FTC and DOJ Propose Significant Changes to US Merger Review Process

On 27 June 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice–Antitrust Division (DOJ) (collectively, the Agencies) announced sweeping proposed changes to the US-premerger notification filing process. The proposed changes mark the first significant overhaul of the federal premerger notification form since its original release in 1978 and would require parties to report

On 27 June 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice–Antitrust Division (DOJ) (collectively, the Agencies) announced sweeping proposed changes to the US-premerger notification filing process. The proposed changes mark the first significant overhaul of the federal premerger notification form since its original release in 1978 and would require parties to reportable transactions to collect and submit significantly more information and documentation as part of the premerger review process. If finalized, the proposed rule changes would likely delay deal timelines by months, requiring significantly more time and effort by the parties and their counsel in advance of submitting the required notification form.

In this alert, we:

  • Provide an overview of the current merger review process in the United States;
  • Describe the proposed new rules announced by the Agencies;
  • Explain the Agencies’ rationale for the new proposed rules;
  • Predict how the proposed new rules could impact parties’ premerger filing obligations, including deal timelines; and
  • Explain what companies should expect over the next several months.

BACKGROUND ON THE HSR MERGER REVIEW PROCESS

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (the HSR Act or “HSR”) requires certain persons making acquisitions of assets, voting securities, and non-corporate interests (i.e., interests in partnerships and limited liability companies) to:

(a)    File premerger notifications with the FTC and DOJ; and

(b)    Wait until the expiration or termination of a waiting period (usually 30 days) before consummating the acquisition.

Most mergers and acquisitions valued in excess of USD$111.4 million fall under the HSR Act subject to size-of-party thresholds in certain cases. Additionally, there are several exemptions that may apply to an otherwise reportable transaction.

The FTC or the DOJ reviews the parties’ HSR filings during the waiting period to determine whether the transaction may substantially lessen competition in violation of the antitrust laws. If, at the end of the waiting period any concerns have not been placated, the reviewing agency may issue a Request for Additional Documents and Information (commonly referred to as a Second Request), a very broad subpoena-like document seeking documents, data, and interrogatory responses from the filers. This tolls the waiting period until both parties substantially comply with the Second Request. The reviewing agency then has an additional 30-day period to decide whether to challenge the transaction in court.

WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED CHANGES?

On 27 June 2023, the FTC and DOJ announced a number of significant changes to the HSR notification form and filing process, the first such overhaul in almost 45 years. The Agencies released the proposed changes and rationale for the same in a 133-page Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) that will be published in the Federal Register later this week. While antitrust practitioners are still digesting the full extent of all of the proposed changes, it is clear that they would require parties to submit significantly more information and documentation to the Agencies as part of their HSR notification form. The most notable additional information and documentation includes:

  • Submission of additional deal documents, including draft agreements or term sheets (as opposed to just the preliminary agreement), where a definitive transaction agreement has not yet been executed; draft versions of all deal documents (as opposed to just the final versions); documents created by or for the deal team lead(s) (as opposed to just officers and directors); and verbatim translations of all foreign language documents.
  • Details about acquisitions during the previous 10 years.
  • Identification of and information about all officers, directors, and board observers of all entities within the acquiring person, including the identification of other entities these individuals currently serve, or within the two years prior to filing had served, as an officer, director, or board observer.
  • Identification of and information about all creditors and entities that hold non-voting securities, options, or warrants totaling 10% or more.
  • Disclosure of subsidies (e.g., grants and loans), by certain foreign governments, including North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran.
  • Narrative description of the strategic rationale for the transaction (including projected revenue streams), a diagram of the deal structure, and a timeline and narrative of the conditions for closing.
  • Identification and narrative describing horizontal overlaps, both current and planned.
  • Identification and narrative describing supply agreements/relationships.
  • Identification and narrative describing labor markets, as well as submission of certain data on the firms’ workforce, including workforce categories, geographic information on employees, and details on labor and workplace safety violations.
  • Identification of certain defense or intelligence contracts.
  • Identification of foreign jurisdictions reviewing the deal.

WHY ARE THESE CHANGES BEING PROPOSED?

In its press release announcing the proposed new rules, the FTC stated that “[t]he proposed changes to the HSR Form and instructions would enable the Agencies to more effectively and efficiently screen transactions for potential competition issues within the initial waiting period, which is typically 30 days.”The FTC further explained:

Over the past several decades, transactions (subject to HSR filing requirements) have become increasingly complex, with the rise of new investment vehicles and changes in corporate acquisition strategies, along with increasing concerns that antitrust review has not sufficiently addressed concerns about transactions between firms that compete in non-horizontal ways, the impact of corporate consolidation on American workers, and growth in the technology and digital platform economies. When the Agencies experienced a surge in HSR filings that more than doubled filings from 2020 to 2021, it became impossible to ignore the changes to the transaction landscape and how much more complicated it has become for agency staff to conduct an initial review of a transaction’s competitive impact. The volume of filings at that time also highlighted the significant limitations of the current HSR Form in understanding a transaction’s competitive impact.2

Finally, the FTC also cited certain Congressional concerns and the Merger Fee Filing Modernization Act of 2022, stating that the “proposed changes also address Congressional concerns that subsidies from foreign entities of concern can distort the competitive process or otherwise change the business strategies of a subsidized firm in ways that undermine competition following an acquisition. Under the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022, the agencies are required to collect information on subsidies received from certain foreign governments or entities that are strategic or economic threats to the United States.”

HOW WILL THESE CHANGES POTENTIALLY IMPACT PARTIES’ HSR FILINGS?

The proposed changes, as currently drafted, would require significantly more time and effort by the parties and their counsel to prepare the parties’ respective HSR notification forms. For example, the proposed new rules require the identification, collection, and submission of more deal documents and strategic documents; significantly more information about the parties, their officers, directors and board observers, minority investments, and financial interests; and narrative analyses and descriptions of horizontal and non-horizontal relationships, markets, and competition. Gathering, analyzing, and synthesizing this information into narrative form will require significantly more time and resources from both the parties and their counsel to comply.

Under the current filing rules, it typically takes the merging parties about seven to ten days to collect the information needed for and to complete the HSR notification form. Under the proposed new rules, the time to gather such information and complete an HSR notification form could be expanded by multiple months.

WHAT IS NEXT?

The Notice will be published in the Federal Register later this week. The public will then have 60 days from the date of publication to submit comments. Following the comment period, the Agencies will review and consider the comments and then publish a final version of the new rules. The new rules will not go into effect until after the Agencies publish the final version of the new rules. This process will likely take several months to complete, and the new rules–or some variation of them–will not come into effect until that time.

While the final form of the proposed rules are not likely to take effect for several months, the Agencies’ sweeping proposed changes to the notification form and filing process are in line with the type of information that the Agencies have been increasingly requesting from parties during the merger review process. Accordingly, parties required to submit HSR filings over the next several months should be prepared to receive similar requests from the Agencies, either on a voluntary basis (e.g., during the initial 30-day waiting period) or through issuance of a Second Request, and they should build into their deal timeline (either pre- or post-signing) sufficient time to comply with these requests.

 

“FTC and DOJ Propose Changes to HSR Form for More Effective, Efficient Merger Review,” FTC Press Release, June 27, 2023, available at FTC and DOJ Propose Changes to HSR Form for More Effective, Efficient Merger Review | Federal Trade Commission.  

“Q and A on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the HSR Filing Process,” FTC Proposed Text of Federal Register Publication, available at 16 CFR Parts 801 and 803: Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements | Federal Trade Commission (ftc.gov).

Copyright 2023 K & L Gates

Diving Into SECURE 2.0: Changes for Small Employer Retirement Plans

International arbitration provides a binding, neutral, and consensual process for resolving contractual disputes between parties, often resulting in resolutions that are quicker, cheaper, more private, and more controllable than litigation in a court of law. Accordingly, arbitration for the resolution of international disputes between contracting parties from different legal jurisdictions has emerged as a fundamental method for resolving complex disputes in an ever-increasingly interconnected world. Multinational companies should make sure they stay up to date on the fundamentals of international arbitration, and it all starts with ensuring any arbitration clause included in an international agreement is drafted in a way that is enforceable and provides contracting parties a clear path toward the resolution of their dispute.

Why Should You Care about What Your Arbitration Clause Says?

An arbitration clause is the starting point for determining the parties’ intent in resolving their dispute outside a court of law. It is an independent agreement within the broader contract, likely enforceable even if the remainder of the contract is procured by fraud, and sits at the apex of what a court or arbitrator will look for to determine the parties’ intent with respect to how a dispute between contracting parties should be resolved.

A clear arbitration clause results in a meaningful, enforceable outcome, minimizes the intervention of U.S. or foreign judiciaries in what should be a private dispute resolution process, grants the third-party administrator and/or the arbitrator the powers necessary to resolve the dispute, and is conducted in accordance with procedures that help guarantee a fair, efficient proceeding.

In contrast, if an arbitration clause is ambiguous, there may be a finding that there is no dispute resolution agreement to enforce. This can result in challenges to the arbitration clause’s enforceability and potential litigation in unfavorable and less-than-ideal judicial systems. Of course, such ambiguity and challenges will create higher costs, longer windows of time to resolve disputes, greater risks that your claims in the dispute will be vulnerable to collateral attacks, and other unintended and unexpected consequences.

What Are the Hallmarks of a Clear Arbitration Clause?

For purposes of clarity, you should ensure your contract’s arbitration clause identifies:

  • Applicable Law. Which country’s (or state’s) law applies?
  • Forum and Rules. There are any number of arbitral forums, each with its own nuances in terms of procedure. Knowing the business and potential disputes that could arise will assist in selecting a good fit in terms of applicable rules.
  • Seat of Arbitration. The seat of the arbitration is more than just the place where the final hearing will take place. It provides a significant backbone to the proceeding and is as important as the selection of the forum and applicable rules.
  • Number of Arbitrators. The more arbitrators, the larger the cost, but a three-member tribunal has its place in certain disputes.
  • Language. Selecting the language (or languages) of the arbitration can greatly affect the cost of the proceeding.

Why Does Selecting the Seat of Arbitration Matter?

More than just the physical place where the arbitration will take place, the seat of arbitration is a legal construct that determines the lex arbitri — the procedural law of the arbitration.

Where the contract between the parties or the rules selected by the parties do not provide for certain procedures, the procedural laws of the seat of arbitration will be applied. Among the important aspects of a proceeding that the seat of the arbitration determines is:

  • Which courts will have supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration;
  • Definitions and form of an agreement to arbitrate;
  • The arbitrability of the dispute;
  • The constitution of the arbitral tribunal and any grounds for challenge;
  • The equality of treatment of the parties;
  • The freedom to agree on detailed rules of procedure;
  • Interim measures of protection and court assistance;
  • Default proceedings;
  • The validity of the arbitration award; and
  • The finality of the arbitration award, including which courts will hear challenges to the award.

If not clearly identified by the parties, the seat of arbitration — and the procedural laws of that seat — will be selected by the arbitral tribunal.

What Do the Rules You Picked Say About Interim Measures?

A major consideration in selecting the applicable arbitral rules is the availability of interim measures. These are measures of relief, which can include injunctive relief, obtained prior to the commencement of, or during, an arbitral proceeding.

One of the most interesting forms of interim measures is an award of security. An interim award of security in arbitration is a payment of an amount of monies (usually tied to damages) pre-hearing for the conservation of, and enforcement of, a judgment so as to not render a judgment in the future a Pyrrhic victory. These securities prevent the dissipation of assets before it is too late to reach those assets. As such, it is an extremely powerful tool, and determining whether the rules you select, and/or the seat of the arbitration, allows for such an interim award should be a key consideration in drafting your arbitration clause.

What Are the Abilities and Liabilities of Third Parties?

Depending on the circumstances, jurisdiction chosen, governing law, and seat of the arbitration, a third party (a non-signatory to the agreement) can compel arbitration and be compelled to arbitration, the latter being the rarer occurrence. Knowing if there is potential exposure to such parties, which can include directors, officers, employees, beneficiaries, and others, should be assessed prior to entering into an arbitration agreement.

On What Basis Are Arbitral Awards Enforceable?

Arbitral awards, because of the adherence by more than 160 countries to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), are the most enforceable award anywhere in the world. Under the New York Convention:

  • A written agreement to arbitrate, including as contained in a contractual arbitration clause, is generally enforceable.
  • Subject to very narrow exceptions, an arbitral award may be recognized and enforced as a final judgment in each contracting country.

In contrast, no treaty requires that the judgments of a country’s court system be recognized; these enforcement decisions are made on an ad hoc basis according to principles of comity and public policy. The Hague Judgments Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, a treaty similar to the New York Convention, may become the relevant applicable framework in the future but is still in its infancy.

How Can Legal Counsel Help My Multinational Company Address International Arbitration Issues?

The best way to ensure a reliable and enforceable arbitration agreement is a careful examination of the structure and purpose of the contract as well as the company’s unique business profile based on how and where it does business.

Adequate legal counsel should provide clients with practical guidance in drafting and enforcing international arbitration agreements. Services provided should include:

  • Counseling: Counseling companies to understand how international arbitration clauses apply to their multinational operations, how they may benefit from such clauses, and/or how such clauses may not be in their best interest.
  • Drafting: Working with clients to ensure enforceable and clearly understood arbitration clauses are prepared for the specific contractual relationship, considering the myriad factors that go into preparing such a clause.
  • Risk Assessments: Working with companies to conduct risk assessments in the event of contract disputes with arbitration clauses.
  • Arbitration: Arbitrating before tribunals to secure interim securities and/or enforceable arbitral awards in the event of a contract dispute anywhere in the world.

© 2023 Foley & Lardner LLP

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Tempur Sealy Acquisition of Mattress Firm: A Vertical Bridge Too Far for the FTC?

In a deal announced on May 9, Tempur Sealy International, Inc., the world’s largest mattress manufacturer, has agreed to acquire Houston-based Mattress Firm Group, Inc., the largest U.S. brick-and-mortar bedding retailer, with more than 2,300 locations and a robust e-commerce platform. The companies hope to finalize the $40 billion deal in the second half of 2024.

Following pre-merger notification of the deal last October, the FTC is reportedly taking a deep dive into the mattress industry to assess whether the transaction is likely to harm competition. The depth of the investigation itself signals a departure from the antitrust agencies’ traditional approach to “vertical” mergers in which firms in the same industry but in non-overlapping market segments (such as manufacturing and retailing the same product category) benefit from a soft presumption of legality. Customarily, vertical integration was perceived to be benign, if not somehow “efficiency enhancing.”

Whatever the merits of applying such leniency to traditional supply chains of widgets, it does not serve competition policy well in an economy dominated by technology-driven platforms that serve several enormous groups of customers at once. In today’s markets, non-overlapping vertical arrangements can severely affect whether rival firms can gain access to inputs, markets, or prospective customers.

Evidence of the FTC’s awareness of the potential for vertical mergers to cause competitive harm abounds. On September 15, 2021, the FTC withdrew the FTC/Department of Justice 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary. The Commission’s majority said that the 2020 Guidelines included a “flawed discussion of the purported procompetitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers, especially its treatment of the elimination of double marginalization” and by failing to address “increasing levels of consolidation across the economy.”

Mattresses and Widgets

A course correction is borne out by the Commission’s recent challenges to several proposed vertical mergers, including Nvidia Corp.’s attempted acquisition of Arm Ltd., Lockheed Martin Corporation’s attempted acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc., Microsoft Corp.’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc., and Illumina, Inc.’s acquisition of GRAIL, Inc. After the parties abandoned the Nvidia/Arm acquisition, the FTC’s press release was effusive: “This result is particularly significant because it represents the first abandonment of a litigated vertical merger in many years,” the Commission said.

Enter the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction, a vertical acquisition in a product category whose markets resemble widgets more than online merchandising or payment networks. Tempur Sealy became the world’s largest mattress manufacturer in 2012, when Tempur-Pedic acquired Sealey Corp. for $1.3 billion. The company currently earns revenues of $5 billion a year, almost a third of the $17 billion U.S. mattress market. Mattress Firm, the largest mattress retailer in the U.S. with annual revenues of $2.5 billion a year, has been owned since 2016 by German retail holding company Steinhoff International Holdings NV. The firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in October 2018, but quickly emerged the following month after closing 700 stores.

The merging parties are no strangers to one another, having engaged in a commercial relationship for the past 35 years. In 2017, Tempur Sealy sued Mattress Firm for selling mattresses that infringed on the Tempur-Pedic line-up, but in 2019, after its emergence from bankruptcy, Mattress Firm and Tempur Sealy struck a long-term partnership agreement. A merger of the two firms has been under discussion in one form or another for most of the past decade.

Public statements by the parties stress the complementarity of the deal, which they describe as combining “Tempur Sealy’s extensive product development and manufacturing capabilities with vertically integrated retail.” The merged entity will end up with about 3,000 retail stores, 30 e-commerce platforms, 71 manufacturing facilities, and 4 R&D facilities around the world. It is the kind of combination of complementary businesses that not long ago might not have even earned a Second Request from the antitrust agencies.

The FTC, which at least since last December has been investigating the potential effects on the mattress industry of a merger between the two market leaders, issued a Second Request earlier this month. By February, the Commission had already interviewed executives from the top 20 mattress manufacturers, according to a report in Furniture Today (February 2, 2023).

Disruptors and Goliaths

The FTC is likely to discover a large and growing global industry undergoing significant changes in how mattresses are designed, marketed, and sold in reaction to changing consumer preferences.

Several online mattress-in-a-box companies have disrupted the industry. Today, nearly half of all consumers purchases are online. They will also find fairly low barriers to entry into both brick-and-mortar and online retailing and mattress manufacturing. Their review of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction will also encounter two players in the market with a long history of cooperation.

With 20 manufacturers significant enough to interview, the Commission would appear to be faced with a fairly competitive market – one in which little or no foreclosure of rivals to the ability to obtain inputs or the availability of channels of distribution to reach consumers will result from the proposed transaction. Additional competitive pressure comes from Amazon, which began selling its own mattresses in 2018 as part of the Amazon Essentials line, and Walmart, which introduced its own mattress-in-box brand, Allswell, available online and in stores.

On balance, the acquisition of Mattress Firm by Tempur Sealy would not appear to raise significant antitrust issues. A challenge to this transaction by the FTC may be a vertical bridge too far. That is no doubt the assessment reached by Scott Thompson, chairman and CEO of Tempur Sealy, who expressed confidence in clearing the FTC’s antitrust review, “either in the traditional sense or through litigation.”

© MoginRubin LLP

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The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Over Dual-Purpose Communications

The Supreme Court will evaluate the scope of attorney-client privilege when applied to communications shared between counsel and client that involve both legal and non-legal advice (“dual-purpose communications”). The decision of the highest court will have long-lasting implications for both business organizations and their retained counsels. The potential outcome of this case cannot be understated.

In this matter, the grand jury issued subpoenas to an anonymous law firm seeking documents related to the government’s investigation of the firm’s client. The law firm had provided both legal and business services to the client by advising on tax-related legal issues and preparing the client’s annual tax returns. When the law firm and client (“Petitioners”) withheld certain correspondence on the grounds that they were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, the government moved to compel the production of those documents. The district court held that, while the correspondence contained a “dual-purpose,” they were not protected by attorney-client privilege because the primary purpose of the correspondence was to obtain business tax advice and not legal advice.

On appeal, Petitioners argued that the appellate court should apply the “because of” test rather than the “primary purpose” test. The “because of” test asks whether the dual-purpose correspondence was made because of a need for legal advice. The application of this test would expand the scope of attorney-client privilege and protect the correspondence at issue. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected Petitioners’ argument and affirmed the district court’s decision. Petitioners appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 3, 2022.

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Grand Jury 21-1397 will be of particular significance for in-house counsels who regularly provide both business and legal advice to their employers. For outside counsels, the outcome of this case will shed light on the standard to be applied for asserting privilege over dual-purpose communications. Oral argument occurred on January 9, 2023 at the Supreme Court.

For more litigation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

U.S. Supreme Court Refuses Review of Case Involving Technical Issue With Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge

Refusing to weigh in on the impact of a plaintiff’s failure to verify her discrimination charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Supreme Court lets stand the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s failure to verify her charge barred her from filing a lawsuit. Mosby v. City of Byron, No. 21-10377, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10436 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022), cert. denied, No. 22-283 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022).

Background

Rachel Mosby served as the fire chief of Byron, Georgia, for 11 years. One month after she came out as transgender, the city fired her.

Mosby filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title VII states that charges filed “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This process is called “verification.” The parties did not dispute that Mosby did not properly verify her charge.

The City of Byron submitted a position statement with the EEOC on the merits of Mosby’s claim, but it did not raise the fact that Mosby failed to verify her charge. Mosby never amended her charge to meet the verification requirement.

After receiving a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC, Mosby sued the City of Byron. Before answering Mosby’s complaint, the City of Byron moved to dismiss because Mosby failed to verify her charge, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. After converting the City’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the district court held the failure to verify the charge barred Mosby’s Title VII and ADA claims.

Jurisdictional or Procedural?

Whether EEOC’s charge filing requirements are prerequisite to filing a lawsuit is jurisdictional or procedural remains in dispute. While procedural requirements can be waived or cured, jurisdictional requirements cannot. In 2019, the Supreme Court provided guidance in Fort Bend City v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, in which it held that a charge’s lack of verification does not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider in a subsequent federal lawsuit. Unlike a jurisdictional issue, the Court reasoned, the lack of verification can be waived or forfeited by the parties. Accordingly, the Court held that an employer forfeited the issue of verification when it failed to raise it promptly at the outset of litigation.

Eleventh Circuit’s Reasoning

In appealing the dismissal of her claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (which has jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, and Georgia), Mosby argued that Fort Bend required a finding that the City of Byron waived its verification defense because it did not raise the defense in its position statement submitted with the EEOC. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. In the Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit said, Fort Bend City did not raise the verification defense until four years and “an entire round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court” had passed. By contrast, the City of Byron raised the defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss before causing “a waste of adjudicatory resources.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that “a charge neither filed under oath or affirmation nor subsequently cured by amendment fails to satisfy the statutory requirement that an employee submit [her] charge to the Commission.” The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 2021, making these the only two circuits that have addressed the issue. See Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333.

Takeaway for Employers

An employer responding to a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC should evaluate whether the claimant properly verified the charge. If not, preserve the defense by raising it as soon as practicable at the EEOC charge stage and in any ensuing litigation.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Keeping Things in Bounds: Private Company Owners Need to Abide by Clear Fiduciary Duties in Managing Their Companies

In February 2009, Pittsburgh Steelers wide receiver Santonio Holmes made a toe tapping catch in the back corner of the end zone[1] to secure a thrilling, come-from-behind win and crush the hearts of Arizona Cardinals fans in Super Bowl 43.  For private company owners running their own firms, the boundaries for their conduct are set by the fiduciary duties they owe to their companies.  But in both sports and the management of private businesses, team leaders can find it challenging to remain in bounds.  This post therefore reviews the legal lanes of proper conduct that owners will want to follow to avoid future claims.

The Scope of Fiduciary Duties

The fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers are not included in the Texas Business Organizations Code (“BOC”), but Texas case law for more than a century makes clear that both directors and company officers owe duties of obedience, care, and loyalty, and these duties are owed to the company, not to the individual shareholders.  See Tenison, v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S.W. 92 (1902); Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 868 (Tex. 2014).  These same fiduciary duties also apply to LLC managers and officers, and all of these parties are referred to in this post as “control persons.”

The Ritchie case focused on whether minority shareholders have a legal right to secure a court-ordered buyout of their minority ownership interest based on claims that control persons engaged in shareholder oppression.  The Court held no claim for shareholder oppression exists in the BOC or at common law that would authorize a trial court to order the company or majority owners to buy the minority owner’s stake in the business.  But, the Ritchie Court did uphold the right of minority shareholders to pursue claims against officers and directors for breach of their fiduciary duties, and recognized that these claims could be brought on a derivative basis.  In this regard, the Court stated that:

“Directors, or those acting as directors, owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation in their directorial actions,and this duty “includes the dedication of [their] uncorrupted business judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation.”  443 S.W.3d at 868.

The BOC permits the fiduciary duties of control persons to be limited in the company’s governance documents, but the statute does not permit a company to remove the duty of loyalty owed by control persons.  The remainder of this post focuses on what the duty of loyalty requires from governing persons in their business relationship with their companies.

Conflicts Transactions by Control Persons Can Lead to Claims

Owners of private companies commonly engage in transactions with their businesses in their capacity as control persons.  Majority owners may buy, sell and lease property from or to their companies, buy and sell products or services from other businesses they also own or control, and loan money to their companies to fund their business operations.  All of these transactions are not at “arm’s-length” and, instead, they are “interested party” transactions, which are sometimes referred to as “conflict transactions.”  These types of conflicts transactions may result in claims by the minority owners who allege that the transactions breached the control person’s fiduciary duties because they were not fair to the company.

Once again, the Supreme Court in Ritchie addressed this problem:

[T]he duty of loyalty that officers and directors owe to the corporation specifically prohibits them from misapplying corporate assets for their personal gain or wrongfully diverting corporate opportunities to themselves. Like most of the actions we have already discussed, these types of actions may be redressed through a derivative action, or through a direct action brought by the corporation, for breach of fiduciary duty.  443 S.W.3d at 887.

There is a “safe harbor” provision in the BOC for company control persons when they engage in business with their company for their personal benefit.  Section 21.418 of the BOC provides that when a control person enters into a transaction with the Company, which would otherwise be void or voidable, the transaction will be nevertheless be upheld as valid if certain conditions are met.  We discussed this safe harbor statute in more detail in a previous post (Read Here).  In summary, a conflict transaction by a control person will be upheld if (i) the details of the transaction were fully disclosed to and approved by a majority of the shareholders and/or by a majority of the disinterested directors or (ii) if the transaction is deemed to be objectively fair to the company.

Fairness is not defined in the BOC provisions, but fair is defined in Webster’s dictionary as “characterized by honesty and justice” and “free from fraud, injustice, prejudice or favoritism.  Once the minority shareholder brings a claim and demonstrates that a control person engaged in a conflict transaction, the control person will then bear the burden of demonstrating in the case that the terms of the transaction were fair to the company.  To avoid being forced to litigate the issue of fairness, control persons may want to avoid the following types of conflict transactions or, alternatively, they may want to take steps to head off the expected challenge from minority owners that the transaction was not fair to the company.

Examples of Conflicts Transactions

The following are the most common types of conflict transactions that control persons engage in with their companies, and for each of these, an approach is suggested that can either eliminate or reduce the potential for future claims.

  • Theft of corporate opportunity
    The duty of loyalty requires control persons not to take business opportunities for themselves that rightfully belong to the company.  When control persons take company opportunities, this is referred to as usurpation or misappropriation and it is a breach of fiduciary duty.  There is a clear way, however, for control persons to avoid this claim.  In 2003, the BOC was amended to allow for a company to include in its certificate of formation, bylaws or in its company agreement an express waiver of the control person’s duty not to usurp a company opportunity.  See. BOC Section 2.101(21).  The specific language gives the company the power to:

 . . . renounce, in its certificate of formation or by action of its governing authority, an interest or expectancy of the entity in, or an interest or expectancy of the entity in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or a specified class or category of business opportunities presented to the entity or one or more of its managerial officials or owners. 

As indicated by this provision, the certificate, bylaw or provision of the company agreement needs to make clear the specific type or category of opportunities that are being excluded from the duty.  By including this limitation on the duty of loyalty, however, the control person will be immune from any liability for usurping a corporate opportunity of the company as it is defined in the bylaws or in the provisions of the LLC agreement.

  • Purchase or sale or lease of property to company, and loans to company 
    It is common for control persons to either sell, purchase or lease property, assets or services to/from the company they control or to provide loans to the company.  These are all conflict transactions that can, and often do, give rise to claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fights about whether the control person engaged in a transaction that was unfair to the company.  To avoid or at least limit claims related to these types of transactions, there are a number of common sense, practical steps that control persons can take before they engage in the transaction.

First, the control person should fully disclose all material terms of the transaction to other shareholders, the board and/or managers of the company and seek their approval, which if given, should eliminate all future claims.  Second, when there are objections raised to the transaction, the control person should consider securing input from outside experts to provide objective information.  For example, if the control person is selling or leasing property to the company, the control person should arrange for an independent appraiser to provide a written appraisal to set the property’s market value.  If a lease of property is at issue, an independent broker can provide market value lease rates for the type of property at issue.  Third, when the company is receiving loans from the control person, bankers can readily provide loan terms that reflect market rates.

Finally, the control person should consider structuring the transaction in a way that provides the company with a better deal on terms more favorable than market rates.  The control person does not need to give the company a gift in the transaction, but if the company receives a deal that is better than market rates, that will make it harder for the other shareholders or LLC members to complain that there was any lack of fairness in the transaction to the company.

  •  Compensation and bonuses 
    Finally, a hot button point with shareholders and members is often compensation, and more specifically, how much money is paid in base compensation and bonuses to the majority owner in his/her capacity as an officer, director or manager.  The obvious concern is that funds paid in compensation should, instead, be issued as dividends or distributions to all owners, and that the compensation paid to the majority owner is considered a “disguised distribution.”

If the other shareholders or members express concern regarding the compensation and bonuses that are being paid to the majority owners, this issue should be addressed by hiring an experienced and independent executive compensation expert.  The compensation expert will provide the company with a range of compensation that is being paid to executives at similarly situated companies in the same or similar industry and geographic region.  As noted above, rather than choosing a compensation/bonus level at the top end of the range determined by the expert, the majority owner is advised to select a range of compensation in the 70-80% range to limit the likelihood of any claim being brought by minority owners on this basis.

Conclusion

In King Henry IV, Shakespeare wrote: “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.”  One cause for this unease by private company owners who wear the mantle of leadership is that they are subject to suits by co-owners for breach of loyalty to the company.  But staying inbounds is by no means an insurmountable challenge for majority owners, as control persons, if they follow a few simple ground rules.  In short, majority owners need to be fully transparent in all of their transactions with the company, they should seek agreement when possible with other owners, but when an agreement is not possible, they need to secure specific input from outside experts who can validate the fairness of the transaction to the company before it takes place.  And regarding that Santonio Holmes TD catch, let’s look ahead and hope the Cardinals get another chance at a Super Bowl win soon led by their exciting QB and No. 1 Draft Choice, Kyler Murray.

_____________________________

[1] Cardinals fans like me continue to question whether Holmes actually managed to get his right toes down on the turf in the end zone before he was pushed out of bounds, and photographs of the catch prolong this debate.

© 2020 Winstead PC.
For more on Corporate Fiduciary Duties, see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organization’s law section.

A Word About Business Interruption Claims From Vandalism, Riot and Civil Commotion

The death of George Floyd is a national tragedy that should never have happened.  The winds of change are in the air and we can only hope that peace, understanding, justice and fairness for all will prevail.  What happened to George Floyd and the cries to end racial injustice, however, have been overshadowed in the eyes of many by the vandalism, looting and rioting that followed.  That brings us to insurance.

There have been many articles discussing whether and how the business losses arising from the vandalism and looting will be covered under insurance policies.  Because these losses took place during the novel coronavirus pandemic, the insurance coverage issues have become more complex.  This is particularly true for business interruption claims.

There are three issues that I thought were worth highlighting.  The first concerns the confluence of the existing COVID-19 stay-home orders and the vandalism and looting.  The second is the necessary nexus between direct physical damage and civil orders under coverage for civil authority.  Finally, the effect of anti-concurrent cause clauses in property policies.

First, some of the business interruption claims now being brought by businesses that had to shut down because of the protests or because of the curfew orders have been complicated by overlapping civil authority stay-home orders because of the novel coronavirus.  Where a business was closed because of COVID-19 stay-home orders or was open only to provide curbside pickup or delivery services, how is its loss of income and extra expense calculated if the business had to close because of the civil unrest?  Analyzing this issue requires much more space than this blog post can provide.  It is a complicated issue that depends on exactly what coverage is provided and how loss of income is calculated under the relevant business interruption coverage grant.

Just as an example, under a common business income and extra expense coverage form, the amount of business income loss is determined based upon the net income of the business “before the direct physical loss or damage occurred,” the likely net income of the business “if no physical loss or damage has occurred . . . ” and “the operating expenses, including payroll expenses, necessary to resume operations with the same quality of service that existed just before the direct physical loss or damage.”  When applied to the recent vandalism and looting business interruption losses, the net income before the vandalism and looting may have been much less than in months or years past because of the COVID-19 stay-home orders.  If no vandalism and looting had occurred, the likely net income would have been the same as under the existing COVID-19 stay-home orders; that is to say, most likely diminished from prior periods.  Yet some are pushing for the COVID-19 effect not to be considered at all in the calculation of net income in the context of business interruption losses due to vandalism and looting.

Second, civil orders that prevented ingress and egress to and from businesses because of the threat of violence from possible protests likely will not be sufficient to trigger coverage under business interruption civil order provisions.  The common form requires a nexus between direct physical damage and the civil order.  For example, the action of civil authority must be “taken in response to dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage or continuation of the Covered Cause of Loss that caused the damage. . . .”  If a local government shuts down a business district in advance of a protest and before there is any physical damage to property, that civil order should not trigger coverage under the business interruption coverage grant.  A civil order that shuts down a business district after vandalism because the area is dangerous likely would result in some coverage under the business interruption coverage grant depending on other policy factors.

Finally, some property policies limit coverage to covered causes of loss and preclude coverage if the loss was caused in part by a non-covered cause of loss.  For example,

We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause of event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.  These exclusions apply whether or not the loss event results in widespread damage or affects a substantial area.

If an insurance policy excludes a cause like looting, but covers vandalism, even if the loss was caused in part by looting, the anti-concurrent causation clause would preclude coverage.  So too, if part of the loss claimed was caused by the novel coronavirus and the policy has a virus exclusion, that would preclude the loss even if part of it was caused by vandalism.

As always, it is most important to read the complete policy because not all insurance policies are the same.  Nevertheless, there is no doubt that business interruption losses arising from the recent civil unrest have been complicated by existing governmental orders covering the novel coronavirus.  It will take patience by all parties and careful analysis to work through these claims.


© Copyright 2020 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more on business interruption claims, see the National Law Review Insurance, Reinsurance and Surety law section.

SBA Rulemaking and Guidance Challenged in Federal Lawsuits in Connection with PPP Loan Guidance

The Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”) was signed into law by the President on March 27, 2020. Title I of the CARES Act, named “Keeping American Workers Employed and Paid” by Congress, appropriated $659 billion for loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).

Section 1114 of the CARES Act instructs the SBA to issue regulations “to carry out this title and the amendments made by this title” within fifteen days and without regard to the usual notice requirements, which the SBA did in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (the “FAQs”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001(1), 9012.

While ostensibly intended to clarify uncertainty in the CARES Act, two recent federal lawsuits challenge certain rulemaking and guidance promulgated by the SBA. The question before the courts is whether such rulemaking and guidance is a lawful interpretation of the CARES Act or, as the plaintiffs argue, amounts to illegal rulemaking.

Agencies are prohibited by the Administrative Procedures Act from taking action “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). The validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute is reviewed by a court using the two-step framework outlined in the landmark case, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The first question reviewed in the Chevron analysis is, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

The plaintiffs argue that certain elements of the SBA guidance did not give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and, as a result, are unlawful and unenforceable.

DV Diamond Club of Flint v. SBA

DV Diamond Club of Flint LLC (“DV Diamond”) is a strip club in Flint, Michigan, which feared that it would be denied a PPP loan by lenders as a result of guidance from the SBA that is not consistent with the CARES Act. DV Diamond’s initial complaint, dated April 8, 2020, was amended on April 17, 2020 to add forty-one new co-plaintiffs (collectively with DV Diamond, the “Plaintiffs”), each of which claims to operate a legal sexual oriented business which meets the eligibility requirements under the CARES Act. The Plaintiffs argue that the CARES Act is unambiguous as to what businesses are eligible for PPP loans and the SBA, therefore, has no right to assert additional eligibility requirements or disqualifiers. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. SBA, 20-cv-10899, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82213, at *27 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020).

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the “District Court”) issued an injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, noting that Congress unambiguously stated that the SBA may not exclude from eligibility for a PPP loan guarantee a business that met the CARES Act’s size standard for eligibility. Id. at *27.

The District Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that, “under step one of Chevron that the PPP Ineligibility Rule conflicts with the PPP and is therefore invalid.” Id. at *42.

“Congress provided temporary paycheck support to all Americans employed by all small businesses that satisfied the two eligibility requirements—even businesses that may have been disfavored during normal times.” Id. at *4-5.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the SBA’s motion for a stay of the injunction, holding that the relevant factors, including the Plaintiff’s likelihood success, weighed in favor of the Plaintiff. DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. SBA, No. 20-1437, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 15822, at *8 (6th Cir. May 15, 2020).

Zumasys, Inc. v. SBA

Zumasys and two affiliated companies (collectively, “Zumasys”) received PPP loans but are concerned that they may subsequently be deemed ineligible as a result of “improper, and legally impermissible, underground regulation” promulgated by the SBA. (Zumasys, Inc. v. U.S. SBA et al., Dkt. No. 20-cv-008511, Dkt. 1 (the Zumasys Complaint) ¶ 58.)

Zumasys claims to have acted in reliance on the CARES Act by obtaining—and spending—what they expected to be forgivable PPP funds under the terms of the CARES Act rather than furloughing or terminating their employees. Subsequently, guidance set forth in questions 31 and 37 of the SBA’s Frequently Asked Questions, according to Zumasys, might require their loans to be repaid. Zumasys claims that being forced to repay their loans will place them in a worse financial position than had it never sought the PPP funds.

The SBA’s “credit elsewhere” test, which requires a borrower to demonstrate that the needed financing is not otherwise available on reasonable terms from non-governmental sources, was expressly excluded as an eligibility requirement to obtain a PPP loan by Congress. Zumasys alleges, however, that the FAQs “purport to re-impose the “credit elsewhere” requirement in contravention of” the CARES Act. (Id. ¶ 66.)

As a result, in an argument similar to that made by DV Diamond and its co-plaintiffs, Zumasys asserts that the FAQs “are not in accordance with the law and exceed Defendants’ authority under the CARES Act,” and asks that the SBA should be enjoined from enforcing them by the court. (Id.)

Subsequent to the filing of the Zumasys lawsuit, on May 13, 2020, the SBA issued guidance in question 46 in the FAQs that any borrower that, together with its affiliates, received PPP loans with an original principal amount of less than $2 million will be deemed to have made the required certification concerning the necessity of the loan request in good faith.

While this development, on its face, would seem to alleviate the concerns of Zumasys, a great deal of uncertainty remains for borrowers in connection with the guidance that has been released by the SBA since the passing of the CARES Act into law. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that subsequent guidance from the SBA will not contradict the guidance currently being relied upon, and in FAQ 39 the SBA noted that it will review all loans in excess of $2 million and in subsequent rulemaking it noted that with respect to a PPP Loan of any size, the “SBA may undertake a review at any time in [the] SBA’s discretion.”

Conclusion

The challenges by DV Diamond, Zumasys and other plaintiffs will hinge on whether or not the applicable courts determine that the guidance issued by the SBA is inconsistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.

To the extent that borrowers and applicants continue to believe that problematic discrepancies exist between the law and guidance being delivered by the SBA, and the SBA subsequently determines that a borrower is ineligible for a PPP loan or forgiveness of such loan, the courts may in the future be called upon again to apply the Chevron analysis to the SBA’s actions in connection with the PPP.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

© Copyright 2020 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.
For more on SBA’s PPP loans, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Board Oversight in the Age of COVID-19: Part Four

Part 4 of a weekly series detailing approaches that independent board members are utilizing to address coronavirus-related matters and highlighting emerging issues. Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3 of the series may be accessed on our website. 

The surreal nature of the current coronavirus environment in the United States continues. The number of new cases appears to have peaked in New York City and the Bay Area, while the S&P 500 ended the week down only about 13.5% year to date, and is higher now than on January 1, 2019. Yet, unemployment claims surged and are approximately 8.5 times higher than levels from the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and scores of businesses across the country remain shuttered and face bankruptcy. So the question of the past four weeks remains — where exactly do we go from here?

What Are Boards Doing Now?

Board Communications. Boards continue to evolve the nature of the periodic updates they are receiving. In addition to hearing about fund performance and operational matters, now some are including presentations from those asset management employees that focus on macro-economic themes, including the head of fixed-income research or those in similar positions.

Future Board Meetings. Boards continue to evaluate their June board schedules, and more are expecting to hold these meetings virtually. Some are also considering the need to hold additional telephonic board meetings to address items already deferred from meeting agendas in March, and expected to be deferred from June meeting agendas, as boards continue to assess the maximum length and most efficient structure of virtual board meetings.

15(c) Requests. Boards and their independent counsel continue to evaluate additional questions for 15(c) Request Letters to address COVID-19 matters. While the nature and extent of these requests is dependent on the types of periodic updates the board is already receiving, most are expecting to request and receive some form of “bring down” update from Fund management closer to the date of the meeting during which 15(c) renewals will be considered.

What’s Next – Emerging Issues

Below are some emerging issues that came to light over the past week, which boards may want to consider as they continue to exercise their fiduciary duties.

Liquidity: Some complexes are filing Form N-LIQUID with respect to funds that have breached the 15% limit on illiquid securities, and related reports are being made to the board, along with a remediation plan. Breaches may be due to a more careful review of holdings or to changes in the character of holdings. Alternatively, some complexes are reporting issues with liquidity categorizations provided by third party service providers causing Liquidity Risk Program Administrators to consider overriding or challenging the liquidity classifications provided. The SEC staff has been open and willing to discuss such filings and related matters, and we are aware that OCIE staff has been participating on some of these calls.

Service Providers: As the impact of the virus is expanding globally, boards are considering the types of risks that may be presented by service providers with operations in less developed countries, including India, where BCP plans may be less robust, do not contemplate “work from home” opportunities for all employees and may be harder to implement. This may be a heighted concern for ETFs, as these funds tend to have more unaffiliated service providers with offshore operations.

Index providers: Fund management has noted the benefit of advance communication with index providers to address the potential impact of market halts or bankruptcies of companies included in an index. While most index rebalances have been suspended, the impact of other market developments remains.

Back Office Issues: Fund management continues to consider operational matters, including the speed and efficiency of processing customer orders and the working relationship with financial printers, where production delays and other operational concerns are occurring.

Borrowing Relief: So far, we are not seeing many Funds utilizing this relief to access liquidity, as fund management considers operational issues.

Closed End Funds: The advantages of holding virtual annual shareholders meetings are being weighed against potential disadvantages, including that certain proxy solicitation firms may object to hosting a virtual meeting if it is contested and concerns that activists could take advantage of this format to hijack the meeting.

Interval Funds: Boards are closely monitoring management’s preparation for upcoming periodic repurchase offers to assess liquidity and valuation issues. In addition, boards are discussing whether repurchase amounts should be set at levels that seek to clear out shares tendered or to prorate, and considering the impact of such decisions on the management of the portfolio, continuing sales and liquidity for future repurchase offers.


© 2020 Vedder Price

For more on COVID-19 impact on various industries, see the Coronavirus News section of the National Law Review

Many Companies With More Than 500 Employees Could Qualify For Stimulus Loans

As the nation scrambles to take advantage of the $2 trillion stimulus benefits in the CARES Act, numerous sources have stated that only businesses with 500 or fewer employees are eligible to apply for loans under the Act’s Paycheck Protection Program. In fact, businesses with far more than 500 could be entitled to participate in the program.

First, section 1102(a) of the Act applies to any business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans’ organization, or Tribal business having the greater of:

1) 500 employees or

2) the “size standard in number of employees established by the [Small Business] Administration for the industry” in which the business operates.

These “size standards” are contained in a list maintained by the Small Business Administration, organized by North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) code, which establishes the maximum number of employees that a particular entity operating in certain industries can have and still qualify under the Paycheck Protection Program. Depending on the applicable NAICS code, a business with significantly greater than 500 employees may still qualify. For example, petroleum refineries (with capacity of less than 200,000 barrels per calendar day) and turbine manufacturers with up to 1,500 employees could qualify, businesses in the crude petroleum extraction, natural gas extraction and coal mining industries could qualify if they have up to 1,250 employees, and entities in the electric power distribution and natural gas distribution industries may have up to 1,000 employees and still qualify. These are only a handful of examples of hundreds of industries contained on the size standards list. Given the Act’s “greater of” language referenced above, the 500 employee maximum will apply even if the SBA’s size standard table indicates a lower number for a particular industry.1 Bear in mind that the SBA generally considers both the actual business concern, as well as all of its affiliates, in determining whether an entity qualifies as small.

Second, businesses must count “employees” as that term is defined under Title I of the CARES Act, i.e., an individual retained on a full-time, part-time, or “other basis.”  While the SBA previously had not expressly defined the term “employee,” the CARES Act has adopted preexisting SBA guidance from the SBA’s HUBZone Program to provide an explicit definition. As a result, it is likely that the full SBA guidance will be used to calculate the number of employees under section 1102(a) of the CARES Act. Under that guidance, an “employee” is an individual who works a minimum of 40 hours per month, including any employees obtained through temporary employee agencies. Independent contractors may also be considered an “employee” where there is evidence of an employee-employer relationship, which is assessed under a multi-factor test. On the other hand, independent contractors who are not considered employees would not count toward the entity’s employee count for purposes of determining eligibility under the Paycheck Protection Program.

1 The SBA’s size standard list also provides standards for certain industries expressed in annual receipts. These are not relevant under the stimulus package. If an industry’s NAICS code reflects a dollar figure, but does not include a number of employees, the 500 employee limit will apply.


© 2020 Bracewell LLP

For more CARES Act analysis, see the Nationa Law Review Coronavirus News section.