LSSO’s annual RainDance Conference is the key resource of the organization. The two-day conference is filled with high-level interactive sessions, roundtables and lively discussions with industry thought leaders.
When: June 7 & 8, 2016
Where: The Mid-America Club, Chicago, IL
RainDance offers less of the theory and more of the practical, effective sales and service strategies for attendees to bring back to their firm and implement immediately. With an intimate setting, you can expect open and honest dialogue among the attendees about the challenges they face in meeting the demands of the increasingly competitive and evolving industry.
RainDance is for firm leaders who have significant responsibilities for client retention, client growth, new business development, client service, and process improvement strategies to shape the future of their firms. It is recognized and known for attracting the highest caliber of attendees who are often regarded as the thought leaders in their firms and those who help shape the industry.
The Legal Sales and Service Organization, Inc. was launched on August 8, 2003. At that time, law firms were beginning the evolution from marketing to incorporate business development and service initiatives.
Legal departments became ever more demanding of their firms and increased their use of process improvement tools, like Six Sigma and Lean, internally. However, law firms did not have the resources or tools in the areas of business development, service excellence and quality initiatives. LSSO was created to fill those needs.
Then and especially now, law firm leaders have ever-greater responsibilities for the future of their firms. The market is crowded and highly competitive. Clients are sophisticated buyers. As such, lawyers and law firms must employ effective sales and service strategies, whether they are responsible for bringing in new business or developing and retaining clients through service delivery.
Covered Entities need to continue to check their inboxes for emails from the HHS Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) requesting verification of contact information in connection with Phase 2 of the HIPAA Audit Program. OCR previously indicated that Covered Entities would begin to receive verification emails in May. We understand that Covered Entities continue to receive emails requesting contact information verification this week.
Emails are sent from OSOCRAudit@hhs.gov and request a response from the entity verifying its information within five days. A sample copy of the email is available from OCR’s website. The receipt of an email requesting contact verification does not necessarily mean that an entity will ultimately be selected for an audit. Covered Entities can begin to prepare for the next step in the audit process by reviewing OCR’s audit pre-screening questionnaire.
For the time being, Business Associates are not being contacted. OCR will request a list of Business Associates from Covered Entities and plans to begin contacting Business Associates selected for audit this summer. Business Associates should use this extra time to ensure that they are ready for an audit should they be selected. OCR has provided a sample template for Covered Entities to use to list their Business Associates.
In order to assist covered entities and business associates with their HIPAA compliance efforts, we have repackaged the audit protocol into a more user-friendly format that can be downloaded here.
©1994-2016 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
The National Labor Relations Board is set to decide if the same test used to determine whether teaching employees of a religious school are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction should be extended to non-teaching employees. Islamic Saudi Academy, Case 05-RC-080474 (May 12, 2016).
In Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), the Board adopted a two-part test for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over teachers at such schools under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Board held that a college or university claiming that it is exempt from NLRB jurisdiction must first demonstrate it holds itself out as providing a “religious educational environment”. If the school satisfies that requirement, it then must show that it holds out the faculty members who a union is seeking to represent “as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining the college or university’s religious educational environment, as demonstrated by its representations to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large.”
On whether a school satisfies the second part of the test, the Board will determine whether the school holds out its faculty members as performing any religious function in creating or maintaining a religious educational environment. The Board noted that evidence in support of this requirement might include showing “that faculty members are required to serve a religious function, such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework, serving as religious advisors to students, propagating religious tenets, or engaging in religious indoctrination or religious training.” For more on Pacific Lutheran University, see NLRB Announces New Standard for Exercising Jurisdiction Over Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universities.
Islamic Saudi Academy is a non-profit private educational institution operating an elementary and secondary school at two locations in Fairfax County, Virginia. In May 2012, the Islamic Saudi Academy Employee Professional Association filed a petition to represent, among others, the Academy’s non-teachers, such as nurses, IT employees, librarians, finance clerks, and internal auditors. After several procedural twists and turns, as well as issuance by the Board of its decision in Pacific Lutheran University, the Board ordered the case be remanded to the Regional Director “for further appropriate action consistent with its decision in Pacific Lutheran University.”
The Regional Director decided that, assuming Pacific Lutheran University applies to non-teaching employees at primary and secondary schools, the Academy had not established that the non-teaching classifications were held out as performing a specific religious function and that the Board should assert jurisdiction over the non-teaching classifications. The Academy then requested review by the NLRB.
It is unclear how the second part of the test –holding employees out as performing a religious function — would be applied to non-teaching employees, since the school must show the non-teacher performs a religious function in creating or maintaining a religious educational environment. Certainly, with respect to many non-teachers, satisfying the burden of proof will be a tall order.
I’m not sure Julia Roberts’ use of that blonde wig and eighties cut-out dress when she leaned against Richard Gere’s car in Pretty Woman should be considered “fair use,” but perhaps a court might say otherwise. How does Julia’s transformation from wayward to womanly in that iconic 1990 film come into play in a fight between tech giants Google and Oracle over the use of copyrighted java? Because they both hinge on “transformative use.”
Google’s going to trial again? Say it isn’t so. I have to wonder how many lawyers Google, alone, employs. But, if you’re going to stand as one of the front-runners in today’s fast-paced, internet-driven services market, you have to be prepared for lawsuits. Google has been fending off some serious claims by Oracle in a copyright suit filed in San Francisco since 2010, but when the focus of the debate turned to expert witness testimony, we wanted to highlight the matter for discussion and debate. Oracle initially sued Google claiming improper use of copyrighted Java, particularly Google’s use of its application programming interfaces (“APIs”) on its Android platform, to allow developers who are familiar with Java to quickly convert their web apps to Android. Oracle is now reportedly seeking royalty damages in excess of $8 billion.
Initially Google argued, and the trial court agreed, that APIs were not subject to copyright. That ruling, however, was overturned by the Federal Circuit on appeal, which means Google’s remaining defense is whether its use of the APIs was “transformative,” which would make it acceptable under the Fair Use Doctrine. What standard of “transformative use” are the parties looking to? 2 Live Crew and their ripping parody of “Pretty Woman” in their 1989 album, “As Clean As They Wanna Be.” Please tell me you’re envisioning that iconic cover right now. Apparently the Supreme Court in a 1994 ruling, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., found 2 Live Crew’s version of “Pretty Woman” so creative and original that it qualified as “fair use,” not copyright infringement. Oracle is arguing the opposite by claiming Google’s use of the Java APIs did nothing to transform the code. Google simply plugged it into to a larger body of work, but in no way altered it, which does not qualify, according to Oracle, as transformative.
Oracle has sought to exclude the testimony of Google’s computer science expert from opining that Google’s use of the Java code altered it sufficiently to qualify as a transformative use, claiming his opinion “flies in the face” of the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google was wrong in claiming its use was transformative simply because it incorporated other elements in the Android system. Google has fought back, stating the Federal Circuit never decided whether the work was transformative and specifically remanded the case so that issue could be decided by a jury. Are you finding both of those arguments a bit rambling and repetitive? Apparently so did the trial court judge when he lamented his role as the gatekeeper who has to “excise every detail of expert testimony on a granular level.” With reams of lawyers on either side fighting over every detail and every dollar, however, that is probably precisely what he will have to do.
If you feel it may be hard, not being a computer science guru, to make a determination as to whether Google’s use of the Java at issue was “transformative,” imagine how the jury is going to feel. In May, 2012, a jury found Google had infringed Oracle’s copyrights but they could not decide whether use of the code in question was “fair.” This will be the second trial and second jury that attempts to answer this question. It will require an expert with exceptional communication skills, who is as persuasive as Julia, to effectively break this Java jumble down and win over the potentially tech-savvy, but stubborn “Richards” in the jury box. That’s the expert we would find for them, anyway, if Google gave us a call.
© Copyright 2002-2016 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.
Today, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) announced its final rule on the minimum salary that white-collar employees must be paid to qualify as exempt from the overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rule raises the current salary level that such employees must receive in order to qualify as “exempt” from $23,660 annually, to $47,476 annually. The new rule takes effect December 1, 2016.
Under current DOL regulations, most white collar employees – executives (supervisors), administrative employees, and professionals – are exempt from the FLSA overtime rules and need not be paid overtime for hours worked over 40 in a workweek if they satisfy two conditions. First, they must perform “exempt” duties as defined by the DOL regulations. Second, they must be paid a guaranteed salary of at least $455 per week, or about $23,660 annually.
The new rule, first proposed in a slightly different form back in 2015, raises the salary level significantly to $913 per week, or about $47,476 annually. This new salary level is set at the 40th percentile of weekly earnings for full-time salaried workers in the lowest income Census region (currently the South). This number is less than the $970 per week, or about $50,440 annually, that the DOL had originally proposed. In addition, the DOL will now permit up to 10 percent of the salary level to come from non-discretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions).
This new threshold of $913 per week/$47,476 annually will be tied to the 40th percentile for full-time salaried workers in the lowest income Census region going forward, and will be updated every three years. It is currently expected to rise to more than $51,000 annually when the first update takes effect on January 1, 2020.
In addition, under the new rule the salary level for employees who qualify for the “highly compensated employee” exemption will rise from $100,000 per year to $134,004 per year. This level is the annual equivalent of the 90th percentile of full-time salaried workers nationally.
One change contemplated by the DOL when the agency first proposed this new rule back in 2015 will not take effect: changes to the “duties” test. The DOL has announced that the final rule will leave the existing duties tests for the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions in place.
The DOL estimates that 4.2 million additional workers will become eligible for overtime as a result of this rule change, including approximately 101,000 workers in the State of Michigan. This is estimated to raise total wages for American workers by approximately $12 billion over the next 10 years.
Many employers will be impacted by this new rule, as many employers have at least one “exempt” employee who is paid less than $47,476 annually. Thus, employers should scrutinize their workforces carefully to determine if changes in exempt status are necessary. Options include:
increase the salary of an employee who meets the duties test to at least $47,476 annually to retain his or her exempt status;
convert the employee to non-exempt status and pay an overtime premium of one-and-one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for any overtime hours worked;
convert the employee to non-exempt status and reduce or eliminate overtime hours;
convert the employee to non-exempt status and reduce the amount of pay allocated to base salary (provided that the employee still earns at least the applicable hourly minimum wage) and add pay to account for overtime for hours worked over 40 in the workweek, to hold total weekly pay constant; or
use some combination of these responses.
Given the significance of these changes, and the expected impact on the American workforce, employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to discuss their options and strategies for implementing changes, if necessary.
On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court offered only limited guidance on the challenges to the religious “accommodation” procedure under the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) contraceptive mandate. Numerous faith-based institutions had challenged the mandate and the procedural requirements for seeking an exemption on religious grounds as violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. In an unusual (but not unprecedented) move, the Court relied on confirmations from both sides that an alternative solution may resolve this dispute, and remanded the cases back to the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits to allow the parties to work it out. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ___ (2016).
Religious Objection Form At Issue
Under the ACA, organizations providing health insurance to their employees must cover certain FDA-approved contraceptives as part of their health plans. Federal regulations, however, permit organizations to object to providing contraceptives on religious grounds. To avoid recourse for failing to provide mandated contraceptive coverage, such organizations must provide a form, either to their insurer or to the federal government, stating their religious objection.
Numerous faith-based nonprofit organizations, including the Little Sisters of the Poor Home For the Aged in Denver, argue that the ACA’s procedures require them to be complicit in providing services that violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. In various federal courts throughout the country, these religious institutions filed lawsuits challenging the legality of having to submit the religious objection form. After various appellate courts weighed in, the cases were consolidated for the Supreme Court to decide.
Court Sought Alternate Solutions
In late March, the Court asked both sides to come up with new proposals on how the female employees of these nonprofit organizations could receive cost-free contraceptive coverage without burdening the organizations’ religious freedoms. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concluded that both sides confirmed there was a feasible option to provide contraceptive coverage through the organizations’ insurance companies without any objection notice from the religious parties.
In its per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgments and remanded the cases back to the respective appellate courts to allow the parties “an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” The Court stated that the parties should be given “sufficient time to resolve any outstanding issues between them.”
The Court, including the concurrence by Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized that it was not ruling on the merits of the case and that the lower courts should not read anything into the Court’s opinion as leaning one way or the other. As it relates to the nonprofits in this case, the Court stated that the government has notice that they object on religious grounds so no further notice is required going forward. It also emphasized that the government should not fine or penalize the nonprofits.
What It Means
The Supreme Court’s failure to decide the legal issues surrounding the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and the religious “accommodation” means that numerous federal appeals courts will individually address whether the parties can come up with a mutually satisfactory resolution of the cases. It is unclear whether any of the courts will have to decide the legal issues (again). In any event, the very real possibility is that one or more cases could end up before the Supreme Court in a later session.
Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.
Last month, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) yet again shed further light on its analysis – and increased scrutiny – of employers’ handbook policies. The NLRB’s decision in T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171 (Apr. 29, 2016), serves as a follow-up to an earlier decision with respect to rules restricting employees’ use of recording devices. We talked about the T-Mobile decision in our post last week and thought we would continue the discussion by elaborating on another of the board’s decisions on recording rules.
In one of many recent decisions scrutinizing employer handbook policies, the board in Whole Foods evaluated an employer rule prohibiting the use of recording devices on company premises. Whole Foods, 363 NLRB No. 87 (Dec 24, 2015). The NLRB specifically explained that it was not holding that all rules regulating recordings are invalid. Rather, the board found “only that recording may, under certain circumstances, constitute protected concerted activity under Sec. 7 and that rules that would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit protected concerted recording violate the Act.” Id. at *3, n.9. The NLRB further explained that employers are not prohibited from maintaining rules restricting or prohibiting employee use of recording devices, but they must be narrowly drawn so that employees understand that Sec. 7 activity is not restricted. This was the board’s issue with respect to the Whole Foods policy, as it found the rules to be overly broad. The board relied on the fact that the rules applied regardless of the type of activity engaged in and that it covered all recordings.
The T-Mobile decision, which we wrote about last week, provides additional insight on how to interpret Whole Foods. In T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171 (Apr. 29, 2016), the board found the following policy to be unlawful:
To prevent harassment, maintain individual privacy, encourage open communication, and protect confidential information, employees are prohibited from recording people or confidential information using cameras, camera phones/devices, or recording devices (audio or video) in the workplace. Apart from customer calls that are recorded for quality purposes, employees may not tape or otherwise make sound recordings of work-related or workplace discussions. Exceptions may be granted when participating in an authorized  activity or with permission from an employee’s Manager, HR Business Partner, or the Legal Department. If an exception is granted, employees may not take a picture, audiotape, or videotape others in the workplace without the prior notification of all participants.
Id. at *4. The administrative law judge found that T-Mobile had set forth valid, nondiscriminatory rationales for the rule, including maintaining a harassment-free work environment and protecting trade secrets, and that the rule was narrowly tailored to these interests. However, the NLRB reversed, noting that “[t]he rule does not differentiate between recordings that are protected by Section 7 and those that are not, and includes in its prohibition recordings made during nonwork time and in nonwork areas.” Id. at *5. Notably, though, the policy did state that the restriction is limited to recordings “in the workplace.”
With respect to the policy justifications alleged, the board conducted the following analysis:
Harassment: T-Mobile asserted that its recording prohibition was in place to prevent harassment and noted that, under federal and state laws, employers have an affirmative obligation to prevent harassing conduct. However, the NLRB found that the recording prohibition was not narrowly tailored to this interest. The board noted that it neither cited laws regarding workplace harassment nor specified that the restriction is limited to recordings that could constitute unlawful harassment.
Confidential information: T-Mobile asserted as an additional justification its interest in protected confidential information in the workplace. The NLRB noted that the employer’s other policies defined “confidential information” as inclusive of employee information such as employee contact information and wage and salary information. The board also cited Whole Foods and said that the employer’s interest in protecting confidential information was too insufficient to justify the broad prohibition on recording.
While Whole Foods indicated that such policies are not per se unlawful, the T-Mobile decision makes clear that simply inserting business justifications into the policy will not distinguish the lawful from the unlawful. The board seems to be closely scrutinizing the justifications and requiring detailed explanations thereof. The decisions in T-Mobile and Whole Foods indicate that the NLRB will also require that a rule carve out recordings that would be considered protected activity under the Act, and it appears – at least for now – that rules which fail to do so will be struck down. T-Mobile teaches us that, while recording rules are still lawful in some circumstances, the rules must be especially specific with regard to their application and justifications. Employers should continue to closely monitor NLRB decisions to stay up-to-date on all decisions analyzing employer handbook policies.
© 2016 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
On April 28, 2016, the European Commission (EC) encouraged Portugal to become fully compliant with the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive) through the release of an April infringements fact sheet. The Directive has set the goal of 20 percent of the European Union’s (EU) 2020 energy consumption coming from renewable energy, with each Member State consuming at least ten percent renewable energy. Biofuels used in reaching this goal must meet a set of harmonized sustainability requirements, and must be treated equally by Member States regardless of the country of origin. Portugal has been sent a reasoned opinion urging it to stop favoring biofuels produced in Portugal over those produced in other countries, and to reduce sustainability requirements that are not warranted by the Directive. Portugal has two months to address these concerns, or else it could be sent to the Court of Justice of the EU.