Supreme Court: False Claims Act & Materiality Requirement

False claims act Supreme courtThe U.S. Supreme Court has rendered a unanimous decision in the hotly-awaited False Claims Act case of Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar.  This case squarely presented the issue of whether liability may be based on the so-called “implied false certification” theory.  Universal Health Service’s (“UHS) problem originated when it was discovered that its contractor’s employees who were providing mental health services and medication were not actually licensed to do so. The relator and government alleged that UHS had filed false claims for payment because they did not disclose this fact and thus had impliedly certified that it was in compliance with all laws, regulations, etc.  The District Court granted UHS’s motion to dismiss because no regulation that was violated was a material condition of payment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that every submission of a claim implicitly represents regulatory compliance and that the regulations themselves provided conclusive evidence that compliance was a material condition of payment because the regulations expressly required facilities to adequately supervise staff as a condition of payment.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the matter in a manner that represents a compromise view of implied false certification.

The Court recognized the vitality of the implied false certification theory but also held that the First Circuit erred in adopting the government’s expansive view that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violation.

Instead, the Court held that the claims at issue may be actionable because they do more than merely demand payment; they fall squarely within the rule that representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information, can be actionable misrepresentations.   Here, UHS and its contractor, both in fact and through the billing codes it used, represented that it had provided specific types of treatment by credentialed personnel.  These were misrepresentations and liability did not turn upon whether those requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment.

The Court next turned to the False Claims Act’s materiality requirement, and stated that statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements are not automatically material even if they are labeled conditions of payment. Nor is the restriction supported by the Act’s scienter requirement. A defendant can have “actual knowledge” that a condition is material even if the Government does not expressly call it a condition of payment. What matters is not the label that the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government’s payment decision.

The FCA’s materiality requirement is demanding. An undisclosed fact is material if, for instance, “[n]o one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have signed this contract if informed of the likelihood” of the undisclosed fact.   When evaluating the FCA’s materiality requirement, the Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is the Government’s option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance sufficient for a finding of materiality. Materiality also cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.

Moreover, if the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. The FCA thus does not support the Government’s and First Circuit’s expansive view that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violation.

The materiality requirement, stringently interpreted, and the fact that the First Circuit’s expansive view was rejected suggest that the game is far from over and that there still are viable defenses, facts allowing, to cases premised upon the implied false certification theory.

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

False Claims Act: DOJ Appealing AseraCare Loss

False Claims ActOn May 27, 2016, the US Department of Justice said it will appeal to the Eleventh Circuit its loss in the False Claims Act (FCA) case against hospice chain AseraCare Inc. The government’s decision to appeal comes as no surprise, and it means that the substantial attention this case has received will continue.

As a reminder, this case, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., focused on whether AseraCare fraudulently billed Medicare for hospice services for patients who were not terminally ill. AseraCare argued (and the district court ultimately agreed) that physicians could disagree about a patient’s eligibility for end-of-life care and such differences in clinical judgment are not enough to establish FCA falsity.

The government appealed three orders issued by the US District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. We previously posted about each of these three orders.

The first order on appeal is the district court’s May 20, 2015 decision bifurcating the trial, with the element of falsity to be tried first and the element of scienter (and the other FCA elements) to be tried second. The government had unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of this decision.  This is the first instance in which a court ordered an FCA suit to be tried in two parts.

The second order on appeal is the district court’s October 26, 2015 decision ordering a new trial, explaining that the jury instructions contained the wrong legal standard on falsity. This order came after two months of trial on the element of falsity and after a jury verdict largely in favor of the government.

The third order on appeal is the district court’s March 31, 2016 decision, after sua sponte reopening summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of AseraCare. In dismissing the case, the court explained that mere differences in clinical judgment are not enough to establish FCA falsity, and the government had not produced evidence other than conflicting medical expert opinions.

The government must file its opening brief 40 days after the record is filed with the Eleventh Circuit. We will be watching this case throughout the appellate process.

© 2016 McDermott Will & Emery

Whistleblower Wins Big in Case that Tests Limits of Confidentiality Agreements

Intimidation Of Whistleblower

Confidentiality agreements are common in corporate America. Many companies require new employees to sign them as part of the hiring process. In some industries like healthcare, privacy policies are elevated to a legal requirement. Can these agreements be used to stop an employee from reporting his or her employer for fraud or turning documents over to an attorney? The answer is “no” but there are some limits on what an employee can take and do with the information. The most recent case to examine the issue comes from the Northern District of Illinois.

On May 9th, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sidney Schenkier dismissed a counterclaim brought by LifeWatch Services against a whistleblower in a federal False Claims Act case.

Matthew Cieszynski was a certified technician working for LifeWatch. His job was to conduct heart monitoring tests. LifeWatch conducts remote heart monitoring testing throughout the United States. Patients can wear heart monitor devices anywhere in the world and have those devices monitored through telemetry. Cieszynski’s job was to look for unusual or dangerous heart arrhythmias. The testing results would be passed to the patients’ cardiologists who use the data to diagnose and treat various heart ailments.

When first hired by the company in 2003, Cieszynski signed a confidentiality agreement that said in part, “you agree that both during your employment and thereafter you will not use for yourself or disclose to any person not employed by [LifeWatch] any Confidential Information of the company…” The agreement also restricted Cieszynski’s ability to access computer systems and records or remove information from the company’s premises.

In 2006, Cieszynski signed a HIPAA confidentiality statement.

Years later, Cieszynski became concerned that LifeWatch was sending some of the heart monitoring work offshore to India in violation of Medicare regulations. He became especially concerned that some of the Indian workers were not properly certified to review and interpret the heart monitoring data.

In 2012, Cieszynski believed that a patient died because of an improper diagnosis made by an unlicensed offshore technician. That is when he became a whistleblower and filed a False Claims Act lawsuit in federal court. In order to file his lawsuit, he provided what he believed were important company documents to his lawyer. Those were later turned over to the government.

Under the Act, complaints are filed under seal and served on the government instead of the defendant. This allows regulators and prosecutors to investigate the merits of the case in secret. Usually the case is unsealed when the government decides to intervene or allow the whistleblower’s counsel to pursue the case. Until unsealed, the whistleblowers identity is not disclosed.

When the complaint was unsealed, LifeWatch Services discovered that Matt Cieszynski was the person who brought the suit.  Their response was to file a counterclaim against Cieszynski for violating his employment agreement and the separate HIPAA nondisclosure agreement.

On May 9th, Magistrate Judge Schenkier dismissed LifeWatch’s counterclaim in a case widely watched by both members of the plaintiffs and defense whistleblower bar.

In dismissing the counterclaims, Judge Schenkier discussed the “strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the government.”

The court recognized the legitimate need for companies to protect confidential information. Those needs must be carefully balanced against the need to prevent “chilling” whistleblowers from coming forward, however.

In deciding that the counterclaim against Cieszynski should be dismissed, the court examined a number of factors. Those include:

  • What was the intent of the whistleblower when taking the documents? Here Cieszynski took them for the sole purpose of reporting what he believed to be fraud. There was no evidence that he sought to embarrass the company.

  • How broad was the disclosure? In this case there was no disclosure to the public or competitors. Cieszynski only provided documents to his lawyer and the the government.

  • The scope of the documents taken from the employer. Although LifeWatch claimed Cieszynski took more documents than were necessary to prosecute his case, the court said it wouldn’t apply hindsight and require a whistleblower to know exactly what documents the government might need. Since the documents were reasonably related to what the government could need, Judge Schenkier elected not to second guess Cieszynski.

There are limits to what a person can take and what he or she can do with those documents. For example, disclosing trade secrets to competitors or releasing sensitive healthcare information to the public will not likely elicit sympathy from the court.

In a case like this, however, courts will give the benefit of doubt to the whistleblower. Especially when there has been no public disclosure and no real harm to the defendant. Although LifeWatch claimed harm, the court found the only harm was the “fees and costs associated with pursuing the counterclaim – which is a self-inflicted wound.”

Corporate counsel should think long and hard before bringing counterclaims against whistleblowers. Not only are courts generally unsympathetic to these challenges, the fee shifting provisions of the False Claims Act can make these cases expensive for the defendants. Under the False Claims Act, defendants must pay the relator’s (whistleblower) lodestar legal fees if the relator prevails.

Article By Brian Mahany of Mahany Law

© Copyright 2016 Mahany Law

Amarin Ruling Solidifies Off-Label Marketing Options but Raises Questions About False Claims Act Enforcement Action

The Southern District of New York recently ruled in Amarin Pharma, Inc. et al. v. Food and Drug Administration, et al. that a drug company may engage in “truthful and non-misleading speech” about off-label uses of an approved drug without the threat of a misbranding action under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. No. 1:15-cv-03588 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 7, 2015). This important decision—which arose out of Amarin’s constitutional challenge seeking to make certain statements about unapproved uses of a triglyceride-lowering drug, Vascepa—builds on recent Second Circuit precedent that allows drug makers more regulatory latitude, at minimum in the Second Circuit, to provide truthful and non-misleading scientific information about unapproved uses for their products. However, the ruling also serves as a reminder of potential False Claims Act (FCA) liability associated with off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals and devices.

Amarin filed its complaint against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) after the company received a Complete Response Letter (CRL) from the FDA in connection with its application for approval of a new indication. The CRL indicated that, while clinical studies revealed that Vascepa reduced triglyceride levels, based on its data review, the FDA advised that additional clinical data would be needed before it could approve the drug for additional uses beyond the original approval for “very” high levels of triglycerides. Despite the fact that Amarin sought to make truthful and non-misleading statements about its product to “sophisticated healthcare professionals,” including the physicians who joined Amarin in the lawsuit, the FDA concluded there was insufficient support for approval of the supplemental application for a new indication and stated that any communications about off-label uses of Vascepa could result in enforcement action.

While the FDA described Amarin’s First Amendment claims as a “frontal assault on the framework for new drug approval that Congress created in 1962,” the court rejected all of the government’s counterarguments. Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), the court held that Amarin could engage in the following activity:

  • Distribute summaries and reprints of the relevant studies in a manner or format other than that specified by the FDA

  • Articulate, in connection with Vascepa, the off-label claim permissible for use on chemically similar dietary supplements

  • Make proactive truthful statements and engage in a dialogue with doctors regarding the off-label use

While the Amarin decision is welcome news for the industry, drug manufacturers must still take care to analyze promotional statements to ensure that the content can be successfully defended as “truthful” and “non-misleading” speech. As the Amarin court acknowledged, manufacturers not only face potential criminal exposure for “false” or “misleading” misbranding, but the promotion of off-label use can give rise to civil claims under the FCA. FCA enforcement in off-label cases—which proceed on a theory that a company caused false claims to be submitted to government health care programs for non-covered and non-FDA-approved uses—have been a huge source of FCA recoveries in recent years. In FY2014, for example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered over $2.2 billion in FCA actions against pharmaceutical and medical device companies stemming from off-label promotion. Regulatory enforcers and qui tam whistleblowers will not hesitate to allege FCA violations where circumstances, for example, allow the inference that narrowly couched promotional statements may have been “truthful” but still factually incomplete and, thus, misleading. The Amarin decision highlights the fact-specific nature of the risk analysis. Amarin relied on truthful statements about Vascepa’s off-label use that were largely derived from an FDA-approved study and writings from the FDA itself on the subject. Rather than shooting from the marketing “hip,” Amarin appears to have invested in building a defensible factual scientific record and preemptively sought an FDA opinion regarding the off-label use of Vascepa before engaging in those communications.

While it remains unclear whether the FDA will appeal the Amarin decision to the Second Circuit, the agency’s decision to let Caronia stand without further appeal suggests that there may be reluctance on the part of regulators to risk a higher court expanding the reach of the Caronia holding across the country. Pharmaceutical and device manufacturers should still proceed cautiously as the FDA determines how it will respond following the Amarin ruling. For example, the FDA updated its draft guidance regarding the dissemination of scientific and medical journal articles following the Caronia decision in February 2014 and agreed in June 2014 to conduct a “comprehensive review [of its] regulatory regime governing communications about medical products,” with the intent of issuing new guidance by June 2015. As the Amarin court noted, this revised guidance is still forthcoming and may be further revised in light of this decision.

© 2015 McDermott Will & Emery

False Claims Act: Do You Really Have Just 60 Days to Repay?

One of your employees informs you of a potential overpayment from Medicare. Do you really only have 60 days from that point to determine if it is indeed an overpayment and repay it?

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 requires that a person who receives an overpayment of Medicare or Medicaid funds report and return the overpayment within 60 days of the “date on which the overpayment was identified,”  and makes the failure to do so a violation of the False Claims Act. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7k(d)((2)-(3)(emphasis added). However, Congress didn’t define what it means toidentify a false claim.

On August 3, 2015, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued the first  federal court decision addressing when an overpayment should be considered to be “identified” for purposes of determining whether there has been a False Claims Act violation.

The ruling came in the case of Kane v. Healthfirst, et al. and U.S. v. Continuum Health Partners Inc. et al., in which Continuum Health Partners Inc. “ which operated and coordinated a network of non-profit hospitals “ was accused of failing to make timely repayment of identified overpayments.

The potential false claim was first brought to the defendants’ attention in September, 2010 by New York State auditors. An employee of Continuum subsequently provided a preliminary list of potential overpayments to management in February, 2011. He was fired four days later and subsequently filed a whistle-blower action. It wasn’t until the government issued a Civil Investigative Demand in June, 2012 that Continuum reimbursed the government for a large number of claims. Continuum did not return all of the overpayments to the government until May, 2013 approximately two years after the initial internal email.

According to the ruling, approximately half of the February, 2011 preliminary list of overpayments did, in fact, constitute overpayments. The Continuum defendants had argued that the 60-day period began only after the overpayment was “classified with certainty.” The court, however, sided with the government and found that the 60-day clock starts when a person is “put on notice” that a claim may be overpaid.

The court tempered its ruling, though, by stating that a false claims violation occurs only when the “obligation is knowingly concealed or knowingly and improperly avoided or decreased.” Further, the court stated that “prosecutorial discretion would counsel against” an enforcement action in a situation involving “well intentioned” providers working with “reasonable haste” to rectify the issue. In such a case, the healthcare provider wouldn’t have acted with the “reckless disregard, deliberate ignorance, or actual knowledge” required to support a false claims case.

While the decision didn’t provide bright lines and identify exactly when that 60-day clock starts, one of the key takeaways is that once a potential overpayment is identified, a health care provider must take prompt action and follow through with a thorough internal review process to determine whether an overpayment truly exists. Then, it must make repayments to the extent required.

© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

The Supreme Court Closes the Books on Civil False Claims Act Cases and Takes Issue with the First to File Rule

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court in Kellogg Brown & Root v. United States ex rel. Carter reversed the Fourth Circuit in part and affirmed in part, holding that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA) only applies to criminal offenses, and that the popular colloquialism known as the “first to file rule” only prohibits qui tam actions when a similar suit is currently pending. Based on the text of the legislation alone, these holdings are glaringly obvious, but somehow both of these decisions manage to upset generally accepted Government contracts assumptions.

In 2005, a whistleblower filed a qui tam action against Kellogg Brown & Root Services Inc. (KBR) and Halliburton Co. (subsidiaries and the relator’s former employers) alleging that they had submitted a false claim to the Government. The relator alleged that KBR billed the Department of Defense under a water purification services contract for services that were either not performed or not properly performed. Water purification service contracts in Iraq have been a popular area for litigation with the U.S. Army, partly because of the enormity of the operation and expense required to supply deployed soldiers with a steady supply of clean water in an arid environment.  Unique to this case, the allegation of fraud was brought as a qui tam action that allows the relator to recover up to 30% of the Government’s total recovery.

The statute of limitations for qui tam actions is within six years of a violation or within three years of the date by which the United States should have known about a violation, but under no circumstances can it be brought more than 10 years after the date of the violation. The Solicitor General argued that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA) indefinitely suspends any statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud against the Government during “hostilities” and therefore also suspended the statute of limitations for qui tam actions. On its face, the WSLA appears broad enough to encompass both civil and criminal accusations of fraud, especially if the reader has an expansive view of the word “offense.” From a practical perspective, this has been very difficult for defense contractors to stomach. As a nation that has been in uninterrupted war for 14 years, Government contractors could be called to disprove an allegation in a qui tam suit stemming from events that transpired more than a decade ago. These liabilities remain on their books and can factor into insurance coverage for dealing with these types of claims. These risks and liabilities inherent in doing business with the Government are often passed on to the Government in the form of less competitive bid proposals and higher costs. Many Government contracts attorneys understood that the Government’s use of WSLA in civil cases was questionable as the WSLA statute is codified in Title 18 “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” The Supreme Court focused on this location of the WSLA text and the definition in place at that time defining “offenses” as crimes. In the end, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit on this point and held that the WSLA does not apply to civil actions involving fraud. While this would seem to be a straightforward result, as noted in the Solicitor General’s brief, “every court of appeals to consider the questions has held that the WSLA applies in civil fraud cases.” The list includes cases in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits as well as the former Court of Claims, so this decision while reasonably anticipated still constitutes considerable reversal.

The Supreme Court’s second holding in this case was similarly obvious from a textualist perspective, but it manages to awaken long dormant liabilities for those contractors that applauded the first part of the Supreme Court’s opinion. This case took an unusual route to get to the Supreme Court. It was filed four separate times after the each of the previous filings was dismissed because similar qui tam cases were pending in other jurisdictions. The False Claims Act, which provides the rules for filing a qui tam states that “no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.” This is popularly referred to as the “first to file rule.” Unfortunately, that shorthand is so prevalent within the industry that the term “first to file,” which does not appear in the text, took on a meaning of its own when combined with decisions on notice and original source requirements. It was generally accepted that Congress’s intent was to prohibit copycat filings where a business would have to deal with the same qui tam allegations of fraud over and over from different relators. It was thought that the public disclosure required in unsealing a qui tam action should prohibit a future relator from using some of that same information in his own qui tam suit filed immediately upon the dismissal of the first suit. The National Whistleblower Center argued in its brief that if the “first to file rule” precluded future filings on the same issue a “wholly uninformed whistleblower could file a vexatious, frivolous, overbroad, and all-encompassing lawsuit. The Government would be left uninformed of the fraud as it was prior to the filing of the suit, and other well-informed whistleblowers would have no incentive or ability to come forward.” The Supreme Court agreed that there was no support in the text of the statute to interpret “pending” as anything more than “not yet decided” and affirmed this portion of the Fourth Circuit’s judgment. This means that qui tam filers must merely wait until similar cases are dismissed before filing their claims.

This doesn’t mean that qui tam filers will simply be able to adopt the accusations and evidence from the previous case, but it remains to be seen what advantages this approach might have for secondary filers who have had the benefit of observing the first qui tam. There is another pending petition at the Supreme Court, Purdue Pharma v. United States ex rel. May, that provide additional clarity on “whether the False Claims Act’s pre-2010 ‘public-disclosure bar,’ 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2009), prohibits claims that are ‘substantially similar’ to prior public disclosures, or instead bars a claim only if the plaintiff’s knowledge ‘actually derives’ from prior disclosures.”

For now, Government contractors need to be aware that qui tam filings are not necessarily prohibited just because someone previously filed a qui tam on the same issue. Defense contractors who supported military efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan can rely on the normal statute of limitations for civil claims involving fraud, but need to be aware that criminal acts of fraud are still prosecutable years after the cessation of hostilities.

© 2015 Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

DaVita Agree to $495 Million Settlement in Alleged Medicare Fraud Lawsuit Filed by Qui Tam Whistleblowers

On Monday, May 4, 2015, DaVita Kidney Care, a division of DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc. (DaVita), and one of the leading dialysis services providers in the United States, agreed to pay the U.S. Government $450 million for allegedly violating the False Claims Act (FCA) when it continuously discarded good medicine and then billed Medicare and Medicaid for it. DaVita also agreed to pay $45 million for legal fees.

According to the lawsuit filed in 2011 by two former employees of DaVita, between 2003 and 2010, when DaVita administered iron and vitamin supplements such as Zemplar, Vitamin D, and Venofer, vials containing more than what the patients needed were used and the rest was thrown away. For example, if a patient only needed 25 milligrams of medicine, DaVita allegedly used a 100 milligram vial, administered only 25 mg, and tossed the rest in the trash. Although before 2001, this practice was condoned by the National Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in order to prevent infectious outbreaks caused by the re-entry of the same vial of medicine, the CDC subsequently changed it policies to outlaw this practice.

This FCA lawsuit alleging that DaVita misused and mishandled of medicine, and overbilled Medicare and Medicaid is not the first such allegation against DaVita, which is not a stranger to FCA lawsuits. In fact, DaVita previously settled two other lawsuits in which it allegedly violated the FCA. In October 2014, DaVita agreed to pay the U.S. Government $350 million for allegedly persuading physicians or physician groups to refer their dialysis patients to DaVita by offering kickbacks for each patient referred. And in 2012, DaVita agreed to pay $55 million to the federal government for overbilling the government for Epogen, an anemia drug. These lawsuits were filed by former employees who decided to come forward as whistleblowers and to help to uncover what they considered to be illegal practices by DaVita. Under the FCA, such whistleblowers can bring what is known as a “qui tam” lawsuit, which is brought by a private citizen to recover money obtained by fraud on the government. As an incentive to bring qui tam lawsuits, the FCA provides that qui whistleblowers receive between 15 and 30 percent of the amount of funds recovered for the government.

Provisions of the FCA make it unlawful for a person or company to defraud governmental programs, such as Medicare or Medicaid.

Posted by the Whistleblower Practice Group at Tycko & Zavareei LLP

© 2015 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

Federal Government to Receive a $75 Million Settlement from CHSPSC in Alleged Medicaid Fraud Scheme: Community Health Systems Professional Services Corp.

Tycko & Zavareei LLP

On February 2, 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation (CHSPSC) and three of its CHS affiliated hospitals in New Mexico, agreed to pay the government $75 million to settle allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA) when it manipulated the Medicaid funding program by making illegal donations to New Mexico county governments in order to receive higher federally funded Medicaid payments.  The alleged improper donations from CHS were made to Chaves, Luna and San Miguel counties in the state of New Mexico.

The Sole Community Provider Program (SCP) is a federal and state funded program that is specifically designed to reimburse SCP hospitals for medical expenses incurred by uninsured and indigent patients.  Payments received by SCP hospitals are processed under New Mexico’s federal and state Medicaid Plan.  Under the SCP, the federal government will share 75 percent of patient claims incurred by SCP hospitals contingent on New Mexico’s state and local government’s ability to pay the remaining 25 percent under the matching share of the SCP.  One of the stipulations for receiving the funds is that the state and county government’s 25 percent share has to consist of state or county funds, and not impermissible “donations” from private hospitals.

According to the qui tam lawsuit filed by Robert Baker, a former CHSPSC revenue manager, on behalf of the government, between 2001 and 2010, CHS hospitals in the state of New Mexico filed claims to recover uninsured or indigent medical expenses under the SCP program.  However, the funds used to pay the state and local counties 25 percent share were donated by CHS.  This ongoing alleged illegal practice by CHS violated the FCA, and caused the state of New Mexico to present false claims to the United States for payments made to CHS under the SCP program.  In addition, the government also alleged that CHS concealed the true nature of these donations to avoid detection by federal and state authorities, and as a result of its scheme, received SCP payments which were funded by the United States in the amount of three times CHS’ “donations.”  The whistleblower, Mr. Baker, will receive approximately $18.6 million as his reward for having disclosed the fraud to the government under the False Claims Act.

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Whistleblower to Receive $23 Million in Office Depot Case

Mahany & Ertl Law Firm, Tax and Fraud Practice, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

“Our actions speak louder than words. We are accountable: doing what we say we’re going to do efficiently and on time.” These words come directly from Office Depot’s vision statement, part of the company’s code of ethics. Last week, Office Depot agreed to pay $68,500,000.00 to settle charges that it defrauded California government customers.

Evidently, actions really do speak louder than words!

The suit against Office Depot was originally filed by a whistleblower on behalf of the State of California. By the time it was resolved, over 1000 California cities, counties, school districts and other agencies are eligible to share in the settlement money.

David Sherwin, a former account manager in the company’s business solutions division, originally filed the suit. Sherwin filed his complaint under the California False Claims Act, a law which allows a whistleblower with original knowledge of fraud against the state to file a complaint in the name of the state and keep a percentage of whatever the government collects.

Sherwin claimed that Office Depot was violating pricing agreements negotiated through the U.S. Communities Government Purchasing Alliance, a non-profit organization that helps government agencies get the lowest prices on goods and services. Under the agreement, Office Depot was required to give participating government agencies the same low prices that had been negotiated through the Alliance.

Instead of giving member agencies the lowest prices, Sherwin said that the company sometimes put customers into higher pricing plans without their knowledge and did not drop prices when a more favorable price had been worked out through the Alliance.

Although it agreed to pay over $68 million to settle the charges, Office Depot admitted no wrongdoing and said Sherwin’s claims had “no merit.”

The story has a bittesweet ending in that Sherwin is entitled to $23 million in whistleblower award monies but died only a month after testifying in the case. His estate will receive the award.

This isn’t Office Depot’s first brush with whistleblower suits and fraud allegations. In 2010, the company paid $4.5 million to settle overcharging claims brought by the State of Florida. The company is also reportedly being investigated in New York, Texas and Arizona.

California isn’t the only state with a whistleblower law on its books. A total of 29 states have similar laws, often called False Claims Acts, which allow a whistleblower to keep a portion of whatever monies are collected by the government. To qualify, you must have original source (inside) information about a fraud involving taxpayer funds or a taxpayer funded program. Many of the claims are associated with Medicare, Medicaid, procurement contracts and residential mortgage lending. The latter are eligible for whistleblower awards because the government backs most mortgages.

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The DOJ Increases Scrutiny of Whistleblower False Claims Act Suits

McBrayer NEW logo 1-10-13The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently announced that it will review all complaints filed under the qui tam provisions of the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) to determine if a parallel criminal investigation is appropriate. This announcement came during a September 17, 2014 speech by the recently-confirmed Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the DOJ, Leslie Caldwell, at the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Conference in Washington D.C. This DOJ announcement signals a departure from prior policy, which allowed, but did not require, the Criminal Division to investigate Civil Division claims. In the past, the decision to open a criminal investigation was left to the discretion of each U.S. Attorney’s Office.

FraudNow, the Civil Division of the DOJ will share all new qui tam complaints with the Criminal Division as soon as they are filed. This change in procedure will likely be detrimental for defendants in future qui tam cases. With the Criminal Division more involved in False Claims cases, settlements with the government may become more difficult due to the need for approval from both the Civil and Criminal Divisions. Defendants may also face increased pressure to accept settlement offers from the government to avoid high-risk criminal penalties.

In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder and Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced the creation of an interagency task force, the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (“HEAT”), to increase coordination and optimize criminal and civil enforcement.  This coordination yielded momentous results: the Department recovered $12.1 billion dollars under the False Claims Act from January 2009 through the end of the 2013 fiscal year.  Most of these recoveries relate to fraud against Medicare and Medicaid Programs. In fiscal year 2013 alone, the DOJ recovered $2.6 billion dollars for health care fraud violations and brought health care fraud-related prosecutions against 345 individuals.

Thus, providers seeking reimbursement from federal programs should be aware that non-compliance risks have never been greater. Providers or entities faced with a civil qui tam suit should immediately evaluate their exposure to possible criminal charges. Because an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, companies should closely review their compliance programs and pay special attention to the protocols in place to prevent and detect potential false claims or billing violations.

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