Category: Investment

Multi-Club Ownership – For the Good of the Game?

Alongside the rise of investment from sovereign wealth and private equity funds, sport has also seen an increase in multi-club/franchise ownership groups. These groups, often spanning across different sports, leagues, countries, and continents, allow investors to diversify their portfolios and spread their risks.

However, in football, the rise of the Multi-Club Ownership (MCOs) model poses a challenge for how the sport is governed and has implications on current and future financial regulation. MCOs acquire multiple football clubs, building a network of related teams in the process. This, consequentially, has a knock-on effect on player transfers, commercial opportunities, and the overall competitive balance of football across the globe.

In this article, we discuss the benefits of MCOs for both clubs and owners, the potential competitive advantages clubs can gain through MCOs, and whether the existing financial regulations are fit for purpose given the increasing number of MCOs within the sport.

Governance

One of the key benefits for clubs under an MCO structure is the ability to leverage centralized governance infrastructure and apply lessons learned from across the group. By centralizing key departments at the portfolio level, and incentivizing knowledge sharing within the group, MCOs can apply synergies and implement best practices with each new acquisition, leading to a more effective and efficient operation. Additionally, the centralized governance structure within an MCO brings with it opportunities for financial benefits in the form of cost savings and potentially increased revenues.

Sponsorships and Commercial Deals

Operating under an MCO allows clubs to benefit from sponsorships and other commercial deals negotiated at the group level, while also increasing individual brand awareness for each respective club. For example, an MCO could negotiate a group sponsorship agreement with a kit manufacturer or shirt sponsor covering a number of teams within the group, including the flagship club.

Agreements of this kind would be beneficial for all parties involved. The sponsor increases its own profile by being associated with the flagship club, while also getting instant access to a variety of markets through the other clubs in the agreement. At the group level, the homogeneity created by having clubs within the group playing in similar kits creates a stronger brand identity, whilst also boosting the brand profile for the smaller clubs by further associating them with the flagship club. Additionally, a group agreement would allow the MCO to secure a competitive rate that may have been unattainable for a solitary club.

Player Scouting, Acquisition, and Development

The other major financial benefit for clubs in an MCO structure relates to how players are scouted, acquired, and developed. A common feature of MCOs is the application of a uniform strategy, across all portfolio clubs, set at a group level by a Sporting/Technical Director. When trickled down to each club, this results in a global scouting network, acquiring local talent with the group’s playing style in mind. These players will then be brought into an academy, through which they will be developed to play in the MCO’s preferred playing style.

While this does not represent an immediate cost saving, this network of local scouting and academies at the club level can lead to a significant competitive and financial advantage as players move within the group from smaller clubs to the flagship club. By transferring or loaning players “in-house”, MCOs can ensure that a player’s development is not hampered by being played in an unfavorable position, or by being asked to perform a different role, protecting their value.

Additionally, by acquiring players from within the group, clubs save both time and money on scouting, as players are already a known quantity within the network. Furthermore, the receiving club acquires a player tailor-made to their playing style, reducing the time required to bed them in.

“In-house” Transfer Agreements

As exemplified by the transfer of Hassane Kamara between Pozzo family-owned clubs Watford and Udinese, “in-house” transfers can be leveraged to alleviate financial constraints for clubs within the group. Kamara, initially purchased by Watford in January 2022 for £4m, and who went on to be Watford’s player of the season, was subsequently sold to Udinese in August 2022 for £16m.

However, Kamara was then loaned straight back to Watford for the 2022/23 season. Although prima facie, this transfer does not benefit Udinese, it allowed Watford to recognize an £8m profit on Kamara while retaining his services, and strengthening their cash flow at a time when they were negotiating contracts with other star players. While “in-house” transfers of this kind raise questions regarding their fitness and propriety, they also have implications on competitive balance.

Parent Feeder

The most recognizable transfer strategy within MCOs is the feeder club model. This can be mutually beneficial to both clubs, with the best-performing players transferring to the “parent” clubs” and the “feeder” club receiving transfer income, as well as occasional loan transfers of youth team players to develop while remaining in the MCO structure.

Such a relationship can be seen between Red Bull owned, RB Leipzig (RBL) and FC Red Bull Salzburg (FCS). Since 2015, twelve players have transferred directly from FCS to RBL, with transfer fees totaling £119.75m. Eight of these players, bought for a total of £73.85m have subsequently been sold for a total of £117.50m, generating £43.65 profit RBL. The cumulative market value of the four players still playing for RBL has risen by £26.32m since their relevant transfers. For perspective, there have only been four transfers from RBL to FCS in the same period. [i]

Competition Integrity

Although centralized governance structures provide a wealth of benefits to clubs and owners within MCOs, there is a regulation to limit the effects of centralized governance on the integrity of competition.

UEFA’s regulations on common ownership prohibit teams from competing in the same competition where a single person or entity has a de facto control over both clubs. For clubs under common ownership to compete in the same competition, they must demonstrate that there are disparities within the clubs’ corporate matters, financing, personnel, and sponsorship arrangements.

On only one occasion since 2002 has UEFA’s rule on common ownership been considered. RBL and FCS both qualified for the 2017/18 Champions League and had to make significant structural changes in order for both teams to be admitted to that season’s edition. Therefore, as long as MCOs are willing to sacrifice centralized operations to an extent satisfactory to UEFA regulations, mutual competition is allowed. However, while many smaller clubs within more centralized MCO structures may not have short-term goals of European Football, UEFA regulations do raise questions over the investor’s long-term footballing ambitions for those clubs.

Financial Sustainability Regulations

In addition to the on-field benefits, being part of an MCO also provides opportunities for clubs to improve their financial position, and potentially exploit loopholes in existing financial regulation. UEFA’s recently introduced Financial Sustainability Rules (FSR) are built upon three pillars: solvency, stability, and cost control. The new cost control regulation, known as the squad cost ratio, states that a club’s outlays on wages, agents’ fees, and amortization costs must be less than 70% of club revenues. [ii]

In a scenario where an MCO owned club requires to decrease their squad cost ratio, it is possible that group sponsorship agreements and in-house transfers could be used to achieve this. By selling players within an MCO, and then receiving those players back on loan, clubs will recognize a profit on the sale for the purposes of FSR and bring down their squad cost ratio.

When considering group sponsorship agreements in respect of FSR, it is also possible that the accounting treatment of this contract at the club level could be engineered to assist a club in complying with the squad cost ratio. The allocation of revenue from a group-level sponsorship to each of the clubs under the agreement is not required to be split evenly, which provides MCOs with an opportunity to funnel revenues from group sponsorships to their clubs complying with FSR. With no current guidance or regulation on how group sponsorships should be treated from an accounting perspective, group sponsorships are another tool that can be utilized to improve their squad cost ratio.

Fair Value Regulations

Although MCOs bring opportunities to improve squad cost ratios, the FSR regulations also require all transactions to be made at “fair value”. This means that financial arrangements for sponsorships and player transfers must be accounted for on an “arm’s length” basis. Where there are doubts amongst the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) board, it can request an adjustment of the proceeds resulting from the transfer of a player, or the allocation of sponsorship monies.

However, there is currently no precedent or evidence to indicate how UEFA would view the accounting treatment for a club under a group sponsorship agreement or the transfer of players within MCOs. Furthermore, while there is a clear means to value a sponsorship agreement, this is considerably more difficult with regard to transfers, specifically the valuation of a player.

While age, injury record, marketability, and contract length, are all attributable factors, a player’s worth comes down to how much the selling club desires weighted against how much the buying club is willing to pay. An MCO structure circumvents this issue and allows for “in-house” transfers at an inflated value stipulated by the shared owner/s. Given the regulations, it is unlikely any club would want to pique the interests of the CFCB by hyper-inflating the value of a transfer, but whether MCOs will be deterred from increasing the value of in house transfers by smaller, nominal values remains to be seen.

The Future of MCOs

Recent trends have shown that the existence of MCOs will be sustained over the coming years. Sport has developed alongside the increasingly commercialized world, resulting in significant growth in investor interest across multiple clubs and sports. However, how the governance and regulation of MCOs evolves will define their development in the long term. Another factor that must be considered is whether investors will prefer multi-sport ownership (MSOs), which bring with them their own regulatory considerations, particularly in relation to conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, in the immediate future we expect continued investment in Football, the question is whether they remain satisfied with just one club, or one sport.

[i] All figures have been taken from https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/

[ii] A full copy of UEFA’s new regulations can be found here

Kurun Bhandari (Director) and James Michaels (Associate) at Ankura authored this article.

For more entertainment, art, and sports legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2023 Ankura Consulting Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

SECURE 2.0 Act Brings Slate of Changes to Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans

In December, the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 (“SECURE 2.0”) was passed, a package of retirement provisions providing comprehensive updates and changes to the SECURE Act of 2019. The legislation includes some key changes that affect employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, such as profit-sharing plans, 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans and stock bonus plans. While some of the changes are effective immediately upon the law’s enactment, most required changes are not effective before the plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2024, so employer sponsors have time to prepare for compliance.

Required Changes

Mandatory automatic enrollment in new plans.

Plan sponsors are currently allowed to provide for automatic enrollment and automatic escalation in 401(k) and 403(b) plans. SECURE 2.0 requires new 401(k) and 403(b) plans to automatically enroll participants at a new default rate, and to escalate participants’ deferral rate each year, up to a maximum of 15%, with some exceptions for new and small businesses. This provision applies to new plans with initial plan years beginning after December 31, 2024.

Changes to long-term part-time employee participation requirements.

The Act currently requires 401(k) plans to permit participation in the deferral part of the plan only by an employee who worked at least 500 hours (but less than 1000 hours) per year for three consecutive years. SECURE 2.0 changes this participation requirement by long-term part-time employees working more than 500, but less than 1000, hours per year to two consecutive years instead of three. However, this two-year provision does not take effect until January 1, 2025, which means the original SECURE Act three-year provision still applies for 2024. Employers should start tracking hours for part-time employees to determine whether they will be eligible in 2024 or 2025 under this provision. For vesting purposes, pre-2021 service is disregarded, just as service is disregarded for eligibility purposes. This provision is applicable to 401(k) plans and 403(b) plans that are subject to ERISA and does not apply to collectively bargained plans. This provision applies to plan years beginning after December 31, 2024.

Changes to catch-up contributions limits.

If a defined contribution plan permits participants who have attained age 50 to make catch-up contributions, the catch-up contributions are now required to be made on a Roth basis for participants who earn at least $145,000 (indexed after 2024) or more in the prior year. This provision is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Changes to the required minimum distribution (RMD) age.

Currently, required minimum distributions must begin at age 72 for participants who have terminated employment. SECURE 2.0 increases the age to age 73 starting on January 1, 2023, and to age 75 starting on January 1, 2033. This means that participants who turn 72 in 2023 are not required to take an RMD for 2023; instead, they will be required to start taking RMDs for calendar year 2024, the year in which they turn 73. This provision is effective for distributions made after December 31, 2022, for individuals who turn 72 after that date.

Early withdrawal tax exemption for emergency withdrawal expenses.

SECURE 2.0 provides for an exception from the 10% early withdrawal tax on emergency expenses, defined as certain unforeseeable or immediate financial needs, on a limited basis (once per year, up to $1000). Plans may allow an optional three-year payback period, and participants are restricted from taking another emergency withdrawal within three years of any unpaid amount on a previous withdrawal. This provision is effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2024.

Changes to automatic enrollment for new plans.

Almost all new defined contribution plans will be required to auto-enroll employees upon hire (existing plans are exempt from this provision). This provision is applicable for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2025.

Optional Changes

Additional catch-up contribution opportunities.

Currently, the catch-up contribution limits for certain plans are indexed for inflation and apply to employees who have reached the age of 50. SECURE 2.0 increases catch-up contribution limits for individuals aged 60-63 to the greater of: (1) $10,000 (indexed for inflation), or (2) 50% more than the regular catch-up amount in effect for 2024. This provision is effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2025.

Additional employer contributions to SIMPLE IRA plans.

Current law requires employers with SIMPLE IRA plans to make employer contributions to employees of either 2% of compensation or 3% of employee elective deferral contributions. SECURE 2.0 allows employers to make additional contributions to each employee of a SIMPLE plan in a uniform manner, provided the contribution does not exceed the lesser of up to 10 percent of compensation or $5,000 (indexed). This provision is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Replacing SIMPLE IRA plans with safe harbor 401(k) plans.

The new law also permits an employer to elect to replace a SIMPLE IRA plan with a safe harbor 401(k) plan at any time during the year, provided certain criteria are met. The current law prohibits the replacement of a SIMPLE IRA plan with a 401(k) plan mid-year. This provision also includes a waiver of the two-year rollover limitation in SIMPLE IRAs converting to a 401(k) or 403(b) plan. This change is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Increasing involuntary cash-out threshold.

Currently plans may automatically cash-out a vested participant’s benefit that is between $1,000 and $5,000 and roll this amount over to an IRA. SECURE 2.0 allows plans to increase the $5,000 involuntary cash-out limit amount to $7,000. This provision of the law is effective for distributions made after December 31, 2023.

Relaxation of discretionary amendment deadline.

Under current law, a discretionary plan amendment must be adopted by the end of the plan year in which it is effective. SECURE 2.0 allows plans to make discretionary plan amendments to increase benefits until the employer’s tax filing deadline for the immediately preceding taxable year in which the amendment is effective. This applies to stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plans to increase benefits for the preceding plan year. This provision is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023.

Elimination of unnecessary plan notices to unenrolled participants.

SECURE 2.0 eases the administrative burden on plan sponsors by eliminating unnecessary plan notices to unenrolled participants. Under the amended law, plan sponsor notices to unenrolled participants may consist solely of an annual notice of eligibility to participate during the annual enrollment period, as opposed to numerous notices from the plan sponsor. This provision is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Crediting of student loan payments as elective deferrals for purposes of matching contributions.

Under SECURE 2.0, student loan payments may be treated as elective deferrals for the purposes of matching contributions to a retirement plan. This provision is available for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2024.

Matching contributions designated as Roth contributions.

Previously, employer matching contributions could not be made as Roth contributions. Effective on the date of the enactment of SECURE 2.0, 401(a), 403(b), or governmental 457(b) plans may allow employees the option to designate matching contributions as Roth contributions.

Expansion of the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS).

Currently, EPCRS contains procedures to self-correct certain limited, operational failures that are insignificant and corrected within a three-year period. SECURE 2.0 expands this, generally permitting any inadvertent failure to be self-corrected under EPCRS within a reasonable period after the failure is identified, without a submission to the IRS, subject to some exceptions. This provision went into effect on the date of enactment.

Recoupment of overpayments.

Currently, fiduciaries for plans that have mistakenly overpaid a participant must take reasonable steps to recoup the overpayment (for example, by collecting it from the participant or employer) to maintain the tax-qualified status of the plan and comply with ERISA. Under SECURE 2.0, 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), and governmental plans (not including 457(b) plans) will not lose tax qualification merely because the plan fails to recover an “inadvertent benefit overpayment” or otherwise amends the plan to permit this increased benefit. In certain cases, the overpayment is also treated as an eligible rollover distribution. This provision became effective upon enactment with certain retroactive relief for prior good faith interpretations of existing guidance.

Simplified plan designs for “starter” 401(k) and 403(b) plans.

Effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023, SECURE 2.0 creates two new plan designs for employers who do not sponsor a retirement plan: a “starter 401(k) deferral-only arrangement” and a “safe harbor 403(b) plan.” These plans would generally require that all employees be enrolled in the plan with a deferral rate of three percent to 15 percent of compensation.

Financial incentives for contributions.

SECURE 2.0 allows participants to receive de minimis financial incentives (not paid for with plan assets) for contributing to a 401(k) or 403(b) plan. Previously, plans were prohibited from offering financial incentives (other than matching contributions) to employees for contributing to a plan. This provision became effective for plan years starting after the date of enactment.

When do employers need to amend their plans for the SECURE Act, CARES Act, and SECURE 2.0 (“the Acts”)?

If a retirement plan operates in accordance with the Acts, plan amendments must be made by the end of the 2025 plan year (or 2027 for governmental and collectively bargained plans). (The amendment deadlines for SECURE and CARES were extended late last year.)

Article By John D. Arendshorst, Andrea M. Gumushian, and Kristy L. De Vos of Varnum LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Varnum LLP

Who Owns the Crypto, the Customer or the Debtor?

Whose crytpo is it? With the multiple cryptocurrency companies that have recently filed for bankruptcy (FTX, Voyager Digital, BlockFi), and more likely on the way, that simple sounding question is taking on huge significance. Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Chief Judge Martin Glenn) attempted to answer that question in the Celsius Network LLC bankruptcy case.

The Facts of the Case

Celsius and its affiliated debtors (collectively, “Debtors”) ran a cryptocurrency finance platform. Faced with extreme turbulence in the cryptocurrency markets, the Debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions on July 13, 2022. As part of their regular business, the Debtors had allowed customers to both deposit cryptocurrency digital assets on their platform and earn a percentage yield, as well as take out loans by pledging their cryptocurrencies as security. One specific program offered by the Debtors was the “Earn” program, under which customers could transfer certain cryptocurrencies to the Debtors and earn “rewards” in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens. On the petition date, the Earn program accounts (the “Earn Accounts”) held cryptocurrency assets with a market value of approximately $4.2 billion. Included within the Earn Accounts were stablecoins valued at approximately $23 million in September 2022. A stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency designed to be tied or pegged to another currency, commodity or financial instrument.

Recognizing their emerging need for liquidity, on November 11, 2022, the Debtors filed a motion seeking entry of an order (a) establishing a rebuttable presumption that the Debtors owned the assets in the Earn Accounts and (b) permitting the sale of the stablecoins held in the Earn Accounts under either section 363(c)(1) (sale in the ordinary course of business) or section 363(b)(1) (sale outside the ordinary course of business) of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion generated opposition from the U.S. Trustee, various States and State securities regulators and multiple creditors and creditor groups. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the sale of the stablecoins under section 363(c)(1) but argued that the sale should be approved under section 363(b)(1) because the Debtors had shown a good business reason for the sale (namely to pay ongoing administrative expenses of the bankruptcy cases). On January 4, 2023, the court issued its forty-five (45) page memorandum opinion granting the Debtors’ motion.

The Court’s Decision

Although the ownership issue may appear complex given the nature of the assets (i.e., cryptocurrency), the bankruptcy court framed the issue into relatively straightforward state law questions of contract formation and interpretation. The court first analyzed whether there was a valid contract governing the parties’ rights to the cryptocurrency assets in the Earn Accounts. Under governing New York law, a valid, enforceable contract requires an offer and acceptance (i.e., mutual assent), consideration and an intent to be bound. The court found that all three elements were satisfied. The Debtors required that all customers agree to and accept “Terms of Use.” The Terms of Use was set up as a “clickwrap” agreement that required customers to agree to the terms and prevented the customers from advancing to the next page and completing their sign up unless they agreed to the Terms of Use. Under New York law, “clickwrap” agreements are sufficient to constitute mutual assent. The court also found that consideration was given by way of allowing the customers to earn a financing fee (i.e., the rewards in the form of payment of in-kind interest or tokens). Finally, the court noted that no party had presented evidence that either the Debtors or the customers lacked intent to be bound by the contract terms. Accordingly, the court held that the Terms of Use constituted a valid contract, subject to the rights of customers to put forth individual contract formation defenses in the future, including claims of fraudulent inducement based on representations allegedly made by the Debtors’ former CEO, Alex Mashinsky.

Having found a valid contract to presumptively exist, the court turned its attention to what the Terms of Use provided in terms of transfer of ownership. In operative part, the Terms of Use provided:

In consideration for the Rewards payable to you on the Eligible Digital Assets using the Earn Service … and the use of our Services, you grant Celsius … all right and title to such Eligible Digital Assets, including ownership rights, and the right, without further notice to you, to hold such Digital Assets in Celsius’ own Virtual Wallet or elsewhere, and to pledge, re-pledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, sell, lend or otherwise transfer or use any amount of such Digital Assets, separately or together with other property, with all the attendant rights of ownership, and for any period of time, and without retaining in Celsius’ possession and/or control a like amount of Digital Assets or any other monies or assets, and use or invest such Digital Assets in Celsius’ full discretion. You acknowledge that with respect Digital Assets used by Celsius pursuant to this paragraph:

  1. You will not be able to exercise rights of ownership;
  2. Celsius may receive compensation in connection with lender or otherwise using Digital Assets in its business to which you have no claim or entitlement; and
  3. In the event that Celsius becomes bankrupt, enters liquidation or is otherwise unable to repay its obligations, any Eligible Digital Assets used in the Earn Service or as collateral under the Borrow Service may not be recoverable, and you may not have any legal remedies or rights in connection with Celsius’ obligations to you other than your rights as a creditor of Celsius under any applicable laws.

Based on this language, the court held that the Terms of Use unambiguously transferred ownership of the assets in the Earn Accounts to the Debtors. Central to the court’s decision was that under the Terms of Use customers had granted the Debtors “all right and title to such Digital Assets, including ownership rights.” Based on this language, the court found that title and ownership of the cryptocurrency held in the Earn Accounts was “unequivocally transferred to the Debtors and became property of the Estate on the Petition Date.”

Finally, the court found that the Debtors had shown that they needed to generate liquidity to fund the bankruptcy cases, and that additional liquidity would be needed early this year. Accordingly, the court held that the Debtors had shown sufficient cause to permit the sale of the stablecoins outside of the ordinary course of business in accordance with section 363(b)(1).

Implications

Given the turbulent nature of the cryptocurrency market and the likelihood of further cryptocurrency bankruptcy filings, the court’s ruling is sure to have significant implications. First, unless it is reversed on appeal, the opinion means that the Debtors’ Earn program customers do not own the funds in their digital accounts and will instead be relegated to the status of unsecured creditors with a highly uncertain recovery. Second, the opinion underscores the Wild West nature of crypto and the fact that unlike deposits at a federally insured financial institution, deposits at cryptocurrency exchanges are not similarly insured and may be at risk. Third, customers or account holders in other cryptocurrency exchanges or businesses should carefully review the applicable terms of use to determine if those terms transferred ownership of their digital assets to their cryptocurrency counterparty. It is likely a fair assumption that such other terms of use transferred ownership in the same way that the Celsius Terms of Use did, in which case customers must remain vigilant of the financial health of their cryptocurrency counterparty. Finally, all parties engaging in on-line business transactions, including those outside of cryptocurrency, are on notice that clickwrap agreements commonly found in such transactions are, at least under New York law, enforceable. In short, those agreements mean something, and the fact that a party did not read the terms before agreeing to them through a “click” is likely not going to be a viable defense to the enforcement of those terms.

For more Bankruptcy Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Caremark Liability Following the SEC’s New ESG Reporting Requirements

Recent developments in the Court of Chancery concerning a corporate board’s duty to monitor and provide oversight over a corporation’s operations, so-called Caremark claims, are likely to intersect with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) proposed new ESG disclosure obligations to create a new category of corporate risk.  In this article, we discuss the recent trends in Delaware law that have led to a revitalization of Caremark and the SEC’s current proposals for enhanced ESG disclosure, the intersection of which can be expected to result in litigation and other corporate risk, and some commonsense steps corporations can take to mitigate this potential new category of risk.

The “Caremark” Doctrine

One of the more notable developments in Delaware case law in recent years has been the revitalization of “Caremark duty” claims.  Caremark actions traditionally were notoriously difficult to plead—in explaining the doctrine, the Chancery Court famously called it “the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In recent years, however, the Delaware courts have breathed new life into the Caremark doctrine by allowing these types of claims to proceed to discovery.

Specifically, the Caremark doctrine was returned to potency in 2019 following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  Although Marchand did not change the Caremark standard, it demonstrated the Delaware courts’ greater willingness to permit Caremark claims to pass the motion to dismiss phase if they could be plausibly pled.  Marchand ultimately laid the groundwork for a number of subsequent rulings demonstrating the renewed vitality of Caremark claims—not only have at least four Caremark suits survived a motion to dismiss since Marchand, but there are also several ongoing Caremark suits in Delaware.

Under Caremark, there are two distinct types of claims.  The first type concern a board’s failure to implement a system of controls to prevent some unlawful misconduct that occurred.  The second type of claims concern a failure to monitor by the directors.  It is imperative, therefore, that boards focus on:  (1) establishing adequate information and reporting systems to monitor “mission critical” aspects of their company’s business; and (2) monitoring those systems once in place.

The SEC’s Proposed New Climate-Related Disclosures

On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed new rules requiring companies to report extensive line-item disclosures on climate-related ESG issues, entitled: “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”  If implemented as written, the proposed rules would require registrants to make significant additional disclosures regarding the impact of climate-related risks on their business.

Among other things, under the proposed rules, registrants would be required to disclose:

  1. Greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, regardless as to whether those emissions are deemed material by the company.  Emissions would now be reported by “scope” or type.

  2. “Climate-related risks” that are “reasonably likely to have a material impact,” including climate-related conditions and events that impact financial statements, business operations, or value chains.

  3. Governance disclosures related to climate risk, including how the board and management assess and manage these climate-related risks.

  4. Any targets or goals related to the reduction of GHG emissions.

These proposed new rules are part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to “advance consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk.”  Yet the sheer breadth, specificity, and complexity of the proposed rules would result in one of the most profound changes to public companies’ disclosure obligations in the history of the SEC.

Additional Caremark Exposure

The SEC’s climate-related disclosure rules will likely fuel ESG-related Caremark claims.  In particular, heightened disclosure requirements will provide ammunition for derivative or class action lawsuits and may expose companies to specific indirect risks, including heightened exposure to pre-suit discovery and proxy contests.

Direct Litigation Risk

The SEC’s new reporting requirements are likely to create new grounds for investors to assert liability claims against corporations and their boards of directors and management. Shareholders can be expected to leverage the new disclosures to seek to hold companies accountable for failing to properly oversee, mitigate or eliminate climate-related risk.  The revitalized Caremark doctrine is likely to be employed to allege boards and managers failed to oversee so-called “mission-critical” aspects of their business that generate climate-related risk.

In this vein, plaintiffs may choose to use disclosures required by the SEC’s proposed rules as the basis for a breach of duty to monitor or Caremark claim through either a derivative suit, brought on behalf of the company against its directors and officers, or a class action suit, brought on behalf of a class of injured shareholders or investors.  Caremark claims will likely arise if and when a board fails to exercise proper oversight with respect to climate-related risks or to consider proper mitigating steps. This new threat will be amplified for companies that (i) have yet to fully examine how ESG issues factor into their mission-critical operations or (ii) have yet to devote resources and personnel to measuring (using consistent, comparable and reliable data) and analyzing their own ESG-related risks. Companies need to be able to ascertain and address their most pressing ESG-related risks to avoid future Caremark liability.

Indirect Risks

Indirect risks from the proposed new disclosure regime may manifest in a variety of ways..  They can result in the disclosure of embarrassing or harmful information about a company, its board, or managers, and lead to the replacement of key company executives or directors by aggrieved shareholders.  Moreover, they give rise to issues that are expensive and resource-intensive to address.  While these risks are indirect to companies, they pose a direct threat to board members and managers.

Pre-Suit Discovery.  Boards can expect new disclosure requirements to enable shareholders to gain greater access to pre-suit discovery.  Section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporate Law provides shareholders with a qualified right to inspect a company’s books and records for suspected corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement, and need only demonstrate a “credible basis” to proceed.  The new ESG reporting requirements will likely provide shareholders with even more information as ammunition to fuel Section 220 demands.  Opening a company’s books to pre-suit discovery could expose boards, management, or companies to serious reputational harm, as well as provide fodder for future lawsuits against the current board.

Proxy Contests.  New ESG-related disclosures are also likely to generate greater turmoil in the form of proxy battles at the board level.  Historically, shareholder activists have been focused on addressing short-term profit, stock price and total shareholder return.  Yet activist campaigns containing an environmental or social objective have doubled as a proportion of campaigns overall during the five years between 2016 and 2021, including a successful campaign against Exxon to place directors on its board.  The proliferation of new ESG reporting requirements is expected to further fuel these contests, particularly with respect to companies that are perceived to be lagging on ESG commitments or expectations.

Avoiding Environmental-Caremark Claims

Companies should take several steps in preparation for the increased pressure expected to arise from the need to address ESG issues.

First, companies should be aware of the obligations and risks they face with regard to ESG issues.  That means determining what ESG-related risks could detrimentally impact a “mission-critical” aspect of a company’s business.  What is determined to be “mission-critical” will necessarily vary by company.

Second, once companies are cognizant of the ESG-related risks they face, they will need to start implementing appropriate governance structures so that they are aware of, and can take steps to address, ESG risks.  Directors should establish responsible committees and internal information and reporting procedures to ensure board members have proper oversight of these efforts.  This will allow boards to demonstrate their engagement in response to potential Caremark claims, as well as to respond to any ESG risks arising in the company’s operations.

Third, with these governance structures in place, companies must focus on generating, collecting, and analyzing consistent and comparable data on the ESG-related risks they face.  These data should be actively monitored by managers and board members so they can identify and address ESG risks before they result in catastrophic situations and resulting litigation.  And, if Caremark claims ensue, boards will be able to use these governance structures and reporting regimes to demonstrate that they have satisfied their oversight obligations.

Finally, once these systems are in place, companies should take steps to prepare for the adoption of the SEC’s new climate-related disclosure requirements.  The development of governance and reporting structures will undoubtedly aid in the collection of information for these purposes.  While taking these steps, it is advisable that corporate executives and boards seek input from subject matter experts and experienced legal counsel to help design and implement robust compliance and monitoring regimes that can help to discourage or forestall future litigation in the form of Caremark or other claims related to ESG issues.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more Securities Law coverage, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Are Loans Securities?

We have been following a case that has been winding its way through New York federal courts for some time that players in the syndicated loan market have described as everything from “a potential game changer” to an “existential threat” to the syndicated loan market.

The case in question is Kirschner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which is before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In this case, the Court will consider an appeal of a 2020 decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which held that the syndicated term loan in question was not a security. Significantly, this ruling indicated that because syndicated term loans are not securities, they are therefore not subject to securities laws and regulations.

The consequence of a determination that syndicated loans are securities would be significant. It would mean, among other things, that the syndicated loan market would have to comply with various state and federal securities laws. This would significantly change the cost of these transactions as well as the means by which syndication and loan trading take place. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) filed an amicus brief in this case in May of this year, which we covered here. The LSTA argued in its brief, among other things, that beyond the increased cost, regulating syndicated loans as securities would fundamentally change other aspects of the syndicated loan market. Specifically, the LSTA pointed to the importance of a borrower’s ability to have veto rights and other control in determining which entities will hold its debt. The LSTA also noted the importance of quick access to funding on flexible terms specific to the borrower in question – something we know is at the heart of so many fund finance transactions – which would be greatly compromised within a securities regulatory regime. The LSTA brief also discusses potential negative impacts on the CLO market.

Those in favor of a change in regulation point to features such as nonbank lender participation in the market, the fact that the test to determine whether a loan is a security may be outdated, and the overall size of the syndicated loan market – at $1.4 trillion – which could be a risk to the larger global financial system potentially warranting more stringent regulation.

Most experts believe that the Second Circuit will not overturn the decision issued in the lower court, but the issue in question is significant enough that market players should keep an eye on this one. Oral arguments will take place early next year. We will continue to watch as this case develops and update you here.

Article By Leah Edelboim of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

“Red Flags in the Mind Set”: SEC Sanctions Three Broker/Dealers for Identity Theft Deficiencies

In 1975, around the time of “May Day” (1 May 1975), which brought the end of fixed commission rates and the birth of registered clearing agencies for securities trading (1976), the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) created a designated unit to deal with the growth of trading and the oversight of broker/dealers. That unit, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (the “OCIE”), evolved and grew over time. It regularly issued Risk Alerts on specific topics aimed at Broker/Dealers and/or Investment Advisers, expecting that those addressees would take appropriate steps to prevent the occurrence of the identified risk, or at least mitigate its impact on customers. On Sept. 15, 2020, the OCIE issued a Risk Alert entitled “Cybersecurity: Safeguarding Client Accounts against Credential Compromise,” which emphasized the importance of compliance with SEC Regulation S-ID, the “Identity Theft Red Flags Rule,” adopted May 20, 2013, under Sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “40 Act”). See, in that connection, the discussion of this and related SEC cyber regulations in my Nov. 19, 2020, Blog “Credential Stuffing: Cyber Intrusions into Client Accounts of Broker/Dealers and Investment Advisors.”

The SEC was required to adopt Regulation S-ID by a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amended a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”) to add both the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the federal agencies that must have “red flag” rules. That “red flag” requirement for the seven federal prudential bank regulators and the Federal Trade Commission was made part of the FCRA by a 2003 amendment. Until Wednesday, July 27, 2022, the SEC had (despite the Sept. 15, 2020, Risk Alert) brought only one enforcement action for violating the “Red Flag” Rule (in 2018 when customers of the firm involved suffered harm from the identity thefts). In 2017, however, the Commission created a new unit in its Division of Enforcement to better address the growing risks of cyber intrusion in the U.S. capital markets, the Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit (“CACU”). That unit almost doubled in size recently with the addition of 20 newly assigned persons, as reported in an SEC Press Release of May 3, 2022. There the Commission stated the Unit “will continue to tackle the omnipresent cyber-related threats in the nation’s [capital] markets.” Also, underscoring the ever-increasing role played by the SEC in overseeing the operations of broker/dealers and investment advisers, the OCIE was renamed the Division of Examinations (“Exams”) on Dec. 17, 2020, elevating an “Office” of the SEC to a “Division.”

Examinations of three broker/dealers by personnel from Exams led the CACU to investigate all three, resulting in the institution of Administrative and Cease-and Desist Proceedings against each of the respondents for violations of Regulation S-ID. In those proceedings, the Commission alleged that the Identity Theft Protection Program (“ITPP”), which each respondent was required to have, was deficient. Regulation S-ID, including its Appendix A, sets forth both the requirements for an ITPP and types of red flags the Program should consider, and in Supplement A to Appendix A, includes examples of red flags from each category of possible risks. An ITPP must be in writing and should contain the following:

  1. Reasonable policies and procedures to identify, detect and respond appropriately to relevant red flags of the types likely to arise considering the firm’s business and the scope of its brokerage and/or advisory activities; and those policies and procedures should specify the responsive steps to be taken; broad generalizations will not suffice. Those policies and procedures should also describe the firm’s practices with respect to theft identification, prevention, and response, and direct that the firm document the steps to be taken in each case.
  2.  Requirements for periodic updates of the Program, including updates reflecting the firm’s experience with both a) identity theft; and b) changes in the firm’s business. In addition, the updates should address changes in the types and mechanisms of cybersecurity risks the firm might plausibly encounter.
  3. Requirements for periodic review of the types of accounts offered and the risks associated with each type.
  4. Provisions directing at least annual reports to the firm’s board of directors, and/or senior management, addressing the program’s effectiveness, including identity theft-related incidents and management responses to them.
  5. Provisions for training of staff in identity theft and the responses required by the firm’s ITPP.
  6. Requirements for monitoring third party service providers for compliance with identity theft provisions that meet those of the firm’s program.

The ITPP of each of the three broker/dealers was, as noted, found deficient. The first, J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC (“MORGAN”), organized under Delaware law and headquartered in New York, New York, is a wholly owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (described by the Commission as “a global financial services firm” in its July 27, 2022, Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings [the “Morgan Order”]). Morgan is registered with the Commission as both a broker/dealer (since Dec. 13, 1985) and an investment adviser (since April 3, 1965). As recited in the Morgan Order, the SEC found Morgan offered and maintained customer accounts “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes that involve or are designed to permit multiple payments or transactions.” The order further notes that from Jan. 1, 2017, through Dec. 31, 2019, Morgan’s ITPP did not meet the requirements of Regulation S-ID because it “merely restated the general legal requirements” and did not specify how Morgan would identify a red flag or direct how to respond to it. The Morgan Order notes that although Morgan did take action to detect and respond to incidents of identity theft, the procedures followed were not in Morgan’s Program. Further, Morgan did not periodically update its program, even as both the types of accounts offered, and the extent of cybersecurity risks changed. The SEC also found Morgan did not adequately monitor its third-party service providers, and it failed to provide any identity theft-specific training to its staff. As a result, Morgan had violated Regulation S-ID. The order noted that Morgan “has undertaken substantial remedial acts, including auditing and revising … [its Program].” Nonetheless, Morgan was ordered to cease and desist from violating Regulation S-ID, was censured, and was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $1.2 million.

The second broker/dealer charged was UBS Financial Services Inc.(“UFS”), a Delaware corporation dually registered with the Commission as both a broker/dealer and an investment adviser since 1971. UFS, headquartered in Weehawken, New Jersey, is a subsidiary of UBS Group AG, a publicly traded major financial institution incorporated in Switzerland. In 2008, UBF adopted an ITPP (the “UBF Program”) pursuant to the 2003 amendments to the FCRA. The program applied both to UBF and to other affiliated entities and branch offices in the U.S. and Puerto Rico “which offered private and retail banking, mortgage, and private investment services that operated under UBS Group AG’s Wealth Management Americas’ line of business.” See my blog published on Aug. 22, 2022, “Only Sell What You Know: Swiss Bank Negligence is a Fraud on Clients,” for information about the origins and history of UBS Group AG.

The July 27, 2022, SEC Order instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings against UBF (the “UBF Order”) stated that UBF made no change to the UBF Program when, in 2013, it became subject to Regulation S-ID, or thereafter from Jan. 1, 2017, to Dec. 31, 2019, other than to revise the list of entities and branches it covered. The Commission found UBF failed to update the UBF Program even as the accounts it offered changed, and without considering if some accounts offered by affiliated entities and branches are not “covered accounts” within regulation S-ID. The UBF Program did not have reasonable policies and procedures to identify red flags, taking into consideration account types and attendant risks, and did not specify what responses were required. The SEC also found the program wanting for not providing for periodic updates, especially addressing changes in accounts and/or in cybersecurity risks. The annual reports to the board of directors “did not provide sufficient information” to assess the UBF Program’s effectiveness or the adequacy of UBF’s monitoring of third-party service providers; indeed, the UBF Order notes the “board minutes do not reflect any discussion of compliance with Regulation S-ID.” In addition, UBF “did not conduct any training of its staff specific” to the UBF Program, including how to detect and respond to red flags.  As a result, the Commission found UBF in violation of Regulation S-ID. Although the Commission again noted the “substantial remedial acts” undertaken by UBF, including retaining “an outside consulting firm to review its Program” and to recommend change, the SEC nonetheless ordered UBF to cease and desist from violating the Regulation, censured UBF, and ordered it to pay a civil penalty of $925,000.

The third member of this broker/dealer trio is TradeStation Securities, Inc. (“TSS”), a Florida corporation headquartered in Plantation, Florida, that, according to the July 27, 2022, SEC Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (the “TSS Order”), “provides primarily commission-free, directed online brokerage services to retail and institutional customers.” TSS has been registered with the SEC as a broker/dealer since January 1996. Their ITPP, too, was found deficient. The ITPP implemented by TSS (the “TSS Program”) essentially ignored the reality of TSS’s business as an online operation. For instance, the TSS Program cited only the red flags offered as “non-comprehensive examples in Supplement A to Appendix A” and not any “relevant to its business and the nature and scope of its brokerage activities.” Hence, the TSS Program cited the need to confirm the physical appearance of customers to make certain it was consistent with photographs or physical descriptions in the file. But an online broker/dealer would have scant opportunity to see a customer or a new customer in person, even when opening an account. Nor did TSS check the Supplement A red flag examples cited in the TSS Program when opening new customer accounts. The TSS Program directed only that “additional due diligence” should be performed if a red flag were identified, rather than directing specific responsive steps to be taken, such as not opening an account in a questionable situation. There were no requirements for periodic updates of the TSS Program. Indeed, “there were no material changes to the Program” after May 20, 2013, “despite significant changes in external cybersecurity risks related to identity theft.” At this point in the TSS Order, the Commission cited a finding in the Federal Register that “[a]dvancements in technology … have led to increasing threats to the integrity … of personal information.” The SEC found that TSS did not provide reports about the TSS Program and compliance with Regulation S-ID either to the TSS board or to a designated member of senior management, and that TSS had no adequate policies and procedures in place to monitor third-party service providers for compliance with detecting and preventing identity theft. The order is silent on the extent of TSS’s training of staff to deal with identity threats, but considering the other shortcomings, presumably such training was at best haphazard. The Commission found that TSS violated Regulation S-ID. Although the TSS Order noted (as with the other Proceedings) the “substantial remedial acts” undertaken by TSS, including retaining “an outside consulting firm” to aid compliance, the Commission nonetheless ordered TSS to cease-and-desist from violating the Regulation, censured TSS, and ordered it to pay a civil penalty of $425,000.

These three enforcement actions on the same day, especially ones involving two of the world’s leading financial institutions, signal a new level of attention by the Commission to cybersecurity risks to customers of broker/dealers and investment advisers, with a focus on the risks inherent in identity theft. As one leading law firm writing about these three actions advised, “[f]irms should review their ITPPs placing particular emphasis on identifying red flags tailored to their business and on conducting regular compliance reviews to update those red flags and related policies and procedures to reflect changes in business practices and risk.” That sound advice should be followed NOW, before the CACU comes calling.

For more Financial, Securities, and Banking Law news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

SEC Ramps Up Enforcement against Public Companies and Subsidiaries in FY 2022

The SEC imposed $2.8 billion in monetary settlements, the largest total in any fiscal year recorded in the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database.

New York—The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 68 enforcement actions against public companies and subsidiaries in the first full fiscal year of Chair Gary Gensler’s tenure. Monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary actions reached $2.8 billion, according to a report released today by the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business and Cornerstone Research.

The report, SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries—Fiscal Year 2022 Update, analyzes information from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). The 68 enforcement actions in FY 2022, which ended September 30, reflected a 28% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The SEC imposed monetary settlements on 97% of the 75 public company and subsidiary defendants that settled in FY 2022. Both the dollar amount and the percentage were the largest of any fiscal year recorded in SEED, which covers actions beginning in FY 2010.

“The number of defendants that settled in FY 2022 with admissions of guilt increased substantially from the previous fiscal year. This was driven by actions involving Broker Dealer allegations brought by the SEC in September,” said Stephen Choi, the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University School of Law and director of the Pollack Center for Law & Business. “The 16 defendants admitting guilt was double the largest number in any previous fiscal year in SEED.”

The $2.8 billion in monetary settlements imposed in public company or subsidiary enforcement actions in FY 2022 was $921 million more than in FY 2021 and $321 million more than in any other fiscal year in SEED. The median monetary settlement in FY 2022 was $9 million, the largest in SEED. The average settlement was $42 million.

“The increase in monetary settlements is consistent with the SEC’s public statements that ‘robust remedies’ are an enforcement priority,” said report coauthor Sara Gilley, a Cornerstone Research vice president. “The $1.2 billion in monetary settlements with 16 public broker-dealer subsidiaries for recordkeeping failures represents 44% of total monetary settlements in the fiscal year.”

Issuer Reporting and Disclosure continued to be the most common allegation type in FY 2022, accounting for 38% of actions. Allegations in the SEC’s Broker Dealer classification were the second most common for the first time since FY 2018. Nearly 70% of the 16 Broker Dealer actions were filed against financial institutions for recordkeeping failures.

Click here to read the full report from Cornerstone Research.

Article By Sara E. Gilley, Lindsay Schick, and Heather B. Lazur of Cornerstone Research

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

Is Crypto Collapsing?

November 11, 2022, brought news of yet another massive crypto bankruptcy filing. One of the largest crypto exchanges, FTX, filed a petition for bankruptcy protection in Delaware. FTX, Alameda, and other affiliates estimated in their filings that they have more than 100,000 creditors. With their estimated range of between $10 and $50 billion worth of assets and liabilities, this could well be the largest crypto-related bankruptcy ever filed.

This follows a slew of other big names in crypto which have filed bankruptcy petitions recently, including lender Three Arrows Capital (3AC) and the Celsius crypto exchange. Others have sought similar protections overseas, such as Zipmex’s proceeding in Singapore.

Why are these companies filing bankruptcy? The reasons vary.

  • Business models built on unsustainable growth rates in cryptocurrency prices
  • Collapse in cryptocurrency prices, leading to “runs on the bank”
  • Financial irregularities

Is your crypto safe? That depends on what it is and where you park it. Some newer tokens and wallet software may not have been extensively tested, and so may have weak points that an attacker might exploit. Even “safe” currencies like Bitcoin can be hacked if stored in a hot wallet. Of particular interest, customers of a bankruptcy exchange may find it difficult to recover their crypto deposits because their investments may be treated as mere unsecured claims against the exchange, drastically reducing the odds of recovery.

Filings by crypto-based entities come with a host of thorny issues. The most obvious is whether a crypto exchange’s bankruptcy estate owns the tokens it holds for others. But there are many others, including privacy concerns with respect to what previously were anonymous transactions and questions about the propriety of large financial withdrawals by high-ranking individuals in the days surrounding the filing of bankruptcy petitions.

For More FinTech Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Federal Reserve Issues Latest Financial Stability Report

At the end of last week, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) issued its semi-annual Financial Stability Report.

In a statement issued with the report, FRB Vice Chair Lael Brainard stated that over the past six months, “household and business indebtedness has remained generally stable, and on aggregate households and businesses have maintained the ability to cover debt servicing, despite rising interest rates.” She also noted that “[t]oday’s environment of rapid synchronous global monetary policy tightening, elevated inflation, and high uncertainty associated with the pandemic and the war raises the risk that a shock could lead to the amplification of vulnerabilities, for instance due to strained liquidity in core financial markets or hidden leverage.”

The Report notes that the FRB’s monitoring framework “distinguishes between shocks to, and vulnerabilities of, the financial system,” and “focuses primarily on assessing vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on four broad categories and how those categories might interact to amplify stress in the financial system.” The four categories of vulnerabilities are (1) valuation pressures, (2) borrowing by businesses and households, (3) leverage within the financial sector, and (4) funding risks. The overview of the Report notes that since the May report was released, “the economic outlook has weakened and uncertainty about the outlook has remained elevated, noting that “[i]nflation remains unacceptably high in the United States and is also elevated in many other countries.”

Related to the funding risk vulnerability (and perhaps showing some prescience to our lead story on FTX this week), the Report noted that stable coins remained vulnerable to runs. The Report included a highlighted discussion of digital assets and financial stability noting trouble and volatility in the crypto market in the spring of this year. That discussion noted that the “[t]he turmoil in the digital asset ecosystem did not have notable effects on the traditional financial system because the digital assets ecosystem does not provide significant financial services and its interconnections with the broader financial system are limited.” However, the report noted that as digital assets grow, so too will the risks to financial stability, and cited the October FSOC Report on Digital Asset Financial Stability Risks and Regulation in addressing those risks and regulatory gaps.

The Report identified several near-term risks that “could be amplified” through the four financial vulnerabilities, including high inflation, geopolitical risks (noting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), market fragilities, and possible shocks caused by a cyber event.

Article By Daniel Meade of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more finance and financial institutions legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP