“Brexit” Dominates, as Financial Markets Roil

brexit financial marketsSecretary Kerry Heads to Brussels and London; President Obama Heads to Canada for the North American Leaders’ Summit; While the House is in Recess, Senate Committees Will Focus on the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Measure and the Full Chamber May Consider the Zika Compromise Measure

President Barack Obama acknowledged from San Francisco early Friday morning that the British had exercised their sovereign rights and chosen to exit the European Union.  Washington awoke to the news and the corresponding negative reaction of the international financial markets soon after. Secretary of State John Kerry changed his travel schedule, adding a stop in Brussels and London to a trip that had him in Italy over the weekend. Meanwhile, President Obama travels to Canada this week to attend the annual North American Leaders’ Summit.

Democratic Members of the House staged a 24-hour sit-in on the floor of the chamber last week, protesting what they believed was the Republican leaders’ unwillingness to address gun control through legislation.  On Thursday, Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin) abruptly adjourned the House until after the July Fourth holiday.

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) cut off an effort to keep suspected terrorists from buying guns last Thursday after Republicans and Democrats failed to reach an agreement on the issue, effectively ending debate of gun control in that chamber ahead of the November elections.  The Senate will be in session this week.

Brexit: British Vote to Exit the EU

Washington awoke to news Friday morning that the British had decided to exit the EU, a development that promptly caused international markets to slump.  Many expect market uncertainty will eventually impact the anemic economic growth in the United States.  After traveling to London in April and speaking in favor of Britain remaining in the EU, President Obama released a statement on Friday saying:

“The people of the United Kingdom have spoken, and we respect their decision.  The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is enduring, and the United Kingdom’s membership in NATO remains a vital cornerstone of U.S. foreign, security, and economic policy.  So too is our relationship with the European Union, which has done so much to promote stability, stimulate economic growth, and foster the spread of democratic values and ideals across the continent and beyond.  The United Kingdom and the European Union will remain indispensable partners of the United States even as they begin negotiating their ongoing relationship to ensure continued stability, security, and prosperity for Europe, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the world.”

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) also issued a statement on Friday recognizing the British decision, while emphasizing the “special relationship” and importance of trade between the two countries:

“[The] referendum will not change our special relationship with the United Kingdom.  That close partnership will endure, and we will continue to work together to strengthen a robust trade relationship and to address our common security interests.”

Secretary of State Kerry said on Friday of the U.K. Referendum:

“I want to emphasize that although the U.K. will be leaving the European Union, the British are in no way departing from the principles and values that undergird the Transatlantic Partnership or from the important role the U.K. plays in promoting peace and stability in the world. The special relationship that has long existed between the United States and the U.K. endures. Our two countries remain strong and vigilant NATO Allies, permanent members of the UN Security Council, commercial partners, and close friends.”

He added:

“I also want to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the European Union and the common agenda we share with Europe on such issues as Ukraine, nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, trade, and human rights.”

Secretary Kerry will be in Brussels and London today, meeting this morning with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, and later today with U.K. Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond.  In speaking with reporters in Italy over the weekend, Secretary Kerry said,

“The most important thing is that all of us as leaders work together to provide as much continuity, as much stability, as much certainty as possible in order for the marketplace to understand that there are ways to minimize disruption, there are ways to smartly move ahead in order to protect the values and interests that we share in common.”

North American Leaders’ Summit This Week

President Barack Obama, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will meet on Tuesday in Ottawa for the annual North American Leaders’ Summit.  President Obama will also address a joint session of the Canadian Parliament.

Upcoming Presidential Trip – NATO, Poland and Spain

From 7-11 July, President Obama will travel to Poland and Spain. He will participate in the NATO Summit in Warsaw from 7-9 July.  The summit is expected to underscore the Alliance’s solidarity and to advance efforts to bolster security along NATO’s eastern and southern fronts. While in Warsaw, President Obama will hold a bilateral meeting with Polish President Andrzej Duda. He will also meet with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission to discuss U.S.-EU cooperation across a range of shared priorities, including countering terrorism, fostering economic growth and prosperity, and addressing the global refugee crisis. The U.K. referendum will also likely be a topic of discussion, as well as ongoing free trade agreement negotiations between the United States and EU.

From 9-11 July, President Obama will visit Spain, where he will meet with King Felipe VI and Acting President Mariano Rajoy.  This visit to another NATO member country will highlight security cooperation between the United States and Spain as well.

SelectUSA Investment Summit & GES

President Obama started last week out at the SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, which focused on attracting investments to the United States.  In addressing the forum, President Obama spotlighted, “Over the last four years, no other country has been named by CEOs around the world more frequently as the best place to invest with confidence.”

President Obama ended the week in San Francisco, attending the annual Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES), which focuses on innovation.  The President signed an Executive Order on Friday to institutionalize key entrepreneurship programs of his Administration highlighting entrepreneurship is a hallmark of American leadership in the world.  The White House released a fact sheet on the GES, available here.

North Korea – Censured Again

After a failed attempt early last week, North Korea claimed on Thursday to have conducted a successful test-firing of a ballistic missile, swiftly drawing the censure of the United Nations Security Council.  In a press statement, the Security Council urged all countries “to redouble their efforts” to fully implement sanctions against North Korea, particularly those imposed in March, which were the toughest in two decades.  U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power sharply criticized North Korea’s “inherently destabilizing behavior” on Wednesday.

Venezuela Dialogue – U.S. Participates

Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro cited the current Government in Caracas as responsible for the near-collapse of Venezuela’s economy and called for the recall of President Nicolás Maduro.  Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon joined the mediation efforts underway in Caracas last week, saying that a follow-on meeting date has yet to be determined.

Zika Funding Compromise Reached – Veto Threat Issued

Last week, House and Senate Republicans reached a compromise on funding a response to the Zika virus without Democrats’ input.  Before adjourning, House Republicans advanced (239-171) a spending measure that includes a $1.1 billion plan for the Zika virus.  The measure would provide $230 million for the National Institutes of Health to develop a vaccine and $476 million for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for mosquito control efforts.

Democratic Senator Bill Nelson (Florida) objected to the compromise, citing the $750 million in budget cuts to other health care programs.  The bill would cut $543 million in unused funds for implementing the Affordable Care Act, $107 million from funds used to fight Ebola, and $100 million in administrative funds from the Health and Human Services Department.  The $1.1 billion is also short of President Obama’s request for $1.9 billion to combat the virus.  The Senate is expected to take up the bill before it leaves Washington this week for its July 4 recess, but its prospects are unclear at best.

TPP – Implementing Bill Reportedly Being Drafted

Despite the public backlash to trade in an election year, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said last Monday that the Obama Administration has begun drafting an implementing bill for a potential lame-duck vote on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Ambassador Froman acknowledged that Majority Leader McConnell “has made clear publicly that he doesn’t want to see a vote [on TPP] before the [November] election,” which leaves the lame-duck session as the best window of opportunity for trying to advance a TPP implementing bill.

Privacy Shield – Agreement Reached

The European Commission and U.S. negotiators wrapped up their discussions over the transatlantic data-flow “privacy shield” agreement late on Thursday.  A Commission official reported the deal contains “additional clarifications regarding the Ombudsperson mechanism, onward transfers and data retention, as well as on an additional U.S. document on the bulk collection of data.”  The Article 31 Committee will next vote on the text of the agreement.

NDAA – Pre-Conferencing Stage

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-Arizona) reported last week that the leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees met on Thursday to begin the process of reconciling the differences in their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).  A formal House-Senate conference does not begin until the two chambers appoint their conferees, which has yet to occur.

Congressional Hearings This Week

  • On Tuesday, 28 June, the Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Improving Strategic Integration at the Department of Defense.”

  • On Tuesday, 28 June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Global Efforts to Defeat ISIS.”

  • On Tuesday, 28 June, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations (SFOPs) is scheduled to hold a mark-up of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 SFOPs measure.

  • On Wednesday, 29 June, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee is scheduled to hold an executive session, where they will consider S. 3084, The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act, among other matters.

  • On Thursday, 30 June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled, “Corruption: Violent Extremism, Kleptocracy, and the Dangers of Failing Governance.”

  • On Thursday, 30 June, the Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hold a closed hearing titled, “National Security Cyber and Encryption Challenges.”

  • On Thursday, 30 June, the Senate Appropriations Committee is scheduled to markup the FY 2017 SFOPs measure.

Looking Ahead

Washington is expected to focus on the following upcoming events:

  • 29 June: North American Leaders Summit in Ottawa, Canada.

  • 7-11 July: President Obama travels to Poland and Spain

  • 8-9 July: NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland

  • 18-21 July: Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio

  • 25-28 July: Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

  • 4-5 September: G-20 Leaders’ Summit in Hangzhou, China

  • 13 September: 71st Session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Begins

  • 20 September: UNGA General Debate Commences

  • 19-20 November: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Peru

© Copyright 2016 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Brexit – What Next for the UK and EU?

UK EU BrexitSo after all the shouting, the half-truths and the speculation, there it is, a vote to leave. What does this mean for your business? What will your Board need to know today?

Let us be clear – no one knows all the details of what happens next, and that includes all the people who said that they did. But there is still plenty of reassurance available for many months, potentially years, into the future. In immediate legal terms there is much less to this than meets the eye.

Remember that the vote is just a vote. By itself it does not alter our legal relationships with Europe at all. Even if Parliament follows the stated wish of the people and formally petitions to leave the EU, the constitutional procedures for an exit will potentially take years to run their course. There are unlikely to be material changes to UK law during that time.

But that does not mean that you should not now be proactive in reviewing how the vote may or may not affect your legal obligations and best practice. In this note we summarise by topic some of the more immediate considerations which may arise in your business.

Employment

    • Leaving the EU does not by itself change our domestic employment law, either from today or from when we do actually leave, even if that law is based on an EU decision or Directive. That means no immediate changes to TUPE, the Human Rights Act, Works Councils, collective information and consultation rules, the Agency Worker Regulations, the Working Time Regulations or any of our EU-derived health and safety rules.
    • Your existing EEA national workers will not automatically have to leave the country or stop working for you, though they may choose to do so. They will still be able to get back into the UK if they go abroad on holiday or business.
    • You can still recruit EEA nationals without work visas for the time being, but if your business relies heavily on relatively unskilled labour from the EEA, start to consider whether it will be practicable to source such workers from within the UK market.
    • The UK may feel itself no longer obliged to implement into domestic law the forthcoming EU Trade Secrets Directive or General Data Protection Regulations, but will probably do so anyway to minimise the damage to inward investment from EU countries.
    • Your existing UK workers based in Continental Europe will not have to come back home immediately. Longer-term (two years at least) their position will depend on what stance the EU adopts towards its own UK-facing immigration controls.
    • It will remain discriminatory to hire EU staff in place of UK nationals (or vice versa) on racial or needs-a-visa grounds.
    • Leaving the EU will potentially take the UK out of the area regarded by the rest of Europe as “safe” for the processing of employee data. Unless an English version of the former US Safe Harbor Agreement can be negotiated, you may ultimately expect difficulties using personal data concerning your EU employees in the UK, and so you should begin to consider adopting increased data protection safeguards in your arrangements with your EU data subjects and processors.
  • The vote will probably mean a weakening of Lock-type holiday pay claims, and of any other legal arguments or proposals which are based on EU law but not yet incorporated into domestic UK statute. Whether the UK Government feels it necessary to pass such statutes before the formal point of exit remains to be seen – our view is that this is unlikely.

Pensions

    • The immediate focus for pensions will inevitably be on investment, not legal issues. Optimists before the vote acknowledged the market shock that is already occurring to sterling and equity markets but suggested that if gilt yields rose on the back of Bank of England intervention, that would reduce defined benefit liabilities. If that scenario plays out,it would be a boon for UK corporates who are struggling to fund deficits but the truth will no doubt be more complex and falls in asset values may cancel out any rise in yields. The worst case is that yields don’t rise. Longer term the vote will mean institutional investors will be reconsidering their investment strategies.
    • These investment consequences will of course affect the values of millions of defined contribution savers too. Sharp falls in asset values there will do nothing for confidence.
    • For UK corporates who are heavily reliant on EU earnings, new covenant assessments may be required by trustees.
  • European-derived equality legislation that applies to pensions will, as with employment law, remain in place, even though speculation will no doubt continue about whether guaranteed minimum pensions still need to be equalised. In the longer run, arguments about the detail of the draft IORP II Directive may now be academic.

Commercial Contracts

    • Termination clauses in contracts are most unlikely to be triggered by the Brexit vote. Even if a contract allows for termination if the obligations under it become more difficult to perform, Brexit is unlikely to mean that goods cannot be delivered or services provided so it is unlikely that automatic termination will occur.
    • Force majeure clauses are equally unlikely to be triggered immediately – the leave vote is hardly an Act of God, even if it may have been beyond the reasonable control of the parties.
    • Governing law clauses are more tricky to predict in terms of their effect but again nothing will change immediately or automatically.
  • Commercial terms, especially where financial instruments are involved and currency hedging is provided for as an option within a contract, may come into play automatically but those provisions will be contract-specific. For longer-term contracts being signed now, consider protection against Brexit consequences such as trade tariffs, exchange rate swings, capital movements, tax changes.

Trade

    • In the likely event of a total break from the EU Single Market, the erection of trade barriers (whether by way of direct tariffs, re-establishment of customs processes, or non-membership of EU trade facilitation schemes) will be inevitable. However, for the time being, all current internal market rights will apply. Agreements as they affect trade may be concluded within the two years allowed for a negotiated withdrawal, so companies should begin adjusting to the new situation as soon as possible.
  • In terms of customs duty, and unless agreed otherwise with the EU before formal withdrawal, the UK will lose the benefit of the duty rates afforded by being an EU Member State under the existing EU trade agreements with third countries. This would be likely to result in an increase in the landed cost of many goods, which may also be affected by any volatility of exchange rates. From an exporter’s perspective, those considerations should be carefully catered for in advance at contractual negotiations stage, starting now.

Financial Services

    • Those non-EEA firms using the UK as the base for their offering of financial services into and around Europe will need to assess their options: potentially they will lose their cross-border or branch passports into other EEA countries. This may mean they need to seek licences/authorisation in the other member states in or into which they conduct activities. Whilst it is possible that the UK may seek to agree a replacement passport regime, financial services providers relying on passports may need to look at their contingency plans and relocate or establish new offices in other member states from which the passports are available.
    • Parties to contractual documentation referencing EU Directive regulatory status (e.g. “credit institution” and “financial counterparty”) as a representation, condition or requirement will need to check whether the consequence of the UK falling outside the jurisdiction of the relevant Directives causes an event of default with immediate termination or right to termination. Consequently, parties may need to agree amendments to that documentation to avoid the potentially material financial consequences of termination.
  • As market uncertainty is already upon us firms with market positions will need to have regard to margin and collateral held against trading activity. Firms seeking to exercise rights under trading and security documentation in the event of defaults by counterparties will need to be alive to due process to ensure their enforcement rights can be properly executed.

Taxation

    • Parties to commercial contracts with EU counterparties which straddle any EU withdrawal will need to consider carefully the VAT and the customs duties consequences of those contracts. Customs duties are particular points of concern. Depending on the nature of the EU withdrawal negotiated by the UK, imports into the EU may give rise to customs duty costs and there is likely to be negotiation between the supplier and the relevant counterparty as to who is to bear the economic burden of those costs.
  • Going forward, policy makers will need to consider the interaction of EU law on the UK’s tax system as many aspects of the UK’s tax system (such as transfer pricing) have been shaped by EU rules. Policy makers will need to consider the extent to which they wish to reshape (if at all) the UK’s tax landscape.

To Brexit or to Bremain? That is the Question on 23 June 2016

A View from BrusselsUK and Europe flag

As the 23 June date for the British referendum about its future in the European Union (EU) comes closer, the EU political leadership in Brussels remains uncertain how best to support the ‘Bremain’ forces in order to avoid the embarrassing and damaging departure of one of its largest and strongest members.

None of the political leaders in Brussels or in other EU capitals want to see the UK leave, but they have learned to be cautious and show restraint when it comes to engaging in EU related discussions in Britain. Often enough they were told to stay neutral (or silent) in order not to make things worse for the pro-EU forces. But they now ask themselves whether their passive stance is a sufficiently supportive strategy for a decision of this magnitude for all partners involved – also because many traditionally pro-EU industry stakeholders in the UK have remained reserved so far, leaving a lot of momentum to the “Leave” side.

Supporting the (B)Remain Camp while Preparing for the Eventuality

The top EU leadership has clearly spoken out in favour of the UK to remain a part of the European family. Already in 2014 European Commission President Juncker has given the financial services dossier to the British EU Commissioner Jonathan Hill, and has recently asked Jonathan Faull, a top level UK EU official in Brussels, to lead the Commission’s high level Brexit task force.

Influential national political leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have clearly spelled out that they want the UK to remain, and have grudgingly accepted UK specific political concessions in an EU summit in February 2016 in order to support David Cameron. They are wary of potential Brexit copycats across Europe.

Behind closed doors, EU institutions such as the European Central Bank and the European Commission are preparing itself for the eventuality of the British voting to “leave” on 23 June. They cannot afford not to, given the enormous impact it would have on Europe – akin to the “Grexit” situation in recent years.

A View from the United States

On 22 April 2016, President Obama visited London and argued that he had a right to respond to the claims of Brexit campaigners that Britain would easily be able to negotiate a fresh trade deal with the US. He said,

“They are voicing an opinion about what the United States is going to do, I figured you might want to hear from the president of the United States what I think the United States is going to do. And on that matter, for example, I think it’s fair to say that maybe some point down the line there might be a UK-US trade agreement, but it’s not going to happen any time soon because our focus is in negotiating with a big bloc, the European Union, to get a trade agreement done. The UK is going to be in the back of the queue.”

The Only Certain Thing is Uncertainty

The overall uncertainty related to a potential Brexit is large and little is known about how the separation process between the UK and the European Union would look like in practice. Many questions remain unanswered, including the political dynamics a Leave decision would trigger within and outside the UK.

What seems certain is that if Britain does leave the EU, a multi-year separation and negotiation process will commence.

When Greenland left the European Economic Community in 1985 it took a full three years to complete – and this even though they only had a few really important political issues to solve. The UK has been part of the European Union since 1973 – thus the social, legal and economic entanglement is much higher.

Article By Wolfgang A. Maschek & Helen Kavanagh of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2016 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Financial Services Sector Implications of ‘Brexit

Should Britain decide to leave both the EU and EEA as a result of a “Brexit” vote on 23 June 2016, the impact on UK and EU financial services firms could be significant.

The City of London is Europe’s key financial centre and one of the world’s leading financial centres. As such, asset managers, investment banks, retail banks, broker-dealers, corporate finance firms, and insurers choose the United Kingdom to headquarter their businesses, anchoring themselves in a convenient time zone and location from which to access the European and global markets.

A central plank of the European Union’s vision for a single market in financial services is that financial services firms authorised by their local member state regulators may carry on business in any other member state by establishing a local branch or by providing services on a cross-border basis without the need for separate authorisation in every host state. UK-based regulated asset managers (e.g., long-only, hedge fund, and private equity), banks, broker-dealers, insurers, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS) funds, UCITS management companies, and investment managers of non-UCITS (known as alternative investment funds or AIFs) have a passporting right to carry on business in any other state in the European Economic Area (EEA) in which they establish a branch or into which they provide cross-border services, without the need for further local registration. Passporting also facilitates the marketing of UCITS and AIFs established in the EEA (EEA AIFs) into other member states.

Members of the EEA (which comprises the 28 EU member states and Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) are subject to the benefits and burdens of the financial services single market directives and regulations, including passporting rights. One outcome of a vote to leave the European Union in the UK referendum to be held on 23 June 2016, would be that the UK leaves the EU but decides to remain in the EEA (with a similar status to, say, Norway)—in which case the impact of a “Brexit” on the financial sector would likely be minimal. Another outcome would be that the UK finds it unpalatable politically to leave the EU whilst remaining in the EEA and therefore decides to leave both the EU and the EEA; it is this scenario that would have significant impact on both UK and EU financial services firms.

Effect on Passporting for UK Financial Services Firms

According to figures released by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in December 2015, more than 2,000 UK investment firms carrying on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) business (e.g., portfolio managers, investment advisers, and broker dealers) benefit from an outbound MiFID passport, and nearly 75% of all MiFID outbound passporting by firms across the EEA is undertaken by UK firms into the EEA. Notably, according to the EBA, 2,079 UK firms use the MiFID passport to access markets in other EEA countries, and the next two highest totals in the EBA list are Cyprus (148 firms) followed by Luxembourg (79 firms). EEA-wide, there are around 6,500 investment firms authorised under MiFID. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are the main jurisdictions for more than 70% of the MiFID investment firm population of the EU; more than 50% are based in the UK.

We consider that these figures suggest that Continental consumers potentially stand to lose more than UK consumers in terms of the cross-border provision of financial services in the event of a Brexit, which could be a driver for the UK being given a special deal to permit access to continue, although this needs to be weighed against the political imperative that the remaining EU countries would likely feel against being seen as being too accommodating to a country leaving the EU.

In the event of a Brexit where the United Kingdom leaves the EEA, unless special arrangements for the UK were to be agreed between the UK and the EU, and subject to the more detailed comments below, UK firms would cease to be eligible for a passport to provide services cross-border into, or establish branches in, the remaining EEA countries (rEEA) and to market UCITS and AIFs across the rEEA. Instead, local licences would be required, and the use of relatively low-cost branches in multiple member states may have to be reassessed. UK-authorised firms no longer able to passport into the rEEA but wishing to do so would need to consider moving sufficient of their main operations to an rEEA jurisdiction in order to qualify for a passport.

Effect on UK Financial Services Regulatory Law

The EU is a major source of UK financial services regulatory law. Recent UK parliamentary research estimates that EU-related law constitutes one-sixth of the UK statute book. That figure does not include the deposit of more than 12,000 EU “regulations” which take direct effect in each member country (including the UK) in contrast to EU “directives” which must be implemented or “transposed” in local law by each country; EU regulations would cease to apply in the UK post-Brexit. In addition, it would be necessary for the UK to renegotiate or reconfirm a series of EU negotiated free-trade deals that would not automatically be inherited by the UK upon Brexit. Post-Brexit, the UK would need to legislate to “renationalise” voluminous laws rooted in the EU and fill any regulatory gaps in UK legislation once the EU treaties ceased to apply.

It would be open to the UK merely to incorporate directly applicable EU regulations into UK law. This might be the easiest course of action, given the volume and breadth of issues which would need to be addressed by the UK government in the event of a vote to leave the EU.

Accordingly, in contrast to the impact that the UK leaving the EEA would have on passporting, the UK regulatory environment for financial services firms may not change dramatically in the event of a Brexit, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, any subsequent changes to the UK regime are more likely than not to be deregulatory in nature and therefore favourable to UK firms. In relation to the AIFMD, to take one example, the UK government would have the option to introduce a more tailored and proportionate regime for fund managers managing AIFs with lower risk profiles.

Pre-Referendum Planning

Planning for a Brexit is difficult without knowing what a post-Brexit landscape would look like (as yet, this is a “known unknown”). However, in the run up to the UK referendum, it seems prudent for UK financial institutions to consider the impact of a Brexit on the terms of any new contracts being entered into and, if relevant, seek to make provision for a Brexit (e.g., by including Brexit in a force majeure provision; providing for termination rights in the event of a Brexit and adapting references to the EEA to continue to cover the UK, if appropriate).

Passporting aside, UK firms will also need to assess the practical issues that would arise in the event of a Brexit. For instance, investment strategies that permit investments in the EEA may need to be amended in order for investments in the UK to continue to be permitted. Similarly, a Brexit may impact the terms of product distribution agreements and other service agreements.

Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)

If the UK were to leave the EEA, then, potentially: UK AIFMs would be treated as non-rEEA AIFMs, marketing by UK AIFMs of AIFs to rEEA investors would have to be undertaken on the basis of member state private placement regimes, and UK AIFMs would no longer be able to manage (from the UK) an AIF established in an rEEA member state without being locally authorised in that member state to do so. Further, UK AIFMs that utilise AIFMD passports for MiFID investment services to provide segregated client portfolio management and/or advisory services on a cross-border basis would cease to be able to use those passports. Conversely, rEEA AIFMs that seek to manage or market AIFs in the UK or provide MiFID investment services to clients in the UK in reliance on AIFMD passports would no longer be able to do so.

However, unlike other single-market directives, the AIFMD provides for its regime to be extended to non-EEA managers, and this offers a potential “third way” should the UK not remain in the EEA. If the UK were to leave its current AIFMD compliant regime in place, it ought to be technically straightforward, following a Brexit, for the AIFMD to be extended to the UK. In this scenario, UK AIFMs could continue to be authorised under the regime and be entitled to use the AIF marketing and management passports (a non-rEEA manager passport). This possibility may influence the UK government to leave the current UK regime unchanged in the event of a vote to leave the EU. However, any such extension of the AIFMD would require a positive opinion from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and a decision by the EU Commission, so there would be a political dimension to it that would likely introduce uncertainty.

It is important to note, though, that the use by a UK AIFM of a non-rEEA manager passport would be subject to a number of conditions prescribed by the AIFMD that would have material practical implications. In particular,

  • a UK AIFM would need to be authorised by the regulator in its rEEA “member state of reference” (this would be determined in accordance with the AIFMD by reference to where in the rEEA the manager is proposing to manage and/or market funds). This regulator could not be the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), so the use of a non-rEEA manager passport would involve dual regulation and supervision—by the FCA in the UK and by a regulator in an rEEA country in relation to compliance with the directive for funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries (the guidance and approach to application and interpretation of the directive by the regulator and local rules in the member state of reference may well differ from that of the FCA);

  • it would be necessary to establish a legal representative in the member state of reference in order to be the contact point between the manager and rEEA regulators, and the manager and rEEA investors. The legal representative would be required to perform the compliance function relating to funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries; and

  • disputes with rEEA investors in a fund managed/marketed by a manager using a non-rEEA manager passport would need to be “settled in accordance with the law of and subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State”—this would preclude the use of UK courts as a forum for disputes with investors.

UK AIFMs should also note that the AIFMD does not provide for a non-rEEA manager passport to cover the provision of MiFID investment services on a cross-border basis. Accordingly, even if the AIFMD were to be extended to the UK so that UK AIFMs could use a non-rEEA manager passport to manage and/or market AIFs in the rEEA, in the event of the UK not remaining in the EEA, UK AIFMs providing cross-border MiFID investment services within the rEEA (e.g. discretionary management/advisory services for separate account clients) may need to think about where the services are in fact being provided and whether local authorisation would be required to continue the provision of those services. For the provision of MiFID investment services, this would re-establish the position prior to the implementation of the Investment Services Directive (the precursor of MiFID) in the mid-1990s.

Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS)

A UCITS fund must by definition be EEA domiciled, as must its management company. Currently, both UCITS funds and their EEA managers benefit from the passport. UCITS funds are passportable into any other member state for the purposes of being marketed locally to the public and management companies can set up branches and/or provide services cross-border into other member states (e.g., a UK-based management company can provide management services to a UCITS fund based in any other EEA country such as, for example, Ireland or Luxembourg). UK UCITS funds and management companies established pre-Brexit would no longer qualify as UCITS post-Brexit. UK-based UCITS funds would no longer be automatically marketable to the public in the rEEA and would therefore become subject to local private placement regimes. Conversely, a UCITS fund established, say, in Ireland or Luxembourg, would no longer be marketable in the UK to the general public, and a management company based in Ireland or Dublin would no longer be entitled to provide management services to a UK-based UCITS fund.

Accordingly, consideration would need to be given to migrating UK UCITS funds to an rEEA country. Otherwise, UK UCITS funds would become subject to the AIFMD regime instead of the UCITS regime and would be subject to additional restrictions and unavailable to most types of retail investor. UK UCITS management companies would have to migrate to rEEA in order to continue to benefit from the passport.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)

MiFID gives EEA investment firms authorised in their home EEA country a passport to conduct cross-border business and to establish branches in other EEA countries, free from additional local authorisation requirements. MiFID prohibits member states from imposing any additional requirements in respect of MiFID-scope business on incoming firms that provide cross-border services within their territory, but does allow host territory regulators to regulate passported branches in areas such as conduct of business.

UK-regulated firms that undertake MiFID business would no longer be able to rely on the passport to undertake MiFID business in rEEA and might have to restructure accordingly. Conversely, rEEA firms that seek to undertake MiFID business in the UK would no longer be able to do so and might also have to restructure. However, in contrast to UCITS, that outcome is potentially leavened by the new third-country regime indicated by the recast Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).

The impact on the provision of cross-border MiFID investment services might be diluted by the regime under MiFID II permitting non-EEA firms to provide investment services to professional clients on a pan-EEA basis upon registration with ESMA, but this would not be an immediate solution, as it would be subject to ESMA making an equivalence determination under MiFID II in relation to the UK, and the timing would be highly uncertain (in particular, MiFID II seems unlikely to come into effect until January 2018, which will be 18 months after the UK referendum). The UK could implement an equivalent regime (in practice, largely by not repealing or amending its EU-generated legislative inheritance and “renationalising” it) to secure its status as an “equivalent” third country with which EEA firms can do business. However, it seems unlikely, given the technical difficulties and delays being experienced generally by ESMA in relation to MiFID II implementation, that an equivalence determination for any non-EEA firms will be high on the agenda until sometime following January 2018.
UK financial institutions would need to consider the regulatory perimeter in each rEEA country in which a financial institution wishes to undertake business. Conversely, rEEA financial institutions would need to consider the UK perimeter to identify what activities by them in the UK would engage a registration requirement locally in the UK.

On the other hand, equivalency considerations aside, the proposals under MiFID II for the unbundling of research and trading fees would fall away in the UK and remain in the rEEA. The unpopular cap on bonuses for systemically important banks and investment firms brought in by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) would also fall away in the UK but remain in the rEEA. Notably, the EBA has recently indicated that the bonus cap should be imposed on all firms subject to the CRD, which would implicate a huge increase in the number of banks and investment firms subject to the cap. On 29 February, it was announced that FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority had decided to reject that advice on the basis of proportionality. Accordingly, even without a Brexit, the UK is already implementing a policy which should put it at a competitive advantage to other EEA countries that decide to follow the EBA’s guidelines.

Under MiFID, EEA countries must permit investment firms from other EEA countries to access regulated markets, clearing and settlement systems established in their country. Post-Brexit, UK investment firms would no longer be able to rely on those provisions, but nor would rEEA firms looking to access the UK. It is precisely this possibility of “mutually assured destruction”—combined with the UK’s status as Europe’s leading financial centre—that could drive some hard bargaining post-Brexit by both sides towards a constructive outcome in favour of continuing integrated financial markets and services.

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

EMIR applies to undertakings established in the EEA (except in the case of AIFs, wherever established, where it is the regulatory status of the manager under AIFMD which is key) that qualify as “financial counterparties” or “non-financial counterparties.” Since, post-Brexit, a UK undertaking would no longer be established in the EEA, under EMIR, UK undertakings that are currently financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties would become third-country entities (TCEs) for EMIR purposes.

Post-Brexit, UK undertakings—along with other TCEs—would not be able to avoid EMIR altogether, as a number of its provisions have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to key requirements such as margin for uncleared trades and mandatory clearing. The trade reporting obligation, however, does not apply to TCEs. The UK government would need to consider whether to introduce similar reporting requirements domestically, particularly given the size and importance of the UK derivatives market. If UK undertakings became TCEs, they would be required to determine whether they would be financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties if they were established in the rEEA, an exercise which would be straightforward.

In any event, UK undertakings subject to the clearing and margin requirements of EMIR pre-Brexit would remain subject to such requirements when entering into derivatives transactions with rEEA firms post-Brexit. Importantly, the exemption from the forthcoming mandatory clearing requirement for UK pension scheme trustees would cease to apply post-Brexit. Accordingly, a UK pension scheme would no longer be able to rely on the EMIR exemption when entering an OTC derivative contract with an rEEA counterparty.

The City of London boasts some of the world’s largest clearing houses, and at least three of them are currently permitted under EMIR to provide clearing services to clearing members and trading venues throughout the EEA in their capacity as ESMA-authorised central counterparties (CCPs). Post-Brexit, however, a UK CCP would become a third-country CCP. Under EMIR, a third-country CCP can only provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the EEA where that CCP is specifically recognised by ESMA. This would require, among other things, clearing houses operating out of London to apply to ESMA for recognition, the European Commission to pass an implementing act on the equivalence of the UK’s regime to EMIR, and relevant cooperation arrangements to be put in place between the rEEA and the UK—a lengthy process overall. Financial institutions based in rEEA will certainly want to continue to access UK regulated markets and CCPs.

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