Tag: employment

The 2019 Honig Act Means New Obligations for New Jersey Employers Around Cannabis at Work

Employers cannot afford to ignore the direct impact of the 2019 amendments to the law permitting legal medicinal marijuana use in New Jersey. Among the most important areas of concern, employers must be prepared to (1) create policies that will comply with federal, state and local laws, as well as maintain a safe workplace and (2) respond to a potential increase in positive drug tests and the resultant challenges to any employer action taken in response to a positive test result (e.g., denial of employment for an applicant or termination of the employment of a current employee).

New Jersey’s former Compassionate Use of Medical Marijuana Act (CUMMA) contained language stating:

[N]othing in [CUMMA] shall be construed to require… an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace. N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14.

On July 2, 2019, Governor Murphy signed into law the Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-2, et seq. (Honig Act), which replaced CUMMA. The revised employment law provisions of the Honig Act create job protections. The above-cited language from CUMMA changed, and the Honig Act provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful to take any adverse employment action against an employee who is a registered qualifying patient based solely on the employee’s status as a registrant with the commission [i.e., the Cannabis Regulatory Commission established pursuant to the law].

The Honig Act defines “adverse employment action” as “refusing to hire or employ an individual, barring or discharging an individual from employment, requiring an individual to retire from employment, or discriminating against an individual in compensation or in any terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.J.S.A. 24:6I-3. State regulations were adopted to support CUMMA (N.J.A.C. 8:64-1 et seq.) but no new regulations were promulgated in furtherance of the Honig Act.

The patient/employee-friendly provision moves New Jersey into the group of states with medical marijuana laws that expressly provide employment law protections for medical marijuana users (e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia).

The Honig Act establishes a procedure employers must follow when an employee tests positive for marijuana. If an employee (or prospective employee) tests positive for cannabis, the employer is required to (1) provide written notice of the right to provide a valid medical explanation for the test result and (2) offer an opportunity to present a valid medical explanation for the result. N.J.S.A. 14-6I-9.

The employee or applicant has three (3) working days after receipt of the employer’s written notice to explain the result or request a retest of the original sample (at the employee’s expense). The Act does not define “working days.” A valid explanation for the positive test result may include an authorization for medical cannabis issued by a health care practitioner or proof of registration with the medical marijuana commission.

If an employee demonstrates she is a valid medical marijuana user, employers will not be permitted to use that alone as a basis to take adverse employment action, unless the employer can demonstrate that one of the federal exemptions applies.

The Honig Act permits employers to take adverse action if an employee possesses or uses an intoxicating substance during work hours, or if such use would require an employer to commit any act that would cause the employer to be in violation of federal law.

“Cannabis” has the meaning given to “marijuana” in section 2 of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, N.J.S.A. 24:21-2. The NJ Controlled Dangerous Substance Act includes cannabis as a Schedule I(e) hallucinogenic that has a high potential for abuse, has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision. Accordingly, we assume “intoxicating substances” includes medical marijuana as it’s used in the Honig Act.

Nothing in the Honig Act requires an employer to commit any act that would cause the employer to be in violation of federal law, lose a licensing-related benefit pursuant to federal law, or lose a federal contract or federal funding. For example, most federal contractors are required to comply with the federal Drug-Free Workplace Act (DFWA), which precludes the possession or use of controlled substances at work sites. 41 U.S.C. §8101(a)(5)(B).

Future lawsuits surrounding marijuana use are likely to be focused on the types of reasonable accommodations employers should make and what jobs are too safety-sensitive to permit an accommodation for medical marijuana use. Due to the Honig Act’s infancy, it is not clear if New Jersey courts will follow precedent from other states imposing a burden on the employer to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine if there are medical alternatives that are equally effective, and the use of which would not violate company policy.

In some other states, when there are no equally effective alternatives, the employer bears the burden of proving that the use of a medication would cause an undue hardship to the employer’s business to justify the employer’s refusal to make an exception to an anti-drug policy. In addition, the use of medical marijuana may be for an underlying condition meeting the definition of a disability, a condition that affords job protections, including the need to engage in the interactive process seeking to reach a reasonable accommodation.

For example, in Massachusetts, an employer may be able to show an undue hardship exists where accommodating the medical marijuana use would impair the employee’s performance of her work; pose an unacceptably significant safety risk to the public, the employee or fellow employees; or violate an employer’s contractual or statutory obligation and thereby jeopardize its ability to perform its business. We do not yet know how New Jersey will interpret what constitutes an undue hardship in accommodating an employee’s medical marijuana use.

On March 27, 2019, New Jersey’s Appellate Division, the second-highest court, issued an unpublished opinion in Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc. et al., A-3072-17T3 (March 27, 2019). Mr. Wild appealed dismissal of his lawsuit against his former employer alleging various Law Against Discrimination (LAD) violations and common-law defamation. His lawsuit claimed his employer discriminated against him for his use of medical marijuana, which he used as part of his cancer treatment. Both parties pointed the Appellate Division to the fact that “nothing” in CUMMA requires an employer to accommodate a medical marijuana user. Based on that the defendants argued, the plaintiff’s claims under the LAD could not go forward.

The Wild court analyzed whether the plaintiff pleaded a case under the LAD; it did not weigh and analyze proofs. The court concluded the plaintiff set forth allegations necessary to his cause of action and the matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Appellate Division held CUMMA’s declaration should not be construed to “require” an accommodation, but does not mean such a requirement might not be imposed by other legislation. N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14. Further, the court concluded that CUMMA’s refusal to require an employment accommodation for a user does not mean CUMMA immunizes employers from obligations already imposed elsewhere. Essentially, CUMMA does not limit the LAD by permitting an employer’s termination of a cancer patient’s employment by discrimination without compassion.

The Appellate Division rejected the argument CUMMA and the LAD are in conflict because CUMMA states that “nothing in this act shall be construed to require … an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.” N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14. CUMMA intended to cause no impact on existing employment rights; CUMMA neither created new employment rights nor destroyed existing employment rights. CUMMA imposes no burden on defendants, and negates no rights or claims available to a plaintiff under the LAD.

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed to review the case and heard oral argument on February 4, 2020. The State Supreme Court is considering the impact of the Honig Act’s amendments providing employment protections to medical marijuana users. Because the Honig Act was passed after the events leading to Wild’s termination, it is unclear how it will affect his case on appeal. The Court may address whether the Honig Act, as amended, grants employees a private right of action, and, if so, whether the amendments are retroactive. We anticipate the Supreme Court’s decision within the next three to six months.

While the Honig Act grants employee protections, it is likely that employees still will seek to bring suits under the LAD as a continued source of protection because, unlike the Honig Act, the LAD allows the possibility for punitive damages and contains a fee-shifting provision.

For now, employers should, at a minimum, make sure they comply with the notice and communication provisions in the Honig Act when an employee/applicant tests positive.

© 2020 Wilson Elser

For more on marijuana and employment see the National Law Review Labor & Employment section.

Coronavirus and the Workplace: What Employers Need To Know

News that multiple cases of the newly-identified 2019 Novel Coronavirus have reached the United States have prompted employers to think about employee safety and ways to address disease prevention in the workplace. Although, according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), “most American workers are not at significant risk of infection” at this time, the situation is evolving, and it is never too early for employers to consider how they can address employee concerns, help prevent an outbreak, or address one if it occurs. Employers should also be aware of legal pitfalls that they may encounter when attempting to protect their employees from the virus.

The following addresses some of the key questions employers may have regarding the Coronavirus threat.

What is the Coronavirus and How Is It Transmitted?

At this point, relatively little is known about the 2019 Novel Coronavirus, more commonly known as the “Coronavirus.” According to the CDC, the initial reports of the illness originated in Wuhan, China, where people likely contracted the virus from animals at a seafood and animal market. Experts now believe that the virus is spreading from human-to-human when an infected person coughs or sneezes, similar to the spread of a cold or flu. However, it is still too early to know how easily the virus is transmitted between people.

What Are the Primary Symptoms of the Coronavirus?

In the confirmed cases of Coronavirus thus far, affected individuals have reported mild to severe respiratory symptoms, fever, cough, shortness of breath, and breathing difficulties. In severe cases, the virus has led to pneumonia, kidney failure, and, in at least 100 deaths (presently, all in China), as of the time of this writing.  The CDC believes at this time that symptoms may appear within two to fourteen days after exposure.  However, some infected individuals have shown little to no symptoms.

How Can Spread of the Coronavirus Be Prevented?

Because there is presently no Coronavirus vaccine available, the CDC is recommending standard precautions to avoid the spread of respiratory viruses, such as washing hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds, or, if soap is not available, using hand sanitizer; avoiding close contact with people who are sick; staying at home when you are sick; and disinfecting frequently touched objects and surfaces.

What If My Employees Travel to China For Business?

As of January 27, 2020, the CDC has issued a level 3 health travel notice (the highest threat level) recommending that people avoid all nonessential travel to China.

Employers whose employees travel to and from China should keep in mind the following:

  • Consider whether to limit business travel to affected areas. While the current CDC travel notice does not specifically define “nonessential travel,” the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requires employers to furnish “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause the death or serious physical harm to … employees.”  Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (also referred to as OSHA) has not promulgated specific standards covering the Coronavirus, requiring employees to engage in nonessential business travel to China (or any other areas in which the risk of contagion is heightened) could create risk under the General Duty Clause, particularly in light of the CDC warning against nonessential travel.  For that reason, employers whose business may involve travel to China (or other areas that become subject to travel restrictions or otherwise experience an increase in the spread of the virus) should consider other available options for employees for the duration of the threat, such as videoconferencing.

By the same token, employers should also be prepared to respond to employees who may express concerns about traveling to affected areas due to the virus.  While an employer generally has broad discretion to decide the duties and requirements of a job and to discipline employees who fail to fulfill those requirements, as a practical matter employers may wish to consider offering employees reasonable alternatives to such travel.

Finally, while employers may implement restrictions on work-related travel to affected areas, employers should tread more carefully when attempting to police personal, non-work-related travel. That said, recent decisions in the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the disability discrimination protections of the ADA do not apply where an employer takes an employment action based on the potential for an employee to become ill and disabled in the future.  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found no liability under the ADA where an employer terminated an employee who requested time off to travel to Ghana to visit family because of the perceived risk that the employee would contract the Ebola virus, due to recent outbreaks of the disease in neighboring countries.  While courts have tended to take this view, it is worth noting that the EEOC has argued on at least one occasion that an employer acting on a potential future health condition may be viewed as “regarding” an employee as disabled as long as the condition otherwise qualifies as a disability under the law.  For this reason, employers should consider the risks with imposing a ban on personal, non-work-related travel to affected areas.

  • Provide relevant safety information to employees. Employers whose employees travel to affected areas should provide information to their employees about how the Coronavirus is transmitted, its symptoms, and how to avoid exposure – utilizing trusted and reputable sources such as the CDC. Employers would be well advised to also provide these employees with resources and contact information for local health departments and the CDC.
  • Understand that employee travel may be interrupted. The Chinese government has closed transit within and out of Wuhan and certain other areas of the Hubei Province. Hong Kong has also imposed certain restrictions on travel to and from the Chinese mainland. The United States is also re-routing passengers from Wuhan, China to certain designated airports (including Chicago O’Hare, Atlanta, New York JFK, Los Angeles, and San Francisco) for enhanced screening. While screening for common viruses usually takes several hours, officials have indicated that those suspected of having the Coronavirus could be delayed for up to a day if additional screening is needed.

What Should I Do if an Employee Has Recently Traveled to China or Otherwise May Have Been Exposed to the Coronavirus?

Employers should remember that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) places certain restrictions on the kinds of inquiries that can be made into an employee’s medical status. Specifically, the ADA prohibits employers from making disability-related inquiries and requiring medical examinations, unless (1) the employer can show that the inquiry or exam is job-related and consistent with business necessity, or (2) where the employer has a reasonable belief that the employee poses a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot otherwise be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

According to Pandemic Preparedness Guidance published in 2009 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in the midst of the H1N1 influenza outbreak, whether a particular outbreak rises to the level of a “direct threat” depends on the severity of the illness.  Employers should look to the most up-to-date assessments being made by the CDC or other public health authorities, as they relate to the employer’s location, to determine the severity level of an illness and, in turn, whether an employee who potentially has been exposed to the illness may constitute a “direct threat.”  Employers should not rely on speculation or unofficial information when making determinations about whether there is a direct threat.  At the moment, the CDC is not classifying the Coronavirus as a pandemic and has not issued a heightened threat level for the United States.  However, the situation continues to rapidly evolve and we will provide updates should additional guidance be released by the CDC or other public health officials on this important issue.

All this being said, employers should keep in mind the following when it comes to employees who have traveled to affected areas:

  • Employers need not wait until an employee returning from travel develops symptoms to inquire about exposure to the Coronavirus. Inquiring about whether an employee has traveled to an affected area or about possible exposure to a contagious illness during such travel would not constitute a disability-related inquiry.  However, as discussed below, the extent to which an employer may act on the information received will depend on the most recent information available from the CDC or other public health officials.  Further, employers inquiring into whether employees have traveled to affected areas should do so of all employees known or believed to have recently traveled, rather than directing such inquiries only to employees of certain races, ethnicities, or national origins. Finally, employers should be mindful to keep confidential all medical-related information received from an employee, in accordance with the ADA.
  • Under certain circumstances, employers may require employees who have traveled to areas affected by serious health threats to stay home. If the CDC or other local public health officials recommend that people who visit specified locations remain at home for several days until it is clear they do not have illness symptoms, an employer may require an employee who traveled to an affected area to remain out of work for the suggested period of time.  While presently the CDC states that individuals who may have been in close contact with someone with the Coronavirus may continue with their daily activities so long as they are not showing any symptoms, employers should continue to monitor the CDC website for further developments. In the absence of a CDC directive that employees who have traveled to affected areas stay at home, an employer who is considering requiring such employees to remain home, they should consult with counsel.

What Other Things Should Employers Be Thinking About When it Comes to the Coronavirus?

  • Employers may – and should – send employees home if they exhibit potential symptoms of contagious illnesses at work. The EEOC has said that sending an employee home who displays symptoms of contagious illness would not run afoul of the ADA’s restrictions on disability-related actions because: (i) if the illness ultimately turns out to be relatively mild or “run of the mill” (such as seasonal influenza), then it would not have constituted a covered disability in the first place; and (ii) if the illness does turn out to be severe (such that it may constitute a disability under the law), then the actions would be warranted under a direct threat analysis. In either case, an employer can send an employee home who is displaying symptoms of contagious illness, even if this is against the employee’s wishes.  Employers should also consider making clear in their policies that employees who have symptoms of a potential contagious illness must not report to work while they are sick.
  • Determine whether the FMLA or other leave laws may apply. An employee who is experiencing a serious health condition or who requires time to care for a family member with such a condition may be entitled to take unpaid leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or state-law analogues.  Employees may also be eligible for leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA or related state or local law, if the underlying condition constitutes a qualifying disability.  However, employees generally are not entitled to take FMLA or reasonable accommodation leave to stay at home to avoid getting sick (though an exception may exist where a preexisting medical condition is likely to be worsened by exposure to a contagious disease). Furthermore, employees in certain jurisdictions may be entitled to paid sick leave if needed to care for themselves or a sick family member in the event of an illness, or if their workplace or a child’s school or day care is closed due to a public health emergency.
  • Consider whether OSHA requirements may apply. While, as noted above, OSHA has not promulgated specific standards covering the Coronavirus, it has issued a notice indicating that employers should be aware of the following general standards to which employers may be subject under OSHA:
    • General Duty Clause: As discussed above, the OSHA General Duty Clause requires employers to furnish “a place of employment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause the death or serious physical harm to … employees.” To that end, there are some readily achievable steps that employers can take to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus (and other contagious illnesses) within the workplace, such as: providing hand sanitizer to employees, ensuring that surfaces and eating areas are disinfected regularly, and encouraging employees who are sick to stay home. Employers also may start to consider certain policy changes they may wish to implement in response to the Coronavirus should the situation become more severe in the U.S., such as allowing employees to work from home.
    • Personal Protective Equipment: OSHA requires that protective equipment, clothing, and barriers be provided whenever it is necessary to prevent employees from being exposed to environmental hazards. Employers are required to assess the workplace, determine if hazards are present, and if so, select and have employees use protective equipment. Employers whose employees may encounter individuals infected with the Coronavirus, such as those in the healthcare and travel industries, should begin to consider what protective equipment would be necessary to protect its workforce should the virus begin to spread within the United States.
    • Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements: OSHA requires that certain employers keep a record of certain work-related illness and injuries (often referred to as an OSHA Form 300 log). While there is a regulatory exemption for recording instances of the standard cold and flu, OSHA has deemed the 2019 Novel Coronavirus a recordable illness when a worker is infected on the job. In addition, certain employers may be subject to reporting requirements under state and local law if they have a reasonable belief that a significant disease is present in the workplace.
    • Employers in Higher-Risk Industries: While, again, OSHA has yet to issue any standards or controls specific to Coronavirus, employers operating in industries where employees may be at a potential increased risk of exposure should prepare for the possibility that heightened requirements may be put in place. In the past, OSHA has issued such guidance for employers in industries such as healthcare, airlines, and mortuary services, such as during the MERS outbreak in 2015.

*          *          *

Information about the Coronavirus is constantly developing, so employers also should continue to refer to the CDC, WHO, and OSHA websites for the latest on appropriate precautions, including changes to travel notices.  Of course, we will continue to monitor this situation and report on any updates as they develop.

© 2020 Proskauer Rose LLP.

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act May Endanger Economy

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act has passed the House of Representatives, and is pending before the Senate where it may pass by unanimous consent (i.e., with no actual vote or hearing).

On its face, the Fairness Act seems fair. By eliminating the 7% per country cap, Indian nationals and Chinese nationals who have been waiting and would continue to wait for years to capture green cards would be placed at the front of line. But this would be at the expense of workers from other countries who are also important to the United States.

About 25% of all STEM workers in the U.S., including those in the fields of healthcare, physical science, computer, and math, are foreign-born and that figure is on the rise. One quarter of all doctors in the U.S. are foreign-born — many from sub-Saharan Africa — and are particularly important in poor, rural areas of the country where physicians are scarce. One in five pharmacists and one in four dentists are foreign-born. Other types of healthcare workers come from Asia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean and our need for these workers rises as baby boomers age.

If the Fairness Act were to pass, recruiting from countries other than India and China might become more difficult, and this talent may well turn elsewhere. New Zealand, Ireland, Australia and the UK are also dependent on foreign-trained doctors.

High-tech workers from India and China are also important to the U.S. and its economy; but our current immigration system is driving them out as well. This started in 2008, when it became difficult for high-tech companies to get the number of H-1B visas they needed. That frustration has grown with the increased scrutiny of H-1B petitions and the long green card waiting lines. Indian and Chinese talent is heading for other countries, and Canada is welcoming them and their companies with open arms. South Africa, Argentina, India, Chile, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Israel, Australia, and Ireland also are popular competitors.

Quotas of one kind or another have been part of the U.S. immigration system since the early part of the 20th century. Literacy requirements limited immigration from some of the poorer countries of the world. Country-of-birth quotas benefited those from the UK, Ireland, and Germany at the expense even of those born in southern and eastern Europe. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Hart-Celler Act), which is the basis of our current system, abolished national origin quotas (to eliminate discrimination) and focused on family reunification. The 7% annual ceiling on the number of immigrants from any one country was established. The ceiling was not meant to be quota, but rather a “barrier against monopolization.”

Senator Rand Paul, who opposes the Fairness Act, introduced the BELIEVE Act (Backlog Elimination, Legal Immigration and Employment Visa Enhancement Act) (S. 2091) on July 11, 2019. That bill would simply quadruple the number of employment-based visas by doubling the number available annually and exempting dependents from being counted toward the annual quota of visas. His bill also would exempt all shortage occupations from green card limits.

The Fairness Act may be just an interim solution. Rather than pitting family-based immigration against employment-based immigration and rather than pitting one country against another or one industry against another, perhaps it is time for legislation like the BELIEVE Act that would simply increase the number of green cards available to everybody.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

For more on green card legislation, see the National Law Review Immigration law page.

California Arbitration Roundup: Employers Are 3-1 For Favorable Arbitration Rulings

California employers received mostly good news this past month on the arbitration front, with a trio of pro-employer arbitration-related rulings.  The California Supreme Court’s recent ruling invalidating an employer’s arbitration agreement (discussed below) is a notable exception.

California Supreme Court Invalidates Employer’s Arbitration Agreement As Unconscionable.

In OTO LLC v. Ken Kho, the California Supreme Court ruled that an Oakland Toyota dealership’s arbitration agreement with a former employee was unenforceable and was so unfair and one-sided that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  “Arbitration is premised on the parties’ mutual consent, not coercion, and the manner of the agreement’s imposition here raises serious concerns on that score,” the majority opinion said.

In 2013, Ken Kho, then an employee of the dealership, One Toyota, was asked to sign several documents, including an arbitration agreement.  Kho signed it, and was later terminated.

The California Supreme Court acknowledged that California and federal laws strongly favor arbitration. However, the Court considered the following factors in determining that One Toyota’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable:

  • The arbitration agreement purported to waive Kho’s right to file a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner and to have a “Berman” hearing before the Labor Commissioner (while not dispositive, the Court noted that this remains a significant factor in considering unconscionability of employee arbitration agreements);

  • The agreement was presented to Kho in his workspace, along with other employment-related documents;

  • Neither its contents nor its significance was explained;

  • Kho was required to sign the agreement to keep the job he had held for three years;

  • Because One Toyota used a piece-rate compensation system, any time Kho spent reviewing the agreement would have reduced his pay;

  • A low-level employee (a porter) presented the agreement to Kho, “creating the impression that no request for an explanation was expected and any such request would be unavailing”;

  • By having the porter wait for the documents, One Toyota conveyed an expectation that Kho sign them immediately, without examination or consultation with counsel;

  • There was no indication that the porter had the knowledge or authority to explain the terms of the agreement;

  • Kho was not given a copy of the agreement he had signed;

  • The agreement was written in an extremely small font in the form of a “single dense paragraph” of 51 lines, and the text was “visually impenetrable” and “challenge[d] the limits of legibility”;

  • The sentences were complex, filled with statutory references and legal jargon;

  • Kho was not offered a version to read in his native language (while the Court noted this factor, it did not consider it because it did not know Kho’s English proficiency);

  • The arbitration agreement did not make clear One Toyota’s obligation to pay arbitration-related costs (and rather cited to statutory provisions and referenced legal precedent; the Court noted “It would have been nearly impossible to understand the contract’s meaning without legal training and access to the many statutes it references. Kho had neither.”);

  • One Toyota’s agreement did not mention how to bring a dispute to arbitration, nor did it suggest where that information might be found (e.g., by citing to a commercial arbitration provider such as JAMS or AAA); and

  • One Toyota’s arbitration process was complicated to navigate and would likely require an attorney, making it cost-prohibitive for Kho.

The Court concluded that “[w]e have not said no arbitration could provide an appropriate forum for resolution of Kho’s wage claim, but only that this particular arbitral process, forced upon Kho under especially oppressive circumstances and erecting new barriers to the vindication of his rights, is unconscionable.”

Employers would thus be well-advised to revisit their employee arbitration agreements to ensure that they do not contain any of the defects discussed by the Supreme Court in the Kho case.

NLRB Upholds Employer Conduct Related to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

In Cordúa Restaurants, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 43 (2019), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) addressed the lawfulness of employer conduct surrounding mandatory arbitration agreements for the first time since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, where the Court held that mandatory arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (see here).  In Cordua Restaurants, the NLRB ruled in part that employers are not prohibited under the NLRA from: (1) informing employees that failing or refusing to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement will result in their discharge; and (2) promulgating mandatory arbitration agreements in response to employees opting in to a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act or state wage-and-hour laws.

The NLRB’s decision in Cordua Restaurants is a natural extension of the Supreme Court’s analysis and ruling in Epic Systems.  There, the Court held that Congress, when passing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, instructed courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written.  Since the passage of the FAA predates the NLRA by ten years, and since the NLRA says nothing about overruling the FAA, the NLRB could not, under the guise of enforcing the NLRA, rule that an arbitration agreement that otherwise is lawful on its face violates the NLRA.  This decision by the NLRB is further evidence of that agency’s retreat from past policies advanced by the NLRB in the prior administration and likely will not be overruled.

California Court of Appeals Compels Employee to Arbitrate Claims Even Though He Filed Suit Before Signing Arbitration Agreement

In Quiroz Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium, the California Court of Appeals compelled an employee to arbitrate his claims against his employer even though the employee filed his lawsuit two days before he signed an arbitration agreement.  The Court held that the arbitration agreement was clear in that it required arbitration of any claims and that it did not contain any restriction based on when a claim was filed.

In the case, Quiroz Franco, the employee, was given an arbitration agreement on March 9, 2018, and a Spanish translation shortly thereafter.  On March 19, 2018, he filed a lawsuit against his employer, alleging harassment, discrimination, and wage and hour claims among others.  On March 21, 2018, Quiroz Franco handed in his signed arbitration form, which the employer used to attempt to compel him to arbitrate. The lower court ruled that the claims in the employee’s suit started to accrue before he signed the arbitration agreement, so arbitration couldn’t be compelled.  The employer appealed and the Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision.

California Court of Appeals Rules that Unfair Competition Law Claims Are Arbitrable

In Clifford v. Quest Software Inc., the California Court of Appeals addressed whether an employee’s claim against his employer for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL) was arbitrable, ruling that it was.  The employee brought various wage and hour claims against his employer, and the employer moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ arbitration agreement.  The trial court granted the motion in part and ordered to arbitration every cause of action except the employee’s UCL claim, which the court concluded was not arbitrable.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the employee’s UCL claim was subject to arbitration along with his other causes of action—more good news for California employers.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

Are Your AI Selection Tools Validated? OFCCP Provides Guidance for Validation of AI-Based Algorithms

We have long counseled employers using or contemplating using artificial intelligence (“AI”) algorithms in their employee selection processes to validate the AI-based selection procedure using an appropriate validation strategy approved by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (“Uniform Guidelines”).  Our advice has been primarily based on minimizing legal risk and complying with best practices.  A recently updated Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) provides further support for validating AI-based selection procedures in compliance with the Uniform Guidelines.

On July 23, 2019, the OFCCP updated the FAQ section on its website to provide guidance on the validation of employee selection procedures.  Under the Uniform Guidelines, any selection procedure resulting in a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact,” which in turn requires the validation of the selection procedure.  These validation requirements are equally applicable to any AI-based selection procedure used to make any employment decision, including hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion.

As stated in the Uniform Guidelines, and emphasized in the FAQ, the OFCCP recognizes three methods of validation:

  1. Content validation – a showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job in question;

  2. Criterion-related validation – production of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive or significantly correlated with important aspects of job performance; and

  3. Construct validation – a showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates possess identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important in successful performance on the job.

With the exception of criterion-related validating studies, which can be “transported” from other entities under certain circumstances, the Uniform Guidelines require local validation at the employer’s own facilities.

If a selection procedure adversely impacts a protected group, the employer must provide evidence of validity for the selection procedure(s) that caused the adverse impact. Thus, it is crucial that employers considering the implementation of AI-based algorithms in the selection process both conduct adverse impact studies and be prepared to produce one or more validation studies.

The new FAQ also provides important guidelines on the substantial methods utilized by OFCCP in evaluating potential adverse impact.  In accordance with the Uniform Guidelines, OFCCP will analyze the Impact Ratio – the disfavored group’s selection rate divided by the favored group’s selection rate.  Any Impact Ratio of less than 0.80 (referred to as the “Four – Fifths Rule”) constitutes an initial indication of adverse impact, but OFCCP will not pursue enforcement without evidence of statistical and practical significance.  For statistical significance, the OFCCP’s standard statistical tests are the Fisher’s Exact Test (for groups with fewer than 30 subjects) and the Two Independent-Sample Binomial Z-Test (for groups with 30 or more subjects).

With the publication of this new FAQ, employers – and particularly federal contractors – should be sure to evaluate their use of AI-based algorithms and properly validate all selection procedures under the Uniform Guidelines.  Moreover, although not addressed in the OFCCP’s new FAQ, employers should also ensure that their AI-based algorithms are compliant with all other state and federal laws and regulations.

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

State Attorney Generals Brace for Battle with Department of Labor Over Newly Proposed Federal Overtime Salary Exemption Threshold

After the March 7, 2019 unveiling by the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) of its long- awaited proposed rule, which would make more workers eligible for statutory overtime  pay, the attorneys general (“AGs”) of 14 states and the District of Columbia announced on May 21, 2019 that they oppose DOL’s proposed rulemaking. Included among the states opposing DOL’s proposal are New Jersey and New York.

The existing annual salary overtime exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) is $23,600 for full-timers (or $455 per week). Employees who are paid below that salary must be paid overtime if they work more than 40 hours per week. The FLSA salary threshold test has not changed since 2004.

DOL’s newly proposed rule, characterized as an Executive Order 13771 “deregulatory action,” would, among other things, increase the qualifying salary threshold for overtime exemption to $35,308 annually for full-time workers (or $679 per week). In doing so, the rule, if promulgated, would effectively convert an estimated one million workers to hourly wage status and qualify them for time-and-one-half overtime pay for hours they work in excess of 40 in a given workweek.

The newly proposed rule also would clarify the type of compensation (such as payments made for vacations, holidays, illness, or failures to provide sufficient work) which would be excluded from the definition of an employee’s “regular rate” for purposes of calculating whether overtime pay is due, and increase the total annual compensation threshold for “highly compensated employees” (for whom overtime wages generally need not be paid) from $100,000 to $147,414 annually.

The proposed new rule stands in sharp contrast to the final rule promulgated by DOL during the Obama Administration in 2016, which would have raised the annual salary exemption threshold to $47,476 for full-timers (or $913 per week) and require automatic adjustments to the salary threshold standard every three (3) years. However, on November 22, 2016, a federal district court in Texas held that that rule was inconsistent with Congressional intent and issued a nationwide injunction staying its implementation. On October 30, 2017, DOL appealed the district court’s summary judgment decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 6, 2017, the appellate court granted the Government’s motion to hold the appeal in abeyance while DOL reexamined the salary threshold test.

The AGs argue that the proposed rule does not go far enough, championing instead the Obama-era 2016 Final Rule, which would have made roughly four million workers newly eligible for overtime pay. In the May 21, 2019 letter signed by each of the AGs, they contend, among other arguments, that the newly proposed rule would be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unlawful under the  federal  Administrative Procedure Act, because it would unreasonably institute a markedly lower salary threshold level and improperly eliminate mandated periodic reviews of the salary threshold standard. Meanwhile, Congressional Democrats have announced plans to introduce legislation that would revive the Obama-era salary exemption threshold.

On March 29, 2019, DOL published its newly proposed rule, triggering a 60-day public comment period that expired May 28, 2019. Presumably, DOL will be reviewing the comments it received and publishing its final rule, though the final rule’s promulgation date is uncertain. Given the anticipated political and judicial battles over what the new threshold should be, it is not clear what overtime salary exemption threshold ultimately will emerge.

Takeaways for Employers

  • Employers should closely monitor administrative, judicial and legislative developments relating to the proposed increase in the salary exemption overtime threshold.

  • An increase in the threshold is likely, though the amount of the increase and the effective date of same remain uncertain.

  • Once the threshold is increased, certain employees previously exempt from overtime will be eligible for hourly overtime pay depending on what dollar amount is established as the new salary threshold standard, and employers will be required to maintain time worked records for those newly converted hourly employees.

  • In anticipation of the change in the threshold amount, employers should begin the process of identifying job classifications that potentially may be impacted by a change in the salary exemption standard.

© Copyright 2019 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.
This post was written by Clifford D. Dawkins, Jr. and David I. Rosen of Sills Cummins & Gross P.C.
Read more news on the DOL Overtime Regulations on the National Law Review’s Employment Law Page.

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Cases Determining Extent of Title VII Protection for LGBT Workers

The Supreme Court of the United States announced three cases will be argued next term that could determine whether Title VII protects LGBT employees from workplace discrimination.

Title VII prohibits discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” but it does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity.  Federal courts have disagreed on whether discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination.  Differing opinions on this topic exist within the federal government as well:  the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, while the Department of Justice has argued it does not.  The Supreme Court’s decisions may ultimately decide these conflicts.

Two cases represent a split in federal appellate courts regarding the extent, if any, to which Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination.  In Altitude Express v. Zarda, a skydiving company fired Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, after Zarda informed a female client he was gay to assuage her concern about close physical contact during skydives.  The trial court dismissed Zarda’s sexual orientation discrimination claim.  In an opinion written by Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann on behalf of a full panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and held that sexual orientation discrimination is properly understood as a subset of discrimination on the basis of sex.  In other words, in the Second Circuit, sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.  The Second Circuit aligned its thinking with the Seventh Circuit’s April 2017 opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, which held that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Gerald Bostock v. Clayton County Georgia.  Gerald Bostock alleged he was terminated from his county job after the county learned of his involvement in a gay recreational softball league and his promotion of involvement in the league to co-workers.  The trial court dismissed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its own precedent that broadly held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  In other words, in the Eleventh Circuit, Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.

The Supreme Court consolidated the cases into a single case to determine whether the prohibition in Title VII against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation.

The third case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, focuses on whether Title VII applies to transgender employees.  In 2007, a funeral home hired Aimee Stephens, whose employment records identified her as a man.  Later, Stephens told the funeral home’s owner she identified as a woman and wanted to wear women’s clothing to work.  The owner fired Stephens, believing allowing Stephens to wear women’s clothing violated the funeral home’s dress code and “God’s commands.”  The EEOC filed suit on Stephens’ behalf.  The trial court dismissed a portion of the lawsuit because “transgender . . . status is not currently a protected class under Title VII,” but permitted other portions to proceed based on the claim Stephens was discriminated against because the funeral home objected to her appearance and behavior as departing from sex stereotypes.  The Sixth Circuit agreed that Stephens had viable claims.  The Supreme Court will review “[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping” under prior Supreme Court precedent.

All three cases will affect the employment rights of LGBT workers.  Dinsmore & Shohl lawyers will closely monitor the Court’s analysis of these cases.  Dinsmore’s Labor and Employment Practice Group stands ready to assist employers in navigating this developing area of law.  Dinsmore’s experience in this arena includes accomplished labor and employment lawyers, former law clerks to federal judges who have drafted orders on these very issues, former federal government attorneys, litigators and published scholars.

 

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
This post was written by Jan E. Hensel and Justin M. Burns of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Read more on the US Supreme Court  decision on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

Cincinnati City Council Passes Ordinance Prohibiting Salary History Inquiries

In a thinly veiled attempt to steal the spotlight from Cleveland, the new destination city for the National Football League, on March 13, 2019, the Cincinnati City Council passed Ordinance No. 83-2019, titled Prohibited Salary History Inquiry and Use, barring employers from inquiring about or relying on job applicants’ salary histories. It is scheduled to become effective in March 2020, and it applies to private employers with 15 or more employees in the city of Cincinnati.

The ordinance makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer or its agent to:

    1. Inquire about the salary history of an applicant for employment; or
    2. Screen job applicants based on their current or prior wages, benefits, other compensation, or salary histories, including requiring that an applicant’s prior wages, benefits, other compensation or salary history satisfy minimum or maximum criteria; or
    3. Rely on the salary history of an applicant in deciding whether to offer employment to an applicant, or in determining the salary, benefits, or other compensation for such applicant during the hiring process, including the negotiation of an employment contract; or
    4. Refuse to hire or otherwise disfavor, injure, or retaliate against an applicant for not disclosing his or her salary history to an employer.”

The ordinance does not limit employers from asking applicants “about their expectations with respect to salary, benefits, and other compensation, including but not limited to unvested equity or deferred compensation that an applicant would forfeit or have cancelled by virtue of the applicant’s resignation from their current employer.” Ordinance No. 83-2019 requires that, following a conditional offer of employment, upon request, the employer must provide the conditional offeree the pay scale for the position. The ordinance provides a private right of action to enforce the law. Remedies for violating the ordinance include “compensatory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, the cost of the action, and such legal and equitable relief as the court deems just and proper.”

Ordinance No. 83-2019 is designed to “ensure that . . . job applicants in Cincinnati are offered employment positions and subsequently compensated based on their job responsibilities and level of experience, rather than on prior salary histories.” In reality, it reaches well beyond Cincinnati, as state and local salary history bans are proliferating. Many municipalities, cities, and states across the country have passed laws limiting salary inquiries, and legislation is pending in numerous other jurisdictions around the country.

 

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
Read more on Equal Pay issues on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

U.S. Senators Seek Formal Investigation Of Non-Compete Use And Impact

Earlier this month, a group of six United States Senators made a joint request for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the impact of non-compete agreements on workers and the U.S. economy as a whole. This action suggests that the federal non-compete reform effort is not going away.

Recent Legislative Efforts

On February 18, 2019, we reviewed a new bill by Florida Senator Marco Rubio to prohibit non-competes for low-wage employees. That bill followed an effort in 2018 by Democrats in both houses of Congress to ban non-competes altogether. Although Senator Rubio’s bill represents a more limited attack on non-competes, we noted that it “suggests a level of bipartisan support that was not previously apparent.”

The Joint Letter

The recent joint letter to the GAO, issued on March 7, 2019, is signed by two Senators who were not involved in the prior legislative efforts: Democratic Senator Tim Kaine (VA); and Republican Senator Todd Young (IN). This represents additional evidence of bipartisanship on non-compete reform.

The joint letter does not formally oppose the use of non-competes. Nevertheless, from the Senators’ explanation for their request, it is clear that they believe the use of non-competes has become excessive, and that significant harm is being done to workers and the greater economy as a result.

In the letter, the Senators cite three ways in which non-competes allegedly are being abused:

  • The allegedly excessive imposition of non-competes on low-wage workers;
  • The alleged inability of workers to “engage in genuine negotiation over these agreements”; and
  • The belief that “most working under a non-compete were not even asked to sign one until after receiving a job offer.”

Further, the Senators allege that “[a]cademic experts and commentators from across the political spectrum have raised serious concerns about the use and abuse of these clauses[.]”

Based on the above-referenced concerns, the letter instructs the GAO to investigate the following questions:

  • What is known about the prevalence of non-compete agreements in particular fields, including low-wage occupations?
  • What is known about the effects of non-compete agreements on the workforce and the economy, including employment, wages and benefits, innovation, and entrepreneurship?
  • What steps have selected states taken to limit the use of these agreements, and what is known about the effect these actions have had on employees and employers?

Of note, these questions appear to address broader concerns about the use and impact of non-compete agreements than the discreet issues raised by the alleged “abuses” set forth above. The letter does not provide a deadline for the GAO to issue its report. However, the GAO’s explanation of how it handles investigation requests sets forth a six-step process, from Congress making the request to the issuance of the report. Further, while the GAO protocol does not offer a time-frame for every step, it does state that it “typically” takes “about 3 months” to simply design the scope of the investigation. Consequently, it would be reasonable to anticipate waiting months at least for the GAO to issue the report.

Where Does This Leave Us?

As noted above, the joint letter indicates that there is growing bipartisan support for restricting the use of non-competes on a nation-wide level. At the same time, by expressing the need for additional information about the use and impact of non-compete agreements on U.S. workers, the Senators may not move forward with further proposed non-compete legislation until they receive that information and take the time to fully digest its implications.

 

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019
For more labor and employment news, check out the National Law Review’s Employment type of law page.

Lactation Law Update: New York and Illinois

Recent developments require employers to reevaluate their lactation and nursing policies and practices to ensure that they are in compliance with newly enacted local laws in New York City and Illinois.

Changes to New York City Lactation Laws: Effective March 17, 2019

Since 2007, New York City employers with four or more employees have been required to provide reasonable unpaid break time (or to allow an employee to use paid break/meal time) to express breast milk in the workplace, for up to three years following the birth of a child, and to make reasonable efforts to provide a room, other than a restroom, to express milk in private.

Additional lactation-related obligations for New York City employers with four or more employees go into effect on March 17, 2019. For example, by that date, a covered employer must provide lactating employees with a sanitary “lactation room,” which is not a restroom, and which has, at minimum, an electrical outlet, a chair, a surface on which to place a breast pump and other personal items, and nearby access to running water. The lactation room must be made available to the employee for lactation purposes only when it is needed (and notice to other employees regarding the same is required), and a refrigerator and the room itself must be in “reasonable proximity” to the employee’s work area.

Notably, the required lactation room must be provided unless the employer can establish an “undue hardship,” in which case the employer must engage in a cooperative dialogue with the employee to determine alternative accommodations and issue a final written determination to the employee that identifies any accommodation(s) that were granted or denied.

In addition, by March 17, 2019, a covered employer in New York City must implement a written lactation room accommodation policy, which states that employees have the right to request a lactation room and identifies the process (as outlined in the Administrative Code) by which an employee may request a lactation room. All new employees must receive the lactation room policy upon hire.

Changes to Illinois’s Lactation Law: Effective August 2018

Like many employers in New York, Illinois employers with five or more employees have been required, since 2001, to provide employees with reasonable unpaid break time to express breast milk, in an appropriate room that is not a toilet stall.

Effective August 2018, the Illinois Nursing Mothers in the Workplace Act was amended. Now, Illinois employers with at least five employees must provide “reasonable break time” each time an employee needs to express breast milk, for up to one year following the child’s birth. While the break time “may” run concurrently with any other break time, the employee’s pay cannot be reduced due to the time spent expressing milk or nursing a baby – meaning, in effect, that any additional break time needed to express milk or nurse must be paid. Further, covered employers in Illinois who do not provide the requisite break time must show, if challenged, that providing the breaks is an “undue hardship” – a heightened burden than that previously imposed under the Act.

Employers should act quickly to ensure full compliance with all of the requirements of the new lactation laws.

 

© 2019 Vedder Price.
This post was written by Elizabeth N. Hall and Grace L. Urban