statutory argument is not here, I’m sure someone’s going to raise it because it’s strong.”

Key Takeaways

It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will rule in this case. A decision that requires strict adherence to the regulation’s reasonable relationship test, even when the minimum daily pay far exceeds the minimum weekly salary threshold, would have a significant negative impact on the manner in which certain industries compensate their workers. It also could lead to even more litigation by highly compensated employees, many of whom make more money without receiving overtime pay than what many people who currently are paid overtime compensation make.

Depending upon its breadth, a decision that the regulations are in conflict with the statutory text of the FLSA could provide a roadmap for additional challenges to other parts of the regulations. This could have a wide-ranging impact, as the DOL currently is in the process of preparing a proposal to revise its FLSA regulations. Then again, if a future litigant takes up Justice Kavanaugh’s invitation to challenge whether the salary regulations are overbroad compared to the language of the FLSA, the current effort to revise the regulations regarding exemptions for executive, administrative, and professional employees may be moot.

Article By Andrew P. Burnside, Steven F. Pockrass, and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

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Wendy’s E. Coli Outbreak Lawsuits

Health Department officials are investigating over one hundred cases of E. coli poisoning in Michigan, Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania. People have been diagnosed with food poisoning in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. The majority of these people claim that they ate sandwiches topped with lettuce at a Wendy’s Restaurant within the week before their food poisoning diagnosis.

Public health officials in Michigan have confirmed 43 cases of E. Coli that match the strain in a multi-state outbreak. A number of similar cases have been identified in Ohio. The specific source of the food poisoning has not been officially determined, but one possible source is romaine lettuce used to top hamburgers and sandwiches at Wendy’s restaurants.

The illness onset dates range from late July through early August 2022. The sickness and harm have ranged from mild to very severe. Many victims have required extensive hospitalization and medical care. Four cases of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) have been diagnosed and suspected to be related to the contaminated lettuce at Wendy’s Restaurants.

E. Coli outbreak cases have been reported in the following counties: Allegan, Branch,Clinton, Genesee, Gratiot, Jackson, Kent, Macomb, Midland, Monroe, Muskegon, Oakland, Ogemaw, Ottawa, Saginaw, Washtenaw, and Wayne and the City of Detroit. Public health departments in those counties are closely monitoring patients and working hard to determine the source of the poisoning.

E. coli is a bacterium that lives in the digestive tracks of animals and humans. Most varieties are harmless, but some can cause severe illness. Common sources of E. coli include:

Raw milk or dairy products that are not pasteurized.
Raw fruits or vegetables, such as lettuce, that have come into contact with infected animal feces.

Symptoms of E. Coli poisoning are very serious. They include severe stomach cramps, diarrhea, and vomiting. Some people experience high fevers and many develop life-threatening conditions.

E. coli infections often require hospitalization and expensive medical care, the damages from this food poisoning can be extensive.

The Wendy’s food poisoning claims are just at their initial stages. Very few lawsuits have been filed to date, but it is expected dozens will be filed in courthouses shortly. At this time, there are no reported Wendy’s food poisoning settlements.

In general, food poisoning settlements include money payment for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the physical injuries caused by the food contamination. In addition, claims for economic losses and damages are also demanded in a food poisoning lawsuit. These are financial losses and include payment of medical bills and expenses, as well as lost wages and income resulted from missed time at work.

If you ate food at a Wendy’s Restaurant that contained romaine lettuce in July or August and were diagnosed or hospitalized with E. coli poisoning, you may benefit from speaking to a food poisoning attorney.

Article By Lawrence J. Buckfire of Buckfire Law

For more personal injury legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Buckfire & Buckfire, P.C. 2022

The Supreme Court Is Poised to Weigh in on a False Claims Act Circuit Split

Three pending petitions for writ of certiorari have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to the pleading standard for False Claims Act (“FCA”) whistleblower claims.

The FCA creates a right of action whereby either the government or private individuals can bring lawsuits against actors who have defrauded the government. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. Under the FCA, a private citizen can act as a “relator” and bring an action on behalf of the government in what is known as a qui tam suit. The government can elect to intervene, which means participate, in the suit; if it does not, the relator can continue to litigate the case without the direct participation of the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Private individuals can receive a portion of the action’s proceeds or settlement amount. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).

The petitions ask the Court to clarify the level of particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”) to plead a claim under the FCA. Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs alleging “fraud or mistake” to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”

Johnson v. Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care LLC, Case No. 21-462

In their petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioners in Johnson asked the Supreme Court to take up the issue of whether Rule 9(b) requires FCA plaintiffs “who plead a fraudulent scheme with particularity to also plead specific details of false claims.” The Eleventh Circuit earlier affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an FCA claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to plead “specific details about the submission of an actual false claim” to the government. Estate of Helmly v. Bethany Hospice & Palliative Care of Coastal Georgia, LLC, 853 F. App’x 496, 502-03 (11th Cir. 2021).

In particular, the relators alleged that several doctors purchased ownership interests in Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care, LLC (“Bethany Hospice”) and were allocated kickbacks for patient referrals through a combination of salary, dividends, and/or bonus payments. Id. at 498. Among other allegations, the complaint alleged that both the relators had access to Bethany Hospice’s billing systems, and, based on their review of those systems and conversations with other employees, were able to confirm that Bethany Hospital submitted false claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement to the government. Id. at 502.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the allegations were “insufficient” under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for fraud cases. Id. Even though the relators alleged direct knowledge of Bethany Hospice’s billing and patient records, their failure to provide “specific details” regarding the dates of the claims, the frequency with which Bethany Hospice submitted those claims, the amounts of the claims, or the patients whose treatment formed the basis of the claims defeated their FCA claim. Id. In addition, the relators did not personally participate or directly witness the submission of any false claims. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also found unpersuasive the relators’ argument that Bethany Hospice derived nearly all its business from Medicare patients, therefore making it plausible that it had submitted false claims to the government. Id. “Whether a defendant bills the government for some or most of its services,” the Eleventh Circuit stated, “the burden remains on a relator alleging the submission of a false claim to allege specific details about false claims to establish the indicia of reliability necessary under Rule 9(b).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the relators did not do so here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case.

United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., Case No. 21-936

The Sixth Circuit took a similarly hardline approach in United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., 16 F.4th 192 (6th Cir. 2021), ruling in favor of a strict interpretation of Rule 9(b). The petition for a writ of certiorari in Owsley asks the Court to take up the same question as in Johnson.

In Owsley, the relator alleged that her employer used fraudulently altered data to make its patient populations seem sicker than they actually were in order to increase Medicare payments received from the government. Id. at 195. The complaint “describe[d] in detail, a fraudulent scheme,” and alleged “personal knowledge of the billing practices employed in the fraudulent scheme.” Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Sixth Circuit ruled that these allegations were not enough under Rule 9(b). Instead, to bring a viable FCA claim, a relator’s complaint must identify “at least one false claim with specificity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A relator can do that in one of two ways: first, by identifying a representative claim actually submitted to the government; or second, by alleging facts “based on personal knowledge of billing practices” that support a strong inference that the defendant submitted “particular identified claims” to the government. Id. (emphasis in original). Here, though the relator alleged specific instances of fraudulent data – such as upcoding a patient with a leg ulcer to include a malignant cancer diagnosis – she did not identify particular claims submitted to the government. Id. at 197. “[T]he touchstone is whether the complaint provides the defendant with notice of a specific representative claim that the plaintiff thinks was fraudulent.” Id. The Owsley relator, the court held, failed to meet that critical touchstone.

Molina Healthcare v. Prose, Case No. 21-1145

The Seventh Circuit adopted a more flexible pleading standard in United States v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., 17 F.4th 732 (7th Cir. 2021). As in Johnson and Owsley, the petition for a writ of certiorari asks the Court to weigh in on the Rule 9(b) standard under the FCA. It also presents an additional question about the requirements for an FCA claim under the implied false certification theory.

In Molina Healthcare, the relator brought an FCA claim against Molina Healthcare (“Molina”) for violating certain requirements of its Medicaid contract. The relator alleged that Molina, which had previously subcontracted with another entity for the provision of certain nursing home services, continued to collect payment for those services from the government even though it no longer provided them. Molina Healthcare, 17 F.4th at 736. Molina Healthcare received fixed payments from the government for different categories of patients. It received the highest per capita payment for patients in nursing facilities: $3,180.30. Id. at 737-38. The relator alleged that Molina Healthcare knowingly continued to collect this rate from the government when it no longer provided a key service to nursing home patients. Id.

The relator brought an FCA claim against Molina based on three theories of liability: (1) factual falsity (i.e., presenting a facially false claim to the government); (2) fraud in the inducement (i.e., misrepresenting compliance with a payment condition “in order to induce the government to enter the contract”); and (3) implied false certification (i.e., presenting a false claim with the “omission of key facts” instead of “affirmative misrepresentations”). Id. at 740-741.

The Seventh Circuit held that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirement under all three theories. First, as to factual falsity, the Court found that the relator provided sufficient information as to the “when, where, how, and to whom” Molina made the allegedly false representations. Id. at 741. Though the relator did not have access to the defendant’s files, the information he provided “support[ed] the inference” that Molina had submitted false claims to the government. Id. Second, as to fraud in the inducement, the Seventh Circuit found that the relator’s “precise allegations” regarding “the beneficiaries, the time period, the mechanism for fraud, and the financial consequences” again satisfied Rule 9(b)’s standard. Id. at 741. The complaint also included details about Molina’s chief operating officer’s statements that indicated that Molina “never intended to perform the promised act that induced the government to enter the contract.” Id. at 741-42. Third, as to the implied false certification theory, the court found that the plaintiff adequately alleged that Molina knowingly omitted key material facts while submitting claims to the government. Id. at 743-44.

The Supreme Court Invites Comment from the Solicitor General

Facing what appears to be a major circuit split, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the views of the United States” in Johnson in January 2022 and in Owsley in May 2022.

The Supreme Court invites the Solicitor General to comment on only a handful of the approximately 7,000 to 8,000 petitions for writ of certiorari that the Court receives in a year. In the 2021 Term, for example, the Solicitor General filed what it calls a “Petition Stage Amicus Brief” in only 19 cases. Four Justices must vote to issue an invitation to the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General’s view on whether the Court should grant certiorari has often been extremely influential. In the 2007 Term, for example, the Court denied certiorari in every case in which the Solicitor General recommended that approach. By contrast, it granted certiorari in 11 out of the 12 cases in which the Solicitor General recommended a grant. More recent data confirm that the Solicitor General’s recommendations as to whether the Court should grant certiorari remain highly influential. One study found that between May 2016 and May 2017, the Supreme Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommended approach in 23 cases (85%). At the same time, even the act of requesting the views of the Solicitor General dramatically increases the chances that the Court will take up a case. For example, between the 1998 Term and 2004 Term, one study found that the Court was 37 times more likely to grant certiorari in cases where it had invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief.

The Solicitor General Urges the Court to Decline Review

On May 24, 2022, the Solicitor General filed its brief in Johnson; it has yet to comment on Owsley. The Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Johnson urges the Court to deny certiorari. The Solicitor General notes that certiorari might be warranted if the courts of appeals applied a rigid, per se rule that required relators to plead “specific details of false claims.” But instead, the brief argues that the courts of appeals have “largely converged” on an approach to FCA pleading requirements that allows relators “either to identify specific false claims or to plead other sufficiently reliable indicia” to support a “strong inference” that the defendant submitted false claims to the government. According to the Solicitor General, the “divergent outcomes” among the circuit courts are merely the result of those courts’ application of a “fact-intensive standard” to various distinct allegations.

The petitioners in Johnson filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s views. They argue that the Solicitor General misinterpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s pleading standard, which effectively requires a relator to allege specific details about false claims to survive a motion to dismiss. In other words, the petitioners argue that in the Eleventh Circuit, the Solicitor General’s “purported” rule that a relator can either allege details about specific false claims or identify reliable indica that false claims were presented are “one and the same.”

Though the Court did not invite the Solicitor General to comment in Molina Healthcare, the petitioners in that case also filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s amicus in Johnson. “Everyone but the Solicitor General agrees that the circuits are hopelessly divided over whether Rule 9(b) requires a relator to plead details of false claims,” the brief argues. The brief notes that the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits do not require plaintiffs to plead specific details of actual false claims; by contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require relators to plead specific details. Accordingly, the brief urges the Supreme Court to resolve the “widely acknowledged circuit split” over Rule 9(b)’s pleading standards.

The Solicitor General has a history of urging the Court to reject certiorari in FCA cases. According to the petitioners’ supplemental brief in Molina Healthcare, since the 1996 Term, the Solicitor General has recommended against review in eleven out of the twelve FCA cases in which the Court invited the Solicitor General’s views. Still, the Court granted certiorari in three of the cases in which the Solicitor General recommended against review.

Given the Supreme Court’s apparent interest in the FCA pleading standard – as evidenced by its calls for the Solicitor General’s views in Johnson and Owsley – there is a chance that it will grant certiorari in at least one of the three cases pending before it. Depending on when the Solicitor General weighs in, the Court may decide to grant certiorari in the fall of 2022.

Any Supreme Court decision that clarifies the pleading standard for FCA cases will likely affect a relator’s ability to successfully litigate qui tam actions in which the government does not intervene more than in cases in which the government does intervene. When a relator files a qui tam action, the government investigates the alleged fraud. If it intervenes in that action, it can file a complaint to include evidence it has discovered in that investigation, allowing it to meet the more stringent version of the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. Relators, however, often do not have access to the same evidence that the government does, such as specific claims data, making it far harder for a relator to meet the more stringent version of pleading standard.

Until the Supreme Court decides to weigh in, qui tam relators will continue to have an easier time satisfying the requirements of Rule 9(b) in those circuits with relaxed pleading standards. In the meantime, and whether the Court takes one of these petitions or not, any FCA whistleblower should seek legal counsel to help her identify the type of factual information that would meet the pleading requirements of the courts that apply a strict pleading requirement.

Article By Kayla Morin of Katz Banks Kumin LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Supreme Court’s Decision In Famous Hale & Norcross Mining Case

Having read Professor Stephen Bainbridge‘s post about the origins of the judicial doctrine that directors must act on an informed basis, I passed along a reference to the California Supreme Court’s in Fox v. Hale & Norcross Silver Mining Co., 108 Cal. 369, 41 P. 308 (1895). The Hale and Norcross mine was a famous silver and gold mine in Nevada’s Comstock mining district. Samuel Clemens (aka Mark Twain), who had worked in Virginia City, Nevada, even bought shares in the mine on margin, as he related in Chapter 15 of his autobiography:

“One day I got a tip from Mr. Camp, a bold man who was always making big fortunes in ingenious speculations and losing them again in the course of six months by other speculative ingenuities. Camp told me to buy some shares in the Hale and Norcross. I bought fifty shares at three hundred dollars a share. I bought on a margin, and put up twenty per cent. It exhausted my funds. I wrote Orion [his brother and the first and only Secretary of the Nevada Territory] and offered him half, and asked him to send his share of the money. I waited and waited. He wrote and said he was going to attend to it. The stock went along up pretty briskly. It went higher and higher. It reached a thousand dollars a share. It climbed to two thousand, then to three thousand; then to twice that figure. The money did not come, but I was not disturbed. By and by that stock took a turn and began to gallop down. Then I wrote urgently. Orion answered that he had sent the money long ago–said he had sent it to the Occidental Hotel. I inquired for it. They said it was not there. To cut a long story short, that stock went on down until it fell below the price I had paid for it. Then it began to eat up the margin, and when at last I got out I was very badly crippled.”

Samuel Clemens disappointing investment predated by a number of years the litigation that resulted in the California Supreme Court’s opinion.

The Hale and Norcross mine was located in Nevada, but the corporation that owned it was incorporated in California. That is why the shareholders sued the directors in the Golden, rather than the Silver, state. The Supreme Court’s decision was big news. The day after the decision was issued, The San Francisco Call published this lengthy article that not only described the case, but also published the decision itself and a drawing of the plaintiff, M.W. Fox.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more Supreme Court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Tag: lawsuit

U.S. Supreme Court: Forced Transfers of Employees Without Loss of Pay or Rank Violate Title VII

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