For Whom the Class Tolls: “No Piggybacking Rule” Does In Would-Be Class in Ongoing Wal-Mart Saga

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Betty Dukes, et al., decertifying a putative class of approximately 1.6 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees who claimed gender discrimination in wages and promotions in violation of Title VII. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).  The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of class certification and determined the plaintiffs failed to meet the class “commonality” standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 349-60. The Dukes decision set in motion a number of spinoff regional cases, one of which – barring another grant of certiorari to the high court – met its end somewhat anticlimactically, when the Eleventh Circuit issued its August 3, 2017 order in Love, et. al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. No. 15-15260.

The Love plaintiffs included a sub-group of the Dukes plaintiffs who worked in the southeastern United States. These holdover Dukes plaintiffs were able to refile their claims because of the requirement that federal court discrimination plaintiffs first file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This rule effectively tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of Dukes. But critically, under the Eleventh Circuit’s “no piggybacking rule”, tolling is limited to individual claims only, not class claims, which has also been adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.  The Love court previously left little room for argument when it noted in a 2013 order that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit categorically refuses to toll the limitations period for subsequent class actions by members of the original class once class certification is denied in the original suit.”  Thus, on October 16, 2015 the individual named plaintiffs and Wal-Mart settled and jointly filed a “stipulation of voluntary dismissal.”

On November 6, 2015, the Love appellants, made up of unnamed members of the would-be class, filed a motion to intervene solely to appeal the dismissal of class claims. This motion was denied 13 days later as moot, which, to make matters worse for the appellants, took them outside of their 30-day deadline to appeal the October 16 stipulated dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit thus found the appeal jurisdictionally barred, providing a rather sudden end to the winding multi-year litigation.

In light of this tangled and technical history, employers and their counsel should be sure to understand the differences in treatment of class actions and individuals under the relevant rules, regulations, and statutes. Though it can be tempting to move immediately to the standard substantive arguments against numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the proposed class, the Wal-Mart cases show that knowing your way around the procedural thicket is another useful skill in avoiding or minimizing the cost of class litigation.

 This post was written by Kelly J. Muensterman of  Polsinelli PC.


[1] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf

[2] http://hr.cch.com/eld/LoveWalmart080317.pdf

[3] Salazar–Calderon v. Presido Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.1985) and Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.1988)

[4] 2013 WL 5434565, at *2.

 For more legal analysis check out the National Law Review’s homepage.

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Procedures for Removal to Federal Court under Class Action Fairness Act

Jackson Lewis Law firm

In a divided 5-to-4 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that defendants seeking to remove a case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) need only allege in the notice of removal an amount in controversy in excess of the $5 million threshold and need not attach evidence to the notice of removal proving the amount in controversy. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, No. 13-719 (Dec. 15, 2014).

Reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision, the majority opinion (authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor) held that a notice of removal need not contain evidentiary submissions because the plain language of the removal statute itself requires only a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.”

Background

In the case below, the plaintiff, Brandon Owens, had filed a putative class action in Kansas state court alleging that defendants Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC and Cherokee Basin Pipeline, LLC underpaid royalties they owed to Owens and the putative class members under oil and gas leases. The complaint failed to plead a specific amount of damages, seeking only “a fair and reasonable amount” of damages on behalf of Owens and the putative class members.

The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas under CAFA. In their notice of removal, the defendants alleged that the purported underpayments to the putative class members totaled more than $8.2 million, but defendants did not attach to their notice of removal any evidence to support the alleged amount in controversy. The plaintiff moved to remand the case, alleging that the defendants’ notice of removal was deficient because it failed to include evidence proving the amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million threshold under CAFA. The District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand. A divided Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently denied defendants’ petition for review and petition for en banc review.

Supreme Court Decision

In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted the federal statute setting forth the requirements for a notice of removal (28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)) requires only that the notice contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” The majority went on to note that, “[b]y design, § 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and that the legislative history of § 1446(a) indicates the statute was intended to “simplify the pleading requirements for removal and . . . clarify that courts should apply the same liberal rules [to removal allegations] that are applied to other matters of pleading.”

The majority went on to explain that “when a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” When the plaintiff does contest the defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation, the majority held, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” The majority concluded by stating that a notice of removal need only include “a plausible allegation” that the amount in controversy is met, and evidence to establish the amount in controversy is required only when the amount in controversy is contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.

Dissenting Opinion

 Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent (which was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Elena Kagan, and joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas) did not focus on the underlying question regarding the requirements for removal under CAFA. The dissent questioned whether the Supreme Court could even address the substantive issue in light of certain procedural and jurisdictional questions, and does not call into question the reasoning of the majority’s substantive holding.

***

The majority’s opinion resolves a prior split among circuit courts regarding a defendant’s burden when removing a case under CAFA. The law is now settled that a removing defendant need only make a good faith allegation in the notice of removal regarding the amount in controversy in order to meet its burden on removal. Only if the amount in controversy is challenged must a defendant offer evidence. Moreover, the majority made it clear that there is no presumption against removal jurisdiction in cases removed under CAFA, rejecting an argument often made by the plaintiffs contesting removal under CAFA.

ARTICLE BY

OF

Supreme Court Limits Stipulations to Circumvent CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act)

ArmstrongTeasdale logo

 

The U.S. Supreme Court decided in State Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles that a class representative plaintiff cannot use a precertification stipulation to evade the federal jurisdictional amount of CAFA. 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(2) &(6). In Knowles, plaintiff sued State Fire Insurance Co. but stipulated precertification that damages would not exceed $5 million dollars, the threshold limit to invoke CAFA jurisdiction. State Fire removed the case from Arkansas state court but the Federal District Court remanded it to the state court concluding that the amount in controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of plaintiff’s stipulation. The Supreme Court found that the stipulation could tie plaintiff’s hands because stipulations are binding on the party that makes them. However, such a stipulation would not be binding at this stage of the litigation because a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. The Court therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A good practice pointer learned from this case is that defendant’s should be mindful of the advantages of the CAFA and invoke federal court jurisdiction where possible. Also, a pretrial stipulation by the class representative does not prevent using CAFA if the other jurisdictional requirements for CAFA are met.

Article by:

Casey O. Housley

Of:

Armstrong Teasdale

Supreme Court Holds That State Attorney General Actions are Not “Mass Actions” Under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)

DrinkerBiddle

 

On January 14, the Supreme Court of the United States held that lawsuits that are filed in the name of a State Attorney General but seek relief on behalf of a State’s citizens cannot be removed to federal court as “mass actions” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036 (Jan. 14, 2014). Resolving a split between the Fifth Circuit on the one hand and the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the other, the ruling means that businesses will have to defend AG actions in state courts, and state courts will have to resolve whether such actions can proceed even though the consumers on whose behalf they are brought have agreed to settle their claims in a class action or, conversely, to pursue their own claims individually rather than collectively.

“Mass Actions”

CAFA gives federal courts original subject matter jurisdiction over certain “class actions” and “mass actions.” It defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action” and defines a “mass action” as “any civil action . . . in which the monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action [exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs].” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(1)(B), (d)(11)(B)(i).[1] Excluded from the definition of “mass action” are (among other things) actions in which “all of the claims are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to State statute specifically authorizing such action . . . .” Id.§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).

The Hood Case

Jim Hood, the Attorney General of Mississippi, filed a parens patriaeaction that alleged that the companies that manufacture and market liquid crystal display (LCD) panels had engaged in price-fixing that violated the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act and Mississippi Antitrust Act. Hood sought equitable and compensatory relief on behalf of both the State and its citizens. The defendants removed the action to federal court under CAFA and the Attorney General moved to remand. The district court remanded, finding that the suit was not a “mass action” because it fell within the definition’s “general public” exception. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Looking at each claim rather than the action as a whole, it reasoned that the real parties in interest were not only the State but also the individual citizens who had purchased LCD products, and as a result the “claims of 100 or more persons [we]re proposed to be tried jointly.” Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). Hood then petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

Yesterday, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is a primer on statutory construction:

Respondents argue that the [mass action] provision covers [AG actions] because “claims of 100 or more persons” refers to “thepersons to whom the claim belongs, i.e., the real parties in interest to the claims,” regardless of whether those persons are named or unnamed. We disagree.

To start, the statute says “100 or more persons,” not “100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest.” Had Congress intended the latter, it easily could have drafted language to that effect. Indeed, when Congress wanted a numerosity requirement in CAFA to be satisfied by counting unnamed parties in interest in addition to named plaintiffs, it explicitly said so: CAFA provides that in order for a class action to be removable, “the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes” must be 100 or greater, and it defines “class members” to mean “the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class.” Congress chose not to use the phrase “named or unnamed” in CAFA’s mass action provision, a decision we understand to be intentional.

More fundamentally, respondents’ interpretation cannot be reconciled with the fact that the “100 or more persons” referred to in the statute are not unspecified individuals who have no actual participation in the suit, but instead the very “plaintiffs” referred to later in the sentence—the parties who are proposing to join their claims in a single trial….[2]

The Court then rejected the argument that “plaintiffs” should be read as including both named and unnamed parties, finding that such a reading “stretches the meaning of ‘plaintiff’ beyond recognition” and would impose an “administrative nightmare” on the lower courts:

The term “plaintiff” is among the most commonly understood of legal terms of art: It means a “party who brings a civil suit in a court of law.” It certainly does not mean “anyone, named or unnamed, whom a suit may benefit,” as respondents suggest.

Yet if the term “plaintiffs” is stretched to include all unnamed individuals with an interest in the suit, then §1332(d)(11)(B)(i)’s requirement that “jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims [exceed $75,000]” becomes an administrative nightmare that Congress could not possibly have intended. How is a district court to identify the unnamed parties whose claims in a given case are for less than $75,000? Would the court in this case, for instance, have to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the identity of each of the hundreds of thousands of unnamed Mississippi citizens who purchased one of respondents’ LCD products between 1996 and 2006 (the period alleged in the complaint)? Even if it could identify every such person, how would it ascertain the amount in controversy for each individual claim?

We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal district courts engage in these unwieldy inquiries. By contrast, interpreting “plaintiffs” in accordance with its usual meaning—to refer to the actual named parties who bring an action—leads to a straightforward, easy to administer rule under which a court would examine whether the plaintiffs have pleaded in good faith the requisite amount. Our decision thus comports with the commonsense observation that “when judges must decide jurisdictional matters, simplicity is a virtue.”[3]

The decision means that the troubling trend of retaining private class action lawyers to file public AG actions in state courts can continue and could conceivably quicken. It also raises a number of interesting questions the Court did not address, for example whether AG actions are barred by agreements to settle class actions brought on behalf of the same consumers,[4] or affected by agreements to resolve claims in individual arbitration rather than representative litigation.[5]


[1]           The defendants did not ask the Court to hold that the case qualified as a “class action,” although they had raised that point below. See Opinion at 4 & n.2.

[2]           Opinion at 5-6 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).

[3]           Id. at 7-10 (citations omitted).

[4]           Cf. New Mexico ex rel. King v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 13-0513, 2013 WL 5944087, at *4-8 (D.N.M. Nov. 4, 2013) (finding that class action settlement barred AG action to the extent it sought compensatory relief).

[5]           Cf. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 206 Cal. App. 4th 949, 964 (2012) (finding that Concepcion requires enforcement of waiver of right to bring representative action under California’s Private Attorney General Act), review granted Sept. 19, 2012 (No. S204032).

Article by:

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP