NFT Endorsed by Celebrities Prompts Class Action

Since the early days of the launch of the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) non-fungible tokens (NFTs), several celebrities have promoted the NFTs. On Dec. 8, 2022, plaintiffs Adonis Real and Adam Titcher brought a lawsuit against Yuga Labs, creators of the BAYC, alleging that Yuga Labs was involved in a scheme with the “highly connected” talent agent Greg Oseary, a number of well-known celebrities, and Moonpay USA LLC, a crypto tech company. According to the complaint:

  1. Yuga Labs partnered with Oseary to recruit celebrities to promote and solicit sales of BYAC;
  2. Celebrities promoted the BAYC on their various platforms;
  3. Oseary used MoonPay to secretly pay the celebrities; and
  4. The celebrities failed to disclose the payments in their endorsements.

According to the complaint, as a result of the various and misleading celebrity promotions, trading volume for the BYAC NFTs exploded, prompting the defendants to launch the ApeCoin and form the ApeCoin decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). Investors who had purchased the ApeCoin allegedly lost a significant amount of money when the value of the coins decreased.

This case highlights the potential risks that may arise in connection with certain endorsements. In addition to the FTC, the SEC also has issued guidance on requirements in connection with promotional activities relating to securities, which may include digital assets, such as tokens or NFTs. Under SEC guidance, any paid promoter, celebrity or otherwise, of a security, including digital assets, must disclose the nature, scope and amount of compensation received in exchange for the promotion. This would include tv/radio advertisements and print, in addition to promotions on social media sites.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Quantifying Cryptocurrency Claims in Bankruptcy: Does the Dollar Still Reign Supreme?

In the past six months, four major players in the crypto space have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection: Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, FTX, and BlockFi, and more may be forthcoming.  Together, the debtors in these four bankruptcy cases are beholden to hundreds of thousands of creditors.  The bulk of the claims in these cases are customer claims related to cryptocurrency held on the debtors’ respective platforms.  These customer claimants deposited or “stored” fiat currency and cryptocurrencies on the debtors’ platforms.  Some of these funds allegedly were commingled or rehypothecated, leaving customer accounts severely underfunded when liquidity crunches arose at the various entities.  The total amount of such claims is estimated to be in the billions — that is, if these claims ultimately are measured in United States Dollars (“USD”).

Crypto-watchers and bankruptcy lawyers alike have speculated how customer claims based on digital assets such as cryptocurrencies should be valued and measured under bankruptcy law.  Given the volatility of cryptocurrency prices, this determination may have a significant effect on recoveries, as well as the viability of the “payment-in-kind” distribution mechanics proposed in Voyager, Celsius, and BlockFi.  A number of creditors appearing pro se in these proceedings have expressed a desire to keep their mix of cryptocurrencies through these proposed “in-kind” distributions.

However, a crypto-centric approach to valuing claims and making distributions raises a number of issues for consideration.  For example, measuring customer claims in cryptocurrency and making “in-kind” distributions of these assets could lead to creditors within the same class receiving recoveries of disparate USD value as the result of the fluctuation in cryptocurrency prices. Moreover, as has been discussed in the Celsius proceedings, the administrative burden associated with maintaining, accounting for, and distributing a wide variety of cryptocurrencies as part of a recovery scheme would likely prove complex.  Equity holders also might challenge the confirmability of a plan where valuations and recoveries are based on cryptocurrency rather than USD, as a dramatic rise in cryptocurrency values could return some value to equity.

Like most issues at the intersection of insolvency and cryptocurrency, there is little precedent to guide creditors through the uncertainties, but a recent dispute in the Celsius bankruptcy proceedings as to whether a debtor is required to schedule claims in USD, or whether cryptocurrency claims can be scheduled “in-kind,” may serve as a preview of things to come.

I.          General Background

Celsius Network (“Celsius” and, together with its affiliated debtors and debtors in possession, the “Debtors”), self-described as one of the “largest and most sophisticated” cryptocurrency-based finance platforms and lenders that claimed over 1.7 million users worldwide,1 filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 13, 2022.2  On October 5, 2022, the Debtors filed their schedules of assets and liabilities (“Schedules”).  Each Debtor’s schedule of unsecured creditors’ claims (Schedule E/F) lists the claims of the Debtors’ customers by the number of various forms of cryptocurrency coins and account types, rather than in USD.3

On October 25, 2022, a group of beneficial holders, investment advisors, and managers of beneficial holders (collectively, the “Series B Preferred Holders”) of the Series B Preferred Shares issued by debtor Celsius Network Limited filed a motion seeking entry of an order directing the Debtors to amend their Schedules to reflect customer claims valued in USD, in addition to cryptocurrency coin counts.4

II.         Arguments

a.         Series B Preferred Holders

Broadly, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a),5 the Series B Preferred Holders sought to have the Debtors amend their Schedule E/F to “dollarize” creditors’ claims, i.e., value customer claims in their dollar value as of the petition date.  As filed, the Series B Preferred Holders asserted that the Debtors’ schedules were “improper, misleading, and fail[ed] to comply” with the Bankruptcy Rules “because they schedule[d] customer claims in cryptocurrency coin counts, rather than in lawful currency of the United States as of the Petition Date.”6  The Series B Preferred Holders asserted that such amended schedules are essential to the Debtors’ ability to structure, solicit, and confirm a plan of reorganization under the requirements of Section 1129, including whether “(i) claims are impaired or unimpaired, (ii) holders of similarly situated claims are receiving the same treatment, and (iii) the plan meets the requirements of the ‘absolute priority rule.’”7  In support of their arguments that USD valuation of a customer’s claim should be required, the Series B Preferred Holders relied on provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules, Bankruptcy Code, and Official Forms.  The Series B Preferred Holders stressed that the motion “takes no position regarding the form of distribution customers” should receive under the Debtors’ plan, but rather that the Debtors must “add the [USD] amount of each customer claim in Schedules E/F to the cryptocurrency coin counts.”8

The Series B Preferred Holders also asserted that the requirement to denominate claims in USD is consistent with Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that when a debtor or party-in-interest objects to a claim, the court determines the amount of the claim in USD as of the debtor’s petition date.

b.         Debtors’ Response

The Debtors had previously indicated that they were not seeking to dollarize its customers’ claims; rather, the Debtors represented that they intend to return cryptocurrency assets to its customers “in kind.”9  The Debtors stated that they interpreted Bankruptcy Rule 9009(a)(1)-(2) and General Order M-386, dated November 24, 2009 (the “General Order M-386”) to allow the Debtors to remove the dollar symbol when scheduling claims regarding cryptocurrency coin counts.10  This approach, the Debtors argue, lessens confusion for its customer case and decreases administrative expense for the estate.11

Further, the Debtors argued that the Series B Preferred Holders’ reliance on Section 502(b) was misplaced because the application of such section is inapplicable at this stage of the proceedings where no claims objection has taken place.12

The Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“UCC”) agreed with the Debtors’ approach, stating that it “makes sense” for account holders to validate their scheduled claims by cryptocurrency type and that it wished to be consulted on the petition date prices used by the Debtors if they filed an amendment to the schedules.13

III.        Analysis

a.         Bankruptcy Code & Rules & Forms

Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1) requires that a debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities must be “prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms.”14  The relevant official form that a debtor must use to prepare its schedule of assets and liabilities is Official Form 206, which contains a USD symbol to denote the amount of liabilities that a debtor must list.15  Specifically, Official Form 206 provides:

As seen above, Official Form 206 does “hardwire” a dollar sign (“$”) into the boxes provided for claim amounts.  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 states that the official forms are to “be used without alteration, except as otherwise provided in the rules, [or] in a particular Official Form.”16  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 permits “certain minor changes not affecting wording or the order of presenting information,” including “expand[ing] the prescribed areas for responses in order to permit complete responses” and “delet[ing] space not needed for responses.”17  Lastly, General Order M-386 permits “such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”18 The introduction to General Order M-386 states that standard forms were adopted to “expedite court review and entry of such orders” and that courts will expect use of the standard forms “with only such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”19

b.         Section 502(b)

Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b) provides that if there is an objection to a claim, the court “shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the [petition] date . . . .”20  This “prevents the value of a claim from fluctuating by setting the claim as of the petition date and converting it to the United States dollars.”21  Acknowledging the “novel phenomenon” of dollarizing claims in cryptocurrency, the Series B Preferred Holders analogize this to cases where courts have required claims asserted in or based on in foreign currency or amounts of gold should be valued in USD.  However, these cases were decided in the context of a claims objection. The Celsius Debtors argued that these cases have limited utility in the context of a motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a).22

IV.        The Court’s Order

Ahead of the hearing regarding the motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules, the Debtors and the Series B Preferred Holders were able to consensually resolve the motion and filed a revised proposed order prior to the hearing on the motions on November 15.23  The Debtors agreed to amend their schedules by filing a conversion table within three days of the entry of the order, in consultation with the UCC and Series B Preferred Holders, that reflects the Debtors’ view of the rate of conversion of all cryptocurrencies listed in the Debtors’ schedules to USD as of the petition date.  The idea is that the conversion table could be used by customers as a reference for calculating the USD value of their claim, to the extent needed for filing a proof of claim.  The conversion table is not binding – the order preserves the rights of all parties to contest the conversion rates and does not require a party-in-interest to file an objection that is not stated in USD “solely on the basis that such claims should be reflected in [USD].”24  The order also requires the Debtors to file updated schedules “dollarizing” its account holders’ cryptocurrency holdings to the extent required by any future court order or judicial determination.

On November 17, 2022, the court entered the revised proposed order.25

V.         Cash Is Still King?

Other bankruptcy courts have taken similar approaches as the Celsius court in this issue.  An earlier cryptocurrency case, In re Cred Inc., the debtors did not schedule cryptocurrency claims in USD, but included a conversion table in their filed schedules, which set forth a conversion rate to USD as of the petition date.26  Debtors in other cases, such as Voyager Digital, scheduled the amounts of their customer claims as “undetermined” and listed them in Schedule F in cryptocurrency.27  BlockFi, which filed for bankruptcy on November 28, 2022, already has filed a proposed plan that would distribute its cryptocurrencies to its customers inkind in exchange for their claims against the BlockFi debtors.28  To date, neither BlockFi nor FTX have filed their schedules, and it remains to be seen whether they will follow the pattern established in Celsius and Voyager.

For creditors and equity holders, whether claims are measured in USD or the applicable cryptocurrency is only the beginning of what will likely be a long and contentious road to recovery.  It remains to be seen whether any of these debtors will be able to confirm a viable restructuring plan that relies on any sort of “in-kind” distribution of cryptocurrencies.  Further issues are likely to arise in the claims resolution process even further down the road as claimants and liquidation trustees (or plan administrators) wrestle with how to value claims based on such a volatile asset, subject to ever-increasing regulatory scrutiny.  However, for the time being, the bankruptcy process continues to run on USD.


FOOTNOTES

1 Declaration of Alex Mashinsky, CEO of the Debtors ¶¶ 1, 9, 20, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 23].

2 Id. at ¶ 131.

3 Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statements of Financial Affairs, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 974]; see also Schedule E/F, Case No. 22-10967 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10970 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10968 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10965 [Docket No. 6]; Case No. 22-10966 [Docket No. 7]; Case No. 22-10964 [Docket No. 974]; Case No. 22-10969 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22- 10971 [Docket No. 5].

4 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1183].

5 “On motion of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing, the court may order any . . . schedule . . . to be amended and the clerk shall give notice of the amendment to entities designated by the court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a).

6 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules ¶ 1.

Id. ¶ 3 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(2)-(4), 1129(a)(1), 1129(b)).

8 Series B Preferred Holders’ Reply ¶ 10, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1334].

9 See 8/16/22 Hr’g Tr. at 35:5-7 (“The company is not seeking to dollarize claims on the petition date and give people back a recovery in fiat.”); id. at 42:11-16 (“[The UCC is] pleased that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . an in-kind recovery is absolutely critical.”).

10 General Order M-386 is a resolution of the Board of Judges for the Southern District of New York, which provides for “a standard form for orders to establish deadlines for the filing of proofs of claim . . . in chapter 11 cases” to “thereby expedite court review and entry of such orders.”

11 Debtors’ Objection to Series B Preferred Holders’ Motion ¶ 9, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1304].

12 Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Mohr, 425 B.R. 457, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio)).

13 Id. at 42:12-16 (“We are pleased to hear that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . receiving an in-kind recover is 16 absolutely critical.”); UCC Statement and Reservation of Rights ¶ 6, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1303].

14 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(1).

15 See Official Form 206, Part 2, Line 4 (using the USD sign into Form 206 for scheduling the debtor’s liabilities).

16 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009(a).

17 Id.

18 General Order M-386 ¶ 9.

19 General Order M-386 ¶ 2 (unnumbered, preliminary statement).

20 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).

21 In re Aaura, Inc., No. 06 B 01853, 2006 WL 2568048, at *4, n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2006).

22 In re USGen New Eng., Inc., 429 B.R. 437, 492 (Bankr. D. Md. 2010) (using the exchange rate in effect on the petition date, in the context of a claims objection, to convert the claim to USD), aff’d sub nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. USGen New Eng., Inc., 458 B.R. 195 (D. Md. 2011); Aaura, 2006 WL 2568048, at *5 (“Section 502(b) converts Aaura’s obligation to repay the obligation in gold into a claim against the estate in dollars, but it makes this transformation only as of the petition date, not retroactive to the date on which Aaura first became liable.”); Matter of Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 608 n.19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting Section 502(b) refers to the petition date as “the appropriate date for conversion of foreign currency claims”), aff’d sub nom. In re Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); ABC Dev. Learning Ctrs. (USA), Inc. v. RCS Capital Dev., LLC (In re RCS Capital Dev., LLC), No. AZ-12-1381-JuTaAh, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4666, at *38-39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 16, 2013) (same).

23 Notice of Proposed Order, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1342].

24 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.

25 Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1099 Directing the Debtors to Amend Their Schedules in Certain Circumstances, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1387].

26 Schedules at 12, In re Cred Inc., Case No. 20-128336 (JTD) (Bankr. D. Del. 2021) [ECF No. 443].

27 Schedules, In re Voyager Digital Holdings, Inc., Case No. 22-10943 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022) [ECF No. 311].

28 Joint Plan of Reorganization § IV.B.1.a, In re BlockFi Inc., Case No. 19361 (MBK) (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) [ECF No. 22].

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Federal Reserve Doubles Down on Oversight of Crypto Activities for Banks

The Federal Reserve Board (the “FRB”) issued Supervision and Regulation Letter 22-6 (“SR 22-6”), providing guidance for FRB-supervised banking organizations (referred to collectively herein as “FRB banks”) seeking to engage in activities related to cryptocurrency and other digital assets.  The letter states that prior to engaging in crypto-asset-related activities, such FRB banks must ensure that their activities are “legally permissible” and determine whether any regulatory filings are required.  SR 22-6 further states that FRB banks should notify the FRB prior to engaging in crypto-asset-related activities.  Any FRB bank that is already engaged in crypto-asset-related activities should notify the FRB promptly regarding the engagement in such activities, if it has not already done so.  The FRB also encourages state member banks to contact state regulators before engaging in any crypto-asset-related activity.

These requirements send a clear message to FRB banks and in fact to all banks that their crypto-asset related activities are considered to be risky and not to be entered into lightly.

Indeed, the FRB noted that crypto-asset-related activities may pose risks related to safety and soundness, consumer protection, and financial stability, and thus a FRB bank should have in place adequate systems, risk management, and controls to conduct such activities in a safe and sound manner and consistent with all applicable laws.

SR 22-6 is similar to guidance previously issued by the OCC and FDIC; in all cases, the agencies require banks to notify regulators before engaging in any kind of digital asset activity, including custody activities. The three agencies also released a joint statement last November in which they pledged to provide greater guidance on the issue in 2022.  Further, in an August 17, 2022 speech, FRB Governor Bowman stated that the FRB staff is working to articulate supervisory expectations for banks on a variety of digital asset-related activities, including:

  • custody of crypto-assets
  • facilitation of customer purchases and sales of crypto-assets
  • loans collateralized by crypto-assets, and
  • issuance and distribution of stablecoins by banking organizations

Interestingly, SR 22-6 comes a few days after a group of Democratic senators sent a letter to the OCC requesting that the OCC withdraw its interpretive letters permitting national banks to engage in cryptocurrency activities and a day after Senator Toomey sent a letter to the FDIC questioning whether it is deterring banks from offering cryptocurrency services.

Although past guidance already required banks to notify regulators of crypto activity, this guidance likely could discourage additional banks from entering into crypto-related activities in the future or from adding additional crypto services. In the end, it could have the unfortunate effect of making it more difficult for cryptocurrency companies to obtain banking services.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

Government Brings First Cryptocurrency Insider Trading Charges

In a series of parallel actions announced on July 21, 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated criminal and civil charges against three defendants in the first cryptocurrency insider trading case.

According to the criminal indictment, DOJ alleges that a former employee of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange used his position at the exchange to obtain confidential information about at least 25 future cryptocurrency listings, then tipped his brother and a friend who traded the digital assets in advance of the listing announcements, realizing gains of approximately $1.5 million. The indictment further alleges that the trio used various means to conceal their trading, and that one defendant attempted to flee the United States when their trading was discovered. The Government charged the three with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy. Notably, and like the Government’s recently announced case involving insider trading in nonfungible tokens, criminal prosecutors did not charge the defendants with securities or commodities fraud.

In its press release announcing the charges, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Damian Williams said: “Today’s charges are a further reminder that Web3 is not a law-free zone. Just last month, I announced the first ever insider trading case involving NFTs, and today I announce the first ever insider trading case involving cryptocurrency markets. Our message with these charges is clear: fraud is fraud is fraud, whether it occurs on the blockchain or on Wall Street. And the Southern District of New York will continue to be relentless in bringing fraudsters to justice, wherever we may find them.”

Based on these facts, the SEC also announced charges against the three men in a civil complaint alleging securities fraud. In order to assert jurisdiction over the matter, the SEC alleges that at least nine of the cryptocurrencies involved in the alleged insider trading were securities, and the compliant traces through the Howey analysis for each. The SEC has not announced charges against the exchange itself, though in the past it has charged at least one cryptocurrency exchange that listed securities tokens for failure to register as a securities exchange. Perhaps coincidentally, on July 21 the exchange involved in the latest DOJ and SEC cases filed a rulemaking petition with the SEC urging it to “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods, including potential rules to identify which digital assets are securities.”

In an unusual move, Commissioner Caroline Pham of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) released a public statement criticizing the charges. Citing the Federalist Papers, Commissioner Pham described the cases as “a striking example of ‘regulation by enforcement.’” She noted that “the SEC’s allegations could have broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.” Commissioner Pham continued, “Major questions are best addressed through a transparent process that engages the public to develop appropriate policy with expert input—through notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” She concluded by stating that, “Regulatory clarity comes from being out in the open, not in the dark.” The CFTC is not directly involved in either case, and it is atypical for a regulator to chide a sister agency on an enforcement matter in this fashion. On the same day, another CFTC Commissioner, Kristin Johnson, issued her own carefully-worded statement that seemed to support the Government’s actions.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Could the Crypto Downturn Lead to a Spike in M&A?

In 2021, we saw a cryptocurrency boom with record highs and a flurry of activity. However, this year, the cryptocurrency downturn has been significant.  We have seen drops in various cryptocurrencies ranging from 20 to 70 percent, with an estimated $2 trillion in losses in the past few months.

Industry watchers had already predicted a spike in crypto M&A from the beginning of 2022, and in a recent interview with Barron’s, John Todaro, a senior crypto and blockchain researcher at Needham & Company, said he believes this downturn could lead to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the crypto space for the second half of this year and even into 2023.

Valuations have dropped across the board this year as the market has faced incredible volatility, and Todaro told Barron’s, “The valuations for public crypto companies have fallen by about 70% this year.”  These lower valuations could make these companies increasingly attractive targets for acquisition, and this activity has already started to pick up.

According recent coverage from CNBC, some larger crypto companies are already looking for acquisition targets in order to drive industry growth and to help them acquire more users. Todaro feels most of the M&A activity we will see will be this kind of crypto to crypto acquisition as opposed to traditional buyers, although there is still opportunity for non-crypto companies to capitalize on these lower valuations and some are already doing so.

With more government regulation coming for the crypto sector this year, it could also impact the activity level as well.  Achieving some legal and regulatory clarity could have implications for this uptick in M&A for crypto companies. Our analysis of the SEC’s recent proposed regulations, other government activity in this area, and their potential implications can be found here.

We could of course see a growing number of acquisitions across industries as valuations remain lower than a year ago, but as the crypto sector continues to see this kind of a downturn, the level of activity in this area could be much greater than it has previously seen.  With that said, both the target company and the acquirer should be looking at any transactions with the same level of due diligence instead of rushing into any deal fueled by panic or haste.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Are You Being Served? Court Authorizes Service of Process Via Airdrop

In what may be the first of its kind, a New York state court has authorized service via token airdrop in a case regarding allegedly stolen cryptocurrency assets. This form of alternative service is novel but could become a more routine practice in an industry where the identities of potential parties to litigation may be difficult to ascertain using blockchain data alone.

Background on the Dispute

According to the Complaint in the case, the plaintiff LCX AG (“LCX”) is a Liechtenstein based virtual currency exchange. As alleged in the Complaint, on or about January 8, 2022, the unknown defendants (named in the Complaint as John Does 1-25) illegitimately gained access to LCX’s cryptocurrency wallet and transferred $7.94 million worth of digital assets out of LCX’s control. Cryptocurrency wallets are similar in many ways to bank accounts, in that they can be used to hold and transfer assets. In the same way a thief can transfer funds from a bank account if they gain access to that account, thieves can also transfer cryptocurrency assets if they gain access to the keys to the wallet holding digital assets.

Following the alleged theft, LCX and its third-party consulting firm determined that the suspected thieves used “Tornado Cash,” which is a “mixing” service designed to hide transactions on an otherwise publicly available blockchain ledger by using complicated transfers between unrelated wallets. While Tornado Cash and other mixing services have legal purposes such as preserving the anonymity of parties to legitimate transactions, they are also utilized by criminals to launder digital funds in an illicit manner.

Even the use of these mixing services, however, can often also be unwound. This is especially true in transactions of large amounts of cryptocurrency, similar to how transactions utilizing complex money laundering schemes in the international banking system can be unwound. According to the blockchain data platform Chainalysis, although Illicit crypto transactions reached an all-time high of $14 billion in 2021, these suspected nefarious transactions accounted for 0.15% of crypto volume last year, down from 0.62% in 2020.

While the Complaint alleges the suspected thieves used Tornado Cash, LCX believes its hired consultants were able to unwind those mixing services to identify a wallet which is alleged to still hold $1.274 million of the allegedly stolen assets.

Unlike bank accounts which have associated identifying information, there are often no registered addresses or other identifying information connected to digital wallets. This makes it difficult to provide the actual proof of service required to institute an action or obtain a judgement against an individual where the only known information is their digital wallet addresses. Service via token airdrop into those wallet addresses solves that issue.

Service Via Airdrop

Service of lawsuits is traditionally made on the defendant personally at a home or business address via special process servers. In cases where service on the individual is not possible for some reason, many states authorize alternative means of service if the plaintiff can show that the alternative means of service likely to provide actual notice of the litigation to the defendant. For example, courts have historically allowed notice via newspaper publication as an alternative means of service where the defendant cannot be serviced personally.

Here, the Court permitted service via “airdrop” in which a digital token is placed in a specific cryptocurrency wallet, similar to how a direct deposit can place funds in a traditional bank account. This particular token contained a hyperlink to the associated court filings in the case, and a mechanism which allowed the data of any individual who clicked on the hyperlink to be tracked. While this is a novel way to serve notice of a lawsuit, similar airdrops have been used to communicate with the owners of otherwise anonymous cryptocurrency wallet owners. Such was the case recently when actor Seth Green had his Bored Ape non-fungible token (“NFT”) stolen and the unknowing buyer of the stolen NFT was otherwise difficult to locate.

While this type of digital service is new, it could be implemented in many disputes in the future regarding digital assets. Similar to the authorization of service that was seen recently in the Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Act litigation (where notice was served on potential class members via email and directly on the Facebook platform), service via airdrop may be the most efficient way to inform potential lawsuit participants of the pending dispute and how they can protect their rights in that dispute.

This type of airdropped service is not without issues, though. First, transactions on the blockchain are largely publicly available, meaning any individual with the wallet address would also be able to see service of the lawsuit notice. Additionally, many users are hesitant to click on unknown links (such as the one in the airdropped LCX) due to legitimate cybersecurity concerns.

While service via airdropped token is unlikely to replace traditional methods of service, it may be a useful means of serving process on unknown persons where there is a digital wallet linked to the acts which the applicable lawsuit relates.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Cryptocurrency As Compensation: Beware Of The Risks

A small but growing number of employees are asking for cryptocurrency as a form of compensation.  Whether a substitute for wages or as part of an incentive package, offering cryptocurrency as compensation has become a way for some companies to differentiate themselves from others.  In a competitive labor market, this desire to provide innovative forms of compensation is understandable.  But any company thinking about cryptocurrency needs to be aware of the risks involved, including regulatory uncertainties and market volatility.

Form of Payment – Cash or Negotiable Instrument

The federal Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay minimum and overtime wages in “cash or negotiable instrument payable at par.”  This has long been interpreted to include only fiat currencies—monies backed by a governmental authority.  As non-fiat currencies, cryptocurrencies therefore fall outside the FLSA’s definition of “cash or negotiable instrument.”  As a result, an employer who chooses to pay minimum and/or overtime wages in cryptocurrency may violate the FLSA by failing to pay workers with an accepted form of compensation.

In addition, various state laws make the form of wage payment question even more difficult.  For example, Maryland requires payment in United States currency or by check that “on demand is convertible at face value into United States currency.”  Pennsylvania requires that wages shall be made in “lawful money of the United States or check.”  And California prohibits compensation that is made through “coupon, cards or other thing[s] redeemable…otherwise than in money.”  It is largely unclear whether payment in cryptocurrency runs afoul of these state requirements.

Of note, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) allows employers to satisfy FLSA minimum wage and overtime regulations with foreign currencies as long as the conversion to U.S. dollars meets the required wage thresholds.  But neither the DOL nor courts have weighed in on whether certain cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin) are the equivalent, for FLSA purposes, of a foreign currency.

Volatility Concerns

When compared to the rather stable value of the U.S. dollar, the value of cryptocurrencies is subject to large fluctuations.  Bitcoin, for example, lost nearly 83% of its value in May 2013, approximately 50% of its value in March 2020, and recently lost and then gained 16% of its value in the span of approximately 15 minutes one day in February 2021.

Such volatility can give payroll vendors a nightmare and can, in some instances, lead to the under-payment of wages or violation of minimum wage or overtime requirements under the FLSA.

Tax and Benefits Considerations

Aside from wage and hour issues, the payment of cryptocurrency implicates a host of tax and benefits-related issues.  The IRS considers virtual currencies to be “property,” subject to capital gains tax rates.  It has also confirmed in guidance materials that any payment to employees in a virtual currency must be reported on a W-2 based upon the value of the currency in U.S. dollars at the time it was delivered to the employee.  This means that cryptocurrency wage payments are subject to Federal income tax withholding, Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax, and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax.

For 401k plan fiduciaries, the Department of Labor recently issued guidance that should serve as a stern warning to any fiduciary looking to invest 401k funds into cryptocurrencies.  Specifically, the DOL wrote: “[a]t this early stage in the history of cryptocurrencies, the Department has serious concerns about the prudence of a fiduciary’s decision to expose a 401(k) plan’s participants to direct investments in cryptocurrencies, or other products whose value is tied to cryptocurrencies.”  Given the risks inherent in cryptocurrency speculation, the DOL stated that any fiduciary allowing such investment options “should expect to be questioned [by the DOL] about how they can square their actions with their duties of prudence and loyalty in light of the risks.”

Considerations for Employers

Given the combination of uncertain and untested legal risks, employers should consider limiting cryptocurrency compensation models to payments that do not implicate the FLSA or applicable state wage and hour laws.  For example, an employer might provide an exempt employee’s base salary in U.S. dollars and any annual discretionary bonus in cryptocurrency.

Whether investing in cryptocurrencies themselves to pay employees or utilizing a third-party to convert US dollars into cryptocurrency, employers should also stay abreast of the evolving tax and benefits guidance in this area.

Ultimately, the only thing that is clear about cryptocurrency compensation is that any decision to provide such compensation to employees should be made with a careful eye towards the unique wage, tax, and benefits-related issues implicated by these transactions.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

The DOJ Throws Cold Water on the Frosties NFT Founders

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York recently charged two individuals for allegedly participating in a scheme to defraud purchasers of “Frosties” non-fungible tokens (or “NFTs”) out of over $1 million. The two-count complaint charges Ethan Nguyen (aka “Frostie”) and Andre Llacuna (aka “heyandre”) with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.   Each charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.

The Defendants marketed “Frosties” as the entry point to a broader online community consisting of games, reward programs, and other benefits.  In January 2022, their “Frosties” pre-sale raised approximately $1.1 million.

In a so-called “rug pull,” Frostie and heyandre transferred the funds raised through the pre-sale to a series of separate cryptocurrency wallets, eliminated Frosties’ online presence, and took down its website.  The transaction, which was publicly recorded and viewable on the blockchain, triggered investors to sell Frosties at a considerable discount.  Frostie and heyandre then allegedly proceeded to move the funds through a series of transactions intended to obfuscate the source and increase anonymity.  The charges came as the Defendants were preparing for the March 26 pre-sale of their next NFT project, “Embers,” which law enforcement alleges would likely have followed the same course as “Frosties.”

In a public statement announcing the arrests, the DOJ explained how the emerging NFT market is a risk-laden environment that has attracted the attention of scam artists.  Representatives from each of the federal agencies that participated in the investigation cautioned the public and put other potential fraudsters on notice of the government’s watchful eye towards cryptocurrency malfeasance.

This investigation comes on the heels of the FBI’s announcement last month of the Virtual Asset Exploitation Unit, a special task force dedicated to blockchain analysis and virtual asset seizure.  The prosecution of the Defendants in this matter continues aggressive efforts by federal agencies to reign in bad actors participating in the cryptocurrency/digital assets/blockchain space.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

Federal Reserve System Takes First Step Toward Creating Its Own Digital Currency

On Jan. 20, 2022, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) issued the Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation paper (Paper) to discuss how a potential U.S. central bank digital currency (CBDC) could improve the U.S. domestic payments system. The Paper covers: (1) the existing forms of money in the United States; (2) the current state of the U.S. payment system and its relative strengths and challenges; (3) the various digital assets that have emerged in recent years, including stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies; and (4) the pros and cons of a U.S. CBDC. This GT Alert summarizes each of these items.

The Fed is welcoming comments in response to the Paper by issuing 20 questions covering the subject. Answers to such questions must be provided by May 20, 2022, on the Fed’s CBDC Feedback Form. It is not a requirement that all questions be answered.

The Existing Forms of Money in the United States

As a means of payment, store of value, or unit of account, money takes multiple forms in the United States:

  • Central Bank Money: A liability of the central bank that serves as the foundation of the financial system and the overall economy. In the United States, central bank money comes in the form of physical currency issued by the Fed and digital balances held by commercial banks at the Fed.
  • Commercial Bank Money: The digital form of money most commonly used by the public. Commercial bank money is held in accounts at commercial banks.
  • Nonbank Money: Digital money held as balances at nonbank financial service providers (e.g., financial technology firms). These firms typically conduct balance transfers on their own books using a range of technologies, including mobile apps.

In the Paper, the Fed explains the downsides of Commercial Bank Money, which has little credit or liquidity risk due to (i) federal deposit insurance, (ii) the supervision and regulation of commercial banks, and (iii) commercial banks’ access to central bank liquidity, and of nonbank money, which lacks the full range of protections of commercial bank money and therefore generally carries more credit and liquidity risk. Conversely, the Fed explains, central bank money carries neither credit nor liquidity risk of the other two forms of money and is therefore considered by the Fed the safest form of money.

Recent Improvements to the U.S. Payment System

The U.S. payment system connects a broad range of financial institutions, households, and businesses. Most payments in the United States rely on interbank payment services—such as the ACH network or wire-transfer systems—to move money from a sender’s account at one bank to a recipient’s account at another bank. Interbank payment systems may initially settle in commercial bank money, or in central bank money, depending on their design. However, because central bank money has no credit or liquidity risk, central bank payment systems tend to underpin interbank payments and serve as the backbone of the broader payment system.

Recent improvements to the U.S. payment system have focused on making payments faster, cheaper, more convenient, and more accessible. A host of consumer-focused services accessible through mobile devices have made digital payments faster and more convenient. However, some of these new payment services, the Fed explains, could pose financial stability, payment system integrity, and other risks. For example, if the growth of nonbank payment services were to cause a large-scale shift of money from commercial banks to nonbanks, it could introduce run risk or other instabilities to the financial system resulting from the lack of equivalent protections that come with commercial bank money.

The Innovations of Digital Assets

Following the recent improvements to the U.S. payment system summarized above, the Fed recognizes that technological innovation has ushered in a wave of digital assets with money-like characteristics (i.e., cryptocurrencies). Cryptocurrencies arose from a combination of cryptographic and distributed ledger technologies, which together provide a foundation for decentralized, peer-to-peer payments. As a more recent incarnation of cryptocurrencies, stablecoins (digital assets backed by other assets such as fiat currency) are emerging as the favored method used today to facilitate trading of other digital assets, and many firms are exploring ways to promote stablecoins as a widespread means of payment.

The Fed, along with other U.S. banking regulators, has expressed concerns and called for regulatory action with respect to cryptocurrencies, particularly stablecoins, in the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report, covered in this November 2021 GT Alert.

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

In reacting to the rapidly changing landscape of digital assets in the United States, the Fed is considering how a CBDC might fit into the U.S. money and payments landscape.

Today, Fed notes (i.e., physical currency) are the only type of central bank money available to the general public, but a U.S. CBDC would enable the general public to make digital payments without requiring mechanisms to maintain public confidence like deposit insurance, and it would not depend on backing by an underlying asset pool to maintain its value. According to the Fed, a CBDC would be the safest digital asset available to the general public, with no associated credit or liquidity risk.

In the Paper, the Fed states that a U.S. CBDC, if one were created, would best serve the needs of the United States by being:

  • Privacy-protected: Any CBDC would need to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding the privacy rights of consumers and affording the transparency necessary to deter criminal activity.
  • Intermediated: Under an intermediated model, the private sector would offer accounts or digital wallets to facilitate the management of CBDC holdings and payments. Potential intermediaries could include commercial banks and regulated nonbank financial service providers and would operate in an open market for CBDC services. Although commercial banks and nonbanks would offer services to individuals to manage their CBDC holdings and payments, the CBDC itself would be a liability of the Fed. An intermediated model would facilitate the use of the private sector’s existing privacy and identity-management frameworks; leverage the private sector’s ability to innovate; and reduce the prospects for destabilizing disruptions to the well-functioning U.S. financial system.
  • Transferable: For a CBDC to serve as a widely accessible means of payment, it would need to be readily transferable between customers of different intermediaries.
  • Identity-verified: Financial institutions in the United States are subject to robust rules designed to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. A CBDC would need to be designed to comply with these rules. In practice, this would mean that a CBDC intermediary would need to verify the identity of a person accessing CBDC, just as banks and other financial institutions currently verify the identities of their customers.

The Fed intends a potential U.S. CBDC to be used in transactions that would be final and completed in real time, allowing users to make payments to one another using a risk-free asset. Moreover it is intended that individuals, businesses, and governments would potentially use a U.S. CBDC to make basic purchases of goods and services or pay bills, and the U.S. government could use a CBDC to collect taxes or make benefit payments directly to citizens.

Potential Benefits of a U.S. CBDC

As highlighted by the Fed, the potential benefits of a U.S. CBDC are:

  • Meeting future needs and demands for payment services: According to the Fed, a U.S. CBDC would safely meet future needs and demands for payment services by offering the general public broad access to digital money free from credit risk and liquidity risk.
  • Improvements to cross-border payments: In the Paper, the Fed explains that a U.S. CBDC would improve cross-border payments by using new technologies, introducing simplified distribution channels, and creating additional opportunities for cross-jurisdictional collaboration and interoperability. However, realizing these potential improvements would require significant international coordination to address issues such as common standards and infrastructure, legal frameworks, preventing illicit transactions, and the cost and timing of implementation.
  • The dollar’s international role: The Fed expects that a U.S. CBDC would support the U.S. dollar’s international role because, in a world where foreign countries and currency unions may have introduced their own CBDCs, which could lead to a decrease in the use of the U.S. dollar, a U.S. CBDC might help preserve the international role of the dollar.
  • Financial inclusion: Promoting financial inclusion—particularly for economically vulnerable households and communities— by, among other benefits: (i) providing access to digital payments; (ii) enabling rapid and cost-effective payment of taxes; and (iii) enabling rapid and cost-effective delivery of wages, tax refunds, and other federal payments.

Potential Risks and Policy Considerations for a U.S. CBDC

Conversely, the potential risks and policies considerations of a U.S. CBDC are:

  • Financial-sector market structure: A U.S. CBDC could fundamentally change the structure of the U.S. financial system, altering the roles and responsibilities of the private sector and the central bank. For example, a widely available U.S. CBDC would serve as a close substitute for commercial bank money. This substitution effect could reduce the aggregate amount of deposits in the banking system and potentially reduce credit availability or raise credit costs for households and businesses. Similarly, an interest-bearing CBDC could result in a shift away from other low-risk assets, such as shares in money market mutual funds, Treasury bills, and other short-term instruments. A shift away from these other low-risk assets could reduce credit availability or raise credit costs for businesses and governments.
  • Safety and stability of the financial system: The safety and stability of the financial system could be affected by a U.S. CBDC because the ability to quickly convert other forms of money—including deposits at commercial banks—into CBDC could make runs on financial firms more likely or more severe. Traditional measures such as prudential supervision, government deposit insurance, and access to central bank liquidity may be insufficient to stave off large outflows of commercial bank deposits into CBDC in the event of financial panic.
  • Consumer privacy: A general-purpose CBDC would generate data about users’ financial transactions in the same ways that commercial bank and nonbank money generates such data today. In the intermediated CBDC model that the Fed would consider, intermediaries would address privacy concerns by leveraging their existing tools.
  • Prevention of financial crimes: Financial institutions must comply with a robust set of rules designed to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, including customer due diligence, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. Any U.S. CBDC would need to be designed in a manner that facilitates compliance with these rules by involving private-sector partners with established programs to help ensure compliance with these rules.
  • Operational resilience and cybersecurity: Threats to existing payment services—including operational disruptions and cybersecurity risks— would apply to a U.S. CBDC as well. Any dedicated infrastructure for a U.S. CBDC would need to be resilient to such threats, and the operators of the U.S. CBDC infrastructure would need to remain vigilant as bad actors employ ever more sophisticated methods and tactics. Many digital payments today cannot be executed during natural disasters or other large disruptions, and affected areas must rely on in-person cash transactions and central banks are currently researching whether offline CBDC payment options would be feasible.
  • Efficacy of monetary policy implementation: Under the current “ample reserves” monetary policy regime, the Fed exercises control over the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates primarily through the setting of the Fed’s administered rates. In this framework, the introduction of a U.S. CBDC could affect monetary policy implementation and interest rate control by altering the supply of reserves in the banking system. In the case of a noninterest-bearing U.S. CBDC, the level and volatility of the public’s demand for U.S. CBDC might be comparable to other factors that currently affect the quantity of reserves in the banking system, such as changes in physical currency or overnight repurchase agreements. In this case, a decline in U.S. CBDC that resulted in a corresponding increase in reserves likely would only make reserves more ample and have little effect on the federal funds rate.

Conclusion

While the Paper examines the potential benefits and risks of a U.S. CBDC, it is not intended to advance any specific policy outcome, nor is it intended to signal that the Fed will make any imminent decisions about the appropriateness of issuing a U.S. CBDC. However, the Paper undoubtedly is the Fed’s first step toward central bank digital currencies via a public discussion with its stakeholders.

As previously indicated, the FED is accepting comments in response to the Paper until May 20, 2022, through the FED’s CBDC Feedback Form.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Article By Carl A. Fornaris, Barbara A. Jones, Marina Olman-Pal and Claudio J. Arruda of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more articles on digital currency, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

SEC Rejects Listing of Two Bitcoin ETFs

The SEC rejected two proposals to list and trade shares in two Bitcoin exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”).

The SEC rejected a proposal from NYSE Arca, Inc. (“Arca”) to list and trade shares of the Valkyrie Bitcoin Fund. The SEC also rejected a proposal from CBOE BZX Exchange, Inc. (“BZX”) to list and trade shares of the Kryptoin Bitcoin ETF Trust.

The SEC assessed whether the exchanges (i) had a comprehensive surveillance-sharing agreement with a significant, regulated market, and (ii) could effectively prevent fraudulent and manipulative activity. In the rejected proposals, the SEC noted its concerns over the abilities of the exchanges to adequately meet the requirements under SEA Section 6(b)(5) (“Determination by Commission Requisite to Registration of Applicant as a National Securities Exchange”) in protecting investors and the public interest by preventing fraudulent and manipulative practices.

The SEC rejected Arca’s argument that (i) liquidity, (ii) price arbitrage, and (iii) frameworks to value assets would be sufficient to mitigate potential manipulation.

Similarly, the SEC rejected BZX’s proposal, concluding “that BZX has not established that it has a comprehensive surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated market of significant size related to bitcoin,” and “that BZX has not established that other means to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices are sufficient to justify dispensing with the requisite surveillance-sharing agreement.”

As a result, the SEC found that both exchanges had failed to prove that they could meet their burdens under SEA Section 6(b)(5).

© Copyright 2021 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more articles on cryptocurrency exchanges, visit the NLR Financial Securities & Banking.