Tag: ERISA

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit, Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

Read on below for coverage of recent law firm news from McDermott Will & Emery.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit

McDermott Will & Emery’s Andrew C. Liazos, Michael B. Kimberly and Charlie Seidell recently filed an amicus brief in the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). McDermott filed the brief in response to a US Department of Labor (DOL) amicus brief that advanced a novel interpretation of its regulations which, if adopted through litigation, would change longstanding procedures for benefit determinations under self-funded medical plans sponsored by large employers. The amicus brief focuses on key arguments against the DOL’s attempted regulatory reinterpretation, including that:

  • DOL may not rewrite its regulations outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking;
  • DOL’s interpretation of its own regulations is inconsistent with the plain text of the regulations;
  • There are good policy reasons underlying differential treatment of healthcare and disability benefits determinations; and
  • DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in its amicus brief is not entitled to deference under the Supreme Court decision in Kisor.

Read ERIC’s amicus brief here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

ERIC Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

McDermott Will & Emery’s Michael B. Kimberly, Sarah P. Hogarth and Andrew C. Liazos, are co-counsel on a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). The petition calls for review of ERIC’s legal challenge to the City of Seattle’s hotel healthcare “play or pay” ordinance. The ordinance mandates hospitality employers make specified monthly healthcare expenditures for their covered local employees if their healthcare plans do not meet certain requirements. The petition demonstrates that Seattle’s ordinance is a clear attempt to control the benefits provided under medical plans in violation of the preemption provision under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA). This case is of significant national importance. Several other cities have proposed making similar changes, and complying with these types of ordinances will substantially constrain the ability of employers to control the terms of their medical plans on a uniform basis. ERIC’s petition is joined by several trade associations, including the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Benefits Council and the Retail Industry Leaders Association.

Read ERIC’s petition for writ of certiorari here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

 

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District Court Declines to Dismiss 401(k) Fee Litigation Case in First Decision Post-Hughes

In the first decision since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hughes v. Northwestern Univ., No. 19-1401, 595 U.S. ___ (U.S. Jan. 24, 2022) (discussed further here), a Georgia federal district court held in favor of plaintiffs and declined to dismiss allegations that defendant’s 401(k) plan included costly and underperforming funds and charged excessive recordkeeping fees. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence by: (1) offering retail share class mutual funds despite the availability of identical lower-cost institutional share classes of these same funds; (2) including actively managed mutual funds which were more expensive than available passively managed funds; (3) selecting and maintaining underperforming funds; and (4) overpaying for recordkeeping services.

In declining to dismiss plaintiffs’ investment management fee claims, the district court relied heavily on Hughes. The court expressed its view that Hughes “suggested” that a defined contribution plan participant may state a prudence claim by merely alleging that the plan offered higher priced retail class mutual funds instead of available identical lower-cost institutional class funds. The district court also rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed in part because the plan offered a variety of investment options that participants could select, including lower-cost passive investment options. The district court explained that Hughes rejected this exact argument in holding that a fiduciary’s decisions are not insulated merely by giving participants choice over their investments and that fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor plan investments.

The court declined to dismiss plaintiffs’ recordkeeping claims because plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the plan paid nearly double the fees charged by similarly sized plans and that defendant failed to monitor those costs. In regards to plaintiffs’ underperformance claims, the court held that the existence and extent of the alleged underperformance was better left for summary judgment given the parties’ differing views on the issue.

Proskauer’s Perspective

While plaintiffs seemingly scored a victory in the first decision since Hughes, the decision does not indicate that this will (or should be) the trend. First, the district court issued its decision one day after Hughes was decided without the benefit of additional briefing, which would have likely included briefing on the Supreme Court’s direction that district courts give “due regard” to the reasons why a fiduciary made the challenged decisions. Second, the district court appears to have, at a minimum, over-emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding as to the plausibility of mutual fund retail share class claims; the Supreme Court did not hold directly or in dicta that a plaintiff may survive dismissal merely by alleging the availability of identical lower-cost mutual fund share classes.

The case is Goodman v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13489 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2022).

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more articles about 401(k) plans, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Sign of Future Changes? DOL Proposes 18-Month Extension of Transition Period for Compliance With ERISA “Fiduciary Investment Advice” Rule

On August 9, the US Department of Labor (DOL) announced in a court filing that it has proposed an 18-month extension of the full implementation of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (the “BIC Exemption”) under the ERISA fiduciary investment advice rule. The Proposed Extension would also apply to the Principal Transaction Exemption and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (together with the BIC Exemption, the “Exemptions”). In April of this year, the DOL extended the effective date of the Rule until June 9 and limited the requirements of the Exemptions to only require compliance with the “impartial conduct standards” (ICS) through December 31 (the “Transition Period”). If the Proposed Extension is approved, full compliance with the Exemptions will not be required until July 1, 2019.

As described in our earlier advisory, “Compliance With the ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule for Private Investment Fund Managers and Sponsors and Managed Account Advisers: Beginning June 9, 2017,” compliance with the ICS generally requires that an investment advice fiduciary (1) act in the “best interest” of plan participants and IRA owners; (2) receive no more than “reasonable compensation” (as defined under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code); and (3) make no materially misleading statements about recommended transactions, fees, compensation and conflicts of interest.

The Proposed Extension was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the form of an amendment to each of the Exemptions.

This post was written by Henry Bregstein Wendy E. Cohen David Y. Dickstein Jack P. Governale Christian B. Hennion and Gary W. Howell of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more legal analysis visit the National Law Review.

HSAs and the ERISA Fiduciary Rule: What Employers Should Know

With the fate of health care reform—and its repeal and/or replacement—up for grabs in Washington, there is a health-related compliance item outside of health care reform that should be on employers’ radars: health savings accounts (HSAs) and the new Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary rule.

We have previously kept you apprised concerning the evolving saga of the ERISA fiduciary rule, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE), and other related exemptions in a series of posts. As you likely know, post-inauguration, this hotly-debated and controversial rule and its exemptions largely became effective June 9, 2017 (with a transition period extending through year-end).

At this stage, most employers and plan sponsors have engaged in dialogue with their retirement plan investment advisors and recordkeepers to understand what is being done to comply with the rule. However, employers offering HSAs, the custodial accounts that can be paired with high deductible health plans (HDHPs) to gain significant tax benefits, should not turn a blind eye to this rule.

Discussing the ERISA fiduciary rule in context of HSAs may seem surprising or bizarre given that HSAs are generally not plans governed by ERISA. These accounts are employee-owned (no “use it or lose it” applies) and not employer-sponsored. That said, the Department of Labor has taken the position that an HSA should be treated like an Individual Retirement Account for purposes of the ERISA fiduciary rule, given that its investment accounts may be used as savings accounts for retiree health care expenses. Depending upon the level of involvement an employer has with the HAS, including whether the employer offers or actively facilitates the provision of investment recommendations/advice on the HSA investments or receives a benefit (including revenue sharing) from an HSA vendor or investment, ERISA’s expanded fiduciary rule could come into effect.

At a minimum, an employer who offers a HDHP and facilitates HSA contributions should consider whether its involvement could trigger ERISA fiduciary status. This undertaking could involve reviewing HSA vendor agreements and related practices touching investments. Even if it is determined that the employer is unlikely to be a fiduciary for its HSA plan, an employer may still benefit from implementing certain features of ERISA best practices to mitigate risk for their organization and employees during this transition time period.

For more legal analysis, go to the National Law Review.

This post was written by Carrie E. Byrnes and Jorge M. Leon of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP. 

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in Favor of “Church Plan” Defendants

Today, the Supreme Court handed a long-awaited victory to religiously affiliated organizations operating pension plans under ERISA’s “church plan” exemption. In a surprising 8-0 ruling, the Court agreed with the Defendants that the exemption applies to pension plans maintained by church affiliated organizations such as healthcare facilities, even if the plans were not established by a church. Justice Kagan authored the opinion, with a concurrence by Justice Sotomayor.  Justice Gorsuch, who was appointed after oral argument, did not participate in the decision.  The opinion reverses decisions in favor of Plaintiffs from three Appellate Circuits – the Third, Seventh, and Ninth.

For those of you not familiar with the issue, ERISA originally defined a “church plan” as “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church.”   Then, in 1980, Congress amended the exemption by adding the provision at the heart of the three consolidated cases.  The new section provides: “[a] plan established and maintained . . . by a church . . . includes a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.”  The parties agreed that under those provisions, a “church plan” need not be maintained by a church, but they differed as to whether a plan must still have been established by a church to qualify for the church-plan exemption.

The Defendants, Advocate Health Care Network, St. Peter’s Healthcare System, and Dignity Health, asserted that their pension plans are “church plans” exempt from ERISA’s strict reporting, disclosure, and funding obligations.  Although each of the plans at issue was established by the hospitals and not a church, each one of the hospitals had received confirmation from the IRS over the years that their plans were, in fact, exempt from ERISA, under the church plan exemption because of the entities’ religious affiliation.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the pension plans, argued that the church plan exemption was not intended to exempt pension plans of large healthcare systems where the plans were not established by a church.

Justice Kagan’s analysis began by acknowledging that the term “church plan” initially meant only “a plan established and maintained . . . by a church.” But the 1980 amendment, she found, expanded the original definition to “include” another type of plan—“a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.’”  She concluded that the use of the word “include” was not literal, “but tells readers that a different type of plan should receive the same treatment (i.e., an exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”

Thus, according to Justice Kagan, because Congress included within the category of plans “established and maintained by a church” plans “maintained by” principal-purpose organizations, those plans—and all those plans—are exempt from ERISA’s requirements. Although the DOL, PBGC, and IRS had all filed a brief supporting the Defendants’ position, Justice Kagan mentioned only briefly the agencies long-standing interpretation of the exemption, and did not engage in any “Chevron-Deference” analysis.  Some observers may find this surprising, because comments during oral argument suggested that some of the Justices harbored concerns regarding the hundreds of similar plans that had relied on administrative interpretations for thirty years.

In analyzing the legislative history, Justice Kagan aptly observed, that “[t]he legislative materials in these cases consist almost wholly of excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual lawmakers—the sort of stuff we have called `among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.’” Nonetheless, after reviewing the history, and as she forecasted by her questioning at oral argument (see our March 29, 2017 Blog, Supreme Court Hears “Church Plan” Erisa Class Action Cases), Justice Kagan rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the legislative history demonstrated an intent to keep the “establishment” requirement.  To do so “would have prevented some plans run by pension boards—the very entities the employees say Congress most wanted to benefit—from qualifying as `church plans’…. No argument the employees have offered here supports that goal-defying (much less that text-defying) statutory construction.”

In sum, Justice Kagan held that “[u]nder the best reading of the statute, a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization therefore qualifies as a `church plan,’ regardless of who established it.”

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence joining the Court’s opinion because she was “persuaded that it correctly interprets the relevant statutory text.” Although she agreed with the Court’s reading of the exemption, she was “troubled by the outcome of these cases.”  Her concern was based on the notion that “Church-affiliated organizations operate for-profit subsidiaries, employee thousands of people, earn billions of dollars in revenue, and compete with companies that have to comply with ERISA.”  This concern appears to be based on the view that some church-affiliated organizations effectively operate as secular, for-profit businesses.

Takeaways:

  • Although this decision is positive news for church plans, it may not be the end of the church plan litigation.  Numerous, large settlements have occurred before and since the Supreme Court took up the consolidated cases, and we expect some will still settle, albeit likely for lower numbers.
  • In addition, Plaintiffs could still push forward with the cases on the grounds that the entities maintaining the church plans are not “principal-purpose organizations” controlled by “a church.”

René E. Thorne and Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C..

The ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule: What Happens on June 9?

This is an update on the upcoming effective date of the “fiduciary rule” or “fiduciary advice rule” (the “Rule”) that was issued under the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Rule was published by the US Department of Labor (DOL) in April, 2016. The purpose of the Rule is to cause a person or entity to become a “fiduciary” under ERISA and the US Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”) as a result of giving of certain types of advice involving investment of assets of employee benefit plans, such as 401(k) or pension plans, or of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and receiving compensation for that advice.

calendar hundred daysThe Rule was originally intended to become effective April 10, but in April the DOL extended (the “Extension Notice”) the effective date of the Rule for 60 days (until June 9), and provided for reduced compliance obligations under the Rule from that date through the end of 2017 (the “Transition Period”). The effective date for Prohibited Transaction Exemptions (PTEs), both new and amended, that are related to the Rule also was extended until June 9, and further transitional relief was provided with respect to certain of those PTEs.

In a May 23 Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal, Labor Secretary Acosta announced that the Rule would go into effect on June 9, as provided for in the Extension Notice, and that the DOL would seek additional public comment on possible revisions to the Rule.  He indicated that the DOL “found no principled legal basis to change the June 9 date while we seek public input.”  The DOL also published, on May 23, FAQs on implementation of the Rule and an update of its previously-issued enforcement policy for the Transition Period. Therefore, it is important to review the rules that will go into effect on June 9.

Under the Rule, fiduciary status is triggered by investment “recommendations.” It provides, in general, that if a person (1) provides certain types of recommendations to a plan or its participants and/or beneficiaries, or to an IRA owner (collectively, “Protected Investors”); and (2) as a result, receives a fee or other compensation (direct or indirect), then that person is providing “investment advice for a fee” and therefore, in giving such advice, is a fiduciary to the Protected Investor. Receipt of compensation tied to such recommendations by a person or entity that is a fiduciary could result in prohibited transactions under ERISA and the Code. Under the Extension Notice, the DOL provided simplified compliance requirements under the Rule for the Transition Period.

This post was written by Gary W. Howell, Austin S. Lilling, Gabriel S. Marinaro, Richard D. Marshall, Andrew R. Skowronski, Robert A. Stone of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.

Supreme Court Solicits Opinions on Breadth of Remedies under ERISA—Including Indemnity and Contribution

Supreme Court ERISA RemediesEarlier this week, the Supreme Court got back to work in the New Year. One of the court’s first orders of business was to invite the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States in a handful of cases. Fenkell v. Alliance Holdings, Inc., a somewhat controversial ERISA case, landed amongst the chosen few. Specifically under Fenkell, the Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General to opine on whether ERISA permits a cause of action for indemnity or contribution by an individual found liable for breach of fiduciary duty in light of the existing circuit split on the issue.

While the facts of Fenkell are largely irrelevant for this discussion, the important takeaway is that an ERISA employee stock ownership plan fiduciary led the effort to offload an unprofitable company onto its employees in a complicated leveraged buyout. The involved and resulting breach of ERISA fiduciary duties is not contested. Rather, the ringleader, Fenkell, challenged (and continues to challenge) the judge’s order requiring him to indemnify his co-fiduciaries. Simply put, the indemnification order seemed appropriate to the court given the control that Fenkell exerted over the other fiduciaries—the court noted the other fiduciaries’ “inexperience” as fiduciaries and their deference to Fenkell as the controlling owner, sole director, president, and CEO of Alliance. Stated another way, Fenkell was the “conductor,” and the other fiduciaries involved were the “mere musicians.”

In an earlier review, the Seventh Circuit rejected each of Fenkell’s arguments and followed its 30-year-old precedent which allows for indemnification and contribution among co-fiduciaries. In support of its decision to uphold its prior interpretation, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that “[i]f we are to interpret ERISA according to the background principles of trust law—as the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us to do—then indemnification and contribution are available equitable remedies under the statute.” Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit found ERISA’s equitable remedial power, as well as its foundation in principles of trust law, supportive of an order for contribution or indemnification among co-fiduciaries based on degrees of culpability.

While this case has not yet been taken up, argued in front of, or decided by the Supreme Court, the Acting Solicitor General’s brief may shed new light on the direction the Supreme Court may take to settle the circuit split. In the meantime and at a minimum, this case and the Supreme Court’s request for the U.S.’s view should remind us that:

  • Under ERISA, if defendants are found to be liable for breaches by co-fiduciaries, then co-fiduciary liability is joint and several.
  • Inexperience—and even fear of retribution from management (e.g., your boss)—will not excuse a failure to discharge fiduciary duties under ERISA.
  • Whether “mere musicians” will ultimately be able to seek protection (in terms of indemnification and/or contribution) from their “conductor” will, under current law, involve lengthy litigation and depend on the reviewing court.

Because fiduciary (and co-fiduciary) duties and conduct will most certainly continue to be closely scrutinized, best practice requires steadfast resolve to work hard as fiduciaries, acting solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries in order to discharge their duties of loyalty and prudence. To help ensure this compliance, it is good practice to undergo periodic fiduciary training.

ARTICLE BY Carrie E. Byrnes & Jorge M. Leon of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

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