Category: Labor & Employment

Washington, D.C. Prepares to Increase Minimum Wage to $15

dc minimum wage increase

— and Tipped Minimum Wage to $5.00 — by July 1, 2020

Washington, D.C. is poised to join California and New York by raising its minimum wage to $15.00 per hour.

On June 7, 2016, the D.C. Council, with support of Mayor Muriel Bowser, unanimously passed on first reading the Fair Shot Minimum Wage Amendment Act of 2016 . The bill will continue to raise the District of Columbia minimum wage – currently $10.50, but previously set to increase to $11.50 on July 1, 2016 – in additional annual increments until it reaches $15.00 by July 1, 2020. Beginning on July 1, 2021, the minimum wage will increase further based on the increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers for the Washington Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Notably, the bill will also increase the tipped minimum wage from the existing $2.77 per hour, where it has been since 2005, in annual increments of 56 cents (55 cents in 2020) to $5.00 on July 1, 2020, again with annual indexing in successive years. This increase in the tipped minimum wage represents a compromise between advocates who sought to eliminate any lower minimum wage for tipped employees, or to at least set a higher rate of half the minimum wage as Mayor Bowser originally proposed, and significant portions of the restaurant industry that resisted any increase at all.

The law also contains special provisions for government contractors that currently are covered by D.C.’s Living Wage Act, which generally require them to pay the minimum wage if it becomes higher that the living wage (currently $13.85, but also subject to annual adjustment). In addition, for the first time, District employees are covered by the D.C. minimum wage law.

The bill still faces a second vote, likely either on June 21 or 28, 2016, at which time it is possible there may be some amendments. After Mayor Bowser signs the bill, it is subject to a Congressional review period, but is expected to take full effect well in advance of the 2017 increases.

ARTICLE BY Brian W. Steinbach of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Employee Error Accounts for Most Security Breaches

security breachesA recent study by a well-known information security company captures one of the most common information security fallacies: that information security is a technology problem. Most businesses view mitigating information security risks as falling squarely in the purview of their information technology department. However, this study reports that human error actually accounted for nearly two-thirds of security compromises, far exceeding causes like insecure websites and hacking.1 While technological measures (e.g., anti-virus software, access controls, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems) are clearly important, their effectiveness pales in comparison to the benefits gained by effective security awareness training.

Just as troubling, another recent study found a 789% increase in e-mail phishing attacks containing malicious code, including ransomware, in the first quarter of 2016 over the final quarter of 2015.2 Phishing, which is an attempt to obtain confidential information or access by fraudulently posing as a legitimate company seeking information via e-mail, instant message or other electronic communication, specifically preys on employees who have not been trained to recognize the scam. A successful phishing expedition can result in the loss of confidential and financial information, system disruption and consumer litigation exposure. Every industry is impacted and at risk.

The results of these studies should serve as a clarion call to businesses. While we have long known that the human component is the key to improved security,3 it is also one of the most neglected areas in many business’ information security programs. Security awareness training for employees is one of the most important and effective means of reducing the potential for costly errors in handling sensitive information and protecting company information systems. Regardless of how much money and effort a business spends on its technological security measures, it cannot achieve an adequate level of security without addressing the human component.

Awareness training can ensure employees have a solid understanding of employer security practices and policies, as well as the tell-tale signs of an attempt to gain improper access to computer systems and confidential information. In contrast, uninformed employees are susceptible to mistakes, malware, phishing attacks, and other forms of social engineering. They can do substantial harm to a company’s systems and place its data at risk. The recent spate of ransomware attacks highlight just how critical the human element really is, as almost every one of those attacks resulted from human error.

First and foremost, it is critical that training programs have the participation of and include input from all relevant stakeholders at the company, including Human Resources, IT, Information Security, Legal, and Compliance.

Key aspects of any successful training program should also include the following:

  • Train on an ongoing basis. Avoid limiting training to when an employee is first hired or assigned to a new role in the organization

  • Train creatively, not just in a non-interactive classroom setting

  • Look for means to introduce interactivity into the training process

  • Have a means of measuring progress

To be truly effective, a security awareness program must provide “multiple methods of communicating awareness and educating employees as well (for example, posters, letters, memos, web based training, meetings, and promotions).”[1]

Training can be conducted through a number of means:

  • Classroom sessions

  • Webinars

  • Security posters and other materials in common areas

  • Brown bag lunches

  • Helpful hints distributed to employees via e-mail or corporate intranet posts

  • Simulated phishing attacks (e.g., systems that will periodically send phishinge-mail to employees attempting to lure them into clicking on an attachment or a hyperlink and then alerting the employee that they have engaged in an insecure activity)

Additionally, having comprehensive and understandable employee policies is critical to a company’s information security safeguards. Readable and effective policies can be used in conjunction with effective employee training to reduce data security incidents caused by human error.

Finally, one of the most effective ways to increase employee security awareness is to help employees understand that good security practices can also benefit them personally. Being security-aware not only serves to protect their employer’s systems, but also helps in better securing the employee’s own personal data and computers. For example, by being more vigilant in identifying potential phishing attacks at work, the employee will become more vigilant in using home e-mail accounts and thereby protect their own data, photographs, financial accounts, etc.

ARTICLE BY Chanley T. Howell, Michael R. Overly & Eileen R. Ridley of Foley & Lardner LLP
© 2016 Foley & Lardner LLP

1https://www.egress.com/news/egress-ico-foi-2016
2http://phishme.com/phishme-q1-2016-malware-review/
3 See, e.g., Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition.http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/12tr012.pdf.

Termination For Conduct Caused By Side Effects of Prescription Medication Was Not Disability Discrimination

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Disability Discrimination

A federal court in Florida has upheld an employee’s termination due to her “inebriated” conduct that was caused by her use of prescription medications, holding that her discharge did not constitute disability discrimination. Caporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 8-14-cv-2131-T-36EAJ (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2016).

Lisa Caporicci worked for Chipotle as a crew member and had a long history of depression and bi-polar disorder. In April 2013 she informed her manager that she took medication for bi-polar disorder but did not mention any side effects or behavioral issues that might arise from taking the medication.

In May 2013, Caporicci began taking new medication because she was experiencing panic attacks. At that time, she requested a few days off and her request was granted.  She did not work for five days and returned on June 4, 2013.  Four days later, she reported for work in what appeared to be an inebriated state.  She was “very slow, messed up orders and was incoherent.”  Caporicci’s supervisor took her off the serving line and sent her home.  She was fired later that day, for violating Chipotle’s Drug and Alcohol Policy, which prohibits employees from reporting for work or being at work under the influence of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances, or with any detectable amount of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances in his or her system.  The policy further provides that if an employee takes prescription medication that may adversely affect the ability to perform the job, he/she must notify his/her manager prior to starting work.

Caporicci asserted disability discrimination claims under federal and state law, as well as FMLA interference and retaliation claims. Her FMLA claims were dismissed because she had been employed less than 12 months.  As to her disability discrimination claims, Caporicci argued that firing her for medication side effects was tantamount to firing her for her disability.

The Court noted that courts are split on the question of whether a termination based on conduct related to, or caused by, a disability constitutes unlawful discrimination. The majority position, which includes courts in the Eleventh Circuit, holds that an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for workplace misconduct even when the misconduct is a result of the disability.  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court discounted the minority position in Raytheon Company v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 n.6 (2003), stating:  “To the extent that [the Ninth Circuit] suggested that, because respondent’s workplace misconduct is related to his disability, petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent on account of that workplace misconduct violated the ADA, we point out that we have rejected a similar argument in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.”

For these reasons, the Court followed the majority position and held that Caporicci’s termination was not discrimination based on her disability, but rather, it was the result of her employer’s application of a neutral policy which prohibited employees from reporting to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Article By Kathryn J. Russo of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Fourth Circuit Allows Casino Workers to Proceed With Putative Class and Collective Action For Unpaid Training Time at “Dealer School”

The Fourth Circuit recently decided in Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland, LLC that casino workers may proceed with a putative class action alleging that their unpaid attendance at a Maryland casino’s “dealer school” violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Maryland wage laws.

Background

Plaintiffs alleged that the Casino advertised for dealer positions after Maryland authorized the operation of table games.  The Casino invited approximately 830 applicants, including the named plaintiffs, Claudia Harbourt, Michael Lukoski and Ursula Pocknett, to attend a free twelve-week “dealer school” to be “held in conjunction with Anne Arundel County Community College” and aimed at teaching them “how to conduct table games” at the Casino.

The dealer school was scheduled for twenty hours per week over twelve weeks. Plaintiffs alleged that the advertised community college had no involvement in the school and the Casino authored the materials and provided the instruction.  Attendees completed new hire paperwork, submitted to a drug test and provided the Casino with information to conduct background checks required for the attendees to obtain gambling licenses.

Plaintiffs Harbourt and Pocknett attended the dealer school for eight and eleven weeks, respectively, and were not paid for their attendance.  Plaintiff Lukoski attended the dealer school for the full twelve weeks and began working as a dealer at the Casino.  He received minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for the last two days of his attendance at the dealer school.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class and collective action lawsuit asserting violations of the FLSA and Maryland wage laws claiming their time spent at the dealer school was compensable.  The district court granted the Casino’s motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs “failed to show that the primary beneficiary of their attendance at the training was the Casino rather than themselves” and therefore the time spent at the dealer school was not compensable.

Decision on Appeal

The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that those who attended the training school were employees performing “work” for the Casino within the meaning of the FLSA and Maryland wage and hour laws.  The Court relied on the Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Casino received an immediate benefit in a trained workforce of over 800 dealers, “the training was unique to the Casino’s specifications and not transferrable to work in other casinos” and attendees were paid minimum wage for the last two days of the dealer school, which suggested that the Casino considered the attendees working for at least those two days.  The Fourth Circuit also found sufficient allegations to conclude that the Casino “conceived or carried out” the dealer school in an effort to avoid paying minimum wage by advertising that the school was associated with a community college, when in fact the college had no involvement.

Takeaway

While the Fourth Circuit did not express an opinion about the likelihood of Plaintiffs’ success on the merits and noted that “[t]he fact that table games were not in operation during the training well may prove an insurmountable obstacle[,]” Harbourt is an important reminder for employers that  training may constitute compensable time under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws, particularly where the primary purpose of the training is to benefit the employer.

Article By Allison P. Dearington of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act: New Pregnancy Provision Taking Effect in August

Colorado Anti-discriminationOn August 10, 2016, a new pregnancy provision of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) will take effect. While the CADA had previously been interpreted as prohibiting pregnancy discrimination and requiring accommodations for pregnancy, the new provision strengthens and clarifies those protections. Indeed, the amendment will require more of employers and will make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail than federal anti-discrimination law. This greater pregnancy protection, combined with the fact that the CADA was amended in 2013 to allow successful plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive damages (remedies previously unavailable under the CADA), make it more likely that employers will face lawsuits under the CADA. Accordingly, employers need to be especially careful to comply with the new amendment.

Accommodation

The bill requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee for health conditions related to pregnancy or the physical recovery from childbirth under the following conditions: (1) an accommodation is necessary to perform the essential functions of the job, (2) the employee has requested an accommodation, and (3) the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer. As in the disability context, once an employee requests an accommodation, the employee and employer are required to engage in an interactive process. Importantly, an employer may also require a note from a licensed healthcare provider before providing an accommodation.

While accommodations are to be tailored to the employee, the bill does give examples of reasonable accommodations, including, more frequent or longer break periods, more frequent restroom and refreshment breaks, limitations on lifting, light duty, and modified work schedule. An employer is not required to create a new position or hire additional employees to provide a requested pregnancy accommodation. However, if an employer provides or is required to provide a particular accommodation to another group of employees, the bill creates a rebuttable presumption that the same accommodations for a pregnant employee would not impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Employers should also note that to preserve a pregnant employee’s ability to work, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to accept an accommodation that has not been requested or is not necessary. Similarly, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take leave if the employer can provide another reasonable accommodation.

Adverse Action

The bill also prohibits taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a pregnancy accommodation. Significantly, the bill prohibits more employment practices than other sections of the CADA. Other sections of the CADA specifically make it improper to “refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to harass during the course of employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ” For pregnancy, adverse action is defined as “an action where a reasonable employee would have found the action materially adverse, such that it might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Accordingly, the bill likely covers a broader range of conduct than the other sections of the CADA.

Notice

To help educate employees about their rights under the new law, the bill requires employers to give new employees notice of their rights under this section at the start of employment. Further, employers are required to give current employees notice by December 8, 2016. Moreover, employers are required to post a notice in the workplace (along with the other employment law posters).

Although the bill does not provide a remedy for an employer’s failure to provide notice to existing or new employees, employers should comply with those provisions.

Remedies

Before filing a lawsuit, an employee who believes she has suffered an adverse action or improperly denied an accommodation under the new bill must file a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission within six months of the conduct. Once the employee has exhausted the administrative remedies, she may sue for back pay (up to two years reduced by what the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence), front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

Action Plan

In anticipation of the new bill taking effect on August 10, 2016, employers should:

  • Review all job descriptions to ensure that they clearly identify the essential functions of each job.

  • Review handbooks and policies to ensure that they clearly define the procedures for an employee to request a pregnancy-related accommodation.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to current employees on or before December 8, 2016.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to new employees.

  • Update on-boarding policies and procedures to include providing the required notice of rights.

  • Review the accommodations provided to other classes of employees to understand the accommodations that may be presumed reasonable for pregnancy-related accommodations.

  • Train the employee or employees who will respond to pregnancy-related accommodation requests on the requirements of the bill.

  • Train managers on the requirements of the new bill, including the prohibitions on taking adverse actions against employees who request or use accommodations and the prohibitions on requiring employees to accept accommodations that are unwanted or unnecessary.

  • Update employment law postings to include a notice of rights under the bill.

Article By Gillian McKean Bidgood of Polsinelli PC
© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

In Case You Missed It: The EEOC Sneaks in Its Final Wellness Program Rule Ahead of The DOL’s New OT Rule

eeoc wellness programThe employer community was sent into a frenzy with the Department of Labor’s release on May 18, 2016 of its final white-collar overtime regulations.  Just two days before however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also released its own final regulations regarding employer wellness programs.

We had previously posted about the Commission’s proposed wellness program rule, and followed with a post discussing the future of wellness programs in light of two recent court decisions – EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc. and Seff v. Broward County.  In its recently issued regulations (which you can access here and here), the EEOC has set forth its final position on how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title II of the Genetic Information and Discrimination Act (GINA) apply to employer wellness programs that request the health information of employees and/or their spouses.  While most provisions of the final ADA rule and final GINA rule are identical to their respective proposed rules, there are some key differences, which we explain below in Q&A format below.

  1. Does the ADA’s safe harbor provision apply to employer wellness programs?

No.  The ADA’s safe harbor provision states that the ADA “shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict  . . . a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).

The Commission made no secret about its opinion that Seff and Flambeau were “wrongly decided” (including by appealing the Flambeau decision to the Seventh Circuit).  Despite case law to the contrary and pending appeals, the Commission reaffirmed its position in the final ADA rule that “the safe harbor provision does not apply to an employer’s decision to offer rewards or impose penalties in connection with wellness programs that include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations.”  Rather, the safe harbor provision only applies “to the practices of the insurance industry with respect to the use of sound actuarial data to make determinations about insurability and the establishment of rates.”  An employer’s use of wellness program to make employees healthier and reduce the costs of health care is not the type of underwriting or risk classification that is protected by the safe harbor provision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6).

  1. What wellness programs are subject to these final rules?

Any wellness program that includes disability-related inquiries and/or medical exams is subject to the rule.  This includes wellness programs: (a) offered only to employees enrolled in an employer-sponsored group health plan; (b) offered to all employees regardless of enrollment in the employer-sponsored group health plan; and (c) offered as a benefit of employment by employers that do not sponsor group health plans/insurance.

  1. Do the final rules provide additional clarification as to what makes a wellness program “voluntary”?

Yes.  The Commission has held steadfast in its decision to apply the “30 percent rule” for incentives set under HIPAA and the Affordable Care Act to participatory wellness programs that inquire as to employee disabilities or require employees to undergo medical examinations.  In doing so, the final rule limits the size of the incentives offered by these programs to 30% of the employee’s total cost of coverage.  Many commenters wanted the Commission to adopt an “affordability standard” to protect low-income workers from incentives that prove to be large enough to render health insurance coverage unaffordable.  The Commission declined to adopt this standard however, because in its view, “this rule promotes the ADA’s interest in ensuring that incentive limits are not so high as to make participation in a wellness program involuntary.”

Additionally, in the rule’s preamble specific to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii), the Commission clarifies that it is of the opinion that the ADA prohibits “the outright denial of access to a benefit available by virtue of employment”, but does not prohibit “an employer from denying an incentive that is within the [30% limit] . . . nor does it prohibit requiring an employee to pay more for insurance that is more comprehensive.”  The Commission likely included this comment to further emphasize its disagreement with the Flambeau and Seff decisions – the Commission has concluded that an employer discriminates against an employee in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4), when it “denies access to a health plan because the employee does not answer disability-related inquiries or undergo medical examinations.”

The final rule explaining the notice requirement, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(iv), also clarifies that it applies to “all wellness programs that ask employees to respond to disability-related inquiries and/o undergo medical examinations.”

  1. What types of incentives may be offered to employees and how can employers calculate incentive limits?

In addition to financial incentives, employers are permitted to offer in-kind incentives (e.g., employee recognition, parking spot use, relaxed dress code) and de minimis incentives to employees, despite any difficulties in valuing these incentives.

The final ADA rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3), also explains how employers can calculate incentive limits in four situations: (a) where participation in a wellness program depends on enrollment in a particular health plan; (b) where wellness program participation does not depend on employee’s enrollment in an employer-offered single group health plan; (c) where wellness program participation does not depend on employee’s enrollment in any of employee’s group health plans; and (d) where an employer does not offer a group health plan or insurance.

  1. How do these rules relate to other federal discrimination laws?

Employers should pay special attention the interpretative guidance following the final ADA rule.  In it, the Commission states:

“[E]ven though an employer’s wellness program might comply with the incentive limits set out in [29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)], the employer would violate federal nondiscrimination statutes if that program discriminates on the basis of race, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, transgender status, and sexual orientation), color, religion, national origin, or age.  Additionally, if a wellness program requirement (such as a particular blood pressure or glucose level or body mass index) disproportionately affects individuals on the basis of some protected characteristic, an employer may be able to avoid a disparate impact claim by offering and providing a reasonable alternative standard.”

This appears to place the additional burden on the employer to examine all wellness program incentives and requirements for potential disparate impact.  The extent to which an employer must understand specific medical characteristics of every protected class on its employee roster is unknown.

  1. What changes did the Commission make in the final GINA rule?

There are four changes of note, all of which were added to the final GINA rules to clarify and/or enhance the proposed rules.

  • The final GINA rule extends the prohibition on offering inducements for information from the children of employees to all children (minor children and those 18 years of age or older).

  • Every provision of the final GINA rule now applies to all employer-sponsored wellness programs requesting genetic information.

  • There is no longer a different inducement limit threshold for employee spouses. The final GINA rule uses the “30 percent rule” when an employee and the employee’s spouse are given the opportunity to enroll in the employer-sponsored wellness program.  The final rule provides examples of how to calculate incentive limits where this is the case.  See 29 C.F.R. 1635.8(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(D).

  • Employers may not condition an employee’s or an employee’s spouse’s participation in an wellness program or their eligibility for offered incentives on the employee, the employee’s spouse, or a covered dependent agreeing to the sale, exchange, sharing, transfer, or other disclosure of genetic information or waiving GINA’s confidentiality protections.

What’s Next?

The final rules apply proactively – thus, are only applicable to wellness programs as of the first date of the plan beginning January 1, 2017 or thereafter.  In the meantime, we await the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the EEOC’s appeal of Flambeau regarding whether the ADA safe harbor provision applies to employer wellness programs.  Given the EEOC’s position that the provision does not apply and the growing number of courts that think otherwise, it is looking like the ultimate decision will be made by the U.S. Supreme Court (think: Young v. UPS – a Supreme Court decision that prompted the EEOC to revise its pregnancy discrimination guidance).

Article By Alden J. Bianchi & Alta M. Ray of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
©1994-2016 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Draft Form I-765V, EAD Application for Abused Nonimmigrant Spouse: Comments Open

nonimmigrant spouseOn May 27, USCIS posted for comment on the Federal Register draft versions of Form I-765V, Application for Employment Authorization for Abused Nonimmigrant Spouse and its instructions. Under section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, abused spouses of certain nonimmigrants are eligible for employment authorization: i.e., the spouses of foreign nationals in the following nonimmigrant categories:

  • A-1, A-2, and A-3 (foreign government diplomats and officials and their immediate family members, attendants, servants, and personal employees);

  • E-3 (Australian specialty occupation workers);

  • G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5 (employees of foreign governments and international organizations and their immediate family members, attendants, servants, and personal employees);

  • and H-1B, H-1B1, H-2A, H-2B, H-3, and H-4 (specialty occupation workers, Free Trade Agreement professionals from Chile and Singapore, temporary agricultural and non-agricultural workers, trainees and special education exchange visitors, and immediate family members of specialty occupation workers).

Earlier this year, March 8, 2016, USCIS released a Policy Memorandum regarding the eligibility of such applicants. Pursuant to the memo, along with the Form I-765V EAD application, credible evidence should be presented to prove various eligibility factors, including that the applicant resides in the United States, that the applicant is or was (under specific circumstances) married to the qualifying principal nonimmigrant spouse, that the applicant was last admitted to the United States in nonimmigrant status, and that the applicant or the applicant’s child was abused or subject to extreme cruelty by the principal nonimmigrant spouse. If approved, the EAD should be granted for two years. Supporting documentation should include copies of the marriage certificate, evidence of the abuse, and I-94 records and biographical identification documents of both the applicant and the principal spouse.

The draft EAD application Form for abused nonimmigrant spouses is six pages, while the regular Form I-765 used by applicants eligible for employment authorization under other bases is only one page. Form I-765V requests information not only on the applicant’s immigration status, but also on biographical physical features including ethnicity, race, height, weight, and eye and hair color. Form I-765V also allows for information to be completed regarding a safe mailing address and an interpreter. Further, the draft Form requests an Applicant’s Certification regarding the authenticity of documents and release of information. USCIS estimates that completing the application Form and preparing the documentation will take three hours per response.

USCIS encourages comments on the draft Form I-765V. Specifically, USCIS seeks feedback regarding whether the proposed collection of information on the form is necessary, the burden on the applicants to compete the form, the accuracy of USCIS’ estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, and the clarity, quality, and utility of the information to be collected. Comments will be accepted for 60 days, until July 26, 2016. All comments should reference OMB Control number 1615-NEW and Docket ID USCIS-2016-0004. Comments can be made online, by email, or by mail.

Article By Lauren A. Tetenbaum of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

©2016 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

SCOTUS Rejects a Rule Neither Employers nor Employees Wanted: Green v. Brennan Decision

Supreme Court Green v. BrennanIn Monday’s Green v. Brennan ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the limitations period for constructive discharge runs from the date the employee gives notice of the intent to resign. The 7-1 outcome was not a surprise following the questioning by the justices during oral arguments. The justices held that the filing period begins when an employee resigns as a result of discriminatory behavior, not when an employer creates an environment so adversarial that an employee feels forced to resign, previously ruled in 2014 by the Tenth Circuit.

The case stems from an original complaint in 2008 by Green, a postmaster in Colorado. Green, who was passed over for a promotion, claimed someone less qualified received the position which caused him to file a discrimination complaint with the equal employment opportunity commission (EEOC).

The court was confronted with three alternative dates by which the limitations period that the EEOC must be contacted would begin to run:

  1. The date Green signed a settlement agreement giving him the option to retire or take a position 300 miles away with a significant pay cut, Dec. 16, 2009, and also the date alleged to be the last act of discriminatory conduct compelling petitioner Green to resign

  2. The date on which Green notified the respondent Postal Service of his intention to resign, Feb. 9, 2010, or,

  3. The date Green’s resignation actually became effective, March 31, 2010.

The choice was determinative because the controlling statute of limitations required Green to contact an EEOC counselor within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” a notably ambiguous requirement. Green contacted an EEOC counselor on March 22, 2010, 96 days after signing a settlement agreement and 41 days after submitting his notice of resignation. The circuits were split on whether the limitations period ran from the “last discriminatory act” or the date the employee resigns.

The rule represents both interpretive and practical considerations that should be viewed favorable to employers, including:

  • It places constructive discharge claims on equal footing with ordinary wrongful discharge claims that require both discrimination and notification of being fired

  • Nothing in the limitations regulation provided an “exception” to the ordinary rule

  • Practical consideration supported the rule applied because it made little sense to start the clock ticking before a plaintiff could actually file suit

Employers should welcome this outcome and breathe a sigh of relief because of the definitiveness and certainty it brings to both the accrual and repose of limitation periods applying to federal employment discrimination claims.

Article By Douglas D. Haloftis of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2016 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Maryland Expands State Equal Pay Act

Equal PayAlso Broadens Employees’ Right to Discuss Wages

Maryland has now joined New York and several other states that have recently passed legislation expanding state equal pay laws and/or broadening the right of employees to discuss their wages with each other (often called “wage transparency”). The Equal Pay for Equal Work Act of 2016 (“Act”), signed by Governor Hogan on May 19, 2016 and set to take effect October 1, 2016, amends Maryland’s existing Equal Pay law (Md. Code, Labor and Employment, §3-301, et seq.), which applies to employers of any size, in several significant aspects.

First, as to the equal pay provisions, the Act:

  • Extends the protections of the law to differentials based on gender identity as well as sex.

  • Bars discrimination not only by paying less for work at the same establishment of comparable character or on the same operation, but also by ‘providing less favorable employment opportunities.”

  • Defines “providing less favorable employment opportunities” to include assigning or directing an employee into a less favorable career track; failing to provide information about promotions or advancement in the full range of career track offered by the employer; or otherwise limiting or depriving an employee of employment opportunities that would otherwise be available but for the employee’s sex or gender identity

  • Expands the definition of “same establishment” to include any workplace of the same employer located in the same county.

  • Adds a new exception for a system that measures performance based on quality or quantity of production.

  • Explicitly allows an employee to demonstrate that an employer’s reliance on one of the now seven exceptions is a pretext for discrimination.

Second, on the apparent theory that if employees gather more information on wages, employers will be more likely to decrease or eliminate wage disparities, the Act adds an entirely new provision that bars employers from prohibiting any employees from inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing the employee’s wages or those of another employee, or requesting that the employer provide a reason for why the employee’s wages are a condition of employment. It also bars any agreement to waive the employee’s right to disclose or discuss the employee’s wages. In particular, an employer may not take any adverse employment action against an employee for:

  • Inquiring about another employee’s wages;

  • Disclosing the employee’s own wages;

  • Discussing another employee’s wages if those wages have been disclosed voluntarily;

  • Asking the employer to provide a reason of the employee’s wages; or

  • Aiding or encouraging another employee’s exercise of rights under this law.

However, an employer may in a written policy provided to each employee establish reasonable workplace limitations on the time, place and manner for inquiries relating to employee wages, so long as it is consistent with standards adopted by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry and all other state and federal laws. (For example, under the National Labor Relations Act, rules limiting discussions to non-working time have been held valid). For example, a limitation may include prohibiting discussion or disclosure of another employee’s wages without that employee’s prior permission, except where the employee has access to that information as part of the employee’s essential job functions and uses it to respond to a complaint or charge, or in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing or action under the Act. Violation of such a policy may be a defense for adverse action.

The Act expressly does not, however, require an employee to disclose his or her wages; diminish employees’ rights to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, or the rights provided under any other provision of law or collective bargaining agreement; create an obligation on any employer or employee to disclose wages; permit disclosure without written consent of an employer’s proprietary information, trade secret information, or information otherwise subject to a legal privilege or protected by law; or permit disclosure of wage information to a competitor.

These provisions enlarging employee sharing of wage information are similar to rules that have long existed under the National Labor Relations Act for employees other than managers and supervisor, and recently promulgated by Executive Order 13665 (April 8, 2014) as to employees of federal contractors. These rights are now expanded to all Maryland employees.

The Act further expands the remedies for violation of the equal pay provisions to include injunctive relief and creates a cause of action under the disclosure provisions for injunctive relief and both actual damages and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Existing law allowing recovery of attorney’s fees and costs apply to both types of claims. Finally, similar to the provisions of federal Title VII law, the Act now extends the statute of limitations to three years after discovery of the act which a lawsuit is based, rather than just three years after the act itself.

Maryland employers should review any rules they have regarding employee discussions about their wages for compliance with the Act’s protections for such discussions.

Article By Brian W. Steinbach of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

NLRB to Decide Organizing Rights of Non-Teaching Employees at Religious Colleges, Universities

NLRB national labor relations boardThe National Labor Relations Board is set to decide if the same test used to determine whether teaching employees of a religious school are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction should be extended to non-teaching employees. Islamic Saudi Academy, Case 05-RC-080474 (May 12, 2016).

In Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), the Board adopted a two-part test for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over teachers at such schools under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Board held that a college or university claiming that it is exempt from NLRB jurisdiction must first demonstrate it holds itself out as providing a “religious educational environment”. If the school satisfies that requirement, it then must show that it holds out the faculty members who a union is seeking to represent “as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining the college or university’s religious educational environment, as demonstrated by its representations to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large.”

On whether a school satisfies the second part of the test, the Board will determine whether the school holds out its faculty members as performing any religious function in creating or maintaining a religious educational environment. The Board noted that evidence in support of this requirement might include showing “that faculty members are required to serve a religious function, such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework, serving as religious advisors to students, propagating religious tenets, or engaging in religious indoctrination or religious training.” For more on Pacific Lutheran University, see NLRB Announces New Standard for Exercising Jurisdiction Over Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universities.

Islamic Saudi Academy is a non-profit private educational institution operating an elementary and secondary school at two locations in Fairfax County, Virginia. In May 2012, the Islamic Saudi Academy Employee Professional Association filed a petition to represent, among others, the Academy’s non-teachers, such as nurses, IT employees, librarians, finance clerks, and internal auditors. After several procedural twists and turns, as well as issuance by the Board of its decision in Pacific Lutheran University, the Board ordered the case be remanded to the Regional Director “for further appropriate action consistent with its decision in Pacific Lutheran University.”

The Regional Director decided that, assuming Pacific Lutheran University applies to non-teaching employees at primary and secondary schools, the Academy had not established that the non-teaching classifications were held out as performing a specific religious function and that the Board should assert jurisdiction over the non-teaching classifications. The Academy then requested review by the NLRB.

It is unclear how the second part of the test –holding employees out as performing a religious function — would be applied to non-teaching employees, since the school must show the non-teacher performs a religious function in creating or maintaining a religious educational environment. Certainly, with respect to many non-teachers, satisfying the burden of proof will be a tall order.

Article by Howard M. Bloom & Philip B. Rosen of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016