Category: Mergers & Acquistions

Constitutionality of FTC’s Structure and Procedures Under SCOTUS Review

Both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) have authority to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act by investigating and challenging mergers where the effect of such transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”

However, the enforcement paths of these two federal agencies differ markedly. DOJ pursues all aspects of its enforcement actions in the federal court system. The FTC, on the other hand, only uses the federal district courts to seek injunctive relief, but otherwise follows its own internal administrative process that combines the investigatory, prosecutorial, adjudicative, and appellate functions within a single agency.

Whether a transaction is subjected to DOJ or FTC review is determined by a “clearance” process with no public visibility. To many, including entities in the health care industry—and, in particular, parties to hospital mergers that are now routinely “cleared” to the FTC (exemplified by two recently filed enforcement actions against hospitals in New Jersey and Utah)—this process appears to be arbitrary. It is also particularly daunting because the FTC has not lost an administrative action in over a quarter-century. Because of the one-sided nature and duration of these administrative proceedings, most enforcement actions brought against merging hospitals rise or fall at the injunctive relief stage. This process also appears to embolden the FTC into taking unprecedented actions, including the pursuit of enforcement remedies against parties to abandoned transactions.

However, this may soon change. The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear a case that raises a forceful constitutional challenge to the FTC’s structure and procedures. The Supreme Court recently agreed to combine the briefing schedule of this case with a similar case that successfully challenged the constitutionality of the administrative process of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The outcome of these cases may fundamentally alter the FTC’s enforcement process.

Article By E. John Steren and Patricia M. Wagner of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more antitrust and trade regulation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Antitrust Enforcers’ “Second Listening” Forum On Merger Reform Highlights Issues In The Healthcare Industry

In March of this year the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) jointly announced a series of “listening forums” that would help gather real world input from participants in key industry segments on possible reforms to the antitrust regulations pertaining to mergers and acquisitions.1 Co-led by DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General (“DAAG”) Doha Mekke and FTC Chairperson Lina Khan, the second of the four announced forums, focusing on healthcare, was held on April 14, 2022. 2  In addition to DAAG Mekki and Chairperson Khan, the program included eight panelists that provided perspectives from nurses, doctors, patients, pharmacists and small businesses. 3

DAAG Mekki started off the discussion by reaffirming the antitrust enforcement agencies’ collective commitment that “healthcare markets remain competitive” because it “is essential to our livelihood or the livelihood of the nation.” Mekki referenced ongoing work by the agencies in the healthcare field, including recent DOJ enforcement actions. 4

The healthcare panelists highlighted several ongoing issues in the industry, such as the adverse impact of care due to post-merger hospital staff downsizing that was tied to merger-specific efficiencies, reduced options to tertiary care, higher healthcare costs for patients, and unfair competition in the pharmaceutical and small business markets, and other impacts in the research and labor markets.

Chairperson Khan indicated that the comments resonated with the concerns that the FTC had in the hospital, pharmacy benefits management, and pharmacy industries. Ms. Khan also suggested a renewed interest in examining the potential anticompetitive effects of vertical integration in addition to horizontal mergers and acquisitions, which is consistent with the FTC’s position when it indicated that it wanted to revisit this issue while withdrawing the Vertical Merger Guidelines in 2021. Khan also reaffirmed the importance of examining anticompetitive effects in the labor market. All of these issues, according to Khan, are important in assessing how the antitrust laws can be used to improve the quality of healthcare for patients.

The forum ended with some of the more than two hundred public comments, most of which echoed similar concerns raised by the panelists in addition to concerns such as disparities in hospital-physician group contracting situations and racial disparities in access to healthcare as a result of healthcare system mergers.

Once again, all signs point toward an unprecedented time in antitrust enforcement in the healthcare industry. Accordingly, it is important that healthcare companies revisit, revise, and implement best practices with regard to their respective antitrust compliance programs. A proactive, as opposed to a reactive, approach would provide companies the best risk management strategy. It is also important to engage antitrust counsel early in potential transactions to assess how the antitrust agencies may view the deal.

The DOJ and FTC Listening Forums continue with Media and Entertainment, which was held on April 27, 2022, and the final one on Technology, which will be held on May 12, 2022. Click here to download the alert. 

FOOTNOTES

1    “Forums to focus on markets commonly impacted by mergers: food and agriculture, health care, media and entertainment, and technology,” March 17, 2022, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/03/ftc-justice-department-launch-listening-forums-firsthand-effects-mergers-acquisitions

2   See “Antitrust Enforcers’ First ‘Listening Forum’ On Merger Reform Highlights Ongoing Concerns in the Food and Agriculture Industry” May 9, 2022, available at: https://www.polsinelli.com/intelligence/antitrust-forum-highlights-concerns-in-food-and-ag

3 Full transcript of forum available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FTC-DOJ-Listening-Forum-%20Health-Care-Transcript.pdf. It should be noted that Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter did make an appearance at the end of the session, reiterating the importance of this forum.

4    See “DOJ Faces Two Strikeouts in First Health Care Wage-Fixing and ‘No Poach’ Prosecutions,” April 20, 2022, available at: https://www.polsinelli.com/intelligence/doj-faces-two-strikeouts-in-first-health-care

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
Article By Arindam Kar with Polsinelli PC.
For more articles about antitrust law, visit the NLR Antitrust law section.

Ticketmaster, Live Nation Get Booed: Concert-Goers File Class Action for “Unchecked” Abuse of Market Power

Live Nation Threatens Anyone Who Doesn’t Play Along, Plaintiffs Allege

Concert-goers tired of paying “supracompetitive fees” on ticket purchases from Ticketmaster LLC filed a class action against the company and its parent, promoter Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on April 28 for abusing its more than 70% share of the primary ticketing market (i.e. where tickets are initially sold) for major concerts. The merged companies are also aggressively deploying anticompetitive tactics in pursuit of the lucrative “secondary ticketing” market where tickets are re-sold, typically at higher prices.

Ticketmaster achieved its dominant position through a “web of long-term exclusive dealing agreements” and other anticompetitive activity, the plaintiffs maintain. The companies merged in 2010, putting the ticketing giant together with the nation’s “most dominant concert promoter.” Live Nation controls 60% of the promotion business for major concerts. AEG Live is a distant number two, with 20% market share. Now, the plaintiffs say, Live Nation uses Ticketmaster as a loss leader to bludgeon its competitors and strong-arm venues (Iderstine v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. and Ticketmaster LLC, No. 1:20-CV-03888-PA-GJS, C.D. Calif., Western Div.).

“Subsidized by the supracompetitive profits Ticketmaster’s business generates from its domination of primary ticketing services for major concert venues, Live Nation Entertainment is able to keep a stranglehold on concert promotion services – losing tens of millions of dollars annually – by paying its clients exorbitant amounts,” the complaint reads. Live Nation “regularly threatens” concert venues with eliminating them from big-act tours if they use a Tickemaster competitor for ticketing services.

Live Nation has apparently become such an emboldened market bully that its CEO, Michael Rapino, openly boasted last year that if a venue doesn’t use Ticketmaster it will suffer economically because “we don’t hold the revenue.”  This stiff-arm anticompetitive style hasn’t been lost on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division or anyone who’s paying attention in the industry. It’s become the norm. The DOJ said U.S. venues have come to accept that if they don’t use Tickmaster they will lose big-star performers and significant revenue. “Given the paramount importance of live event revenues to a venue’s bottom line, this is a loss most venues can ill-afford,” the DOJ observed.

We recently wrote in our post — DOJ: Event Powerhouse Live Nation Punished Concert Venues for Using Competing Ticketers Despite Bar – of the government’s charge that Live Nation has been violating the DOJ-ordered ban on anticompetitive behavior for years. Now, Live Nation is operating under what the DOJ calls “the most significant enforcement action” of an existing antitrust consent decree in its history, one intended, at least, to secure stricter and longer lasting conditions designed to rein in the event conglomerate’s anticompetitive behavior. The DOJ action began more than a decade ago after the company acquired Ticketmaster. A 2010 final judgment permitted the merger but prohibited the company from retaliating against concert venues for using competing ticket companies, threatening concert venues, or taking other actions against concert venues for 10 years (United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:10-cv-00139-RMC [July 30, 2010]).

These are highly profitable companies. Live Nation’s 2018 revenues were $10.8 billion. Ticketmaster, a wholly-owned subsidiary following their merger in 2010, made $1.5 billion in 2018.

Despite the 2010 judgment, the DOJ announced earlier this year that Live Nation had been repeatedly violating it for years. The government hopes the modified and extended judgment clarifies for Live Nation what conduct is out of bounds and gives consumers and venues the relief the DOJ wanted in the first place.

Historically, structural remedies (such as divestitures) have been preferable to behavioral remedies (like consent decrees) in addressing antitrust concerns over proposed mergers. As Live Nation and Tickmaster are demonstrating, behavioral remedies are too easily ignored or abused by post-merger behemoths. Too often the benefits of violation outweigh the punishment. Their behavior also highlights the anticompetitive effects that can result from large-scale vertical mergers, which have been rampant in recent years. Bundling, tying, and exclusive contracts are just a few of the competitive concerns that we see playing out here, not to mention a stagnation in the entry of new competitors in various complementary markets.

Seeking relief under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Tickemaster and Live Nation, the Iderstine v. Live Nation complaint says:

  • Engage in anticompetitive exclusive dealing with concert venues;
  • Improperly wield the conditional copyright license Ticketmaster employs to grant access to its online platform, blocking, for example, purchases of a large number of tickets. This forces ticket brokers into exclusivity with Ticketmaster, and not its competitor;
  • Bar individuals from transferring tickets unless they use Ticketmaster to do so;
  • Prevent secondary ticket service providers from being able to do business – and charge consumers lower fees – by forcing venues to use both their concert promotion and concert ticketing services. In other words, tying. Ticketmaster enjoys double-digit annual growth as a result of its “unchecked” anticompetitive conduct, the complaint says.
  • Use “coercion of and threats against disloyal customers, ticket brokers, and others”;
  • Execute vertically arranged boycotts.

Ticketmaster has “clearly engaged in blatant, anti-consumer behavior for years,” the plaintiffs say. In addition to its “behind-the-scenes efforts to feed ticket brokers huge amounts of supply if they sold on Ticketmaster’s secondary platform,” the plaintiffs cite the DOJ’s extension of the 2010 consent decree. It’s only recently come to the attention of ticket-buyers that Live Nation has been “shamelessly” violating the consent agreement for years.  It also notes that the Federal Trade Commission ordered Ticketmaster to stop implying ticket prices were higher on its primary platform than its secondary re-sale platform, when the opposite is true.

The complaint seeks certification of two subclasses:

  1. Primary Ticketing Services Consumer Class. “All end-user purchasers in the United States who purchased a primary ticket and paid associated fees for primary ticketing services for an event at a major concert venue in the United States from Ticketmaster or one of its affiliated entities owned, directly or indirectly, by Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. at any point since 2010.”
  2. Secondary Ticketing Services Consumer Class. “All end-user purchasers in the United States who purchased a secondary ticket and paid associated fees for secondary ticketing services for an event at a major concert venue in the United States from Ticketmaster or one of its affiliated entities owned, directly or indirectly, by Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. at any point since 2010.”

© MoginRubin LLP

Is a Moratorium on Mergers During the Pandemic a Bridge Too Far?

In an interview with Politico’s Leah Nylen and Betsy Woodruff Swan, Rep. David Cicilline (D-R.I.) explained that he wants the next coronavirus relief package to include a moratorium on mergers while the U.S. economy struggles to face the pandemic. According to the report, the Rhode Island Congressman’s proposal would allow deals “only if a company is already in a bankruptcy or is otherwise about to fail.” Any other deals would be on hold at least until the national pandemic declaration is lifted.

In prepared remarks, Rep. Cicilline’s stated: “As millions of businesses struggle to stay afloat, private equity firms and dominant corporations are positioned to swoop in for a buying spree.” The remarks continued: “This is not complicated. Our country can leave room for merger activity that is necessary to ensuring that distressed firms have a fresh start through the bankruptcy process or through necessary divestitures while also ensuring that we do not undergo another period of rampant consolidation.”

These comments were part of the Congressman’s presentation for an event run by the Open Markets Institute (OMI), which recently said that it favors “an immediate ban on all mergers and acquisitions by any corporation with more than $100 million in annual revenue, and by any financial institution or equity fund with more than $100 million in capitalization.” The OMI claims the ban should remain in place during the current economic and health crisis.

According to the OMI, the ban is necessary because enforcement agencies are partially shut down and unable to effectively evaluate mergers. The OMI believes the ban will help “prevent a wholesale concentration of additional power by corporations that already dominate or largely dominate their industries, especially in ways that may significantly worsen the crisis that now threatens America’s health, social, and economic systems. The history of the Panic of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession instructs us that such a massive, uncontrolled consolidation will result in the unnecessary firing of millions of employees, the unnecessary bankrupting of innumerable independent businesses, a dramatic slowing of innovation in vital industries such as pharmaceuticals, and a further concentration of power and control dangerous both to our democracy and our open commercial systems.”

Piles of Cash

The organization says that private equity firms and corporations “sit today atop vast piles of cash” and can readily swallow up distressed companies.

Rep. Cicilline and the OMI are rightfully concerned about an uptick in unlawful mergers stemming from the pandemic and should be commended for proactively raising the issue. History has demonstrated that well-capitalized firms will use economic downturns and the consequent drop in company valuations to acquire struggling rivals. And antitrust enforcers are certainly not operating at full capacity given current health and safety guidelines.

Even so, a moratorium on mergers seems like an overcorrection. Most mergers are lawful. While we can debate their overall effectiveness, since 2015, federal antitrust authorities have made second requests in less than 3% of qualifying transactions. And lawful mergers can lead to lower prices, higher quality, and increased innovation, as well as providing liquidity events.

Given these realities, lawmakers should craft legislation that aims to preserve the integrity of the pre-pandemic oversight process. This presumably can be achieved by giving regulators the power to slow down the merger review process when necessary. A resolution along these lines would seem to strike a better balance between protecting against rampant, unlawful consolidation and permitting lawful mergers to proceed.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Timothy Z. LaComb of MoginRubin.
For more on COVID-19 related legislation, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Is a Pandemic a Material Adverse Event or Change in M&A?

Question already casting clouds over corporate deals.

Reuters has reported that Gray Television Inc. has withdrawn its $8.5 billion offer to buy Tegna Inc. due to the potential impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on regional TV stations like those operated by Tegna. The news agency also reported that Volkswagen’s CFO cited the “curveball” the outbreak has thrown at its liquidity in stating that, while the automaker remains interested in buying U.S. truck-maker Navistar, it must first “conserve cash as it shuts down plants and throttles back production.” The New York Times, meanwhile, has reported that Japan’s SoftBank is threatening to withdraw an offer to purchase as much as $3 billion of WeWork stock due to government investigations, but at a time when the outbreak has reduced the value of WeWork’s “shared office space” business model.

There is no question that the coronavirus pandemic – in addition to the devastating human toll – will deeply disrupt business. That includes mergers and acquisitions. For deals not yet consummated, the validity of withdrawing from a deal comes down to the “material adverse effects” or “material adverse conditions” clauses (MAE/MAC) in deal agreements.

Depending on the negotiated terms of an agreement, the MAE/MAC clause may pertain to a company’s financial condition, operations, properties, prospects, tangible or intangible assets, the ability to repay debt, capitalization, products, intellectual property, or liabilities.

The clause may have exceptions, excluding changes such as those:

• Resulting from actions one party takes at the direction or request of the other;
• Affecting the relevant industry, assuming the changes do not disproportionately affect the parties;
• Triggering the loss of value a company may suffer when the market, suppliers or employees learn of the deal;
• Impacting economic, market or political conditions, including those arising out of war, terrorism or, in this case, a pandemic.

These clauses vary as they are negotiated by the parties. So close examination of the clause is required to determine if pulling out of a deal is a viable option. Buyers will want to see if pandemics are included or specifically excluded.

Merging companies will also want to anticipate the slowing down of necessary approvals and antitrust reviews. For example, the DOJ Antitrust Division announced that for pending mergers or those that may be proposed, it may take an additional 30 days to complete its review of transactions after parties comply with document requests.

What’s the impact on “long-term earnings power over a commercially reasonable period”?

One of the leading cases cited in answering questions surrounding MAE/MACs outside of the pandemic context is the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2018 decision in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG (2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325). A healthcare company terminated a merger with a drug company, because the drug company, as a whistleblower revealed, misrepresented that it was compliant with important government regulations. The drug company tried to enforce the merger agreement, but the court found the misrepresentations had a material adverse effect on the company’s value. The healthcare company’s termination of the deal was valid, the court found. It went on to discuss the high bar set for determining the existence of a MAE/MAC.

“The ‘reasonably be expected to’ standard used in merger agreements to evaluate the deviation between a target business’s as-represented condition and its actual condition is an objective one,” the court held. “When this phrase is used, future occurrences qualify as material adverse effects (MAE). As a result, an MAE can have occurred without the effect on the target’s business being felt yet. Even under this standard, a mere risk of an MAE cannot be enough.”

In the case of a merger, the court said, whether a material adverse change occurred depends on “the long-term impact of the event,” which the court said required a “somewhat speculative analysis.” “The ‘would reasonably be expected’ formulation is best thought of as meaning likely to happen, with likely, in turn, meaning a degree of probability greater than five on a scale of one to ten. In other words, it means more likely than not.” The court said the context of the transaction and the words of the agreement must be examined.

To kill a deal by invoking a MAE clause, the court said, buyers face a heavy burden. “A short-term hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the MAE should be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a corporate acquirer may be assumed to be purchasing the target as part of a long-term strategy. The important consideration therefore is whether there has been an adverse change in the target’s business that is consequential to the company’s long-term earnings power over a commercially reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than months.”

The Delaware court said judges must not rewrite contracts to appease a parties who suddenly believe they have agreed to a bad deal. Parties have a right to enter into good and bad contracts and the law enforces both, the court said. However, turning to the facts presented in Akorn, and given all that needed to be established, the court concluded that “any second thoughts” the healthcare company about purchasing the drug company were “justified by unexpected events” at the drug company.

A justifiable question.

A typical MAE/MAC provision addresses material adverse changes in a company generally. Also, as we have discussed, the clause may delineate specific types of events that constitute adverse changes and list exceptions that would preclude bidders from leaving a deal or seeking a renegotiation.

Surveys, like the Nixon Peabody MAC Survey 2015, have shown that the most common MAE/MAC element is a change in the financial condition of the business, however some of the most common exceptions include changes in the economy and acts of God. Understanding those elements and exceptions, which differ from deal to deal, are key to any determination or litigation over whether financial turmoil facing a business as a result of COVID-19 means that a MAC/MAE has occurred.

Whether a pandemic and its related business effects will constitute a MAE/MAC remains an open question and certainly one which will be repeatedly litigated. However, in light of the various government mandates surrounding the COVID-19 crisis, the dire predictions for the economy from both official sources and highly credible non-official sources, and the recent stock market downside volatility, parties that invoke MAE/MAC clauses at this time appear to have supportable justifications.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE WRITTEN BY Dan Mogin and Jennifer M. Oliver  & Edited by Tom Hagy of MoginRubin.

FTC Announces 2020 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings Under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced its annual revisions to the dollar jurisdictional thresholds in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”); the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of their publication in the Federal Register.  These changes increase the dollar thresholds necessary to trigger the HSR Act’s premerger notification reporting requirements.  The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, effective as of January 21, 2020.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the contemplated transactions to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies.  The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing.  Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $94 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size of Transaction Test

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $376 million;

or

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $94million but not more than $376 million, and the Size of Person thresholds below are met.

Size of Person Test

One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $188 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $18.8 million in total assets or annual sales. If the acquired party is not “engaged in manufacturing,” and is not controlled by an entity that is, the test applied to the acquired side is annual sales of $188 million or total assets of $18.8 million.

 The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold

2019 Threshold

2020 Revised Threshold
(Effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register)

$10 million

$18 million

$18.8 million

$50 million

$90 million

$94 million

$100 million

$180 million

$188 million

$110 million

$198  million

$206.8 million

$200 million

$359.9 million

$376 million

$500 million

$899.8 million

$940.1 million

$1 billion

$1,799.5 million

$1,880.2 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions have not changed, but the transaction value ranges to which they apply have been adjusted as follows:

Filing Fee

Revised Size of Transaction Thresholds

$45,000

For transactions valued in excess of $94 million but less than $188 million

$125,000

For transactions valued at $188 million or greater but less than $940.1 million

$280,000

For transactions valued at $940.1 million or more

Note that the HSR dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ.  Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $43,280 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) the “interlocked” corporations each have combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $38,204,000 (up from $36,564,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”1

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”2  After the revised thresholds take effect, a corporate interlock does not violate the statute if: (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $3,820,400 (up from $3,656,400); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales.

The revised dollar thresholds for interlocking directorates of $38,204,000 and $3,820,400 will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register; there is no 30-day delay as there is for the HSR thresholds.

1   15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2   S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

ARTICLE BY Joel Mitnick and Ngoc Pham Hulbig of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.
For more on Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds, see the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation section.

Spurned by HP Board of Directors, Xerox Gets Hostile, and is Spurned Again

Case raises a unique antitrust question.

Copy equipment giant HP Inc. turned down the much smaller Xerox Holdings Corp.’s acquisition overtures twice in one week as the exchange of statements between corporate leadership grows increasingly hostile. From an anticompetition perspective, the case raises the interesting question of how the “failing firm” defense could come into play.

A deal would bring together the world’s second largest copier company, HP, a company whose leadership position was once so strong that its very brand name, derived from the word “xerographic” in 1938, became a verb used more often than the word “copy” itself. Xerox is also credited with innovations that brought us tools like the mouse and ethernet networks.

But Xerox, which has long since fallen from the top of the copier industry, was met with a flat-out rejection of its offer to get its mojo back by acquiring HP. Xerox offered HP $17.00 in cash and 0.137 Xerox shares for each HP share or $22 per share, or $27 billion overall. Skeptics wondered whether Xerox could execute such a deal, given it is “only” a $9.2 billion business, a third the size of HP. The skeptics were right. On Nov. 17 the HP Board of Directors informed Xerox that its offer was not in the best interests of shareholders as it “significantly undervalues” the HP business.

In its letter to Xerox Vice Chairman and CEO John Visentin, HP wrote that its board was concerned about the “potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock.” While saying it remained “ready to engage” with Xerox to better understand its business and its thinking around a merger, the HP board rejected the bid unanimously.

“We recognize the potential benefits of consolidation, and we are open to exploring whether there is value to be created for HP shareholders through a potential combination with Xerox. However,” the HP letter to Visentin continued, “… we have fundamental questions that need to be addressed in our diligence of Xerox. We note the decline of Xerox’s revenue from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, which raises significant questions for us regarding the trajectory of your business and future prospects. In addition, we believe it is critical to engage in a rigorous analysis of the achievable synergies from a potential combination. With substantive engagement from Xerox management and access to diligence information on Xerox, we believe that we can quickly evaluate the merits of a potential transaction.”

Xerox had said it could generate $2.3 billion by selling its 25% share in the joint venture, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., to FUJIFILM Holdings Corp. In a Nov. 8, 2019, statement, Xerox also said it was selling to a Fuji Xerox affiliate Xerox’s 51% stake in Xerox International Partners, a joint original-equipment-manufacturer venture between Xerox and Fuji Xerox. The companies also agreed to end the $1 billion lawsuit FUJIFILM filed against Xerox after last year’s terminated merger. “Total after-tax proceeds to Xerox from the transactions, which included accrued but unpaid dividends through closing, are approximately $2.3 billion. Xerox expects to use the proceeds opportunistically to pursue accretive M&A in core and adjacent industries, return capital to shareholders and pay down its $554 million December 2019 debt maturity,” according to Xerox.

Xerox did not take HP’s rejection well.

“We were very surprised that HP’s Board of Directors summarily rejected our compelling proposal ….” Xerox CEO Visentin responded, “claiming our offer ‘significantly undervalues’ HP. Frankly, we are confused by this reasoning in that your own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co., set a $14 price target with a ‘sell’ rating for HP’s stock after you announced your restructuring plan on October 3, 2019. Our offer represents a 57% premium to Goldman’s price target and a 29% premium to HP’s 30-day volume weighted average trading price of $17.” Visentin added that the offer was not, as HP said, “highly conditional” or “uncertain.” “There will be NO financing condition to the completion of our acquisition of HP,” the Xerox CEO said.

Xerox gave HP until today (Monday, Nov. 25) to accept the offer, otherwise it would take the case directly to HP’s shareholders. “The overwhelming support our offer will receive from HP shareholders should resolve any further doubts you have regarding the wisdom of swiftly moving forward to complete the transaction,” Visentin said.

But HP didn’t need the whole weekend. Yesterday, on Sunday, Nov. 24, it rejected Xerox again via a letter signed by HP Chairman and CEO Enrique Lores and HP Board Chair Chip Bergh. They repeated that Xerox is undervaluing the company, adding that Xerox did not address HP’s concerns about Xerox’s ability to raise the cash or handle such a substantial debt burden. Lores and Bergh didn’t seem to appreciate Visentin’s attitude, either.

“It is clear in your aggressive words and actions that Xerox is intent on forcing a potential combination on opportunistic terms and without providing adequate information,” the HP leaders wrote. “When we were in private discussions with you in August and September, we repeatedly raised our questions; you failed to address them and instead walked away, choosing to pursue a hostile approach rather than continue down a more productive path. But these fundamental issues have not gone away, and your now-public urgency to accelerate toward a deal, still without addressing these questions, only heightens our concern about your business and prospects. Accordingly, we must have due diligence to determine whether a Xerox combination has any merit.”

And yet, things had seemed to be going so well. In June, Xerox and HP announced they were expanding their relationship. Xerox was to begin sourcing certain products from HP, many of which used Xerox software, and supplying toner for HP for these and other products. These printers use laser printing technology HP acquired from Samsung in 2017. Xerox and HP also agreed to partner in the Device as a Service (DaaS) market. Xerox said it would sell HP PCs and peripherals to its commercial customers under a DaaS model, and HP would make Xerox cloud-based content management available to its commercial PC customers in the United States.

As the HP leaders said, the relationship started to sour at least as early as August.

HP questions Xerox’s resources and innovation.

HP offered additional specifics as to why it didn’t find the deal attractive:

  • Xerox has missed consensus revenue estimates in four of the last five quarters.
  • Xerox’s revenue has fallen from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, and this is expected to continue. Xerox management projects revenue declines of 6% in fiscal 2019.
  • Given how much of the Xerox business is based on contractual revenue, HP is concerned about the decline in customer Total Contract Value (TCV) in excess of revenue declines, which suggests Xerox’s revenues may decline even faster in future years. HP noted that the TCV of enterprise signings (including renewals) in 2018 was down 13.9% in constant currency and Xerox’s churn for 2018 was 18%, both data points which Xerox has stopped providing publicly since the end of 2018.
  • After a review of synergies based on public information and the “limited information” Xerox provided, HP said it does not agree with the value of potential synergies. “[I]t appears that your assumptions include significant savings that are already included in each company’s independently announced cost reduction plans,” HP wrote.
  • When Xerox exited the Fujifilm joint venture, Xerox essentially “mortgaged its future for a short-term cash infusion.” HP feels this has “left a sizeable strategic hole” in the Xerox portfolio.
  • HP also took a shot that has to sting the once-heralded leader of innovation. “[W]e have concerns as to the state of Xerox’s technology resources, research and development pipeline, future product programs, and supply continuity and capability.
  • HP said Xerox has not accessed the great potential of the Asia Pacific market.

The ‘failing firm’ defense

What’s intriguing from an antitrust perspective is how the parties might use the “failing firm” defense in a hostile takeover scenario. The failing firm defense argues that a merger that substantially lessens competition is less harmful to competition than one party’s failure and exit from the market. The defense requires a showing that the acquired company cannot meet its financial obligations, would not be able to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy, has been unsuccessful efforts to elicit other reasonable offers, and is succumbing to the only available purchaser.

We would expect to see that defense raised here given the high post-merger market share and years-long decline of both parties. But how will Xerox make the required showing without the cooperation of HP management? And, in this case the acquirer is arguably the greater “failure” risk of the two firms, making this use of a “failing firm” case a rarity, if not a first.

Copier industry landscape.

Xerox’s global annual revenue was at $20.64 billion in 2011, $19.54 billion in 2014, and $9.83 billion in 2018. It’s now a $9.2 billion company, with revenues generated from a combination of services and equipment. In 2016, Xerox services accounted for roughly a third of the company’s global revenue. From 2012 to 2014 services generated more revenue than technology. That flipped in 2015 when service revenue dropped to a third of prior years.

HP’s net revenue from its printing business was at a high of $29.6 billion in 2008. It fell to $18.26 in 2016 and bounced up to $20.8 billion in 2018.

Worldwide, Canon is the market leader, with 24% of the market. HP is close behind with more than 21% of the market. Xerox has been in the low single digits for the past two years. After Canon and HP, market leaders are Brother (11%), Epson (10%), Kyocera (7%), NEC (5.6%), Ricoh (2.5%). Some 18.5% of the market is attributed to “other” companies.

Statistics provided by Statista based on data from IT Candor. Additional statistics from HP and Xerox.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Dan Mogin and Jennifer M. Oliver of MoginRubin, edited by Tom Hagy.

Five Tips to Mitigate Risk in Cryptocurrency Mergers and Acquisitions

Congratulations!

Your client just closed on the purchase of a cutting-edge, blockchainbased payment processing startup. Before this deal, you had heard of bitcoin and blockchain. But, you had never seen a company that actually accepted payment in bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. You were a little confused by the whole idea. However, your client liked the prospect of purchasing a company that had dealt in digital assets, so you didn’t think much about it.

Arriving to the office the day after the closing, you open up your computer to learn news of a hack at one of the big bitcoin exchanges. The article explains that hackers had accessed the hot wallets on the exchange and made off with over $150 million in digital assets. News of the hack sent the price of bitcoin tumbling 15% in the four hours following the incident. Other digital assets had plunged even further. The headline jumped out at you because the company that your client just purchased used custodial wallets on the exchange to store a lot of its digital assets.

Five minutes after you finish reading the article, you get a call from your client. Sure enough, a good chunk of the digital assets that your client had just purchased were lost in the hack. To make matters worse, the new company had just lost 5 percent of its book value because of the crashing cryptocurrency market.

Volatility of Digital Assets Means Risk

The world of cryptocurrencies has matured somewhat. But, scenarios like the previous hypothetical above remain a real possibility. Indeed, 15 percent price swings in a matter of hours are still common for cryptocurrencies, also known as digital assets, especially for less established currencies. In addition to big price swings, the digital asset industry continues to face regulatory uncertainty, especially in the United States with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and other regulators undecided about how exactly to regulate digital assets. Despite the volatility and regulatory ambiguity, for risk hungry participants, the potential for large gains has helped drive an increase in merger activity in the digital asset world during the past two years.

Acquiring or selling a company that deals heavily in digital assets presents a litigation risk. Many of the factors that increase the risk of litigation in mergers or acquisitions in the digital asset industry are outside the control of the parties to a transaction. Deal lawyers try to control for these externalities but, in the new and vibrant realm of companies who deal in cryptocurrencies, those controls can be elusive, which in turn enhances the risk of litigation.

There are, however, ways to minimize the chance of a dispute. The following are a few practical tips for transactional lawyers and litigators to help contain the risks inherent in digital asset M&As.

    • Valuation Methodology: Transaction and litigation counsel should pay close attention to valuation methods used in a digital asset transaction. Cryptocurrencies and digital tokens are new and the methods used to value them may be untested. Different digital assets have different applications, e.g., utility tokens versus value storage tokens, and valuation theories should be tailored to the transaction and assets involved. In light of these unique issues and the attendant risks, transactional lawyers should give particular scrutiny to the valuation formulas to avoid a dispute. Litigators, too, should take note of the valuation methods used since they may be fodder for a dispute. And, of course, litigators should also be aware of the possibility for a Daubert-type challenge of any expert valuation witness that may arise in a subsequent dispute.
    • Earn-Outs/Purchase Price Adjustments: Transactional lawyers should pay special attention to earn-out or purchase price adjustment provisions in a digital asset M&A deal. Valuating digital assets is difficult; thus, inclusion of an earn-out or purchase price adjustment clause might help the parties reach a deal more easily. Given the volatility of digital assets, there is a higher than typical likelihood that the value of the earn-out or purchase price adjustment will also fluctuate substantially. Litigators, in turn, should also be especially cognizant of earn-out and purchase price adjustment provisions. Earn-out provisions can be especially ripe for dispute since the earn-out periods often extend for years after closing. While long earn-out periods might not present problems in more traditional fields, the fast pace of change and high levels of volatility in the digital asset industry mean that long earn-out periods are particularly susceptible to disagreement.
    • Reverse Break Up Fees: Transactional lawyers should consider including a reverse breakup fee or a reverse termination fee. These are fees paid by the buyer if the buyer breaches the governing agreements or is unable to close the transaction. For example, imagine you represent the seller in a deal set to close in three days when news breaks about a lawsuit filed by a state attorney general against a new cryptocurrency company. The enforcement action sends the price of all digital assets plummeting by 20 percent in a matter of hours. Your client still meets all of the closing conditions, but the client’s value, which consists largely of digital assets, has just taken a huge hit and the buyer’s counsel is telling you that her client is going to walk away from the deal unless your client drops the price. A reverse breakup fee will help to lessen the buyer’s willingness to run from the transaction and may also help your client recoup costs incurred in the event the buyer does walk away. Litigators representing a buyer or seller should also pay particular attention to whether the conditions in a breakup fee or reverse breakup fee clause have been satisfied.
  • Heightened Importance of Stock Terms: Transactional lawyers should give extra consideration to the applicable law and venue selection provisions in the deal documents. Some states, e.g., Wyoming, among others, have adopted more crypto-friendly regulatory regimes than other states. Consequently, transaction lawyers should consider the pros and cons of each viable state law. And, corporate attorneys should consider obtaining review of deal documents by experienced cryptocurrency litigators who can help position the transaction as best as possible in case of future litigation.
  • Last, transaction lawyers should consider the appropriateness of a mandatory arbitration provision. Arbitration has its drawbacks, e.g., the cost of the arbitrator, absence of clear rules for discovery, restricted appeal rights, etc., but the benefits of arbitration may be particularly helpful when dealing with a digital asset M&A dispute. For example, the parties can make their proceedings confidential, which can avoid the disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information in public court proceedings. Further, in the highly technical field of cryptocurrencies, the parties have greater latitude to ensure that the proceeding is adjudicated by an arbitrator with pertinent knowledge of and/or experience in digital assets or blockchain technology.

Of course, the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the ways to reduce risk in digital asset M&A deals. Other terms and conditions in the transaction contracts for a digital asset M&A deal should not escape scrutiny. Representations and warranties, contract exhibits and schedules should be tailored to the deal and the nature of digital assets in play. Due diligence is also an especially important component of risk mitigation since the nature of digital assets makes for a more difficult diligence process than a traditional transaction. Regardless of which contractual provisions are used, litigators and transactional lawyers should both be aware of and understand the heightened risk of a dispute in the volatile world of cryptocurrencies and digital assets.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

ARTICLE BY Thomas H. Wagner of Polsinelli PC.
For more on cryptocurrency, see the Financial Institutions & Banking law page on the National Law Review.

Colleges, Students Tell DOJ McGraw-Hill/Cengage Merger Would Create a Textbook Duopoly

Two of the three dominant college textbook publishers – McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. and Cengage Learning Holdings II, Inc – have agreed to merge, creating a virtual duopoly in the college textbook market and setting the stage for a potential antitrust fight with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. McGraw-Hill and Cengage claim the new company will generate global growth, improve margins, and produce efficiencies that will lead to more affordable education materials for students.

But several student and consumer groups disagree, arguing the merger will lead to decreased competition and higher prices for college textbooks. They also claim the post-merger entity will implement digital strategies (e.g., all-access digital subscriptions) that will: (1) force smaller competitors out of the market; (2) eliminate the secondary textbook market, which provides students a lower cost option for purchasing or renting textbooks; and (3) allow the two dominant publishers to collect and monopolize certain types of student data, including data showing students’ learning styles, students’ understanding of core concepts, students’ need additional assistance, and/or students’ risk of dropping out.

The Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC) has been one of the loudest critics of the merger. On August 14, 2019, SPARC sent a letter to the DOJ urging it to block the merger, arguing that it will “significantly decrease competition in a market already rife with anti-consumer behavior.”

In its section titled “The Textbook Market is Broken,” SPARC explains that college textbooks are sold in a “captive market” because students are forced to purchase the materials selected by their professors. This system “effectively hands the three major companies who currently dominate the market a blank check to develop expensive materials without regarding the preferences, needs, or financial circumstances of students. The textbook industry’s current state of dysfunction results from years of consolidation, unsustainable practices, and lack of price competition.” SPARC points to textbook pricing as an example of this dysfunction, as prices “have increased 184% over the last two decades — three times the rate of inflation.”

In a separate letter sent to the DOJ at the end of July, U.S. PIRG Education and student leaders from colleges across the country raised similar concerns. Specifically, the students explain they have “directly felt the impacts of skyrocketing textbook prices, further exacerbated by Cengage and McGraw-Hill’s efforts to remove cost-cutting options for students by undermining used book markets,” and that “[t]o maintain profit margins, publishers have put out custom or frequent new editions to make it difficult to find a used book for our classes ….” Citing a rather shocking statistic, the students claimed that “65% of students have skipped buying a book at some point in their college career because of cost despite 94% of them knowing it would hurt their grade.”

The students also identified several specific harms caused by “innovative” digital models employed in the textbook industry:

  • The publishers issue expiring access codes to paid online platforms that students must also use to submit homework and test answers, destroying the used book market;
  • Students cannot sell their materials at the end of the course or keep them or future reference, harming students who already cannot afford books;
  • Automatic billing or so-called “inclusive access” means that students are automatically charged for materials, eliminating their ability to price shop; and
  • Based on contracts proposed at some schools, publishers will continue to raise prices at the same rate that has led to the current affordability crisis.

The potential anticompetitive impacts of this merger are obvious and significant. Assuming the relevant market is the U.S. college textbook market, the merger is between two entities that each control more than 20% of an already highly concentrated market. Under relevant case law and the DOJ’s/FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the merger presumptively increases market power for the post-merger entity and violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Moreover, the merging entities have made clear they intend to develop an all-access digital subscription service that, if adopted en masse, will likely eliminate both smaller competitors and the secondary market for college textbooks. Finally, by creating a virtual duopoly, the merger increases the likelihood of coordination among rivals. Considering these issues, the DOJ must take a very close look at this merger and implement conditions that address these issues if the merger is approved.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Timothy Z. LaComb of MoginRubin.
Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP

2016 Year In Review: Corporate Governance Litigation and Regulation

2016 year in review2016 saw many notable developments in corporate governance litigation and related regulatory developments.  In this article, we discuss significant judicial and regulatory developments in the following areas:

  • Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”): 2016 was a particularly significant year in M&A litigation.  In Delaware, courts issued important decisions that impose enhanced scrutiny on disclosure-only M&A settlements; confirm the application of the business judgment rule to mergers approved by a fully informed, disinterested, non-coerced shareholder vote; inform the proper composition of special litigation committees; define financial advisors’ liability for breaches of fiduciary duty by their clients; and offer additional guidance for calculating fair value in appraisal proceedings.

  • Controlling Shareholders: Delaware courts issued important decisions clarifying when a person with less than majority stock ownership qualifies as a controller, when a shareholder may bring a quasi-appraisal action in a controlling shareholder going-private merger, and when the business judgment rule applies to controlling shareholder transactions. In New York, the Court of Appeals followed Delaware’s guidance as to when the business judgment rule applies to a controlling shareholder squeeze-out merger.

  • Indemnification and Jurisdiction: Delaware courts issued decisions clarifying which employees qualify as officers for the purpose of indemnification and articulating an updated standard for exercising jurisdiction in Delaware over actions based on conduct undertaken by foreign corporations outside of the state.

  • Shareholder Activism and Proxy Access: Shareholder activists remained busy in 2016, including mounting successful campaigns to replace CEOs and board members at Chipotle and Hertz. Additionally, the SEC’s new interpretation of Rule 14a-8 has limited the ability of management to exclude a shareholder proposal from a proxy statement on the grounds that it conflicts with a management proposal.  Also, some companies have adopted “proxy rights” bylaws, which codify a shareholder’s right to directly nominate board members.

I.  M&A

A.Enhanced Scrutiny of Disclosure-Only Settlements

In January 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an important decision, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,1 making clear the court’s renewed scrutiny of—and skepticism towards—so-called disclosure-only settlements of shareholder class actions. In Trulia, shareholders sought to block the merger of real estate websites Zillow and Trulia.  After litigation was commenced, the parties agreed to a settlement in which Trulia would make additional disclosures in proxy materials seeking shareholder approval of the transaction in exchange for a broad release of present and future claims by the class and fees for plaintiffs’ counsel.

Chancellor Bouchard rejected the proposed settlement and criticized disclosure-only settlements as generally unfair to shareholders.  Chancellor Bouchard noted that the Court of Chancery had previously expressed concerns regarding the incentives of plaintiff counsel to settle class action claims in which broad releases were granted in exchange “for a peppercorn and a fee”—i.e., for fees and immaterial disclosures that provided little benefit to shareholders.2  According to the Court, “these settlements rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders and threaten the loss of potentially valuable claims that have not been investigated with vigor.”3

Continue reading at the National Law Review…

ARTICLE BY Nathan Bull, Alejandra Contreras, Jaclyn A. Hall, Jason M. Halper, Hyungjoo Han & Adam Magid of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
© Copyright 2017 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP