U.S., Mexican, and Canadian Officials Conclude First Round of NAFTA Modernization Talks

On August 20, trade officials from the United States, Mexico, and Canada concluded the first round of negotiations to modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In a joint statement released following five days of talks, trade officials reiterated their commitment to updating the deal, continuing domestic consultations, and working on draft text. They also pledged their commitment to a comprehensive and accelerated negotiation process to set 21st Century standards and to benefit the citizens of North America.

Their agenda covered a wide range of existing and new NAFTA chapters, including: updating the Rules of Origin, adding and amending trade remedies provisions, addressing transparency, combatting corruption, increasing intellectual property protections, and addressing issues facing financial services and investment. The U.S. reportedly tabled roughly 10 proposals updating existing chapters or proposing new ones. Officials expect the modernized NAFTA deal will include a total of 30 chapters (the current agreement is comprised of 22 chapters and seven annexes).

The NAFTA negotiating teams are being led by Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for the Western Hemisphere John Melle, veteran Canadian trade expert Steve Verheul, and Director of the Embassy of Mexico’s Trade and NAFTA Office Kenneth Smith Ramos. In addition to negotiators, a number of Canadian and Mexican stakeholders – including eight members of the Mexican Senate and 150 representatives of Mexico’s private sector – were present on the margins of the talks. However, U.S. negotiators have acknowledged that their accelerated schedule leaves little time for formal business stakeholders to be included in events like those organized during the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks.

Negotiators are expected to head to Mexico City for the second round of talks from September 1 to 5, and to Canada for their third round in late September (reportedly September 23-27). Negotiators will continue at this rapid pace, moving back to United States in October and planning additional rounds through the end of the year. The NAFTA parties hope to finish talks by the end of 2017 or early 2018, ahead of Mexico’s July 2018 presidential elections.

This post was written by Mayte Gutierrez and Ludmilla L. Savelieff of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP © Copyright 2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

President Trump Announces Withdrawal from Paris Agreement on Climate Change

President Trump announced on Thursday his intention to initiate a formal withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, a global agreement designed to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. The President indicated that the United States would move forward with the pull-out and possibly attempt to re-negotiate the agreement in order to get “terms that are fair to the United States.”  President Trump frequently discussed pulling out of the Paris Agreement while on the campaign trail, citing concerns regarding its potential impact on the American economy, particularly the energy sector.

While the President’s intentions are clear, the path forward is less obvious. The U.S. cannot immediately exit the Paris Agreement and several nations, including Germany, France, and Italy, announced in a joint statement that “that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated.”  In addition to announcing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, President Trump also indicated that the U.S. would immediately halt the remaining $2 billion of the $3 billion in aid to developing countries pledged by President Obama as a part of the Green Climate Fund, which also is a component of the UNFCCC.

The Paris Agreement’s formal processes does not allow for a notice of withdrawal to be submitted until November 4, 2019, after which it will take one year for such notice to become effective. Assuming adherence to this process, the earliest the U.S. can formally withdraw from the Paris Agreement is November 5, 2020, one day after the next presidential election.  Because the Agreement’s only binding obligations are certain reporting requirements, the withdrawal is viewed by some as a symbolic gesture, since any federal GHG reduction measures resulting from the Paris Agreement would still need to be pursued through domestic legislation or regulatory action.  As a practical matter, irrespective of the Paris Agreement the administration can—and likely will—take steps to alter federal climate change policy.

Paris Agreement Background

The Paris Agreement builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty signed by President George H. W. Bush and ratified by the United States Senate in 1992. The Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015 as part of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC.  Following its initial adoption, President Obama ratified the Paris Agreement as an “executive agreement” on September 3, 2016.  The Paris Agreement was ultimately signed by 195 parties, ratified by 146 nations and the European Union, and entered into force on November 4, 2016.

The Paris Agreement directs signatory nations to develop voluntary GHG reduction measures, known as “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions,” which convert to “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) after a nation ratifies the Paris Agreement.  The Paris Agreement further provides for periodic updates to NDCs in order to continually “enhance” emission reductions targets.  The Paris Agreement’s only binding provisions are reporting obligations largely governed by the UNFCCC and “global stocktakes” that occur every five years.  These reporting measures were designed to help track total carbon emissions and progress towards meeting each NDC.  However, actual attainment of an NDC is voluntary and the Paris Agreement has no legally binding enforcement mechanism. The Paris Agreement also directs wealthier nations to help developing nations reduce GHG emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change, but again these actions would be taken on a voluntary basis.

What happens next?

The UNFCCC made a formal statement in response to President Trump’s announcement that it “regrets” the decision of the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that it remains open to discussion of the rules and modalities currently being negotiated for implementation of the Paris Agreement.  At the same time, the UNFCCC stated that the Paris Agreement has been “signed by 195 Parties and ratified by 146 countries plus the European Union [and] cannot be renegotiated based on the request of a single Party.”  Based on this statement and similar statements from France, Germany, Italy, and other nations, it appears that any near-term renegotiation of the Paris Agreement is unlikely.

Regardless of whether the United States is a party to the Paris Agreement, multinational corporations will still be subject to GHG reduction programs in other nations as those nations attempt to fulfill their NDCs. In addition, France and other nations have indicated the possibility of imposing a carbon tax on American imports from certain industries if the United States does formally withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

Under the Paris Agreement, the United States established its NDC as a goal of reducing GHG emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels, by 2025, and to make “best efforts” to reduce emissions by 28 percent. It is important to note that the U.S. is in the first sustained period where greenhouse gas emissions have decreased while economic growth has increased, largely the result of increased reliance on natural gas, improved vehicle fuel economy, state and regional GHG programs, and growth in renewable energy.  These factors are likely to persist even if the U.S. leaves the Paris Agreement.  And even in the absence of U.S. commitments under the Paris Agreement or additional federal action, U.S. GHG emissions are expected to decline by about 15-18 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.

The federal Clean Power Plan was one measure that was expected to further reduce U.S. GHG emissions. However, that program is subject to ongoing legal challenges and has been stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  There also are various lawsuits underway seeking to compel the federal government to take action on climate change. See e.g., Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2016).   Apart from litigation, the Trump Administration has indicated a willingness to modify the Clean Power Plan (should it be upheld) and reconsider other federal regulations and programs directed at GHG emissions and climate change, such as motor vehicle emissions standards.  These processes will take time to play out and, in combination with ongoing state-level programs, will ultimately determine the course of climate change policy in the United States for the remainder of the Trump Administration.

This post was written by Brook J. Detterman, Leah A. Dundon and Kristin H. Gladd of Beveridge & Diamond PC.

Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Intent to Renegotiate NAFTA

The White House formally notified Congress on Thursday of the Trump administration’s intent to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The notification letter from U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer marked the start of a 90-day window to consult with members of Congress on developing negotiation priorities before beginning formal negotiations with Canada and Mexico as early as August 16, 2017.NAFTA, USA, Mexico, Canada

Currently, there is no indication that renegotiations will impact NAFTA-related immigration programs. However, under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, the administration’s negotiation objectives are required to be made public 30 days before formal negotiations begin. While the letter to Congressional leadership did not discuss any specific changes to NAFTA, the administration indicated that it would aim to modernize outdated chapters of the agreement and address challenges faced by U.S. consumers, businesses, and workers.

NAFTA Immigration Programs

Among other economic and trade relationships established under NAFTA, the agreement created the TN nonimmigrant classification, which allows certain citizens of Canada and Mexico to work temporarily in the United States in a professional capacity. The agreement also provides an expanded range of permissible business activities for Canadian and Mexican citizens in B-1 visitor status and permits Canadian citizens to submit L-1 intracompany transferee petitions directly at U.S. ports of entry and pre-flight inspection stations for adjudication by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Whether the Trump administration intends to alter existing immigration programs under NAFTA is not yet known.

This post was written by Kara Kelly of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

Continued International and Domestic Coordinated Focus on Money Laundering

On February 1st, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) announced an unspecified number of arrests of Hizballah money launderers, including Mohamad Noureddine. stack of moneyThese arrests followed the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designation of Noureddine pursuant to its counterterrorism authority. The OFAC press release for this designation identifies Noureddine as a key Hizballah money launderer. According to OFAC,  Noureddine and his company Trade Point International S.A.R.L. established a money laundering network across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East that provides bulk cash shipping and black market currency exchange services for those seeking to hide their ill-gotten gains.

Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015

Irrespective of the detention of Noureddine, foreign financial intuitions that knowingly facilitate or conduct significant financial transactions for Trade Point International S.A.R.L. may have their U.S. correspondent or payable through accounts severed. OFAC has this authority under Section 102 of the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, which authorizes secondary sanctions on Hizballah.

Lebanese Canadian Bank

The arrests stem from  interagency  investigations of the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB). U.S.  law enforcement agencies have a long history with this now defunct Hizballah-linked bank.  In February 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to exclude  LCB from the U.S. financial system, finding that the bank is of “primary money laundering concern.”  In response to this action, the Banque du Liban revoked LCB’s banking license in September 2011. The bank’s remaining assets and liabilities were then sold to Societé General. Two years later, LCB entered into a $102 million settlement agreement to resolve a civil forfeiture and money laundering lawsuit filed by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  FinCEN withdrew  its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in September 2015, on the basis that LCB no longer exists.

Coordinated Effort to Combat Money Laundering

The success of the ongoing money laundering investigation and recent arrests were possible because of the cooperation and coordination among the following international and domestic agencies:

  • DEA Philadelphia, DEA Miami, DEA Newark, DEA New York

  • DEA Special Operations Division and DEA Bilateral Investigative Unit

  • DEA country offices in Europe

  • DEA country offices in Bogota and Cartagena, Colombia

  • S. Customs and Border Protection National Targeting Center

  • S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

  • S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

  • Various French, German, Italian and Belgian law enforcement agencies

  • EUROPOL

  • EUROJUST

Like the LCB investigation before it, yesterday’s arrests will likely lead to additional U.S. and international actions against money launderers around the world.

ARTICLE BY Jeremy P. Paner of Holland & Hart LLP

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations Face Tighter Timeline as Talks Continue

Trade ministers announced that they will continue negotiations over several unresolved provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during a four-day meeting in Maui, Hawaii that concluded July 31. Trade ministers representing the 12 Pacific Rim countries included in the free trade deal remain optimistic about negotiations and said in a joint statement that they are “more confident than ever that TPP is within reach.”

trade partnership, negotiations, trading deal, stakeholders, intellectual property

One of the major sticking points reportedly centers around intellectual property protections for biologics. The U.S. reportedly attempted to secure 12 years’ data protection for pharmaceutical companies, while Australia is insisting on five years. Observers suggest the agreement will fall somewhere between five and seven years’ data protection. U.S. stakeholders concerned with a deal that only includes five years of data protection could threaten to round up enough opposition in Congress to stymie the deal.

Other points of contention arose over agricultural issues and the auto industry. The U.S. is pushing for greater access to Canada’s dairy market, but Canada is concerned that could cause instability in its prices. Australia is seeking increased access to the U.S. sugar market, while the U.S. is trying to limit large increases in sugar imports. Meanwhile, the U.S., Canada, Mexico and Japan are hashing out “rule of origin” and other auto industry issues.

Once all 12 trade ministers agree to a deal, Congress will have 90 days to review and approve it. If talks continue beyond August, pushing the review period deep into the fall or winter, the deal is likely to become front and center in the U.S. presidential campaign. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton would face intense pressure from labor unions to disavow the deal, along with the 28 House Democrats who supported legislation to fast-track passage of the agreement. It could also become a problem for Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who is up for re-election in October.

The TPP will govern foreign exports, imports, and investment implicating several major sectors of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, intellectual property, textiles and apparel, telecommunications, agriculture and others. It will also cover labor, employment, and environmental issues. The TPP will initially cover 12 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Collectively these countries represent 40 percent of the global economy.

© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

BIS Removes Cuba as State Sponsor of Terrorism in Regulations

On July 22, 2015, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), an agency of U.S. Department of Commerce, amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to reflect Cuba’s removal from designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary of State rescinded Cuba’s designation on May 29, 2015.

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As part of Cuba’s removal from designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, BIS amended the EAR to remove references in the text associating Cuba with terrorism. It also removes anti-terrorism (AT) license requirements from Cuba. Finally, BIS amended the EAR to remove Cuba from Country Group E:1, although Cuba remains on the Country Group E:2 list.

These amendments to the EAR affect certain license requirements and exceptions that apply to exports to Cuba. Specifically, the EAR apply to items that contain more than a de minimis amount of U.S.-origin content. For exports to most countries, that de minimis amount is 25 percent, but for exports to countries on the Country Group E:1 list, that de minimis amount is 10 percent. Exports of most items to Cuba are now also subject to the 25 percent de minimis rule. Yet, foreign-made items destined for Cuba that incorporate certain U.S.-origin 600 series content continue to be subject to the EAR regardless of level of U.S.-origin content.

Additionally, Cuba’s removal from the Country Group E:1 list makes exports to the country eligible for four new license exceptions including:

  • License Exception Servicing and Replacement of Parts and Equipment (RPL);
  • License Exception Governments, International Organizations, International Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Space Station (GOV);
  • License Exception Baggage (BAG); and
  • License Exception Aircraft, Vessels and Spacecraft (AVS).

Despite these changes, it is important to remember that Cuba is still subject to a comprehensive embargo. Licenses are still required to export or reexport to Cuba any item subject to the EAR unless authorized by a license exception. Those who would like to export items authorized by license exceptions may only use license exceptions listed in 15 CFR 746.2(a).

©2015 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

The European Court of Justice Overturns, Unfreezes EU Iran Sanctions

Sheppard Mullin 2012

In a series of recent rulings, the European Court of Justice overturned economic sanctions issued by the Council of the European Union (EU) on several Iranian banks and shipping lines.  On September 6 and 16, 2013, the Court halted sanctions on Persia International Bank plc, Bank Refah Kargaran, Export Development Bank of Iran, Post Bank Iran, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Co., Iran Insurance Company, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Khazar Shipping Lines, and Good Luck Shipping.  The EU had sanctioned these entities for their support of nuclear proliferation activities in Iran, but the Court determined that the EU lacked sufficient evidence to introduce such sanctions.  The cases are notable for their effect on global sanctions against Iran, although it seems unlikely that U.S. sanctions against Iran would be lifted on similar grounds.

While a full review of the developments in each case would be beyond the scope of this blog article, a few representative matters bear closer scrutiny.  In the case against IRISL, the Court noted that the imposition of sanctions was only permitted where a party had allegedly supported nuclear proliferation.  The Court indicated that sanctions could not be imposed simply based on a risk that  IRISL might provide support for nuclear proliferation in the future.  In particular, the Court determined that, while the EU established that IRISL had been involved in exports of arms from Iran, that activity was not alone sufficient to support the imposition of nuclear sanctions.  As a result, the Court struck down the sanctions against IRISL.

Similarly, in considering sanctions against Iran Insurance Company, the Court noted that the EU had sanctioned the company for insuring the purchase of helicopter spare parts, electronics, and computers with applications in aircraft and missile navigation, which the EU alleged could be used in violation of nuclear proliferation sanctions.  The Court ruled that the EU had relied on “mere unsubstantiated allegations” regarding the provision of insurance services, and annulled the sanctions.

We think these two matters are noteworthy for the types of evidence used to link the activities of the entities to nuclear proliferation.  When viewed in the light of a formal court proceeding, it seems somewhat remarkable that the EU sought to tie the insuring of items including helicopter spare parts to nuclear proliferation at all.  But, as we have discussed previously in this blog, [see May 2013 sanctions article]  economic sanctions against Iran have been broadly construed and applied by the United States and the EU to target industries integral to the functioning of the Iranian economy.  Insofar as a functioning Iranian economy also supports the nuclear development efforts of its government, it may make political sense for the EU and the United States to impose leverage through sanctions.  As a legal matter, however, the European Court of Justice rulings suggest that Court will be loathe to tie restrictions on general economic activity to a statute focused on the specific activity of nuclear proliferation.

In other words, the European Court of Justice seems unlikely to defer to the EU, even where European security is at stake.  This stands in relatively stark contrast to U.S. courts, which have generally shown deference to government activity on issues of national security.[1]

For the time being, U.S. sanctions on Iran and key entities within the Iranian banking and shipping sectors remain in place, with far reaching consequences that will continue to deter Western business from even considering business in Iran.  And ultimately, any warming in diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran will likely be more momentous than judicially vacated sanctions.  But at a minimum, the European Court of Justice has signaled that EU sanctions are subject to standards of proof that cannot be broadly construed to incorporate all types of economic activity.


[1] At least one U.S. court has overturned criminal sanctions charges on individuals by reading regulatory provisions in the accused’s favor due to issues of vagueness in the sanctions regulations. [see Clarity Required: US V. Banki]

Politics and Consequences: An Update on U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

Sheppard Mullin 2012

Since Hassan Rouhani’s election to the Iranian presidency, some U.S. leaders have expressed interest in diplomatic talks with Iran.  It is currently unclear whether any such talks will ever occur, or on what terms.  In the face of ongoing uncertainty, the U.S. sanctions program against Iran has continued to develop in a piecemeal sometimes inconsistent fashion.

More Restrictive Sanctions: Executive Order 13645

On June 3, 2013, President Obama’s Executive Order 13645 authorized sanctions against foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions in the Iranian Rial or that provide support to Iranian persons on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.  Under the Executive Order, the Secretary of Treasury may prohibit those financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent or payable through account and may block the institutions’ property in the United States.

Less Restrictive Provisions

Notwithstanding the restrictions in EO 13645, there remains some room for engaging in business with Iran in some sectors.

The Executive Order itself is restricted to certain types of transactions.  A foreign financial institution engaged in transactions involving petroleum products from Iran may be subject to restrictions on its accounts in the United States only if the President of the United States determines there is a sufficient supply of such products from countries other than Iran.  The same sanctions apply to a natural gas transaction only if the transaction is solely for trade between Iran and the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution, and any funds owed to Iran as a result of the trade are credited to an account located in the latter country.

The prohibition against significant foreign financial transactions for SDNs does not apply to transactions for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran, or to transactions involving a natural gas project described in section 603(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.

On July 25, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) followed in the wake of the Executive Order, issuing a General License for the exportation or reexportation of medicine and basic medical supplies to Iran.  OFAC delineated the scope and limitations of the authorization via a list of frequently asked questions and new guidance, and updated section 560.530(a)(3)(i) of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations to reflect the change.

Under the new regulations, the sale of food, medicine, and medical devices by U.S. persons or from the United States to Iran, and the sale of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran by non-U.S. persons are not subject to U.S. sanctions.  The financing or facilitation of such sales by non-U.S. persons do not trigger sanctions either, so long as the transaction does not involve certain specifically proscribed conduct or designated persons (such as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or a designated Iranian bank).  Iranian oil revenues held in Central Bank of Iran or non-designated Iranian bank accounts at foreign banks, for example, may be used to finance exports of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Iran from the country in which the account is held or from any other foreign country.

Separately, On September 10, OFAC issued two new general licenses. General License E authorizes nongovernmental organizations to export or reexport services to or related to Iran in support of specific not-for-profit activities designed to directly benefit the Iranian people.  The enumerated activities include those aimed at basic human needs, post-disaster reconstruction, environmental and wildlife conservation, human rights, and democracy.

General License F permits the importation into the United States, exportation from the United States, or other dealing in Iranian-origin services related to professional and amateur sporting activities and exchanges involving the United States and Iran.  The authorized activities include those related to matches and events, sponsorship of players, coaching, refereeing, and training.

Conclusion

The recent Executive Order and General Licenses highlight a fundamental fact about U.S. sanctions programs: because they are subject to unilateral executive control, changes can be sweeping and abrupt.  It remains to be seen whether the United States will engage in increased diplomacy with Iran.  But what is clear is that shifting geopolitical realities are sure to alter the future course of the Iran sanctions program and to carry real consequences for U.S. and foreign businesses.

US Taxpayers with Canadian Registered Retirement Savings Accounts (RRSPs)? File now to avoid penalties!

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This blog post focuses on the rules around US citizens or tax residents who have Canadian Registered Retirement Savings Accounts (RRSPs). RRSPs are a government sanctioned savings program in which contributions are deducted from taxable income, and any investment growth is deferred from taxation until the owner of the account makes withdrawals. This is a fantastic program for Canadian residents, as it provides significant tax savings in the short term, while allowing pre-tax retirement accounts to grow for use in a later year when income (and thus marginal tax rates) are expected to be lower.

However, there is a complication for US citizens resident in Canada, who are subject to both Canadian and US tax rules. Many assume that because the growth in an RRSP account is sheltered from tax in Canada, it need not be reported and taxed in a US tax return either. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the default treatment of RRSP accounts under US tax law is no different than a non-registered investment account – interest, dividends or gains on invested funds are reportable in the Form 1040 tax return, with no deduction for contributions in a given year.

However, there is relief available under Article XVIII(7) of the Canada-US Tax Treaty. Since 2002, US income tax residents have been able to make an election to defer US tax on the growth within an RRSP. The election is made by filing Form 8891 with a timely filed income tax return. Of course, the IRS will not permit a deduction for RRSP contributions; even so, Canada’s generally higher income tax rates usually mean that no US income tax is payable on the difference in taxable income, after foreign tax credits are applied. And, it is important to recall that RRSP accounts must be disclosed on FBAR returns annually.

This Treaty election is certainly helpful, but what should be done for those just hearing about their US tax obligations? The difficulty is that Form 8891 must be filed with a Form 1040 income tax return, so coming into compliance after the fact will not necessarily be effective. However, a trio of recent Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) from the IRS does provide some comfort regarding the IRS’ view on this issue.

As background, PLRs are written memoranda released by the IRS in response to specific enquiries by taxpayers regarding their tax situations (all personal information is redacted prior to public release on the IRS website). While these rulings are completely fact-specific, and cannot be used as legal precedents in any future cases, the IRS reasoning and interpretation of the rules can be instructive.

On September 12, 2013, three PLRs were released in which the IRS granted an extension to taxpayers in order to file appropriate Form 8891 Treaty Elections without penalty or interest accruing. In each case, the taxpayer was seeking discretionary relief from the IRS to permit late filings of Form 8891 in respect of their RRSP accounts in Canada. In each case, the extension was granted.

While each case was ostensibly decided on its own facts, a few common elements from all three cases are worth noting. First, in each case the taxpayer was otherwise tax compliant. This may be a relevant factor in terms of how the IRS would view late-filed Form 8891 – if the tax returns were timely filed at first instance, amended returns attaching the Treaty election form may be less likely to attract attention.

More significantly, however, in each case the IRS made a point of noting that the taxpayers promptly took action upon learning about the need to file Form 8891. The taxpayers did not wait until the IRS sent letters or notices of deficiency regarding the RRSP income.

The regulation that permits the IRS to grant extensions (i.e. Treasury Regulation § 301.9100-3(a)) requires that the taxpayer must satisfy the Commissioner that she acted reasonably and in good faith, and that the grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the US government.

This factor should serve as fair warning to anyone in this position who is still trying to decide how to deal with their US tax compliance issues. While it may be the simplest and cheapest option, leaving your head in the sand is unlikely to earn any sympathy from the IRS if and when your delinquency does come to their attention. Instead, acknowledging an honest mistake and taking action to come into compliance will help to build a set of facts that will permit the IRS to grant some leniency toward your situation.

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It’s Time to Register for the 2015 Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery!

MintzLogo2010_Black

On October 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of State will begin accepting requests to register for the 2015 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV-2015), also known as the Green Card Lottery. The Diversity Lottery Program provides a path for foreign nationals to become permanent residents of the United States regardless of whether they have a family member or an employer willing to sponsor them. This program is a success, facilitating the immigration of people from across the globe. If you meet the eligibility requirements and wish to secure permanent residence status in the United States, you should consider registration in the lottery.

Registration begins October 1, 2013

The State Department will open online registration for the DV 2015 Program on Tuesday, October 1, 2013 at 12:00 noon, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (GMT-4), and conclude on Saturday, November 2, 2013 at 12:00 noon, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (GMT-4). Individuals who meet the eligibility requirements and submit an application during the appointed time will be entered into a lottery from which 55‚000 green card entries will be selected. Applications must be submitted electronically by 12:00 noon EST on Saturday‚ November 2‚ 2013. Detailed instructions are athttp://travel.state.gov/pdf/DV_2015_Instructions.pdf. There is no fee to register for consideration in the lottery. Entries may not be submitted through the U.S. Postal Service.

Am I eligible for a green card if I am selected in the lottery?

Selection in the lottery does not guarantee the applicant a green card; applicants must still meet all standards for admissibility and be able to process their green cards within the allotted time. Immediate family members of successful lottery applicants are eligible for green cards as well, provided they meet the same admissibility standards. Individuals who are selected and eligible for one of the 55,000 visa numbers may either secure an immigrant visa at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate or, if they are in the United States and qualified to do so, adjust their status by filing an application and supporting documentation with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

What countries are eligible?

Lottery visas are apportioned to foreign nationals hailing from the following six geographic regions: Africa; Asia; Europe; North America; Oceania; and South America‚ Central America, and the Caribbean. To qualify‚ a foreign national must claim nativity or country of birth in an eligible country and meet certain education or work experience requirements. The purpose of the program is to diversify and encourage immigration from countries that send lower numbers of immigrants to the United States.

Not all countries in the six eligible regions fall within the Green Card Lottery program. Because each of the following countries has sent more than 50‚000 immigrants to the United States in the past five years, natives of these countries will not be eligible for the DV 2015 Lottery: Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and Vietnam.

For the coming year, Nigeria was added to this list of countries ineligible for the lottery.

How do I know if I was selected in the lottery?

Official notifications of selection will be made through Entrant Status Check, available starting May 1, 2014, through at least June 30, 2015, on the E-DV website: www.dvlottery.state.gov. Please note that the Department of State does not send selectee notifications or letters by regular postal mail or by e-mail. Any e-mail notification or mailed letter stating that you have been selected to receive a DV does not come from the Department of State and is not legitimate. Any e-mail communication you receive from the Department of State will direct you to review Entrant Status Check for new information about your application.

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