Tag: Commodity Futures Trading Commission

CFTCs Increased Reach over Environmental Commodities

During 2023 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) engaged in several regulatory actions aimed at further clarifying its jurisdictional reach over environmental commodity markets generally and the voluntary carbon credit (VCC) markets in particular. First, on June 20, 2023, the CFTC issued an alert seeking whistleblower tips relating to carbon market misconduct. CFTC noted that many VCCs serve as the underlying commodity for futures contracts that are listed on CFTC designated contract markets (DCMs) over which the CFTC has full enforcement authority as well as the regulatory oversight. Importantly, the CFTC also noted that it has anti-fraud and anti-manipulation enforcement authority over the related spot markets for VCCs as well as carbon allowances and other environmental commodities products that are linked to futures contracts.1

Second, on July 19, 2023 the CFTC held its second convening where several market participants expressed the view that reliability, integrity and resilience of VCCs will be significantly improved with greater regulatory involvement.2

Third, in response to a growing demand to become more actively involved in environmental commodity markets on December 4, 2023, the CFTC issued proposed Guidance Regarding the Listing of Voluntary Carbon Credits Derivatives and Request for Comment (VCC Guidance).3 The VCC Guidance “outlines factors for a DCM to consider in connection with product design and listing [of futures contracts on VCCs] to advance the standardization of such products in a manner that promotes transparency and liquidity.”

The VCC Guidance is remarkable because: (i) it is non-binding (i.e., it is only guidance, not a regulation – stating that DCMs “should consider”); (ii) it notes several times that “for the avoidance of doubt, this proposal is not intended to modify or supersede the Appendix C Guidance” [to Part 38 of CFTC regulations];4 (iii) it addresses the already existing regulatory requirements for DCOs (i.e., Core Principle 3 – the requirement that all listed futures are not readily susceptible to manipulation);5 (iv) it attempts to reach over spot physically-settled VCC markets over which the CFTC does not have the regulatory jurisdiction and can only exercise its limited enforcement anti-fraud and anti-manipulation jurisdiction; (v) it requires DCMs to “consider” a number of VCC characteristics that are clearly outside of DCM’s control and probably competency, which include transparency, additionality, permanency and risk of reversal, robust quantification, governance and tracking mechanisms, and measures to prevent double-counting of VCCs; (vi) it requires DCMs to submit to the CFTC “explanation and analysis of the contract” it intends to list; (vii) it requires DCMs to actively monitor VCC contracts to ensure that they continue to meet these standards; and (viii) notes that the same standards should apply to swap execution facilities (SEFs) that may list swaps on VCCs. Finally, this VCC Guidance is followed by a number of questions and an open comment period ending on February 16, 2024.

The VCC Guidance is an important step forward to promoting transparency and integrity of VCC markets within the jurisdictional constraints of the CFTC. Even though the VCC Guidance does not (and cannot) impose any additional compliance requirements on DCMs and SEFs short of promulgating a rulemaking in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that DCM’s compliance burden with respect to listed VCC contracts before the VCC Guidance was issued are clearly different than after the VCC Guidance would become effective. Further, unlike other physically-deliverable commodities that serve as underliers to futures contracts on DCMs, VCCs traded in spot and forward markets are treated differently and will probably be in the same category as virtual currencies.

https://icvcm.org/

1 https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8723-23

2 https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventvoluntarycarbonmarkets071923

3 https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8829-23

4 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-I/part-38/appendix-Appendix%20C%20to%20Part%2038

5 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
For more news on CFTC Environmental Oversight, visit the NLR Financial Institutions & Banking section.

Crypto Fraud Remains Focus of CFTC Whistleblower Program

For the second straight year, the majority of whistleblower tips received by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Whistleblower Program were related to cryptocurrency fraud.

On October 31, the CFTC released its Annual Report on the Whistleblower Program for the 2023 Fiscal Year. The report revealed that during the fiscal year, the CFTC received a record 1,530 whistleblower tips.

According to the report, “the majority of tips received during the Period involved allegations of fraudulent solicitation and subsequent misappropriation of crypto/digital assets.” The report further explains that examples of these crypto frauds include “pump-and-dump schemes, fraudulent representations of moneymaking opportunities, or refusals to honor withdrawal requests.”

“The majority of the tips received this year involved crypto—an area that continues to have pervasive fraud and other illegality,” said CFTC Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero in a statement supporting the Whistleblower Program. “With the rise of crypto, more retail customers have come under the CFTC’s jurisdiction, making even more critical the efforts of the CFTC’s Whistleblower Program and the Office of Customer Education and Outreach.”

Through the CFTC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to monetary awards of 10-30% of the sanctions collected by the CFTC in the enforcement action related to their disclosure. To qualify for an award, a whistleblower must voluntarily provide original information that leads to a successful enforcement action of at least $1 million.

Back in 2019, the CFTC Whistleblower Program issued a Whistleblower Alert drawing attention to how individuals can blow the whistle on cryptocurrency fraud. The Alert explains that “when a virtual currency is used in a derivatives contract, or if there is fraud or manipulation involving a virtual currency traded in interstate commerce, CFTC enforcement of the [Commodity Exchange Act] comes into play.”

Since then, the CFTC has filed a number of high-profile charges against entities for crypto fraud. For example, in 2021, BitMEX was ordered to pay $100 million for illegally operating a cryptocurrency trading platform and Coinbase was ordered to pay $6.5 million for false, misleading, or inaccurate reporting and wash trading. Earlier this year, the CFTC charged Binance and its founder, Changpeng Zhao, with operating an illegal digital asset derivatives exchange.

In December 2022, CFTC Chair Rostin Behnam testified before the U.S. Senate about the CFTC’s regulation of digital assets and cryptocurrency. Behnam highlighted the essential role the agency’s whistleblower program plays in its enforcement efforts in these areas. “In the absence of direct regulatory and surveillance authority in an underlying cash market, CFTC enforcement activity begins with a referral or whistleblower tip from an external source,” Behnam stated.

Over the past decade-plus, the CFTC Whistleblower Program has become an integral part of the CFTC’s enforcement efforts. Given that in recent years the agency has increasingly focused on cryptocurrency fraud, it is no surprise that the whistleblower program is playing a central role in the CFTC’s efforts on that front.

“Whistleblowers play a vital role in supporting CFTC investigations related to fraud and other illegality,” Commissioner Romero further stated. “The CFTC could not fully protect customers and markets without whistleblowers. Whistleblowers help identify fraud and other illegality, interpret key evidence, and save considerable Commission resources and time. The faster we can stop fraud, the more we can protect customers from harm.”

This article was authored by Geoff Schweller.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2023. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Crypto Fraud and the CFTC Whistleblower Program, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Rise in VCM Business May Trigger CFTC Oversight on Sales of Carbon Offset Credits

Many major companies have announced a blueprint to minimize their carbon footprint. Some companies have gone so far as to proclaim that they will achieve “net zero” emissions in the near future. To accomplish their climate goals, many have turned to purchasing products called “carbon offset credits.”

Offset credits are defined as tradable “rights” or certificates linked to activities that lower the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. These offsets are purchased and sold on what is commonly referred to as “voluntary carbon markets” (VCMs), where owners of carbon-reducing projects can sell or trade their carbon offsets to emitters who wish to offset the negative effects of their emissions.[1] The VCMs, however, have been subject to criticism and concern due to lack of effective regulation to combat potential fraud. In response, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has announced its intent to increase enforcement resources and expertise to police the carbon markets.

How It Works

The owner of the carbon-reducing project applies to an independent (and largely unregulated) registry for carbon offsets. The registry then evaluates the project, often relying on complex information submitted by the project owner, to determine whether and how much atmospheric carbon the project will reduce. If the registry determines the project will reduce atmospheric carbon, it will issue a carbon offset credit to the project owner.

Typically, one offset credit represents one metric ton of carbon dioxide removed or kept out of the atmosphere. The price of offset credits will vary depending on different project types, different levels of benefits, and the markets in which they are traded. Once the registry issues the offset credit, the project owner can sell it to whomever it wants on a VCM. It is not uncommon for profit-seeking entities such as brokers or investors to purchase the offset credit and then sell it to the “end user,” which is the entity that wants to take credit for the carbon reduction. Once the “end user” purchases the offset credit, the credit is “retired” to ensure that it cannot be sold again.

Although voluntary carbon markets have been around for decades, they have taken off in recent years amid a deluge of corporate climate commitments. From 2018 to 2021, the VCM’s value grew from $300 million to $2 billion. Global management consultancy company McKinsey estimates that the value of VCMs may reach as high as $180 billion by 2030, while Research and Markets has projected a global value of $2.68 trillion by 2028.

Yet, the voluntary carbon market is fragmented and largely unregulated, suffers from varying accounting standards, and has been described as “the Wild West” for fraud. An investigation by The Guardian found that 90% of offsets issued by one of the largest registries for rainforest preservation projects were worthless because they did not represent legitimate carbon reductions. The voluntary carbon market is largely unregulated in the United States, and carbon offsets are almost exclusively issued by nongovernmental entities. Perhaps not surprisingly, regulators have started to look at the voluntary carbon markets more closely. In particular, the CFTC has shown an increasing interest in carbon in recent years.

Road Ahead

In September 2020, the CFTC’s Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee issued a report, “Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System,” that concluded climate change poses a major risk to the stability and integrity of the US economy and presented several dozen recommendations to mitigate climate risks. Less than a year later, CFTC Chairperson Rostin Behnam created the Climate Risk Unit to focus on the role of derivatives “in climate-related risk and transitioning to a low carbon economy.”

In June 2022, the CFTC held the first ever Voluntary Carbon Markets Convening to discuss issues related to a potential carbon offset market and to solicit input from industry participants in the CFTC’s potential role. After the Convening, the CFTC issued an RFI asking whether and how the CFTC should be involved in creating and regulating a voluntary carbon market. The responses to the RFI reflected that, while most industry participants agreed on the need for additional transparency and standardization in the voluntary carbon markets, they disagreed on the role the CFTC should play in such a market. A group of seven United States senators, including Sens. Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), argued that the CFTC should establish a robust regime governing the carbon market. Others argued that it is too soon for the CFTC to create rules and a registration mechanism, expressing concern that those actions might stifle industry innovation and progress.

At a keynote speech in January 2023, Chair Behnam stated that the CFTC “can play a role in voluntary [carbon] markets.” CFTC Commissioner Goldsmith Romero echoed the sentiment a month later in another speech and gave proposals for the CFTC to “promote resilience to climate risk.” Among those was a proposal that the “Commission should promote market integrity by increasing enforcement resources and expertise to combat greenwashing and other forms of fraud.”

The voluntary carbon market, Goldsmith Romero noted, “carr[ies] particular concerns of greenwashing, fraud, and manipulation” which “can lead to serious harm, distort market pricing, seriously damage a company’s reputation, and undermine the integrity of the markets.” This is particularly true with an esoteric commodity such as carbon offsets. For tangible commodities such as soybeans or oil, verifying delivery of the goods is relatively easy. But for carbon offsets, the offset purchaser often cannot verify that the promised greenhouse gas reduction is actually occurring; instead, the purchaser must rely on the promises made by the project owner or independent registry.

At present, the CFTC has limited enforcement jurisdiction over carbon offsets because only a limited number of carbon derivatives are traded on regulated futures markets. Carbon, as well as carbon and other environmental offsets or credits, are generally considered “commodities” as defined by § 1a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA). As a regulated commodity, transactions involving carbon credits or offsets are subject to the CFTC’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation enforcement jurisdiction.

As VCMs continue to grow, it is likely that offerings of carbon derivatives such as futures, options, and swaps will grow with them, which may provide the jurisdictional catalyst for the CFTC to get more involved. The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of futures markets, including oversight of the listing of new contracts on futures exchanges. Currently, a limited number of carbon futures are available to trade, and most trade on already regulated exchanges such as the Global Emissions Offset (GEO) futures contracts traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The price of CME’s GEO futures contract is based on CORSIA-eligible (Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation) offset credits issued through specific independent registries.

But given the varying standards and methodologies for these registries, combined with an increasing number of investigations that have found significant issues with offset credits, it is reasonable to expect that the CFTC may eventually seek to engage in more oversight of the registries to ensure that futures contracts are not being manipulated and the offset credits are actually delivering the carbon reductions promised. Given that offsets are widely traded as commodities, that demand for offset-based derivatives products is growing, and that fraud may be a widespread problem throughout the marketplace, it seems like a matter of when, not if, the CFTC begins to regulate VCMs more heavily.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Although often used interchangeably, voluntary carbon markets are different from compliance carbon markets. Compliance carbon markets are regulated markets set by “cap-and-trade” regulations at the state, national, or international governmental organizations. Governmental organizations set a cap on carbon emissions and then provide members with credits that act as a “permission slip” for a company to emit up to the cap. Voluntary carbon markets, on the other hand, involve trading of carbon credits between companies to reduce their own carbon footprint.

© 2023 ArentFox Schiff LLP
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CFTC Clarifies That Variation Margin Constitutes Settlement

The Division of Clearing and Risk (DCR) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has issued an interpretive letter clarifying that payments of variation margin, price alignment amounts and other payments in satisfaction of outstanding exposures on a counterparty’s cleared swap positions constitute “settlement” under the  (CEA) and CFTC Regulation 39.14. The CEA and CFTC Regulation 39.14 provide that a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) must effect a settlement at least once each business day and ensure that settlements are final when effected.

Although not mentioned by DCR, the letter is clearly intended to complement earlier guidance issued jointly by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Guidance) regarding the Regulatory Capital Treatment of Certain Centrally Cleared Derivatives Contracts Under Regulatory Capital Rules. As the Guidance explains in greater detail, for purposes of the risk-based capital calculation and the supplementary leverage ratio calculation, the regulatory capital rules require financial institutions to calculate their trade exposure amount with respect to derivatives contracts. The trade exposure amount, in turn, is determined, in part, by taking into account the remaining maturity of such contracts. The Guidance goes on to explain that for a derivatives contract that is structured such that on specific dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that the fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset.

“Accordingly, for the purpose of the regulatory capital rules, if, after accounting and legal analysis, the institution determines that (i) the variation margin payment on a centrally cleared Settled-to-Market Contract settles any outstanding exposure on the contract, and (ii) the terms are reset so that fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity on such contract would equal the time until the next exchange of variation margin on the contract.”

CFTC Letter No. 17-51 provides the legal analysis to confirm that, as a condition of registration with the CFTC as a DCO, each DCO must provide for daily settlement of all obligations, including the payment and receipt of all variation margin obligations, which payments are irrevocable and unconditional when effected. As a result, a clearing member’s obligations to each DCO are satisfied daily and the fair value of the open cleared derivatives held at the DCO is effectively reset to zero daily.

This post was written by James M. Brady & Kevin M. Foley of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., ©2017
For more Financial & Banking legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Part I: Update on CFTC Rules 4.5 and 4.13 for Registered Investment Companies and Hedge Funds

The National Law Review recently published an article regarding CFTC rules for Registered Investment Companies and Hedge Funds written by Michael A. Piracci, F. Mindy Lo, and Laura E. Flores of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP:

Investment advisers operating registered investment companies and private funds that conduct more than a de minimis amount of speculative trading in futures, commodity options, and other commodity interests will no longer be exempt from registering with the CFTC as CPOs.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced on February 9the adoption of final rules that significantly curtail the ability of registered investment companies to claim relief under CFTC Rule 4.5 as well as the rescission of the exemption from commodity pool operator (CPO) registrationcontained in Rule 4.13(a)(4), which is relied on by a substantial portion of the hedge fund industry. The CFTC did not, as it had proposed, rescind the exemption from CPO registration under Rule 4.13(a)(3) for hedge funds that conduct a de minimis amount of trading in futures, commodity options, swaps, and other commodity interests.[1]

The Final Rules will require full CPO registration by investment advisers operating registered investment companies and private funds that conduct more than a de minimis amount of speculative trading in futures, commodity options, and other commodity interests. Those investment advisers required to register as CPOs as a result of changes in Rule 4.5 must become registered by the later of December 31, 2012 or 60 days after the effective date of the final rulemaking by the CFTC defining the term “swap.” Once an investment adviser is registered as a CPO for a registered investment company, it will not be required to comply with the CFTC’s recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements until 60 days after the adoption of final rules implementing certain proposed exemptions from these requirements for registered investment companies.[2] Investment advisers operating private funds that are currently relying on the Rule 4.13(a)(4) exemption will be required to register as CPOs by December 31, 2012, unless they are able to avail themselves of another exemption.

CFTC Rule 4.5 Exemption

CFTC Rule 4.5 currently provides an exclusion from the definition of CPO for advisers operating entities regulated as registered investment companies, banks, benefit plans, and insurance companies. Prior to August 2003, any of the regulated persons claiming eligibility for the exclusion under Rule 4.5 were required to represent that commodity futures or options contracts entered into by the qualified entity were for bona fide hedging purposes[3] and that the aggregate initial margin and/or premiums for positions that did not meet the bona fide hedging criteria did not exceed 5% of the liquidating value of the qualifying entity’s portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and losses. The rule further required that participation in the qualifying entity not be marketed as participation in a commodity pool or otherwise as a vehicle for trading commodity futures or options. In August 2003, as part of a larger overhaul of its regulation of CPOs and commodity trading advisors (CTAs), the CFTC eliminated the Rule 4.5 eligibility conditions requiring that the qualified entity limit speculative trading to 5% of the liquidating value of its portfolio and not market itself as a vehicle for exposure to commodity futures or options.[4]

The Final Rules return Rule 4.5 to its pre-2003 requirements for registered investment companies (but not for the other types of regulated entities), with the addition of an alternative definition of de minimis. Banks, benefit plans, and insurance companies currently relying on the exemption are unaffected by the changes and may continue to conduct their commodity pool businesses without registration. In a comment letter, however, National Futures Association (NFA) suggested broadening the scope of the coverage to apply the same types of limits on banks and trust companies as the revised rule does on registered investment companies.[5]

In the case of registered investment companies, the CFTC noted in the Final Rules release, as it had in the proposed rules, that it was concerned that funds were “offering de facto commodity pools” and should be subject to CFTC oversight to “ensure consistent treatment of CPOs regardless of their status with respect to other regulators.”[6] As a result of the adopted changes, a registered investment company will no longer be able to rely on Rule 4.5 to avoid registering the investment adviser as a CPO if the registered investment company invests more than an immaterial amount of its assets in commodity futures, commodity options, and swaps, other than for hedging, or markets itself as providing commodity exposure. In response to requests from commenters, the CFTC confirmed “that the investment adviser for the registered investment company is the entity required to register as the CPO,” if registration is required. Prior to the adoption of the Final Rules, there was a lack of clarity around which entity or persons might be considered to be the CPO of a registered investment company that was deemed to be a commodity pool. Many in the industry were concerned that a registered investment company’s board of trustees or directors would be required to register. The CFTC recognized that requiring trustees or directors to register as CPOs “would raise operational concerns for the registered investment company as it would result in piercing the limitation on liability for actions undertaken in the capacity as director.”[7]

In order to rely on amended Rule 4.5, a registered investment company will have to limit the aggregate initial margin it posts for its speculative commodities-related trading to 5% of the liquidating value of its portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and losses. Alternatively, a registered investment company may limit the aggregate net notional value[8] of its speculative commodities-related trading positions to 100% of the liquidation value of its portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and losses (excluding the in-the-money amount of an option at the time of purchase). The new exclusion added by the rule allows a registered investment company to enter into derivatives having a net notional value equal to up to 100% of the fund’s net asset value (NAV). Although this exclusion does provide additional flexibility over the 5% limitation, it may not be useful to funds investing in commodities through a controlled foreign corporation (CFC)[9]because the rule treats the CFC itself as a fund and would measure notional value based on the NAV of the CFC.[10] In addition, the rule limits the ability of a fund to market itself as a vehicle to provide commodities exposure even if the de minimisthresholds are met.

CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4) and Rule 4.13(a)(3) Exemptions

The CFTC had proposed to rescind the exemptions available to persons that operate pools exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (Private Funds) under both CFTC Rules 4.13(a)(3) and (4). The Final Rules, however, only rescinded Rule 4.13(a)(4) and retained the exemption under Rule 4.13(a)(3). Accordingly, advisers operating Private Funds (i) that are offered only to sophisticated investors referred to in CFTC Rule 4.7 as qualified eligible persons (QEPs), accredited investors, or knowledgeable employees; and (ii) where either the aggregate initial margin and/or premium attributable to commodity interests (both hedging and speculative) do not exceed 5% of the liquidation value of the pool’s portfolio or the net notional amount of the commodity interests held by the pool do not exceed the fund’s NAV will continue to be able to claim an exemption from registering an operator as a CPO. The rescission of Rule 4.13(a)(4) means that advisers operating Private Funds will no longer be able to claim exemption from CPO registration for funds that that are offered only to institutional QEPs and natural persons who meet both definitional and portfolio QEP requirements that hold more than a de minimis amount of commodity interests. As of December 31, 2012, a Private Fund that currently relies on this exemption will be required to register an operator as a CPO unless it is able to claim another exemption from CPO registration, such as that in CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(3).

Full registration as a CPO is a relatively involved process and typically takes from six to eight weeks to complete. Registration involves submission of Form 7-R for the CPO and Form 8-Rs for all natural person Principals and for all Associated Persons (APs), along with fingerprints for such Principals and APs, as well as proof that each AP passed the required proficiency exams (generally the Series 3 or 31). At least one Principal will be required to be registered as an AP. Fully registered CPOs will also be subject to CFTC and NFA regulation. Such regulation includes providing disclosure documents to pool participants that are subject to review by NFA and recordkeeping and periodic and annual reporting requirements, including delivery of audited annual financial statements.

Registered CPOs may rely on CFTC Rule 4.7 for relief from certain requirements. Rule 4.7 provides relief from the disclosure, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements for CPOs that offer interests in private pools investing in commodities solely to QEPs. Currently, Rule 4.7 provides that a CPO claiming relief under the rule is not required to provide its pool participants with audited annual financial statements. The Final Rules rescind this relief and require CPOs operating pools pursuant to relief under Rule 4.7 to have the annual financial statements for the pool certified by a public accountant.[11] The rules do not, however, rescind the other types of relief offered under Rule 4.7. Accordingly, a Private Fund that will now be required to register an operator as a CPO due to the rescission of Rule 4.13(a)(4) will be able to claim at least some relief from the disclosure, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements under the CFTC rules.

The rescinding of 4.13(a)(4) also means that a number of investment advisers will be required to register with the CFTC as CTAs. Investment advisers who currently operate under an exemption from CTA registration under CFTC Rule 4.14(a)(8), based on the fact that they provide advice only to pools that are exempt under Rule 4.13(a)(4), will be required to register as CTAs with the CFTC and become NFA members. These advisers will also be subject to the full scope of CFTC and NFA requirements applicable to CTAs.

The changes will impact a wide variety of private funds and other investment managers, such as family offices. Given that the CFTC invoked the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as part of the basis for its decision to roll back Rules 4.13 and 4.14, it is surprising that the CFTC declined to adopt a carve out for family offices as Congress did in the case of SEC registration.

Annual Notice

Currently, Rules 4.5, 4.13, and 4.14 require persons claiming relief from registration with the CFTC to electronically file with NFA a notice claiming such exemption at inception. The Final Rules require that on an annual basis, in order to retain eligibility for the exemption, persons who are still eligible for relief under Rules 4.5, 4.13, and 4.14 must affirm the accuracy of their original notice of exemption, withdraw the exemption if they cease to conduct activities requiring registration or exemption from registration, or withdraw the exemption and apply for registration.

Copyright © 2012 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.