Football and Antitrust Law: American Needle v. NFL and It's Meaning for Combinations in Restraint of Trade and the Rule of Reason in the 21st Century

Posted in the National Law Review on November 30th an article by the  Winner Winter 2011 Student Legal Writing Contest, Michael Sabino of Brooklyn Law School regarding  the commonality of antitrust law and the NFL:

 

NFL football.  And antitrust law.  What, if anything, do they have in common?  A great many things, one might say.  Both conjure up images of powerful contestants vying for control on the field of play.  Each participant utilizing its skills, its knowledge, and its intuition to gain an edge and dominate the game.  Competition in its purest form.  Unless somebody cheats, of course.

But rules —- that is why we must have rules.  Otherwise competition descends into chaos, battle descends into barbarism, and injuries inevitably follow.  Football, for all its controlled violence, has rules that must be followed.

In the realm of business, and the controlled violence we call “competition,” antitrust law provides these rules, in large part to keep the game fair and provide the proverbial level playing field.  Thus, even from this small comparison, we can see that professional football and antitrust law have something in common, after all.[1]

Now add to the aforementioned confluences the recent Supreme Court decision inAmerican Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, et al.,[2] where the underdog, a maker of sporting apparel, decided to challenge on antitrust grounds the loss of its right to manufacture league-sanctioned hats and headwear.  Given that the high Court’s decision lacked finality, this case has not yet reached the level of a Super Bowl victory.  Nonetheless, it is akin to a playoff win that well positions the upstart hatmaker on the road to a possible upset win over what is arguably America’s best organized and most formidable sports league.

The first half of this Article will introduce, in pertinent part, the essentials of antitrust law relevant to understanding the Supreme Court’s decision, including a brief overview of the preceding landmarks that formed the basis of the Justices’ ultimate ruling.

The second half of the Article shall be devoted to the actual “play by play” of the Court’s decision, and how it was arrived at.  And just like any given Sunday, the conclusion will mimic a postgame report as to what this decision means, and where do the contestants go from here.  But far more important, a forecast for what American Needle means, for the business of sports other than football, and the business of business itself, shall be the coda.  That said, it is time for the kick off.

I.

ANTITRUST LAW – THE BASICS

Antitrust law did not evolve in a vacuum.  Quite to the contrary, it is deeply entwined with American history, its roots going back to the progressive President Theodore Roosevelt, and his goal of stamping out or at least curtailing the monopolistic business practices that so dominated late-Nineteenth Century America.[3]

Antitrust law in the United States essentially begins with the Sherman Act, promulgated in 1890.[4]  The Sherman Act was intended to be a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition” by assuring that natural competitive forces interact freely, without manipulation or restraint.[5]

The Supreme Court has been steadfast in regarding the Sherman Act as akin to a common law statute, and, in interpreting that body of law, the federal courts act more as common law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute.  This is so the antitrust law “adapts to modern understanding and greater experience… to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”[6]

Its three foremost weapons against restraint of trade are firstly Sections 1 and 2 thereof.  Section 1 explicitly prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” [7]  Section 2, in turn, makes illegal any monopoly or attempt to monopolize.[8] But the true weapon of mass destruction found in the antitrust arsenal is the provision for an award of treble damages to prevailing private plaintiffs.[9]  Since the singular focus of this Article is Section 1, as exposited by American Needle, henceforth the following analysis shall be limited to that statutory prohibition.

It is essential to remember that the Sherman Act “prohibit[s] only unreasonable restraints of trade.” [10]  It is axiomatic that Section 1 outlaws “only restraints affected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy.”[11]

To be certain, Section 1 liability has been limited to concerted conduct for nearly a century.[12]  Therefore, it maintains a fundamental distinction between concerted and independent action.[13]  The penultimate question is then whether allegedly anticompetitive conduct stems from independent decisions or from an agreement between otherwise distinct actors.[14]

The federal courts have judiciously employed Section 1 to condemn business combinations or more nefarious conspiracies that unlawfully restrain competition.[15]  Basic prudential concerns relevant to Section 1 enforcement are premised upon the reality that exclusive contracts are commonplace, and therefore any firm with a modicum of market power that enters into such an exclusionary accord risks an antitrust suit.  The unacceptable and unjustified risk of such a litigious free-for-all must be counterbalanced against the real need to ensure vigorous and freely competitive markets via judicious and rational enforcement of  the provisos of Section 1.[16]

For these reasons, combinations such as joint ventures have always been adjudged under the Rule of Reason.[17]  As we shall see below, the Rule of Reason has assured the sensible enforcement and adjudication of the antitrust laws for over a century now.

An icon of antitrust law, historically as well as jurisprudentially, is of course Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.[18]  Ironically for this Article, we cite this case nearly on the day of its centennial.  And as well discussed in the last one hundred years, Standard Oil caused the breakup of the insidious Rockefeller oil monopoly, only in recent decades to see the once independent “Seven Sisters” turn back the clock via merging into the handful of “supermajor” oil companies left on the American scene.[19]

In pertinent part, the legal truisms of Standard Oil are easily related to Section 1 enforcement.  The Justices of that era declared that the statute “should be construed in the light of reason.”[20]  To be certain, said the high Court, Section 1 is not aimed to interrupt all collaboration in business; rather, its explicit and rightful goal is to protect the free flow of commerce “from contracts or combinations… which would constitute an interference with, or an undue restraint upon [commerce].”[21]  And to achieve a just and sensible result when enforcing the statute, Standard Oil decreed that “the standard of reason which had been applied at common law should be applied in determining whether particular acts [are] within its prohibitions.”[22]

Not surprisingly, such fidelity to reason extends to the remedies to be accorded when Section 1 is violated.  As characterized by the Standard Oil Court a hundred years ago, the specific remedy to an unlawful combination is two-fold: first, enjoin the continuation of the offending behavior; and two, abolish the combination or conspiracy, so as to rob it of its unlawful power.[23]  In dispensing this remedy, the Supreme Court cautioned, courts must consider the actual results of their decrees, and therefore refrain from inflicting serious injury on the public by a needless and deleterious interference with commerce.[24]

And in a final, precautionary reminder, Standard Oil confirms that the objective of American antitrust law is never to deprive business of the power and the right to make “normal and lawful contracts,” but instead solely to restrain malefactors from engaging in illegal combination or conspiracies aimed at the unlawful restraint of trade.[25]

In closing out this section of our discussion, it is only appropriate to end with a final word on The Rule of Reason from the legendary Justice Brandeis, who provided the classic formulation of the Rule of Reason in Chicago Board of Trade:[26]

The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.  To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.[27]

The foregoing primer on antitrust law now concluded, we can turn to the actual Supreme Court decision in American Needle, and how it represents the newest landmark in this important, century-old field of law.

II.

GAME TIME: AMERICAN NEEDLE VS. THE NFL

At the time of this writing, American Needle has attained outsized prominence, partly for reasons we shall discuss below.  Much of that has to do with the prime defendant, the NFL.  And given the enormous popularity of professional football in the United States today, only a brief exposition of the relevant facts is necessary.

The National Football League (“NFL”) includes 32 separately owned professional football teams, each with its own distinctive names, colors and logos, as well known to millions of fans.[28]  In 1963, the constituent clubs organized National Football League Properties (“NFLP”), an unincorporated entity, to develop, license, and market their intellectual property.  From its inception until 2000, NFLP granted nonexclusive licenses to a number of vendors, permitting them to manufacture and sell apparel adorned with team logos.[29]  American Needle was one of those licensees.[30]

All this changed at the end of 2000, when the teams voted to authorize NFLP to enter into exclusive licenses, and NFLP then granted such an exclusive deal for 10 years to Reebok International Ltd.  Reebok now had the sole right to manufacture and sell trademarked headwear for all 32 NFL teams.  As a direct consequence, NFLP did not renew American Needle’s nonexclusive license.[31]

Understandably chagrined, American Needle filed an antitrust action against the NFL and others, alleging that the exclusive contracts violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.[32]  As their key defense, the NFL, the teams, and NFLP replied that they constituted a single economic enterprise, and therefore were incapable of conspiring to restrain trade within the meaning of Section 1.[33]

On this singular question, the district court sided with the league, concluding that the NFL and its constituent members comprised a single entity.[34]  The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding, inter alia, that football can only be carried out jointly, and the league can function only as one source of economic power when presenting NFL football.[35]   But it was not “game over” just yet.  Certiorari was granted,[36] and the matter came before the high Court.

Delivering the final opinion of his storied career, Justice John Paul Stevens[37] began by reciting the language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in that every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal under American antitrust law.[38]  But the first question to be asked is “whether an arrangement is a contract, combination, or conspiracy” before inquiring if it unreasonably restrains trade.[39]

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens framed the precise issue here as that “antecedent question” in relation to the NFL and its formation of NFLP to manage its intellectual property.[40]  Wasting no time, the Supreme Court declared that the league’s action “is not categorically beyond the coverage of [Section] 1,” and the legality — or lack thereof — “must be judged under the Rule of Reason.”[41]

Having posited and then answered the question before it in such a delimited fashion, the Court confirmed that it had but one, narrow issue to adjudicate; whether the NFL and its affiliates were a single enterprise or, conversely, were independent actors capable of contracting, combing or conspiring in restraint of trade, as such activity is defined by the Sherman Act.[42]

Invoking the hallowed distinction the Sherman Act makes between Sections 1 and 2, the Court reminds that the former only applies to concerted action that restraints trade.  In contradistinction, the latter covers both concerted and independent action, but only if that action monopolizes or threatens to monopolize, by definition a narrower category than restraint of trade.[43]

In the high Court’s view, this stricter oversight for concerted behavior is rooted in Congress’ recognition that joint action is inherently fraught with anticompetitive risk.[44]  Moreover, since concerted action is but a “discrete and distinct” category of endeavor, restricting that segment only leaves unmolested “a vast amount of business conduct.”[45]

Thus, opined Justice Stevens, action done in concert is easier to examine, and easier to remedy.  Indeed, the high Court has judged collaborative action much more harshly.[46]  But of course the inquiry must be made as to whether the actors are in fact working in concert, and to that the Court now turned.[47]

To find concerted action “does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct entities.”[48]  Justice Stevens set out the Court’s long held view disregarding overly formalistic distinctions, instead relying upon “a functional consideration of how the parties … actually operate.”[49]  Mere labels do not persuade, said the learned Justice, but the reality of identities can and should motivate the Court’s deliberations.[50]

Therefore, business organizations that hold themselves out as formally distinct actors can still be encompassed by Section 1’s oversight.[51]  It is the rule, posited Justice Stevens, rather than the exception, for the Court to look beyond the form of a purported single entity when nominal competitors come together to form professional organizations or trade groups.[52]

Function rules over form, declared Justice Stevens, and a functional analysis is justified by the Sherman Act’s goal of regulating substance, unswayed by mere formalisms.[53]  Calling upon the landmark of Copperweld, the American NeedleCourt adhered to the axiom of substance over form in determining if an entity is capable of conspiring pursuant to Section 1.[54]

Justice Stevens found it a misconception to describe such an inquiry as simply asking if the alleged malefactors are a single entity.  No one merely asks if it “seems” like the parties are one or independent in any metaphysical sense, observed the Court.[55]  “The key,” according to Justice Stevens, is whether the concerted action “joins together separate decision makers.”[56]

Putting a finer point upon the inquiry is to ask if there is a contract, combination or conspiracy amongst individual economic units who would normally be pursuing individual economic interests.[57]  If the accord between these entities deprives the marketplace of independent decisionmaking and chills the diversity of separate entrepreneurial interests, then it is violative of the antitrust law.[58]

Summarizing this portion of the opinion, the high Court emphasized that “the inquiry is one of competitive reality,” and not artificial formalisms.[59]  The conjoining of formerly legally distinct entities under a single label is not a bulwark against appropriate inquiry.[60]

The paramount question, declared American Needle, is whether the former independence of once distinct centers of decisionmaking is compromised into something lacking the normal vigor of competitive business.[61]  If so, the actors so united now have the capability to conspire in violation of Section 1, and it is then appropriate for courts to decide “whether the restraint of trade is an unreasonable and therefore illegal one.”[62]

Against these rubrics, the Justices now turned to the controversy before them.  Without equivocation or apology, the unanimous Court found that “[d]irectly relevant to the case, the [NFL] teams compete in the market for intellectual property.”[63]  Whenever each team licenses its valuable logos and trademarks, it is not acting for the league’s greater good.  Quite to the contrary, each franchise is motivated solely by its own corporate aims to enhance individual wealth.[64]

With a reference specific to the case at bar, here American Needle’s disenfranchisement from the lucrative ballcap manufacturing trade, Justice Stevens invoked the imagery of the then-reigning Super Bowl contestants.  “[T]he [New Orleans] Saints and the [Indianapolis] Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable trademark…. [t]o a firm making hats.”[65]  In making business decisions as to who to grant such remunerative licenses to, each club is an independent economic entity pursuing individual economic interests.  A fortiori, each team is capable of making independent business decisions.[66]

Therefore, from all this the Court reached the inescapable conclusion that “[d]ecisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks collectivelyand to only one vendor … depriv[e] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.”[67]

In this context, the high Court made short shrift of the NFL’s defense that, by incorporating NFLP as a single entity to market the entirety of the league’s intellectual property as a unitary whole, the actors escaped antitrust scrutiny.  It is not dispositive, opined Justice Stevens, that those competitors on the field of play combined on the field of business to organize a fresh legal entity to market their valuable logos and colors.[68]

“An ongoing [Section] 1 violation cannot evade [Section] 1 scrutiny simply by giving the ongoing violation a name and label,” said the Court.”[69]  Indeed, in once again declaring that in antitrust cases form can never subdue substance, the Justices remind in one voice that condoning such facile labeling could condemn antitrust law to impotence.[70]

To be sure, the high Court acknowledged that “NFL teams have common interests” in promoting the league as a unified brand.  Nevertheless, the clubs “are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.”[71]

Justice Stevens went on to characterize the teams’ common interests in the league’s brand as a partial unification of their separate economic agendas, “but the teams still have distinct, potentially competing interests.”[72]  And therein lies the danger, heldAmerican Needle, for reason that “illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to the restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.”[73]  Such harm to others is precisely what the antitrust law is designed to prohibit.[74]

The Supreme Court continued by taking up the Seventh Circuit’s view that “without [the teams’] cooperation, there would be no NFL football.”[75]  The high Court acknowledged this element of the league’s defense, duly noted that some degree of collective action is inherent to the NFL’s business, as well as in taking the field of play.  Nonetheless, the Justices found the appellate tribunal’s reasoning unpersuasive.[76]

Here Justice Stevens coined an analogy sure to be enshrined in the pantheon of antitrust jurisprudence.  The learned justice posited that “a nut and bolt can only operate together, but an agreement between nut and bolt manufacturers is still subject to [Section] 1 analysis.”[77]  Wisdom for the ages, to be sure.  Thus,American Needle declared unequivocally that while the teams may work in unison in some sense, they are surely not immune from antitrust scrutiny when they do collaborate economically.[78]

Given this conclusion, it was but a short step for the high Court to likewise declare NFLP subject to inquiry pursuant to Section 1, “at least with regards to its marketing of property owned by the separate teams.”  The Justices based that holding upon the fact that the promotional entity’s licensing decisions are made by 32 potential competitors, each of which is the actual owner of its share of this jointly managed intellectual property.[79]

Decisive here, indicated the Court, is that if NFLP had never been created, “there would be nothing to prevent each of the teams from making its own market decisions” with regard to their trademarked apparel businesses.[80]

From this analysis of what the licensing entity is capable of (and, conversely, what its existence forestalls the clubs from doing individually in competition with each other), the Supreme Court ruled that “decisions by the NFLP regarding the teams’ separately owed intellectual property constitute concerted action.”[81]  Justice Stevens sharply refuted the notion that the league members acting through NFLP is akin to components of a single entity meshing to create a collective profit.  In actuality, foundAmerican Needle, the 32 football teams retain independence, operate as individual profit centers, distinct from each other and NFLP, and are at least potential (if not actual) competitors.[82]

To be sure, the Supreme Court reached this holding with a view towards preserving the integrity of the antitrust laws.  The Justices hypothesized that if potential competitors could share profits or losses in a joint venture without worry of Section 1 inquiry, “then any cartel could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a joint venture to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing products.”[83]  The high Court made clear that it would never permit colluding parties to circumvent the antitrust laws by acting through the artifice of some straw third-party or a so-called joint venture.[84]

Drawing to the end, Justice Stevens offered some words of comfort to the NFL and others similarly situated.  Certainly, ‘[f]ootball teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law.”[85]  A “host of collective decisions,” such as scheduling and then producing games, “provides a perfectly sensible justification” for concerted action without needless fear of incurring Section 1 liability.[86]  To discern sensible, neutral joint action as opposed to unlawful restraint of competition, the Supreme Court pledged that the axiomatic and flexible Rule of Reason would be applied, explicitly to the football league, and, implicitly, to others similarly situated in the world of sport business, as well as business in general.[87]

Finally, having refined and then applied the parameters of concerted action subject to Section 1 scrutiny, and having confirmed the proven Rule of Reason is to be the yardstick for evaluating same, the Supreme Court reversed the holding below, and cleared the path for the case to continue on remand.[88]  And so ended the Supreme Court’s newest landmark of antitrust law.

III.

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY

We now come to the concluding portion of this Article, the customary analysis and commentary upon the case that has been the subject under discussion.  Before proceeding, however, circumstances call for the issuance of a caveat.

Certainly, and as well noted above, American Needle is, technically speaking, an interlocutory decision.  It lacks finality, as it makes no decision as to the ultimate winners and losers in the subject litigation.  It is a preliminary decision, one that sets the rules, and remands to the lower courts for further determinations consistent with its holdings.

As candidly noted at its outset by Justice Stevens, American Needle is delimited to a threshold inquiry, here, what concerted action is subject to Section 1 scrutiny.  But this self-imposed limitation of the question presented does not diminish one bit the vigor and the precedent-setting aspect of this new holding.

It can well be said that threshold determinations often presage the outcome of an entire case.  Opening the door to further inquiry, as American Needle unquestionably does here, might be all that is needed to turn the tide of battle in favor of one side.  At the least, the guarantee of further litigation compels a change in tenor for both sides: akin to a turnover of ball possession, the NFL, seeking a quick dismissal, has had its hopes dashed.  The plaintiff American Needle may now renew its offensive, and all that comes with it.

As with so many notable Supreme Court edicts, American Needle of today may prove to be the last time these contestants take the field before the high Court.  Thus, the Justices’ decision might prove to be the first, and the last, contemporary word on the case at bar.  There then is a reminder not to underestimate the importance of this holding to the field of antitrust law, its supposed preliminary nature notwithstanding.

Let us now proceed to the more sanguine elements of our analysis, and placeAmerican Needle in perspective.  Our first point is timing, as purely a happenstance as that may be.

We noted early on how this Article is written more or less on the centennial of that most famous of American antitrust cases, that of Standard Oil.  Ironically, American Needle has been, in most likelihood, the most quoted and publicly visible antitrust ruling of the Supreme Court since the turn of the last century.  We would be hard pressed to think of an antitrust case decided since Standard Oil that has consumed as much newsprint and garnered as much notoriety in the popular press as the instant case.  The reason for that is well known.

At the time of this writing, the NFL owners and the NFL Players’ Association (the “NFLPA,” distinguished, to be sure, from NFL Properties as discussed herein) have been embroiled in an epic labor dispute.  We need not provide a citation here, since this struggle has been reported daily on the front of the sports page (if not the main page) of every media outlet in the nation.  It is an apt demonstration of the American psyche, that with all of the pressing issues of the day about the Recession, the price of gasoline, and health care, just to name a few, so much ink is spilled on coverage of whether or not there shall be NFL football this year.

As is equally well known, American Needle is mentioned in nearly every news article on football’s labor strife, been the subject of radio and television sports talk, and has thereby captured the attention of the general population like few other Supreme Court cases.  Among other examples, various pundits have offered it in support of the players, relied upon it as exposing the supposed vulnerability of the NFL to antitrust claims, and cited it as evidence that judicial intervention may ultimately decide if there will be a football season.

To be sure, this is a nonsubstantive observation.  But the inescapable point remains that the public’s awareness of American Needle is far more attenuated than the vast majority of Supreme Court cases.  Be that as it may, however, the paramount concern of this Article is legal substance, so to that we now turn.

Having noted above the public’s fascination with American Needle vis-à-vis professional football, of what note has or should the NFL take of the high Court’s decision?  A great deal, one would say, and not just because the underlying antitrust action is alive and well.  Obviously, how the NFL markets its intellectual property in the years to come will be largely determined by the final outcome (be it in court or via settlement) of the instant case.  But there is much more.

As in all modern professional sports, the NFL engages in concerted action on a number of fronts, not just marketing its team logos for hats and tee shirts.  Two that immediately come to mind are television broadcast rights and the drafting of collegiate players into the professional ranks.  While those aspects of professional football’s business are far too intricate to make a worthwhile comparison here, the undeniable point remains, and it is that the NFL shall henceforth be deemed to be a collection of independent economic forces that, from time to time, band together and act in economic concert in order to enhance their corporate profits.

Given such, when these formerly independent economic actors band together and act as one, American Needle makes plain that they have thus deprived the marketplace of the free competition brought about by maintaining separate centers of financial autonomy.  That step taken, the teams cannot escape antitrust scrutiny, pursuant to Section 1 at the least, when they engage in joint endeavors.  Put in football terms, it is early in the season.  As the “game changer” of American Needle takes firmer hold within the federal courts, it remains to be seen who will emerge the victor, the league or its opponents.

The above is one emerging issue for the NFL.  What of the other leagues in the business of sports?  One need not be a legal scholar to rightly conclude that they have the same exposure.

The other professional associations, whether in the acknowledged major American sports or the ones of lesser stature, all have operating characteristics similar to that of the NFL, in one form or another.  Generally, each individual competitive team willingly accedes its rights as an independent economic actor, and collaborates with its on-the-field rivals in joint endeavors aimed at increasing each constituent’s profits.

To be sure, the case law predating American Needle, and this new landmark itself, make plain there is a safe harbor for appropriate collaboration.  Once again, Justice Stevens echoes high Court landmarks of years past in acknowledging that presenting professional sporting events requires cooperation.  The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that league sports intrinsically need to cooperate and take concerted action in order to function.[89]  Clearly, there shall be no break in that continuity.

American Needledoes nothing to upset the truism that a team cannot play itself.  Thus, all leagues in all sports can proceed with general confidence that not every collaborative action will subject its members to an antitrust lawsuit.  That is as it has always been, as it should be, and it shall clearly remain so.

Nonetheless, all professional sports leagues must proceed mindful that American Needle is as applicable to badminton as it is to NFL football.  Each and every professional league must take due note that when collaboration exceeds the boundaries of what is essential and appropriate to put on an exhibition of their sport, and crosses the line into a stifling of competition, to the injury of others, then antitrust scrutiny shall be next week’s opponent.  And unlike a regularly scheduled game, the teams do not profit when playing inside a staid courthouse.

As we alluded to early on in this writing, the field of sports is often a metaphor for the field of business.  The similarities abound, and we Americans are oft times guilty of borrowing the strategies and tactics of one, and applying them to the other (and this interchange, most certainly, works in both directions).  What then, does American Needle  portend for American business, not the business of sports to be sure, but the business of business, be it high-tech, low-tech or anywhere in between?

Not to be unduly repetitive, but the firm conclusion is that the lessons remain the same.  Competing businesses may not play in an organized “league,” and they may not sell team jerseys with the name of your favorite CEO on the back, but they most certainly do compete.  Yet sometimes they put aside their competitive fervor, to act for their common good in trade associations or as lobbyists, to deal with common problems, or to act in concert in certain combinations or joint ventures.  And that is where business lines up on the field against American Needle and its teammates, also known as legal precedents.

Here are the headlines for American business generally, as drawn from American Needle.  First, what some might characterize as the “bad news,” or at least the one with potentially negative implications for some of the players:  just as in professional football, combinations that rob the free market of independent centers of competing economic interests are illegal.

At a minimum, those that submerge their competitive vigor in return for collaboration open the doors wide to antitrust scrutiny pursuant to Section 1.  Such examination, accompanied by the threat of treble damages under the Sherman Act, might be enough by itself to drive such noncompetitors from the field of play.  To be sure, bad for them, but good for competition.

Businesses, regardless of what their precise occupations are, must hereafter be mindful that joint ventures, combinations and other forms of concerted action can expose them to antitrust liability.  They are on notice to monitor their collaborations accordingly, and scrupulously avoid any conspiratorial urges that might fatten their bottom lines at the expense of normal competitive forces.

If that is the bad news, one must candidly admit it is not all the bad, for at the least it is merely today’s iteration of the laws of antitrust that have ruled for at least a century.  In sum, no one is really changing the size and shape of the playing field.  Potential malefactors confront, more or less, the same law and penalties that they always did.  In that regard, the news is only bad if you were intent on violating the law.

That said, let us turn to the good news.  American Needle maintains the same consistency within antitrust jurisprudence that has abounded for over a century.  It is beyond cavil that business hates uncertainty more than anything else.  By reaffirming tried and true maxims, this latest Supreme Court landmark maintains that much valued consistency, and business can act accordingly and with certitude that the rulebook has not been altered from seasons past.

Next, this latest pronouncement acts in defense of full and fair competition.  The American economy, probably more so than any other in the world, is profoundly based upon free competition.  This is reflected in our laws, in our history, and indeed in the very mindset of how we conduct business in these United States.

American Needlecontinues and reinvigorates this rich and storied tradition, by giving paramouncy to the fostering of free and unfettered competition.  American businesses have always worked within this framework, and this new case encourages them to continue to do so, and with confidence that free competition will not be compromised.

American Needlefurthermore reaffirms the notion that not every combination is bad.  Business, quite naturally, sometimes draws competitive forces together, whether by contract, joint action or via some other form of mutually beneficial combination.  That, by itself, is not evil, and today’s case says so.  Justice Stevens makes clear that the law has always reserved its scrutiny for joint ventures that truly act to restrain competition, in this case the elimination of nominal and healthy competitive forces by restraining these erstwhile combatants from truly engaging each other in the marketplace.

That unification leads to our next point, that of actors usually engaged in stiff competition who, shall we say, strip off their opposing colors and join under one banner for concerted action.  In this and all other respects, American Needle confirms the long held and undeniably just maxim that substance rules over form.  Mere labels have no sway in antitrust cases, nor should they, says the high Court.

As in the preceding century, the next hundred years of antitrust jurisprudence will exalt the substance of any subject activity over the mere accident of its form.  For those whom the substance of their business activity conforms to the laws fostering free competition, that is good news.  Conversely, it is only detrimental to those who would attempt to cloak their lawbreaking ways under the guise of a meaningless label.  Put in sports terms, it does not matter what jersey you wear; it is what you do on the field of competition that counts.

Now to our last, and possibly the greatest, point of American Needle.  As described above, the Rule of Reason has dominated the process of antitrust analysis since the law’s inception well over a century ago.  We need expend few words to affirm the rightness and sagacity of that precept.  Suffice to say that truly free enterprise is a cathedral of rationality, of decisions made for good reason, and not based upon emotion, ideology nor other factors.

Therefore, the law overseeing same, and seeking to justly assure that the market remains free and fair to all participants, should likewise, in the main, examine its doings in the light of that same reasonability.  In its own way, American Needle is the modern implementation of Chief Justice Hughes’ maxim that “[realities] must dominate the judgment in antitrust cases.”[90]

In sum, American Needle does more than just declare the Rule of Reason is applicable to the case at bar; its fundamental adjudication confirms the ongoing and essential role of such a mode of analysis in all such cases to come.

Conclusion

 

In conclusion, American Needle has gone from making headlines in the field of law to now the field of professional football.  It affirms that even the obvious need for collaboration in the business of the NFL has its just limits, those boundaries to be measured by the nation’s longstanding antitrust laws.  So too for other professional sports, and so too for the rest of American business.  But in doing so, we find the Supreme Court affirming basic notions that not all collaboration is illegal, rather only concerted action that unlawfully drives out competition.  Tried and true rules, above all the proven and just Rule of Reason, will dominate the field when measuring such actions for their propriety.  It is still early in the game, but American Needle makes certain that, in the end, the real winner will be justice.[91]

[1] Over a half-century ago, the Supreme Court declared that the NFL falls “within the coverage of the antitrust laws.”  Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 448 (1957) (Clark, J.) (holding baseball’s antitrust exemption inapplicable to professional football).  See also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. dba Washington Redskins, 518 U.S. 231, 233 (1996) (Breyer, J.) (dealing with “the intersection of… labor and antitrust laws” in the context of professional football).  Professional basketball and boxing also fall under the purview of the antitrust laws, to name but a few sports.  See Haywood v. N.B.A., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); U.S. v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).  Of all the major American sports leagues, only Major League Baseball (“MLB”) enjoys an exemption from the antitrust laws.  To appreciate the rich but convoluted history of the immunity enjoyed by the National Pastime, see Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 357, 357 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972).

[2] __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (May 24, 2010) (hereinafter “American Needle” at 130 S.Ct.).

[3] See Edmund Morris, THEDORE REX (Random House 2001).  In this, the second of three installments chronicling the life of America’s twenty-sixth Chief Executive, Roosevelt’s preeminent biographer Edmund Morris devotes substantial discussion to President Roosevelt’s determination to utilize the still nascent Sherman Act to curb the monopolistic practices then prevalent in the American economy, for instance, Roosevelt’s initiation of the groundbreaking Northern Securities case.  THEODORE REX, inter alia, at 88-89, 314-316, 427-28; See Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (pluralityopinion), cited by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 761 n.4 (1984).  See also Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 361 (Brewer, J., concurring in the result) (proposing the Rule of Reason in order to contain the antitrust laws within the walls of rationality in a free enterprise system).

[4] See Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.

[5] Northern Pacific R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958), quoted by N.C.A.A. v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n. 27.

[6] Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-87 (2007).

[7] 15 U.S.C. § 1.

[8] 15 U.S.C. § 2.

[9] 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).

[10] N.C.A.A. v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)(Stevens, J.); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (Thomas, J.).

[11] Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984),  cited by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (while substantively an antitrust case, Twombly has become the modern age’s preeminent holding on the pleading standard for federal cases).

[12] U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), cited by Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 775-76.

[13] Monsato Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).

[14] Twomblysupra, 550 U.S. at 555, quoting Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).  See also Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 769.

[15] Seee.g. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977);Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).

[16] See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

[17] See Continental T.V., Inc.supra, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Chicago Board of Trade,supra, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).

[18] 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

[19] See Wysocki, “The Progeny of Standard Oil,” Wall Street Journal (Wednesday, December 2, 1998) at p. B1 cl. 4.  See also Lavelle, “Rockefeller’s Revenge,” U.S. News & World Report (December 14, 1998) at p. 27 cl. 1 (charting and discussing the disassembly of the Rockefeller empire into the colloquially known “Seven Sisters” of the U.S. oil industry, and detailing how the “merger mania” of the 1990s drove them to reunite, leaving essentially only three surviving siblings (ExxonMobil, BP, and Chevron).

[20] Id. at 1.

[21] Id. at 3.

[22] Id. at 3.

[23] Id. at 3-4.

[24] Id. at 4. Cf.  Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-26 (1988) (Rule of Reason presumed to apply in Section 1 cases).

[25] Id. at 4.

[26] Supra, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).

27] Id. at 238, cited by American Needle,  supra, 130 S.Ct. at 2217 n. 10.  See alsoLeegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-87 (2007);National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-91 (1978).

[28] American Needlesupra, 130 S.Ct. at 2207.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.  The NFL is no stranger to antitrust litigation.  In addition to the cases citedanteseee.g.United States Football League v. N.F.L., 842 F.2d 1335, 1340 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the famous jury verdict whereby the NFL, although found guilty of violating the antitrust laws, had to pay only one dollar to the defunct upstart USFL).

[33] Id.

[34]Id., citing American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007), affirmed sub nom., 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), reversed and remandedsupra, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010), where Senior District Judge Moran found that “in the jargon of antitrust law…. [the NFL teams] so integrated their operations that they should be deemed to be a single entity.”

[35] Id. at 2207-08, citing American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 and 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (Kanne, J.) (holding intrinsic nature of NFL football “requires extensive coordination and integration between the teams,” and thus “the NFL teams are best described as a single source of economic power when promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property”).  But compare Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2002) (Boudin, C.J.) (“Single entity status for ordinarily organized [sports] leagues has been rejected in several [of the] circuits.” (summarizing  cases).

[36] Id. at 2208.

[37] Of the then-sitting Justices, no one was better suited to the task at hand than Justice Stevens.  Before his appointment to the nation’s highest court, he was renowned as an antitrust law attorney and scholar.  The only other Justice who might have been a worthy candidate to craft this opinion was the by-then-retired Justice Byron “whizzer” White, who was the high Court’s only member to have achieved stardom as a collegiate football player.  See Biskupic, “Justice Stevens to Retire from the Supreme Court,” (April 12, 2010) USA Today.  See also Biskupic, “Stevens Ascends to His Final Day on Bench,” (June 27, 2010)  USA Today.

[38] Id. at 2006.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id. at 2206-07.

[42] Id. at 2208.

[43] Id. at 2208-09, citing Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 777 (abolishing so-entitled “intraenterprise conspiracy” theory).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1 and § 2.

[44] Id. at 2209, citing Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 768-69 (“This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction.”).

[45] Id. at 2209.

[46] Id., citing Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 768.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id., citing U.S. v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 (1967).

[51] Id. at 2209-10, citinginter aliaN.C.A.A.supra, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

[52] Id. at 2210 (footnotes omitted).

[53] Id.

[54]Id. at 211, citing Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 773 n. 21.

[55] Id. at 2211-12.

[56] Id. at 2212.

[57] Id., quoting Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 769.  Copperweld was limited to the very narrow question of whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were capable of conspiring in violation of Section 1.  Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 767.  The Court there declared no, because “the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise” for Section 1 purposes.  Id. at 771.  Noteworthy with regard to better understanding American Needle today, consider the stress by Chief Justice Burger in writing in Copperweldthat coordination between a parent corporation and an internal division “does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests,” and  thus immunizing such activity from Section 1 scrutiny.  Id. at 770-71.  As we will see, the harmlessness of the parent/subsidiary coordination in Copperweld stands in sharp contradistinction to the joint endeavors of the league and teams in American Needle.

[58] Id. (citations omitted).

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.  In some ways, in writing for the high Court in American Needle, Justice Stevens revives the observation made in his dissent in Copperweld, whereby he questioned absenting two or more corporations from Section 1 scrutiny when “they are controlled by the same godfather.”  Copperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Criticizing that Supreme Court of over twenty five years ago for not confronting the question, Justice Stevens took a step towards answering it in his penultimate opinion as a Justice.

[63] Id. at 2213.

[64] Id. at 2213.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.  (quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied).  See also Areeda & Hovenkamp, VII ANTITRUST LAW 2d ed. at  ¶ 1478a, at 318 (unquestionably, the most pernicious threats to competition arise when actual or potential competitors join forces in a joint endeavor).

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] Id.  Furthermore, while allowing there is some similarity between the NFL and a single enterprise that owns several pieces of intellectual property which chooses to license them jointly, that outward similarity is wholly undercut here because in “the relevant functional sense” the NFL’s constituent teams compete against each other for revenue from intellectual property as much as they vie for dominance on the field of play.  Id.

[72] Id. (citations omitted).

[73] Id.

[74] Id.  Here, the Court quickly disposed of another of the NFL’s defenses, that it had marketed its intellectual property in this unitary fashion for some time.  The Court’s unanimous rejoinder: “a history of concerted activity does not immunize conduct from [Section] 1 scrutiny.”  Id. at 2213-14.

[75] Id. at 2214.  Seesupra, 538 F.3d at 737 and 744.

[76] Id.

[77] Id. (emphasis supplied).

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Id. at 2214-15.  Parenthetically, we acknowledge the Court’s observation that the law “generally treat[s] agreements within a single firm as independent action on the presumption that the components of the firm will act to maximize the firm’s profits.”  Id. at 2215.  Notwithstanding that convention, the Court allowed that in “rare cases” said presumption must be discarded, such as where intrafirm agreements impact economic interests wholly apart from the firm itself.  Section 1 scrutiny is therefore called for when such an intrafirm agreement is merely “a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action.”  Id. at 2215.

[81] Id. at 2215.

[82] Id.  The Court widened the gap separating NFLP from league members, finding the former to be an instrumentality of the latter, with regard to licensing decisions.  Id.  Clearly this separation undergirds the holding that the NFL, the teams, and NFLP are actors with distinguishable economic interests, and were taking concerted action in licensing their intellectual property.  Id.

[83] Id., quoting Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotations omitted).

[84] Id. at 2215-16.

[85] Id. at 2216.

[86] Id.

[87] Id.  See also Brownsupra, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Presaging his opinion for the majority in American Needle, there Justice Stevens advocated applying the Rule of Reason in benchmarking the NFL’s activity vis-à-vis the league’s potential for restraining the market.

[88] Id. at 2217.

[89] See N.C.A.A.supra, 468 U.S. at 101-02, quoting R. Bork, “The Antitrust Paradox” 278 (1978).

[90] Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933), quoted byCopperweldsupra, 467 U.S. at 774.

[91] As of this writing, recent events in professional football have ordained an extraordinary role for the precedents cited above.   See Brady, et al. v. National Football League, et al., 11 CV 00639 (SRN) (D. Minn.), a class antitrust action brought by professional football players against the NFL and its constituent teams, seeking, inter alia, monetary damages and injunctive relief.  Complaint at p. 48-50.  In pleadings headlining Super Bowl winning quarterbacks Tom Brady, Peyton Manning, and Drew Brees, the players charge the league with engaging in “group boycotts, concerted refusals to deal and price fixing,” alleging same as per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Complaint at Para. 4, page 3.  Most pertinent to this Article, the plaintiffs allege these actions “constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason.”  Id.   Thus, we witness two of the linchpins of the foregoing discussion as being highly determinative in this new lawsuit.  And so,American Needle may yet prove to be the catalyst for a day of reckoning for the NFL and the players.

Michael Sabino @ Copyright 2011

Mostly Dead Comments on Irrational Exuberance: the Shortcomings of Legal Education.

Posted in the National Law Review on November 28th an article by attorney Kendall M. Gray of Andrews Kurth LLP regarding legal education and the pursuit of the legal career:

 

This one goes out to all the law students or think you wanna be law students.

It has been a long time since last we met. Long time, no posts. I wasn’t completely dead. I was just in trial. So like Westley, a/k/a, the Dread Pirate Roberts in the Princess Bride (a/k/a the greatest movie ever made) I was only mostly dead.

You can doubtless imagine my surprise when I awoke from my mostly dead state on Sunday morning and saw an article on the shortcomings of legal education on the front page of my New York Times. The article detailed how new lawyers graduate from law school not knowing the first thing about how to lawyer. Their firms then have to teach them that pesky lawyering part that the law schools left out.

The article quotes a client:

“The fundamental issue is that law schools are producing people who are not capable of being counselors,” says Jeffrey W. Carr, the general counsel of FMC Technologies, a Houston company that makes oil drilling equipment. “They are lawyers in the sense that they have law degrees, but they aren’t ready to be a provider of services.”

Firms try to fill in the skills that the law school left out, but in this environment, clients don’t want to pay for that.

Is there anything to be done? Does it have to be this way? After the break, a comment from a crusty old Baylor lawyer about why it ain’t necessarily so.

So, young man (or woman). You think you want to be a lawyer. How did you make that decision and how are you going to decide to proceed?

Did you have some Atticus Finch moment? Have you watched every episode of Law and Order? Is this a fire in your belly? Is this just a way to make a living? Have you shown any indication that you would be any good at this?

Well assuming you have a good reason to pursue a legal education, I encourage you to read the New York Times article by David Segal. He describes the type of problems in legal education that you will encounter if you go about letting someone else chart your path in the conventional way.

  • With your stellar (or not-so-stellar) undergraduate grades in hand, you will prepare for the LSAT and get the highest score possible.
  • You will apply to all the “best” law schools and try to get into the “best” school possible.
  • (Note well the “quote” marks because those will come back to bite you later)
  • Government financed lenders will line up to lend you $150,000 in debt to finance that education.
  • (Think of those as law school junk bonds that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy)
  • You will attend the “best” school on your non-dischargeable junk bond financing, confident that you will dominate moot court and law review.
  • You confidently anticipate graduating summa cum laude and becoming the Young Don (or Donna) of a large firm.
  • All of your classmates share that same confidence.
  • Most of you are wrong.
  • All of you will graduate knowing more about legal theory or “The Rule in Shelly’s Case” than how to incorporate a small business or handle a divorce or write a brief.
  • Those few, those happy few, who land the plumb job will get sufficient training from their firms to safely permit them to be alone in a room with a client and the client’s problems.
  • But the “ninety-nine percent” will have non-dischargeable junk bonds and lack many of the experiences or marketable skills necessary to pay those back.

What the article describes is is the irrational way to pursue a legal education–borrowing money from a very persistent loan shark to purchase a lottery ticket in hopes of paying it back. Irrational exuberance.

The article is accurate so far as it goes. But it does not go nearly far enough. It gave me the impression that this is a racket from which no lemming can escape. It focuses too much on gloom and doom and acts as if law students are pawns in a game where they have no control.

But there is a different path.

If you want to be a lawyer, and a good one, nobody is forcing you into that kind of bargain. You can take responsibility for your own outcomes and professional development. If you do, your path will be roughly similar to my own path.

  • Entry to the profession is still regulated by states. Start by deciding where you want to live and work, then learn about the schools in that state.
  • Some schools reward teaching rather than publishing law review articles on legal theory and social science.Baylor, where I come from, is one of them. I’m sure it is not the only one, even if it is not one of the “best” schools.
  • At schools like Baylor, unlike the “best” schools, they teach you to do stuff–how to pass the bar, how to handle a lawsuit, how to take a deposition, how to try a case.
  • At schools like Baylor, unlike the “best” schools, you can get paid to go to school. I started on a half scholarship and by the end I was paying nothing.
  • But no matter which school you go to, don’t let school stand in the way of your education.
  • You control whether you actually learn what you need to learn.
  • Work in a legal clinic.
  • Work part time as a grunt in a small law office.
  • Work for free.
  • WORK.
  • And when you get into a firm, big small or indifferent, you control your training and development.
  • Learn at every opportunity from lawyers who know how to do stuff, whether or not you are inside a class room.

I did these things and got the best (no quotes) education I could have gotten. I “knew things” upon graduation that you can’t buy with non-dischargeable junk bonds at the “best” schools. And I didn’t have $150,000 in junk bonds to pay off.

Sure, I might not have been hired by an AmLaw 200 Firm. I might have been stuck handling people’s problems or practicing outside New York.

Like Abraham Lincoln or Leon Jaworski.

Just a thought.

But if you’re thinking about going to law school, now is as good of a time as any to start thinking for yourself.

© 2011 Andrews Kurth LLP

NLR 2011 Law Student Writing Competition

The National Law Review would like to remind you of the Winter Law Student Writing Contest deadline is November 21st!

The National Law Review (NLR) consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for easy access by lawyers, paralegals, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, compliance officers, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

The NLR Law Student Writing Competition offers law students the opportunity to submit articles for publication consideration on the NLR Web site.  No entry fee is required. Applicants can submit an unlimited number of entries each month.

  • Winning submissions will initially be published online in November and December 2011.
  • In each of these months, entries will be judged and the top two to four articles chosen will be featured on the NLR homepage for a month.  Up to 5 runner-up entries will also be posted in the NLR searchable database each month.
  • Each winning article will be displayed accompanied by the student’s photo, biography, contact information, law school logo, and any copyright disclosure.
  • All winning articles will remain in the NLR database for two years (subject to earlier removal upon request of the law school).

In addition, the NLR sends links to targeted articles to specific professional groups via e-mail. The NLR also posts links to selected articles on the “Legal Issues” or “Research” sections of various professional organizations’ Web sites. (NLR, at its sole discretion, maydistribute any winning entry in such a manner, but does not make any such guarantees nor does NLR represent that this is part of the prize package.)

Why Students Should Submit Articles:

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article from Northwestern University, please click here or please review the winning submissions from Spring 2011.

Content Guidelines and Deadlines

Content Guidelines must be followed by all entrants to qualify. It is recommended that articles address the following monthly topic areas:

Articles covering current issues related to other areas of the law may also be submitted. Entries must be submitted via email to lawschools@natlawreview.com by 5:00 pm Central Standard Time on the dates indicated above.

Articles will be judged by NLR staff members on the basis of readability, clarity, organization, and timeliness. Tone should be authoritative, but not overly formal. Ideally, articles should be straightforward and practical, containing useful information of interest to legal and business professionals. Judges reserve the right not to award any prizes if it is determined that no entries merit selection for publication by NLR. All judges’ decisions are final. All submissions are subject to the NLR’s Terms of Use.

Students are not required to transfer copyright ownership of their winning articles to the NLR. However, all articles submitted must be clearly identified with any applicable copyright or other proprietary notices. The NLR will accept articles previously published by another publication, provided the author has the authority to grant the right to publish it on the NLR site. Do not submit any material that infringes upon the intellectual property or privacy rights of any third party, including a third party’s unlicensed copyrighted work.

Manuscript Requirements

  • Format – HTML (preferred) or Microsoft® Word
  • Length Articles should be no more than 5,500 words, including endnotes.
  • Endnotes and citations Any citations should be in endnote form and listed at the end of the article. Unreported cases should include docket number and court. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and proper format of related cites. In general, follow the Bluebook. Limit the number of endnotes to only those most essential. Authors are responsible for accuracy of all quoted material.
  • Author Biography/Law School Information –Please submit the following:
    1. Full name of author (First Middle Last)
    2. Contact information for author, including e-mail address and phone number
    3. Author photo (recommended but optional) in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 150 x 200 pixels.
    4. A brief professional biography of the author, running approximately 100 words or 1,200 characters including spaces.
    5. The law school’s logo in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 300 pixels high or 300 pixels wide.
    6. The law school mailing address, main phone number, contact e-mail address, school Web site address, and a brief description of the law school, running no more than 125 words or 2,100 characters including spaces.

To enter, an applicant and any co-authors must be enrolled in an accredited law school within the fifty United States. Employees of The National Law Review are not eligible. Entries must include ALL information listed above to be considered and must be submitted to the National Law Review at lawschools@natlawreview.com. 

Any entry which does not meet the requirements and deadlines outlined herein will be disqualified from the competition. Winners will be notified via e-mail and/or telephone call at least one day prior to publication. Winners will be publicly announced on the NLR home page and via other media.  All prizes are contingent on recipient signing an Affidavit of Eligibility, Publicity Release and Liability Waiver. The National Law Review 2011 Law Student Writing Competition is sponsored by The National Law Forum, LLC, d/b/a The National Law Review, 4700 Gilbert, Suite 47 (#230), Western Springs, IL 60558, 708-357-3317. This contest is void where prohibited by law. All entries must be submitted in accordance with The National Law Review Contributor Guidelines per the terms of the contest rules. A list of winners may be obtained by writing to the address listed above. There is no fee to enter this contest.

Congratulations to our Spring 2011 Law Student Writing Contest Winners!

Spring 2011:

NLR 2011 Law Student Writing Competition

The National Law Review would like to remind you of the Winter Law Student Writing Contest deadline is November 21st!

The National Law Review (NLR) consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for easy access by lawyers, paralegals, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, compliance officers, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

The NLR Law Student Writing Competition offers law students the opportunity to submit articles for publication consideration on the NLR Web site.  No entry fee is required. Applicants can submit an unlimited number of entries each month.

  • Winning submissions will initially be published online in November and December 2011.
  • In each of these months, entries will be judged and the top two to four articles chosen will be featured on the NLR homepage for a month.  Up to 5 runner-up entries will also be posted in the NLR searchable database each month.
  • Each winning article will be displayed accompanied by the student’s photo, biography, contact information, law school logo, and any copyright disclosure.
  • All winning articles will remain in the NLR database for two years (subject to earlier removal upon request of the law school).

In addition, the NLR sends links to targeted articles to specific professional groups via e-mail. The NLR also posts links to selected articles on the “Legal Issues” or “Research” sections of various professional organizations’ Web sites. (NLR, at its sole discretion, maydistribute any winning entry in such a manner, but does not make any such guarantees nor does NLR represent that this is part of the prize package.)

Why Students Should Submit Articles:

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article from Northwestern University, please click here or please review the winning submissions from Spring 2011.

Content Guidelines and Deadlines

Content Guidelines must be followed by all entrants to qualify. It is recommended that articles address the following monthly topic areas:

Articles covering current issues related to other areas of the law may also be submitted. Entries must be submitted via email to lawschools@natlawreview.com by 5:00 pm Central Standard Time on the dates indicated above.

Articles will be judged by NLR staff members on the basis of readability, clarity, organization, and timeliness. Tone should be authoritative, but not overly formal. Ideally, articles should be straightforward and practical, containing useful information of interest to legal and business professionals. Judges reserve the right not to award any prizes if it is determined that no entries merit selection for publication by NLR. All judges’ decisions are final. All submissions are subject to the NLR’s Terms of Use.

Students are not required to transfer copyright ownership of their winning articles to the NLR. However, all articles submitted must be clearly identified with any applicable copyright or other proprietary notices. The NLR will accept articles previously published by another publication, provided the author has the authority to grant the right to publish it on the NLR site. Do not submit any material that infringes upon the intellectual property or privacy rights of any third party, including a third party’s unlicensed copyrighted work.

Manuscript Requirements

  • Format – HTML (preferred) or Microsoft® Word
  • Length Articles should be no more than 5,500 words, including endnotes.
  • Endnotes and citations Any citations should be in endnote form and listed at the end of the article. Unreported cases should include docket number and court. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and proper format of related cites. In general, follow the Bluebook. Limit the number of endnotes to only those most essential. Authors are responsible for accuracy of all quoted material.
  • Author Biography/Law School Information –Please submit the following:
    1. Full name of author (First Middle Last)
    2. Contact information for author, including e-mail address and phone number
    3. Author photo (recommended but optional) in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 150 x 200 pixels.
    4. A brief professional biography of the author, running approximately 100 words or 1,200 characters including spaces.
    5. The law school’s logo in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 300 pixels high or 300 pixels wide.
    6. The law school mailing address, main phone number, contact e-mail address, school Web site address, and a brief description of the law school, running no more than 125 words or 2,100 characters including spaces.

To enter, an applicant and any co-authors must be enrolled in an accredited law school within the fifty United States. Employees of The National Law Review are not eligible. Entries must include ALL information listed above to be considered and must be submitted to the National Law Review at lawschools@natlawreview.com. 

Any entry which does not meet the requirements and deadlines outlined herein will be disqualified from the competition. Winners will be notified via e-mail and/or telephone call at least one day prior to publication. Winners will be publicly announced on the NLR home page and via other media.  All prizes are contingent on recipient signing an Affidavit of Eligibility, Publicity Release and Liability Waiver. The National Law Review 2011 Law Student Writing Competition is sponsored by The National Law Forum, LLC, d/b/a The National Law Review, 4700 Gilbert, Suite 47 (#230), Western Springs, IL 60558, 708-357-3317. This contest is void where prohibited by law. All entries must be submitted in accordance with The National Law Review Contributor Guidelines per the terms of the contest rules. A list of winners may be obtained by writing to the address listed above. There is no fee to enter this contest.

Congratulations to our Spring 2011 Law Student Writing Contest Winners!

Spring 2011:

NLR 2011 Law Student Writing Competition

The National Law Review is wants to remind you the Deadline for Submission is October 17!

The National Law Review (NLR) consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for easy access by lawyers, paralegals, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, compliance officers, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

The NLR Law Student Writing Competition offers law students the opportunity to submit articles for publication consideration on the NLR Web site.  No entry fee is required. Applicants can submit an unlimited number of entries each month.

  • Winning submissions will initially be published online in November and December 2011.
  • In each of these months, entries will be judged and the top two to four articles chosen will be featured on the NLR homepage for a month.  Up to 5 runner-up entries will also be posted in the NLR searchable database each month.
  • Each winning article will be displayed accompanied by the student’s photo, biography, contact information, law school logo, and any copyright disclosure.
  • All winning articles will remain in the NLR database for two years (subject to earlier removal upon request of the law school).

In addition, the NLR sends links to targeted articles to specific professional groups via e-mail. The NLR also posts links to selected articles on the “Legal Issues” or “Research” sections of various professional organizations’ Web sites. (NLR, at its sole discretion, maydistribute any winning entry in such a manner, but does not make any such guarantees nor does NLR represent that this is part of the prize package.)

Why Students Should Submit Articles:

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article from Northwestern University, please click here or please review the winning submissions from Spring 2011.

Content Guidelines and Deadlines

Content Guidelines must be followed by all entrants to qualify. It is recommended that articles address the following monthly topic areas:

Articles covering current issues related to other areas of the law may also be submitted. Entries must be submitted via email to lawschools@natlawreview.com by 5:00 pm Central Standard Time on the dates indicated above.

Articles will be judged by NLR staff members on the basis of readability, clarity, organization, and timeliness. Tone should be authoritative, but not overly formal. Ideally, articles should be straightforward and practical, containing useful information of interest to legal and business professionals. Judges reserve the right not to award any prizes if it is determined that no entries merit selection for publication by NLR. All judges’ decisions are final. All submissions are subject to the NLR’s Terms of Use.

Students are not required to transfer copyright ownership of their winning articles to the NLR. However, all articles submitted must be clearly identified with any applicable copyright or other proprietary notices. The NLR will accept articles previously published by another publication, provided the author has the authority to grant the right to publish it on the NLR site. Do not submit any material that infringes upon the intellectual property or privacy rights of any third party, including a third party’s unlicensed copyrighted work.

Manuscript Requirements

  • Format – HTML (preferred) or Microsoft® Word
  • Length Articles should be no more than 5,500 words, including endnotes.
  • Endnotes and citations Any citations should be in endnote form and listed at the end of the article. Unreported cases should include docket number and court. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and proper format of related cites. In general, follow the Bluebook. Limit the number of endnotes to only those most essential. Authors are responsible for accuracy of all quoted material.
  • Author Biography/Law School Information –Please submit the following:
    1. Full name of author (First Middle Last)
    2. Contact information for author, including e-mail address and phone number
    3. Author photo (recommended but optional) in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 150 x 200 pixels.
    4. A brief professional biography of the author, running approximately 100 words or 1,200 characters including spaces.
    5. The law school’s logo in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 300 pixels high or 300 pixels wide.
    6. The law school mailing address, main phone number, contact e-mail address, school Web site address, and a brief description of the law school, running no more than 125 words or 2,100 characters including spaces.

To enter, an applicant and any co-authors must be enrolled in an accredited law school within the fifty United States. Employees of The National Law Review are not eligible. Entries must include ALL information listed above to be considered and must be submitted to the National Law Review at lawschools@natlawreview.com. 

Any entry which does not meet the requirements and deadlines outlined herein will be disqualified from the competition. Winners will be notified via e-mail and/or telephone call at least one day prior to publication. Winners will be publicly announced on the NLR home page and via other media.  All prizes are contingent on recipient signing an Affidavit of Eligibility, Publicity Release and Liability Waiver. The National Law Review 2011 Law Student Writing Competition is sponsored by The National Law Forum, LLC, d/b/a The National Law Review, 4700 Gilbert, Suite 47 (#230), Western Springs, IL 60558, 708-357-3317. This contest is void where prohibited by law. All entries must be submitted in accordance with The National Law Review Contributor Guidelines per the terms of the contest rules. A list of winners may be obtained by writing to the address listed above. There is no fee to enter this contest.

Congratulations to our Spring 2011 Law Student Writing Contest Winners!

Spring 2011:

NLR Winter Law Student Writing Contest

The National Law Review is pleased to announce the commencement of the Winter Law Student Writing Contest:

The National Law Review (NLR)consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for easy access by lawyers, paralegals, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, compliance officers, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

The NLR Law Student Writing Competition offers law students the opportunity to submit articles for publication consideration on the NLR Web site.  No entry fee is required. Applicants can submit an unlimited number of entries each month.

  • Winning submissions will initially be published online in November and December 2011.
  • In each of these months, entries will be judged and the top two to four articles chosen will be featured on the NLR homepage for a month.  Up to 5 runner-up entries will also be posted in the NLR searchable database each month.
  • Each winning article will be displayed accompanied by the student’s photo, biography, contact information, law school logo, and any copyright disclosure.
  • All winning articles will remain in the NLR database for two years (subject to earlier removal upon request of the law school).

In addition, the NLR sends links to targeted articles to specific professional groups via e-mail. The NLR also posts links to selected articles on the “Legal Issues” or “Research” sections of various professional organizations’ Web sites. (NLR, at its sole discretion, maydistribute any winning entry in such a manner, but does not make any such guarantees nor does NLR represent that this is part of the prize package.)

Why Students Should Submit Articles:

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article fromNorthwestern University, please click here or please review the winning submissions from Spring 2011.

Content Guidelines and Deadlines

Content Guidelines must be followed by all entrants to qualify. It is recommended that articles address the following monthly topic areas:

Articles covering current issues related to other areas of the law may also be submitted. Entries must be submitted via email to lawschools@natlawreview.com by 5:00 pm Central Standard Time on the dates indicated above.

Articles will be judged by NLR staff members on the basis of readability, clarity, organization, and timeliness. Tone should be authoritative, but not overly formal. Ideally, articles should be straightforward and practical, containinguseful information of interest to legal and business professionals. Judges reserve the right not to award any prizes if it is determined that no entries merit selection for publication by NLR. All judges’ decisions are final. All submissions are subject to the NLR’s Terms of Use.

Students are not required to transfer copyright ownership of their winning articles to the NLR. However, all articles submitted must be clearly identified with any applicable copyright or other proprietary notices. The NLR will accept articles previously published by another publication, provided the author has the authority to grant the right to publish it on the NLR site. Do not submit any material that infringes upon the intellectual property or privacy rights of any third party, including a third party’s unlicensed copyrighted work.

Manuscript Requirements

  • Format – HTML (preferred) or Microsoft® Word
  • Length  Articles should be no more than 5,500 words, including endnotes.
  • Endnotes and citations – Any citations should be in endnote form and listed at the end of the article. Unreported cases should include docket number and court. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and proper format of related cites. In general, follow the Bluebook. Limit the number of endnotes to only those most essential. Authors are responsible for accuracy of all quoted material.
  • Author Biography/Law School Information –Please submit the following:
    1. Full name of author (First Middle Last)
    2. Contact information for author, including e-mail address and phone number
    3. Author photo (recommended but optional) in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 150 x 200 pixels.
    4. A brief professional biography of the author, running approximately 100 words or 1,200 characters including spaces.
    5. The law school’s logo in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 300 pixels high or 300 pixels wide.
    6. The law school mailing address, main phone number, contact e-mail address, school Web site address, and a brief description of the law school, running no more than 125 words or 2,100 characters including spaces.

To enter, an applicant and any co-authors must be enrolled in an accredited law school within the fifty United States. Employees of The National Law Review are not eligible. Entries must include ALL information listed above to be considered and must be submitted to the National Law Review at lawschools@natlawreview.com. 

Any entry which does not meet the requirements and deadlines outlined herein will be disqualified from the competition. Winners will be notified via e-mail and/or telephone call at least one day prior to publication. Winners will be publicly announced on the NLR home page and via other media.  All prizes are contingent on recipient signing an Affidavit of Eligibility, Publicity Release and Liability Waiver. The National Law Review 2011 Law Student Writing Competition is sponsored by The National Law Forum, LLC, d/b/a The National Law Review, 4700 Gilbert, Suite 47 (#230), Western Springs, IL 60558, 708-357-3317. This contest is void where prohibited by law. All entries must be submitted in accordance with The National Law Review Contributor Guidelines per the terms of the contest rules. A list of winners may be obtained by writing to the address listed above. There is no fee to enter this contest.

Congratulations to our Spring 2011 Law Student Writing Contest Winners!

Spring 2011:

NLR 2011 Law Student Writing Competition

The National Law Review is pleased to announce the commencement of the Winter Law Student Writing Contest:

The National Law Review (NLR) consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for easy access by lawyers, paralegals, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, compliance officers, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

The NLR Law Student Writing Competition offers law students the opportunity to submit articles for publication consideration on the NLR Web site.  No entry fee is required. Applicants can submit an unlimited number of entries each month.

  • Winning submissions will initially be published online in November and December 2011.
  • In each of these months, entries will be judged and the top two to four articles chosen will be featured on the NLR homepage for a month.  Up to 5 runner-up entries will also be posted in the NLR searchable database each month.
  • Each winning article will be displayed accompanied by the student’s photo, biography, contact information, law school logo, and any copyright disclosure.
  • All winning articles will remain in the NLR database for two years (subject to earlier removal upon request of the law school).

In addition, the NLR sends links to targeted articles to specific professional groups via e-mail. The NLR also posts links to selected articles on the “Legal Issues” or “Research” sections of various professional organizations’ Web sites. (NLR, at its sole discretion, maydistribute any winning entry in such a manner, but does not make any such guarantees nor does NLR represent that this is part of the prize package.)

Why Students Should Submit Articles:

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article from Northwestern University, please click here or please review the winning submissions from Spring 2011.

Content Guidelines and Deadlines

Content Guidelines must be followed by all entrants to qualify. It is recommended that articles address the following monthly topic areas:

Articles covering current issues related to other areas of the law may also be submitted. Entries must be submitted via email to lawschools@natlawreview.com by 5:00 pm Central Standard Time on the dates indicated above.

Articles will be judged by NLR staff members on the basis of readability, clarity, organization, and timeliness. Tone should be authoritative, but not overly formal. Ideally, articles should be straightforward and practical, containing useful information of interest to legal and business professionals. Judges reserve the right not to award any prizes if it is determined that no entries merit selection for publication by NLR. All judges’ decisions are final. All submissions are subject to the NLR’s Terms of Use.

Students are not required to transfer copyright ownership of their winning articles to the NLR. However, all articles submitted must be clearly identified with any applicable copyright or other proprietary notices. The NLR will accept articles previously published by another publication, provided the author has the authority to grant the right to publish it on the NLR site. Do not submit any material that infringes upon the intellectual property or privacy rights of any third party, including a third party’s unlicensed copyrighted work.

Manuscript Requirements

  • Format – HTML (preferred) or Microsoft® Word
  • Length Articles should be no more than 5,500 words, including endnotes.
  • Endnotes and citations Any citations should be in endnote form and listed at the end of the article. Unreported cases should include docket number and court. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and proper format of related cites. In general, follow the Bluebook. Limit the number of endnotes to only those most essential. Authors are responsible for accuracy of all quoted material.
  • Author Biography/Law School Information –Please submit the following:
    1. Full name of author (First Middle Last)
    2. Contact information for author, including e-mail address and phone number
    3. Author photo (recommended but optional) in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 150 x 200 pixels.
    4. A brief professional biography of the author, running approximately 100 words or 1,200 characters including spaces.
    5. The law school’s logo in JPEG format with a maximum file size of 1 MB and in RGB color format. Image size must be at least 300 pixels high or 300 pixels wide.
    6. The law school mailing address, main phone number, contact e-mail address, school Web site address, and a brief description of the law school, running no more than 125 words or 2,100 characters including spaces.

To enter, an applicant and any co-authors must be enrolled in an accredited law school within the fifty United States. Employees of The National Law Review are not eligible. Entries must include ALL information listed above to be considered and must be submitted to the National Law Review at lawschools@natlawreview.com. 

Any entry which does not meet the requirements and deadlines outlined herein will be disqualified from the competition. Winners will be notified via e-mail and/or telephone call at least one day prior to publication. Winners will be publicly announced on the NLR home page and via other media.  All prizes are contingent on recipient signing an Affidavit of Eligibility, Publicity Release and Liability Waiver. The National Law Review 2011 Law Student Writing Competition is sponsored by The National Law Forum, LLC, d/b/a The National Law Review, 4700 Gilbert, Suite 47 (#230), Western Springs, IL 60558, 708-357-3317. This contest is void where prohibited by law. All entries must be submitted in accordance with The National Law Review Contributor Guidelines per the terms of the contest rules. A list of winners may be obtained by writing to the address listed above. There is no fee to enter this contest.

Congratulations to our Spring 2011 Law Student Writing Contest Winners!

Spring 2011:

IKEA’s Way to Eternal Life: A Deconstruction of the Furniture Giant’s International Tax Practices

Congrats to Julia W. Gin of Santa Clara University School of Law winner of the National Law Review’s Spring Legal Writing Contest!  Julia’s topic discusses IKEA’s Interational Tax Practices

Since its first store in Sweden in 1958, IKEA has rapidly become an international household name.  The large Swedish flag-inspired blue and yellow buildings are a beacon for anyone searching for a wide selection of affordable modern furniture for varying tastes.  On its face, IKEA appears as any other large corporation that has taken the world by storm but with a few notable exceptions.  Firstly, the physical IKEA stores and business operations are owned by an untaxed two-pronged nonprofit foundation in the Netherlands: the Stichting INGKA Foundation and the Stichting IKEA Foundation.  Secondly, the IKEA Concept and IKEA trademark rights are owned by Inter IKEA Systems B.V., which is operated through a variety of companies based in the Dutch Antilles, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein that are all controlled by IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad himself and his three sons through the untaxed Interogo Foundation.  Thirdly, Kamprad moved from his hometown in Sweden to Denmark and finally to Switzerland, successfully benefitting from ideal tax regulations, especially the generous Swiss tax breaks for wealthy foreigners.[1]  This is only a brief summary of what is so unique about IKEA, aside from its eccentric founder.

The intricate corporate structure was created to give IKEA eternal life through lessening the international tax impacts and maintaining the foundational IKEA corporate culture.  This paper will disentangle the numerous organizations within the IKEA system while delineating their interrelationships, and explore the current tax practices of IKEA and the tax-induced reasons for this particular setup.

International IKEA Business Structure and Tax Practices

Kamprad registered IKEA as a company in Sweden in 1943.  Soon after IKEA’s booming success within Sweden, Kamprad became concerned with the high Swedish inheritance and wealth taxes, and family squabbles that could potentially tear the company apart.[2]  In his own words, “as an emerging global company, I also had to ensure that we were structured in tax efficient ways to avoid the burden of double taxation.”[3]  Kamprad met with the National Tax Board in Stockholm to discuss IKEA’s departure from Sweden and then with Denmark’s tax board to clarify what the tax benefits would be if he moved IKEA across the Drogden Strait.[4]  In 1973, Kamprad moved the company to Denmark and began the plan to secure IKEA’s immortality.  In his own words:

When the family and I moved abroad, we automatically received permission from the National Bank [of Sweden] to take with us 100,000 kronor[5] per member of the family.  That half-million was enough to start a foundation in Switzerland, where real estate may not be owned by foreigners, and to found a whole series of companies in different countries with different tax regulations—from Switzerland and Holland to Panama, Luxembourg, and the Dutch Antilles.  Our many lawyers quite often had completed registration of companies in their back pockets in reserve, so the process was soon completed and not particularly expensive.  Many of the companies have never been used.[6]

It is unknown how many companies are still unused and in reserve, but there are many organizations currently active in IKEA operations.

The international IKEA business structure involves the following main entities:

  • Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA Foundation—will refer to as the IKEA Foundation (Netherlands)
  • INGKA Holding B.V. (Luxembourg)
  • Inter IKEA Systems B.V. (Netherlands)
    • Inter IKEA Holding S.A. (Luxembourg)
    • Inter IKEA Holding (Dutch Antilles)
    • I.I. Holding (Luxembourg)
  • IKANO Group (Liechtenstein)
  • Interogo Foundation (Liechtenstein)

More IKEA entities are involved within the main controlling bodies and there are likely additional IKEA related companies that have either ownership or an interest in IKEA business.[7]

IKEA Business and Ownership Structure

IKEA Foundation (Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA Foundation)

Formed in 1982 in Leiden, Netherlands, the IKEA Foundation, made up of the Stichting[8] INGKA and Stichting IKEA foundations, has been the world’s biggest charity since 1984 when Kamprad gave the Foundation the irrevocable gift of 100% of his equity in the company.[9]  

The Netherlands was chosen as an ideal country by a team of lawyers from Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, France, and England because it had “the oldest and most stable legislation on foundations.”[10]  As an added incentive, Dutch foundations have loose regulations, little oversight, and “are not, for instance, legally obliged to publish their accounts.”[11]

The IKEA Foundation is based on the double Dutch foundation system.  The Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA are technically one foundation but operate as two, with Stichting INGKA as the owner foundation and Stichting IKEA as the charitable foundation.[12]  Stichting INGKA holds all the shares in the for-profit INGKA Holding B.V., which is the group of companies that controls all of the IKEA stores worldwide and will be discussed below.[13]  Stichting IKEA is to receive money from the Stichting INGKA arm for distribution towards the fulfillment of the IKEA Foundation’s mission: “to promote and support innovation in the field of architectural and interior design.”[14]  The IKEA Foundation must also “ensure ‘the continuity and growth’ of the IKEA Group” and is required to maintain INGKA Holding B.V.[15]  To ensure this mission is carried out, the IKEA Foundation is run by a five-person executive committee with two seats reserved for the Kamprad family[16] (which is chaired by Kamprad and has also included Kamprad’s wife, Margaretha Stennert) that appoints its own committee members and also appoints the board of directors of INGKA Holding B.V.[17]

The IKEA Foundation is registered in the Netherlands as an “Institution for the General Good”[18] charitable foundation, which is the equivalent of a 501(c)(3) in the United States.[19]  Qualification as a charitable foundation under Dutch law is relatively simple with only a few conditions that need to be met:

  • A request for charitable foundation status filed with the Dutch tax authority
  • The purpose of the foundation is not to generate profit and has a charitable purpose
  • An individual or entity may not use assets as if owned by the individual or entity
  • Board members may not receive remuneration other than costs
  • If dissolved, all funds must go towards a charitable purpose
  • The foundation’s assets must not exceed what is required for a reasonable fulfillment of the foundation’s charitable purpose.[20]

In addition, Dutch charitable foundations receive the following benefits:

  • Gifts are tax deductible for Dutch income and corporate income tax purposes, and are not subject to the Dutch gift tax,
  • Inheritances are not subject to Dutch inheritance tax, and
  • Are not subject to Dutch corporate income tax on any income.[21]

With the IKEA Foundation categorized as a Dutch charitable foundation, they are not required to pay taxes on any income from the IKEA business.  In 2010, IKEA earned almost $4.1 billion[22] and as of 2006 the IKEA Foundations net worth was at least $36 billion[23].  In order to fulfill the mission of “innovation in the field of architectural and interior design”, the IKEA Foundation gave one grant in 2005 to the Swedish Lund Institution for $1.7 million.[24] [25]  Additionally, IKEA’s new BoKlok flat-pack housing could be seen as a contribution to innovating architecture.[26]

Ultimately, any profit made from the INGKA Foundation through its ownership of INGKA Holding B.V. is not taxed in the Netherlands.

INGKA Holding B.V.

INGKA Holding B.V. may be owned by the IKEA Foundation, but is itself a private company registered in Leiden, Netherlands.[27]  INGKA Holding B.V. has physical ownership of the entire IKEA business.  This currently includes “more than 300 stores in 35 countries and more than 130,000 co-workers.”[28]  It is the parent company for the IKEA Group which includes, but is not limited to: IKEA Group Management[29], Swedwood[30], IKEA Services B.V. and IKEA Services AB[31], and IKEA of Sweden[32].[33]  To manage the IKEA Group, INGKA Holding B.V. assigns INGKA International A/S, headquartered in Humlebæk, Denmark, to run the executive functions of INGKA Holding B.V. and to manage international store business.  This includes “purchasing, product range, distribution, sales, and sometimes manufacturing.”[34]

INGKA Holding B.V.’s ownership and control of the physical IKEA stores and business operations is entirely separate from the IKEA Concept, which is exclusively owned by Inter IKEA Systems B.V.

Inter IKEA Systems B.V.

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is registered in Delft, Netherlands.  It owns the IKEA concept and trademark, and controls the IKEA Concept franchise.[35]  This “Sacred Concept” controls the brand name, copyrights, regulations, and anything else related to the idea of IKEA.[36]  The root of the Concept can be found in Kamprad’s Testament of a Furniture Dealer[37], “to create a better everyday life for the many people by offering a wide range of well-designed, functional home furnishing products at prices so low that as many people as possible will be able to afford them.”[38]

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is the entity that approves or denies a franchise permit to run any IKEA store.[39]  It also ensures that every franchisee follows the exact IKEA Concept with very specific store designs including the children’s playroom, the restaurant, and the set-up that leads the shopper around the store in a guided pathway.[40]  Store managers must send a written request to deviate from the IKEA Concept, and if the rules are broken without permission Inter IKEA Systems B.V. has the power to stop supplies and have the rogue store’s IKEA sign taken down.[41]

 For its efforts as the IKEA Concept franchisor, Inter IKEA Systems B.V. receives a generous 3% royalty from the global sales from all the IKEA stores worldwide[42], an income of 80 billion Swedish Kronor[43] in the last 20 years.[44]  This figure is expected to rise considering in 2010 “IKEA’s sales grew by 7.7% to 23.1 billion [Euros] and net profit increased by 6.1% to 2.7 billion [Euros].”[45]  Inter IKEA Systems makes large payments to another company registered in Luxembourg called I.I. Holding (unknown ownership and no website), and both companies paid 19 million Euros in taxes in 2004 of a combined profit of 328 million Euros.[46]

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. itself is owned by parent company Inter IKEA Holding S.A. which is registered in Luxembourg, and is also a part of the identically named Inter IKEA Holding S.A. that is registered in the Dutch Antilles.[47]  Until its liquidation in 2009[48], a “trust company” headquartered in Curaçao operated the Inter IKEA Holding S.A. of the Dutch Antilles[49].  Inter IKEA Holding S.A. had post-tax profits of $1.7 billion in 2004.[50]  Further details on Inter IKEA Holding S.A. are discussed below within the context of the Interogo Foundation.

 Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is assisted in preserving the IKEA Concept by the IKANO Group, which is a company owned and controlled by Kamprad’s three sons, Peter, Jonas and Matias.[51]

IKANO Group

The IKANO Group was founded in 1988 and is owned by the Kamprad family with fund assets of 3.4 billion Euros in 2009.[52] [53]  The IKANO Group is based in Liechtenstein, with the vision “to inspire our people to build profitable companies that dare to be different and are fun to work for.”[54]  The IKANO Group contains all of the Kamprad-owned companies that were not given to the IKEA Foundation[55]and is primarily concerned with managing the Kamprad family fortune[56].  Peter, Jonas and Matias are currently on the IKANO Board of Directors with Kamprad listed as a Senior Advisor.[57]  Kamprad gave IKANO to his sons to run as they see fit[58] as separate but in support of the IKEA entity.

 “IKANO fundamentally safeguards the same virtues—simplicity, thrift, and so on—that mark IKEA” through its activities in finance, insurance, retail and property.[59]  Though the finance division is most profitable, the property stock of the IKANO Group will ensure the Kamprad family’s economic security.[60]  Most notably, IKANO had made early investments in shopping centers near IKEA stores[61], which must be extremely lucrative at present day considering the rapid development of the surrounding areas that generally radiates from the opening of new IKEA stores.  Though IKEA and IKANO had absolute ties when Kamprad chaired both entities until 1998[62], it will be no surprise if the two continue a close business relationship.

Initially, it was believed that IKANO was the Kamprad family’s covert ownership and controlling interests in IKEA.  However, with the recent discovery of the Interogo Foundation, it appears that IKANO is indeed an independent and merely supporting entity of IKEA.

Interogo Foundation

According to Kamprad himself, the “Interogo Foundation, based in Liechtenstein, is the owner of the Inter IKEA Holding S.A., the parent company of the Inter IKEA Group…[and] is controlled by my family…”[63]  The Inter IKEA Group includes Inter IKEA Systems B.V. (controls and owns the lucrative IKEA Concept) and Inter IKEA Holding S.A. (which owns Inter IKEA Systems B.V.).  As discussed earlier, the identically named Inter IKEA Holding S.A. of the Dutch Antilles that was operating in Curaçao was liquidated, which can only be done by the owner of the company[64], now known to be the Interogo Foundation.

The Interogo Foundation was created by Kamprad in 1989[65] [66] with the purpose of investing in the expansion of IKEA to ensure its longevity as a method of financial security.[67]

Liechtenstein is a strategic choice for many companies because of its closed system of rules and regulations which lead to its reputation as an international tax-haven[68].  Furthermore, Liechtenstein has “liberal principles of [ ] foundation law” with the purpose of attracting lucrative investments.[69]  Some of the advantages of Liechtenstein foundations include:

  • Political and economic stability, and a central European location
  • A liberal and business-oriented legal system
  • Stringent professional secrecy regulations for banks and trustees
  • Effective methods of preserving family wealth over generations
  • Efficient protection of assets from third parties
  • Efficient international tax planning
  • Flexibility regarding the advancement of charitable purposes, and
  • Discretion and anonymity with regard to the founder’s wishes.[70]

These benefits create the perfect environment for the foundation envisioned by Kamprad to ensure his family would not be plagued by the high inheritance taxes in Sweden.

“[Interogo] Funds could also be used to support individual IKEA retailers experiencing financial difficulties and for philanthropic purposes”[71] as an additional safeguard to IKEA’s immortality.  Liechtenstein law governing charitable foundations follows a “Criterion of Preponderance” which allows a foundation to be classified as charitable if the majority of activities are dedicated to charitable versus private purposes.[72]  The current law defines “charitable” as:

…purposes which help fostering the public benefit… This is especially the case if the activities of the foundation foster the public benefit in the charitable, religious, humanitarian, scientific, cultural, moral, social, sporting or ecological field, even if the activities are only in favour of a determined circle of persons.[73]

A Swedish documentary aired on the Swedish public network SVT on January 26, 2011 by the Uppdrag granskning investigative news program[74] stated that the Interogo Foundation has $15.4 billion in funds.[75]  2010 was the first year in the last two decades of its existence that the foundation published detailed figures on sales, profits, assets, and liabilities.[76]

The Uppdrag granskning documentary further stated that the 3% of IKEA sales royalties from all IKEA stores worldwide that are supposed to go to Inter IKEA Systems B.V. for use of the IKEA Concept and franchise actually goes directly to the Interogo Foundation and is tax-free.[77]  Interogo’s purpose of ensuring IKEA’s prolonged existence and assisting in IKEA’s philanthropic ventures would seem to indicate a mixed family foundation[78] which supports the Kamprad family while also contributing to charitable institutions.  However, if the tax treatment of Interogo’s business venture through Inter IKEA Systems B.V. holds true, this would signify Interogo’s treatment as a purely charitable foundation under Liechtenstein law.  Liechtenstein law does acknowledge that that this is not a typical allowance for foundations:

Foundations, in principle, may not engage in commercial activities.  However, the foundation may pursue commercial trade when this serves the attainment of its non-commercial purpose, or the nature and extent of the foundation’s assets (e.g. the holding of participations) necessitates business operations.[79]

If Interogo’s goal of supporting IKEA’s possible philanthropic projects is upheld by Liechtenstein as its main non-commercial purpose and the ownership of Inter IKEA Systems B.V. necessitates business operations, Interogo would legally not be taxed. 

There is also a supreme focus for Liechtenstein foundations on the intent and purpose of the founder.  The founder provides the purpose of the foundation, which is fixed and unchangeable once the foundation has its own legal personality, and has the sole power to revoke the foundation.[80]  If the founder chooses to revoke the foundation, the assets of the foundation revert to the founder.[81]  The founder may name an “ascertainable class of beneficiaries”, be assisted by a family council, and manage the foundation’s assets personally.[82]  A Liechtenstein foundation may exist indefinitely or until the founder’s purpose is realized.[83]  With Interogo founder Kamprad’s goal of IKEA’s eternal life, Interogo will be in operation for as long as IKEA is in existence, aided by both IKANO and Interogo. 

Additionally, certain bylaws of the foundation leave little doubt that Interogo was intended to be left to its own devices:

  • Documents about the foundation are not allowed be shown to outsiders or foreign authorities
  • Proceeds may be paid in the form of grants to individuals or organizations related to architecture, interior design, and consumer products
  • The Kamprad family has “total control” over the executive board of the Inter IKEA Group[84]

The revelation of Interogo’s existence, control over IKEA, and ownership by the Kamprad family is unfortunate for the founder considering his consistent stance that “he and his family no longer controlled the global furniture giant.[85]”  He has further stated “that his influence over the company is limited and that a Dutch charitable foundation, Stichting INGKA Foundation, directed [IKEA].[86]” [87]

If the Inter IKEA Group owns the IKEA Concept, and the Kamprad-owned Interogo controls the Inter IKEA Group, it follows that Kamprad still has control over the essential part of the IKEA system.  This same ownership is what the public had been led to believe was gifted to the IKEA Foundation that still owns the physical IKEA business, which is arguably worthless without the IKEA Concept. 

Impact to the International Community

Despite the tax-free status of both the IKEA Foundation and the Interogo Foundation, according to Kamprad, the Inter IKEA Group (Inter IKEA Holding S.A. and Inter IKEA Systems B.V.) and the IKEA Group companies pay taxes like any other corporation in every country of operation.[88]  He emphasizes that those operations comply with relevant laws and regulations.[89]

The unique corporate structure of IKEA is likely one of a kind.  However, other companies that may have a similar complex and international configuration would be a challenge for the international community to identify.  Whatever the case, it is clear that international corporations are constantly operating in new and innovative ways leaving lawmakers in all countries racing to keep up.


[1] Kamprad is considered the richest man in the world and benefits from Switzerland’s lump-sum taxation that is only offered to a few thousand foreigners living in Switzerland.  With this taxation system, Kamprad pays 200,000 Swiss francs in taxes annually, which is approximately $215,933 USD according to XE Currency on April 5, 2011 with 1 Swiss franc worth a little over $1 USD. The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group (2007), http://www.evb.ch/cm_data/
Ikea_e.pdf

[2] Bertil Torekull, Leading by Design 88 (ed. Wahlström & Widstrand 1998) (1999).

[3] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments, (Jan 28, 2011), available athttp://www.ikea.com/at/de/about_ikea/newsitem/
statement_Ingvar_Kamprad_comments.

[4] Id. at 91.

[5] Would be around $15,816.95 USD according to XE Currency on April 4, 2011 with 1 Swedish Kronor worth almost 16 cents USD.

[6] Torekull at 89.

[7] For example, IKEA Catalogue Services AB which is based in IKEA birthplace Älmhult, Sweden is where the 300 plus page IKEA catalogue is created.  It is unknown who owns, controls, or pays IKEA Catalogue Services AB.
IKEA, The IKEA Catalogue – the world’s largest free publication (2003),http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_GB/
about_ikea/press_room/thecatalogue.pdf.

[8] Stichting is Dutch for “foundation”.

[9] IKEAFANS, IKEA Corporate Structure,available athttp://www.ikeafans.com/ikea/ikea-corporate/ikea-corporate-structure.html.

[10] Torekull at 92.

[11] Economist, Flat-pack accounting, (May 11, 2006), available athttp://www.economist.com/node/6919139/.

[12] Id. at 99.

[13] Id.

[14] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[15] Id.

[16] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[17] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[18] Algemeen nut beogende instelling, acronym ANBI, is Dutch for “institution for general benefit”.

[19] Rich Cohen, Nonprofit Newswire of The Nonprofit Quarterly: The biggest and stingiest foundation in the world, (October 19, 2009), available athttp://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=1554:nonprofit-newswire-october-19-2009&catid=155:nonprofit-newswire&Itemid=986

[20] Spigthoff Law Firm, The Legal 500: The Use of Foundations in the Netherlands, (Aug 2008), available athttp://www.legal500.com/c/netherlands/developments/5049.

[21] Id.

[22] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder, (Jan 27, 2011), available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14799699,00.html.

[23] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[24] Cohen, Nonprofit Newswire.

[25] IKEA won a Public Eye Global Awards through nominations by SOMO (Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen, literal English translation: Foundation Research Multinational Companies) in the Netherlands and the Berne Declaration (a corporate social responsibility NGO in Switzerland).  The award cites payment of taxes as a central element of corporate social responsibility and criticizes IKEA’s lack of tax payment for Kamprad’s individual gain and lack of contributions to charitable purposes. Id. and The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group.

[26] The BoKlok venture is a joint-project between IKEA and the Skansa company to provide cost efficient, sustainable, and low energy consumption track apartments and housing at a low cost for the consumer based on the IKEA model of construction.  BoKlok housing is currently in operation in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom.
BoKlok, The Product Familyavailable at http://www.boklok.com/UK/About-BoKlok/The-BoKlok-Products2/.

[27] Economist, The secret of IKEA’s success: Lean operations, shrewd tax planning and tight control, (Feb 24, 2011), available athttp://www.economist.com/node/18229400.

[28] Inter IKEA Systems B.V., The IKEA Concept: How the IKEA Concept Began 2,http://franchisor.ikea.com/
showContent.asp?swfId=concept3.

[29] IKEA Group Management contains the executives of IKEA, including the President and CEO, Vice President, Head of Human Resources, and other corporate leadership positions.

[30] Swedwood is the group of industrial companies responsible for manufacturing all IKEA products.  This group has concentrated manufacturing in Poland, Slovakia, and Russia but have plants around the world.

[31] IKEA Services B.V. and IKEA Services AB are located in Sweden and the Netherlands and serve to support all the work of the IKEA Group companies.

[32] IKEA of Sweden is located at the birthplace of IKEA in Älmhult, Sweden and is the hub for all of the designers that create and develop the range of IKEA products.

[33] IKEAFANS, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[34] Torekull at 99.

[35] IKEA Fans, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[36] Torekull at 100.

[37] Kamprad wrote The Testament of a Furniture Dealer at the behest of the IKEA staff in Sweden before he emigrated to Denmark.  It includes nine “commandments”: 1. The Product Range is Our Identity, 2. The IKEA Spirit is Strong and Living Reality, 3. Profit Gives us Resources, 4. Reaching Good Results with Small Means, 5. Simplicity Is a Virtue, 6. Doing It a Different Way, 7. Concentration Is Important to Our Success, 8. Taking Responsibility Is a Privilege, and 9. Most Things Still Remain to Be Done—A Glorious Future.  These Kamprad principles serve as a textbook for manager training.  The Testament is published by Inter IKEA Systems B.V. and is given to all new employees.  Torekull at 111-114 and Bloomberg Businessweek, Ikea: How the Swedish Retailer became a global cult brand, (Nov. 14, 2005), available athttp://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959001.htm.

[38] Ingvar Kamprad, The Testament of a Furniture Dealer and A Little IKEA Dictionary 6(2007), http://www.emu.dk/
erhverv/merkantil_caseeksamen/doc/ikea/english_testament_2007.pdf.

[39] Torekull at 100.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Economist,The secret of IKEA’s success.

[43] Would be over $12 billion USD according to XE Currency on April 4, 2011 with 1 Swedish Kronor worth almost 16 cents USD.

[44] Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review), Granskningen av Ikea ett brett samarbetsprojekt (The review of Ikea, a broad collaborative), (Jan 26, 2011), available at http://svt.se/2.150075/1.2304474/granskningen_av_ikea_ett_brett_samarbet….

[45] Economist, The secret of IKEA’s success.

[46] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[47] IKEAFANS, IKEA Corporate Structure.

[48]Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review).

[49] The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group.

[50] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[51] Torekull at 103-4 and 107.

[52] IKANO, Facts & Figuresavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-facts-and-figures.html.

[53] The 1988 foundation date is according to the IKANO Group website, however, in Torekull’s book on IKEA Leading by Design IKANO is said to be one of the many companies founded by Kamprad and his lawyers before his departure from Sweden to Denmark in the 1950s.  Torekull at 104.

[54] IKANO, Our essenceavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-our-essence.html.

[55] Torekull at 104.

[56] IKEAFANS, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[57] IKANO, Group Boardavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-group-board.html.

[58] Torekull at 103-104.

[59] Id. at 105-106.

[60] Id. at 106.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[64] Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review).

[65] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation, (Jan 26, 2011), available at http://www.thelocal.se/31650/20110126.

[66] This date is different from the 1980 foundation date that was in a statement by Kamprad released ahead of the documentary according to Deutsche Welle inSwedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[67] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[68] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[69] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes, available athttp://www.marxerpartner.com/fileadmin/user_upload/marxerpartner/pdf-dow…. Note: though there were revisions to Liechtenstein Foundation laws (Art. 552-570 Persons and Companies Act (PGR)) that entered into force on Apr 1, 2009, none of these revisions impact foundations created prior to that date.  Additionally, the changes were intended to clarify rules but in no way limit or initiate forceful regulations on Liechtensteiner foundations (ex. the new law necessitates the appointment of an auditor for charitable foundations, which does not apply to Interogo).  The intent was to maintain the country’s attractive laws.

[70] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth, available at http://www.kaiser-ritter-partner.com/uploads/media/Liechtensteinische_st….

[71] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[72] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes.

[73] Id. (emphasis added)

[74] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[75] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[76] Economist, The Secret of IKEA’s success.

[77] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[78] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[79] Id.

[80] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[81] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes.

[82] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[83] Id.

[84] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[85] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[86] Id.

[87] Despite this claim, it is known that the IKEA store managers are still “trained and groomed by Kamprad himself” at workshops in IKEA mecca, Älmhult. Bloomberg Businessweek, Ikea: How the Swedish Retailer became a global cult brand, (Nov 14, 2005), available athttp://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959001.htm.

[88] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[89] Id.

© 2011 Julia W. Gin

The Need for a Detailed Procedure of Judicial Review of Civil Rights Arbitration Awards after Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson

Congrats to Nicole Farbes-Lyons of St. John’s University School of Law – winner of the National Law Review Spring Student Legal Writing Contest.  Nicole’s topic  explored several components underlying the Supreme Court’s recent Rent-A-Center decision and the subsequent need for clearer guidance per civil rights arbitration.  

Introduction

The November 17, 2010 New York Times article “Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance” blasted the Supreme Court of the United States for its issuance of sweeping and politically polarized decisions, and criticized the quality of the Court’s “judicial craftsmanship” by positing that “[i]n decisions on questions great and small, the Court often provides only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts. And it increasingly does so at enormous length.” [1] The article continued that critics of the Court’s work “point to reasoning that fails to provide clear guidance to lower courts,” and described the Court’s recent rulings as “fuzzy” and “unwieldy.”[2]

In the past, the Supreme Court has been notably divided over issues such as abortion and the death penalty. But the “fuzziness” in many recent rulings is owed to an obvious ideological divide in the area of arbitration. Over the past decades, a significant number of controversial decisions have arisen from the considerable attention (and contention) the Supreme Court has given arbitration as it endeavors to counterbalance pro-arbitration rulings and assurances that arbitration does not erode sufficient, constitutionally proscribed judicial control.[3] However, these decisions have been largely criticized as providing, at best, a fuzzy blueprint for lower courts to design more specific rules.

Rent-A-Center v. Jackson [4] is the most controversial, ideologically split arbitration decision of the Supreme Court’s recent term. The central issue arose because Rent-A-Center requires employees to sign a two-part arbitration agreement as a condition of their employment, stipulating first that all disputes arising out of the employment relationship be settled by arbitration, and second, that an arbitrator must settle all challenges to the validity of the arbitration agreement.[5] When plaintiff Jackson, a Rent-A-Center account manager, brought a 42 USC § 1981(a) / 42 USC §§. 2000(e)(2) employment discrimination claim against the company, Rent-A-Center insisted that the claim be resolved through arbitration.[6]

Jackson argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it denied him meaningful and appropriate access to court for a satisfactory remedy in the exact way prohibited by federal statute. Rent-A-Center argued that this threshold question of whether there was a valid and fair agreement to arbitrate Jackson’s employment grievance was a matter for the arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Jackson asserted that because the unconscionability challenge went to both parts of the arbitration agreement, arbitrability of the agreement was a question for the court.

By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court ruled in Rent-A-Center’s favor. Led by Justice Scalia, the Court held that if Jackson had solely questioned the second part of the contract – that the agreement must be arbitrated – then the challenge would have been proper before the court. But because the employee’s grounds for unconscionability applied equally to the agreement to arbitrate all employment disputes, the general question of unconscionability was no longer a “gateway issue” before the court, and was a matter for the arbitrator.[7]

Though it generated very little media attention, the majority decision in Rent-A-Center incited much sideline animosity. Critics of Rent-A-Center argued that the case is incorrectly decided and the latest, deadliest blow to consumers and employees in a trajectory of pro-arbitration rulings that are supplanting the constitutional right to court access with compulsory arbitration. Lawmakers have admonished the Court’s short-sightedness, and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy referred to Rent-A-Center as “a blow to our nation’s civil rights laws”.[8] Throughout the blogosphere, commentators described Rent-A-Center as “audacious,” and, as Justice Stephens described in his dissent, “fantastic”.[9]

In addition to the political arguments arising from Rent-A-Center, critics also raised concerns about procedural challenges facing professional arbitrators in light of the Court’s holding. The recent case law culminating in Rent-A-Center has drawn criticism for its lack of guidance instructing either the courts or arbitrators about their respective roles within civil rights arbitration. Broad principles of arbitration and specific doctrines of the Supreme Court encourage but do not demand that the federal protections of civil rights statutes must be enforced in private arbitration. Though the Supreme Court gives assurance that courts may reject arbitral awards for “manifest disregard,” in regards to statutory protection, the courts do not agree as to whether a showing of manifest disregard is proper grounds for vacating an arbitration award.[10]

This conundrum is disturbing, and the doctrine culminating in Rent-A-Centercreates, at best, a blueprint for potential interpretations of arbitration agreements and judicial remedies for arbitrable disputes. The question left before the legal community is, then, whether the Supreme Court’s next step will be to clarify a specific process for civil rights arbitration. Until then, the courts will likely remain divided over the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, statute-created court access can be circumvented with compulsory arbitration agreements, without violating due process of law.

This paper will explore several components underlying the Rent-A-Centerdecision and the subsequent need for clearer guidance per civil rights arbitration. First, this paper will prepare the background and context of civil rights arbitration by exploring the legislative history and statutory framework of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and the Civil Rights Acts, particularly focusing on 42 USC §1981(a) right to recovery under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Second, this paper will introduce problems of separability stemming from the Supreme Court’s efforts to increase the preemptive reach of the FAA under a broad definition of interstate commerce. Finally, this paper will assert potential remedies towards ameliorating the ambiguities that culminate in the Rent-A-Center decision, in light of this judicial and legislative history.

I. Background and Context of Civil Rights Arbitration

A. Statutory History of 42 USC § 1981

The civil right at issue in Rent-A-Center was Jackson’s right to protection against racial discrimination under 42 USC § 1981. During the Reconstruction Era, restrictive employment covenants were an acknowledged social evil used by former slave owners to deny freedmen any opportunity to exercise their rights to property and employment.[11] Recognizing the elements that impaired the emancipated slaves’ ability to obtain a fair trial in former Confederate states, Congress observed that, “To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not able to assert and maintain his right in a court of justice is a negation of terms.”[12]

The framers of the Civil Rights Acts had a specific legislative goal of rooting out discrimination. The Reconstruction Congress determined that the Civil Rights Acts would only have force if the statutes also created a clear mechanism of judicial enforcement, and delineated a remedy at law that would ensure all Americans the right to a fair tribunal.[13] Accordingly, this Congress created statutes providing a federal right to action as protecting against discrimination.[14]

The legislative history behind the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts is not antiquated, and the Supreme Court has recognized that, “ameliorating the effects of past racial discrimination [is] a national policy objective of the highest priority.‟[15]A predominant effect of the Civil Rights Acts, particularly 42 USC § 1981(a), is that federal law prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, gender, disability, and sexual orientation. In 1991, the 102nd Congress expanded the provisions of 42 USC § 1981(a) and subsequent law to provide statutory basis for arbitration and alternative dispute resolution to “the extent available by law.”[16]

B. Statutory History of the Federal Arbitration Act

Formal arbitration practices can be dated to the Middle Ages, and many primary themes continue in modern arbitration: greater confidentiality, group amelioration, arbitrators with particularized commercial expertise, less formality than court proceedings, greater expedition, compromise, judgments that are final in merit, and the idea that, optimally, resolution of the dispute allows the parties to maintain favorable business relationships.

Despite this equitable premise, many difficulties hindered arbitration until the 20th century, such as difficulty in enforcing awards and judicial concern over jurisdictional ouster. In 1920, the New York State legislature enacted the first modern arbitration statute, which was followed in 1925 by enactment of the FAA and, subsequently, the advent of arbitrable statutes in most of the states.[17]Core principles of the New York statute were cloned in the FAA, particularly the idea that a pre-dispute agreement compelling arbitration is contractual, and therefore a litigant must assert a valid contract defense such as fraud, duress or unconscionability to prove the agreement is unenforceable.[18]Where a counter party to a pre-dispute agreement brings a case, a party can move to stay the court case by showing the agreement was arbitrable or, if there is general recalcitrance, move to compel arbitration.[19]

C. Common Criticisms of Modern Arbitration

These attributes of modern arbitration have been greatly criticized in the context of statutory arbitration, particularly in respect to Title VII claims.[20] In the legal discussions surrounding Rent-A-Center, Jackson’s supporters argued that he, and similarly situated employees, did not have a choice about whether to sign the Rent-A-Center mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement; Jackson had no opportunity to negotiate its terms, and the failure to sign would have precluded employment.[21] Additionally, supporters argued that Jackson should not have been expected to understand that his acceptance of the employment agreement was a waiver of his statutory right to court access.[22] Finally, supporters believed that, even in favorable arbitration circumstances, acceptance of all arbitration terms was likely to favor the employer with respect to fees, discovery, and procedures.[23] However, the Supreme Court has noted many times that these criticisms are not unique to civil rights arbitration but instead are inherent to the very nature of dispute resolution.[24]

The Court of Appeals has noted the issue of enforceability in employment contracts mandating employees’ waiver of court access with respect to all employment disputes relating to discrimination.[25] The court described an arbitrator who resolves statutory claims as a “private judge,” but noted that, unlike a judge, an arbitrator is not publicly accountable and the lack of public accountability may favor companies over individuals.[26] The court also acknowledged that confidentiality is won at the cost of binding precedent, which presents both a potential barrier to future plaintiffs’ ability to locate necessary information as well as reduced effectiveness of binding precedence.[27] The Court of Appeals also noted that the competence of an arbitrator to analyze and decide purely legal issues in connection with statutory claims might be questioned because arbitrators do not have to be legal professionals.[28] Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals dismissed all of these criticisms by stating that the Supreme Court has decided that, as a general rule, employment discrimination claims are fully subject to binding arbitration.[29]

The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals’ dismissal of these critical issues does little to assuage the valid concerns raised regarding civil rights’ arbitration.[30]Particularly in light of the legislative history substantiating 42 USC § 1981, the Court of Appeals’ deference, without meaningful underlying analysis behind its decision, is demonstrative of the enormous lack of guidance criticized by the New York Times.

II. The Preemptive Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act

A. Basic Principles of Federal Preemption in Arbitration

The FAA is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction.[31]The FAA does not vest exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts though it creates the body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating arbitration.[32] Unless there is either a federal question or complete diversity, it is up to the state courts to apply the FAA and the federal case law standards for its implementation in any cases involving interstate commerce.[33]

Some, including some Supreme Court Justices, take this to mean that the congressional intent was that the FAA should only apply in federal court as a federal remedy.[34] The disagreement between jurists of the correct application of the FAA is, at least, indicative of the lack of clarity in the congressional intention behind the Act. The FAA says that it applies to all matters involving “interstate commerce.”[35] However, interstate commerce of 1925 was a restricted concept, to the point that a business’ involvement in interstate activity did not create sufficient minimum contact to assert jurisdiction over it.[36] Therefore, it is questionable whether this statutory language should be imposed upon by a modern definition of interstate commerce.

B. Federal Preemption of the FAA and Substantive Law Under Erie

Additionally, the Supreme Court did not distinguish substantive diversity of state versus federal law until Erie v. Tompkins in 1938.[37] Under Erie, state contract law is applied to interpret the substantive meaning of the arbitration agreement.[38] Within the context of preemption – under which interstate commerce is broadly sweeping, without regard to its substantial impact – the Court has construed the FAA as broadly as the constitutional limit.[39] Under the constitutional provisions of the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has held that state courts and legislatures cannot enact statutes restricting arbitration.[40]Likewise, states cannot ease the federal presumption of arbitrability.[41]

C. Restrictions to Separability

This imposition of preemption may be the most problematic because of its restrictions to common law contract defenses. In his dissent to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., Justice Black described the Court’s holding that the preemptive reach of the FAA compels a counter party to carry out his agreement to arbitrate even though the a court might find the agreement void because of fraud as “fantastic.”[42] Justice Black continued in his dissent that he was unconvinced that a broad preemptive application of the FAA is not a denial of a person’s rights to due process of law.[43]

Under contract law,undue influence, fraud, and unconscionability are remedies available to parties attempting to rescind a contractual clauses. Contract defenses may be ruled on separately or prior to arbitration. This makes sense because, as Justice Stevens suggested, there is no need to arbitrate an unenforceable agreement.[44] In Rent-A-Center, plaintiff Jackson presented a well-pleaded case of unconscionability, relying on the separability of contract and arbitration.[45]However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, that a defense of unconscionability should be heard by the arbitrator, entirely undermines the presumed separability of the arbitrable matter and the arbitration agreement.[46]

This ruling is unwieldy, at best. It does not make sense to compel arbitration of the validity of an arbitration agreement when a party claims to have contractual defenses to that arbitration agreement.[47] Nevertheless, the Rent-A-Centerdecision approves this conceptual change to separability. In light of the legislative intent of the FAA and Title VII, any denial of court access resulting from this faulty logic must be considered a lack of due process.[48]

III. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Post-Rent-A-Center

A. Lack of Guidance on Judicial Review of Civil Rights Arbitration

Jackson’s argument in Rent-A-Center was that the making of the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and therefore required the court to make a determination of the agreement’s legality before compelling any arbitrable review of the dispute.[49] However, as illustrated in the previous sections, even those legal minds most versed in the FAA are unable to agree whether compulsory arbitration of employment discrimination suits can be forced on employees. The Court’s ruling in Rent-A-Center dramatically affects the ability of employees to challenge the enforceability of arbitration agreements, because it sends valid challenges to arbitration to the arbitrator.[50]

However, the Rent-A-Center decision provides little guidance on judicial review of contractual defenses to arbitration. The decision does not consider the obvious question that arises from its holding: in light of this decision, has the scope of review of arbitration awards changed such that the arbitrator’s determination of whether to arbitrate is a valid ground for judicial review?

The Rent-A-Center decision is premised on the assumption that an arbitrator’s ruling on unconscionability is still subject to post-award review under the FAA.[51]In fact, Justice Scalia was insistent that an arbitrator would not be able to disregard the law when determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable.[52] However, the Rent-A-Center decision does not provide any guidance on the procedure of this scope of review.

B. The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard

Justice Scalia’s insistence that an arbitrator may not disregard the law hints at the doctrine of manifest disregard, and the validity of its application to the scope of review. The Supreme Court has ruled that, so long as the litigant may vindicate his or her statutory claim in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.[53] However, actual judicial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited under section 10 of the FAA.[54] The award may be vacated only if the proceeding was tainted with corruption, misconduct or bias; if the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority; or if the arbitrator acted in “manifest disregard of the law.”[55]

Generally, manifest disregard means that the arbitrator knew the applicable law but purposefully chose to ignore it or refused to apply it.[56] Since the inception of the doctrine, there has been a great expansion of the arbitrator’s authority over disputes.[57] This expansion of power has been so broad that, under applicable arbitration rules, the arbitrator himself may not correct his award after release for substantive deficiencies.[58] Because judicial review of arbitration awards is rare, it seems a convincing argument that manifest disregard applies in circumstances where arbitrators have exceeded their powers.[59] However, the doctrine is also contested because the language of section 10 does not specifically refer to manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards.[60]

A good deal of confusion around the extent of the arbitrator’s power and the applicability of manifest disregard is owed to the lack of guidance provided by recent Supreme Court decisions. Prior to Rent-A-Center, the Supreme Court held in Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. that the statutory grounds for judicial review under section 10 are exclusive. This ruling indicated that manifest disregard was not valid grounds for review.[61] Shortly after the Hall Streetdecision, the court concluded, in dictum, that if an arbitration panel exceeds its powers, the courts are authorized by section 10(b) of the FAA to either direct a rehearing or review the question de novo.[62] The federal circuit courts have been diametrically opposed in their rulings, as they struggle to interpret the meaning of these conflicting Supreme Court writings.[63]

C. Post-Award Judicial Review after Rent-A-Center

Historically, courts have been reluctant to even review arbitration awards, let alone vacate or demand rehearing. However, Rent-A-Center may be an opportunity for a new post-award standard of review.

Consider the following: An arbitration panel is selected to hear an employment discrimination dispute. Though the panel members are all industry experts and well versed in employment discrimination issues, they are not lawyers. The employee asserts that not only have her Title VII rights been violated, but also that the arbitration agreement is invalid because it was fraudulently induced. In its misunderstanding of applicable contract law, the panel misinterprets the employee’s claim and decides that the arbitration agreement is enforceable. The panel proceeds with arbitration.

This example illustrates a potential conflict arising from the Supreme Court’sRent-A-Center and Hall Street decisions. Does the arbitrators’ incorrect determination manifest purposeful disregard of the law? Although section 10 of the FAA does not allow a court to set aside an award for an error of law per se, an argument could be made that, in such a case as the previous scenario, the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers under section 10(a)(4) by acting on an unfamiliar area of law. However, there is no precedent on how the court should proceed to review such a situation. As the Supreme Court continues to expand the scope of post-award judicial review, more guidance and clearer judicial intent will be required to direct both arbitrators and the courts.

Professional mediator and former Columbia University Negotiation and Conflict Resolution faculty member, Bathabile Mthombeni, vehemently agrees that the Supreme Court must put forth specific rules relating to civil rights arbitration claims. Professor Mthombeni is an enthusiastic supporter of mediation, including employment and statutory mediation. However, her wariness of compulsory arbitration has increased over the years in tandem with Supreme Court pro-arbitration rulings.

“I am very concerned about the way that Rent-A-Center was decided because of the impact this has on access to the courts – especially by people who are likely the most vulnerable,” Professor Mthombeni stated. “Do potential employees really have a choice? [In the future, will] this mean that an employee cannot file with the EEOC? And, as the dissent inRent-A-Center points out, how are the lawyers arguing these cases supposed to anticipate how thinly they must slice their arguments as to the seperability of various portions of the agreement to arbitrate?”

Professor Mthombeni’s concern about the Rent-A-Center case’s impact on employees and consumers is based in her extensive knowledge of both dispute resolution and civil rights statutes. She suggests that arbitrators should be held to the same standards of evidential and procedural rules that would pertain in court. “The framers of [42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)] did not anticipate those claims being investigated or decided in arbitration. My recollection of 1981 legislation is that it is especially articulated in order to allow individuals to act as attorneys general, recognizing the particular interest that society has in rooting out civil rights violations.

“It does not seem that arbitration is a forum that champions this end. I am at least concerned about the lack of protections afforded to litigants in arbitration – in particular… the rules of evidence and civil procedure not being strictly adhered to.”

Professor Mthombeni suggests that not only should post-judicial review standards be more defined but also that the Supreme Court should parallel its rulings with evidential and procedural rules of arbitration. “Some might argue that the rules of evidence and civil procedure are themselves flawed. But at least they are part of a commonly understood scheme that has evolved and been tested over several hundred years that puts everyone on level ground – so long as they all understand the rules.”

Conclusion

In their best light, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration rulings can be dense and confusing. The Court has upheld the validity of mandatory compulsory arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s right to court access as predicated by Title VII. The Court has held that this negation of the legislative intent of Title VII is still fair, so long as arbitration provides the same statutory remedy as the court system. The Supreme Court has previously held that, because arbitration agreements are separable contractually, a party may seek judicial review of defenses to the arbitration agreement.

However, the Supreme Court has now ruled in Rent-A-Center that the entire arbitration agreement, even the contractual defenses, may be removed to the arbitrator, for a determination of whether the agreement to arbitrate is valid. This ruling is not only a confusing departure, but also requires the Supreme Court to go further with an explanation of the scope of review for civil rights arbitration.

The Rent-A-Center opinion holds that judicial review of challenges to civil rights arbitration agreements is still available under the FAA, but does not address how this review should happen. Without guidance and procedure for post-award review, and without guidance of whether manifest disregard is applicable under the FAA, the criticism of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration rulings as “sweeping”, “politically polarized,” and “fuzzy” will likely continue.


[1]Liptak, Adam. “Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance.” The New York Times Online. 17 November 2010, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.

[2]Id.

[3]See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d. Cir. 1998).

[4]Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010).

[5]Id.

[6]Id.

[7]See id.

[8]Marks, Clifford M. “Supreme Court’s Arbitration Ruling Draws Liberal’s Ire.” The Wall Street Journal Blogs. 21 June 2010, available athttp://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/21/supreme-courts-arbitration-ruling-draws-liberals-ire/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+wsj/law/feed+%28WSJ.com:+Law+Blog%29.

[9]Lithwick, Dahlia. “Justice by the Hour.” Slate.com. 26 April 2010. Accessed 10 November 2010. http://www.slate.com/id/2252001/pagenum/all/#p2.

[10]See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F.3d 415 (6th. Cir. 2008) (holding that manifest disregard is an applicable standard of review). But see Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349(5th Cir. 2009) (holding that manifest disregard is not an applicable standard of review.)

[11]A common antebellum holding, reflecting Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott,was that freedmen did not have the right to exercise the same civil rights as white men. See e.g., Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235 (1858).

[12]Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866).  See generally Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction Pt. II, 240 (1866).

[13]See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.1758 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).

[14]42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).

[15]Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976).

[16]Pub. L. 102-166, Title I §118.  There has been consistent disagreement between the circuit courts whether this statutory language refers to the extent defined by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (holding that an agreement to arbitrate employment claims could be binding even under the ADEA), versus Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (holding that an employee’s suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not foreclosed by the prior submission of his claim to arbitration).

[17]N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501.

[18]9 U.S.C. § 1-16.

[19]9 U.S.C. § 4.

[20]Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203 (2d. Cir. 1998).

[21]Brief of Amicus Curiae Service Employees International Union, Legal Aid Society, Employment Law Center, National Employment Lawyers Association, National Employment Law Project, Women’s Employment Rights Clinic, and The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy in Support of Respondent. Part I, p. 6.

[22]Id.

[23]Id.

[24]Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).

[25]Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

[26]Id. at 1477.

[27]Id.

[28]Id.

[29]Id. at 1478, see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. 26, 34-35.

[30]Id.

[31]Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26.

[32]Id.

[33]Id.

[34]Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (J. Stevens dissenting).

[35]The Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 US 52, 53 (2003).

[36]Gilmer,500 U.S. at 39-40 (J. Stevens dissenting).

[37]See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)

[38]Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995). “The Act’s provisions (about contract remedies) are important and often outcome determinative, and thus amount to “substantive”, not “procedural” provisions of law.”

[39]Id.

[40]Id.

[41]Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,388 U.S. 395, 400.

[42]Id.at 407 (J. Black dissenting).

[43]Id.

[44]Id.

[45]Id. As a matter of substantive federal law, a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause is for the arbitrator, but the issue of fraud in the inducement for the arbitration clause itself is a question for the court.Id.

[46]Id.

[47]130 S. Ct. at 2782 (J. Stevens dissenting).

[48]Gilmer,500 U.S. at 39-40 (J. Stevens dissenting).

[49]Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in Support of Respondent. Part I, p. 5-9.

[50]130 S. Ct. at 2782 (J. Stevens dissenting).

[51]9 U.S.C. § 10.

[52]130 S. Ct. at 2781.

[53]Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

[54]Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d. Cir. 1998).

[55]Merrill Lynch v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th. Cir. 1995).

[56]Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202.

[57]The concept of manifest disregard was first used by the Supreme Court inWilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

[58]A.A.A., Rule R-46.

[59]Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d. Cir.

2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

[60]9 U.S.C. § 10.

[61]Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 579, 589 (2008). “[T]he statutory text gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds [of judicial review under the FAA].” Id.

[62]Stolt-Nielsen, S.A.,130 S. Ct. at 1772.

[63]Supra note 10.

Copyright © 2011 Nicole Farbes-Lyons

Employers are Watching Your Facebook: Worker Privacy Significantly Diminished in the Digital Era

Congrats to Michael Carlin  of University of Minnesota Law School winner of the Spring 2011 National Law Review student legal writing contest winner!   Michael’s topic explores the legal basis for privacy in and out of the workplace, specifically off- duty employee monitoring in the private sector.    

  Introduction

As surveillance technology improves, employers increasingly monitor their employees, both in and out of work.  Public sector employees enjoy First and Fourth Amendment protections, but private sector employees lack these fundamental protections.  State and federal common law and statutory protections developed during the past twenty years provide a handful of remedies for private workers when employers unduly infringe upon their right to be let alone.  Nevertheless, these laws fail to provide adequate protection in light of technological advances that make employer monitoring simple, cheap, and surreptitious.   Employees, with limited exceptions, should be given greater protection of their privacy and freedom of expression both in and especially out of the workplace.

This paper explores the legal basis for privacy in and out of the workplace, specifically off- duty employee monitoring in the private sector.  Part I details this history, discusses disturbing trends in employee monitoring, and explores open legal and ethical questions stemming from the increase in employee monitoring.  Part II reviews the interests implicated by employee monitoring and suggests a balancing point to stem employer invasiveness but protect against employee malfeasance.  The current common law protections described in Part III as well as the statutory protections covered by Part IV demonstrate that, in practice most law misses the mark and leaves employees with insufficient rights against invasive monitoring.  Finally Part V proposes new federal legislation to close the gaps in employee privacy law.

I.  Social and Historical Context of Off Duty Monitoring

A.  History of Worker Monitoring

The separation between work and home life is a recent phenomenon, developed during industrialization and urbanization.[1] The typical family in preindustrial society received little privacy; “business was conducted in the house, and the house was a crowded bustling place with little opportunity for the family to retreat in isolation.”[2]  It was not until city dwellers started working predominantly in offices that the home life was thought of as separate from work life.[3]  As Justices Warren and Brandeis stated, “[t]he intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world. . .”[4]

Today privacy is taken, albeit mistakenly, for granted.[5]  However, even in the early Twentieth Century, the concept of privacy was challenged by the desire to monitor employees in and out of the workplace.  For example, Henry Ford created a “Sociology Department . . . . responsible for ferreting out immoral and undesirable behaviour on the part of Ford employees.”[6]  Today news stories frequently describe how employees are disciplined for their off duty behavior.[7]  Underlying these stories is a private employer’s right to substantially monitor their employees.  Employers are given broad discretion, with some exceptions, to log and monitor an employee’s phone use, voicemail,[8] and much more.

B.  Recent Developments of Off Duty Monitoring

An American Management Association study found sixty six percent of employers monitor workers’ Web site connections; forty three percent review e-mail; forty percent of companies analyze the contents of outbound e-mail; forty five percent track content, keystrokes, and time spent at the keyboard; and thirty percent have fired for misuse of the internet.[9]  RFID is another tool many employers use to track the location of their employees in and out of work, although not much is known about the extent to which this is used for off-duty monitoring.[10]  Eight percent of employers now use GPS technology to track wherever their employees go.[11]

Aligo’s WorkTrack is a technology that allows employers to monitor the location of their employees over the internet using employer provided cell phones.[12]  Technologies like Aligo promise to increase productivity, efficiency, and overall cost savings.[13]  However there are serious invasion of privacy concerns. First, the product has an “on break” mode, which allows employers to know when an employee is not working.[14]  These monitoring features often do not shut off at the end of the workday, allowing the employer to monitor even off duty behavior.[15]  Aligo and similar technologies are used by large employers such as Sun Microsystems, Lucient Technologies, and Motorola.[16]

The trend in monitoring appears to be increasing.[17]  As technology becomes more accessible, monitoring becomes easier. The social networking revolution is one prime example of how, if given easy means, employers will pry into the lives of their employees.  Employers increasingly use social networks to screen job applicants,[18] “Forty-five percent of employers use social networking sites to research job candidates.”[19]  Employers now have the power “to gather enormous amounts of data about employees, often far beyond what is necessary to satisfy safety or productivity concerns.”[20]  It is very likely that without greater privacy protections, as GPS and RFID monitoring become less expensive that more employers will begin utilizing it.

C.  Unanswered Legal Questions

Underlying the employer’s power to collect data on employers is the long line of court decisions upholding an employer’s right to monitor.  The Supreme Court’s latest of decision was City of Ontario v. Quon. Although concerning public employees, and the First and Fourth Amendments, the Quon decision raised interesting policy concerns regarding the potential importance of electronic communications as essential means of for self expression.[21]  However, the court also mentioned that these devices are so easily and cheaply available that one could easily purchase a device for personal use, defeating any expectation of privacy.[22]  This decision failed to analyze the basis for which an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy,[23] so the expectation of privacy regarding digital monitoring is still not clear.[24]

II.  Should There Be a Line Between Work and Private Life Online? If so Where Should We Draw the Line?

A.  Employer’s Perspective

First, from an employer’s perspective, monitoring of employees is within their discretion because of the nature of at-will employment.  Generally, with the exception of Montana, employment is considered at will in the U.S,[25]  meaning employees can be fired, or leave, at any time for whatever or even no reason.[26]  Employers argue that if employees do not want to be monitored they can leave.

Employers also need to protect the integrity of their business and prevent unlawful activity.  Never before has so much damage been accomplished by low level employees through mindless behavior and social media.  One example of this occurred in April 2009 when two Domino’s Pizza employees posted several videos of disgusting, and unsanitary activities in preparation of a customer’s pizza.[27]  The video went viral and was responsible for a steep decline in stock values.[28]

Employers also need to protect against the leaking of confidential data.  In February 2010 the personal information of Shell employees in dangerous parts of the work was leaked to a blogger and published.[29]  This leak posed a great threat to the lives of these individuals; Shell employees have been attacked, and kidnapped in places like Nigeria.[30]  Similarly, the risk of liability is high for leaking of trade secrets and for initial public offerings before they are public.[31]

Productivity concerns also cause many employers to monitor employees. Even minor personal internet use in the workplace can lead to millions in lost profits.[32]  Off-duty, employers can claim fewer interests in monitoring, but in a world where telecommuting is on the rise, the line between office and home is blurring and this means that an employer may need to monitor an employee while working remotely.  Additionally, employers may want to check against irresponsible drinking, and negligent driving as evidenced by traffic tickets, especially if the worker is in a driving profession.[33]

B.  Employee’s perspective

When employers monitor their workers morale can decrease substantially.[34]  Monitoring may also undermine intended purposes of increasing productivity by spurring stress related ailments such as increased illness and absenteeism.[35]  Information gleaned from social media may also be inaccurate, forgeries of facebook accounts are commonplace.  Moreover, monitoring is usually inequitable where employees are not represented by unions, “[b]ecause of the substantial interests individuals have in both employment and in privacy, invasive monitoring puts employees in a ‘catch-22’ situation, forcing them to sacrifice reasonable expectations of privacy because of their need to work.”[36]

Technological advances exacerbate the invasiveness of monitoring and allow employers to know intimate details about an employee’s life, as one commenter notes “what happens when an employer virtually observes the employee stopping during her lunch hour at Planned Parenthood and fires her based on assumptions about her position on family planning methods?”[37]  Further, technology like social networking has become such an integral part of self expression.  Although in the context of cell phones, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it may be that some forms of communication are “essential means or necessary instruments for self expression, even identification.”[38]  This is just as true of social media.[39]

Employer monitoring has already altered the online behavior of many bloggers and social networking users, “29% of employees have become more conservative online because they fear that ‘employers can use anything and everything as an excuse to fire” them in a down economy.”  Social networking and blogging merits protection because not only is it integral to self expression, it serves a socially useful purpose by keeping people connected, and sharing and breaking news in a more effective way than traditional means ever could.[40]  Although First Amendment protection does not extend to workers in the private sphere, employer monitoring can affect speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if done by a government employer.  Most Americans spend nearly a quarter of their lives at work;[41] do we want constitutional protections to extend to only three quarters of a person’s life?  Do we want to allow employers to treat their employees like sex offenders, under constant surveillance?

Most social networking users begin using in their teens; because of this many of these users have material from their youth that depicts less than mature behavior.  Young people’s past lawful, but unfortunate conduct should not harm their employment prospects later.[42]  Even those with private profiles, as discussed in Part IV may still be at risk for having their profiles hacked by employers. Without protections we allow employers to be voyeurs and produce a chilling effect to use of online communications.[43]  Finally, the right to adequate livelihood is an international human right; one should not have to waive expression rights to enjoy the right to a livelihood.[44]

C.  Other Policy Considerations Make Line Drawing Difficult.

On one hand the free flow of information should not be impeded to protect what is usually discriminated against: misconduct and unpopular speech.  We should not have to protect people from making public fools of themselves.  Nevertheless, as the lifestyle discrimination statutes and case law discussed in Part IV attest to, employers who monitor off duty scrutinize a great deal of legal and socially important behavior including political speech.

Another issue is that the internet is by definition public, and speech is not being infringed by any unconstitutional means by employers checking social media.  However, off-duty social networking use merits privacy protections because employees have a higher expectation of privacy off the clock.[45]  Although any manager could check out an employee’s Facebook, there is a difference when this action is done with the intention to dig up dirt.  This argument also fails to consider that employers may find ways to view even non public profiles.

Finally, we must also consider whether employers should be punished just because they are using information for actions socially disapproved of.  After all, there are many anti-discrimination and collective bargaining labor laws designed to prevent employers from the really harmful discrimination.  However, anti-discrimination lawsuits are not a simple means of protecting the worst forms of discrimination; they are among the most difficult cases to prove.[46]  Employers who reserve the right to monitor of social network use and GPS location off duty can relatively easily use any information they gather as pretext for more heinous action.  Finally, the low interest the employer has in off-duty behavior, and the high value of privacy in U.S. culture, tips the balance in favor of the employee.  Although when employers suspect serious misconduct that would expose the employer to liability or lost profits, they should be allowed to monitor the employee with proper notice.

III.  Common Law Protections Are Generally Not Available for Digital Off-Duty Monitoring

Private sector privacy actions are typically based in the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.[47]  The elements for an intrusion claim are “[1] [intentional] intru[sion], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . [and] [2] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”[48] In other words, did an individual have a reasonable expectation of keeping a matter private which the employer intruded upon.  Voluntary disclosure of information is a problem for social networking users.[49]  Some jurisdictions allow for an employer to use “intrusive and even objectionable means to obtain employment-related information about an employee.[50]  Generally, invasion of privacy actions will not be available to bloggers and social network users given the public nature of these activities.[51]  However, invasion of privacy claims may be available for monitoring off-duty personal cell phones,[52] home computer use, and location via GPS.  Still, these claims will probably fail if the employer reserves the right to monitor in an employee handbook.[53]

One recent exception to waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy via employer notice has been found if the communication is privileged.  In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., a home care nursing professional used her employer provided laptop to communicate with her attorney via a web-based yahoo mail account.[54]  The employer collected these emails in preparation for a lawsuit the employee filed against it. Although the employer use policy stated that employees can expect to be monitored, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her attorney-client privileged emails even on a work computer.[55]

IV.  Current Statutory Causes of Action Provide Little Protection.

A.  ECPA Claims Against Off-Duty Monitoring Fail.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted “to provide greater protection of an individual’s privacy from emerging communication technologies in the private sector.”[56]  The Act “prohibits the intentional or willful interception, accession, disclosure, or use of one’s electronic communication.”[57]  It extends the protections of the Wiretap Act to electronic communications; it allows for criminal prosecution as well as civil action.[58]  However, “[c]ase law interpreting ECPA is virtually uniform in finding that employers can monitor with or without consent, even without notice.”[59] Further, courts disagree as to whether the interception of emails stored on a centralized server are prohibited by ECPA.

All that is necessary for a party to waive their privacy is to give so called consent, which can easily be done by the employer providing a poster or notice in a policy handbook that communications will be monitored.[60]  Further, consent or notice is not required in many federal jurisdictions when equipment is used in the course of business.[61]  Because the EPCA effortlessly allows employers to skirt the statute’s requirements, off-duty monitoring suits do not succeed against employers.[62]

B.  SCA Claims Require Employers to Behave Extremely Irresponsibly.

The Stored Communications Act (SCA) prevents communications companies from turning over communications to the government, but also prohibits hacking and exceeding authorization to view information.[63]  In Konop, an employee of Hawaiian Airlines created a blog, requiring authorization and terms of use that prohibited the airline management from reading and any disclosure of the contents of the blog.[64]  Hawaiian Airlines used the usernames and passwords of other employees to access Konop’s blog.  The company then terminated Konop after reading his critical commentary of the airline’s president and labor practices. The court held that because only a website user or provider could authorize a third party’s access under SCA, summary judgment should not have been granted for this claim.[65]

Although the employee here was given a cause of action, the remedy was limited because the court decided that “for a website such as Konop’s to be ‘intercepted’ in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.”[66]  The First Circuit disagreed with this in United States v. Councilman, holding that communications in storage can be intercepted in violation of the ECPA.[67]

Another shortcoming of these statutes is that neither EPCA or SCA would not protect all instances of employer digital snooping.  The following alteration of Konops facts illustrates this.  If Hawaiian Airlines was given the Facebook login information of Konop’s Facebook friend, and used it to login and see Konop’s critical wall posts of the company; the employer would avoid liability under SCA because there is no Facebook policy prohibiting the use of another’s login information.[68]  ECPA and SCA weaknesses points to the need for stronger statutory protections in the area of employee privacy.

C. CFAA Generally Does not Apply to Employers.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a criminal statute that prohibits the unauthorized access of computers involved in interstate or foreign commerce.[69]   However, unless an employer hacked into an employee’s personal computer, an action would not be possible against a monitoring employer.

D. State Protections, Statutory Privacy and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes Mostly Miss the Mark.

Though as many as ten state constitutions explicitly provide privacy protections, nine of these provisions are interpreted to require government invasion of privacy.[70]  California is exceptional in that the state constitution provides a remedy for invasion of privacy actionable against private individuals.[71]

Twenty five states protect against employee discrimination for the use of tobacco and other legal products off-duty.[72]  However, these laws would not protect against employer monitoring and adverse action based on political or other lawful expression gleaned from social network use.  Five states prohibit adverse action based on political behavior.[73] Only California, Colorado, New York, and North Dakota protect against discrimination from legal off-duty behavior in general,[74] but these statutes may be limited where an employer declares a policy that prohibits blogging about work.[75]  Limiting employee monitoring is not a popular option even when tailored narrowly; Michigan and Illinois are the only states that prevent an employer from monitoring political activity.[76]  Only eleven states have some form of RFID use restrictions, and none have GPS monitoring restrictions.

V.  “Privacy Protection in Employment Act” a Proposal to Close Privacy Gap

Congress made two attempts to pass employee privacy legislation, the broad Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act in the 1990s and the toothless Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act in 2000.[77]  Though these failed, federal legislation is necessary for several reasons. The courts are too slow and lack the technological expertise to adequately keep privacy up to date with technological changes.  Moreover, “providing protections for employees on a state-by-state basis can cause “a race to the bottom” with states purposefully providing low protections to encourage business.”[78]  To close the gaps in employee privacy law Congress should pass what some have call the “Privacy Protection in Employment Act”.[79]  This Act would generally prevent all off-duty monitoring of employees in the home, and in any secluded area. Employers would only be permitted to monitor off-duty behavior if the employer has “reasonable grounds to believe the employee is engaging in behavior that will cause a significant concrete harm to the employer.”[80]  However, the employer must carry the burden to prove reasonable grounds.  An employer also must put the employee on notice of the scope and duration of any monitoring, and provide them an opportunity to review all information collected. The Department of Labor would also monitor compliance with these provisions, and a violation of the Act would allow a civil action with an allowance for plaintiff’s attorney fees.[81]

VI.  Conclusion

Statutory and common law protections show that there should be a line between work and private life even in this age of diminishing privacy.  However, these protections are inadequate to keep up with monitoring techniques.  Although there are important interests in promoting the free flow of information and the profitability of businesses; the risk for discriminatory use of information is great.  Interests in privacy must be balanced against interests in security of employment and reflect well reasoned normative views of society.  This can be accomplished by enacting legislation like the Privacy Protection in Employment Act.


[1] Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, 1138 (2002) (documenting the history of the concept of privacy and exploring new ways to think of it).

[2]Id. (“homes were primarily devoted to work, a shop with a place in the back or above to eat and sleep.”)

[3]Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 281, 289 (1966). See also Tamara K. Hareven, The Home and the Family in Historical Perspective, 58 Soc. Res. 253, 259 (1991) (“Following the removal of the workplace from the home as a result of urbanization and industrialization, the household was recast as the family’s private retreat, and home emerged as a new concept and existence.”).

[4]Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890).

[5]C.f. Solove, supra note 1.

[6]Donald V. Nightingale, Workplace Democracy: An Inquiry into Employee Participation in Canadian Work Organizations 9 (1982).

[7]See Stephanie Chen, CNN International, Can Facebook get you fired? Playing it safe in the social media world, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/11/10/facebook.fired.social.media.eti… (reviewing story of woman fired for posting about her boss reprimanding her for union activity); Don Aucoin, MySpace vs. WorkPlace, Boston Globe, May 29, 2007, at D1 (describing an Olive Garden employee fired for posting MySpace pictures of herself); Hyoung Chang, Bud Man: Canned for Coors?, USA Today, May 18, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2005-05-18-beer-man_x.htm (finding a Budwieser employee was fired for drinking a Coors in public).

[8]Jane Kirtley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security, Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. 23334 15, 119 (Practising Law Institute, 2010) (citing Fact Sheet 7: Workplace Privacy and Employee Monitoring, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, June 30, 2010, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm#2c) (finding exceptions in California, where in state callers must be informed of monitoring, and in the Eleventh Circuit where the employer realizes the call is personal).

[9] American Management Association, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey: Many Companies Monitoring, Recording, Videotaping and Firing Employees, Feb. 8, 2008, http:// www.amanet.org/press/amanews/ems05.htm.

[10]Although less is known, RFID presents the largest potential invasion of privacy issues; RFID can be placed in Id badges, clothing, cell phones, and just about anything without being detectible by employees. Jeremy Gruber, RFID and Workplace Policy, (last visited, Dec. 1, 2010)  http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/RFIDWorkplacePrivacy.html#_ft….

[11]Id.

[12]Aligo – The Mobile Enterprise Software Company, WorkTrack, http://aligo.c3design.jp/products/workTrack/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).

[13]Id.

[14]This feature is marketed to help reduce unnecessary billing time, but it has troublesome invasion of privacy implications.  Jill Yung, Big Brother Is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should Do About It, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 163, 173 (2005).

[15]Id.

[16]Aligo Inc., Aligo Customers, (last visited December 1, 2010), http://aligo.c3design.jp/customers/.

[17] Friedman, Barry A. and Lisa J. Reed, Workplace Privacy: Employee Relations and Legal Implications of Monitoring Employee E-Mail Use, 19 J. Bus. Ethics 75 (2007) (describing the follies of employer use of social networks as a monitoring tool).

[18] Jenna Wortham, More Employers Use Social Networks to Check Out Applicants, New York Times, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/more-employers-use-social-netwo… (finding an increasing trend in use of social networks to screen applicants).

[19]Career Builder, Press Release, Forty-five Percent of Employers Use Social Networking Sites to Research Job

Candidates, CareerBuilder Survey Finds, August 19, 2009, http://uncw.edu/stuaff/career/documents/employersusingsocialnetworkingsi…

[20]Frederick S. Lane III, The Naked Employee: How Technology Is Compromising Workplace Privacy 3-4 (2003).

[21] Id. (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.”)

[22]Id. (“[E]mployees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own.”).

[23]City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).

[24]The court also did not address whether employers can monitor their employees while off duty. C.f. Gregory I. Rasin & Ariane R. Buglione, Social Networking and Blogging: Managing the Conversation, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202432487473&slreturn=1….

[25]See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 Akron L. Rev. 331, 338 (2010).

[26]See generally, James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior,43 Ga. L. Rev. 133, 140 (2008).

[27]Paul E. Starkman, What You Need to Know about Monitoring Employees’ Off-Duty Social Networking Activity (last accessed Dec. 2, 2010), http://chiefexecutive.net/ME2/Audiences/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publish….

[28]Id. (receiving over a million views in two days).

[29]Id.

[30]James Herron, Shell Data Leak May Compromise Safety Of Staff –Emails, Feb. 4, 2010 http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2010/02/04/shell-data-leak-may-compromise-….

[31]See Starkman, supra note 27.

[32]See, Association of  Local  Government Auditors, Monitoring  Internet  Usage, Spring  2010, http://www.governmentauditors.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti… This potential loss may only get worse as the average gen-y’er spends upwards of thirty four percent of their time online doing personal tasks, as opposed to the twenty five percent found in the rest of the working population.  Burst Media, “Online At Work”, Nov. 11, 2007,http://www.burstmedia.com/pdfs/research/2007_11_01.pdf.

[33]Ronald J. Rakowski, Employee Off-Duty Conduct: Be Careful!, Sep 7, 2010, http://www.suite101.com/content/employee-off-duty-conduct-be-careful-a28….

[34]See Mia Shopis, Employee Monitoring: Is Big Brother a Bad Idea?, Dec. 9, 2003, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/interview/0,289202,sid14_gci94….

[35]Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54  Fla. L. Rev. 289, 319-20 (April 2002)

[36]S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 825, 835 (1998).

[37]Yung, supra note 14at 174.

[38] City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).

[39]See Peggy Orenstein, The Way We Live Now: I Tweet, Therefore I Am, August 1, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/magazine/01wwln-lede-t.html

[40]I use social media broadly: it includes blogs, YouTube, and any other internet based means of conveying information.

[41]See supra note 36.

[42] Leigh A. Clark & Sherry J. Roberts, Employer’s Use of Social Networking Sites: A Socially Irresponsible Practice, 95 J. Bus. Ethics 507 (2010) (exploring the ethical concerns of employer use of social networking to monitor employees and screen applicants in the private workplace).

[43] Friedman, Barry A. and Lisa J. Reed. 2007. Workplace Privacy: Employee Relations and Legal Implications of Monitoring Employee E-Mail Use, 19 J. Bus. Ethics 75.

[44]Nevertheless, the U.S. does not recognize the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or the optional protocol, which would give rise to a claim for damages for the right to work. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.

[45] Compare withthe following “the use of computers in the employment context carries with it social norms that effectively diminish the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his use of his employer’s computers.” TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 452 (2002) (holding that an employee who used a computer designated for working at home did not have sufficient privacy interests to prevent an employer from monitoring his computer use).

[46]See generally Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La. L. Rev. 555, (2001), see also Jonah Gelbach et al.,Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797 (2009) (“federal antidiscrimination law inadequately addresses either intentional or unintentional passive discrimination”)

[47] Tanya E. Milligan, Virtual Performance: Employment Issues in the Electronic Age, 38 Colo. Law. 29, 34 (2009) (exploring defamation, invasion of privacy, wiretap, EPCA, and SCA causes of action as a result of employer monitoring).

[48]Restatement 2d. Torts § 652B.

[49] Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Mp. L. 355, 384 (2007) (exploring legal protections bloggers may be able to assert as a result of monitoring off duty conduct).

[50] Kelly Schoening & Kelli Kleisinger, Off-Duty Privacy: How Far Can Employers Go, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 287, 290-292 (2010) (exploring the limits of employer peering into the private lives of employees using technology under several privacy statutes as well as common law tort claims) (citing Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992)).

[51]Sprague supra note 49at 363.

[52] But see Karch v.  Baybank FSB, 794 A.2d  763  (N.H.  2002) (refusing to find a cause of action against an employer who uses information surreptitiously intercepted from a cell phone conversation by a third party to reprimand an employee).

[53]See e.g. Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or. 2004).

[54]990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010)

[55]Id. at  663-664 (“e-mails she exchanged with her attorney on her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account, accessed on a company laptop, would remain private.”).

[56] Michael Newman, Shane Crase, What in the World is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act? An Overview of the ECPA Hurdles in the Context of Employer Monitoring, 54 Fed. Law. 12 (2007).

[57]  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.

[58]18 U.S.C. §§2510 to 2712.  Although an employer cannot violate the wiretap act because of a deficiency in language of the statute, they could be liable under the ECPA).  Jill Yung, supra note 14at 182 n.90.

[59]Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Privacy Bailout: State Government Involvement in the Privacy Arena, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 597, 605 (2010).

[60]See United States v. Rittweger, 258 F. Supp. 2d 345, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding a handbook made monitoring policy clear).

[61]Arias v. Mutual Cent. Alarm Serv. Inc., 202 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2000).

[62]Cf. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) cert denied, 537 U.S. 119 (2003) (dismissing the 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1)(a) claim).

[63] 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq.

[64]Konop 302 F.3d at 876.

[65]Id.

[66]302 F.3d 868, 878-879.

[67]See Newman supra note 56at 14 (quoting 418 F.3d 67, 79-81 (1st Cir. 2005)).

[68]See Facebook terms http://www.facebook.com/terms.php.

[69] 18 U.S.C. §1030.

[70]See, Corey A.Ciocchetti, The Privacy Bailout: State Government Involvement in the Privacy Arena, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 597, 620.

[71]Chico Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Butte Glenn Med. Soc’y, 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1203

(E.D. Cal. 1983) (finding an action against defendants for an infringement of the state’s constitutional privacy right to prevent procreative choice interference).

[72]Corey A.Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework For Employee Monitoring, 17 (2010)http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/The_Eavesdropping_Employer_%20A_Twenty-First_Century_Framework.pdf

[73]Id.

[74]Id.See also e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (“[i]t shall be a discriminatory or unfair practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours. . .”); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-02.4-03 (“[i]t is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a person; to discharge an employee; or to [otherwise discriminate with respect to] participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during nonworking hours . . . .”).

[75] Levinson,supra note 25at 372.

Jessica Jackson, Colorado’s Lifestyle Discrimination Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment Law, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 143 (1996).

[76]Ciocchetti, supra note 72.

[77]Levinson,supra note 25at 343.

[78]Id.

[79]Id. at 331.

[80]Id. at 402 (These would exclude activities that merely reduce office morale, and injury to reputation and would include, but are not limited to activity such as: competition with employer’s business, reduction in the employees work or that of co-workers, harassment, obscene behavior if the employee is a child’s role model, financial harm, and complaints).

[81]Id. at 411.

© Copyright 2011 Michael Carlin