740,000 Reasons to Think Twice Before Putting a Company in Bankruptcy

A recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Delaware provides a cautionary tale about the risks of involuntary bankruptcy.

In the Delaware case, the debtor managed a group of investment funds. The business was all but defunct when several investors, dissatisfied with the debtor’s management, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition.  They obtained an order for relief from the bankruptcy court, then removed the debtor as manager of the funds and inserted their hand-picked manager.  So far, so good.

The debtor, who was not properly served with the involuntary petition and did not give the petition the attention it required, struck back and convinced the bankruptcy court to set aside the order for relief. The debtor then went after the involuntary petitioners for damages.  After 8 years of litigation, the Delaware court awarded the debtor $740,000 in damages – all of it attributable to attorneys’ fees and costs.

If you file an involuntary petition and the bankruptcy court dismisses it, then a debtor can recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The legal fees include the amount necessary to defeat the involuntary filing.  In addition, if the court finds that the petition was filed in bad faith, then the court also can enter judgment for all damages proximately caused by the filing and punitive damages.  The Delaware court awarded the debtor $75,000 for defeating the involuntary petition.

The debtor also sought a judgment for attorneys’ fees in pursuit of damages for violating the automatic stay.  The involuntary petitioners had replaced the debtor as manager without first obtaining leave from the court to do so.  The investment fund was barely operating and had little income to support a claim for actual damages.  Nevertheless, the Delaware court awarded $665,000 in attorneys’ fees related to litigating the automatic stay violation.

Because the debtor had no “actual” damages from the stay violation, the involuntary petitioners contended that the debtor was not entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees.  The Delaware court pointed out that “actual” damages (e.g., loss of business income) are not a prerequisite to the recovery of attorneys’ fees, much to the chagrin of the defendants.  The court held that attorneys’ fees and costs are always “actual damages” in the context of a willful violation of the automatic stay.

The Delaware court also rejected defendants’ argument that the fee amount was “unreasonable” since there was no monetary injury to the business.  In other words, the debtor should not have spent so much money on legal fees because it lost on its claim.  The court held that defendants’ argument was made “with the benefit of hindsight” – at the end of litigation when the court had ruled, after an evidentiary trial, that debtor suffered no actual injury.  The court pointed out that the debtor sought millions in damages for the loss of management’s fees, and even though the court rejected the claim after trial, it was not an unreasonable argument for the debtor to make.  The court concluded that “the reasonableness of one’s conduct must be assessed at the time of the conduct and based on the information that was known or knowable at the time.”

The involuntary petitioners likely had sound reasons to want the debtor removed as fund manager.  But by pursuing involuntary bankruptcy and losing, they ended up having to stroke a check to the debtor for over $700,000.  Talk about adding insult to injury.  The upshot is that involuntary bankruptcy is an extreme and risky action that should be a last-resort option undertaken with extreme caution.

Large Corporate Bankruptcy Filings Surged in First Half of 2023

Increase in large corporate bankruptcy filings driven by companies in retail trade, services, and manufacturing.

The increase in large corporate bankruptcies in the first half of 2023 marked a reversal from a gradual decline in filings since the start of 2021, according to a report released today by Cornerstone Research.

The report, Trends in Large Corporate Bankruptcy and Financial Distress—Midyear 2023 Update, found that the number of bankruptcies filed by public and private companies with over $100 million in assets increased during the first half of 2023 to 72 filings, already surpassing the 53 bankruptcy filings in 2022. While the number of bankruptcies increased, the average assets at the time of filing, $780 million, were well below the 2005–2022 average of $2.05 billion and the 2022 average of $1.62 billion.

The surge in large corporate bankruptcy filings in the first half of 2023 is consistent with economic conditions posing heightened bankruptcy risk for highly leveraged companies.

Retail Trade, Services, and Manufacturing saw the most notable increases in bankruptcy filings in the first half of the year, while Mining, Oil, and Gas continued to decline. Manufacturing has already seen nearly twice as many bankruptcies as in the previous year (24 filings in 1H 2023 compared to 13 in 2022) and accounted for 33% of all bankruptcies filed in the first half of 2023.

“The surge in large corporate bankruptcy filings in the first half of 2023 is consistent with economic conditions posing heightened bankruptcy risk for highly leveraged companies,” said Matt Osborn, a principal at Cornerstone Research and coauthor of the report. “Along with a general rise in interest rates, credit spreads for highly leveraged corporate issuers compared to investment grade issuers began widening in mid-2022, a shift that generally persisted into the first half of 2023.”

The number of mega bankruptcies, those filed by companies with over $1 billion in reported assets, also increased. In the first half of 2023, the number of mega bankruptcies already matched the full-year total for 2022 of 16 and surpassed the 2005–2022 half-year average of 11. The largest bankruptcy was filed by SVB Financial Group, with $19.68 billion in assets at the time of filing. The largest non-financial-firm bankruptcy filing was by Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., with $4.40 billion in assets at the time of filing. Six mega bankruptcies were filed by companies in the Services industry.

Additional Statistics and Trends

  • The first half of 2023 saw an average of 12 bankruptcies per month, nearly twice the monthly average between 2005 and 2022 of 6.4.
  • The average assets at the time of filing among the largest 20 bankruptcies in the first half of 2023 ($32 billion) were 41% lower than that of the 20 largest in 2022 ($3.95 billion).
  • The most common venues for bankruptcy filings were Delaware and the Southern District of Texas, which accounted for 39% and 32% of all bankruptcy filings in 1H 2023, respectively.
  • The second half of 2022 saw a large number of corporate bankruptcies involving crypto lending companies, exchanges, and related businesses, with such bankruptcy filings continuing in the first half of 2023.

Click here to read the full report.

Cryptocurrency Brings Disruption to Bankruptcy Courts—What Parties Can Expect and the Open Issues Still To Be Resolved (Part Two)

In this second part of our blog exploring the various issues courts need to address in applying the Bankruptcy Code to cryptocurrency, we expand upon our roadmap.  In part one, we addressed whether cryptocurrency constitutes property of the estate, the impacts of cryptocurrency’s fluctuating valuation, issues of perfection, and the effects of cryptocurrency on debtor-in-possession financing.  In this part two, we explore preferential transfers of cryptocurrency, whether self-executing smart contracts would violate the automatic stay, and how confusing regulatory guidelines negatively impact bankruptcy proceedings, including plan feasibility.

Preferential Transfers

Pursuant to section 547(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-in-possession (or trustee) can avoid a transfer of the debtor’s property to a creditor made in the 90-days before filing the petition if, among other things, the creditor received more than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.  Notably, such a transfer can only be avoided if the thing transferred was the debtor’s property.  When cryptocurrency is valued and whether cryptocurrency is considered to be property of the estate can impact preference liability.

Perhaps the first question to arise in cryptocurrency preference litigation is whether the transferred cryptocurrency is property of the estate.  If, as in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Celsius Network LLC and its affiliates, the cryptocurrency withdrawn by the accountholder during the ninety days prior to the bankruptcy is determined to be property of the estate, and not the accountholder’s property, a preferential transfer claim could be asserted.  If, however, the cryptocurrency was property of the accountholder, for instance if it was held in a wallet to which only the accountholder had exclusive rights, no preference liability would attach to the withdrawal of the cryptocurrency.

Assuming that a preferential transfer claim lies, the court must decide how to value the preferential transfer.  Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor-in-possession to recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property.”[1] This gives the debtor-in-possession wide latitude in asserting a preference claim.  For instance, the debtor-in-possession could take the position that the cryptocurrency is a commodity, in which case a claim could be asserted to recover the cryptocurrency itself, which, by the end of the case, may be worth a much more than it was at the time of the transfer, with any gain accruing to the estate’s benefit.[2]  In contrast, the party receiving the transferred cryptocurrency would likely take the position that the cryptocurrency is currency, in which case a claim would be limited to the value of the cryptocurrency at the time of the transfer.[3]

The proper valuation methodology has not to date been definitively addressed by the courts.  Perhaps the closest a court has come to deciding that issue was in Hashfast Techs. LLC v. Lowe,[4] where the trustee claimed that a payment of 3,000 bitcoins to a supplier was a preferential transfer.  The bitcoin was worth approximately $360,000 at the time of the transfer but was worth approximately $1.2 million when the trustee asserted the preferential transfer claim.  The trustee argued that the payment to the supplier was intended to be a transfer of bitcoins and not a payment of $360,000, and that the supplier was required to pay 3,000 bitcoins to the estate, notwithstanding the substantial increase in value (and the resulting windfall to the estate).  Ultimately, the court refused to decide whether bitcoin is either currency or commodities and held that “[i]f and when the [trustee] prevails and avoids the subject transfer of bitcoin to defendant, the court will decide whether, under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), he may recover the bitcoin (property) transferred or their value, and if the latter, valued as of what date.”[5]

The changing value of cryptocurrency will also impact the question of whether the creditor received more than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.[6]  While the value of preferential transfers are determined at the time of the transfer,[7] the analysis of whether such transfer made the creditor better off than in a Chapter 7 liquidation is determined at the time of a hypothetical distribution, which means, practically, at the time of the petition.[8]  Therefore, if a customer withdraws cryptocurrency from a platform during the 90-day preference period, and the cryptocurrency experiences a decrease in value during those 90 days, that customer could arguably be liable for a preferential transfer because the withdrawn cryptocurrency was worth more at the time of the transfer than at the time of the petition.

Presently unanswered is whether the safe-harbor provisions provided for in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shield cryptocurrency transfers from preferential transfer attack.  Pursuant to section 546(e), a debtor-in-possession cannot avoid as a preference a margin payment or settlement payment made to “financial participant . . . in connection with a securities contract . . . commodity contract . . . [or] forward contract . . . that is made before the commencement of the case.” If the court determines that cryptocurrency is a security or commodity, and that the transfers were made in connection with forward or commodities contracts, then section 546(e) may shield those transfers from attack as preferential.

Violations of the Automatic Stay and Smart Contracts

The self-executing nature of smart contracts may raise automatic stay concerns.  The automatic stay arises upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and in general, prevents creditors and other parties from continuing their collection efforts against the debtor.[9]  Of relevance to smart contracts, section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the stay applies to “any act” to obtain possession of or control of property of the estate.  Very recently, in Chicago v. Fulton, the United Stated Supreme Court held that section 362(a)(3) prevented any “affirmative act that would alter the status quo at the time of the bankruptcy petition.”[10]

Prior to Fulton, a bankruptcy court in Arkansas examined an analogous issue in Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton).[11]  In Hampton, the court adjudicated whether a device that automatically locked the debtor out of her car violated the automatic stay when it disabled function of the car’s engine postpetition.  The device relied on a code—if the debtor paid, the creditor sent her a code, which she would then input, and this prevented the device from automatically disabling the car’s starter.  In this instance, the court found a violation of the automatic stay.[12]

Based on current case law, it remains unclear whether a smart contract, operating automatically, would violate the automatic stay.  For example, if a smart contract is based on a DeFi loan, and it automatically executes postpetition to transfer to the lender assets of the estate, a court may find a violation of the automatic stay.

Hampton would suggest that such actions would be a violation—but two issues caution against relying on Hampton as a clear bellwether.  First, Hampton was decided pre-Fulton and it remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the Supreme Court’s holding in Fulton would change the outcome of Hampton. Second, a potentially key factual distinction exists: the device in Hampton required the creditor to give the debtor a code to prevent the disabling of the car, but smart contracts can be programmed to automatically execute postpetition without any further action by the parties.  If a smart contract is found to violate the automatic stay, the next question is whether such a violation is willful, meaning that a court can impose monetary penalties, including potentially punitive damages.[13]

Note that even if a smart contract is found not to violate the automatic stay, it does not mean that a creditor can retain the property.  Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code requires those in possession of estate property to turnover the property to the estate.  The estate is created at the time of the filing of the petition, and therefore, any smart contract that executes postpetition would theoretically concern estate property and be subject to turnover.  Unfortunately, ambiguities arise even in this statute, as section 542 contains a good-faith exemption to the turnover mandate if the recipient is not aware of bankruptcy filing and transfers the assets.[14]  Thus, the turnover mandate may be difficult to apply to non-debtor parties to smart contracts who program the contract ahead of time with the knowledge that such a contract may execute after a bankruptcy petition but with no actual knowledge of such petition having been filed.

Regulatory Confusion

The regulatory world has no uniform approach to cryptocurrency. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), perhaps in part spurred by executive pressure, recently advanced heavier regulatory oversight of cryptocurrency.[15]  The two agencies also share jurisdiction; one agency asserting authority to regulate cryptocurrency does not preclude the other from doing so.[16]  Other agencies, such as the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen), have also asserted the jurisdiction to regulate cryptocurrency.[17]  The result is regulatory confusion for market participants, both because of the sheer number of agencies asserting jurisdiction and the fact that individual agencies can sometimes issue confusing and ill-defined guidelines.

For instance, the SEC applies the Howey test, developed in the 1940s, to determine whether a specific cryptocurrency is a security.[18]  Unfortunately, the SEC has stated that whether a specific cryptocurrency is a security can change overtime, and recently announced even more cryptocurrencies that they believe meet Howey’s definition of a security via their lawsuits with crypto exchanges Binance.US and Coinbase.[19]

The regulatory confusion clouding cryptocurrency has directly impacted bankruptcy proceedings. One recent case study offers a glimpse into that disconcerting influence. In 2022, crypto exchange Voyager Digital Holdings Ltd. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Another major crypto exchange, Binance.US, entered into an agreement with Voyager to acquire its assets—valued at around $1 billion. The SEC, the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), and the New York Attorney General all filed sale objections in Voyager’s bankruptcy proceedings, arguing that if Voyager’s crypto assets constitute securities, then Binance.US’s rebalancing and redistribution of these assets to its account holders would be an “unregistered offer, sale or delivery after sale of securities” in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.[20]  The NYDFS also alleged that the agreement “unfairly discriminates” against New York citizens by subordinating their recovery of diminished assets in favor of Voyager’s creditors—as well as foreclosing the option to recover crypto rather than liquidated assets.[21]

SEC trial counsel noted that, “regulatory actions, whether involving Voyager, Binance.US or both, could render the transactions in the plan impossible to consummate, thus making the plan unfeasible.”[22]  In April 2023, Binance.US sent Voyager a legal notice canceling the prospective transaction, writing that “the hostile and uncertain regulatory climate in the United States has introduced an unpredictable operating environment impacting the entire American business community.”[23]

The SEC’s desire towards regulating cryptocurrency as securities appears to be growing.  On August 15, 2023, the SEC settled for $24 million its claims against Bittrex, which included violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act.[24] Upon the settlement, the director of the SEC stated that Bittrex “worked with token issuers . . . in an effort to evade the federal securities law.  They failed.”[25]  Uncertainty combined with aggressive enforcement leaves cryptocurrency entities in an uncertain and precarious position.

Plan Feasibility

The Voyager case also highlights issues with plan feasibility in Chapter 11.  In Voyager, the SEC objected to plan feasibility on the basis that one known digital asset of Voyager was a security, and therefore, the purchaser should register as a securities dealer.[26]  Although the court overruled the SEC’s objection, as noted above, Binance.US ultimately withdrew its purchase offer, placing blame on the overall regulatory climate.[27]  As regulations remain uncertain, and government authorities have shown a willingness to assert themselves into the process of reorganization, debtors who file for bankruptcy will have to brace for new or unforeseen objections to an otherwise confirmable plan.

Conclusion

Cryptocurrency has been seen by some as a disruptive force in finance.  As the above issues show, it also appears to be a disruptive force in bankruptcy cases.  Debtors and creditors alike will have to weather the disruption as best they can while the courts continue to grapple with the many open issues raised by cryptocurrencies.

See Cryptocurrency Brings Disruption to Bankruptcy Courts—What Parties Can Expect and the Open Issues Still To Be Resolved (Part One)


[1] See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

[2] This position would arguably be consistent with cases interpreting section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code that have held that the estate is entitled to recover the value of the property when value has appreciated subsequent to the transfer.  See, e.g., In re Am. Way Serv. Corp., 229 B.R. 496, 531 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that when the value of the transferred property has appreciated, “the trustee is entitled to recover the property itself, or the value of the property at the time of judgment.”).

[3] Mary E. Magginis, Money for Nothing: The Treatment of Bitcoin in Section 550 Recovery Actions, 20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 485, 516 (2017).

[4] No. 14-30725DM (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016),

[5] Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1-2, Hashfast Techs. LLC v. Lowe, Adv. No. 15-3011DM (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2016) (ECF No. 49).

[6] See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (requiring the transferee to have received more that it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation).

[7] Maginnis, supra note 3.

[8] See In re CIS Corp., 195 B.R. 251, 262 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Thus, the Code § 547(b)(5) analysis is to be made as of the time the Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition); Sloan v. Zions First Nat’l Bank (In re Casteltons, Inc.), 990 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1993) (“When assessing an alleged preferential transfer, the relevant inquiry . . . [is] . . . the actual effect of the payment as determined when bankruptcy results.”).

[9] 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

[10] 141 S.Ct. 585, 590 (2021).

[11] 319 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).

[12] Hampton, 319 B.R. at 165-170.

[13] See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (providing that, subject to a good faith exception “an individual injured by any willful violation of [the automatic stay] shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”).

[14] See 11 U.S.C. § 542(c).

[15] David Gura, The White House calls for more regulations as cryptocurrencies grow more popular (Sept. 6, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/09/16/1123333428/crypto-cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-terra-luna-regulation-digital-currencies.

[16] See, e.g.CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 222, 228-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The jurisdictional authority of CFTC to regulate virtual currencies as commodities does not preclude other agencies from exercising their regulatory power when virtual currencies function differently than derivative commodities.”).

[17] See Treasury Announces Two Enforcements Actions for over $24M and $29M Against Virtual Currency Exchange Bittrex, Inc., (October 11, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1006.

[18] See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

[19] Emily Mason, Coinbase Hit With SEC Suit That Identifies $37 Billion of Crypto Tokens As Securities, (June 6, 2023 5:08 pm), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilymason/2023/06/06/coinbase-hit-with-sec-suit-that-identifies-37-billion-of-crypto-tokens-as-securities/?sh=3cc4c6d667a9SEC Charges Crypto Asset Trading Platform Bittrex and its Former CEO for Operating an Unregistered Exchange, Broker, and Clearing Agencyhttps://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-78 (last visited July 31, 2023).

[20] Jack Schickler, SEC Objects to Binance.US’ $1B Voyager Deal, Alleging Sale of Unregistered Securities, (last updated Feb. 23, 2023 at 2:32 p.m.), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2023/02/23/sec-objects-to-binanceus-1b-voyager-deal-alleging-sale-of-unregistered-securities/.

[21] See NYDFS Objection to Plan, In re Voyager Digital Holdings, et al. at 9-10, No. 22-10943 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023) [ECF No. 1051].

[22] Kari McMahon, SEC and New York Regulators Push Back on Binance.US’s Acquisition of Voyager, The Block (Feb. 23, 2023), https://www.theblock.co/post/214333/sec-and-new-york-regulators-push-back-on-binance-uss-acquisition-of-voyager.

[23] Yueqi Yang & Steven Church, Binance US Ends $1 Billion Deal to Buy Bankrupt Crypto Firm Voyager, Bloomberg (April 25, 2023), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-25/binance-us-terminates-deal-to-buy-bankrupt-crypto-firm-voyager.

[24] See Crypto Asset Trading Platform Bittrex and Former CEO to Settle SEC Charges for Operating an Unregistered Exchange, Broker, and Clearing Agencyhttps://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-150 (last visited Sept. 18, 2023).

[25] Id.

[26] See Objection of the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission to Confirmation at 3 n.5, In re Voyager Digital Holdings, et al., No. 22-10943 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023) (ECF No. 1047).

[27] See supra at n. 23.

For more articles on cryptocurrency, visit the NLR communications, media and internet section.

Upstream and Affiliate Guaranties in NAV Loans

Guaranties are a common feature in fund finance transactions. Particularly in NAV loans, upstream and affiliate (or “sideways”) guaranties are used. Below we discuss some of the context for the use of these types of guaranties, as well as some of the issues that lenders should consider in relying on them.

Upstream Guaranties

It is not uncommon in NAV loan transactions for the borrower to hold the underwritten assets for the financing (i.e., the fund’s portfolio of investments) through one or more controlled subsidiary holding vehicles (each, a “HoldCo”). Lenders may take a pledge of the management and economic interests in the HoldCos (rather than the underlying investments). In order to get as close to the underlying investments as possible (without taking a pledge), lenders may require that a HoldCo issue a guaranty directly to the lenders (or the administrative agent, on behalf of the lenders), guaranteeing the borrower’s obligations under the NAV loan facility. This “upstream” guaranty provides the lenders a direct claim against the HoldCo for amounts due under the loan, mitigating some of the risk of structural subordination to potential creditors (expected or unexpected) at the level of the HoldCo.[1]

Affiliate Guaranties

It is also common in NAV loan facilities for the borrower’s portfolio of investments to be held by multiple subsidiaries and/or affiliates of the borrower. Each such subsidiary or affiliate may be designated as a guarantor for repayment of the loan. As a result, such entities end up guaranteeing the obligations of their affiliates. The purpose of these affiliate guaranties is the same as the upstream guaranties discussed above – namely, to provide the lenders with a more direct enforcement claim in a default scenario.

Use of Such Guaranties

Motivations for the use of such upstream and affiliate guaranties may include:

a lender’s desire to underwrite a broader portfolio of investments, mitigating concentration risk to the portfolio of a single holding entity;
a lender’s desire to ensure that it is not subordinate to creditors that may arise at the level of the entity that directly owns the investment; or
a borrower’s desire to obtain a higher loan-to-value ratio than the lenders would otherwise provide based on the investments alone.
While upstream and affiliate guaranties can help to address these issues, they may raise nuanced legal issues that should be discussed with counsel in light of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Enforceability Considerations

Guaranties constitute the assumption of the liabilities of another entity and are contingent claims against the guarantor. Under certain insolvency laws, guaranties may be subject to challenge, and payments under guaranties may be subject to avoidance. Upstream or affiliate guaranties may be subject to heightened scrutiny and challenge in a bankruptcy or distress scenario. Below are a few potential issues lenders should bear in mind with respect to upstream and affiliate guaranties.

1. Constructively Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance. Under Bankruptcy Code section 548 and certain state laws, (a) transfers of property (including grants of security interests or liens), or (b) obligations assumed (such as incurring a loan or guaranty obligation) may be avoided as constructively fraudulent if BOTH of the following requirements are satisfied:[2]

  • (i) the transferor/guarantor does not receive reasonably equivalent value; AND
  • (ii) the transferor/guarantor is insolvent or undercapitalized or rendered insolvent, undercapitalized or unable to pay its debts because of the transfer or the assumed liability.

A guaranty by a parent of the obligations of a wholly owned and solvent subsidiary, a so-called downstream guaranty, is generally regarded as providing the parent with reasonably equivalent value through an enhancement of the value of its equity ownership of the subsidiary.

Upstream and affiliate guaranties require more scrutiny than guaranties by a borrower parent to determine whether any potential enforceability issues are present.

a. Reasonably Equivalent Value. The determination of value is not formulaic or mechanical, but rather generally determined by the substance of the transaction. Value or benefits from a transfer may be direct (e.g., receipt of loan proceeds) or indirect. But if indirect, they must be “fairly concrete.”

In each of the above scenarios, we are assuming that the upstream or affiliate guarantor would not use the proceeds of any loans and, consequently, would not be added to the loan facility as a borrower. However, other indirect but tangible benefits or value to the guarantor should be identified, e.g., favorable loan terms or amendments, use of the NAV facility proceeds that may indirectly but materially benefit the guarantor, maintenance of the entire fund group of entities that benefits the guarantor, etc.

b. Financial Condition of Guarantor. The financial condition of the transferor/guarantor is evaluated at the time of the incurrence of the guaranty. The evaluation is made from the debtor/guarantor – in what condition was the guarantor left after giving effect to the transfer or assumption of the obligation. Diligence regarding a guarantor’s financial condition may demonstrate that such guarantor is sufficiently creditworthy to undertake the guaranty and remain solvent and able to conduct its respective businesses. Representations from the guarantor may be sought to confirm its financial condition.

c. Potential Mitigants. In addition to performing diligence with respect to the above points, lenders and their counsel will often include contractual provisions to mitigate the possibility that a guaranty may be found to constitute a fraudulent transfer. Savings clauses, limited recourse guaranties, and net worth guaranties are all tools that can be used to address the issues noted above. The scope and appropriateness of such provisions is beyond the scope of this article and should be discussed with external deal and restructuring counsel.

2. Preference Challenge. Under Bankruptcy Code section 547, a transfer made by a debtor to a creditor, on account of an antecedent debt, that is made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the bankruptcy case has been commenced may be subject to avoidance as a preferential transfer. Certain defenses may apply to a potential preferential transfer, including the simultaneous exchange of “new value” by the creditor. However, note that any pre-bankruptcy transfers of value, like payments under a guaranty, may be subject to scrutiny and potential challenge by the guarantor/debtor or a bankruptcy trustee.

Guaranties can be an important element in structuring NAV loan transactions to achieve the terms desired by the parties and to provide necessary protections for the lenders, but consideration needs to be given to the legal issues, such as the ones mentioned here, that their inclusion can present.

[1] Lenders will typically also require the HoldCo to pledge its accounts to which proceeds of the underlying investments are paid, allowing lenders to foreclose on such cash at the HoldCo level, without the need for such cash to first be distributed up to the borrower.

[2] Note that the precise language of certain state fraudulent transfer laws may differ, but conceptually, most state statutes require a showing of (i) insufficient or unreasonably small consideration in exchange for the transfer or liability incurred, and (ii) the transferor/debtor being insolvent at the time of the transfer, or becoming insolvent or subject to financial distress as a result of the transfer.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Who Owns the Crypto, the Customer or the Debtor?

Whose crytpo is it? With the multiple cryptocurrency companies that have recently filed for bankruptcy (FTX, Voyager Digital, BlockFi), and more likely on the way, that simple sounding question is taking on huge significance. Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Chief Judge Martin Glenn) attempted to answer that question in the Celsius Network LLC bankruptcy case.

The Facts of the Case

Celsius and its affiliated debtors (collectively, “Debtors”) ran a cryptocurrency finance platform. Faced with extreme turbulence in the cryptocurrency markets, the Debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions on July 13, 2022. As part of their regular business, the Debtors had allowed customers to both deposit cryptocurrency digital assets on their platform and earn a percentage yield, as well as take out loans by pledging their cryptocurrencies as security. One specific program offered by the Debtors was the “Earn” program, under which customers could transfer certain cryptocurrencies to the Debtors and earn “rewards” in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens. On the petition date, the Earn program accounts (the “Earn Accounts”) held cryptocurrency assets with a market value of approximately $4.2 billion. Included within the Earn Accounts were stablecoins valued at approximately $23 million in September 2022. A stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency designed to be tied or pegged to another currency, commodity or financial instrument.

Recognizing their emerging need for liquidity, on November 11, 2022, the Debtors filed a motion seeking entry of an order (a) establishing a rebuttable presumption that the Debtors owned the assets in the Earn Accounts and (b) permitting the sale of the stablecoins held in the Earn Accounts under either section 363(c)(1) (sale in the ordinary course of business) or section 363(b)(1) (sale outside the ordinary course of business) of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion generated opposition from the U.S. Trustee, various States and State securities regulators and multiple creditors and creditor groups. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the sale of the stablecoins under section 363(c)(1) but argued that the sale should be approved under section 363(b)(1) because the Debtors had shown a good business reason for the sale (namely to pay ongoing administrative expenses of the bankruptcy cases). On January 4, 2023, the court issued its forty-five (45) page memorandum opinion granting the Debtors’ motion.

The Court’s Decision

Although the ownership issue may appear complex given the nature of the assets (i.e., cryptocurrency), the bankruptcy court framed the issue into relatively straightforward state law questions of contract formation and interpretation. The court first analyzed whether there was a valid contract governing the parties’ rights to the cryptocurrency assets in the Earn Accounts. Under governing New York law, a valid, enforceable contract requires an offer and acceptance (i.e., mutual assent), consideration and an intent to be bound. The court found that all three elements were satisfied. The Debtors required that all customers agree to and accept “Terms of Use.” The Terms of Use was set up as a “clickwrap” agreement that required customers to agree to the terms and prevented the customers from advancing to the next page and completing their sign up unless they agreed to the Terms of Use. Under New York law, “clickwrap” agreements are sufficient to constitute mutual assent. The court also found that consideration was given by way of allowing the customers to earn a financing fee (i.e., the rewards in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens). Finally, the court noted that no party had presented evidence that either the Debtors or the customers lacked intent to be bound by the contract terms. Accordingly, the court held that the Terms of Use constituted a valid contract, subject to the rights of customers to put forth individual contract formation defenses in the future, including claims of fraudulent inducement based on representations allegedly made by the Debtors’ former CEO, Alex Mashinsky.

Having found a valid contract to presumptively exist, the court turned its attention to what the Terms of Use provided in terms of transfer of ownership. In operative part, the Terms of Use provided:

In consideration for the Rewards payable to you on the Eligible Digital Assets using the Earn Service … and the use of our Services, you grant Celsius … all right and title to such Eligible Digital Assets, including ownership rights, and the right, without further notice to you, to hold such Digital Assets in Celsius’ own Virtual Wallet or elsewhere, and to pledge, re-pledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, sell, lend or otherwise transfer or use any amount of such Digital Assets, separately or together with other property, with all the attendant rights of ownership, and for any period of time, and without retaining in Celsius’ possession and/or control a like amount of Digital Assets or any other monies or assets, and use or invest such Digital Assets in Celsius’ full discretion. You acknowledge that with respect Digital Assets used by Celsius pursuant to this paragraph:

  1. You will not be able to exercise rights of ownership;
  2. Celsius may receive compensation in connection with lender or otherwise using Digital Assets in its business to which you have no claim or entitlement; and
  3. In the event that Celsius becomes bankrupt, enters liquidation or is otherwise unable to repay its obligations, any Eligible Digital Assets used in the Earn Service or as collateral under the Borrow Service may not be recoverable, and you may not have any legal remedies or rights in connection with Celsius’ obligations to you other than your rights as a creditor of Celsius under any applicable laws.

Based on this language, the court held that the Terms of Use unambiguously transferred ownership of the assets in the Earn Accounts to the Debtors. Central to the court’s decision was that under the Terms of Use customers had granted the Debtors “all right and title to such Digital Assets, including ownership rights.” Based on this language, the court found that title and ownership of the cryptocurrency held in the Earn Accounts was “unequivocally transferred to the Debtors and became property of the Estate on the Petition Date.”

Finally, the court found that the Debtors had shown that they needed to generate liquidity to fund the bankruptcy cases, and that additional liquidity would be needed early this year. Accordingly, the court held that the Debtors had shown sufficient cause to permit the sale of the stablecoins outside of the ordinary course of business in accordance with section 363(b)(1).

Implications

Given the turbulent nature of the cryptocurrency market and the likelihood of further cryptocurrency bankruptcy filings, the court’s ruling is sure to have significant implications. First, unless it is reversed on appeal, the opinion means that the Debtors’ Earn program customers do not own the funds in their digital accounts and will instead be relegated to the status of unsecured creditors with a highly uncertain recovery. Second, the opinion underscores the Wild West nature of crypto and the fact that unlike deposits at a federally insured financial institution, deposits at cryptocurrency exchanges are not similarly insured and may be at risk. Third, customers or account holders in other cryptocurrency exchanges or businesses should carefully review the applicable terms of use to determine if those terms transferred ownership of their digital assets to their cryptocurrency counterparty. It is likely a fair assumption that such other terms of use transferred ownership in the same way that the Celsius Terms of Use did, in which case customers must remain vigilant of the financial health of their cryptocurrency counterparty. Finally, all parties engaging in on-line business transactions, including those outside of cryptocurrency, are on notice that clickwrap agreements commonly found in such transactions are, at least under New York law, enforceable. In short, those agreements mean something, and the fact that a party did not read the terms before agreeing to them through a “click” is likely not going to be a viable defense to the enforcement of those terms.

For more Bankruptcy Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

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Tom Brady, Larry David, and Others Named Defendants in Class Action Suit Filed Against FTX

Four days after FTX, once the world’s third-largest crypto exchange, filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy, former FTX investors filed a class action against 11 athletes and celebrities who promoted FTX in advertisements and on social media, including NFL quarterback Tom Brady and comedian Larry David.

The lawsuit, which also names FTX’s co-founder and former chief executive Sam Bankman-Fried as a defendant, seeks $11 billion in damage.

Background

The FTX bankruptcy filing covers about 130 FTX Group companies, including FTX.com, FTX’s US operations, and Bankman-Fried’s cryptocurrency trading firm, Alameda Research. According to published reports, Bankman-Fried had covertly used funds from FTX customers to make risky bets for Alameda Research – a hedge fund he also ran – and had commingled funds between the two entities.

Allegations Against FTX Celebrity Endorsers

The class action was brought on behalf of US investors who hold FTX yield-bearing accounts funded with crypto assets. The plaintiff and class-action members alleged that FTX lured them to its yield-bearing accounts and transferred investor funds to related entities to maintain the appearance of liquidity.

While an investor class action following bankruptcy is not necessarily surprising, the fact that the complaint named various celebrity endorsers and spokespeople as defendants is fairly unusual. Among them, Larry David starred in an advertisement for FTX that aired during the 2022 Super Bowl. The ad featured David being a skeptic on inventions such as the wheel, the fork, the toilet, democracy, the light bulb, the dishwasher, the Sony Walkman, and, finally, FTX, and cautioned viewers, “Don’t be like Larry.” Other conduct cited by the complaint includes:

  • Tom Brady and Gisele Bundchen: according to the complaint, Brady and Bundchen served as brand ambassadors for FTX, took equity stakes in FTX Trading Ltd., and appeared in an advertisement showing them telling acquaintances to join the FTX platform.

  • Kevin O’Leary: served as brand ambassador and FTX shareholder and made several public statements, including on Twitter, “designed to induce consumers to invest in” FTX’s yield-bearing accounts.

  • Naomi Osaka: the tennis star served as a brand ambassador for FTX in exchange for an equity stake and payments in an unspecified amount of cryptocurrency, appeared in advertisements, and promoted FTX to her Twitter followers.

The plaintiff and class members claimed that those FTX promoters engaged in a conspiracy to defraud investors and violated Florida state laws prohibiting unfair business practices. Specifically, in their civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff and class members alleged that “the FTX Entities and Defendants made numerous misrepresentations and omissions to Plaintiff and Class Members about the Deceptive FTX Platform in order to induce confidence and to drive consumers to invest in what was ultimately a Ponzi scheme, misleading customers and prospective customers with the false impression that any cryptocurrency assets held on the deceptive FTX Platform were safe and were not being invested in unregistered securities.” [1]

Celebrities Under Scrutiny in Crypto Industry

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has gone after celebrities for deceptively touting cryptocurrencies since 2017. In November 2017, SEC Chair Gary Gensler warned celebrities that federal securities laws require people who tout a certain stock or crypto security to disclose the amount, the source, and the nature of those payments they received.[2]

In October 2022, the SEC found that Kim Kardashian violated the anti-touting provision of the federal securities laws by plugging on social media a crypto asset security offered and sold by EthereumMax (EMAX) without disclosing the payment she received for the promotion.[3] Kardashian later settled with the SEC, paid $1.26 million in penalties, disgorgement, and interest, and cooperated with the Commission’s ongoing investigation.[4] “Ms. Kardashian’s case also serves as a reminder to celebrities and others that the law requires them to disclose to the public when and how much they are paid to promote investing in securities,” Gensler added.[5]

Investors have also gone after celebrities for deceptively touting cryptocurrencies. In January 2022, a group of investors filed a lawsuit against Kim Kardashian, along with boxer Mayweather and former basketball star Paul Pierce, for losses they suffered after the celebrities promoted EMAX.

Implications

This case offers a stark warning to celebrities and non-crypto companies that might be considering serving as brand ambassadors or paid influencers for crypto companies, or engaging in sponsorships. Any individual or organization considering entering into a co-promotion or sponsorship agreement with a company in the crypto industry should ensure adequate due diligence has been conducted on the potential partner and carefully scrutinize crypto and NFT offerings for potential liability or exposure under US securities laws. Notably, the US Federal Trade Commission is also carefully scrutinizing the use of influencers and endorsements in commercial marketing and imposes its own disclosure obligations.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more Finance Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.


FOOTNOTES

[1] See Complaint, Count Three.

[2] See SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs, available at SEC.gov | SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs.

[3] See SEC Charges Kim Kardashian for Unlawfully Touting Crypto Security, available at SEC.gov | SEC Charges Kim Kardashian for Unlawfully Touting Crypto Security.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

Quantifying Cryptocurrency Claims in Bankruptcy: Does the Dollar Still Reign Supreme?

In the past six months, four major players in the crypto space have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection: Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, FTX, and BlockFi, and more may be forthcoming.  Together, the debtors in these four bankruptcy cases are beholden to hundreds of thousands of creditors.  The bulk of the claims in these cases are customer claims related to cryptocurrency held on the debtors’ respective platforms.  These customer claimants deposited or “stored” fiat currency and cryptocurrencies on the debtors’ platforms.  Some of these funds allegedly were commingled or rehypothecated, leaving customer accounts severely underfunded when liquidity crunches arose at the various entities.  The total amount of such claims is estimated to be in the billions — that is, if these claims ultimately are measured in United States Dollars (“USD”).

Crypto-watchers and bankruptcy lawyers alike have speculated how customer claims based on digital assets such as cryptocurrencies should be valued and measured under bankruptcy law.  Given the volatility of cryptocurrency prices, this determination may have a significant effect on recoveries, as well as the viability of the “payment-in-kind” distribution mechanics proposed in Voyager, Celsius, and BlockFi.  A number of creditors appearing pro se in these proceedings have expressed a desire to keep their mix of cryptocurrencies through these proposed “in-kind” distributions.

However, a crypto-centric approach to valuing claims and making distributions raises a number of issues for consideration.  For example, measuring customer claims in cryptocurrency and making “in-kind” distributions of these assets could lead to creditors within the same class receiving recoveries of disparate USD value as the result of the fluctuation in cryptocurrency prices. Moreover, as has been discussed in the Celsius proceedings, the administrative burden associated with maintaining, accounting for, and distributing a wide variety of cryptocurrencies as part of a recovery scheme would likely prove complex.  Equity holders also might challenge the confirmability of a plan where valuations and recoveries are based on cryptocurrency rather than USD, as a dramatic rise in cryptocurrency values could return some value to equity.

Like most issues at the intersection of insolvency and cryptocurrency, there is little precedent to guide creditors through the uncertainties, but a recent dispute in the Celsius bankruptcy proceedings as to whether a debtor is required to schedule claims in USD, or whether cryptocurrency claims can be scheduled “in-kind,” may serve as a preview of things to come.

I.          General Background

Celsius Network (“Celsius” and, together with its affiliated debtors and debtors in possession, the “Debtors”), self-described as one of the “largest and most sophisticated” cryptocurrency-based finance platforms and lenders that claimed over 1.7 million users worldwide,1 filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 13, 2022.2  On October 5, 2022, the Debtors filed their schedules of assets and liabilities (“Schedules”).  Each Debtor’s schedule of unsecured creditors’ claims (Schedule E/F) lists the claims of the Debtors’ customers by the number of various forms of cryptocurrency coins and account types, rather than in USD.3

On October 25, 2022, a group of beneficial holders, investment advisors, and managers of beneficial holders (collectively, the “Series B Preferred Holders”) of the Series B Preferred Shares issued by debtor Celsius Network Limited filed a motion seeking entry of an order directing the Debtors to amend their Schedules to reflect customer claims valued in USD, in addition to cryptocurrency coin counts.4

II.         Arguments

a.         Series B Preferred Holders

Broadly, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a),5 the Series B Preferred Holders sought to have the Debtors amend their Schedule E/F to “dollarize” creditors’ claims, i.e., value customer claims in their dollar value as of the petition date.  As filed, the Series B Preferred Holders asserted that the Debtors’ schedules were “improper, misleading, and fail[ed] to comply” with the Bankruptcy Rules “because they schedule[d] customer claims in cryptocurrency coin counts, rather than in lawful currency of the United States as of the Petition Date.”6  The Series B Preferred Holders asserted that such amended schedules are essential to the Debtors’ ability to structure, solicit, and confirm a plan of reorganization under the requirements of Section 1129, including whether “(i) claims are impaired or unimpaired, (ii) holders of similarly situated claims are receiving the same treatment, and (iii) the plan meets the requirements of the ‘absolute priority rule.’”7  In support of their arguments that USD valuation of a customer’s claim should be required, the Series B Preferred Holders relied on provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules, Bankruptcy Code, and Official Forms.  The Series B Preferred Holders stressed that the motion “takes no position regarding the form of distribution customers” should receive under the Debtors’ plan, but rather that the Debtors must “add the [USD] amount of each customer claim in Schedules E/F to the cryptocurrency coin counts.”8

The Series B Preferred Holders also asserted that the requirement to denominate claims in USD is consistent with Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that when a debtor or party-in-interest objects to a claim, the court determines the amount of the claim in USD as of the debtor’s petition date.

b.         Debtors’ Response

The Debtors had previously indicated that they were not seeking to dollarize its customers’ claims; rather, the Debtors represented that they intend to return cryptocurrency assets to its customers “in kind.”9  The Debtors stated that they interpreted Bankruptcy Rule 9009(a)(1)-(2) and General Order M-386, dated November 24, 2009 (the “General Order M-386”) to allow the Debtors to remove the dollar symbol when scheduling claims regarding cryptocurrency coin counts.10  This approach, the Debtors argue, lessens confusion for its customer case and decreases administrative expense for the estate.11

Further, the Debtors argued that the Series B Preferred Holders’ reliance on Section 502(b) was misplaced because the application of such section is inapplicable at this stage of the proceedings where no claims objection has taken place.12

The Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“UCC”) agreed with the Debtors’ approach, stating that it “makes sense” for account holders to validate their scheduled claims by cryptocurrency type and that it wished to be consulted on the petition date prices used by the Debtors if they filed an amendment to the schedules.13

III.        Analysis

a.         Bankruptcy Code & Rules & Forms

Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1) requires that a debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities must be “prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms.”14  The relevant official form that a debtor must use to prepare its schedule of assets and liabilities is Official Form 206, which contains a USD symbol to denote the amount of liabilities that a debtor must list.15  Specifically, Official Form 206 provides:

As seen above, Official Form 206 does “hardwire” a dollar sign (“$”) into the boxes provided for claim amounts.  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 states that the official forms are to “be used without alteration, except as otherwise provided in the rules, [or] in a particular Official Form.”16  Bankruptcy Rule 9009 permits “certain minor changes not affecting wording or the order of presenting information,” including “expand[ing] the prescribed areas for responses in order to permit complete responses” and “delet[ing] space not needed for responses.”17  Lastly, General Order M-386 permits “such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”18 The introduction to General Order M-386 states that standard forms were adopted to “expedite court review and entry of such orders” and that courts will expect use of the standard forms “with only such revisions as are necessary under the circumstances of the individual case or cases.”19

b.         Section 502(b)

Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b) provides that if there is an objection to a claim, the court “shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the [petition] date . . . .”20  This “prevents the value of a claim from fluctuating by setting the claim as of the petition date and converting it to the United States dollars.”21  Acknowledging the “novel phenomenon” of dollarizing claims in cryptocurrency, the Series B Preferred Holders analogize this to cases where courts have required claims asserted in or based on in foreign currency or amounts of gold should be valued in USD.  However, these cases were decided in the context of a claims objection. The Celsius Debtors argued that these cases have limited utility in the context of a motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a).22

IV.        The Court’s Order

Ahead of the hearing regarding the motion for an order directing the Debtors to amend their schedules, the Debtors and the Series B Preferred Holders were able to consensually resolve the motion and filed a revised proposed order prior to the hearing on the motions on November 15.23  The Debtors agreed to amend their schedules by filing a conversion table within three days of the entry of the order, in consultation with the UCC and Series B Preferred Holders, that reflects the Debtors’ view of the rate of conversion of all cryptocurrencies listed in the Debtors’ schedules to USD as of the petition date.  The idea is that the conversion table could be used by customers as a reference for calculating the USD value of their claim, to the extent needed for filing a proof of claim.  The conversion table is not binding – the order preserves the rights of all parties to contest the conversion rates and does not require a party-in-interest to file an objection that is not stated in USD “solely on the basis that such claims should be reflected in [USD].”24  The order also requires the Debtors to file updated schedules “dollarizing” its account holders’ cryptocurrency holdings to the extent required by any future court order or judicial determination.

On November 17, 2022, the court entered the revised proposed order.25

V.         Cash Is Still King?

Other bankruptcy courts have taken similar approaches as the Celsius court in this issue.  An earlier cryptocurrency case, In re Cred Inc., the debtors did not schedule cryptocurrency claims in USD, but included a conversion table in their filed schedules, which set forth a conversion rate to USD as of the petition date.26  Debtors in other cases, such as Voyager Digital, scheduled the amounts of their customer claims as “undetermined” and listed them in Schedule F in cryptocurrency.27  BlockFi, which filed for bankruptcy on November 28, 2022, already has filed a proposed plan that would distribute its cryptocurrencies to its customers inkind in exchange for their claims against the BlockFi debtors.28  To date, neither BlockFi nor FTX have filed their schedules, and it remains to be seen whether they will follow the pattern established in Celsius and Voyager.

For creditors and equity holders, whether claims are measured in USD or the applicable cryptocurrency is only the beginning of what will likely be a long and contentious road to recovery.  It remains to be seen whether any of these debtors will be able to confirm a viable restructuring plan that relies on any sort of “in-kind” distribution of cryptocurrencies.  Further issues are likely to arise in the claims resolution process even further down the road as claimants and liquidation trustees (or plan administrators) wrestle with how to value claims based on such a volatile asset, subject to ever-increasing regulatory scrutiny.  However, for the time being, the bankruptcy process continues to run on USD.


FOOTNOTES

1 Declaration of Alex Mashinsky, CEO of the Debtors ¶¶ 1, 9, 20, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 23].

2 Id. at ¶ 131.

3 Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statements of Financial Affairs, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 974]; see also Schedule E/F, Case No. 22-10967 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10970 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10968 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22-10965 [Docket No. 6]; Case No. 22-10966 [Docket No. 7]; Case No. 22-10964 [Docket No. 974]; Case No. 22-10969 [Docket No. 5]; Case No. 22- 10971 [Docket No. 5].

4 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1183].

5 “On motion of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing, the court may order any . . . schedule . . . to be amended and the clerk shall give notice of the amendment to entities designated by the court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a).

6 Series B Preferred Holders Motion to Direct Debtors to Amend Schedules ¶ 1.

Id. ¶ 3 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(2)-(4), 1129(a)(1), 1129(b)).

8 Series B Preferred Holders’ Reply ¶ 10, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1334].

9 See 8/16/22 Hr’g Tr. at 35:5-7 (“The company is not seeking to dollarize claims on the petition date and give people back a recovery in fiat.”); id. at 42:11-16 (“[The UCC is] pleased that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . an in-kind recovery is absolutely critical.”).

10 General Order M-386 is a resolution of the Board of Judges for the Southern District of New York, which provides for “a standard form for orders to establish deadlines for the filing of proofs of claim . . . in chapter 11 cases” to “thereby expedite court review and entry of such orders.”

11 Debtors’ Objection to Series B Preferred Holders’ Motion ¶ 9, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1304].

12 Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Mohr, 425 B.R. 457, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio)).

13 Id. at 42:12-16 (“We are pleased to hear that the company is not focused on dollarization of claims . . . receiving an in-kind recover is 16 absolutely critical.”); UCC Statement and Reservation of Rights ¶ 6, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1303].

14 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(1).

15 See Official Form 206, Part 2, Line 4 (using the USD sign into Form 206 for scheduling the debtor’s liabilities).

16 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009(a).

17 Id.

18 General Order M-386 ¶ 9.

19 General Order M-386 ¶ 2 (unnumbered, preliminary statement).

20 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).

21 In re Aaura, Inc., No. 06 B 01853, 2006 WL 2568048, at *4, n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2006).

22 In re USGen New Eng., Inc., 429 B.R. 437, 492 (Bankr. D. Md. 2010) (using the exchange rate in effect on the petition date, in the context of a claims objection, to convert the claim to USD), aff’d sub nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. USGen New Eng., Inc., 458 B.R. 195 (D. Md. 2011); Aaura, 2006 WL 2568048, at *5 (“Section 502(b) converts Aaura’s obligation to repay the obligation in gold into a claim against the estate in dollars, but it makes this transformation only as of the petition date, not retroactive to the date on which Aaura first became liable.”); Matter of Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 608 n.19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting Section 502(b) refers to the petition date as “the appropriate date for conversion of foreign currency claims”), aff’d sub nom. In re Axona Intern. Credit & Com. Ltd., 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); ABC Dev. Learning Ctrs. (USA), Inc. v. RCS Capital Dev., LLC (In re RCS Capital Dev., LLC), No. AZ-12-1381-JuTaAh, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4666, at *38-39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 16, 2013) (same).

23 Notice of Proposed Order, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1342].

24 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.

25 Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1099 Directing the Debtors to Amend Their Schedules in Certain Circumstances, In re Celsius Network LLC, Case No. 22-10964 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) [ECF No. 1387].

26 Schedules at 12, In re Cred Inc., Case No. 20-128336 (JTD) (Bankr. D. Del. 2021) [ECF No. 443].

27 Schedules, In re Voyager Digital Holdings, Inc., Case No. 22-10943 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022) [ECF No. 311].

28 Joint Plan of Reorganization § IV.B.1.a, In re BlockFi Inc., Case No. 19361 (MBK) (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) [ECF No. 22].

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

SEC Ramps Up Enforcement against Public Companies and Subsidiaries in FY 2022

The SEC imposed $2.8 billion in monetary settlements, the largest total in any fiscal year recorded in the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database.

New YorkThe U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 68 enforcement actions against public companies and subsidiaries in the first full fiscal year of Chair Gary Gensler’s tenure. Monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary actions reached $2.8 billion, according to a report released today by the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business and Cornerstone Research.

The report, SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries—Fiscal Year 2022 Update, analyzes information from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). The 68 enforcement actions in FY 2022, which ended September 30, reflected a 28% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The SEC imposed monetary settlements on 97% of the 75 public company and subsidiary defendants that settled in FY 2022. Both the dollar amount and the percentage were the largest of any fiscal year recorded in SEED, which covers actions beginning in FY 2010.

“The number of defendants that settled in FY 2022 with admissions of guilt increased substantially from the previous fiscal year. This was driven by actions involving Broker Dealer allegations brought by the SEC in September,” said Stephen Choi, the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University School of Law and director of the Pollack Center for Law & Business. “The 16 defendants admitting guilt was double the largest number in any previous fiscal year in SEED.”

The $2.8 billion in monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary enforcement actions in FY 2022 was $921 million more than in FY 2021 and $321 million more than in any other fiscal year in SEED. The median monetary settlement in FY 2022 was $9 million, the largest in SEED. The average settlement was $42 million.

“The increase in monetary settlements is consistent with the SEC’s public statements that ‘robust remedies’ are an enforcement priority,” said report coauthor Sara Gilley, a Cornerstone Research vice president. “The $1.2 billion in monetary settlements with 16 public broker-dealer subsidiaries for recordkeeping failures represents 44% of total monetary settlements in the fiscal year.”

Issuer Reporting and Disclosure continued to be the most common allegation type in FY 2022, accounting for 38% of actions. Allegations in the SEC’s Broker Dealer classification were the second most common for the first time since FY 2018. Nearly 70% of the 16 Broker Dealer actions were filed against financial institutions for recordkeeping failures.

Click here to read the full report from Cornerstone Research.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

Large Corporate Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Decrease through First Half of 2022

Most industry groups saw bankruptcy filings decline from mid-2020 pandemic highs.

New York—Following the spike in large corporate bankruptcy filings triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, filings in 2021 and the first half of 2022 fell to levels below historical averages, according to a Cornerstone Research report released today.

The report, Trends in Large Corporate Bankruptcy and Financial Distress—Midyear 2022 Update, examines trends in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by companies with assets of $100 million or higher. It finds that 70 large companies filed for bankruptcy in 2021, down significantly from 155 in 2020 and below the annual average of 78 filings since 2005. In the first half of 2022, only 20 large companies filed for bankruptcy, compared to midyear totals of 43 in 1H 2021 and 89 in 1H 2020. The 20 bankruptcies in 1H 2022 were the lowest midyear total since the second half of 2014.

“U.S. government stimulus programs, low borrowing rates, and high debt forbearance helped disrupt predictions of continued growth in the number of bankruptcy filings,” said Nick Yavorsky, a report coauthor and Cornerstone Research principal. “Looking ahead, however, there are some concerns that increased corporate debt levels, rising interest rates and inflation, and a potential global recession may contribute to an increase in bankruptcy filings.”

In 2021, there were 20 “mega bankruptcies”—bankruptcy filings among companies with over $1 billion in reported assets—a substantial decline from the 60 mega bankruptcy filings in 2020. The first half of 2022 saw four Chapter 11 mega bankruptcy filings, compared to nine in the first half of 2021 and at a pace significantly lower than the annual average of 22 filings in 2005–2021.

Most industry groups saw bankruptcy filings decrease in 2021 and the first half of 2022, including those industries with the highest number of filings following the pandemic’s onset: Mining, Oil, and Gas; Retail Trade; Manufacturing; and Services.

Read the full report here.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

The Unredeemable Debtor

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.

– Oliver Wendell Holmes

Bankruptcy law decisions are replete with references to the “worthy debtor.”  In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2003); In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291 (1st Cir.2004); In re Institute of Business and Professional Educ., Inc., 79 B.R. 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Nickerson, 40 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Marble, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Doherty, 219 B.R. 665 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1998).

These decisions typically employ the “worthy debtor” nomenclature in the context of the entitlements that are afforded by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  It is always the “worthy debtor” that is entitled to a discharge of debts, a “fresh start”,  or to reject cumbersome contracts. This usage bespeaks a universe that also contains the “unworthy debtor,” a party whose behavior does not merit the statutory benedictions of the Bankruptcy Code. The identity of these parties is most often examined in the context of the discharge of debts and the behavior or actions that merit a denial of discharge or the finding that a particular debt is non-dischargeable.

There is a larger and more amorphous question though that also merits consideration, namely are their industries, companies, enterprises whose function and purpose is so odious and inconsistent with the precepts of good citizenship and the “moral development of the race”, to quote Justice Holmes, that they should be denied the benefits of reorganization afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.

If there is an argument to be made to prevent such enterprises from receiving the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, to deny them the colloquial label of “worthy debtor”, that recourse likely lies within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that require that a plan of reorganization be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  The “not forbidden by law” requirement is of limited utility in situations where the behavior is recognizable as immoral or intrinsically evil to most but has not yet been sanctioned by any legislative authority. Notably, and perhaps inversely, enterprises engaged in the sale and growing of cannabis are without access to the Bankruptcy Code because they act in contravention of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., which has been found to take precedence over state laws allowing the sale of cannabis. SeeGonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005).  As a result, bankruptcy being a creature of federal law, cannabis cases are generally being dismissed at the outset for cause in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and not making it as far as the confirmation standard. See, In re Way To Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).

If “forbidden by law” is unavailable as a source of relief, the last best hope to prevent the sanctioned reorganization of the unworthy debtor lies within the requirement that a plan be proposed in “good faith.”

“Good faith” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a fact that makes it more likely that our  understanding of good faith may be transitory and that as the ‘moral development of the race’ proceeds, so might our understanding of ‘good faith.’  In other words, what was good faith yesterday might not, in light of our communal experience and growth as citizens, be good faith today.

In the first instance, we can understand from the ordering of the words within section 1129(a)(3) that the good faith standard exists independently of the ‘forbidden by law’ standard.  A plan of reorganization may describe a course of action not forbidden by law, but may still not meet the ‘good faith’ standard.

The good faith standard as used within section 1129(a)(3) is most commonly described as proposing a plan that fulfills the purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  Those purposes and objectives within the context of Chapter 11 are most commonly understood as being “to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”  NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983);  see alsoBank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 452 (1999) (“[T]he two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 [are] preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”)

This case law, which is by far the most consistent usage of the term, emphasizes paying back creditors and preserving an ongoing enterprise. It does not suggest the existence of anything more amorphous beyond those standards and it supports the idea that the ‘good faith’ standard is not meant to be an existential inquiry into the moral worth of a particular industry.

Bankruptcy courts have, however, recognized that the absence of a definition of good faith leaves courts without “any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation.”  Metro Emps. Credit Union v. Okoreeh–Baah (In re Okoreeh–Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (6th Cir.1988) (interpreting good faith in context of Chapter 13).

Any successful collateral attack under section 1129(a)(3) on the ‘good faith’ of the immoral enterprise must likely follow the path of connecting the good faith standard to the “public good.”  Bankruptcy Courts have invoked the ‘public good’ in refusing to enforce certain contracts and have followed the dictates of some courts that “while violations of public policy must be determined through “definite indications in the law of the sovereignty,” courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society. Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n., 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1982).

The concept of the ‘public good’ is not a foreign one in bankruptcy courts.  Seeking relief for debtors that are the only providers of a service within their geographic area is an immensely easier task, no court, and no bankruptcy judge, likes to see a business fail and when the business is important to the community, support for reorganization from the bench often works to make reorganization easier.  Bankruptcy courts, although restrained by a statutory scheme, are as a matter of practice courts of equity.  Employing those equitable arguments to support a reorganization is both achievable and a reality of present practice.

Whether equitable arguments can be inversely employed to graft a sense of the ‘public good’ onto the good faith requirement within section 1129(a)(3) is decidedly uncertain and is not directly supported by the case law as it exists.

Somewhere out there though in one of those small border towns between the places of unelected legislators and the judicious and novel application of historical precedent lies the “moral development of the race” and the bankruptcy court that finds that incumbent within the concept of good faith is fair consideration of the public good.

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