Tag: competition

Algorithmic Pricing Agents and Price-Fixing Facilitators: Antitrust Law’s Latest Conundrum

Are machines doing the collaborating that competitors may not?

It is an application of artificial intelligence (“AI”) that many businesses, agencies, legislators, lawyers, and antitrust law enforcers around the world are only beginning to confront. It is also among the top concerns of in-house counsel across industries. Competitors are increasingly setting prices through the use of communal, AI-enhanced algorithms that analyze data that are private, public, or a mix of both.

Allegations in private and public litigation describe “algorithmic price fixing” in which the antitrust violation occurs when competitors feed and access the same database platform and use the same analytical tools. Then, as some allege, the violations continue when competitors agree to the prices produced by the algorithms. Right now, renters and prosecutors are teeing off on the poster child for algorithmic pricing, RealPage Inc., and the many landlords and property managers who use it.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LITIGATION

A Nov. 1, 2023 complaint filed by the Washington, DC, Attorney General’s office described RealPage’s offerings this way: “[A] variety of technology-based services to real estate owners and property managers including revenue management products that employ statistical models that use data—including non-public, competitively sensitive data—to estimate supply and demand for multifamily housing that is specific to particular geographic areas and unit types, and then generate a ‘price’ to charge for renting those units that maximizes the landlord’s revenue.”

The complaint alleges that more than 30% of apartments in multifamily buildings and 60% of units in large multifamily buildings nationwide are priced using the RealPage software. In the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria Metropolitan Area that number leaps to more than 90% of units in large buildings. The complaint alleges that landlords have agreed to set their rates using RealPage.

Private actions against RealPage have also been filed in federal courts across the country and have been centralized in multi-district litigation in the Middle District of Tennessee (In re: RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litigation [NO. II], Case No. 3:23-md-3071, MDL No. 3071). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest and a Memorandum in Support in the case urging the court to deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Even before the MDL, RealPage had attracted the Antitrust Division’s attention when the company acquired its largest competitor, Lease Rent Options for $300 million, Axiometrics for $75 million, and On-Site Manager, Inc. for $250 million.

The Antitrust Division has been pursuing the use of algorithms in other industries, including airlines and online retailers. The DOJ and FTC are both studying the issue and reaching out to experts to learn more.

JOURNALISTS AND SENATORS

Additionally, three senators urged DOJ  to investigate RealPage after reporters at ProPublica wrote an investigative report in October 2022. The journalists claim that RealPage’s price-setting software “uses nearby competitors’ nonpublic rent data to feed an algorithm that suggests what landlords should charge for available apartments each day.” ProPublica speculated that the algorithm is enabling landlords to coordinate prices and in the process push rents above competitive levels in violation of the antitrust laws.

Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Dick Durban (D-IL) and Cory Booker (D-NJ) wrote to the DOJ concerned that the RealPage enables “a cartel to artificially inflate rental rates in multifamily residential buildings.”

Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) also wrote to the Federal Trade Commission with concerns “about collusion in the rental market,” urging the FTC to “review whether rent setting algorithms that analyze rent prices through the use of competitors’ private data … violate antitrust laws.” The Ohio senator specifically mentioned RealPage’s YieldStar and AI Revenue Management programs.

THE EUROPEANS

The European Commission has enacted the Artificial Intelligence Act, which includes provisions on algorithmic pricing, requiring algorithmic pricing systems be transparent, explainable, and non-discriminatory with regard to consumers. Companies that use algorithmic pricing systems will be required to implement compliance procedures, including audits, data governance, and human oversight.

THE LEGAL CONUNDRUM

An essential element of any claimed case of price-fixing under the U.S. antitrust laws is the element of agreement: a plaintiff alleging price-fixing must prove the existence of an agreement between two or more competitors who should be setting their prices independently but aren’t. Consumer harm from collusion occurs when competitors set prices to achieve their maximum joint profit instead of setting prices to maximize individual profits. To condemn algorithmic pricing as collusion, therefore, requires proof of agreement.

It may be difficult for the RealPage plaintiffs to prove that the RealPage’s users agreed among themselves to adhere to any particular price or pricing formula, but not impossible. End users are likely to argue that RealPage’s pricing recommendations are merely aggregate market signals that RealPage is collecting and disseminating. The use of the same information service, their argument will go, does not prove the existence of an agreement for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The parties and courts embroiled in the RealPage litigation are constrained to live under the law as it presently exists, so the solution proposed by Michal Gal, Professor and Director of the Forum on Law and Markets at the University of Haifa, is out of reach. In her 2018 paper, “Algorithms as Illegal Agreements,” Professor Gal confronts the agreement problem when algorithms set prices and concludes that it is time to “rethink our laws and focus on reducing harms to social welfare rather than on what constitutes an agreement.” Academics have been critical of the agreement element of Section 1 for years, but it is unlikely to change anytime soon, even with the added inconvenience it poses where competitors rely on a common vendor of machine-generated pricing recommendations.

Nonetheless, there is some evidence that autonomous machines, just like humans, can learn that collusion allows sellers to charge monopoly prices. In their December 2019 paper, “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion,” Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolo, and Sergio Pastorello at the Department of Economics at the University of Bologna showed with computer simulations that machines autonomously analyzing prices can develop collusive strategies “from scratch, engaging in active experimentation and adapting to changing environments.” The authors say indications from their models “suggest that algorithmic collusion is more than a remote theoretical possibility.” They find that “relatively simple [machine learning] pricing algorithms systematically learn to play collusive strategies.” The authors claim to be the first to “clearly document the emergence of collusive strategies among autonomous pricing agents.”

THE AGREEMENT ELEMENT IN THE MACHINE PRICING CASE

For three main reasons, the element of agreement need not be an obstacle to successfully prosecuting a price-fixing claim against competitors that use a common or similar vendor of algorithmic pricing data and software.

First, there is significant precedent for inferring the existence of an agreement among parties that knowingly participate in a collusive arrangement even if they do not directly interact, sometimes imprecisely referred to as a “rimless wheel hub-and-spoke” conspiracy. For example, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2000), the court inferred the necessary concerted action from a series of individual agreements between toy manufacturers and Toys “R” Us in which the manufacturers promised not to sell the toys sold to Toys “R” Us and other toy stores to big box stores in the same packaging. The FTC found that each of the manufacturers entered into the restraint on the condition that the others also did so. The court found that Toys “R” Us had engineered a horizontal boycott against a competitor in violation of Section 1, despite the absence of evidence of any “privity” between the boycotting manufacturers.

The Toys “R” Us case relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), in which movie theater chains sent an identical letter to eight movie studios asking them to restrict secondary runs of certain films. The letter disclosed that each of the eight were receiving the same letter. The Court held that a direct agreement was not a prerequisite for an unlawful conspiracy. “It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.”

The analogous issue in the algorithmic pricing scenario is whether the vendor’s end users that their competitors are also end users. If so, the inquiry can consider the agreement element satisfied if the algorithm does, in fact, jointly maximize the end users’ profits.

The second factor overcoming the agreement element is related to the first. Whether software that recommends prices has interacted with the prices set by competitors to achieve joint profit maximization—that is, whether the machines have learned to collude without human intervention—is an empirical question. The same techniques used to uncover machine-learned collusion by simulation can be used to determine the extent of interdependence in historical price setting. If statistical evidence of collusive pricing is available, it is enough that the end users knowingly accepted the offer to set its prices guided by the algorithm. The economics underlying the agreement element in the first place lies in prohibition of joint rather than individual profit maximization, so direct evidence that market participants are jointly profit maximizing should obviate the need for further evidence of agreement.

A third reason the agreement element need not stymie a Section 1 action against defendants engaged in algorithmic pricing is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). In that case the Court made clear that arrangements that remove independent centers of decision-making from the market run afoul of Section 1, if the net effect of the algorithm is to displace individual decision-making with decisions outsourced to a centralized pricing agent, the mechanism should be immaterial.

The rimless wheel of the so-called hub-and-spoke conspiracy is an inadequate analogy because the wheel in these cases does have a rim, i.e., a connection between the conspirators. In the scenarios above in which the courts have found Section 1 liability i) each of the participants knew that its rivals were also entering into the same or similar arrangements, ii) the participants devolved pricing authority away from themselves down to an algorithmic pricing agent, and iii) historical prices could be shown statistically to have exceeded the competitive level in a way consistent with collusive pricing. These elements connect the participants in the scheme, supplying the “rim” to the spokes of the wheel. If the plaintiffs in the RealPage litigation can establish these elements, they will have met their burden of establishing the requisite element of agreement in their Section 1 claim.

© MoginRubin LLP
For more news on AI in the context of Antitrust Law, visit the NLR’s Communications, Media & Internet section.

Intellectual Property Consolidation in the Agriculture Industry

Ever since agencies around the world such as the USPTO, USDA, and Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) have started recognizing and enforcing intellectual property rights relating to plants, there has been a slow yet massive consolidation in global seed markets.  This article discusses a brief history of how intellectual property rights and lax antitrust enforcement in the seed industry created one of the largest industry consolidations and how the current Administration seems to be taking steps in the right direction.

Intellectual Property in the Agriculture Industry

In 1930, the United States began granting plant patents and the USPTO issued the first plant patent in 1931 for a rose.  The UPOV is an international organization that was founded in 1961 to acknowledge and make available exclusive property rights for breeders of new plant varieties in all member states to the UPOV Convention. The U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) was enacted by Congress in 1970 to encourage the development of new varieties and to make them available to the public.  The Plant Variety Protection Act established in the Department of Agriculture an office to be known as the Plant Variety Protection Office.  These regulations are all very important for the protection and continued innovation of certain varieties of crops and plants.  However, when genetically modified seeds were introduced in 1996, seed companies began to take advantage of these protections and began to invest heavily in amassing as many seed-related IP rights as they could.  As these companies have merged and acquired smaller businesses, they remove competition from the industry, harming farmers, families, and consumers.

There are many ways that companies protect intellectual property in the agricultural industry.  For example, companies file for utility patents to protect a wide variety of plant-related inventions, such as breeding methods, plant-based chemicals, plant parts, and plant products. Plant patents are unique to the United States and provide protection to any distinct and new variety of plant that has been asexually reproduced, other than a tuber-propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state.  Plant Variety Protection certificates, which are similar to plant patents, provide certain exclusive rights to breeders of any new, distinct, uniform, and stable sexually or asexually reproduced or tuber-propagated plant varieties.  Other rights, known as Breeders’ Rights, exist in other countries outside the United States and are very similar to the Plant Variety Protection regulations.  These protections generally last for 20 years from the date of filing and, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the patent owner has the right to decide who may – or may not – use the patented invention for the period in which the invention is protected.

The Key Players in the Agriculture Industry

Monsanto was a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation founded in 1901 and based in the United States.  In 1970, Monsanto scientist John Franz discovered that glyphosate was an herbicide and quickly patented it as such.  In 1974, Monsanto brought the patented glyphosate herbicide to the market using the tradename “Roundup.”  In 1996, Monsanto created the first genetically engineered (GE), glyphosate-resistant crop, causing Roundup-resistant soybeans to be planted commercially throughout the United States.  By 1998, glyphosate-resistant corn was available on the market, and Monsanto became the largest supplier of these new GE, “Roundup-Ready” seeds.  This was such a breakthrough in the agriculture industry that in 2003, Roundup-Ready seeds accounted for about 90% of the genetically modified seeds planted around the globe.

As with many industries, the agriculture industry has those companies that are at the top and those that are not.  The agriculture industry’s “Big Six” companies—Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, and BASF—turned into the “Big Four”—ChemChina, Corteva, Bayer, and BASF— after a series of mergers and acquisitions that took place in the last decade with very little oversight from some of the antitrust authorities in the United States and around the world.  As a result of these mergers, the “Big Four” companies now control around 60% of the proprietary seed in the world market.

The Consolidation of the Seed Industry

Dr. Phil Howard from Michigan State University discussed the tremendous consolidation of the commercial seed industry in one of his first publications, 2009’s Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996-2008.  Dr. Howard describes how the hybrid-seed corn industry of 1930, the enforcement of patent-like protections, and especially the commercialization of fully patent-protected transgenic, genetically engineered seeds in the mid-late 1990s triggered a wave of consolidation in the agricultural industry.  To make matters worse, when these companies consolidated and amassed massive intellectual property portfolios, it was not uncommon for seed rights to be bundled with other inputs to protect profits in other, agrochemical divisions.  For example, as Dr. Howard details in Visualizing Consolidation, in order to use Monsanto’s herbicide-tolerant transgenic seed, farmers are required to also use Monsanto’s proprietary glyphosate herbicide, rather than a generic herbicide.  Essentially, if you were buying Roundup-Ready seed, you were buying Roundup herbicide, and if you were using Roundup herbicide, it was probably a good idea to buy Roundup-Ready seed.  This type of competitive business practice is one that eventually creates a multitude of problems for smaller, independent businesses, breeders, and farmers.

Antitrust and Anti-Competition in America

Antitrust laws are not a new concept in American society.  Antitrust laws are statutes and regulations that are designed to promote the overall competition in the market by promoting free, open, and competitive markets.  Congress passed the first antitrust law in 1890 when it wrote the Sherman Act, which made it illegal for companies to enter into agreements to compete with one another, resulting in price fixing and monopoly power.  Several years later, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act to protect American consumers by giving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) the authority to oversee and review mergers and acquisitions that are likely to stifle competition.  Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the FTC and DOJ review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the United States and either agency can take legal action to block deals that it believes would “substantially lessen competition.”

While these laws are all beneficial in theory, their implementation in the agricultural industry has been lacking to say the least.  According to a study in 2018, Bayer alone is estimated to control 35% of corn seed, 28% of soybean seed, and 70% of cottonseed in the global market!  Even more alarming may be the USDA’s 2014 report citing concerns that glyphosate-resistant crops have become ubiquitous with American agriculture with 93% of soybeans, 85% of corn, and 82% of cotton planted being genetically modified to be glyphosate-resistant.  The herbicides that are used to combat the weeds surrounding the crops, in many cases, are supplied by the same company that provides the seeds.

Promoting Competition in the Agriculture Industry

It has been almost a century since the first antitrust laws were enacted, and yet the problem of corporate consolidations remains in many industries across America.  On July 9, 2021, the Biden Administration signed an executive order aimed to promote competition within various industries in the United States.  The order includes 72 initiatives by more than a dozen federal agencies to promptly tackle some of the most pressing competition problems across our economy.  According to the Administration, this order is a “whole-of-government” approach to drive down prices for consumers, increase wages for workers, and facilitate innovation. This was a major step in the right direction to weaken the power that major businesses have obtained as a result of corporate consolidation in industries like healthcare, technology, transportation, and especially agriculture.

This Executive Order also established the White House Competition Council to drive forward the Administration’s whole-of-government effort to promote competition.  On September 10, 2021, the Competition Council held its inaugural meeting to discuss promoting pro-competitive policies and new ways of delivering concrete benefits to America’s consumers, workers, farmers, and small businesses.  During the meeting, the heads of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Trade Commission briefed the council members on their efforts to implement the directives of the Executive Order.

The Challenge of Facing the Consolidated Agriculture Industry

According to an October 20, 2021 report by Thomson Reuters, Tom Vilsack, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, said that the Biden Administration plans to take a hard look at the consolidation of the seed industry and figure out “why it’s structured the way it’s structured” and “whether these long patents make sense.”  The White House Competition Council is certainly faced with a difficult challenge to parse through both anti-competition law and intellectual property law.  For centuries these bodies of law have caused great debate.  One body of law restricts monopolization wherein the later grants monopolistic opportunities.

There is no doubt that any changes to the current seed industry scene would shake things up.  But what exactly would that look like?  Are we going to see the “Big-4” morph into another, new identity?  Are changes to the patent law system likely?  Whatever happens, the agriculture industry will likely pay close attention to the actions of the White House Competition Council over the next couple months.

Article By Reinier R. Smit of Summa PLLC

Copyright 2021 Summa PLLC All Rights Reserved

Claims of False Advertising and Unfair Competition Are Not Disparagement or Defamation

Most commercial general liability policies include coverage for personal and advertising injury claims by third parties.  In a recent case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether claims of false advertising and unfair competition brought against a competitor entitled the policyholder to a defense under its personal and advertising injury coverage.

In Albion Engineering Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 18-1756 (3rd Cir. Jul. 10, 2109) (Not Precedential), the policyholder was sued by a competitor alleging claims for false advertising and unfair competition based on the allegation that the policyholder’s products were represented as being made in the US when they were really made overseas.  The policyholder sought coverage from its carrier under its personal and advertising injury coverage, particularly for publication of material that slanders or libels a person or disparages a person’s goods, products or services.  The carrier disclaimed and the policyholder brought suit seeing to enforce coverage.  The district court dismissed the complaint after summary judgment in favor of the carrier.

On appeal, the policyholder contended that the claims in the underlying suit were essentially disparaging and defamatory.  In applying New Jersey law, the circuit court rejected the policyholder’s arguments because nothing alleged by the underlying claimant or in the extrinsic evidence discovered constituted the publication of false statements about the competitor.  Under New Jersey law, for the duty to defend to arise, the false and defamatory statement has to be made about another (in this case about the competitor’s products).  “For the suit to fall within the policy’s coverage, [policyholder] must demonstrate [competitor] brings a claim that [policyholder] (1) made an electronic, oral, written or other publication of material that (2) slanders or libels [competitor] or disparages [competitor’s] good, products, or services.” Here, said the court, the claims were about the policyholder’s own products, not about the competitor’s products.  Thus, because the policyholder had not shown that the competitor’s claims constitute disparagement or defamation claims made by the policyholder about the competitor’s products, the carrier had no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Sizing Up the Competition: Antitrust Enforcement and the Bazaarvoice Ruling

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High-profile or highly profitable firms are no longer the sole targets of post-merger divestitures by antitrust enforcers. Today, firms that have little or no revenues, including some that operate in emergent industries with little or negative profits, also find themselves subject to merger inquiries, as demonstrated by the recent merger review of Bazaarvoice’s 2012 non-reportable $160 million acquisition of PowerReviews. 

Bazaarvoice merger antitrust

These competing firms were both operating at a loss in the relatively small Ratings and Review (R&R) market. Yet, the nature of competition in the industry and the industry’s potential importance to adjacent industries – combined with statements by the acquirer’s executives prior to the transaction – attracted the scrutiny of antitrust enforcers. Ultimately, Bazaarvoice agreed to divest all of its PowerReviews assets, including employees and client base, to a small competitor, Viewpoints – which had initially entered R&R space by building a solution for Sears – for $30 million.  

This article considers the economic arguments and evidence used by the court to reach its decision in United States v. Bazaarvoice.

Background

R&R platforms offer an online interface for customer reviews of different products, which can help to drive sales, increase product visibility, and offer valuable information on customers to brands and retailers, allowing brands to respond to customer concerns in real time. Leading platforms offer clients the following services: confirmation of the authenticity of customer reviews; moderation of reviews (e.g., removing offensive language); syndication that combines reviews from multiple retailers to increase the visibility of a product; data on retailers and social media analytics to support marketing; and search engine optimization to drive traffic. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered clients all of these services, but Bazaarvoice generally provided more customizable features at higher price points to larger clients. Bazaarvoice offered human moderation of customer reviews, for example, while PowerReviews offered only automated monitoring.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers.

In 2012, Bazaarvoice had 800 employees and revenue of $106.1 million; in 2011, the privately held PowerReviews employed just 80 people and reportedly had revenue of $11.5 million. Although PowerReviews did not publicly report its profitability, according to Bazaarvoice executives, the smaller firm was operating at a loss. Similarly, Bazaarvoice itself reported consistently negative operating margins in 2011–2013 that were no higher than -23%.

At the time of the court ruling (January 2014), actual competition from other platforms in the R&R market was marginal, composed primarily of a handful of start-ups with inferior products or of larger firms that offered complementary products. Direct competitors like Pluck, Gigya, Practical Data, Rating-system.com, and European Reevoo were tiny, with few customers and weak services. More established firms that might have acted as potential competitors, such as Google, Facebook, Oracle, and Salesforce, were more interested in partnering with Bazaarvoice than in competing in the R&R market. Meanwhile, Amazon accounted for 28% of e-commerce revenue and maintained (and still does, as of August 2014) its own R&R platform, which was not available to competing retailers. 

Competitive arguments and evidence 

In its review of the transaction, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers. The analysis focused instead on the nature of competition in the R&R industry, including barriers to entry and the anticompetitive potential for long-run harm to consumers as detailed in the assessments of Bazaarvoice senior staff.

Low margins: The parties were losing money. Their profits were a far cry from the supracompetitive profits often associated with companies targeted by antitrust litigation. In previous antitrust cases against Microsoft, for example, the company’s margins on Windows and MS Office had played a significant role at trial. Similarly, the potential for enhanced market power and exceptional margins contributed to the DOJ decision to prevent Microsoft from acquiring Intuit in 1994–1995.

Barriers to entry: Bazaarvoice’s extensive syndication network, in particular, became a major component of the case. The DOJ argued that it would be extremely difficult for competitors to develop a comparable syndication network of retailers and brands, allowing Bazaarvoice to leverage anticompetitive economies of scale across many important clients. These advantages, combined with the difficulty of switching from one R&R platform to another – as demonstrated by the reluctance of PowerReviews customers to switch to the Bazaarvoice platform – would effectively block new entrants from the market. While the DOJ’s argument was much less convincing with respect to other barriers to entry, such as the company’s technology and reputation, clearly antitrust enforcers had seized on important elements of the relationship between Bazaarvoice’s value proposition and the growth of the R&R market.

Bad documents: These potential anticompetitive implications were explicitly referenced in Bazaarvoice’s own internal documents, which became instrumental in court. The firm’s current CEO remarked that there were “literally, no other competitors” beyond PowerReviews, and the former CEO wrote that after the proposed acquisition of PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice would have “[n]o meaningful direct competitor.” Bazaarvoice senior executives openly acknowledged that syndication networks created high barriers to entry in the R&R industry and clearly described that the elimination of Bazaarvoice’s “primary competitor” would provide “relief from price erosion.” The DOJ seized on these documents, arguing that the merger would increase prices and eliminate the “substantial price discounts” that retailers and manufacturers received as a result of competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews.

Court’s opinion 

In this case, the court noted these apparent competitive weaknesses and remained on the lookout for changes in the R&R market. In fact, in the 18 months from the time of the acquisition on June 12, 2012, until the case’s ultimate outcome on January 8, 2014, the only post-merger evidence that was considered dispositive by the court was
the absence of serious entry to the market. The court explicitly rejected the use of pricing data, suggesting that it could be manipulated. The same pricing data that regulators might have expected to rise above competitive levels – and that therefore could have created space for new entrants in the R&R market at lower price points – was viewed as suspect. The DOJ case was structured instead around the absence of a credible entry threat in the R&R space, despite Bazaarvoice’s annual margins of around -30%. 

For Bazaarvoice, the challenge was less about responding to customer concerns or even to actual prices than it was about addressing the incendiary internal paper trail left by the company’s senior executives.

Discussion 

The court’s focus on the entry threat and its dismissal of pricing policies is curious, because the two issues are highly related. In an industry characterized by prices so low that the market leader is highly unprofitable, new firms have no incentive to enter. To become profitable, Bazaarvoice would have had to double its prices, and yet no evidence presented in the case demonstrated that entry would be impossible at that much higher price level. Surprisingly, the court did not connect these two issues in a meaningful way.

For Bazaarvoice, the challenge was less about responding to customer concerns or even to actual prices than it was about addressing the incendiary internal paper trail left by the company’s senior executives. In fact, as the testifying expert for Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews, Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh, pointed out, customers expressed no reservations about the merger, and Bazaarvoice had not raised prices. Ultimately, the court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments related to the absence of actual anticompetitive effects, noting that the firms could moderate their behavior while under antitrust scrutiny and focused instead on the firm’s own internal documents, which had detailed a plan to block competitive pressure. Bazaarvoice found itself fighting its own internal assessment of the competitive effects of the proposed merger, in addition to the DOJ’s economic arguments. The internal documents and emails were far more difficult to explain away than the economic circumstances, resulting in a full divestiture.

ARTICLE BY

Rebecca Kirk Fair
 
OF 
Analysis Group, Inc.

SawStop Dismissal Explained: Opinion Crosscutting SawStop’s Antitrust Lawsuit Released

Mintz Levin Law Firm

Judge Claude M. Hilton of the Eastern District of Virginia recently issued a Memorandum Opinion following up on his June 27, 2014 order (on which we previously wrote here and here) dismissing the complaint filed against the power tool industry bySawStop, LLC.

To recap, according to the February 2014 complaint, in 2000, Stephen Gass, inventor of “SawStop” and a patent attorney, began licensing negotiations with several companies now named as defendants in the lawsuit. As a result, the companies allegedly held a vote on how to respond to SawStop and shortly thereafter ended their individual licensing negotiations with Gass. The complaint also alleges the companies conspired to alter voluntary standards to prevent SawStop technology from becoming an industry standard.

In his opinion dismissing SawStop’s antitrust claims, Judge Hilton wrote:

An alleged antitrust conspiracy is not established simply by lumping ‘the defendants’ together.

Judge Hilton found no evidence that any of the named manufacturer defendants conspired through their industry organization, the Power Tool Institute, Inc. (PTI), not to license SawStop’s safety technology. Judge Hilton also found that the conspiracy allegations were belied by SawStop’s admissions in the complaint that it was actively negotiating with Emerson, Ryobi, and Black & Decker “well after the alleged group boycott began in October 2001,” concluding that “[s]uch history fails to show an agreement to restrain trade.”

The judge also pointed to other contradictions in SawStop’s complaint, including evidence that Ryobi signed an agreement with SawStop regarding royalties related to SawStop’s technology licensing during the time period of the alleged conspiracy. In addition, the judge ruled that Black & Decker’s proposed a licensing agreement with the SawStop, which was negotiated 6 to 8 months after the alleged conspiracy was formed, similarly contradicted SawStop’s allegations. The judge further dismissed SawStop’s arguments that Black & Decker’s 1% royalty payment offer was disingenuous, noting that even if that were the case, such actions do “not sufficiently infer conspiratorial conduct” and cannot be characterized as refusals to deal.

Finally, the judge found that SawStop failed to adequately plead that the defendants corrupted the standard setting process or otherwise agreed to a boycott, pointing out that the complaint alleged that only 5 of the 24 defendants had representatives on the relevant standards-setting committee. Moreover, the court found SawStop’s allegations of competitive harm resulting from the conspiracy (lost sales and profits from UL failing to mandate its safety technology on the market) insufficient, stating:

‘Lost sales’ do not amount to competitive harm because [users] were not ‘in some way constrained from buying [SawStop’s] products’ . . . and failing to mandate [SawStop’s] proposed safety standard does not thereby harm their market access.

Finding no support for an inference that defendants had entered into an agreement to boycott SawStop’s product or otherwise restrain trade, the court dismissed SawStop’s complaint in its entirety.

In addition to the antitrust lawsuit, SawStop technology is at the center of an ongoing rulemaking by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). You can read more about the CPSC’s rulemaking here.

Article By:

Helen J. Kim
Charles A. Samuels
Of:
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Clash Of Titans over Biosimilars at Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Workshop

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On Tuesday, February 4, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted an all-day public workshop at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. on competition issues involving biologics and biosimilars.1 During highly informative presentations and roundtable discussions, the FTC and various stakeholders, including top-level representatives from originators of biologics (Pfizer and Amgen), biosimilars developers (Sandoz, Momenta and Hospira), payors (Aetna), prescribers (CVS and Express Scripts) and academia (Harvard Medical School), analyzed the likely impact of recent state substitution laws and naming conventions on biosimilars.

No one denied nor debated that the future of the drug industry lies in the robust and dynamic area of biologics. In 2010, 4 of the top 10 drugs were biologics and it is anticipated that in 2016 biologics will account for 7 of the top 10 drugs worldwide.2 At the same time, all panelists were concerned that the costs associated with biologics are rising at a staggering rate and are therefore not sustainable for patients nor payors, and that many patients will be unable to afford biologics if competition is not introduced.

According to Harry Travis, Vice President at Aetna, patients currently spend about $1 a day on non-specialty medication (traditional drugs) whereas they spend roughly $100 a day for specialty medication (biologics).3 He stated that only 1% of Aetna’s customers use specialty products, which account for 50% of Aetna’s total drug spending. This trend was confirmed by Steve Miller, Chief Medical Officer at Express Scripts, who underlined that specialty products (biologics) currently account for 30% of total drug spending, but this number will rise to 50% in 5 years.

It is thus not surprising that all participants urged for FDA-approved biosimilars in order to improve access to biologics while at the same time protecting public health and safety. Participants were also virtually unanimous in their recommendations that fostering public confidence in biosimilars will be crucial to their success and that unnecessary obstacles to substitution may restrict competition.4

The following points were discussed, relying on a large amount of data and comparative studies between countries:

  • Competition between originators of biologics and biosimilars developers: Panelists agreed that competition is not expected to have the same effects on the biologics industry as it has had in the small-molecule drugs space when generics penetrated the latter. Because the dynamics are completely different, the entry of biosimilars is unlikely to result in either steep price discounting or rapid acquisition of market share by manufacturers of biosimilars.5
  • Premature state biosimilar substitution laws: 18 states have already decided to introduce bills to regulate biosimilars, and 4 of them have enacted laws, all of which may seem slightly premature given that the FDA has yet to approve a biosimilar. Certain provisions of these substitution laws appear controversial as they place onerous requirements on the substitution of biosimilars for branded biologics. Of particular concern are certain substitutions laws requiring pharmacists to promptly notify patients and/or prescribers when dispensing a biosimilar, and to keep special records. These state-level restrictions not only deter substitution by imposing on pharmacists burdensome recordkeeping and additional communications with the physician, they also contradict federal law, namely the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which expressly provides for substitution.6 These state laws are arguably inconsistent with the BPCIA and could undermine the attractiveness and access to more affordable biologics.
  • Impact of naming on biosimilars: There was debate as to whether biosimilars should bear different non-proprietary names and whether such a requirement would have anticompetitive effects. Some argued that requiring distinct non-proprietary names is simply an effort to cause doubt and distrust among physicians and patients by making biosimilars appear different from biologics. As noted by Bruce Leicher, General Counsel at Momenta, the Biotechnology Industry Organization opposes GMO labelling on genetically modified foods precisely for the same reason – requiring a different name for biosimilars would communicate a different (and perhaps suspicious) product and would therefore grant a competitive advantage to branded biologics. Other panelists argued that names and other types of identifiers were justified by the need for an effective pharmacovigilance system, while some speakers expressed the need for distinguishable naming or other identifiers for purposes of linking a responsible product to a specific adverse event in the event of product liability.

The FTC did not express its own views on the effect of state-level restrictions and naming conventions on competition in the biosimilars market, but did note that securing more prescribing physicians on the panel might have added to the debate.

We will continue to monitor federal and state activities in the regulation of biosimilars.

1 The Food and Drug Administration defines biologics as medical products made from a variety of natural sources (human, animal or microorganism).  Moreover, a biological product may be demonstrated to be “biosimilar” if data show that, among other things, the product is “highly similar” to an already-approved biological product.

2 As presented by Steve Miller, Senior Vice President and Chief Medical Officer at Express Scripts.

3 More alarming to Mr. Travis is that the cost of biologics increased by approximately 15% annually, as compared to the approximately 5% increase in the cost of small molecule drugs.

4 Substitution, by allowing the pharmacist to automatically substitute an interchangeable biosimilar for the branded biologic without the intervention of the physician, provides a strong incentive to use biosimilars.

5 According to Dr. Sumant Ramachandra, Hospira’s Senior Vice President and Chief Scientific Officer, it takes approximately $5 million and 2-3 years for a generic manufacturer to bring a small molecule drug to market, whereas it takes over $100 million and 8-10 years for a biosimilar manufacturer to bring a biosimilar to market.

6 The BPCI provides that “the [interchangeable] biological product may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.”

Article by:

Of:

Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Call Waiting: Department of Justice (DOJ) to Maintain Scrutiny of Wireless Industry Consolidation

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The wireless industry has seen steady consolidation since the late 1980s.  Recently, in late 2013, reports began circulating about a potential merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, the nation’s third and fourth-largest wireless carriers, respectively.  Last week, however, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, William Baer, the assistant attorney general for the antitrust division at the Department of Justice (DOJ), cautioned that it would be difficult for the Agency to approve a merger between any of the nation’s top four wireless providers.

T-Mobile’s CEO, John Legere, stated that a merger between his company and Sprint “would provide significant scale and capability.”  Baer, on the other hand, warned that “It’s going to be hard for someone to make a persuasive case that reducing four firms to three is actually going to improve competition for the benefit of American consumers,”  As a result, any future consolidation in the wireless industry is likely to face a huge hurdle in the form of DOJ’s careful scrutiny of any proposed transaction.

Much of the DOJ’s interest in the wireless industry stems from the Agency’s successful challenge of a proposed merger between T-Mobile and AT&T in 2011.  Since then, Baer believes consumers have benefitted from “much more favorable competitive conditions.”  In fact, T-Mobile gained 4.4 million customers in 2013, bringing optimism to the company’s financial outlook after years of losses.  In the final two quarters of 2013, T-Mobile’s growth bested that of both Sprint and AT&T.  The low-cost carrier attracted customers and shook up the competition by upending many of the terms consumers had come to expect from wireless carriers, as well as investing in network modernization and spectrum acquisition.  This flurry of activity has pushed the competition to respond with its own deals, resulting in “tangible consumer benefits of antitrust enforcement,” according to Baer.

The DOJ’s antitrust division has kept careful watch over the wireless industry the past few years. That scrutiny will remain, as the Agency persists to advocate that four wireless carriers are required for healthy market competition.  The cards are beginning to play out from the Agency’s decision, and as Baer stated, “competition today is driving enormous benefits in the direction of the American consumer.”

Article by:

Lisa A. Peterson

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery