Tag: Arbitration

Diving Into SECURE 2.0: Changes for Small Employer Retirement Plans

International arbitration provides a binding, neutral, and consensual process for resolving contractual disputes between parties, often resulting in resolutions that are quicker, cheaper, more private, and more controllable than litigation in a court of law. Accordingly, arbitration for the resolution of international disputes between contracting parties from different legal jurisdictions has emerged as a fundamental method for resolving complex disputes in an ever-increasingly interconnected world. Multinational companies should make sure they stay up to date on the fundamentals of international arbitration, and it all starts with ensuring any arbitration clause included in an international agreement is drafted in a way that is enforceable and provides contracting parties a clear path toward the resolution of their dispute.

Why Should You Care about What Your Arbitration Clause Says?

An arbitration clause is the starting point for determining the parties’ intent in resolving their dispute outside a court of law. It is an independent agreement within the broader contract, likely enforceable even if the remainder of the contract is procured by fraud, and sits at the apex of what a court or arbitrator will look for to determine the parties’ intent with respect to how a dispute between contracting parties should be resolved.

A clear arbitration clause results in a meaningful, enforceable outcome, minimizes the intervention of U.S. or foreign judiciaries in what should be a private dispute resolution process, grants the third-party administrator and/or the arbitrator the powers necessary to resolve the dispute, and is conducted in accordance with procedures that help guarantee a fair, efficient proceeding.

In contrast, if an arbitration clause is ambiguous, there may be a finding that there is no dispute resolution agreement to enforce. This can result in challenges to the arbitration clause’s enforceability and potential litigation in unfavorable and less-than-ideal judicial systems. Of course, such ambiguity and challenges will create higher costs, longer windows of time to resolve disputes, greater risks that your claims in the dispute will be vulnerable to collateral attacks, and other unintended and unexpected consequences.

What Are the Hallmarks of a Clear Arbitration Clause?

For purposes of clarity, you should ensure your contract’s arbitration clause identifies:

  • Applicable Law. Which country’s (or state’s) law applies?
  • Forum and Rules. There are any number of arbitral forums, each with its own nuances in terms of procedure. Knowing the business and potential disputes that could arise will assist in selecting a good fit in terms of applicable rules.
  • Seat of Arbitration. The seat of the arbitration is more than just the place where the final hearing will take place. It provides a significant backbone to the proceeding and is as important as the selection of the forum and applicable rules.
  • Number of Arbitrators. The more arbitrators, the larger the cost, but a three-member tribunal has its place in certain disputes.
  • Language. Selecting the language (or languages) of the arbitration can greatly affect the cost of the proceeding.

Why Does Selecting the Seat of Arbitration Matter?

More than just the physical place where the arbitration will take place, the seat of arbitration is a legal construct that determines the lex arbitri — the procedural law of the arbitration.

Where the contract between the parties or the rules selected by the parties do not provide for certain procedures, the procedural laws of the seat of arbitration will be applied. Among the important aspects of a proceeding that the seat of the arbitration determines is:

  • Which courts will have supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration;
  • Definitions and form of an agreement to arbitrate;
  • The arbitrability of the dispute;
  • The constitution of the arbitral tribunal and any grounds for challenge;
  • The equality of treatment of the parties;
  • The freedom to agree on detailed rules of procedure;
  • Interim measures of protection and court assistance;
  • Default proceedings;
  • The validity of the arbitration award; and
  • The finality of the arbitration award, including which courts will hear challenges to the award.

If not clearly identified by the parties, the seat of arbitration — and the procedural laws of that seat — will be selected by the arbitral tribunal.

What Do the Rules You Picked Say About Interim Measures?

A major consideration in selecting the applicable arbitral rules is the availability of interim measures. These are measures of relief, which can include injunctive relief, obtained prior to the commencement of, or during, an arbitral proceeding.

One of the most interesting forms of interim measures is an award of security. An interim award of security in arbitration is a payment of an amount of monies (usually tied to damages) pre-hearing for the conservation of, and enforcement of, a judgment so as to not render a judgment in the future a Pyrrhic victory. These securities prevent the dissipation of assets before it is too late to reach those assets. As such, it is an extremely powerful tool, and determining whether the rules you select, and/or the seat of the arbitration, allows for such an interim award should be a key consideration in drafting your arbitration clause.

What Are the Abilities and Liabilities of Third Parties?

Depending on the circumstances, jurisdiction chosen, governing law, and seat of the arbitration, a third party (a non-signatory to the agreement) can compel arbitration and be compelled to arbitration, the latter being the rarer occurrence. Knowing if there is potential exposure to such parties, which can include directors, officers, employees, beneficiaries, and others, should be assessed prior to entering into an arbitration agreement.

On What Basis Are Arbitral Awards Enforceable?

Arbitral awards, because of the adherence by more than 160 countries to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), are the most enforceable award anywhere in the world. Under the New York Convention:

  • A written agreement to arbitrate, including as contained in a contractual arbitration clause, is generally enforceable.
  • Subject to very narrow exceptions, an arbitral award may be recognized and enforced as a final judgment in each contracting country.

In contrast, no treaty requires that the judgments of a country’s court system be recognized; these enforcement decisions are made on an ad hoc basis according to principles of comity and public policy. The Hague Judgments Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, a treaty similar to the New York Convention, may become the relevant applicable framework in the future but is still in its infancy.

How Can Legal Counsel Help My Multinational Company Address International Arbitration Issues?

The best way to ensure a reliable and enforceable arbitration agreement is a careful examination of the structure and purpose of the contract as well as the company’s unique business profile based on how and where it does business.

Adequate legal counsel should provide clients with practical guidance in drafting and enforcing international arbitration agreements. Services provided should include:

  • Counseling: Counseling companies to understand how international arbitration clauses apply to their multinational operations, how they may benefit from such clauses, and/or how such clauses may not be in their best interest.
  • Drafting: Working with clients to ensure enforceable and clearly understood arbitration clauses are prepared for the specific contractual relationship, considering the myriad factors that go into preparing such a clause.
  • Risk Assessments: Working with companies to conduct risk assessments in the event of contract disputes with arbitration clauses.
  • Arbitration: Arbitrating before tribunals to secure interim securities and/or enforceable arbitral awards in the event of a contract dispute anywhere in the world.

© 2023 Foley & Lardner LLP

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No More Surprise Medical Bills: Providers Score More Victories in First Year of No Surprises Act Arbitrations, But Claims Backlog Otherwise Complicates Implementation

In the year following the implementation of the arbitration process established under the federal No Surprises Act (NSA), more than 330,000 disputes have been submitted for resolution. This figure far outpaces the predictions of the US Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor, and the Treasury (the Departments), and complicates the implementation of the NSA.

*This is the eighth article in a series analyzing the No Surprises Act and its implementation. To view the entire series, click here.

As background, Congress passed the NSA in 2020, effective in 2022, to curb so-called “surprise” medical bills — balance bills received by patients in situations where they have no control over who is involved in their care. Frequently, patients incur these bills when they obtain emergency care from out-of-network facilities or non-emergency services at in-network facilities where at least one member of the care team is out-of-network. In these situations, the NSA forbids out-of-network providers from balance billing the patients to collect the difference between billed charges and what the patient’s health insurance actually paid. Instead, to protect patients and ensure that reasonable payments are made to providers, the NSA establishes an alternative dispute resolution process, allowing eligible parties to submit disputed claims to independent dispute resolution entities (IDREs) to determine appropriate out-of-network payment rates.

Dispute resolution was intended to be streamlined and efficient, but IDREs have been inundated with submissions in the year since the NSA became effective. The volume of claims has created a significant backlog, hindering providers’ ability to obtain timely and appropriate reimbursement for the services they rendered. In an effort to promote transparency, the Departments recently issued a “status update” on the arbitration process. The report revealed several key findings regarding the volume, eligibility, and outcomes of claims submitted under the NSA to date.

Key Findings of the Status Update Report

First, the report provided insight into the overall numbers of claims that have been filed since the NSA became effective. Since the federal claims submission portal first went live in April 2022, disputing parties have initiated more than 330,000 arbitration submissions. This figure is nearly 14 times greater than the Departments’ initial estimates. The sheer volume of claims has drastically slowed the adjudication of claims submitted under the NSA.

Second, the report states that IDREs have rendered determinations in favor of one party or the other in only a small fraction of cases, with approximately 42,000 disputes decided as of March 31, 2023. Of these, initiating parties (typically health care providers) have prevailed approximately 71% of the time.

Third, to date, IDREs have closed more cases than they have decided. Overall, more than 100,000 claims,  – more than four times the amount anticipated by the Departments, have been closed. There are various reasons for this. Some claims were closed following successful negotiations between the parties. Others were closed due to one or both parties failing to submit the required fees mandated under the NSA. A large number — nearly 40,000 — were closed for eligibility reasons. Non-initiating parties have challenged the eligibility of more than a third of claims submitted for arbitration, balking at approximately 120,000 disputes. Non-initiating parties frequently object that claims are not eligible for arbitration under the NSA for multiple reasons, including lack of timely negotiation or arbitration submission, or because the disputed claims involve insurance programs outside the scope of the NSA.

In addition to the objections lodged by non-initiating parties, the IDREs have an independent duty to confirm that all claims submitted for arbitration are eligible under the NSA. These determinations require IDREs to engage in what can be a complex and time-consuming analysis of each claim, frequently requiring the submission of additional information from the parties. The report finds that these eligibility determinations represent the primary cause for the delays in processing arbitration submissions.

Finally, in an effort to help resolve delays, the status update includes that the Departments have begun to require initiating parties to submit additional information to assist IDREs in evaluating the eligibility of claims. The Departments have also modified the arbitration portal to require the input of additional information to enable non-initiating parties to identify disputed claims. These are among the “ongoing technical and operational improvements” the report states the Departments have been making over the last year.

Looking Ahead: Additional Legislation and Ongoing Court Challenges

The report highlights a series of problems that have hampered the implementation of the NSA, including larger-than-expected dispute volume, complex eligibility determinations, and technical issues. Collectively, these problems have left many parties awaiting arbitration awards and payment.

Meanwhile, the legal challenges to the Departments’ implementing regulations under the NSA continue, and HHS Secretary Xavier Bacerra recently testified before Congress regarding the implementation of the NSA. These developments have fueled speculation that Congress may step in and pass additional legislation to streamline the arbitration process. While these events play out, providers should continue to submit timely open negotiation notices and IDR initiation forms to preserve their rights under the NSA.

A copy of CMS’s report can be found here.

© 2023 ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more Healthcare Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Mediation vs. Arbitration Provisions in a Contract

All provisions of a contract are relevant, no matter how innocuous they appear to be and no matter how many times you are told that they are “just boilerplate.” Mediation and arbitration provisions often are deemed to fall in the “boilerplate” category, but the impact of these provisions cannot be understated.

Taking a step back, in the event of a dispute between contract counterparties, the underlying contract often provides an avenue for resolution of such dispute, which may require that the parties pursue such matter in court, through arbitration or by other means, including mediation. While most parties are familiar with the concept of litigation, the differences between mediation and arbitration are less well-known. Among the many relevant factors distinguishing between mediation and arbitration, the following three factors should be considered:

  1. Mediation in the United States is non-binding, meaning that a party is not obligated to follow the determination of a mediator. Arbitration, on the other hand, may be binding.

  2. From a timing standpoint, the mediation process is more expeditious, often being completed anywhere from one to three months after the process is initiated, depending upon the complexity of the issues and the parties’ agreements. Arbitration proceedings often last as long as a lawsuit with a formal discovery process and other formalities that commonly would be part of a lawsuit.

  3. From a cost perspective, mediation is more economical, largely due to the speed of the process and less legal formalities. This generally bodes well for the parties if they agree to abide by the determination of the mediator or view such decision as indicative of how an arbitrator or judge ultimately would rule on a matter. But since mediation is non-binding, parties may view this process as an unnecessary delay and waste of resources.

© 2023 Chuhak & Tecson P.C.

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Non-Negotiable Arbitration Agreements May Be Required as a Condition of Employment

On February 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit struck down AB 51, a California statute that imposed criminal and civil penalties against employers who required employees to enter into an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, finding the statute to be an “unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 20-15291 (9th Cir. 2023).

As discussed in our prior post and articles (link here), in August 2022 the Ninth Circuit withdrew its prior decision, which had upheld portions of AB 51, following the United States Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana.

AB 51, embodied in California Labor Code §432.6 effective January 1, 2020, prohibited an employer from entering into a non-negotiable agreement that required the employee to waive “any right, forum, or procedure” for a violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act or the California Labor Code, including “the right to file and pursue a civil action.”  Further, AB 51 imposed harsh penalties for employers who violated the statute, including a fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months’ imprisonment, as well as the potential for civil litigation by the State of California or by private individuals.  In an effort to avoid Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws that improperly targeted arbitration agreements, the California legislature also created the confusing outcome that potentially criminalized the formation of non-negotiable arbitration agreements, but permitted their enforcement once executed.

Noting that arbitration agreements by their very nature require parties to waive their rights to bring disputes in court, and crediting the plaintiffs’ evidence that the possible imposition of civil and criminal penalties deterred employers from attempting to enter into non-negotiable agreements with employees, the court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction in favor of several trade associations and business groups who sought to block the implementation of the statute.  Relying on principles of preemption and judicial precedent striking down similar state laws or judge-made rules that singled out executed arbitration agreements, the Court found AB 51 improperly “burden[s]” the formation of arbitration agreements in violation of the FAA.

Having written the previous 2-1 decision upholding AB 51, Judge Lucero now found himself dissenting.  Arguing that the majority “misconstrue[d] the jurisprudence” of the Supreme Court, the dissent claimed that arbitration was permissible only if consensual and that AB 51 only applied to conduct occurring prior to the formation of the contract and thus was not an obstacle to the objectives of the FAA.

Employers may require their California employees to sign non-negotiable arbitration agreements to obtain or maintain their employment.  Arbitration agreements may still be unenforceable however if they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable, if the agreement lacks mutual consent because a party was forced to sign by threats or physical coercion or “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Thus, employers should review their agreements to ensure they are in compliance with other California requirements, that the terms are not unfair or one-sided, and, the agreement presented is not unfair, surprising or oppressive.

Article By Sheryl L. Skibbe of Vedder Price

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Vedder Price

Important Considerations for Mediation

“You can’t always get what you want. But if you try sometimes, well, you just might find, you get what you need.” – Mick Jagger and Keith Richards

Successful Mediation. Unlike the regular adjudication of a legal dispute, in mediation there is no “decision-maker” to determine who is “right” or “wrong.” No final order or judgment is issued. Instead, a good mediation will result in a resolution created by both parties that satisfy both parties’ interests or concerns. Mediators are not looking to find fault or assign blame – rather, a mediator works with the parties to problem solve and find creative solutions and proposals.

Selecting a Mediator. In some court programs there is a list of “pre-approved” mediators. The mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution program in the Western District of Pennsylvania has such a list. In the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas there will be no such guidance on preferred mediators. Pennsylvania does not have any national or statewide organization that certifies mediators. However, there is training available and basic mediation training is generally a 40-hour course covering problem solving, conflicts, communication skills, ethics and practical skills in role plays and other exercises. Mediators should have attended at least a basic mediation training course as well as have experience in mediating civil cases.

Article By Kathryn L. Clark of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

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©2022 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

US Supreme Court Holds That Airline Cargo Loaders Are Exempt From Arbitration

The US Supreme Court has held that airline cargo loaders who load and unload cargo from planes that travel across state lines are exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because they belong to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under § 1 of the FAA. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (June 6, 2020).

Background

Latrice Saxon worked for Southwest Airlines and was responsible for training and supervising teams of ramp agents who load and unload airplane cargo on Southwest planes that travel across state lines. Saxon brought a collective action alleging failure to pay proper overtime wages FLSA in the Northern District of Illinois. However, Saxon had signed an arbitration agreement requiring her to arbitrate her wage disputes, and Southwest moved to dismiss the lawsuit and to compel arbitration under the FAA.

Saxon opposed the motion, invoking § 1 of the FAA, which exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” She argued that ramp supervisors, like seamen and railroad employees, were an exempt “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” but the district court agreed with Southwest and found that only employees involved in “actual transportation,” not those who merely handle goods, fell within § 1 of the FAA. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s decision, holding that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce.” The Seventh Circuit’s decision conflicted with an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit, Eastus v. ISS Facility Services, Inc., 960 F. 3d 207 (2020), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the two circuits.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that loaders who load and unload airplane cargo that travels intrastate play a direct role in the interstate transportation of goods and therefore belong to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under § 1 of the FAA. The Court engaged in a two-step analysis. First, it considered how to define the relevant “class of workers.” The Court rejected Saxon’s argument that the “class of workers” should be defined as virtually all airline employees, which would include shift schedulers or those who design Southwest’s website. Rather, the Court held that the inquiry must focus on the job duties of the employees themselves, rather than the employer’s business and that Saxon “belongs to a class of workers who physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis.”

Next, the Court considered whether that class of airplane cargo loaders “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” It determined that “one who loads cargo on a plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved with the commerce of that cargo” and that workers like Saxon who load and unload airplane cargo that travels in interstate commerce are exempt from the FAA.

Takeaway for Employers

Though the Court did find a class of workers exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, it expressly rejected the assertion that this exemption should apply to all employees of an employer engaged in foreign or interstate transportation. It went on to provide examples of positions that would not satisfy the exemption, such as workers engaged in the sale of interstate asphalt or workers who supply janitorial services to a corporation engaged in interstate commerce.

Employers engaged in interstate or foreign transportation commercial should consult legal counsel if they plan to utilize arbitration agreements as part of their dispute resolution process.

Article By John P. Zaimes and Natalie C. Kreeger of ArentFox Schiff LLP

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© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

BREAKING: Supreme Court Reverses California Court of Appeal in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana

On June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (Case No. 20-1573) reversing the California Court of Appeal’s decision to affirm the denial of Viking’s motion to compel arbitration Moriana’s “individual” PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims.

As previously reported, the question presented in Viking River Cruises involved whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 58 Cal.4th 380 (2014), which invalidates contractual waivers of representative claims under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that while Iskanian’s prohibition on “wholesale waivers” of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA, Iskanian’s rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into “individual” and “non-individual claims” is preempted.

Applying this holding to the parties, the Court held that Viking was entitled to enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim.  As for Moriana’s non-individual PAGA claims,  because PAGA itself “provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding,” Moriana lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non-individual” claims separately in state court.  Accordingly, “the correct course is to dismiss her remaining claims.”

Article By Timothy Kim and Michele J. Beilke of Hunton Andrews Kurth

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Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

SCOTUS Significantly Narrows Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for International Arbitrations

The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al., v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, holds that U.S. federal courts cannot order discovery in aid of international commercial arbitrations or investor-state arbitrations.  In a unanimous decision, the Court reasoned that a “foreign tribunal,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, “is best understood as an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority” rather than a private body that is merely located in another country.  Because the private arbitral tribunal in the ZF Automotive case did not exercise governmental authority, the Supreme Court denied discovery in aid of the proceeding under Section 1782.

The decision resolves a circuit split over whether private commercial arbitration panels should be considered “foreign or international tribunals” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and thus whether U.S. discovery should be allowed in such private commercial arbitrations.  Section 1782 authorizes a district court to order the production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”  The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have previously held that international commercial arbitrations are foreign tribunals under the statute, while the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that they are not.  The availability of discovery under Section 1782 is a key issue for the international arbitration community because the scope of discovery allowed under Section 1782 is generally broader than any discovery allowed under institutional arbitral rules or under foreign arbitration laws.

In reaching its decision, the Court found that the word “tribunal” carries a distinctively governmental flavor.  A prior version of Section 1782 covered only “judicial proceeding[s]” in any court in a foreign country, however, Congress later expanded the legislation’s scope to cover proceedings in a “foreign or international tribunal.”  The Court found that while this change broadens the understanding of “tribunal” to include tribunals that are not formal courts, the term is still best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority.  Under the decision, a “foreign tribunal” is a tribunal belonging to a foreign nation while an “international tribunal” is best understood as one that involves two or more nations imbued with governmental authority.  Location of the tribunal or the nature of the parties to the dispute are not determinative in this interpretation.

The Court also noted that extending Section 1782 discovery to cover international arbitrations would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs domestic arbitrations.  Thus, interpreting Section 1782 as applying to international arbitration would create a “notable mismatch between foreign and domestic arbitration.”

The Court’s decision came in a consolidated case arising out of appeals in the Sixth and Second Circuits.  The first case involves a dispute between Luxshare, a Hong Kong company and ZF Automotive US Inc., a Michigan-based company, over an allegedly fraudulent sales transaction.  The agreement between the parties provided that all disputes would be resolved by an arbitral panel under the Arbitration Rules of the German Arbitration Institute (DIS).  In preparation for bringing an arbitration, Luxshare filed an ex parte petition under Section 1782 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking information from ZF Automotive and its officers.  The district court granted the petition and ZF Automotive moved to quash, arguing that a panel formed under the auspices of the DIS was not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.  The district court denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit denied a stay.

The second case involves AB bankas SNORAS, a Lithuanian bank which was nationalized by Lithuanian authorities.  The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, a Russian corporation, commenced an ad hoc arbitration proceeding against Lithuania under a bilateral investment treaty that the country entered with Russia.  The Fund filed a petition under Section 1782 in the district court seeking information from AlixPartners, LLP, a New York-based consulting firm, and one of its officers.  AlixPartners challenged the petition, arguing that the ad hoc panel was also not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.  The district court rejected that argument in a decision that was affirmed by the Second Circuit.

The Court’s decision is likely to spark much discussion in the international arbitration community.  There will likely be a significant impact on current and future international arbitrations, with parties having to consider their strategies for discovery in light of the unavailability of a critical information-gathering tool.  On the other hand, for better and for worse, this decision will further streamline the international arbitration process, as many arbitral proceedings will not be delayed by related litigation over discovery in U.S. courts.

Article By Travis A. Gonyou of Binder & Schwartz

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Binder & Schwartz LLP. All Rights Reserved

Supreme Court Holds That Judges Can’t Invent Rules Governing Arbitration Waiver

Litigators who defend cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), particularly ‘collective actions” alleging wage-and-hour violations, often have been able to counter, or even sometimes support, allegations that arbitration agreements have been waived where the conduct of a party has caused prejudice to the other side. In the case of Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., a unanimous Supreme Court has now held that the determinant of waiver is solely dependent upon the nature and magnitude of the actions of the party that might be inconsistent with arbitration, without respect to alleged prejudice.

Morgan thus is an important case for any civil litigator, but it is especially significant for those who deal with employment disputes potentially governed by arbitration agreements, and for those who draw up such agreements in the first place. As is well known, the Court has, in recent years, frequently upheld the primacy of arbitration agreements pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In the Morgan case, a unanimous Court does it again. Ms. Morgan was an hourly employee at a Taco Bell franchise who had signed an arbitration agreement intended to govern employment disputes. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Morgan went to federal court to bring a nationwide “collective action” arguing that her employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. Sundance, a franchisee of Taco Bell, initially defended against the lawsuit as if the arbitration agreement didn’t exist—filing a motion to dismiss (which the District Court denied) and engaging in mediation (which was unsuccessful). Next, Sundance moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under the FAA—almost eight months after Morgan filed the suit. Morgan then expectedly opposed on grounds of waiver of the right to arbitrate.

The governing precedent in the Eighth Circuit, where the case was litigated below, conditioned a finding of waiver of an arbitration agreement on whether the party knew of the right, “acted inconsistently with that right,” and—critical here– “prejudiced the other party by its inconsistent actions.” In deciding that issue, the Court below, as had eight other circuits, invoked “the strong federal policy favoring arbitration” to decide the matter of waiver. Two circuits rejected that rule, and the Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve that split. Justice Kagan, writing for all of the Justices, agreed with those two circuits.

Holding that “the FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration’ does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules,” and deciding no other issue with respect to the merits, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings that focus on the whether the employer relinquished its right to arbitrate by its actions that were inconsistent with it. Whatever an employer might otherwise have preferred (given the prior law in most courts of appeals), given the Supreme Court’s holding that any presumption of arbitration and the fact of prejudice are irrelevant, the Morgan case gives clear guidance in several regards, particularly demanding arbitration, if applicable, at the outset of a formal dispute, and resisting any discovery, to the extent possible, until the issue of arbitrability is decided. A defense against waiver simply based on prejudice is not going to fly.

Article By Stuart M. Gerson of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Your Employee As Your Arbitrator? Maybe!

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) has, by its order dated August 24, 2009, in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (“Appellants”) Vs. M/s. Raja Transport (P) Ltd. (“Respondent”)1, once again upheld that the Court must give full effect and meaning to the appointment procedure set by the parties in the arbitration agreement before appointing arbitrator of their choice.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Appellant and Respondent entered into an agreement dated February 28, 2005 (“Agreement”), where under, the Respondent was appointed as the dealer of the Appellant for the retail sale of petroleum products. Clause 692 of the Agreement provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration where the Director, Marketing of the Appellant, or a person appointed by him, was to act as the sole arbitrator.

On August 06, 2005, the Appellant terminated the dealership. The Respondent filed suit in the Civil Court, Dehradun, seeking (1) a declaration that the order of termination of dealership was illegal and void and (2) for a permanent injunction restraining the Appellant from stopping the supply of petroleum products to the retail outlet of the Appellant. In this same suit, the Appellant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), praying that the suit be rejected and the matter be referred to arbitration in terms of Section 69 of the Agreement. The Ld. Judge allowed the Appellant’s application and directed the parties to refer the matter to arbitration within two months and also directed the Appellant not to stop supplies to the Respondent for a period of two months.

Both parties challenged the said order before the District Court, Dehradun. The Respondent also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act seeking an interim injunction against the Appellant. Both appeals and the Section 9 application were disposed off by a common order dated January 20, 2006, whereby, both appeals were dismissed and the Section 9 application was allowed, retraining the Appellant from interrupting the supply of petroleum products to the Respondent for two months as well as directing the parties to refer the matter to arbitration as per the agreement, within the said period of two months.

While the appeals were pending, the Respondent issued letter dated January 04, 2006, through their counsel, wherein, the Respondent, referring to the Appellant’s insistence that only its Director, Marketing could be appointed as the Arbitrator, inter alia alleged that it (the Respondent) did not expect fair treatment or justice if the Director, Marketing or any other employee of the Appellant was appointed as the Arbitrator and called upon the Respondent to have a joint meeting so as to enable the parties to mutually agree on an independent arbitrator. This request was not accepted by the Appellant.

Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application before the Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of an independent arbitrator to decide the dispute. This application7 was allowed and a retired High Court Judge was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to decide the dispute. The Ld. Chief Justice inter alia assigned the following two reasons to appoint a retired Judge as an Arbitrator instead of the persons as named in the arbitration agreement.

  1. The Director (Marketing) of the Appellant, being its employee, should be presumed not to act independently or impartially.
    1. The Respondent had taken steps in accordance with the agreed appointment procedure contained in the arbitration agreement and directions of the civil court by issuing notice dated January 04, 2006, calling upon the Appellant to appoint an arbitrator. After receipt of the said notice, the Appellant had to refer the matter to its Director, Marketing, which it did not do, nor did it take any steps for the appointment of an Arbitrator. The Appellant had, thus, failed to act as required under the agreed procedure.

    Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant preferred an appeal before the Court.

    JUDGMENT:

    The facts and circumstances of this case raised three issues for the Court to consider:

    1. Whether the Ld. Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court was justified in assuming that when an employee of one of the parties to the dispute is appointed as an arbitrator, he will not act independently or impartially.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • Arbitration is a binding and voluntary dispute resolution process by a private forum so chosen by the parties.
    • Where a party, with open eyes and full knowledge and comprehension of the said provision enters into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise, where such arbitration agreements providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, were common, such party cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act.
    • It was settled law that arbitration agreements in government contracts providing that an employee of the department (usually a high official unconnected with the work or the contract) will be the arbitrator are neither void, nor unenforceable.
    • Whilst the provisions relating to independence, impartiality and freedom from bias are implicit under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the same are made explicit in the Act.
    • This position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement. In such cases, there may be a valid and reasonable apprehension of bias in view of his position and interest. In such cases, the court has the discretion not to appoint such a person.
    1. In what circumstances the Chief Justice or his designate can ignore the appointment procedure or the named arbitrator in the arbitration agreement to appoint an arbitrator of his choice.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • The court must first ensure that the terms of the agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted.
    • It is not mandatory to appoint the named arbitrator but at the same time, due regard has to be given to the qualifications required by the agreement and other considerations. Referring the disputes to the named arbitrator shall be the rule. Ignoring the named arbitrator and nominating an independent arbitrator shall be the exception to the rule, which is to be resorted to for valid reasons.

    Interestingly, the Court also proceeded to expound on the scope of Section 11 of the Act, which contains the scheme of appointment of arbitrators.

    1. Whether the Respondent had taken the necessary steps for the appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement, and the Appellant had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure, by not referring the dispute to its Director, Marketing for arbitration.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • In view of the order dated January 20, 2006, the Respondent ought to have referred the dispute to the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant within two months from January 2006. The Respondent had not done so and in light thereof, it was the Respondent that had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure and not the Appellant.
    • As the Arbitrator was already identified, there was no need for the Respondent to ask the Appellant to act in accordance with the agreed procedure.

    The Court proceeded to hold that the Chief Justice had erred in having proceeded on the basis that the Respondent had performed its duty under the agreement and that there was justification for appointment of an independent arbitrator.

    The Court then proceeded to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and appointed the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties.

    ANALYSIS:

    By this decision, the Court has once again upheld that when a person enter into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise having an arbitration agreement providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, such person cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act. However, this position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement.

    Referring to its decision taken earlier in the matter of Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi Vs. Patel Engineering Company Ltd. (please refer to our earlier hotline dated August 26, 2008) Court reiterated that it is important to first ensure that the terms of the arbitration agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted, before they intervene in any manner.

    However, If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.

    FOOTNOTES

    1 Civil Appeal No. 5760 of 2009 arising out of SLP (C) No. 26906 of 2008.

    2 “69. Any dispute or a difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this Agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director, Marketing of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director Marketing. The dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the contract related or that in the course of his duties or differences. ………………..It shall also be a term of this contract that no other person other than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such Director, marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder…………………….”

    Nishith Desai Associates 2022. All rights reserved.

Article By Sahil Kanuga and Vyapak Desai with Nishith Desai Associates.

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