Sign of Future Changes? DOL Proposes 18-Month Extension of Transition Period for Compliance With ERISA “Fiduciary Investment Advice” Rule

On August 9, the US Department of Labor (DOL) announced in a court filing that it has proposed an 18-month extension of the full implementation of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (the “BIC Exemption”) under the ERISA fiduciary investment advice rule. The Proposed Extension would also apply to the Principal Transaction Exemption and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (together with the BIC Exemption, the “Exemptions”). In April of this year, the DOL extended the effective date of the Rule until June 9 and limited the requirements of the Exemptions to only require compliance with the “impartial conduct standards” (ICS) through December 31 (the “Transition Period”). If the Proposed Extension is approved, full compliance with the Exemptions will not be required until July 1, 2019.

As described in our earlier advisory, “Compliance With the ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule for Private Investment Fund Managers and Sponsors and Managed Account Advisers: Beginning June 9, 2017,” compliance with the ICS generally requires that an investment advice fiduciary (1) act in the “best interest” of plan participants and IRA owners; (2) receive no more than “reasonable compensation” (as defined under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code); and (3) make no materially misleading statements about recommended transactions, fees, compensation and conflicts of interest.

The Proposed Extension was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the form of an amendment to each of the Exemptions.

This post was written by Henry Bregstein Wendy E. Cohen David Y. Dickstein Jack P. Governale Christian B. Hennion and Gary W. Howell of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more legal analysis visit the National Law Review.

HSAs and the ERISA Fiduciary Rule: What Employers Should Know

With the fate of health care reform—and its repeal and/or replacement—up for grabs in Washington, there is a health-related compliance item outside of health care reform that should be on employers’ radars: health savings accounts (HSAs) and the new Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary rule.

We have previously kept you apprised concerning the evolving saga of the ERISA fiduciary rule, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE), and other related exemptions in a series of posts. As you likely know, post-inauguration, this hotly-debated and controversial rule and its exemptions largely became effective June 9, 2017 (with a transition period extending through year-end).

At this stage, most employers and plan sponsors have engaged in dialogue with their retirement plan investment advisors and recordkeepers to understand what is being done to comply with the rule. However, employers offering HSAs, the custodial accounts that can be paired with high deductible health plans (HDHPs) to gain significant tax benefits, should not turn a blind eye to this rule.

Discussing the ERISA fiduciary rule in context of HSAs may seem surprising or bizarre given that HSAs are generally not plans governed by ERISA. These accounts are employee-owned (no “use it or lose it” applies) and not employer-sponsored. That said, the Department of Labor has taken the position that an HSA should be treated like an Individual Retirement Account for purposes of the ERISA fiduciary rule, given that its investment accounts may be used as savings accounts for retiree health care expenses. Depending upon the level of involvement an employer has with the HAS, including whether the employer offers or actively facilitates the provision of investment recommendations/advice on the HSA investments or receives a benefit (including revenue sharing) from an HSA vendor or investment, ERISA’s expanded fiduciary rule could come into effect.

At a minimum, an employer who offers a HDHP and facilitates HSA contributions should consider whether its involvement could trigger ERISA fiduciary status. This undertaking could involve reviewing HSA vendor agreements and related practices touching investments. Even if it is determined that the employer is unlikely to be a fiduciary for its HSA plan, an employer may still benefit from implementing certain features of ERISA best practices to mitigate risk for their organization and employees during this transition time period.

For more legal analysis, go to the National Law Review.

This post was written by Carrie E. Byrnes and Jorge M. Leon of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP. 

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in Favor of “Church Plan” Defendants

Today, the Supreme Court handed a long-awaited victory to religiously affiliated organizations operating pension plans under ERISA’s “church plan” exemption. In a surprising 8-0 ruling, the Court agreed with the Defendants that the exemption applies to pension plans maintained by church affiliated organizations such as healthcare facilities, even if the plans were not established by a church. Justice Kagan authored the opinion, with a concurrence by Justice Sotomayor.  Justice Gorsuch, who was appointed after oral argument, did not participate in the decision.  The opinion reverses decisions in favor of Plaintiffs from three Appellate Circuits – the Third, Seventh, and Ninth.

For those of you not familiar with the issue, ERISA originally defined a “church plan” as “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church.”   Then, in 1980, Congress amended the exemption by adding the provision at the heart of the three consolidated cases.  The new section provides: “[a] plan established and maintained . . . by a church . . . includes a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.”  The parties agreed that under those provisions, a “church plan” need not be maintained by a church, but they differed as to whether a plan must still have been established by a church to qualify for the church-plan exemption.

The Defendants, Advocate Health Care Network, St. Peter’s Healthcare System, and Dignity Health, asserted that their pension plans are “church plans” exempt from ERISA’s strict reporting, disclosure, and funding obligations.  Although each of the plans at issue was established by the hospitals and not a church, each one of the hospitals had received confirmation from the IRS over the years that their plans were, in fact, exempt from ERISA, under the church plan exemption because of the entities’ religious affiliation.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the pension plans, argued that the church plan exemption was not intended to exempt pension plans of large healthcare systems where the plans were not established by a church.

Justice Kagan’s analysis began by acknowledging that the term “church plan” initially meant only “a plan established and maintained . . . by a church.” But the 1980 amendment, she found, expanded the original definition to “include” another type of plan—“a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.’”  She concluded that the use of the word “include” was not literal, “but tells readers that a different type of plan should receive the same treatment (i.e., an exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”

Thus, according to Justice Kagan, because Congress included within the category of plans “established and maintained by a church” plans “maintained by” principal-purpose organizations, those plans—and all those plans—are exempt from ERISA’s requirements. Although the DOL, PBGC, and IRS had all filed a brief supporting the Defendants’ position, Justice Kagan mentioned only briefly the agencies long-standing interpretation of the exemption, and did not engage in any “Chevron-Deference” analysis.  Some observers may find this surprising, because comments during oral argument suggested that some of the Justices harbored concerns regarding the hundreds of similar plans that had relied on administrative interpretations for thirty years.

In analyzing the legislative history, Justice Kagan aptly observed, that “[t]he legislative materials in these cases consist almost wholly of excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual lawmakers—the sort of stuff we have called `among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.’” Nonetheless, after reviewing the history, and as she forecasted by her questioning at oral argument (see our March 29, 2017 Blog, Supreme Court Hears “Church Plan” Erisa Class Action Cases), Justice Kagan rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the legislative history demonstrated an intent to keep the “establishment” requirement.  To do so “would have prevented some plans run by pension boards—the very entities the employees say Congress most wanted to benefit—from qualifying as `church plans’…. No argument the employees have offered here supports that goal-defying (much less that text-defying) statutory construction.”

In sum, Justice Kagan held that “[u]nder the best reading of the statute, a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization therefore qualifies as a `church plan,’ regardless of who established it.”

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence joining the Court’s opinion because she was “persuaded that it correctly interprets the relevant statutory text.” Although she agreed with the Court’s reading of the exemption, she was “troubled by the outcome of these cases.”  Her concern was based on the notion that “Church-affiliated organizations operate for-profit subsidiaries, employee thousands of people, earn billions of dollars in revenue, and compete with companies that have to comply with ERISA.”  This concern appears to be based on the view that some church-affiliated organizations effectively operate as secular, for-profit businesses.


  • Although this decision is positive news for church plans, it may not be the end of the church plan litigation.  Numerous, large settlements have occurred before and since the Supreme Court took up the consolidated cases, and we expect some will still settle, albeit likely for lower numbers.
  • In addition, Plaintiffs could still push forward with the cases on the grounds that the entities maintaining the church plans are not “principal-purpose organizations” controlled by “a church.”

René E. Thorne and Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C..

The ERISA Fiduciary Advice Rule: What Happens on June 9?

This is an update on the upcoming effective date of the “fiduciary rule” or “fiduciary advice rule” (the “Rule”) that was issued under the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Rule was published by the US Department of Labor (DOL) in April, 2016. The purpose of the Rule is to cause a person or entity to become a “fiduciary” under ERISA and the US Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”) as a result of giving of certain types of advice involving investment of assets of employee benefit plans, such as 401(k) or pension plans, or of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and receiving compensation for that advice.

calendar hundred daysThe Rule was originally intended to become effective April 10, but in April the DOL extended (the “Extension Notice”) the effective date of the Rule for 60 days (until June 9), and provided for reduced compliance obligations under the Rule from that date through the end of 2017 (the “Transition Period”). The effective date for Prohibited Transaction Exemptions (PTEs), both new and amended, that are related to the Rule also was extended until June 9, and further transitional relief was provided with respect to certain of those PTEs.

In a May 23 Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal, Labor Secretary Acosta announced that the Rule would go into effect on June 9, as provided for in the Extension Notice, and that the DOL would seek additional public comment on possible revisions to the Rule.  He indicated that the DOL “found no principled legal basis to change the June 9 date while we seek public input.”  The DOL also published, on May 23, FAQs on implementation of the Rule and an update of its previously-issued enforcement policy for the Transition Period. Therefore, it is important to review the rules that will go into effect on June 9.

Under the Rule, fiduciary status is triggered by investment “recommendations.” It provides, in general, that if a person (1) provides certain types of recommendations to a plan or its participants and/or beneficiaries, or to an IRA owner (collectively, “Protected Investors”); and (2) as a result, receives a fee or other compensation (direct or indirect), then that person is providing “investment advice for a fee” and therefore, in giving such advice, is a fiduciary to the Protected Investor. Receipt of compensation tied to such recommendations by a person or entity that is a fiduciary could result in prohibited transactions under ERISA and the Code. Under the Extension Notice, the DOL provided simplified compliance requirements under the Rule for the Transition Period.

This post was written by Gary W. HowellAustin S. LillingGabriel S. MarinaroRichard D. MarshallAndrew R. SkowronskiRobert A. Stone of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.

Supreme Court Solicits Opinions on Breadth of Remedies under ERISA—Including Indemnity and Contribution

Supreme Court ERISA RemediesEarlier this week, the Supreme Court got back to work in the New Year. One of the court’s first orders of business was to invite the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States in a handful of cases. Fenkell v. Alliance Holdings, Inc., a somewhat controversial ERISA case, landed amongst the chosen few. Specifically under Fenkell, the Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General to opine on whether ERISA permits a cause of action for indemnity or contribution by an individual found liable for breach of fiduciary duty in light of the existing circuit split on the issue.

While the facts of Fenkell are largely irrelevant for this discussion, the important takeaway is that an ERISA employee stock ownership plan fiduciary led the effort to offload an unprofitable company onto its employees in a complicated leveraged buyout. The involved and resulting breach of ERISA fiduciary duties is not contested. Rather, the ringleader, Fenkell, challenged (and continues to challenge) the judge’s order requiring him to indemnify his co-fiduciaries. Simply put, the indemnification order seemed appropriate to the court given the control that Fenkell exerted over the other fiduciaries—the court noted the other fiduciaries’ “inexperience” as fiduciaries and their deference to Fenkell as the controlling owner, sole director, president, and CEO of Alliance. Stated another way, Fenkell was the “conductor,” and the other fiduciaries involved were the “mere musicians.”

In an earlier review, the Seventh Circuit rejected each of Fenkell’s arguments and followed its 30-year-old precedent which allows for indemnification and contribution among co-fiduciaries. In support of its decision to uphold its prior interpretation, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that “[i]f we are to interpret ERISA according to the background principles of trust law—as the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us to do—then indemnification and contribution are available equitable remedies under the statute.” Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit found ERISA’s equitable remedial power, as well as its foundation in principles of trust law, supportive of an order for contribution or indemnification among co-fiduciaries based on degrees of culpability.

While this case has not yet been taken up, argued in front of, or decided by the Supreme Court, the Acting Solicitor General’s brief may shed new light on the direction the Supreme Court may take to settle the circuit split. In the meantime and at a minimum, this case and the Supreme Court’s request for the U.S.’s view should remind us that:

  • Under ERISA, if defendants are found to be liable for breaches by co-fiduciaries, then co-fiduciary liability is joint and several.
  • Inexperience—and even fear of retribution from management (e.g., your boss)—will not excuse a failure to discharge fiduciary duties under ERISA.
  • Whether “mere musicians” will ultimately be able to seek protection (in terms of indemnification and/or contribution) from their “conductor” will, under current law, involve lengthy litigation and depend on the reviewing court.

Because fiduciary (and co-fiduciary) duties and conduct will most certainly continue to be closely scrutinized, best practice requires steadfast resolve to work hard as fiduciaries, acting solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries in order to discharge their duties of loyalty and prudence. To help ensure this compliance, it is good practice to undergo periodic fiduciary training.


Lehman Brothers Wins Stock Drop Lawsuit

Lehman brothers stock dropA New York federal appeals court once again rejected a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the now bankrupt Lehman Brothers brought by its employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) participants. In In Re: Lehman Bros. Sec. and ERISA Litig., No. 15-2229 (2d Cir. 2016), the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 18 ruled that participants “failed to allege sufficiently” that plan fiduciaries violated their duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The appeals court upheld an earlier July 15, 2015 decision by a US district court in New York to dismiss the complaint.

Soon after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September 2008, the ESOP participants sued, claiming that ESOP fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA “by continuing to permit investment in Lehman stock in the face of circumstances arguably foreshadowing its eventual demise,” the Second Circuit said. The New York district court dismissed the complaint for the first time in 2011, and the Second Circuit court upheld the dismissal in 2013. Both courts cited a long-held legal principle applicable to ESOPs—the presumption of prudence—to support the defendants’ request for dismissal.

However, in June 2014, the US Supreme Court nullified this long-standing presumption of prudence principle in a unanimous decision inFifth Third Bancorp, et. al. v Dudenhoeffer, et. al. According to the Supreme Court in the Dudenhoeffer decision, fiduciaries that evaluate an investment in employer stock may rely on its market price unless there are “special circumstances.” Specifically, the court held that “where a stock is publicly traded, allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized, from publicly available information alone, that the market was over or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.” This means that the stock market price is the best estimate of employee stock value. But the Supreme Court did not address what it means by “special circumstances,” so, as a result, lower courts will need to determine when a plan fiduciary should have considered the market price as questionable.

Following Dudenhoeffer, the Lehman employees tried to establish special circumstances by pointing to orders issued by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in summer 2008 that prohibited the short-selling of Lehman securities. They argued both that the orders described market conditions that constituted special circumstances and that the orders themselves qualified as special circumstances. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the SEC orders “speak only conditionally” about the market effects of short sales.

This Second Circuit ruling marks the first time that a circuit court has applied the Supreme Court’s recent decision reaffirming the high hurdle facing employees who challenge company stock losses under ERISA (SeeAmgen Inc. v. Harris 136 S. Ct. 758 (US 2016)). This special circumstances requirement has derailed several lawsuits in the last two years, with courts dismissing claims involving the company stock plans of various major companies.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Dave & Busted? Reductions in Employee Work Schedules May Not Negate Employer’s ACA Health Coverage Mandate

Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), employers with at least 50 full-time employees (“FTEs) must generally offer qualifying health insurance to all employees who work at least 30 hours or more per week. A company that fails to satisfy this so-called “employer mandate” faces the possibility of significant penalties under the ACA. As a result, the ACA amplifies many risks for companies with respect to their employment classifications and the delivery of health care benefits to their employees.

ACA Implications for Employers

In response to these uncertainties, some employers have gone so far as to reduce the hourly work schedules of some employees to less than 30 hours per week to avoid any additional costs under the ACA employer mandate.  In what is believed to be a case of first impression, the plaintiffs in Marin v. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., S.D.N.Y., No. 1:15-cv-036081 challenged their employer over the reductions to their work schedules by filing a class action suit in federal court in May 2015. Specifically, current and former employees alleged that Dave & Buster’s, the national restaurant chain, violated the protections under Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) by intentionally interfering with their eligibility for benefits under the company’s health plan. They also claimed damages for lost wages and demanded the restoration of their health coverage, as well as reimbursement of their out-of-pocket medical costs.

In response to the lawsuit, Dave & Buster’s filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the plaintiffs’ ERISA Section 510 claim failed as a matter of law because there was no guaranteed “accrued benefit” over future health insurance coverage for hours not yet worked.  On February 9, 2016, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the company’s motion to dismiss.  The court found that the complaint “sufficiently and plausibly” alleged enough facts to support a possible finding that Dave & Buster’s intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ rights to receive benefits under the company’s health plan. The court noted that the complaint referenced specific e-mails and other communications that the plaintiffs allegedly received when their work schedules were reduced, as well as public statements by senior executives and disclosures in the company’s securities filings, which overtly explained that the workforce management protocols were instituted to thwart the potential impact of the ACA on the company’s bottom line.

While the decision on the motion to dismiss does not necessarily mean that the employer will ultimately lose, it does signal the court’s willingness to allow the plaintiffs to develop their legal theories in subsequent court filings. One can also question the impact to the court, at least initially, of the company’s open and obvious disclosures about its reasoning for reducing the employees’ work schedules.  Based on the strong wording of the court’s ruling, however, these obvious and seemingly bold statements certainly did not help the company’s request for an early exit from this case.  As a result, the court may eventually allow robust discovery which could, of course, be cumbersome and expensive for the company.

Takeaways for Employers

In light of this case development, companies that are subject to the ACA employer mandate should review their compliance strategies now to address any risks with their employment classifications and the delivery of future health care benefits to their FTEs, and also take heed in the manner as to how they communicate any reductions in employees’ work schedules.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California