Tag: discrimination

Chamber of Commerce Challenges CFPB Anti-Bias Focus Concerning AI

The end of last month the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers Association and other industry groups (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in Texas federal court challenging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) update this year to the Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices section of its examination manual to include discrimination.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Case No. 6:22-cv-00381 (E.D. Tex.)

By way of background, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which is Title X of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (the “Act”), prohibits providers of consumer financial products or services or a service provider from engaging in any unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice (“UDAAP”).  The Act also provides the CFPB with rulemaking and enforcement authority to “prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”  See, e.g., https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaaps_procedures.pdf.  In general, the Act provides that an act or practice is unfair when it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

The CFPB earlier this spring published revised examination guidelines on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices, or UDAAPs.  Importantly, this set forth a new position from the CFPB, that discrimination in the provision of consumer financial products and services can itself be a UDAAP.  This was a development that was surprising to many providers of financial products and services.  The CFPB also released an updated exam manual that outlined its position regarding how discriminatory conduct may qualify as a UDAAP in consumer finance.  Additionally, the CFPB in May 2022 additionally published a Consumer Financial Protection Circular to remind the public of creditors’ adverse action notice requirements under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).  In the view of the CFPB, creditors cannot use technologies (include algorithmic decision making) if it means they are unable to provide required explanations under the ECOA.

In July 2022, the Chamber and others called on the CFPB to rescind the update to the manual.  This included, among other arguments raised in a white paper supporting their position, that in conflating the concepts of “unfairness” and “discrimination,” the CFPB ignores the Act’s text, structure, and legislative history which discusses “unfairness” and “discrimination” as two separate concepts and defines “unfairness” without mentioning discrimination

The Complaint filed this fall raises three claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in relation to the updated manual as well as others.  The Complaint contends that ultimately it is consumers that will suffer as a result of the CFPB’s new position, as “[t]hese amendments to the manual harm Plaintiffs’ members by imposing heavy compliance costs that are ultimately passed down to consumers in the form of higher prices and reduced access to products.”

The litigation process started by Plaintiffs in this case will be time consuming (a response to the Complaint is not expected from Defendants until December).  In the meantime, entities in the financial sector should be cognizant of the CFPB’s new approach and ensure that their compliance practices appropriately mitigate risk, including in relation to algorithmic decision making and AI.  As always, we will keep you up to date with the latest news on this litigation.

For more Consumer Finance Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

L.A. Jury Delivers Mother of All Verdicts – $464 Million to Two Employees!

As we have previously reported, jury verdicts in employment cases have continued to skyrocket in recent months, and there is no sign they are leveling off. Late last week, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury awarded a total of over $464 million ($440 million of which was in punitive damages) in a two-plaintiff retaliation case. This verdict is more than double any previous amount ever awarded and clearly qualifies as the largest verdict of its kind since the Fall of the Roman Empire.

The plaintiffs alleged they were retaliated against for making complaints about sexual and racial harassment in the workplace, directed at them and other coworkers, leading to their being pushed out of the company.

One plaintiff brought complaints to management about the alleged sexual harassment of two female employees and claimed he was constructively discharged after being subjected to retaliatory complaints and investigations from other supervisors.  The other plaintiff made anonymous complaints to the internal ethics hotline about the racial and sexual harassment of both himself and other coworkers.

After a two-month trial, the jury awarded one plaintiff $22.4 million in compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive damages and awarded the other plaintiff $2 million in compensatory damages and $40 million in punitive damages.

This latest verdict comes on the heels of a judge reducing another huge December 2021 verdict from a Los Angeles Superior Court jury (which we wrote about here) that awarded $5.4 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages to a fired insurance company executive who alleged discrimination and retaliation. The judge ordered a reduction in the verdict to $18.95 million in punitive damages (or, in the alternative, a new damages trial) on the grounds that the prior verdict involved an impermissible double recovery ($75 million each from two Farmers Insurance entities) and a presumably unconstitutional ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages (a ratio exceeding 9 or 10-to-1 is presumed to be excessive and unconstitutional, and the ratio, in that case, was 28-to-1).

Only time will tell if this $464 million verdict stands. In the meantime, our advice to employers worried about these gargantuan verdicts remains the same: ARBITRATE!

Article By Anthony J Oncidi and Morgan J. Peterson of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

The X Box: EEOC Announces Addition of Nonbinary Gender Option to Discrimination Charge

In recognition of Transgender Day of Visibility, today, the EEOC announced that it would be providing members of the LGBTQI+ community the option to select a nonbinary “X” gender marker when completing the voluntary self-identification questions that are traditionally part of the intake process for filing a charge of discrimination.

Specifically, in an effort to promote greater equity and inclusion, the EEOC will add an option to mark “X” during two stages of the intake and charge filing process. This addition will be reflected in the EEOC’s voluntary demographic questions relating to gender in the online public portal, which individuals use to submit inquires regarding the filing of a charge of discrimination, as well as related forms that are used in lieu of the online public portal. The nonbinary “X” gender marker will also be included in the EEOC’s modified charge of discrimination form, which will also include “Mx” in the list of prefix options.

Additionally, the EEOC will incorporate the CDC and NCHS’s proposed definition of “X,” which provides as follows: (1) “unspecified,” which promotes privacy for individuals who prefer not to disclose their gender identity; and (2) “another gender identity,” which promotes clarity and inclusion for those who wish to signify that they do not identify as male or female.

The EEOC’s announcement came shortly after the White House released a detailed Fact Sheet highlighting the steps the federal government has taken to address equality and visibility for Transgender Americans.

Article By Aretta K. Bernard and Stephanie Olivera Mittica of Roetzel & Andress LPA

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress

Regulation by Definition: CFPB Broadens Definition of “Unfairness” to Rein in Discrimination

In a significant move, the CFPB announced on March 16 a revision to its supervisory operations to address discrimination outside of the traditional fair lending context, with future plans to scrutinize discriminatory conduct that violates the federal prohibition against “unfair” practices in such areas as advertising, pricing, and other areas to ensure that companies are appropriately testing for and eliminating illegal discrimination.  Specifically, the CFPB updated its Exam Manual for Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAPs) noting that discrimination may meet the criteria for “unfairness” by causing substantial harm to consumers that they cannot reasonably avoid.

With this update, the CFPB intends to target discriminatory practices beyond its use of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) – a fair lending law which covers extensions of credit – and plans to also enforce the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which prohibits UDAAPs in connection with any transaction for, or offer of, a consumer financial product or service.  To that end, future examinations will focus on policies or practices that, for example, exclude individuals from products and services, such as “not allowing African-American consumers to open deposit accounts, or subjecting African-American consumers to different requirements to open deposit accounts” that may be an unfair practice where the ECOA may not apply to this particular situation.

The CFPB notes that, among other things, examinations will (i) focus on discrimination in all consumer finance markets; (ii) require supervised companies to include documentation of customer demographics and the impact of products and fees on different demographic groups; and (iii) look at how companies test and monitor their decision-making processes for unfair discrimination, as well as discrimination under ECOA.

In a statement accompanying this announcement, CFPB Director Chopra stated that “[w]hen a person is denied access to a bank account because of their religion or race, this is unambiguously unfair . . . [w]e will be expanding our anti-discrimination efforts to combat discriminatory practices across the board in consumer finance.”

Putting it Into Practice:  This announcement expands the CFPB’s examination footprint beyond discrimination in the fair lending context and makes it likely that examiners will assess a company’s anti-discrimination programs as applied to all aspects of all consumer financial products or services, regardless of whether that company extends any credit.  By framing discrimination also as an UDAAP issue, the CFPB appears ready to address bias in connection with other kinds of financial products and services.  In particular, the CFPB intends to closely examine advertising and marketing activities targeted to consumers based on machine learning models and any potential discriminatory outcomes.

Article By Moorari Shah and A.J. S. Dhaliwal of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more financial legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Protections for Employees Who Report Workplace Discrimination

While thousands of employees each year submit complaints of discrimination against their employers, many more experience workplace discrimination and do not submit a formal complaint or even report it internally. A 2016 study by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) noted that three out of four individuals who experienced harassment never spoke with a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassment. Other studies estimate that only one percent of people who experience workplace discrimination file a formal discrimination charge.

Types of Discrimination Charges Filed

Even with a high level of underreporting of harassment and discrimination in the workplace, the EEOC reported that workers filed 67,448 charges of workplace discrimination in fiscal year 2020.[1] The EEOC breaks down the data by the characteristics of the individual who filed the complaint. The breakdown reflects the various bases for protection under federal anti-discrimination laws, specifically disability, race, sex, age, national origin, color, religion, and genetic information. In the EEOC data from fiscal year 2020, retaliation claims made up 55.8% of all charges filed, which was the most common claim asserted. Retaliation claims are often coupled with claims of discrimination because they generally require complaints about, or opposition to, discrimination in the workplace. Because of this overlap in claims and the reality that workers may have multiple characteristics or identities that entitle them to protections, the total of the percentages of the types of claims asserted is greater than 100%.

Following retaliation claims, discrimination claims based on disability were the most common in fiscal year 2020, making up 36.1% of all workplace discrimination claims. Fiscal year 2020 may have seen an even greater increase in disability-related charges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The EEOC continues to update its guidance periodically on the impact of COVID-19 on workplace discrimination laws related to disability. Discrimination based on race made up 32.7% of claims, and discrimination based on sex made up 31.7%.

The breakdown by category is consistent with charge filing patterns in past years. One study conducted by the Center for Employment Equity of the University of Massachusetts Amherst analyzed all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC (or a comparable state agency) from 2012 to 2016. It determined that discrimination charges based on disability and race were the most common and that disability-related claims had become more frequent than charges based on other protected categories. In an article published by staff at the Center for Employment Equity, they determined that 63% of employees who filed a complaint eventually lost their jobs.

Protections from Retaliation

The data from the EEOC and Center for Employment Equity underscores an unfortunate reality for employees who come forward to report discrimination—they face the possibility of retaliation by their employer, which, at its most extreme, results in a loss of their job. Fortunately, there are legal protections in place for employees who face retaliation for complaining about workplace discrimination.

Employees who engage in protected activity, either by participating in an investigation of workplace discrimination, complaining of workplace discrimination, or opposing discrimination in the workplace, are protected from retaliation. This means that an employer cannot take any “materially adverse action” against these employees. Such actions include anything that would deter a reasonable worker from coming forward to complain about discrimination in the workplace.  This includes actions short of termination, like demotions or salary reductions. The law protects not only current employees and applicants, but also former employees and third parties who have a close relationship with the employee who experienced discrimination. Employees who face retaliation for reporting discrimination in the workplace may be entitled to monetary compensation for the harm caused by the retaliation, including back wages, reinstatement to their former position if they were terminated, compensation for emotional distress caused by the employer’s actions, and reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees and costs.

While no employee should face retaliation for reporting workplace discrimination or harassment, the data demonstrates that it is an unfortunate reality in workplaces. If you believe you have faced discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, you should contact an employment attorney to determine your options and how to proceed.

Importance of Seeking Legal Counsel

The Center for Employment Equity’s analysis highlighted another reality faced by employees who filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. Upon examining the outcome of each charge and excluding charges that were closed because of administrative reasons, it noted that monetary benefits and changes to workplace practices were relatively infrequent. In less than 20% of charges, employees received a monetary benefit.  Less than 10% resulted in changes to employer practices. This data does not account for employees who made complaints of discrimination and were able to reach a resolution with their employer prior to filing a charge.

This data showing the poor outcomes from filing discrimination charges demonstrates the importance of seeking legal counsel if you believe that you have faced discrimination in the workplace. An attorney can advise you on the merits of your claim as well as the appropriate deadlines for filing a charge and lawsuit, and can advocate for you before the employer, both before and after submitting a discrimination charge. For current employees, such advocacy may help to shield you from retaliation or to exit from your employment on more favorable terms. In addition to seeking legal counsel, you can begin to take other steps to assist your case by doing the following:

  • Document the mistreatment you experience.

  • Create a detailed timeline of instances of discrimination, which will assist an attorney who may assess your potential claims.

  • Retain employment-related documents, like employee manuals; employment offer letters and agreements; and information concerning commission, equity, and benefits plans.

  • Do not record conversations without the consent of the other party and without first seeking advice from legal counsel. Each state has different recording law statutes that require all parties or at least one party to consent to recording. It is important not to violate these laws, which can carry civil and sometimes criminal liability.

This list only identifies basic steps that you can take if you believe you have experienced discrimination or harassment in the workplace. If you have faced workplace discrimination, you should consult with an employment attorney for advice on your potential claims

[1] The number of charges filed has decreased steadily in recent years, with 72,675 charges of workplace discrimination filed with the EEOC in fiscal year 2019 and 76,418 filed in 2018. There may be multiple explanations for this decrease, though this year’s decline may be in part explained by the COVID-19 pandemic, which left many employees without work for much of 2020 and required others to work remotely.

This article was written by Alia Al-Khatib of Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP.
For more articles regarding workplace discrimination, please visit our Labor and Employment News section.

COVID-19 Layoff or Pretext for Age Discrimination?

The recent, unprecedented changes to our country and its workforce due to the COVID-19 pandemic have upended the lives of millions. The economic fallout continues and in many instances, employers simply have no choice but to lay off large swaths of their employees due to the lack of business/revenue. And these employers have legitimate reasons for doing so and view this as a heart-wrenching but necessary step.

At the same time, a small subset of employers may decide that, even though mass layoffs are not necessary, they will still lay off certain, older employees. In this scenario, there is no legitimate business need driving the termination but an opportunity to let go of older employees who often have higher salaries. Or the employer is concerned that older employees may trigger additional costs in terms of insurance or paid time off because of their susceptibility to COVID-19. Similarly, the employer may hold stereotypical views that older employees are less likely to function well in a virtual/remote work setting that requires technological skills.

As such, the employer’s claim that it had to lay off the older employee due to the pandemic could be a pretext for age discrimination. The question is, how do courts make this call? The answer to this question centers on how an employee can prove that the employer’s purported reasons were just a mask for illegal behavior.

Signs That The Layoff May Be Age Discrimination

Each case will be reviewed based on its own facts and merits, so no “one size fits all” approach can apply when analyzing age discrimination and pretext claims. In the context of COVID-19 layoffs, there are some red flags that may suggest that the employer is targeting an employee(s) because of their age rather than a legitimate business need to reduce the workforce. These red flags include:

  • The company institutes a relatively small-scale layoff, which includes a number of more experienced, older, and higher paid employees
  • Younger, less experienced, and less expensive employees are retained and in some cases take over the work of the departed, older workers
  • Comments by decision-makers reference (or had referenced) the experience level, age, higher salaries, nearness to retirement, etc. of the older employees
  • The employer hires new, younger employees within a relatively short period of time after the older employees are let go

Many companies will be required to provide laid off employees with specific, written information about the employees it chose to lay off, including their job titles and ages. This is helpful information to assess whether age discrimination may have motivated the termination decision. But often it will be necessary to dig deeper into the employer’s data about the laid off employees to see if a correlation between the termination decision and their ages emerges.

Legal Standards For Age Discrimination And Pretext Claims

The key federal law that prohibits age discrimination in employment is aptly named the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). It prevents an employer from discharging or otherwise “[discriminating] against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).

To win, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009). Circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination (which is less frequently available to plaintiffs), is analyzed under a three-part test created by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Note that the Supreme Court clarified that federal employees have a less onerous legal burden to prove in age discrimination claims as compared to private sector employees. Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 (2020).

The McDonnell Douglas framework for an ADEA claim for layoff due to age discrimination is as follows:

STEP 1/prima facie case (burden on plaintiff)

  • They belong to a protected class (older than 40 years old)
  • They were qualified for the job and performing in accordance with the expectations of their employer
  • Employer terminated their employment
  • The employer replaced plaintiff with an individual who was comparably qualified to the plaintiff, but substantially younger, or that they were laid off under circumstances that give rise to an inference of age discrimination

STEP 2 (burden on defendant)

  • Employer must produce evidence that its actions were the result of legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons

STEP 3 (burden on plaintiff)

  • Employee must prove that the non-discriminatory reason(s) offered by the employer in Step 2 were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination based on age.

The Supreme Court held that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-7 (2000). Also, Reeves allows the trier of fact to consider the evidence used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (first prong of McDonnell Douglas) when they are deciding the final prong of McDonnell Douglas framework. How the employer treats similarly situated (but younger) employees plays a key role in age discrimination cases.

How Can Older Employees Protect Their Rights?

For employees in the private sector, a charge of age discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the discriminatory act (that is the notice of the layoff). The 180 calendar day filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a state or local law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis.

For age discrimination, however, the filing deadline is only extended to 300 days if there is a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and a state agency or authority enforcing that law. The deadline is not extended if only a local law prohibits age discrimination.

Note: federal employees have a different charge filing process. Visit www.eeoc.gov for more information.

 

© 2020 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more on discrimination in hiring and firing, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.

Sticks and Stones May Break Bones, But Words May Constitute Unlawful Discrimination

In recent months, there have been several news stories about the legal implications of inappropriate and/or offensive language in our society, generating discussion about whether such language is, or should be, unlawful in certain circumstances.  This past fall, the Massachusetts Legislature held a committee hearing on a widely-publicized bill which sought to penalize the use of “bitch,” by imposing a fine of up to $200 for any person who “uses the word ‘bitch’ directed at another person to accost, annoy, degrade or demean” another person.

While this proposed legislation, fraught with Constitutional issues involving the exercise of free speech, was largely decried and gained no traction, it does highlight an important question: In what circumstances may offensive and demeaning comments constitute unlawful discrimination?  In fact, in January, Chief Justice John Roberts, during oral arguments in Babbe v. Wilkie, asked the hypothetical question whether the phrase “OK Boomer” would qualify as age discrimination.

The answer to Chief Justice Robert’s question is not a bright-line “yes” or “no.” Context matters. For example, in connection with a hostile work environment claim, one of the central legal issues is whether the conduct in question was severe or pervasive. As a general rule, a single, isolated comment will not be actionable as creating a hostile work environment, but in some instances, it may. See Augis Corp. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 408-409 (2009) (noting that a supervisor who calls a black subordinate a f***ing n***** “has engaged in conduct so powerfully offensive that the MCAD can properly base liability on a single instance”).

Courts do not impose a numerosity test. Rather, the legal analysis is focused on whether the discriminatory comments “intimidated, humiliated, and stigmatized” the employee in such a way as to pose a “formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.” See Thomas O’Connor Constructors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 560–61(2008); Chery v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 179, 193 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that, in the context of a hostile work environment based upon race, “[i]t is beyond question that the use of the [“N” word] is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination”).

Similarly, in the context of a disparate treatment claim (e.g., allegations that employee was terminated based on unlawful age bias), evidence that the decision-maker referred to the employee as a “Boomer” should not be evaluated in a legal vacuum. Rather, this evidence may be presented to the jury as just one piece of a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a fact-finder could properly determine that the termination decision was driven by discriminatory animus based upon age. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).

So, while sticks and stones may break bones, words also do harm and depending upon the circumstances, may result in legal claims and liability.

© 2020 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP

For more on Free Speech, see the National Law Review Constitutional Law section.

Seventh Circuit: ADA Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Based on Future Impairments

On October 29, 2019, railway operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) prevailed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin – in a case in which the company argued that its refusal to hire an obese candidate due to an unacceptably high risk that the applicant would develop certain obesity-related medical conditions incompatible with the position sought did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Ronald Shell applied for a job with BNSF as a machine operator position.  Per its standard practice when the applied-for position is safety-sensitive, as was the heavy equipment operator position sought by Shell, BNSF required him to undergo a medical examination.  During the medical examination, the examiner determined that Shell’s body mass index (“BMI”) was 47.  BNSF had a practice of refusing to hire individuals with a BMI higher than 40 for safety-sensitive positions.  In Shell’s case, the employer expressed concern that his obesity, although not causing any present disability, would cause Shell disabilities in the future, such as sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease.  BNSF asserted that this risk was significant because a sudden onset of any of these conditions could be catastrophic for a heavy machine operator.  BNSF therefore did not place Shell in the position.

Shell sued, arguing that he was “disabled” under the ADA’s definition of that term because BNSF had “regarded him as” having a disability.  The ADA not only protects individuals who are actually disabled or have a record of being disabled, but also protects individuals who have been subjected to an adverse employment action because of an actual or perceived physical impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits a major life activity.  Shell argued that by refusing to hire him based on the risk of future disabilities that he was at risk of as a result of his obesity, BNSF essentially treated him as though he currently had those conditions.

The Court ruled that the ADA does not protect non-disabled employees from discrimination based on a risk of future impairments.  The Court cited precedent from the Eighth Circuit, where BNSF also faced challenges to its practice of refusing to hire obese applicants due to the risk of future impairments.  The Eighth Circuit, like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also has held that the statutory language of the ADA does not protect non-disabled individuals who have a risk of disability in the future.

Of note, Shell also argued at the trial court level that his obesity constituted an actual disability, rendering BNSF’s refusal to hire him based on this characteristic a violation of the ADA for this reason as well.  However, as you may recall from our blog post from earlier this year, just a few months ago, the Seventh Circuit addressed this argument in another case, Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority, and held that obesity, by itself, is not a disability for purposes of the ADA unless it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder.  Shell did not present any evidence in his case of such an underlying disorder, and thus could not, therefore, claim that he was actually disabled.  Notably, the federal appellate courts are split on this issue, which may tee it up for consideration by the United States Supreme Court in the future.  In contrast, among the appeals courts that have addressed the issue of future disabilities, all have agreed, thus far, that the ADA’s reach does not extend to potential or likely future disabilities of currently non-disabled individuals.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more ADA litigation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Supreme Court Will not Disturb Ruling that a False Rumor about “Sleeping Your Way to a Promotion” can be a Hostile Work Environment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to review an appellate court decision that held a false rumor about a woman “sleeping” her way to a promotion can give rise to a hostile work environment claim.  This means that the February 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc. will stand.  In Parker, the Fourth Circuit held that, where an employer participates in circulating false rumors that a female employee slept with her male boss to obtain a promotion, this constitutes Title VII gender discrimination.

Parker’s Discrimination Claim

Evangeline Parker started worked for Reema Consulting Services, Inc., (“RCSI”) at its warehouse facility as a low-level clerk.  She was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager.  About two weeks after she was promoted to a manager position, she learned that some male employees were circulating “an unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor about her” that “falsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual relationship” with a higher-ranking manager to obtain her management position.

The rumor originated with another RCSI employee who was jealous of Parker’s achievement, and the highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility participated in spreading the rumor.  Parker’s complaint alleged that as the rumor spread, she “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising.

At an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the door in Parker’s face and excluded her from the meeting.  The following day, the warehouse manager screamed at Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace.” He also stated that “he could no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and that he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  A few days later, the warehouse manager “lost his temper and began screaming” at Parker, and Parker then filed an internal sexual harassment complaint with RCSI Human Resources.  Shortly thereafter, RCSI gave Parker two warnings and terminated her employment.

Lawyer pointingParker brought a discrimination claim, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  The district court dismissed her claim on the grounds that 1) the harassment was not based upon gender and instead based upon false allegations of conduct by her, and 2) the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of Parker’s employment because the rumor was circulated for just a few weeks.  Judge Titus found, “Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her.”  However, he continued “that is not a harassment based upon gender.  It’s based upon false allegations of conduct by her.  And this same type of a rumor could be made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity leading to a promotion.”  Ultimately, Judge Titus held that “the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.

Gender-Based Rumors Can Constitute Sex Harassment

Taking into account all of the allegations of the complaint, including the sex-based nature of the rumor and its effects, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor that Parker had sex with her male superior to obtain a promotion was gender-based in that it implied that she “used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion.”  The court found that the rumor invoked “a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success.”  This double standard precipitated by negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior can cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men.  Thus, the rumor about Parker sleeping her way to a promotion constituted a form of sexual harassment.

The Fourth Circuit also held that Parker sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment:

[T]he harassment was continuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the Sterling facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her final promotion.  The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male workplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees.  Management too contributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor.  The highest-ranking manager asked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker, whether his wife was divorcing him because he was “f–king” Parker.  The same manager called an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker.  In another meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace. And in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he should have fired her when she began “huffing and puffing” about it.

Implications

Parker correctly recognizes that gender-based stereotypes can prevent women from advancing in the workplace and that Title VII bars employers from using negative gender stereotypes to harass employees.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
More on workplace harassment via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

OFCCP Proposes New Rule to “Ensure Religious Employers are Protected”

As previewed in the Spring regulatory agenda, the Office of Federal Compliance Contract Programs (OFCCP) has proposed a new rule to clarify aspects of a religious exemption available to federal contractors. In the proposed rule, the agency said it intends to address concerns from religious organizations that ambiguity in the exemption left them reluctant to participate in federal contracts.

The proposed rule was published August 15 in the Federal Register. OFCCP will accept public comments on the rule for 30 days, until September 16, 2019.

The rule would clarify the religious exemption in Executive Order 11246, which includes anti-discrimination obligations for federal contractors. The exemption allows religious organizations to prefer individuals of a particular religion, while still requiring adherence to other anti-discrimination provisions. The rule comes one year after OFCCP issued a Directive reminding its staff to tread lightly when dealing with religious contractors and “proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of . . . religious beliefs.”

As proposed, the rule would clarify that:

  • The exemption covers “not just churches but employers that are organized for a religious purpose, hold themselves out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose, and engage in exercise of religion consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose.”

  • Religious employers can condition employment upon acceptance of, or adherence to, a religious tenet, provided that they do not discriminate based on other protected bases.

  • Define terms such as “Religion,” “Particular Religion,” and religion “As understood by the employer.”

The rule does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or LGBTQ protections. However, it does cite Masterpiece Cakeshop, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving a business owner’s decision to deny service to gay customers based on the owner’s religious beliefs.  In a news release, OFCCP said it considered that case while drafting the rule, in addition to other Supreme Court cases, statutes, and executive orders.

Today’s proposed rule helps to ensure the civil rights of religious employers are protected,

said Patrick Pizzella, acting U.S. Secretary of Labor.

“As people of faith with deeply held religious beliefs are making decisions on whether to participate in federal contracting, they deserve clear understanding of their obligations and protections under the law.”

The proposed rule also comes at the same time it has been reported by Bloomberg Law that the Department of Justice and EEOC are seemingly taking differing positions on LGBTQ rights before the Supreme Court.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019
For more on religious protections, see the National Law Review Civil Rights page.