World Trade Organization Approves U.S. Tariffs on European Union Goods to Counteract Civil Aviation Subsidies

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has approved U.S. duties on $7.5 billion in products from the European Union (EU) after ruling that the EU had unfairly subsidized the production of large civil aircraft, such as those produced by Airbus. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will enforce 10 percent duties on imports of certain aircraft and 25 percent duties on imports of other goods (including agricultural products, apparel, machinery, and other products) beginning October 18, 2019.

The EU plans to impose retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S. exports in response to subsidies allegedly provided to American plane manufacturer Boeing. However, the EU will have to wait for WTO approval in separate proceedings. The United States and the EU have been involved in WTO dispute settlement proceedings regarding subsidies for large civil aircraft since 2004.

Duties of 10 percent apply to imports of passenger and cargo aircraft from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (where the majority of Airbus production is based), provided that they have an unladen weight exceeding 30,000 kg.1

Duties of 25 percent apply to imports of other products from all EU member states (or a subset of these member states, depending on the product category). These products include certain cheeses, pork, coffee, seafood, fruit, dairy spreads, wine, whisky, apparel, bedding, optical instruments, appliances, tools, folding knives, and magnets.

Military aircraft, civil helicopters, and parts or components of civil aircraft are not subject to the duties.2


1 Examples of subject aircraft over 30,000 kg are regional jets capable of seating more than 100 passengers (such as the Airbus A220) and any larger aircraft (including long-haul, wide-body jets). Smaller aircraft, including recreational aircraft, private jets, most turboprop aircraft, and most regional jets with a capacity of fewer than 100 passenger, have an unladen weight of less than 30,000 kg and are excluded.

2 Airbus has production facilities in the United States, that rely on components imported from the EU. Additionally, some EU companies produce certain components of military aircraft for export to the United States.


©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on international trade, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation or Global law pages.

Espionage and Export Controls: iPhone Hack Highlights New World of Warfare

iPhone HackLast week, researchers at Citizen Lab uncovered sophisticated new spyware that allowed hackers to take complete control of anyone’s iPhone, turning the phone into a pocket-spy to intercept communications, track movements and harvest personal data. The malicious software, codenamed “Pegasus,” is believed to have been developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli company (whose majority shareholder is a San Francisco based private equity firm) that describes itself as a “leader in cyber warfare” and sells its software — with a price tag of $1 million – primarily to foreign governments. The software apparently took advantage of three previously unknown security flaws in Apple’s iOS software, and was described by experts as “the most sophisticated” ever seen on the market. Apple quickly released a patch of its software, iOS 9.3.5, and urged users to download it immediately.

Citizen Lab learned about Pegasus from Ahmed Mansoor, a UAE human rights activist, who received text messages baiting him to click on a link to discover “new secrets about the torture” of Emirati prisoners. Mr. Mansoor had been prey to hackers before, so he contacted Citizen Lab. When researchers tested the link, they discovered software had been remotely implanted onto the phone, and brought in Lookout, a mobile security firm, to reverse-engineer the spyware. Citizen Lab later identified the same software as having been used to track a Mexican journalist whose writings have criticized Mexico’s President. Citizen Lab and Lookout also determined that Pegasus could have been used across Turkey, Israel, Thailand, Qatar, Kenya, Uzbekistan, Mozambique, Morocco, Yemen, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Bahrain, based on domains registered by NSO.

NSO Group, the architect of Pegasus, claims to  provide “authorized governments with technology that helps them combat terror and crime,” insisting that its products are only used in lawful ways., NSO spokesperson Zamir Dahbash told reporters that the company “fully complies with strict export control laws and regulations.” The Citizen Lab researcher who disassembled the malicious program, however, compared it to “defusing a bomb.” All of which raises the question – what laws or regulations govern the export of cyber-weapons by an Israeli firm (likely controlled by U.S. investors) to foreign governments around the world?

Cyber weapons are becoming increasingly interchangeable with traditional weapons. Governments (or terrorists) no longer need bombs or missiles to inflict large-scale destruction, such as taking down a power grid, since such attacks can now be conducted from anywhere there is a computer. Do export controls – which have long been used as foreign policy and national security tools, and which would regulate the transfer of traditional weapons – play any real role in regulating the transfer of weapons of cyber-surveillance or destruction? In fact, the legal framework underlying current export controls has not caught up (and maybe never will) to the capabilities of technological tools used in cyberwarfare. Proposals to regulate malware have been met with resistance from the technology industry because malware technology is often dual-use and the practical implications of requiring licenses would impede technological innovation and business activities in drastic ways.

The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established in 1996 as a multilateral nonproliferation regime to promote regional security and stability through greater transparency and responsibility in the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies. The United States is a member. Israel is not, but has aligned its export controls with Wassennaar lists.

In December 2013, the list of export controlled technologies under WA was amended to include commercial surveillance software, largely to curb human rights abuses by repressive governments’ use of spyware on citizens. Earlier this year, the Department of Commerce issued recommendations that the definition of “intrusion software” in the WA be modified to encompass the concept of “authorization” so that malware such as Pegasus, in which the user does not truly understand the nature of the consequences, would be controlled. Those proposals have not been implemented.

U.S. Export Controls of Malware

In 2015, following data breaches at the Officer of Personnel Management and several private companies, the Department of Commerce published proposed rules to harmonize concepts embedded in the WA into the U.S. regulatory framework for export controls. One critical proposal was a definition of “intrusion software” to require a license for the export and use of malware tools. But the definition covered much more than malware. Cybersecurity experts were alarmed by the rule’s over-inclusive and vague language. The rules would have impeded critical business activities, stifled international research and cross-border exchanges of technology, and hindered response to cyber threats.

NSO Group has been described by researchers as “incredibly committed to stealth, and  reportedly has close partnerships with other Israeli surveillance firms that seek to sell spyware, suggesting an inevitable increase in cyber mayhem. As malware becomes more sophisticated, widespread, and threatening, the need for strictly tailored export controls is not going to go away.

Regulating software is challenging at least in part, because there is no workable legal definition of what constitutes a cyber weapon. Because malware is largely dual-use, the only way to determine whether particular software constitutes a cyber weapon is retroactively. If software has been used as a weapon, it is considered a cyber weapon. But that definition arrives far too late to control the dissemination of the code. Moreover, controlling  components of that software would likely be over-inclusive, since the same code that can exploit flaws to break in to devices can also have benign uses, such as detecting vulnerabilities to help manufacturers like Apple learn what needs patching. Another challenge is that requiring  export licenses can take months, which, in the fast-moving tech world is as good as denial.

The revelation of the Pegasus iPhone spyware highlights questions that have perplexed national security and export control experts in recent years. As the use and sophistication of malware continue their explosive growth, not only must individuals and governments face the  chilling realities of cyber warfare, but regulators must quickly understand the technological issues, address the risks, and work with the cyber security and technological communities to find a path forward.

US Treasury and Commerce Departments Announce New Changes to Cuba Regulations

On January 25, 2016, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new changes to existing US sanctions on Cuba, including OFAC’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and BIS’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These changes expand allowable financing for certain authorized exports, allow more flexibility in a number of sectors to export to Cuba, permit air carriers to serve customers in Cuba and further liberalize travel rules. These new regulatory changes may constitute the most that President Obama can do to liberalize trade and travel with Cuba in the absence of congressional legislation to lift the embargo in whole or in part.

Authorized Export Transactions

Amendments to the CACR and EAR to increase support for the Cuban people and facilitate authorized exports include the following:

  • The CACR have been amended to remove financing restrictions for most types of authorized non-agricultural exports. (OFAC is required by statute to maintain the existing limitations on payment and financing terms for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities and agricultural items). Permissible payment and financing terms for authorized non-agricultural exports and reexports now include payment of cash in advance, sales on open account, and financing by third-country financial institutions or US financial institutions.

  • OFAC expanded an existing general license to authorize certain additional travel-related transactions directly related to market research, commercial marketing, sales or contract negotiation, accompanied delivery, installation, leasing, or servicing in Cuba of items consistent with the export or reexport licensing policy of the Department of Commerce, provided that the traveler’s schedule of activities does not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule.

  • BIS now will generally approve license applications for exports and reexports of telecommunications items that would improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people; certain agricultural items not eligible for a license exception, including insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides; and items necessary to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation.

  • BIS ended its policy of denial and now will consider on a case-by-case basis license applications for exports and reexports of items to meet the needs of the Cuban people, including exports and reexports for such purposes made to state-owned enterprises and agencies and organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services to the Cuban people. Exports and reexports eligible for this licensing policy include items for: agricultural production; artistic endeavors (including the creation of public content, historic and cultural works and preservation); education; food processing; disaster preparedness, relief and response; public health and sanitation; residential construction and renovation; public transportation; and the construction of infrastructure that directly benefits the Cuban people (e.g., facilities for treating public water supplies and supplying energy to the general public).

Travel

OFAC has expanded several existing allowable travel categories to facilitate travel to Cuba, including the following:

  • OFAC will authorize travel-related and other transactions directly incident to professional media or artistic productions of information or informational materials for exportation, importation, or transmission, including the filming or production of media programs (such as movies and television programs), music recordings, and the creation of artworks in Cuba by persons that are regularly employed in or have demonstrated professional experience in a field relevant to such professional media or artistic productions.

  • OFAC is expanding the general license for travel-related and other transactions to organize professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. The existing general license authorized only attendance at such meetings or conferences.

  • OFAC is authorizing by general license travel-related and other transactions to organize amateur and semi-professional international sports federation competitions and public performances, clinics, workshops, other athletic or non-athletic competitions, and exhibitions in Cuba.  OFAC is also removing requirements that US profits from certain events must be donated to certain organizations and that certain events be run at least in part by US travelers.

Conclusion

These changes to the regulations offer important changes and will allow for additional market opportunities for US businesses looking to enter the Cuba market. Still, the embargo is in place, and US companies should proceed with caution to ensure full compliance with all existing US and Cuban laws.

© 2016 McDermott Will & Emery

Commerce Department Rulings Spur Oil Export Battle

Covington BUrling Law Firm

As reported in our blog post of last week, the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) recently determined in two private classifications that lease condensate — a type of stabilized and distilled light crude oil — is not subject to the United States’ broad ban on crude oil exports.  BIS has for years defined “crude oil” in its regulations as “a mixture of hydrocarbons that existed in liquid phase in underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities and which has not been processed through a crude oil distillation tower.”   Although the regulations state that this definition includes lease condensate, BIS appears to have determined that lease condensate that has been distilled is a refined petroleum product that is not subject to the broad ban on crude oil exports from the United States.

While BIS claims that there has been “no change in policy on crude oil exports,” the recent determinations have spurred the debate over whether the U.S. should change its position on crude oil exports.  In particular, Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Edward Markey (D-Mass.) — who have been vocal opponents of lifting the ban on crude oil exports — wrote a letter to Commerce Secretary Priztker alleging that BIS may have impermissibly approved the exports of lease condensate and demanding copies of the two determinations and information on the legal rationale for approving such exports by July 14, 2014.  Senators Markey and Menendez argue that allowing exports of crude oil would increase reliance on foreign oil and cause domestic gas prices to rise.  However, with U.S. crude oil production surging as a result of the advancements in hydrofracking technology, Senators Lisa Murkowski and Mary Landrieu have championed the effort to reconsider the ban on crude oil exports, which has been in place since the Arab oil embargo and global energy supply shortages of the 1970s.  In particular, Senator Murkowski has issued a report calling for a “renovation” of U.S. energy export policy, which includes an April 2014 white paper in advocating for condensate exports.

While some view BIS’ approval of condensate exports as a step towards a greater liberalization in crude oil export policy, financial analysts such as Morgan Stanley are not bullish on any significant changes occurring before this years’ mid-term elections.  Moreover, recent reports indicate that the White House may not have been aware that BIS was planning to issue such determinations, and therefore this may not represent a conscious effort on the part of the Obama Administration to change crude oil export policy.  Indeed, Secretary Pritzker has confirmed publicly that the rulings were not a change in policy.  However, the Secretary also said that “it’s a mistake to think there isn’t serious conversation going on within the administration about what we should do,” and that the issue of energy exports overall should be “examined holistically from an economic, strategic, and diplomatic standpoint.”  These statements suggest that the Administration is not backing down from the condensate rulings, and is considering the broader policy issues involved in allowing exports of other oil products.

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Starving the Bear: The United States Restricts Exports to Russia

Sheppard Mullin 2012

The pressure on Russia continues to build.  As we previously reported here and here, throughout March, the United States and other Western powers implemented a series of sanctions against individuals and entities deemed to be involved in the political destabilization of Ukraine.  Those sanctions were restricted to specific parties, including high ranking Russian and Ukrainian officials and – notably – one Russian bank.

The United States has now gone further, implementing restrictions that restrict trade with the entire country of Russia.  These sanctions are bound to have more bite.

Specifically, on March 26, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that, since March 1, 2014 and until further notice, it had not and will not issue licenses for exports or re-exports to Russia.  Commerce governs exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin commercial and “dual use” items.  While not all such items require a license for Russia, many sensitive items do.

On March 27, the State Department followed suit: it announced that, until further notice, it will not issue any authorizations for exports of defense articles or services to Russia.  This is essentially an absolute embargo on defense exports to Russia and Russian nationals: an export authorization is required for virtually any export of a defense article, technical data, or defense service to Russia (or any other country).

These two actions constitute a significant expansion of U.S. trade restrictions on Russia, particularly because the license restrictions apply to exports of both goods and technology.  Moreover, the restrictions apply to all Russian individuals and entities, as opposed to the very targeted economic sanctions previously imposed by the Treasury Department.

While the United States has acted quickly, it is not alone, as the European Union has also taken action, introducing targeted sanctions, including an asset freeze and visa ban, against designated parties responsible for human rights violations, violence, and use of excessive force with respect to Ukraine.  In addition, EU Member States have agreed to (i) suspend export licenses on equipment that might be used for internal repression and (ii) reconsider export licenses to Ukraine and Russia related to military technology and equipment.

Collectively, the sanctions imposed to date bring with them a host of practical challenges for companies conducting business in or with Russia.  Western banks may scrutinize transactions with Russian banks and other parties especially carefully in light of the new restrictions.  In some cases, a Western bank might hold up a legitimate transaction for further review if a Russian counterparty is involved.

Companies with current business ties in Russia must, therefore, consider the commercial and related risks of continuing that business.  The United States in particular is implementing sanctions rapidly, piecemeal, and often without much warning.  As the landscape of trade restrictions continues to change, companies must perform ongoing diligence with respect to their Russian business.  For example, companies should perform periodic rescreening of Russian business partners to ensure they do not appear on any U.S. prohibited parties lists.

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