AUVSI and DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit Announce Collaboration for Cyber Standards for Drones

The Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the world’s leading trade association for drones and other autonomous vehicles, announced a collaboration with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to further commercial cyber methodologies to design a shared standard. AUVSI’s effort is meant to expand the number of vetted drones that meet congressional and federal agency drone security requirements.

This pilot program would extend relevant cyber-credentialing across the U.S. industrial base and assist the DOD and other government entities in streamlining and accelerating drone capabilities across the board. Overall, this collaboration will help make the drone industry more secure. The program will work with numerous cybersecurity firms to conduct technical cyber assessments before the DIU, DOD, and other government entities conduct additional vetting as necessary.

Currently, the Blue UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) Cleared List has 14 drones on it and 13 more drones are scheduled to be added. The Blue UAS Cleared List is routinely updated and contains a list of DOD-approved drones for government users. These drones are section 848 FY20 NDAA compliant, validated as cyber-secure and safe to fly, and are available for government purchase and operation. However, even with these additions, the demand for additional cleared drones with new capabilities and technology has outpaced the DIU’s ability to scale the program. This collaboration seeks to close that gap and offer cybersecurity certification in close cooperation with the DIU. With off-the-shelf drones serving as critical tools to help conduct diverse government operations, partnership with AUVSI and cybersecurity experts will make it easier for government users to use commercial technology and achieve effective operations in a secure manner.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Defense Department Takes Aim at Anticompetitive Mergers in Defense Industry

Government says market concentration poses a national security risk.

In 1990, the Department of Defense could turn to 13 companies to produce tactical missiles, eight to make fixed-wing aircraft, and another eight to build ships. Now there are only three missile and three aircraft makers, and only two surface ship builders. There were eight satellite manufacturers in 1990; today there are only four. Tanks and other tracked vehicles are now made by a single company.

Such market consolidation is potentially harmful for the usual reasons, such as less innovation, higher prices, and a lower level of customer service. But when that customer is the DOD, having only one or a handful of defense equipment makers, suddenly critical military missions, military and civilian lives, and national security are put at risk, “[P]articularly in cases where the existing dominant supplier or suppliers are influenced by an adversary nation ….”

That is the worrisome assessment contained in a report issued by the DOD which is following up on President Biden’s July 2021 executive order, titled “Promoting Competition in the American Economy.” DOD is just one of the agencies now responding with plans to evaluate their respective competitive landscapes and to make recommendations to restore productive rivalries.

If market consolidation suggests harmful anticompetitive conditions, then the defense industry’s merger history should send up multiple flares. “Since the 1990s, the defense sector has consolidated substantially, transitioning from 51 to 5 aerospace and defense prime contractors,” the report says.

DOD offers five general recommendations to increase defense industry competition, saying it should:

  • Strengthen Merger Oversight. When a merger threatens DOD interests, DOD will support the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice in antitrust investigations and recommendations involving the defense industry.
  • Address Intellectual Property Limitations. Certain practices surrounding intellectual property and data rights have been used to limit competition in DOD purchasing and to induce “vendor-lock” and other undesirable results. DOD says it will identify its long-term intellectual property needs early in the bidding process. This should ensure that intellectual property is a key factor in evaluating competitive awards, and a negotiation objective in sole-source awards and when contracting with vendors willing to provide the government the intellectual property and rights it needs.
  • Increase New Entrants. To counteract the shrinking list of contractors, DOD says it will work to attract new entrants to the defense marketplace by reducing barriers to entry. This will be accomplished through small business outreach and support. DOD says it will use “acquisition authorities” that will give it the flexibility to adopt and incorporate commercial best practices to reduce barriers and attract new vendors.
  • Increase Opportunities for Small Businesses. DOD will increase small business participation in defense procurement, with an emphasis on increasing competition in priority segments of the defense industry.
  • Implement Sector-Specific Supply Chain Resiliency Plans. DOD calls for greater resilience in the supply chain for five priority sectors: casting and forgings, missiles and munitions, energy storage and batteries, strategic and critical materials, and microelectronics.

In June 2021, Bradley Martin, Ph.D., a retired Navy captain now with the RAND National Security Supply Chain Institute, wrote of the dangers of the defense industry’s shift to practices that make resupply of military equipment “highly questionable” should demand for equipment suddenly spike.


Abrams Main Battle Tank manufactured by General Dynamics, the sole producer of tanks and other tracked combat vehicles for the Department of Defense. Photo from General Dynamics’ website.


“If evaluated solely against meeting steady-state demand, the military operational supply chain works as it should,” Martin wrote. “The problem is not performance relative to incentives. Rather, the problem is that the existing guidance does not lead the system to conduct analyses and make decisions needed to support the highly demanding combat operations likely in a conflict with a major power. As a result, the ability of this system to properly support the joint force in the event of major conflict is at best untested and could be highly problematic.”

Recent Public and Private Actions

In addition to the government’s focus on the overall industry, it has been taking action to address specific instances of alleged and potentially anticompetitive behavior. In one instance, a private class action quickly followed.

In January, the FTC sued to stop Lockheed Martin Corp.’s $4.4 billion acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings Inc., marking the first time in decades the government opposed a defense industry merger. (Read FTC Sues to Torpedo Lockheed’s $4.4 Billion Aerojet Acquisition.)

The FTC noted that Aerojet, which reported more than $2 billion in 2020 revenue, is the last independent U.S. supplier of defense-critical missile propulsion systems. If the deal were to go through, the FTC said, “Lockheed will use its control of Aerojet to harm rival defense contractors and further consolidate multiple markets critical to national security and defense.”

Lockheed leads the pack of the largest defense contractors in the world. It is one of the leading suppliers of missile technology in a concentrated group that includes Raytheon Technologies, Inc., Northrop Grumman Corporation, and The Boeing Company. All are missile system prime contractors to the Department of Defense. The FTC says these companies are intermediaries between the U.S. government and the missile supply chain, including subcontractors like Aerojet.

In December 2021, a federal grand jury in Connecticut returned an indictment charging a former manager of leading aerospace engineering company Pratt & Whitney, Inc., and five executives of outsource engineering suppliers for participating in a long-running conspiracy to restrict the hiring and recruiting of employees among their respective companies. (Read Aerospace Execs Indicted for Conspiracy to Limit Worker Pay and Job Prospects.)

The conspiracy is said to have affected thousands of engineers and other skilled workers in the aerospace industry who perform services in the design, manufacturing, and servicing of aircraft components for both commercial and military purposes. According to the felony indictment, unsealed in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, six individuals conspired with others to allocate employees by agreeing not to hire or solicit professionals from each other’s ranks.

Following the indictment, a jet engine mechanic formerly employed by Pratt & Whitney filed a class action suit in federal court in Connecticut against the company and five outsource engineer suppliers. The plaintiffs seek damages because of the alleged conspiracy to suppress labor costs and hamper employees’ career prospects using illegal no-poach agreements in violation of antitrust laws.

Ukraine Invasion Demonstrates ‘Rapid Escalation’

Combined with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the alarming specter of a widening conflict, security supply chain expert Bradley Martin’s assessment that the industry may not be set up to address a spike in demand for military equipment illustrates why the DOD’s plan to improve competition in the defense industry is an urgent one.

“The Ukraine crisis shows that situations can rapidly escalate, potentially leading to situations where spikes in demand might occur in largely unexpected ways,” Martin told the MoginRubin Blog. “If the U.S. had to deal with an expanded conflict in Europe, such as might occur if Russia were to threaten a NATO ally, DOD could reallocate munitions and supplies for some period, but expanding production and inventory over a longer period would be very challenging. This would likely be exactly the kind of conflict where low-standing issues with supply chains would show themselves, sometimes in unexpected ways.”

Defense is just one of several industries seeing increased scrutiny from enforcers. Healthcare also has been a focus of late (see our article regarding FTC’s action to stop a New England hospital merger). The technology sector is getting attention, too. As we wrote in February, chipmaker Nvidia called off its vertical acquisition of Arm Ltd. following an FTC challenge to the dealA recent Treasury Department report on the alcoholic beverage industry foreshadows greater attention from the FTC and DOJ regarding deals in that sector.

In October the FTC said it was bringing back its policy of routinely restricting anticompetitive mergers, putting “industry on notice” that it will require aggressive acquirers to obtain prior approval “before closing any future transaction affecting each relevant market for which a violation was alleged, for a minimum of 10 years.” The agency is clearly making good on its promise.   

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP.

© MoginRubin LLP
For more articles about antitrust, visit the NLR Antitrust Law section.

Continuing Effort to Protect National Security Data and Networks

CMMC 2.0 – Simplification and Flexibility of DoD Cybersecurity Requirements

Evolving and increasing threats to U.S. defense data and national security networks have necessitated changes and refinements to U.S. regulatory requirements intended to protect such.

In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARs) intended to better protect defense data and networks. In 2017, DoD began issuing a series of memoranda to further enhance protection of defense data and networks via Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC). In December 2019, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued long-awaited guidance in part governing the minimum encryption requirements for storage, transport and/or transmission of controlled but unclassified information (CUI) and technical defense information (TDI) otherwise restricted by ITAR.

DFARs initiated the government’s efforts to protect national security data and networks by implementing specific NIST cyber requirements for all DoD contractors with access to CUI, TDI or a DoD network. DFARs was self-compliant in nature.

CMMC provided a broad framework to enhance cybersecurity protection for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). CMMC proposed a verification program to ensure that NIST-compliant cybersecurity protections were in place to protect CUI and TDI that reside on DoD and DoD contractors’ networks. Unlike DFARs, CMMC initially required certification of compliance by an independent cybersecurity expert.

The DoD has announced an updated cybersecurity framework, referred to as CMMC 2.0. The announcement comes after a months-long internal review of the proposed CMMC framework. It still could take nine to 24 months for the final rule to take shape. But for now, CMMC 2.0 promises to be simpler to understand and easier to comply with.

Three Goals of CMMC 2.0

Broadly, CMMC 2.0 is similar to the earlier-proposed framework. Familiar elements include a tiered model, required assessments, and contractual implementation. But the new framework is intended to facilitate three goals identified by DoD’s internal review.

  • Simplify the CMMC standard and provide additional clarity on cybersecurity regulations, policy, and contracting requirements.
  • Focus on the most advanced cybersecurity standards and third-party assessment requirements for companies supporting the highest priority programs.
  • Increase DoD oversight of professional and ethical standards in the assessment ecosystem.

Key Changes under CMMC 2.0

The most impactful changes of CMMC 2.0 are

  • A reduction from five to three security levels.
  • Reduced requirements for third-party certifications.
  • Allowances for plans of actions and milestones (POA&Ms).

CMMC 2.0 has only three levels of cybersecurity

An innovative feature of CMMC 1.0 had been the five-tiered model that tailored a contractor’s cybersecurity requirements according to the type and sensitivity of the information it would handle. CMMC 2.0 keeps this model, but eliminates the two “transitional” levels in order to reduce the total number of security levels to three. This change also makes it easier to predict which level will apply to a given contractor. At this time, it appears that:

  • Level 1 (Foundational) will apply to federal contract information (FCI) and will be similar to the old first level;
  • Level 2 (Advanced) will apply to controlled unclassified information (CUI) and will mirror NIST SP 800-171 (similar to, but simpler than, the old third level); and
  • Level 3 (Expert) will apply to more sensitive CUI and will be partly based on NIST SP 800-172 (possibly similar to the old fifth level).

Significantly, CMMC 2.0 focuses on cybersecurity practices, eliminating the few so-called “maturity processes” that had baffled many DoD contractors.

CMMC 2.0 relieves many certification requirements

Another feature of CMMC 1.0 had been the requirement that all DoD contractors undergo third-party assessment and certification. CMMC 2.0 is much less ambitious and allows Level 1 contractors — and even a subset of Level 2 contractors — to conduct only an annual self-assessment. It is worth noting that a subset of Level 2 contractors — those having “critical national security information” — will still be required to seek triennial third-party certification.

CMMC 2.0 reinstitutes POA&Ms

An initial objective of CMMC 1.0 had been that — by October 2025 — contractual requirements would be fully implemented by DoD contractors. There was no option for partial compliance. CMMC 2.0 reinstitutes a regime that will be familiar to many, by allowing for submission of Plans of Actions and Milestones (POA&Ms). The DoD still intends to specify a baseline number of non-negotiable requirements. But a remaining subset will be addressable by a POA&M with clearly defined timelines. The announced framework even contemplates waivers “to exclude CMMC requirements from acquisitions for select mission-critical requirements.”

Operational takeaways for the defense industrial base

For many DoD contractors, CMMC 2.0 will not significantly impact their required cybersecurity practices — for FCI, focus on basic cyber hygiene; and for CUI, focus on NIST SP 800-171. But the new CMMC 2.0 framework dramatically reduces the number of DoD contractors that will need third-party assessments. It could also allow contractors to delay full compliance through the use of POA&Ms beyond 2025.

Increased Risk of Enforcement

Regardless of the proposed simplicity and flexibility of CMMC 2.0, DoD contractors need to remain vigilant to meet their respective CMMC 2.0 level cybersecurity obligations.

Immediately preceding the CMMC 2.0 announcement, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a new Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative on October 6 to combat emerging cyber threats to the security of sensitive information and critical systems. In its announcement, the DOJ advised that it would pursue government contractors who fail to follow required cybersecurity standards.

As Bradley has previously reported in more detail, the DOJ plans to utilize the False Claims Act to pursue cybersecurity-related fraud by government contractors or involving government programs, where entities or individuals, put U.S. information or systems at risk by knowingly:

  • Providing deficient cybersecurity products or services
  • Misrepresenting their cybersecurity practices or protocols, or
  • Violating obligations to monitor and report cybersecurity incidents and breaches.

The DOJ also expressed their intent to work closely on the initiative with other federal agencies, subject matter experts and its law enforcement partners throughout the government.

As a result, while CMMC 2.0 will provide some simplicity and flexibility in implementation and operations, U.S. government contractors need to be mindful of their cybersecurity obligations to avoid new heightened enforcement risks.

© 2021 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more articles about cybersecurity, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

Whistleblower Rewarded Over $2 Million for Exposing Contractor of Military Helicopters That Provided Unsafe Helicopters, Risking the Lives of Military Members Deployed to War Zones

An Illinois-based aviation services company and its subsidiary in Florida have agreed to pay the government $11,088,000 to resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by breaching their contract to maintain military aircraft that were “fully mission capable.”

The aviation service companies own and maintain helicopters.  They had contracted with the Department of Defense to supply helicopters for use in transporting cargo and personnel in support of missions in Afghanistan and Africa.  However, according to a whistleblower, the aviation companies schemed to maximize profits by failing to provide the resources needed to maintain the helicopters.  This resulted in the helicopters not being airworthy.  Yet, the companies continued to certify the helicopters as “fully mission capable.”  Thus, it was alleged, the companies knowingly risked the lives of military personal who were using the aircraft while deployed in war zones and committing fraud against U.S. taxpayers.

The same companies also paid an additional amount to resolve a separate matter brought by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) against them for deficiencies in helicopter maintenance work.

This lawsuit originated from a former employee of the aviation service companies who brought suit under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act. Whistleblower lawsuits allow private parties, known as “relators,” to bring suit on behalf of the government and to share in any recovery, usually 15% to 25% of the settlement amount.  In this case, the whistleblower will receive $2,162,160.  The False Claims Act allows the government to intervene and prosecute an action, as it did in this case.  Fraud in government contracting is often exposed by individuals with knowledge that the fraud is occurring, as in this case. Whistleblowers may be employees, clients, or competitors of the wrongdoer.  Such individuals can use their inside knowledge to bring fraud to the attention of the government, saving lives and protecting taxpayer money.


© 2021 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

EPA Acts to Increase Supply of Clean Drinking Water in U.S. Virgin Islands

WASHINGTON (September 23, 2017) — The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) today issued an order to the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) that provides direction on supplying of clean drinking water in the U.S. Virgin Islands in response to impacts to the island’s drinking water system from Hurricane Maria and Hurricane Irma.

The order authorizes FEMA and DOD to install and operate temporary water treatment units that will provide a supply of clean drinking water. U.S. Virgin Islands public water systems are currently not in operational condition. The lack of clean alternative water supplies has created the potential for significant public health impacts. USVI public water systems have been significantly impacted by Hurricanes Maria and Irma and subsequent flooding, including by a loss of electrical power, and are not yet fully able to provide adequately treated water to meet the needs of those affected areas.

EPA is monitoring environmental and public health conditions across the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico and is working closely with federal, territorial and local officials to ensure impacts from the hurricanes are addressed in order to protect public health.

Read this article on the EPA website here.

This post was written by the United States Environmental Protection Agency © Copyright 2017
For more Environmental & Energy Legal Analysis go to the National Law Review

A Change to the Suspending and Debarring Official (SDO) Position at NASA

On March 8, 2016, a final rule changed the position of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (“NASA”) suspending and debarring official (“SDO”).  The SDO had been NASA’s Assistant Administrator for Procurement.  The final rule reassigns the position to NASA’s Deputy General Counsel.  Public comments were not accepted because NASA concluded that the change “affects only the internal operating procedures” of the agency.

Not mentioned in this action is Section 861(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013.  That law applies to the U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”), the U.S. Department of State (“State”), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”), not to NASA, but for those agencies it specifically prohibits the not-uncommon practice of having a procurement officer act as an SDO.  Last year, in International Relief and Development, Inc. et al. v. United States Agency for International Development et al., No. 15-CV-854 RCL (D.D.C.), a federal court concluded that such an arrangement at USAID likely violated Section 861(a).

Section 861(a) precipitated a necessary discussion on the independence and impartiality of SDOs.  It is not hard to imagine how an SDO who also serves as a procurement officer could be predisposed against a contractor.  But even if NASA’s change tacitly acknowledges this concern, it hardly resolves it.  Conditioned already to advocate for a particular client, agency counsel are sure to have predispositions, as well.

© 2016 Covington & Burling LLP

Wasn't That Supposed to be Made in the USA?

Made in the USA.jpgDespite the existence of long-standing U.S. laws strongly favoring the purchase of domestic products for use by governmental entities, in governmental programs and particularly the fulfillment of Department of Defense (“DoD”) contracts, a surprising number of companies still attempt to circumvent these laws.  They do so at their own peril.  Recognizing the harm likely to befall American workers as a result, an increasing number of employees and former employees have “blown the whistle” on these practices in recent years and teamed up with the U.S. Government to curtail this trend.

The Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 83018305, (“BAA”) was enacted in 1933 under President Hoover as part of New Deal legislation intended to help struggling American depression era companies.  The BAA superseded an 1875 statute that “related to preferential treatment of American material contracts for public improvements.” (1933, Sect. 10).   The law carried with it a very simple idea: require the government to exercise a clear preference for US-made products in its purchases to bolster the American economy.

To this day, the BAA continues to require federal agencies to purchase “domestic end products” and use “domestic construction materials” in contracts exceeding certain dollar amounts performed in the United States. Unmanufactured end products or construction materials qualify as “domestic” if they are mined or produced in the United States. Manufactured products are treated as “domestic” if they are manufactured in the United States, and either (1) the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the items are commercially available off-the-shelf items.

Exemptions and exceptions to the applicability of the BAA exist. For example, the BAA does not apply if the purchasing agency determines “it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable.” Furthermore, the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 authorizes the President to waive any procurement law or regulation that accords foreign products less favorable treatment than that given to domestic products in foreign lands.  Additionally, purchases from Canada and Mexico are exempt from BAA prohibitions under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Other treaties and agreements also limit the BAA.  Despite these, the BAA continues to cast a wide liability net for those that seek to willfully or knowingly circumvent it.

Similar to the BAA, the Berry Amendment was passed in 1941 to promote the U.S. economy through the preferential purchase of certain U.S. goods. The Amendment was eventually codified as 10 U.S.C. 2533a in 2002.  The law prohibits the Department of Defense (“DoD”) from utilizing any funding available to or appropriated by the DoD for the purchase of the following end product items from “non-qualifying countries” unless these items are wholly of U.S. origin: food; clothing; tents, tarpaulins, or covers; cotton and other natural fiber products; woven silk or woven silk blends; spun silk yarn for cartridge cloth; synthetic fabric or coated synthetic fabric (including all textile fibers and yarns that are for use in such fabrics); canvas products, or wool (whether in the form of fiber or yarn or contained in fabrics, materials, or manufactured articles); or any item of individual equipment manufactured from or containing such fibers, yarns, fabrics, or materials; and hand or measuring tools. Noticeably absent from the definition of “qualifying country” are China, Japan, Thailand and Korea- among others.

Congress revised the Berry Amendment for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 with National Defense Authorization Act. The revised statute, 10 U.S.C. 2533b, declares that the DoD is prohibited from acquiring specialty metals or component parts for the use in the construction of aircraft, missile and space systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon systems, or ammunition unless the DoD itself acquires those materials directly.  In other words, contractors engaged in the production of these items must use American made specialty metals or require that the DoD obtain these materials and component parts for use in any such fabrication and manufacturing.

Despite the existence numerous limitations with the Buy American Act, Berry Amendment and Trade Agreements Act, as discussed above, the United States Government and private citizen plaintiffs (known as Relators) have recently collaborated in bringing numerous False Claims qui tam actions against companies seeking to profit at the expense of the American Taxpayers. In the majority of these cases, contractors attempted to pass off foreign goods as made in the U.S.A.  Examples of these include: MedTronic (relabeled Chinese devices allegations – $4.4 million settlement); ECL Solutions (conceal country of origin-$1.066 million civil forfeiture); Invacare (wrongfully certified as American Made- $2.6 Million settlement); Staples (foreign made goods- $7.4 million settlement), Office Depot (foreign made goods – $4.75 million settlement) and Office Max (sale of goods not permitted by Trade Agreements Act results in $9.72 million settlement).

According to Justice Department statistics released last week, whistleblowers filed 638 False Claims Act lawsuits in FY2015. Because these cases remain under seal sometimes for years, we do not know how many involved violations of BAA or related laws. We are aware from conversations with the Justice Department of an uptick in these claims, however.

Whistleblowers who bring claims under the False Claims Act can earn up to 30% of whatever the government collects from the wrongdoer. To qualify, one must have original knowledge or information about the fraud. Successful whistleblowers are usually current or former employees but anyone with inside information can file.

Article By Brian Mahany of Mahany Law

© Copyright 2015 Mahany Law

Wasn’t That Supposed to be Made in the USA?

Made in the USA.jpgDespite the existence of long-standing U.S. laws strongly favoring the purchase of domestic products for use by governmental entities, in governmental programs and particularly the fulfillment of Department of Defense (“DoD”) contracts, a surprising number of companies still attempt to circumvent these laws.  They do so at their own peril.  Recognizing the harm likely to befall American workers as a result, an increasing number of employees and former employees have “blown the whistle” on these practices in recent years and teamed up with the U.S. Government to curtail this trend.

The Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 83018305, (“BAA”) was enacted in 1933 under President Hoover as part of New Deal legislation intended to help struggling American depression era companies.  The BAA superseded an 1875 statute that “related to preferential treatment of American material contracts for public improvements.” (1933, Sect. 10).   The law carried with it a very simple idea: require the government to exercise a clear preference for US-made products in its purchases to bolster the American economy.

To this day, the BAA continues to require federal agencies to purchase “domestic end products” and use “domestic construction materials” in contracts exceeding certain dollar amounts performed in the United States. Unmanufactured end products or construction materials qualify as “domestic” if they are mined or produced in the United States. Manufactured products are treated as “domestic” if they are manufactured in the United States, and either (1) the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the items are commercially available off-the-shelf items.

Exemptions and exceptions to the applicability of the BAA exist. For example, the BAA does not apply if the purchasing agency determines “it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable.” Furthermore, the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 authorizes the President to waive any procurement law or regulation that accords foreign products less favorable treatment than that given to domestic products in foreign lands.  Additionally, purchases from Canada and Mexico are exempt from BAA prohibitions under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Other treaties and agreements also limit the BAA.  Despite these, the BAA continues to cast a wide liability net for those that seek to willfully or knowingly circumvent it.

Similar to the BAA, the Berry Amendment was passed in 1941 to promote the U.S. economy through the preferential purchase of certain U.S. goods. The Amendment was eventually codified as 10 U.S.C. 2533a in 2002.  The law prohibits the Department of Defense (“DoD”) from utilizing any funding available to or appropriated by the DoD for the purchase of the following end product items from “non-qualifying countries” unless these items are wholly of U.S. origin: food; clothing; tents, tarpaulins, or covers; cotton and other natural fiber products; woven silk or woven silk blends; spun silk yarn for cartridge cloth; synthetic fabric or coated synthetic fabric (including all textile fibers and yarns that are for use in such fabrics); canvas products, or wool (whether in the form of fiber or yarn or contained in fabrics, materials, or manufactured articles); or any item of individual equipment manufactured from or containing such fibers, yarns, fabrics, or materials; and hand or measuring tools. Noticeably absent from the definition of “qualifying country” are China, Japan, Thailand and Korea- among others.

Congress revised the Berry Amendment for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 with National Defense Authorization Act. The revised statute, 10 U.S.C. 2533b, declares that the DoD is prohibited from acquiring specialty metals or component parts for the use in the construction of aircraft, missile and space systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon systems, or ammunition unless the DoD itself acquires those materials directly.  In other words, contractors engaged in the production of these items must use American made specialty metals or require that the DoD obtain these materials and component parts for use in any such fabrication and manufacturing.

Despite the existence numerous limitations with the Buy American Act, Berry Amendment and Trade Agreements Act, as discussed above, the United States Government and private citizen plaintiffs (known as Relators) have recently collaborated in bringing numerous False Claims qui tam actions against companies seeking to profit at the expense of the American Taxpayers. In the majority of these cases, contractors attempted to pass off foreign goods as made in the U.S.A.  Examples of these include: MedTronic (relabeled Chinese devices allegations – $4.4 million settlement); ECL Solutions (conceal country of origin-$1.066 million civil forfeiture); Invacare (wrongfully certified as American Made- $2.6 Million settlement); Staples (foreign made goods- $7.4 million settlement), Office Depot (foreign made goods – $4.75 million settlement) and Office Max (sale of goods not permitted by Trade Agreements Act results in $9.72 million settlement).

According to Justice Department statistics released last week, whistleblowers filed 638 False Claims Act lawsuits in FY2015. Because these cases remain under seal sometimes for years, we do not know how many involved violations of BAA or related laws. We are aware from conversations with the Justice Department of an uptick in these claims, however.

Whistleblowers who bring claims under the False Claims Act can earn up to 30% of whatever the government collects from the wrongdoer. To qualify, one must have original knowledge or information about the fraud. Successful whistleblowers are usually current or former employees but anyone with inside information can file.

Article By Brian Mahany of Mahany Law

© Copyright 2015 Mahany Law

Department of Defense Moves Forward with Stricter Sourcing Requirements for Photovoltaic Devices

Earlier this week, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) issued a proposed rule to revise (and make stricter) the unique sourcing requirements applicable to certain photovoltaic devices that are used in the performance of DoD contracts.  Specifically, unless an exception under the Trade Agreements Act applies or a contractor secures a waiver based on public interest or unreasonable cost, the proposed rule would require photovoltaic devices provided under a covered contract to be both manufactured in the United States and made “substantially all” from components or materials that are also mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States.  DoD contracts covered by the proposed rule involve the provision of photovoltaic devices that are—within the United States—either (i) installed on DoD property or in a DoD facility or (ii) reserved for the DoD’s exclusive use for their full economic life.  Although the proposed rule does not apply to contracts under which the DoD directly acquires photovoltaic devices as end products, it does extend to energy savings performance contracts and power purchase agreements under which the DoD effectively acquires electricity produced by photovoltaic devices that are installed and managed by contractors.  As we have previously discussed, these contracts represent significant opportunities, especially given the DoD’s continued focus on securing sources of renewable energy.

The proposed rule implements new sourcing requirements set forth in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which overlap with existing requirements established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 that are contained largely in DFARS 252.225-7017.  Although the new requirements are largely consistent with existing requirements, which make the Buy American Act applicable to photovoltaic devices provided under similar contracts, the new requirements contain key differences that may complicate existing supply chains.  Importantly, the DoD has interpreted the new requirements to foreclose existing exceptions and waivers on which contractors may currently rely to provide photovoltaic devices that are manufactured outside the United States or made from foreign components.  In addition, whereas existing requirements apply only when both the DoD has reserved the exclusive use of a photovoltaic device and the device is to be installed on DoD property or in a DoD facility, the new requirements apply when either condition is satisfied.  As a result, a number of contracts will suddenly be subject to new sourcing requirements under the proposed rule, including contracts under which the DoD does not have an exclusive right to power generated from a photovoltaic device installed on DoD property or in a DoD facility, such as when a contractor is authorized to export power produced by such a device to a commercial grid, as well as contracts which have a term that is less than the full economic life of such a device.

The proposed rule mirrors existing requirements in that the primary effect of the current application of the Buy American Act to covered photovoltaic devices is to require contractors to ensure that the devices are manufactured in the United States.  Although existing requirements also technically require covered photovoltaic devices to be made “substantially all” from components or materials that are mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, this requirement has been waived under existing regulations, as described below.  The proposed rule also mirrors existing requirements in that it recognizes a significant exception to contractors’ obligation to ensure that covered photovoltaic devices are manufactured in the United States by making the proposed rule’s application subject to the Trade Agreements Act, which provides an exemption from the Buy American Act’s requirements under contracts valued above certain dollar thresholds and requires contractors to provide photovoltaic devices that are “substantially transformed” in an authorized country, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, or Italy.  The application of the “substantial transformation” test under the Trade Agreements Act dramatically increases the number of available sources of supply as it focuses on the point at which a photovoltaic device is transformed into a new and difference article of commerce rather than the origin of its components or its final point of assembly.  Thus, under both the proposed rule and existing requirements, without considering other limitations on imports, a contractor could provide a photovoltaic device that is substantially transformed in an authorized country—such as the United Kingdom—from components manufactured in an otherwise unauthorized country—such as Malaysia.  DoD’s previous clarification that the relevant test focuses on the final place of substantial transformation remains unaffected by the proposed rule.

However, because the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 merely imposes key obligations from the Buy American Act and, unlike existing requirements, does not make the Buy American Act directly applicable to covered contracts, the proposed rule does not recognize other exceptions that currently apply to existing requirements.   In particular, the proposed rule does not recognize the waiver of the Buy American Act for components of commercially available off-the-shelf items, which the DoD has interpreted to apply to components of all photovoltaic devices covered by existing requirements.  Thus, in circumstances in which the Trade Agreements Act does not apply, contractors will be forced to trace the origin of the components of each photovoltaic device to ensure that “substantially all” of the components—which has been interpreted to mean more than fifty percent of component costs—have been manufactured in the United States.

More importantly, as the Trade Agreements Act will likely apply to the majority of covered contracts given the relatively high value of energy savings performance contracts and power purchase agreements, the proposed rule does not recognize general exceptions to the Buy American Act for (i) photovoltaic devices manufactured in other countries with which the United States has reciprocal defense procurement agreements, such as Turkey and Egypt, (ii) other foreign photovoltaic devices that are available at a cost that is less than the cost of domestic photovoltaic devices after a fifty percent adjustment to the foreign devices’ cost, and (iii) photovoltaic devices that are substantially transformed in the United States but potentially assembled in another country or made with foreign components in circumstances in which the Trade Agreements Act applies.  Although the proposed rule provides the DoD with authority to effectively implement these exceptions on a case-by-case basis, contractors will need to be cognizant of the circumstances in which a waiver can be requested and ensure that they actively pursue waivers when required.

The proposed rule will likely have a minimal impact on contractors that source photovoltaic devices through relatively uncomplicated supply chains that involve countries covered by the Trade Agreements Act.  However, contractors that have supply chains that source items from other countries or rely on existing exceptions to the Buy American Act should consider the impact of the proposed rule on their existing practices, especially considering complications that can arise in determining the origin of photovoltaic devices that include wafers, cells, and modules manufactured or assembled in different countries.

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP

Department of Defense Contractors Agree to Pay the U.S. Government $5.5 Million for Allegedly Supplying the Military with Low-Grade Batteries for Humvee Gun Turrets Used in Iraq; Minnesota Whistleblower to Receive $990,000

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On September 16, 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, M.K. Battery, Inc. (M.K. Battery), East Penn Manufacturing Company (East Penn), NPC Robotics, Inc. (NPC), BAE Systems, Inc. (BAE) and BAE Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems LP (BAE) had agreed to a settlement of $5.5 million for allegedly violating the False Claims Act (FCA) by selling the U.S. Military substandard batteries for Humvee gun turrets used on military combat vehicles in Iraq. Minnesota whistleblower, David McIntosh, former employee of M.K. Battery, will receive $990,000 which represents his share of the settlement for reporting fraud against the government – in this case misrepresentation of a vital product supplied to the DOD.

A gun turret is a weapon mount that protects the crew or mechanism of a projectile-firing weapon and at the same time lets the weapon be aimed and fired in many directions. Sealed acid batteries are used as a backup to turn the turrets on the Humvees in the event that the engine gives out.  According to Mr. McIntosh, and unbeknownst to the Army, the manufacturing process of the batteries was allegedly changed from the original design presented to the DOD, consequently cutting the battery’s life span by as much as 50 percent and potentially putting U.S. Troops in harm’s way.  Mr. McIntosh, from Stacy, Minnesota, who at the time was employed by M.K. Battery as a regional sales representative, brought his concerns to top company officials at M.K. Battery.  However, in 2007 after numerous unsuccessful attempts to convince M.K. Battery that its decision to cut costs on these batteries could be hazardous to U.S. Troops, especially during combat, Mr. McIntosh alerted the DOD to this matter.  Three month later, M.K. Battery fired Mr. McIntosh.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. McIntosh and his attorneys filed the lawsuit under the whistleblowersprovisions of the False Claims Act, which is one of the most effective methods that the government has implemented for combating fraud. Under the FCA, any person, who knows of an individual or company that has defrauded the federal government, can file a “qui tam” lawsuit to recover damages on the government’s behalf.  Mr. McIntosh filed this particular lawsuit on behalf of himself and the Department of Defense. Additionally, a whistleblower who files a case against a company that has committed fraud against the government, may receive an award of up to 30 percent of the settlement. In this case, Mr. McIntosh’s share of $5.5 million is approximately 18 percent of the settlement.

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© 2014 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP