SEC Issues Long-Awaited Climate Risk Disclosure Rule

INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, 6 March 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved its highly anticipated final rules on “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” by a vote of 3-2, with Republican Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissenting. Accompanying the final rules was a press release and fact sheet detailing the provisions of the rulemaking. The final rules will go into effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register and will include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants.

This is likely to be one of the most consequential rulemakings of Chairman Gary Gensler’s tenure given the prioritization of addressing climate change as a key pillar for the Biden administration. However, given the significant controversy associated with this rulemaking effort, the final rules are likely to face legal challenges and congressional oversight in the coming months. As such, it remains unclear at this point whether the final rules will survive the forthcoming scrutiny.

WHAT IS IN THE RULE?

According to the SEC’s fact sheet:

  • “The final rules would require a registrant to disclose, among other things: material climate-related risks; activities to mitigate or adapt to such risks; information about the registrant’s board of directors’ oversight of climate-related risks and management’s role in managing material climate-related risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition.
  • Further, to facilitate investors’ assessment of certain climate-related risks, the final rules would require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a phased-in basis by certain larger registrants when those emissions are material; the filing of an attestation report covering the required disclosure of such registrants’ Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, also on a phased-in basis; and disclosure of the financial statement effects of severe weather events and other natural conditions including, for example, costs and losses.
  • The final rules would include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants, with the compliance date dependent on the registrant’s filer status and the content of the disclosure.”

NEXT STEPS

The final rules are likely to face significant opposition, including legal challenges and congressional oversight. It is expected that there will be various lawsuits brought against the final rules, which are likely to receive support from several industry groups, or potentially GOP-led state attorneys general who have been active in litigating against environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and regulations. It is also possible that the final rules could face criticism from some climate advocates that the SEC did not go far enough in its disclosure requirements.

Further, it is expected that the House Financial Services Committee (HFSC) will conduct oversight hearings, as well as introduce a resolution under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), to attempt to block the regulations from taking effect. HFSC Chairman Patrick McHenry (R-NC) indicated that the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee will hold a field hearing on March 18 and the full Committee will convene a hearing on April 10 to discuss the potential implications of the rules. If a CRA resolution were to pass the House and garner sufficient support from moderate Democrats in the Senate to pass, it would likely be vetoed by President Biden.

Ultimately, the SEC climate risk disclosure rules are unlikely to significantly change the trajectory of corporate disclosures made by multinational companies based in the U.S., most of whom have already been making sustainability disclosures in accordance with the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. The ongoing problem for investors is that such disclosures are not standardized and therefore are not comparable. Consequently, many of these large issuers may continue to enhance their sustainability disclosures in accordance with standards issued by the International Sustainability Standards Board and the Global Reporting Initiative as an investor relations imperative notwithstanding the SEC’s timetable for implementation of these final rules.

A more detailed analysis of the SEC rules is forthcoming from our Corporate and Asset Management and Investment Funds practices in the coming days.

Striking a Balance: The Supreme Court and the Future of Chevron Deference

In its frequent attempts to enforce the separation of powers that the Constitution’s framers devised as a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, it is often the so-called “Fourth Branch”—that includes the varied administrative agencies—that is at the heart of things.[1]

These agencies possess a level of technical and scientific expertise that the federal courts generally lack. And, without reference to expertise, Congress often leaves it to agencies and the courts to interpret and apply statutes left intentionally vague or ambiguous as the product of the legislative compromise required to gain passage. This phenomenon begs the question of the extent to which the federal courts may defer to administrative agencies in interpreting such statutes, or whether such deference abnegates the judicial prerogative of saying what the law is. Having passed on several opportunities to revisit this question, the Supreme Court of the United States has finally done so.

In what potentially will lead to a decision that might substantially change the face of federal administrative law generally while voiding an untold number of agency regulations, the Supreme Court, on January 17, 2024, heard oral argument in a pair of appeals, Loper Bright Enterprises, et al., v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, and Relentless, Inc., et al. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, focusing on whether the Court should overrule or limit its seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense CouncilInc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Almost 40 years ago, the Chevron decision articulated the doctrine commonly known as “Chevron deference,” which involves a two-part test for determining when a judicial determination must be deferential to the interpretation of a statute. The first element requires determining what Congress has spoken directly to the specific issue in question, and the second is “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Among the most cited Supreme Court cases, Chevron has become increasingly controversial, especially within the conservative wing of the Court, with several Justices having suggested that the doctrine has led to the usurpation of the essential function of the judiciary.

Chevron deference affects a wide range of federal regulations, and the Court’s ruling, whether or not Chevron is retained in some form, is likely to result in significant changes to how agencies may implement statutes and how parties affected by regulations may seek relief from the impact of those regulations. Interestingly, commentators on the recent oral argument in the case are widely divided in their predictions as to the outcome—some suggesting that the conservative majority of the Court will overrule Chevron outright, others suggesting that the Court has no intention at all to do so.

Based on remarks made during the oral arguments by Justice Gorsuch, and by Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Elena Kagan, as well as Justice Kagan’s fashioning of a majority that clarified a related interpretive rule in an earlier case focusing on agencies’ authority to interpret their own regulations, we suggest that there is a substantial possibility that the Court will take a moderate path by strengthening judicial scrutiny at the “Step One” level while recognizing that there are technical and scientific matters as to which courts have no expertise. At the same time, the Court may make it clear that, essentially, legal issues are within its prerogatives and are not subject to agency interpretation.

We examine how the Court might find a path to a better balancing of agency and judicial functions that is consistent with and builds upon other recent rulings involving the review of actions taken by administrative agencies. Whatever the outcome, the Court’s ruling in these cases will have a profound impact on individuals and entities that are regulated by federal agencies or that depend on participation in government programs, such as Medicare and Social Security.

Chevron Refresher

Most law students and lawyers have some familiarity with the touchstone for judicial review of agency rules that was articulated in Chevron, a case that dealt with regulations published by the Environmental Protection Agency to implement a part of the Clean Air Act.[2] The Supreme Court explained that judicial review of an agency’s final rule should be based on the two-part inquiry that we mentioned earlier. First, the reviewing court should determine whether Congress made its intent unambiguously clear in the text of the statute; if so, the inquiry ends, and both the agency and the reviewing court must give effect to Congress’s intent. This has become known by the shorthand phrase “Step One.”

If Congress’s intent is not clear, either because it did not address a specific point or used ambiguous language, then the court should defer to the agency’s construction if it is based on a permissible reading of the underlying statute. This has become known as “Step Two.”

In applying Step Two, a reviewing court should determine if the gap left by Congress was explicit or implicit. If the ambiguity is explicit, then the agency’s regulations should be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.[3] If the ambiguity is implicit, then the “court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”[4]

Chevron deference is not a blank slate for courts to find ambiguity. It recognized that the judiciary “is the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and instructed that in applying Step One, judges are expected to apply the “traditional tools of statutory construction.”[5] It also recognized that any deference analysis should fit within the balance among the branches of government. The Supreme Court explained that while Congress sets an overall policy, it may not reach specific details in explaining how that policy is to be executed in particular contexts. In these situations, the executive branch may have the necessary technical expertise to fill in the details, as it is charged with administering the policy enacted into law. The Court noted that the judiciary was not the ideal entity to fill in any gaps left in legislation because “[j]udges are not experts in the field” and that courts are not political entities. As a result, agencies with expertise are better suited to carry out those policies. Moreover, even if agencies are not accountable to the public, they are part of the executive branch headed by the President, who (unlike judges with life tenure) is directly accountable to the electorate.[6]

Nevertheless, during the recent oral arguments, the Chief Justice stated that the Court had not in recent years employed Chevron itself in its analysis of agency action. The reason why the issue of whether Chevron unduly intrudes upon the judicial function, and whether it should be overruled or modified, relates to the fact that it is widely used in lower court review of administrative actions. Its reconsideration also relates to increasing jurisprudential conservatism on the Supreme Court and the application of originalism and, more widely, textualism.

The Chevron concept of deference to agency regulations exists alongside a line of cases in which courts have deferred to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. In both Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.[7] and Auer v. Robbins,[8] the Supreme Court developed the principle that courts are not supposed to substitute their preference for how a regulation should be interpreted; instead, a court should give “controlling weight” to that interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”[9] Nevertheless, the Court has refused to extend that form of deference to subregulatory guidelines and manuals where there is little or no evidence of a formal process intended to implement Congress’s expressed intent.[10]

The Chevron framework has generated criticism, including statements by several current Justices. Their position relies on an argument that Chevron distorts the balance of authority in favor of the executive and strips courts of their proper role. In a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch complained that Chevron creates a bias in favor of the federal government and that instead of having a neutral judge determine rights and responsibilities, “we outsource our interpretive responsibilities. Rather than say what the law is, we tell those who come before us to go ask a bureaucrat.”[11] Justice Thomas has written that the Administrative Procedure Act does not require deference to agency determinations and raises constitutional concerns because it undercuts the “obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”[12]

Chevron and the Herring Fishermen

The dispute that has brought Chevron deference to the Supreme Court in 2024 starts with the business of commercial fishing for herring. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a regulation in 2020 that requires operators of certain fishing vessels to pay the cost of observers who work on board those vessels to ensure compliance with that agency’s rules under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (“Act”). Several commercial fishing operators challenged the regulations, which led to two decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit. Both courts upheld the regulations, but on slightly different grounds. In the first decision, Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo,[13] the District of Columbia Circuit followed the traditional Chevron analysis and concluded that the Act did not expressly address who would bear the cost of the monitors. The NMFS’s interpretation of the statute in the regulation was found to be reasonable under Step Two of Chevron based on the finding that the agency was acting within the scope of a broad delegation of authority to the agency to further the Act’s conservation and management goals, and on the established precedent concluding that the cost of compliance with a regulation is typically borne by the regulated party.

The second decision by the First Circuit, Relentless, Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce,[14] took a slightly different approach. That court focused on the text of the Act and concluded that the agency’s interpretation was permissible. It did not anchor its decision in a Chevron analysis and stated that “[w]e need not decide whether we classify this conclusion as a product of Chevron step one or step two.”[15] The First Circuit also emphasized that the operators’ arguments did not overcome the presumption that regulated entities must bear the cost of compliance with a relevant statute or regulation.

The parties have staked out starkly different views of Chevron’s legitimacy and whether it is compatible with the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution. The fishermen petitioners argue that Chevron is not entitled to respect as precedent because the two-part test was only an interpretive methodology and not the holding construing the Clean Air Act. Their core argument is that Chevron improperly and unconstitutionally shifts power to the executive branch by giving more weight to the agencies in rulemaking and in resolving disputes where the agency is a party and shifts power away from the judiciary’s role under Article III to interpret laws and Congress’s legislative authority power under Article I. Taking this one step further, the petitioners argue that this shift violates the due process rights of regulated parties. They also argue that Chevron is unworkable in practice, citing instances where the Supreme Court itself has declined to apply the two-part test and the lack of a consensus as to when a statute is clear or ambiguous, making the application of Chevron inconsistent. Put another way, according to the petitioners, the problem with Chevron is that there is no clear rule spelling out how much ambiguity is needed to trigger deference to an agency’s rule. Next, they argue that Chevron cannot be applied when an underlying statute is silent because this allows agencies to legislate when there is a doubt as to whether Congress delegated that power to the agency at all and that it would run counter to accepted principles of construction that silence can be construed to be a grant of power to an agency. Finally, they contend that Chevron deference to agencies conflicts with Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress authorized courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”[16]

The Secretary of Commerce argues that there are multiple reasons to preserve Chevron deference. First, the Secretary argues that Chevron fits within the balance of power between the branches of the federal government. In the Secretary’s view, Chevron deference is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, as it respects (1) Congress’s authority to legislate and to delegate authority to an administrative agency, (2) the agency’s application of its expertise in areas that may be complex, and (3) the judiciary’s authority to resolve disputed questions of law. Therefore, the Chevron framework avoids situations where courts may function like super-legislatures in deciding how a statute should be implemented or administered and second-guess policy decisions.

According to the Secretary, courts know how to apply the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if an ambiguity exists after that exercise is complete, it is appropriate to defer to an administrative agency that has technical or scientific experience with the subject matter being regulated. In addition, the Secretary contends that Chevron promotes consistency in the administration of statutes and avoids a patchwork of court rulings that may make it difficult or impossible to administer a nationwide program, such as Social Security or Medicare. Third, the Secretary notes that Chevron is a doctrine that has been workable for 40 years and that over those decades, Congress has not altered or overridden its holding, even as it has enacted thousands of statutes since 1984 that either require rulemaking or have gaps that have been filled by rulemaking. As a result, the Secretary argues that there are settled interpretations that agencies and regulated parties rely on, and overruling Chevron would lead to instability and relitigating settled cases. Finally, the Secretary argues that Chevron deference cannot be limited to interpretations of ambiguous language alone, as there are no accepted criteria for distinguishing ambiguous statutory language from statutory silence.

The Oral Argument

The Supreme Court heard arguments in both cases on January 17, 2024. Over more than three hours of argument, the Justices focused on several questions. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson expressed concerns that abandoning the Chevron framework would put courts in the position of making policy rather than just ruling on questions of law. In their view, courts lack the skills and expertise to craft policy and should not act as super-legislators. They also stressed that there are situations in which the tools of statutory construction do not yield a single answer or that Congress has not addressed the question either because it left some matters unresolved in the statute or through other subsequent changes not contemplated by Congress, such as the adoption of new technologies. In these cases, the Justices wanted to know why deference to an agency was not appropriate and did not see any clear indication that Congress intended that courts, not agencies, should make determinations when the statutory language is ambiguous or silent. They also questioned why the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron when Congress has been fully aware of the decision for 40 years and has not enacted legislation to eliminate the ability of a court to defer to an agency’s determinations.

The members of the more conservative wing of the Supreme Court questioned counsel about weaknesses in the Chevron framework. Justice Gorsuch returned to his earlier criticism of Chevron and asked the parties to define what constitutes enough ambiguity to allow a court to move from Step One to Step Two. He further questioned whether there was sufficient evidence that Congress ever intended to give the government the benefit of the doubt when an individual or regulated entity challenges agency action. Justice Gorsuch, along with Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, asked whether Chevron actually resulted in greater instability and whether it was appropriate to abandon Chevron in favor of the lesser form of deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., where deference is not a default outcome and a court is supposed to exercise its independent judgment to give weight to agency determinations based on factors including the thoroughness of the agency’s analysis, the consistency and validity of the agency’s position, and the agency’s “consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”[17] The follow-up questions asked whether it was correct to accord deference to agency regulations when the agency’s policy can shift from administration to administration.

Where Is the Conservative Court Likely to Go?

The length of the argument and the alacrity of questioning do not mean that the Supreme Court is going to overrule the 40-year-old, highly influential Chevron doctrine. It is, however, quite likely that the doctrine will be narrowed and clarified. To say nothing of the recent oral argument, several recent decisions evidence a reluctance to abandon deference altogether. In a pair of decisions issued in 2022 involving Medicare reimbursement to hospitals, the Court resolved deference questions by relying on the statutory text alone.

Those decisions involved challenges to a Medicare regulation governing hospital reimbursement, and a published interpretation of a section of the Medicare statute governing reimbursement for outpatient drugs. Although the Court ruled in the government’s favor in the former case and against the government in the latter case, neither decision relies on Chevron—even though in one case, the petitioner’s counsel expressly asked the Court to overrule Chevron during the oral argument.[18] Yet, by relying on the text of each statute to resolve a regulatory dispute, the Court’s reasoning in both decisions is consistent with Step One of the Chevron test and demonstrates that it is workable in practice and need not result in a dilution of judicial review. In addition, the Court has developed another limit to agency action in its decisions, finding that when a regulatory issue presents a “major question,” deference is irrelevant unless the agency can show that Congress expressed a clear intent that the agency exercise its regulatory authority. This concept remains a work in progress because the Court has not defined criteria that make an issue a major question.[19]

These cases provide a useful background to an increasingly jurisprudentially conservative, textually oriented Court. Two cases that were specifically discussed during oral argument are particularly significant in plotting the Court’s landing place with regard to Chevron. Justice Gorsuch made multiple references to Skidmore, which sets forth the principle that a federal agency’s determination is entitled to judicial respect if the determination is authorized by statute and made based on the agency’s experience and informed judgment. Unlike the Chevron standard, the Skidmore standard considers an agency’s consistency in interpreting a law it administers.

The second, and more recent, precedent that is even more likely to guide the narrowing of Chevron is Kisor v. Wilkie.[20] There, a 5-4 divided Court adopted a multi-stage regime for reviewing an agency’s reliance upon arguably ambiguous regulations that is roughly analogous to Chevron’s two-stage analytical modality. In doing so, it modified, but did not overrule, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and its doctrinal predecessor, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which permit a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, so long as that interpretation is reasonable, even if the court believes another reasonable reading of the regulation is the better reading.

Kisor saw a mixed bag of Justices joining, or dissenting from, various parts of the Kagan opinion. What made the majority as to its operative section was the Chief Justice’s joining Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. With Justice Ginsburg having been succeeded by Justice Barrett, and Justice Breyer having been succeeded by Justice Jackson, one might hypothesize that there now would be a conservative 5-4 majority that would have overruled Auer. However, it was Justice Barrett who raised the possibility of “Kisorizing” Chevron, a suggestion quickly adopted by Justice Kagan. Justice Gorsuch, a longtime opponent of Chevron, is likely amenable to a Skidmore-oriented result.

The Kagan opinion cabins and arguably lowers the level of deference an agency’s interpretation of a rule should receive. Thus, with a strong nod to the Court’s jurisprudential drift to the right, Justice Kagan begins with the truism that whatever discretion an agency might claim, the Court’s analysis must proceed under the proposition that an unambiguous rule must be applied precisely as its text is written. It is not unlikely that, if the Court narrows Chevron (as we predict it shall), it also will begin with a more robust requirement to apply the statutory text in Step One and re-emphasize the need to exhaust all of the tools of statutory construction; in other words, there is no need for deference unless there is genuine ambiguity. If an agency’s determination is to become relevant, it only becomes so after ambiguity is established.[21]

In short, if the law gives a definitive answer on its face, there is nothing to which a court should defer, even if the agency argues that there is an interpretation that produces a better, more reasonable result. This is a textual determination that addresses the criticism of the so-called Administrative State’s acting as a quasi-legislature to which the Court yields its own power to say what the law is.

However, even a reasonable agency interpretation, the Kagan opinion notes, might not be dispositive. The opinion must be the agency’s official position, not one ginned up for litigation purposes, and it must reflect the agency’s particular expertise.

­Conclusion

In its 40-year life, Chevron deference has been at the heart of the application of federal administrative law. No case among all of the many governmental functions that the Supreme Court considers has been more widely cited, and no administrative law case has been more controversial, especially among jurisprudential conservatives. While asked by various parties to do so, the Court has declined, and the Chevron structure has been applied, often inconsistently, by federal courts. Perhaps reflecting the increasingly conservative direction of the Court, we have reached a point where the Court will consider retiring this long-standing precedent or, alternatively, refreshing it based on the experience of courts and agencies since 1984.

Justice Kagan’s analytic method in Kisor v. Wilkie could also apply to tightening Chevron. In her decisions, she has exhibited great fidelity to reading text literally, avoiding the perils of legislation from the bench. As she wrote in Kisor:

[B]efore concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the traditional tools of construction. . . . For again, only when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has no single right answer can a judge conclude that it is more one of policy than of law. That means a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation impenetrable on first read. Agency regulations can sometimes make the eyes glaze over. But hard interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often be solved. A regulation is not ambiguous merely because discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry. To make that effort, a court must carefully consider the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on. . . . Doing so will resolve many seeming ambiguities out of the box, without resort to . . . deference” (citations and internal punctuation omitted).[22]

Text alone might not provide the answer in every case, as Justice Kagan recognizes as she outlines four additional steps that might lead to judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. However, to the extent that a majority of the Court elects to retain Chevron, though narrowing it, her approach in the analogous setting reflected in Kisor would be effective in resolving the two cases now at bar—recognizing agency expertise in technical and scientific matters beyond the competency of the judiciary while preserving the function of the courts to determine what the legislature actually wrote, not to write it themselves.

* * * *

ENDNOTES

[1] Besides the administrative bureaucracy, various jurists and commentators have, under this rubric, included the press, the people acting through grand juries, and interest or pressure groups. Those institutions represent the arguable influence of extra-governmental sources. We are focused here on the level of judicial deference afforded to federal administrative agencies.

[2] 467 U.S. at 842-43.

[3] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

[4] Id. at 844.

[5] Id. at 843, fn.9.

[6] Id. at 865-66.

[7] 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).

[8] 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

[9] Id.

[10] United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).

[11] Buffington v. McDonough, No. 21-972 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting at 9) (2022).

[12] Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199,1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

[13] 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

[14] 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023).

[15] Id. at 634.

[16] 5 U.S.C. § 706.

[17] 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

[18] Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, 142 S.Ct. 2354 (2022), and American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S.Ct. 1896 (2022). The request to overrule Chevron appears in the transcript of the American Hospital Ass’n oral argument, at 30.

[19] West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

[20] 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

[21] Kisor predicated deference, if at all, upon five preliminary stages. First, as noted, the reviewing court should determine that a genuine ambiguity exists after applying all of the tools of statutory construction. This is consistent with Step One of Chevron, but Justice Kagan makes it clear that this is a heightened textual barrier. Second, the agency’s construction of the regulation must be “reasonable”; this is a restatement of Step Two of Chevron. The Court cautioned that an agency can fail at this step. Third, the agency’s construction must be “the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’” which was explained as an interpretation that is authorized by the agency’s head or those in a position to formulate authoritative policy. Fourth, the regulatory interpretation must implicate the agency’s “substantive expertise.” Finally, the regulatory interpretation must reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and that a court should decline to defer to a merely “convenient litigating position” or “post hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced” to “defend past agency action against attack.”

[22] 139 S.Ct. at 2415.

Key Developments in Environmental Law and Policy in 2023, and What’s Ahead in 2024 [PODCAST]

On this episode of the Bracewell Environmental Law Monitor, we look back at the significant developments in environmental and natural resources law and policy in 2023, as well as look ahead to what’s to come in 2024. Co-hosts Daniel Pope and Taylor Stuart talk with Ann Navaro and Tim Wilkins, partners in Bracewell’s environment, lands and resources practice, about a range of topics, such as climate and environmental justice, renewable energy advancements, regulatory developments and much more.

 

EPISODE HIGHLIGHTS

[01:44] Big Developments in 2023: The Biden administration’s top priorities have been climate and environmental justice. The big development of 2023 on the climate front has been on the methane side rather than the carbon dioxide side. Regarding environmental justice, the Biden administration and NGOs have been really pushing to apply justice factors in enforcement, in cleanups, new rulemaking, permitting, issuance of grants and loans, and the like.

[06:59] A Significant Year for Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: Almost a year ago, the Biden administration issued its definition of “Waters of the United States.” Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued another decision interpreting Waters of the United States in the Sackett case and essentially eviscerated one of the bases for the Biden administration’s Waters of the US rulemaking. Litigation is ongoing.

[09:33] Congress Amended the National Environmental Policy Act and the Fiscal Responsibility Act: This was enormous, as core provisions had never seen substantive amendments. There are mixed reviews of what that amendment to NEPA accomplished.

[13:41] Renewable Energy: There’s been advancement in renewable energy projects and trying to permit those projects and an emphasis on promoting renewable energy. For example, for offshore wind, in this year and in prior years of the Biden administration, there’s been a lot of advancement on leasing.

[21:57] On the Horizon in Environmental Law in 2024: Ann shares that the US Army Corps of Engineers could revise Nationwide Permit 12. Tim shares that the White House is reviewing EPA’s CERCLA hazardous substance listing for two of the leading PFAS chemicals, and the listing will go final sometime early in 2024. In addition, the SEC’s semi-annual rulemaking agenda for April 2024 promises to include proposed climate disclosure rules for publicly traded companies.

PFAS State AG Lawsuits Update: Delaware Enters the Fray

2023 has proven to be an extremely busy year for PFAS state AG lawsuits seeking environmental pollution remediation costs from PFAS manufacturers and AFFF manufacturers. We previously wrote that Illinois (February), Maine (April), Kentucky (April),  Rhode Island, Arizona, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington (all in May), South Carolina (July), and Tennessee and Washington DC (August)  were the latest states seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in PFAS remediation costs. Now, Delaware has joined the fray, bringing the number of state PFAS lawsuits to close to 25 cases, with more expected to be filed. While the lawsuits target a narrowly tailored set of companies, lawsuits in other states have already demonstrated that downstream commerce corporations are at risk of being involved in lawsuits seeking hundreds of millions of dollars.

PFAS State AG Lawsuits

The Delaware Attorney General lawsuit seeks PFAS remediation costs from 3M and various AFFF manufacturers. The lawsuit specifically details the extent to which several types of PFAS are found in groundwater, surface water, drinking water, waste treatment byproducts, and various other environmental impact avenues. There is one unique aspect of the Delaware lawsuit as compared to other state lawsuits in that the Delaware case only specifically mentions PFAS contamination at New Castle County Airport and at the Dover Air Force Base. Other state AG lawsuits have more broadly claimed that PFAS contamination is widespread throughout the states. Delaware is seeking costs “in excess of $1,000,000” related to investigating, cleaning up, restoring, treating, and monitoring the state’s contaminated groundwater, surface water, soil and other natural resources.

Implications For Downstream Manufacturers

While the latest state PFAS lawsuit targets PFAS manufacturers and AFFF manufacturers, companies should not dismiss the lawsuits as events unlikely to impact them in any way. On the contrary, in other states, including California, companies have been directly named as defendants in lawsuits seeking billions of dollars in PFAS remediation costs. Corporations should not ignore the pollution and environmental contamination issues that PFAS pose, as states, federal and state regulatory agencies, and even private citizens are actively seeking damages from companies that they believe placed PFAS into the environment. All companies of all types would be well advised to conduct a complete compliance audit to best understand areas of concern for PFAS liability issues, and ways to mitigate PFAS concerns.

For more news on PFAS state AG lawsuits, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Lessons We All Should Learn from the Great Salt Lake Crisis

Those of us on the east coast have heard that the Great Salt Lake has receded to the verge of a public health crisis, including because toxins in the sediment that have been underwater for millennia may soon may soon be widely spread air pollutants.   Today I had the opportunity to visit the rapidly shrinking Great Salt Lake and hear from leading experts about what might be done about it.  Much of what I heard surprised me.  More importantly, some of the lessons learned in Utah are generally applicable to our still evolving response to our global climate emergency.

How much has the Great Salt Lake shrunk?   In the modern era it has lost 73 percent of its water and 60 percent of its area.  Of the 120 saline lakes on the planet, 100 are in decline and on average they have shrunk, on average, 60 percent.  That means that as bad as things are at the Great Salt Lake, there are many other places where things are worse.

Contrary to popular belief, while a warming climate is a contributing cause of this decline, it is not the main cause.  The main cause is that water has been diverted from the historic tributaries to the Great Salt Lake for other uses, primarily agriculture which is responsible for 72 percent of Utah’s water consumption.  Those diversions have been occurring since Brigham Young arrived in Utah in the 19th century.

Why does the shrinking of the lake matter?  Well, in addition to the public health threat posed to the southwestern United States by the toxins in the sediment, the increased water salinity that comes with the Great Salt Lake being smaller is toxic to the brine shrimp that are essential to the survival of the tens of millions of migratory birds that make the lake home for part of the year on their way to and from other places in North and South America.  The rapidly receding waters also pose a clear and present danger to other economically important activities including mineral extraction and tourism.  One example of the broad range of negative impacts of the shrinking lake — snow in the mountains has been proven to melt faster as a result of the deposition of dust from the lake, shortening Utah’s economically important ski season.

I was of the prior impression that people in Utah didn’t appreciate the magnitude of the crisis at hand.  I was wrong.  The fact is that the Utah Legislature has taken numerous actions in recent years to reverse more than a century of momentum in the wrong direction.  As a result of these actions there is cause for real optimism that the level of the Great Salt Lake will continue to rise though it will take decades to make lasting improvements.

And that brings me to the lessons of general applicability that I learned.   As one local water law expert said, there is no silver bullet to end the Great Salt Lake crisis but there is silver buckshot.   There is no one law that can be passed or one lawsuit that will be litigated that will immediately void the water rights that have resulted in Utah (and all of the other western states) using much more water than can sustainably be used.  What the people of Utah have learned is that many interventions are necessary, all at the same time.  And they’re implementing that lesson in real time.    We all might consider whether we’re acting with the same ingenuity and urgency respecting our environmental challenges.

And I heard another important thing for the second time in a week.  The biggest challenge in repairing the Great Salt Lake isn’t identifying what needs to be done.  It is getting people to own what it will take to get water into the Great Salt Lake and why that matters.   The necessary messaging is complicated because there is no one size fits all message and even if you’re doing it correctly, it isn’t immediately effective.  I heard The Nature Conservancy’s Chief Scientist, Dr. Katherine Hayhoe, say something similar about decarbonization and resilience when she was in Boston last week.

The Great Salt Lake crisis became too big for the people of Utah to ignore.  But their multifaceted approach to the crisis is impressive and left me wondering what we on the east coast might be able to do about our much different but equally serious environmental challenges, like the need to more quickly build renewable energy infrastructure and improve our resilience to GHG supercharged storm waters, if we acted with the same urgency.

For more articles on the environment, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Consumer Fraud PFAS Lawsuits Update: Two Cases Dismissed

On several instanceswe have written regarding consumer fraud PFAS class action lawsuits filed in several states. The number of product types targeted for these lawsuits are growing and diverse in terms of the industries targeted. While there has been at least one significant settlement in these lawsuits to date, recently two of the lawsuits that we previously reported on related to PFAS consumer fraud allegations were dismissed by separate courts.

While it is too early to say that these dismissals are a preview of a coming trend in the litigation, the rulings at least provide companies with assurance that there are defenses available in these cases. Nevertheless, with the number of consumer fraud lawsuits likely to continue increasing for the time being, consumer goods industries, insurers, and investment companies interested in the consumer goods vertical must pay careful attention to these lawsuits.

Consumer Fraud PFAS Lawsuits – Overview

The consumer fraud PFAS lawsuits filed to date follow a very similar pattern: various plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of a proposed class allege that companies market consumer goods as safe, healthy, environmentally friendly, etc., or that the companies themselves market their corporate practices as such, yet it is allegedly discovered that certain products marketed with these buzzwords contain PFAS. The lawsuits allege that since certain PFAS may be harmful to human health and PFAS are biopersistent (and therefore environmentally unfriendly), the companies making the good engaged in fraud against consumers to entice them to purchase the products in question.

In the Complaints, plaintiffs typically allege the following counts:

  • Violation of state consumer protection laws and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
  • Violations of various state consumer protection laws
  • Breach of warranty
  • Fraud
  • Constructive fraud
  • Unjust enrichment

The plaintiffs seek certification of nationwide class action lawsuits, with a subclass defined as consumers in the state in which the lawsuits are filed. In addition, the lawsuits seeks damages, fees, costs, and a jury trial. Representative industries and cases that have recently been filed include:

  • Cosmetics industry:
    • Brown v. Cover Girl, New York (April 1, 2022)
    • Anderson v. Almay, New York (April 1, 2022)
    • Rebecca Vega v. L’Oreal, New Jersey (April 8, 2022)
    • Spindel v. Burt’s Bees, California (March 25, 2022)
    • Hicks and Vargas v. L’Oreal, New York (March 9, 2022)
    • Davenport v. L’Oreal, California (February 22, 2022)
  • Food packaging industry:
    • Richburg v. Conagra Brands, Illinois (May 6, 2022)
    • Ruiz v. Conagra Brands, Illinois (May 6, 2022)
    • Hamman v. Cava Group, California (April 27, 2022)
    • Azman Hussain v. Burger King, California (April 11, 2022)
    • Little v. NatureStar, California (April 8, 2022)
    • Larry Clark v. McDonald’s, Illinois (March 28, 2022)
  • Food and drink products:
    • Bedson v. Biosteel, New York (January 27, 2023)
    • Lorenz v. Coca-Cola, New York (December 28, 2022)
    • Toribio v. Kraft Heinz, Illinois (November 29, 2022)
  • Apparel products:
    • Krakauer v. REI, Washington (October 28, 2022)
  • Hygiene products:
    • Esquibel v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., New York (January 27, 2023)
    • Dalewitz v. Proctor & Gamble, New York (August 26, 2022)
  • Feminine hygiene products:
    • Gemma Rivera v. Knix Wear Inc., California (April 4, 2022)
    • Blenis v. Thinx, Inc., Massachusetts (June 18, 2021)
    • Destini Canan v. Thinx Inc., California (November 12, 2020)

Recent Rulings In Consumer Fraud PFAS Cases

In California, the Yeraldinne Solis v. CoverGirl Cosmetics et al. case made allegations that cosmetics were marketed as safe and sustainable, yet were found to contain PFAS. The defendants in the lawsuit filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing in relevant part that the plaintiff had no standing to file the lawsuit because she did not sufficiently allege that she suffered any economic harm from purchasing the product. The plaintiff put forth two theories to counter this argument: (1) the “benefit of the bargain” theory, under which the plaintiff alleged that she bargained for a product that was “safe”, but received the opposite. The court dismissed this argument because the product packaging did not market the product as safe, and the ingredient list explicitly named the type of PFAS found in testing; and (2) an overpayment theory, under which plaintiff alleged that if she knew the product contained PFAS, she would not have paid as much for it as she did. The Court dismissed this argument because the product packaging specifically listed the type of PFAS at issue in the case.

In Illinois, the Richburg v. Conagra Brands, Inc. alleged that popcorn packaging was marketed as containing “only real ingredients” and ingredients from “natural sources”, yet the popcorn contained PFAS (likely from the packaging itself), which was allegedly false and misleading to consumers. The defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit on several grounds and the Court found in defendant’s favor on one important ground. The Court held that the statements on the popcorn packaging would not mislead an ordinary and reasonable consumer because a consumer would understand “ingredients” to mean those items that are required to be disclosed by the FDA and not materials that may have migrated to the food from the product packaging. In fact, the Court ruled that the FDA “exempts substances migrating to food from equipment or packaging;” and those “do not need to be included in the ingredients list.”  The defendant argued that reasonable consumers would not consider PFAS to be an “ingredient” under this regime.  In other words, whether or not PFAS migrated into the popcorn, the representations that the popcorn contained “only real ingredients” and “100% ingredients from natural sources” were “correct as a matter of law.” The court dismissed plaintiffs claims on this basis.

Conclusion

Several major companies now find themselves embroiled in litigation focused on PFAS false advertising, consumer protection violations, and deceptive statements made in marketing and ESG reports. The lawsuits may well serve as test cases for plaintiffs’ bar to determine whether similar lawsuits will be successful in any (or all) of the fifty states in this country. Companies must consider the possibility of needing to defend lawsuits involving plaintiffs in all fifty states for products that contain PFAS. It should be noted that these lawsuits would only touch on the marketing, advertising, ESG reporting, and consumer protection type of issues. Separate products lawsuits could follow that take direct aim at obtaining damages for personal injury for plaintiffs from consumer products. In addition, environmental pollution lawsuits could seek damage for diminution of property value, cleanup costs, and PFAS filtration systems if drinking water cleanup is required.

While the above rulings are encouraging for companies facing consumer fraud PFAS lawsuits, it is far too early to tell if the trend will continue nationally.  Different courts apply legal standards differently and these cases are very fact specific, which could lead to differing results.

It is of the utmost importance that businesses along the whole supply chain in the consumer products industry evaluate their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate PFAS at an ever-increasing pace. Similarly, state level EPA enforcement action is increasing at a several-fold rate every year. Now, the first wave of lawsuits take direct aim at the consumer products industry. Companies that did not manufacture PFAS, but merely utilized PFAS in their manufacturing processes, are therefore becoming targets of costly enforcement actions at rates that continue to multiply year over year. Lawsuits are also filed monthly by citizens or municipalities against companies that are increasingly not PFAS chemical manufacturers.

©2023 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

The EPA and Army Corps’ “Waters of the U.S.” (WOTUS) Rule to Become Effective on March 20

In January of 2023, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) published in the Federal Register (see Federal Register/Vol. 88, No. 11, January 18, 2023) new rules that define which water bodies are classified under the Clean Water Act (CWA) as “waters of the U.S.” (WOTUS). While this may not appear to be significant, the adoption of these rules will have major implications for how federal agencies will identify the types of water bodies that are subject to jurisdiction under the CWA. The January 18th Federal Register publication provides that these new rules will become effective on March 20, 2023.

The CWA is the law that provides federal agencies the authority to prohibit or limit various activities that can impact WOTUS, such as the regulation of industrial and municipal wastewater discharges to navigable waters, the dredging or filling of wetlands, and the requirement to prepare “Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plans” (SWPPP) for industrial facilities. It also is the basis for much State law water regulation.

Applicability of the CWA

To be classified as a WOTUS, a water body must be considered to be “navigable,” but this term is more arcane than it might at first appear. Navigable waters as defined by the CWA includes, “waters of the United States,” and has been further defined by regulation to include those waters that “are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce.” This approach to navigability has led some states to adopt a “saw log test” as to whether the body of water could float a saw log for commercial purposes. In other states, such as Wisconsin, the test for navigability is whether the body of water can on a recurring basis – even if intermittent – support navigation by the smallest recreational craft, such as a canoe or kayak. Therefore, navigable waters not only can include larger lakes, rivers and streams, but can also include less obvious smaller water types such as wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, and even in some instances, ditches that hold water. While the CWA provides federal jurisdiction over WOTUS, the CWA does not actually define the term WOTUS; rather, it provides authority for EPA and the USACE to define WOTUS in regulations, which since the 1970s, the agencies at various times have done.

The Rapanos Decision and Competing Rationales

Further, the definition of what constitutes WOTUS has been reviewed in several U.S. Supreme Court cases, but the most significant case on this subject is the 2006 case of Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), in which the Supreme Court interpreted the definition of WOTUS using two separate tests. In a four-justice plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia, WOTUS was defined as “only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features that are described in ordinary parlance as streams[,] … oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to a “relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.” However, Justice Kennedy applied a different approach in a concurring opinion and stated that WOTUS must possess a “significant nexus” to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.” He added that adjacent wetlands could possess a significant nexus if the wetlands “either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.'”

Regulatory Attempts to Define WOTUS Following Rapanos

Following Rapanos, the agencies have at various times developed guidance for implementing the WOTUS definition. For example, in 2015, under the Obama administration, the agencies amended their regulations defining WOTUS as part of the “Clean Water Rule, which expanded the definition of which water bodies were defined as WOTUS, and included the use of the “significant nexus” test. Again, in 2020, under the Trump administration, another rule was adopted, known as the “Navigable Waters Protection Rule” (NWPR), which limited the types of water bodies that were considered WOTUS under the previous 2015 Clean Water Rule. However, in 2021, in Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, (Case No. 4:20-cv-00266), the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona vacated implementation of the NWPR nationwide. The new rules published in the January 2023 Federal Register represents the Biden administration’s effort to rewrite the WOTUS rules following the vacation of the NWPR, allowing the agencies the ability to use both Justice Scalia’s “relatively permanent” test or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test in determining whether they have jurisdiction over water bodies.

WOTUS under the New Rule

Use of the “relatively permanent” test or the “significant nexus” test is apparent in the new rule’s definition of WOTUS. The 2023 rules identify the following waters as WOTUS:

  • Traditional navigable waters, the territorial seas, and interstate waters;
  • Impoundments of waters otherwise identified as WOTUS;
  • Tributaries of navigable waters, territorial seas, interstate waters, or impoundments if the tributaries meet the relatively permanent test or the significant nexus test;
  • “Adjacent wetlands,” which includes wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to and with a continuous surface connection to relatively permanent impoundments, wetlands adjacent to tributaries that are relatively permanent, and wetlands adjacent to impoundments or tributaries which meet the significant nexus test; and
  • Intrastate lakes and ponds, streams, or wetlands not listed above which meet the relatively permanent test or the significant nexus test.

The 2023 rules specifically exclude the following from the WOTUS definition, though some activities may still be subject to Wisconsin rules:

  • Prior converted cropland;
  • Waste treatment systems;
  • Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only dry land, and that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water;
  • Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land if the irrigation ceased.
  • Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating or diking dry land, that are used exclusively for stock watering, irrigation, settling basins or rice growing;
  • Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools, and other small ornamental water bodies created by excavating or diking;
  • Waterfilled depressions in dry land incidental to construction activity and pits excavated in dry land for obtaining fill, sand or gravel unless the construction is abandoned and the water body meets the definition of WOTUS; and
  • Swales and erosional features that are characterized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow.

Where is this Going?

While these new WOTUS rules become effective on March 20, 2023, the future of these new rules is in question as the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewing a case (Sackett v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022)) in which the legal sufficiency of the “significant nexus” test, in the context of wetland permitting, is under review. The Court’s opinion is expected to be issued after the 2023 rules becomes effective. Therefore, depending on the Court’s opinion related to the “significant nexus” test, it is possible that the 2023 rules may need to be revised. Further, in early March, a federal Congressional Committee (the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee) approved a joint resolution to overturn the 2023 rules. In addition, several industry groups have filed suits to overturn the 2023 rules. These definitions have always been politically and scientifically contentious and we expect that to continue.

Due to the potential flux in which this new rule may ultimately be applied and considered, it will be increasingly important for the regulated public to keep abreast of which water bodies are ultimately determined to be classified as WOTUS, either by the agencies through regulation or guidance, by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sackett, and/or other legal or Congressional challenges. We will be tracking the implementation of this new rule by the agencies and related caselaw developments and Congressional challenges and will provide timely future Legal Updates. In the meantime, the extent of regulations of WOTUS – particularly wetlands – will continue to be very challenging.

©2023 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

New Climate Guidance Issued to Federal Agencies Conducting Environmental Impact Analyses

Overview

On January 9, 2023, the Council for Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) published interim National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change (hereafter, “guidance” or “GHG Guidance”).1 CEQ intends for agencies to apply the guidance now even as CEQ seeks public comment on it.2 The guidance aims to establish best practices to ensure that Federal agencies conduct detailed analyses of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change when evaluating proposed major Federal actions in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and CEQ’s Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA.3 The guidance states that these analyses should (1) quantify a proposed action’s GHG emissions; (2) place GHG emissions in appropriate context and disclose relevant GHG emissions and relevant climate impacts; and (3) identify alternatives and mitigation measures to avoid or reduce GHG emissions.

The long-awaited GHG Guidance does not set a numerical threshold for significant impact under NEPA, but it emphasizes achievement of national and other climate objectives. The guidance also stresses monetization of climate-related impacts (social cost of carbon) and consideration of alternatives to fossil energy production and transport, mitigation of climate-related impacts, and resilience and adaptation to climate-related vulnerability. Also prominent in the guidance is consideration of disparate impacts to environmental justice communities.

GHG Guidance

Quantifying a Proposed Action’s GHG Emissions

The guidance explains that agencies should quantify the reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect GHG emissions of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives (including the no-action alternative) to ensure that each agency adequately considers the incremental contribution of its action to climate change. CEQ recommends that agencies quantify gross emissions increases or reductions (including direct and indirect emissions) individually by each GHG, as well as aggregated in terms of total CO2 by factoring in each pollutant’s global warming potential (“GWP”). CEQ further recommends that agencies quantify the proposed action’s total net GHG emissions or reductions (both by pollutant and by total CO2 emissions) relative to baseline conditions. Finally, CEQ recommends that “[w]here feasible . . . [agencies] should present annual GHG emissions increases or reductions, as well as net GHG emissions over the projected lifetime of the action, consistent with existing best practices.”4 CEQ emphasizes that agencies should be guided by the rule of reason when quantifying emissions. The guidance does not set a “significance” threshold that would trigger the requirement to prepare an EIS.

Disclosing and Providing Context for a Proposed Action’s GHG Emissions and Climate Effects

In the eyes of CEQ, quantifying emissions and summarizing this information in a NEPA document is not sufficient. Agencies should also disclose and provide context for GHG emissions and climate effects to help decision makers and the public understand a proposed action’s potential GHG emissions and climate change effects. CEQ provides a list of best practices for disclosing and contextualizing quantified GHG emissions:5

  • Use the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (“SC-GHG”) to estimate the dollar value of impacts associated with each type of GHG emission;
  • Explain how the proposed action and alternatives would help meet or detract from achieving climate action goals and commitments, and discuss whether and to what extent the proposal’s reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions are consistent with GHG reduction goals;
  • Summarize and cite to available scientific literature to help explain the real-world effects associated with an increase in GHG emissions that contribute to climate change; and
  • Provide accessible comparisons or equivalents to help the public and decision makers understand GHG emissions in more familiar terms (i.e., household emissions per year, annual average emissions from a certain number of cars on the road, etc.).

CEQ explicitly states that monetizing the “social cost” of GHG emissions as recommended does not require the agency also to monetize the social benefits of the proposed action, nor does it have to compare estimated costs and benefits.6 The guidance also emphasizes the use of “substitution analysis” to discern the GHG-related changes associated with shifting energy sources if the proposed or alternative actions occurred.7

Identifying Reasonable Alternatives and Potential Mitigation Measures

The GHG Guidance directs agencies to use the NEPA process to identify and assess the reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize GHG emissions or climate change effects. CEQ recognizes that reasonable alternatives must be consistent with the purpose and need of the proposed action, and that agencies are not required to select the alternative with the lowest net GHG emissions or climate costs or the greatest net climate benefits.8 However, “in line with the urgency of the climate crisis,” agencies should identify the alternative with the lowest net GHG emissions or the greatest net climate benefits among the alternatives they assess and should “use the NEPA process to make informed decisions grounded in science that are transparent with respect to how Federal actions will help meet climate change goals and commitments, or alternately, detract from them.”9 When quantifying reasonably foreseeable emissions associated with the proposed action or alternatives, CEQ directs agencies to include reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect GHG emissions of their proposed actions. CEQ provides that processing, refining, transporting, and end-use of the fossil fuel being extracted, including combustion of the resource to produce energy, would constitute indirect emissions of fossil fuel extraction.10

CEQ encourages agencies to mitigate GHG emissions “to the greatest extent possible.”11 It instructs agencies to consider potential mitigation measures by determining whether impacts from a proposed action or alternatives can be avoided, considering whether adverse impacts can be minimized, and rectifying or requiring compensation for residual impacts where unavoidable. CEQ considers available mitigation that avoids, minimizes, or compensates for GHG emissions and climate change effects to include measures like renewable energy generation and energy storage, carbon capture and sequestration, and capturing GHG emissions such as methane.12

Examples

The guidance provides a number of examples as to how it would work in specific scenarios. For example, the guidance notes that “absent exceptional circumstances,” construction of renewable energy projects “should not warrant a detailed analysis of lifetime GHG emissions.”13 CEQ uses natural gas pipelines as an example of consideration of indirect effects, stating that they create the “economic conditions for additional natural gas production and consumption, including both domestically and internationally, which produce indirect (both upstream and downstream) GHG emissions that contribute to climate change.”14 When discussing the need to analyze the effects of climate change on a proposed action (and not just the impacts of the proposed action on climate change), CEQ gives as an example a project that may require water from a source with diminishing quantities available and advises the agency consider such issues to “inform decisions on siting, whether to proceed with and how to design potential actions and reasonable alternatives, and to eliminate or mitigate effects exacerbated by climate change.”15

Conclusion

Robust comments are likely to be filed to further inform CEQ’s effort on the GHG Guidance. Nevertheless, CEQ has directed agencies to apply the guidance to all new proposed actions and to consider applying it to proposed actions that are currently under NEPA review. Comments on the interim guidance are due March 10, 2023.

FOOTNOTES

1. CEQ, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,196 (Jan. 9, 2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-01-09/pdf/2023-00158.pdf (“GHG Guidance”).

2. Id.

3. Note that CEQ has announced its intention to further revise its existing NEPA regulations in 2023, after having issued an earlier round of regulatory amendments in 2022. See CEQ Fall 2022 Regulatory Agenda, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions Phase 2, RIN No. 0331-AA07, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202210&RIN=0331-AA07; CEQ, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 87 Fed. Reg. 23,453 (Apr. 20, 2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-04-20/pdf/2022-08288.pdf.

4. GHG Guidance at 1,201.

5. Id. at 1,202-03.

6. Id. at 1,203, 1,211.

7. Id. at 1,205.

8. Id. at 1,204.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id. at 1,206.

12. Id.

13. Id. at 1,202.

14. Id. at 1,204 n.86.

15. Id. at 1,208.

For more Environmental and Energy News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Bracewell LLP

Federal PFAS Drinking Water Standards: 2023 Is the Year

On Friday, October 7, 2022, the EPA formally sent its proposed federal PFAS drinking water standards to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for consideration and approval or rejection. The proposed rule cleared OMB review on November 30, 2022; however, the EPA has not yet released the proposed rule. While the details of the rule under consideration are not yet known, what is evident from the title of the document logged on the OMB website is that the drinking water standards will address PFOA and PFOS. At least from the document title, it does not appear that any other PFAS will be subject to Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) regulation at the moment.

The delay in releasing the proposed drinking water standards for over a month now, though, could suggest that the proposed rule may seek to regulate more than just PFOA and PFOS, and the EPA may be looking to shore up language and support language in the proposed rule for such a proposal in light of comments from the OMB. Similarly, many wonder whether the EPA proposed a limit so low that the OMB had concerns as to whether the limits were detectable. With the EPA keeping its proposed language a closely guarded secret for the time being, much of the discussions rest on speculation. What we do know is that he EPA is statutorily required to put forth a proposed standard before the first half of 2023, and it has publicly pledged repeatedly to act more quickly than that statutory requirements.

Thus, 2023 will see federal PFAS drinking water standards for at least two PFAS from the EPA and we predict that it is only a matter of days before the country sees the EPA’s proposal, which will kick off what promises to be an extremely contentious public comment period.

Now more than ever, the EPA is clearly on a path to regulate PFAS contamination in the country’s water, land and air. These regulations will require states to act, as well (and some states may still enact stronger regulations than the EPA). Both the federal and the state level regulations will impact businesses and industries of many kinds, even if their contribution to drinking water contamination issues may seem on the surface to be de minimus. In states that already have PFAS drinking water standards enacted, businesses and property owners have already seen local environmental agencies scrutinize possible sources of PFAS pollution much more closely than ever before, which has resulted in unexpected costs. Beyond drinking water, though, the EPA PFAS Roadmap from 2021 shows the EPA’s desire to take regulatory action well beyond just drinking water, and companies absolutely must begin preparing now for regulatory actions that will have significant financial impacts down the road.

©2023 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

EPA’s Contaminant List Includes All PFAS

We previously reported on the EPA’s announcement for its Draft Fifth Contaminant Candidate List (CCL 5), which contemplated listing all PFAS as an entire class on the Contaminant List. On October 28, 2022, the EPA issued its prepublication version of the final CCL 5 rule. The EPA’s contaminant list final version is the first step in the Safe Drinking Water Act regulatory process, which will allow the EPA to begin its assessment into any of the over 12,000 PFAS as to whether they should be included in a drinking water enforceable limit. Such a move would build upon the EPA’s current progress towards regulating PFOA and PFOS with an enforceable drinking water limit, and open the door to significant future enforcement action and litigation.

EPA’s Contaminant List and PFAS

On October 28, 2022, the EPA announced its Final Fifth Contaminant Candidate List (CCL 5). The CCL is a list of contaminants that are currently not subject to any proposed or promulgated national primary drinking water regulations, but are known or anticipated to occur in public water systems. Contaminants listed on the CCL may require future regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). On the CCL 5 are 66 individual chemicals, but notably PFAS as an entire class are also listed on the CCL 5. Simply because PFAS are listed on the CCL 5 does not guarantee that regulation will occur; however, it does open doors to research that are not otherwise available without the listing on the CCL.

The EPA’s contaminant list rule is not the only step the agency has taken with respect to PFAS and drinking water, but developing the CCL is the first step under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in potentially regulating drinking water contaminants. SDWA requires EPA to publish a list of currently unregulated contaminants that are known or anticipated to occur in public water systems and that may require regulation. EPA must publish a CCL every five years. The CCL does not create or impose regulatory burden on public water systems or state, local, or Tribal governments. EPA has completed four rounds of CCLs since 1996. The last cycle of CCL, CCL 4, was published in November 2016. EPA began the development of the CCL 5 in 2018 by asking the public to nominate chemicals, microbes, or other materials for consideration for the CCL 5.

Impact On Businesses and Litigation

Many companies assume that any regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act will not impact them, as virtually no industries, aside from water utilities, have any direct impact on drinking water. However, this belief provides a false sense of security that must immediately be dispelled. There are three specific ways that drinking water limits for PFAS will trigger scrutiny on environmental practices of businesses: (1) elffluent discharges into water sources; (2) waste sent to landfills that may leach into drinking water sources; and (3) properties abutting or in the vicinity of water sources.

Direct industry effluent discharges into water sources (which may not be drinking water sources, but may feed into drinking water sources) will be the low-hanging fruit target for local environmental agencies at the state level. Companies must ensure that they have all permitting in order, and it is advisable that the permitting specifically encompasses PFAS. Failing to do so will cause issues down the line when local environmental regulatory bodies look to determine, even retroactively, who PFAS water polluters are or were, as those agencies seek to hold businesses responsible for the costs associated with cleaning up PFAS in drinking water.

Companies that send their industrial waste to landfills are also well advised to do a full compliance check. While many companies do not use PFAS directly in their own manufacturing processes, do the parts or other raw materials used in the manufacturing process have PFAS contamination issues? If so, a company could unknowingly send PFAS-laden industrial waste products to landfills, and so these are questions that companies must get answers to. Over time, it is possible that the PFAS may leach out of the landfill and find their way into local water sources. Environmental regulatory agencies will look to these sites, the owners of the sites, and potentially companies sending waste to the sites as responsible parties for PFAS contamination in waterways.

Finally, even businesses having nothing to do with PFAS or manufacturing from which PFAS could be a contaminant need to follow news regarding PFAS regulations. For example, has the property on which your business sits ever had fires that have required a local fire department to extinguish flames using foam (historically, a PFAS containing product)? What did the owner of the site prior to you use the site for? Were there possible PFAS contamination issues stemming from that prior business? Did your due diligence reports and tests when purchasing the property take PFAS into consideration? If PFAS were a contaminant on the land on which your business now operates, local environmental agencies will pursue cleanup costs from any such business regardless of knowledge or intent, and regardless of whether the PFAS issues were the result of a prior company on the site. These investigations and remediations can be extremely expensive and disruptive to businesses.

Should the EPA broaden its regulations for PFAS in drinking water to include more than PFOA and PFOS, this will trigger considerable enforcement action at the state level to identify responsible parties and ensure that the parties pay for remediation costs. Historically, this has also led to civil litigation, as companies identified as responsible parties litigate the percent allocation that they are responsible for the alleged pollution, and look to bring in additional companies to reduce allocation shares for remediation costs.

Conclusion

Future regulatory steps for certain PFAS under the Safe Drinking Water Act will require states to act (and some states may still enact stronger regulations than the EPA). Both the federal and the state level regulations will impact businesses and industries of many kinds, even if their contribution to drinking water contamination issues may seem on the surface to be de minimus. In states that already have PFAS drinking water standards enacted, businesses and property owners have already seen local environmental agencies scrutinize possible sources of PFAS pollution much more closely than ever before, which has resulted in unexpected costs. Companies absolutely must begin preparing now for regulatory actions that will have significant financial impacts down the road.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.