My Business Is In Arizona, Why Do I Care About California Privacy Laws? How the CCPA Impacts Arizona Businesses

Arizona businesses are not typically concerned about complying with the newest California laws going into effect. However, one California law in particular—the CCPA or California Consumer Privacy Act—has a scope that extends far beyond California’s border with Arizona. Indeed, businesses all over the world that have customers or operations in California must now be mindful of whether the CCPA applies to them and, if so, whether they are in compliance.

What is the CCPA?

The CCPA is a comprehensive data privacy regulation enacted by the California Legislature that became effective on January 1, 2020. It was passed on September 13, 2018 and has undergone a series of substantive amendments over the past year and a few months.

Generally, the CCPA gives California consumers a series of rights with respect to how companies acquire, store, use, and sell their personal data. The CCPA’s combination of mandatory disclosures and notices, rights of access, rights of deletion, statutory fines, and threat of civil lawsuits is a significant move towards empowering consumers to control their personal data.

Many California businesses are scrambling to implement the necessary policies and procedures to comply with the CCPA in 2020. In fact, you may have begun to notice privacy notices on the primary landing page for national businesses. However, Arizona businesses cannot assume that the CCPA stops at the Arizona border.

Does the CCPA apply to my business in Arizona?

The CCPA has specific criteria for whether a company is considered a California business. The CCPA applies to for-profit businesses “doing business in the State of California” that also:

  • Have annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars; or
  • Handle data of more than 50,000 California consumers or devices per year; or
  • Have 50% or more of revenue generated by selling California consumers’ personal information

The CCPA does not include an express definition of what it means to be “doing business” in California. While it will take courts some time to interpret the scope of the CCPA, any business with significant sales, employees, property, or operations in California should consider whether the CCPA might apply to them.

How do I know if I am collecting a consumer’s personal information?

“Personal information” under the CCPA generally includes any information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked” with a specific consumer. As the legalese of this definition implies, “personal information” includes a wide swath of data that your company may already be collecting about consumers.

There is no doubt that personal identifiers like name, address, email addresses, social security numbers, etc. are personal information. But information like biometric data, search and browsing activity, IP addresses, purchase history, and professional or employment-related information are all expressly included under the CCPA’s definition. Moreover, the broad nature of the CCPA means that other categories of data collected—although not expressly identified by the CCPA—may be deemed to be “personal information” in an enforcement action.

What can I do to comply with the CCPA?

If the CCPA might apply to your company, now is the time to take action. Compliance will necessarily be different for each business depending on the nature of its operation and the use(s) of personal information. However, there are some common steps that each company can take.

The first step towards compliance with the CCPA is understanding what data your company collects, how it is stored, whether it is transferred or sold, and whether any vendors or subsidiaries also have access to the data. Next, an organization should prepare a privacy notice that complies with the CCPA to post on its website and include in its app interface.

The most substantial step in complying with the CCPA is to develop and implement policies and procedures that help the company conform to the various provisions of the CCPA. The policies will need to provide up-front disclosures to consumers, allow consumers to opt-out, handle consumer requests to produce or delete personal information, and guard against any perceived discrimination against consumers that exercise rights under the CCPA.

The company will also need to review contracts with third-party service providers and vendors to ensure it can comply with the CCPA. For example, if a third-party cloud service will be storing personal information, the company will want to verify that its contract allows it to assemble and produce that information within statutory deadlines if requested by a consumer.

At least you have some time!

The good news is that the CCPA includes a grace period until July 1, 2020 before the California Attorney General can bring enforcement actions. Thus, Arizona businesses that may have ignored the quirky California privacy law to this point have a window to bring their operations into compliance. However, Arizona companies that may need to comply with the CCPA should consult with counsel as soon as possible to begin the process. The attorneys at Ryley Carlock & Applewhite are ready to help you analyze your risk and comply with the CCPA.


Copyright © 2020 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

Learn more about the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) on the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet Law page.

Arizona Law Aimed at Curbing Service Dog Fraud May Be All Bark, No Bite (US)

Under federal and Arizona state law, persons with disabilities can bring service animals—all breeds of dog and miniature horses—into places of public accommodation (businesses open to the public) even if the business otherwise excludes pets. No specific training or certification program is required to qualify as a service animal, nor are such animals required to wear any particular vests, leashes, or other identifying gear. Owners are not required to carry any papers proving that their animals are service animals. In fact, business owners are limited to asking persons with disabilities if (1) the dog or miniature horse is a service animal required because of a disability, and (2) what work or task the animal has been trained to perform.

Because there are so few restrictions on individuals bringing animals into places of public accommodation, many business owners report situations when patrons have brought pets or comfort animals into their businesses trying to pass them off as legitimate service animals. But without the ability to inquire further or any meaningful consequence for persons who try to fraudulently represent their pets as service animals, business owners have been limited to excluding such animals only if they present a current threat to the health or safety of others, are not housebroken, or if the animal’s presence fundamentally alters the business’ service, program, or activity or poses an undue burden.

To try to remedy this, Arizona lawmakers recently passed a bill, which Gov. Ducey signed into law, making it illegal to misrepresent a pet as a service animal or service animal-in-training, and creating civil penalties of up to $250 for each violation. Critics say the law will have little practical impact, as it does not expand the type of questions business owners can ask or require that owners carry papers certifying the animal as a service animal. Business owners must still accept patrons at their word that an animal is a service animal that helps them perform a particular task; it is the rare individual who would volunteer that he or she is trying to falsely represent their pet as a service animal. Disability advocates worry the measure will prompt business owners to ask impermissible questions of disabled patrons—particularly those with non-visible disabilities like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or epilepsy—in an attempt to get them to admit that the animal is not, in fact, aiding them with their disability needs, and that calls to law enforcement to report suspected abuse of service animal accommodations will escalate.

When the law goes into effect this fall, Arizona business owners can take comfort knowing that abusers of animal accommodations may be subject to significant fines, but should still be sure to adhere to restrictions on what they can and cannot ask of patrons bringing animals into their businesses. The law does not permit business owners to demand proof of the person’s disability, the animal’s training, or any form of certification or identification, and the failure or refusal by patrons to produce such information is not a violation of the law, but business owners insisting that patrons produce such proof is a violation of disability law. Business owners still should exclude patrons with service animals only where the animal’s very presence would fundamentally alter the nature of the business or where the animals pose a safety risk.

 

© Copyright 2018 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

What Employers Need to Know About Arizona’s New Paid Sick Time Requirements

Arizona Paid sick timeIn November 2016, Arizonans passed Proposition 206. This proposition, entitled the “Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act,” not only increased the state’s minimum wage, but also created new requirements regarding paid sick time in Arizona. This article details the changes regarding paid sick time and the steps employers should be taking before July 1, 2017.

Overview of the Paid Sick Time Requirements

Before the passage of Proposition 206, Arizona did not require employers to provide paid sick time to employees. However, Proposition 206 establishes new requirements regarding (1) paid sick time accrual, (2) permissible uses of paid sick time, (3) how to handle unused paid sick time, and (4) notice to employees regarding paid sick time. These requirements apply to private employers and political subdivisions of the state and become effective July 1, 2017.

Accrual. Under Proposition 206, employers must provide employees with paid sick time. Employees must accrue at least one hour of paid sick time per 30 hours worked. Employers with 15 or more employees must allow employees to accrue, and use, up to 40 hours of paid sick time per year. Employers with less than 15 employees must allow employees to accrue, and use, up to 24 hours of paid sick time per year.

Permissible Uses. Employers must allow employees to use paid sick time for the following purposes:

  • mental or physical illness;

  •  care for a family member who has a mental or physical illness;

  • a public health emergency; and

  • to address issues related to domestic violence.

Employees do not need to provide prior notice to the employer if the leave is “not foreseeable” unless the employer has implemented a written policy setting forth how notice should be provided. If the leave is foreseeable, then employees must “make a good faith effort” to provide notice. If possible, employees must make a “reasonable effort” to avoid “unduly disrupting the operation of the employer” when scheduling paid sick time. Employers may not require an employee to find a replacement as a condition of using paid sick time, retaliate against an employee for use of paid sick time, or count paid sick time absences against an employee.

Unused Paid Sick Time. Proposition 206 provides employers two options regarding unused paid sick time. First, employers may allow unused paid sick time to carry over. If an employer allows paid sick time to carry over, employees are still only entitled to use the amount of time required by the statute unless the employer sets a higher limit. Second, if an employer does not allow for paid sick time to be carried over, then the employer must pay employees for unused paid sick time at the end of the year and provide the employee with an amount of paid sick time that is available for the employee’s immediate use at the beginning of the subsequent year. Employers are not required to pay out the unused paid sick time of employees who have been terminated, have resigned, or have retired, unless the employer has a policy or practice of doing so.

Notice to Employees. Proposition 206 requires employers to provide certain notices to employees. Among other things, employers must provide a summary of each employee’s paid sick time on or with each regular paycheck. The summary must include (1) the amount of earned paid sick time available for the employee, (2) the amount of earned paid sick time taken by the employee to date that year, and (3) the amount of pay the employee has received as earned paid sick time.

Next Steps for Employers

Employers should immediately take steps to ensure compliance with Arizona’s new law. To comply with this law, employers should consider taking the following steps.

  • Revise Policies. Employers should review current policies to determine whether they are adequate.  Many existing policies, including “use it or lose it” policies or policies that do not permit accrual of paid sick time until an employee has been employed for a specified period of time, will not comply with the new law.  If current policies are inadequate, employers and/or their legal counsel should revise existing policies or draft new policies to be implemented by July 1.

  • Provide Notice. Employers should become familiar with the notice requirements. Among other requirements, the Industrial Commission will require a new posting to accompany other required workplace posters.

  • Payroll and Recordkeeping Requirements. Employers should coordinate with their payroll companies or internal payroll personnel about how paid sick time will be tracked and reported, and be prepared for the additional recordkeeping requirements imposed by the law.

Copyright © 2017 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

Arizona Voters Approve Paid Sick Leave for Employees and Minimum Wage Increase

Arizona Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Time OffThe election results are in, and President-elect Donald Trump’s victory over Secretary Hillary Clinton has the nation abuzz and undoubtedly will for the foreseeable future.  However, the Presidential race was not the only notable race or measure on the ballot.  Although the dust hasn’t quite settled from last night’s historic vote, there a number of approved ballot measures that employers will need to understand and prepare for immediately.

Specifically, in Arizona, the Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Time Off Initiative, also known as Proposition 206, passed by a 59% to 41% margin.  The paid sick time component of the law will go into effect July 1, 2017, while the minimum wage increase begins in just a few months by raising the Arizona minimum wage to $10.00 per hour effective January 1, 2017.

The first component of the new Arizona law inserts Article 8.1 entitled “Earned Paid Sick Time” into Section 5, Title 23, Chapter 2 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.  The new paid sick time law applies to covered employers regardless of the number of employees; a covered employer with at least one Arizona employee is obligated to comply with the law.  Accrued paid sick time may be used for the employee for his or her own mental or physical illness, injury or health condition; or to care for a family member’s – as the term family member is defined under the statute – mental or physical illness, injury or health condition.  Here are the major points of emphasis:

All employees will accrue paid sick time at a minimum rate of one hour for every 30 hours worked for the employer.

Employees of an employer with 15 more employees may cap maximum annual accrual of paid sick time at 40 hours, while smaller employers may cap the maximum annual accrual at 24 hours.

Employees who are exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) will be assumed to work 40 hours in each work week for purposes of calculating paid sick time accrual, unless their normal work week is less than 40 hours, in which case earned paid sick time accrues based on actual hours worked.

Unused earned paid sick time must be carried forward to the following year consistent with the accrual limits of the statute. Employers may forego this requirement by following a procedure specified in the statute.

A 90-day probationary period for new employees may apply to the use, but not accrual, of paid sick time.

The new law includes specific employee protections making it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee for exercise of his or her use of paid sick time.

Further complicating the new law will be the statutory provision allowing employers to do away with the accrual method in favor of simply providing an employee at the beginning of the year all earned paid sick time that an employee is expected to accrue during the year.  (This provision brings Arizona’s law relatively on par with neighboring California’s paid sick time law.)  The new Arizona law contains other provisions explaining issues such as an employer’s ability to pay its employees for earned, unused paid sick time rather than carrying it forward to the next year; notice required by the employee for use of paid sick time; and the employer’s ability to request documentation to verify proper use of paid sick time.   Notably, the law does not require the payment of accrued but unused paid sick time upon termination of employment.

Employers should note that the provisions of the new paid sick time law are minimum requirements, and nothing in the new law prevents an employer from establishing a more generous policy or continuing one already in place.

The second component of the new Arizona law adjusts Arizona Revised Statute § 23-363 to require a gradual increase of Arizona’s minimum wage beginning this coming January.  Arizona’s new minimum wage will be $10.00 per hour effective January 1, 2017.  Thereafter, the minimum wage will be raised to $10.50 effective January 1, 2018, $11.00 effective January 1, 2019, and $12.00 per hour effective January 1, 2021.  Beginning in 2021, the minimum wage will continue to be adjusted annually based on Arizona’s cost of living.  Employers with employees who customarily and regularly receive tips as part of their income may continue to pay employees $3.00 less than the minimum wage in accordance with Arizona’s minimum wage act if the employer can prove the employee is earning at or beyond the minimum wage after tips are counted.

Arizona’s passing of Proposition 206 continued a national trend of answering demands for paid sick time and increasing the minimum wage.  Maine and Colorado also agreed to raise the minimum wage, while Washington voters approved of both a minimum wage increase and to provide paid sick leave for employees in similar fashion to Arizona’s measure.

Arizona employers are encouraged to reach out to local employment attorneys for additional guidance or as questions may arise.

Arizona Supreme Court Holds That The Uniform Trade Secrets Act Only Preempts Claims for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, Not Other Confidential Information

In Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC v. Noder (Ariz. Nov. 19, 2014), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Arizona’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the “AUTSA”) “does not displace common-law claims based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information that is not a trade secret.”  Orca, a public relations firm, filed suit against Ann Noder, its former president, for unfair competition after Noder left Orca to start a rival company.  Orca alleged that Noder had learned confidential and trade secrets information about “Orca’s business model, operation procedures, techniques, and strengths and weaknesses,” and that Noder intended to “steal” and “exploit” that information and Orca’s customers for her company’s own competitive advantage.  The trial court dismissed Orca’s complaint at the pleadings stage, concluding that the AUTSA preempts Orca’s “common law tort claims arising from the alleged misuse of confidential information,” even if such information is “not asserted to rise to the level of a trade secret.”  The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the AUTSA preemption exists only to the extent that the unfair competition claim is based on misappropriation of a trade secret.

The Arizona Supreme Court considered the text of the 1990 AUTSA’s displacement provision, concluding that nothing in the language of the statute “suggests that the Legislature intended to displace any cause of action other than one for misappropriation of a trade secret.”  “If such broad displacement was intended, the legislature was required to express that intent clearly.”  The court assumed, but did not decide, that Arizona’s common law recognizes a claim for unfair competition.  Nor did it decide what aspects, if any, of the alleged confidential information in plaintiff’s unfair competition claim might fall within the AUTSA’s broad definition of a trade secret and therefore be displaced.  “That determination will not hinge on the claim’s label, but rather will depend on discovery and further litigation that has not yet occurred.

While the court acknowledged the split of authority among various states as to the preemptive effects of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it found that the “quest for uniformity is a fruitless endeavor and Arizona’s ruling one way or the other neither fosters nor hinders national uniformity.”  With its ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court joins courts in states such as Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin that have the narrowed the preemptive effects of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Conversely, courts in other states including California, Indiana, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Utah have held that Uniform Trade Secrets Act statutes should be read to broadly preempt all claims related to the misappropriation of information, regardless of whether the information falls within the definition of a trade secret.

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Legal Updates for Government Entities Covering March and April 2014

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Arizona Court of Appeals

Immunity under A.R.S. § 12-820.05

Tucson Unified School District v. Gallagher, –P.3d–, 2014 WL949114 (March 11, 2014)

The Gallaghers sued TUSD and a TUSD school employee, Michael Corum, alleging that Corum sexually abused and/or exploited their developmentally challenged daughter at a TUSD school. The Gallaghers claimed that TUSD was vicariously liable for Corum’s conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising Corum. The Gallaghers alleged that if TUSD had properly investigated Corum’s employment history they would have discovered that a prior employer recommended that he not be employed in a position that involved disabled children. TUSD filed for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune under A.R.S. § 12-820.05 because Corum had committed a felony and it had no actual knowledge of Corum’s purported propensity for such conduct. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that TUSD should have known of the circumstances of Corum’s previous conduct and thus the immunity statute did not apply. TUSD appealed.

A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) provides that a public entity is not liable for losses that arise out of and are directly attributable to a public employee’s act or omission that is determined by a court to be a felony, unless the public entity knew of the public employee’s propensity for that action. The Court of Appeals held that immunity under A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) applies unless the entity has actual, not constructive, knowledge. The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute. When the legislature intends a standard of actual or constructive knowledge, it expressly states so. The use of the word “knew” in the immunity statute unambiguously shows the legislature’s intent to require actual knowledge rather than constructive knowledge. A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) means exactly what it says—that immunity applies unless the public entity actually knew of the “employee’s propensity.”

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Qualified immunity for warrantless entry

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014)

Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and was residing in a group home.  Her assigned social worker was concerned about her deteriorating condition, deemed her gravely disabled, and called the police to transport her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When officers Reynolds and Holder arrived at the home, they entered Sheehan’s room, without a warrant, to confirm her mental condition and take her into custody. Sheehan reacted violently, grabbed a knife, threatened to kill the officers, and told them that she did not wish to be detained in a mental health facility. The officers retreated to the hallway for their safety and called for backup. But rather than waiting for backup to arrive, the officers drew their weapons and forced their way back into Sheehan’s room. Sheehan again threatened them with a knife. The officers shot her six times. Sheehan survived and filed a § 1983 action, claiming the officers’ entry into her room violated the Fourth Amendment and they used excessive force. The district court found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. Sheehan appealed.

Generally, a warrantless search or seizure in a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. But there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the emergency aid exception. The emergency aid exception applies when, under the totality of the circumstances, (1) law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm, and (2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. Under this exception, the Ninth Circuit held that the officers’ first entry into Sheehan’s room did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an urgent need to protect Sheehan from serious harm. The officers knew she was off of her medication, was not taking care of herself, had threatened her social worker, and was gravely disabled and in need of involuntary hospitalization.  Indeed, the court noted that the officers reasonably took a cautious approach to the situation and that “erring on the side of caution is exactly what we expect of conscientious police officers.”  And they carried out the search in a reasonable manner. They knocked and announced and used a pass key to gain entry. They did not draw their weapons and had no reason to believe that their entry would trigger a violent confrontation.

The court found that the emergency aid exception also justified the second warrantless entry into Sheehan’s room. The officers continued to have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an urgent need to protect Sheehan from serious harm. And because the two entries were part of a single, continuous search or seizure, the officers were not required to separately justify the continuing emergency with respect to the second entry. But the court found that fact issues as to whether the entry was conducted in a reasonable manner precluded summary judgment, and noted that Ninth Circuit case law would put any reasonable, competent officer on notice that it is unreasonable to forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill subject who is acting irrationally and threatening anyone who entered, when there was no objective need for immediate entry.

Lack of resources defense/ jury instruction in § 1983 cases

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014)

Peralta, a prison inmate, sued a prison dentist claiming deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. At trial, the court instructed the jury that “whether a dentist or doctor met his duties to Peralta under the Eighth Amendment must be considered in the context of the personnel, financial, and other resources available to him or her or which he or she could reasonably obtain.” Peralta challenged this jury instruction on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not said whether juries and judges may consider a lack of resources as a defense in § 1983 cases. But the Supreme Court has held that prison officials are not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs unless they act wantonly, and whether an official’s conduct can be characterized as wanton depends on the constraints facing him. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). The Court has also held that even if an official knows of a substantial risk, he’s not liable if he responded reasonably. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994). This framework makes clear that what is reasonable depends on the circumstances that constrain what actions an official can take.

Several constraints impacted and delayed provision of care for Peralta. Security concerns dictate that only one prisoner at a time can be in the exam room, and the prisoner cannot be left alone in the room because dental tools can be used as weapons. During lockdown, only emergency cases can be seen. Dentists can’t accept prisoners’ complaints at face value, as inmates often try to jump the line by exaggerating symptoms.

The Ninth Circuit noted that lack of resources is not a proper defense to a claim for prospective relief. But a claim for damages is different. Damages provide redress for something an official could have done but did not. So with respect to a claim for damages, the nature of the available resources is highly relevant to show the scope of choices that the individual defendant had. A prison medical official who fails to provide needed treatment because he lacks the necessary resources can hardly be said to have intended to punish the inmate. The court held that the challenged jury instruction properly advised the jury to consider the resources the dentist had available in determining whether he was deliberately indifferent.

United States Supreme Court

Scope of Fourth Amendment consent to search

Fernandez v. California, 132 S.Ct. 1126 (2014)

Officers responding to an assault call saw a man running through an alley and into a building.  A minute or two later, they heard sounds of screaming and fighting coming from the building. They knocked on the apartment unit from which the screams were coming. A crying woman, Rojas, answered the door. Her face was red, she had a large bump on her nose, and fresh blood was on her shirt and hand. Officers asked her to step outside so they could do a protective sweep of the apartment.  The plaintiff, Fernandez, stepped forward and told the officers that they could not enter. Believing that Fernandez had assaulted Rojas, the officer removed him from the apartment and arrested him. About an hour later, a detective returned to the apartment and requested and received oral consent from Rojas to search the premises. Police found evidence incriminating Fernandez, which Fernandez moved to suppress in his criminal case. Fernandez argued that the search was unconstitutional because his denial of consent trumped the later consent Rojas gave. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, and the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Consent searches are recognized as an exception to the requirement for a search warrant. In 1974, the Supreme Court held that police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).  Years later, the Court recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Here, the Court declined to expand the current rule. They rejected Rodriguez’s argument that his objection to the search should have barred a later search since he was absent from the premises only because the police arrested and removed him.  The Court held that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason. The Court also rejected the idea that once an occupant objects to a search, the objection remains effective until withdrawn.

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Prospective Waivers of the Fair Market Value Defense Held Invalid in Arizona Court

Lewis Roca Rothgerber

In an opinion issued last week, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that commercial borrowers and guarantors ‎cannot prospectively waive their right to limit their damages in a deficiency action on the basis of the fair market value of property ‎sold through a trustee’s sale, potentially impacting any loan agreements that provide for such ‎waivers.‎ The holding does not affect most residential loans, for which lenders are generally precluded from recovering deficiencies.

Background

A.R.S. § 33-814(A) provides that borrowers, and by extension guarantors, are entitled to a credit ‎on the underlying debt for the greater of the trustee’s sale price or the fair market value of the ‎trust property at the time of the sale, as determined by the court at a priority hearing. The ‎purpose of these provisions is to protect borrowers from inequities that may result if the property ‎is sold below market value. In an effort to avoid litigation, lenders sometimes include language ‎in loan documents stating that borrowers and guarantors waive the ability to seek a determination ‎of market value.‎

The Arizona Court of Appeals Abolishes Prospective Waivers of the Fair Market Value Defense

A prospective waiver of a fair market defense hearing was at issue in CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. ‎Loop 101, LLC., No. 1 CA-CV 12-0167, 2013 WL 4824461 (Ariz. App. Sept. 10, 2013). In that ‎case, a lender made a $15.6 million loan, which was secured by a deed of trust. In the note and ‎guaranty, the borrower and guarantors waived “the benefits of any statutory provision limiting ‎the right of [lender] to recover a deficiency,” including the benefits of A.R.S. § 33-814. Even ‎more specific, the deed of trust stated that the sales price at the trustee’s sale would conclusively ‎establish the fair market value of the property and that the borrower and guarantors waived their ‎ability to seek a fair market value determination.‎

Following a default, the lender initiated a trustee’s sale, at which the lender’s assignee purchased ‎the property with a credit bid of $6.15 million. At the time, about $11.2 million remained due on ‎the note. The lender’s assignee then brought a deficiency action against the borrower and ‎guarantors for the difference. The borrower and guarantors counterclaimed, asserting that the ‎credit bid was unreasonably low. The court denied a motion to dismiss the counterclaims, ‎holding the borrower and guarantors were entitled to a fair market value hearing ‎notwithstanding the written agreements to the contrary. ‎

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the deed of trust statutes impliedly prohibit ‎prospective waivers of fair market value hearings. The court relied on the purpose of the deed of ‎trust statutes, the comprehensiveness of the protections, and the legislative history, which the ‎court stated was to protect borrowers from the unfairness that results if a property is sold at a ‎trustee’s sale below its market value. According to the court, allowing parties to prospectively ‎waive the protection of a fair market value hearing would effectively undo the statutory scheme ‎and undermine an important purpose of the deed of trust statutes.‎

Conclusion

Arizona’s appellate courts have shown increased interest of late in foreclosure-related cases. ‎Earlier this summer, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals abolished prospective ‎waivers by borrowers of the residential anti-deficiency protections under A.R.S. § 33-814(G) based on public ‎policy grounds. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Zivkovic, 232 Ariz. 286, 304 P.3d 1109 (App. ‎‎2013). In another decision out last week, Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals, citing ‎Parkway Bank, declined to consider whether a guarantor can waive same the protections of A.R.S. § ‎‎33-814. First Credit Union v. Courtney, No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0005, slip op. (Ariz. App. Sept. 12, ‎‎2013). Lewis Roca Rothgerber continues to monitor the developments in this evolving area.‎

Lenders, borrowers, and guarantors should consider how these recent decisions affect their ‎existing and prospective lending relationships.

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