Category: Health Care Law

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees with HHS Payment Methodology for Disproportionate Share Hospitals

The fight about how Medicare compensates disproportionate share hospitals (“DSH”) is one of the longest-running reimbursement disputes of recent years, and it has generated copious work for judges around the country.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court settled one piece of the conflict:  the counting of “Medicare-entitled” patients in the Medicare fraction of the “disproportionate-patient percentage.”  Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 597 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op.).  The Supreme Court concluded that the proper calculation, under the statute, counts “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits[,]’ . . . regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments” for certain services.  Id. (slip op., at 18) (emphasis added).

DSH payments are made to hospitals with a large low-income patient mix.  “The mark-up reflects that low-income individuals are often more expensive to treat than higher income ones, even for the same medical conditions.”  Id. (slip op., at 3).  The federal government thus gives hospitals a financial boost for treating a “disproportionate share” of the indigent population.

The DHS payment depends on a hospital’s “disproportionate-patient percentage,” which is basically the sum of two fractions: the Medicare fraction, which reflects what portion of the Medicare patients were low-income; and the Medicaid fraction, which reflects what portion of the non-Medicare patients were on Medicaid.  Historically, HHS calculated the Medicare fraction by including only patients actually receiving certain Medicare benefits for their care.  In 2004, however, HHS changed course and issued a new rule.  It counted, in the Medicare fraction, all patients who were eligible for Medicare benefits generally (essentially, over 65 or disabled), even if particular benefits were not actually being paid.  For most providers, that change resulted in a pay cut.

The new rule sparked several lawsuits.  Hospitals challenged HHS’s policy based on the authorizing statutory language.  These hospitals essentially argued in favor of the old methodology.  Appeals led to a circuit split, with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits agreeing with HHS, and the Ninth Circuit ruling that HHS had misread the statute.

The Supreme Court has now resolved the issue.  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, sided with HHS.  The majority concluded that, based on the statutory language, “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits’ are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.”  Id. (slip op., at 18).  The majority also explained that if “entitlement to benefits” bore the meaning suggested by the hospital, “Medicare beneficiaries would lose important rights and protections . . . [and a] patient could lose his ability to enroll in other Medicare programs whenever he lacked a right to [certain] payments for hospital care.”  Id. (slip op., at 11).

Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Alito.  The dissent argued that those lacking certain Medicare coverage should be excluded from HHS’s formula, based on “the most fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: Read the statute.”  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).  According to the dissent, the majority’s ruling will also restrict hospitals’ ability to provide care to underprivileged communities.  “HHS’s misreading of the statute has significant real-world effects: It financially harms hospitals that serve low-income patients, thereby hamstringing those hospitals’ ability to provide needed care to low-income communities.”  Id. (slip op., at 4).

There was one point of agreement among the majority and dissenting justices: the complexity of the statutory language for DSH payments.  Echoing the thoughts often held by healthcare advisors, Justice Kagan found the statutory formula to be “a mouthful” and “a lot to digest.”  Id. (majority opinion) (slip op., at 4).  And in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh called the statute “mind-numbingly complex,” and resorted to an interpretation that he found “straightforward and commonsensical”: that patients cannot be “simultaneously entitled and disentitled” to Medicare benefits.  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 3).

Article By Jeffrey DeBeer and Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more Supreme Court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Vedder Price

Update: In Opioid Liability Ruling for Doctors, SCOTUS Deals Blow to DOJ

On June 27, 2022, the United States Supreme Court ruled that doctors who act in subjective good faith in prescribing controlled substances to their patients cannot be convicted under the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).  The Court’s decision will have broad implications for physicians and patients alike.  Practitioners who sincerely and honestly believe – even if mistakenly – that their prescriptions are within the usual course of professional practice will be shielded from criminal liability.

The ruling stemmed from the convictions of Dr. Xiulu Ruan and Dr. Shakeel Kahn for unlawfully prescribing opioid painkillers.  At their trials, the district courts rejected any consideration of good faith and instructed the members of the jury that the doctors could be convicted if they prescribed opioids outside the recognized standards of medical practice. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits affirmed the instructions.  Drs. Ruan and Kahn were sentenced to 21 and 25 years in prison, respectively.

The Court vacated the decisions of the courts of appeals and sent the cases back for further review.

The question before the court concerned the state of mind that the Government must prove to convict a doctor of violating the CSA.  Justice Breyer framed the issue: “To prove that a doctor’s dispensation of drugs via prescription falls within the statute’s prohibition and outside the authorization exception, is it sufficient for the Government to prove that a prescription was in fact not authorized, or must the Government prove that the doctor knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized?”

The doctors urged the Court to adopt a subjective good-faith standard that would protect practitioners from criminal prosecution if they sincerely and honestly believed their prescriptions were within the usual course of professional practice.  The Government argued for an objective, good-faith standard based on the hypothetical “reasonable” doctor.  The Court took it one step further.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.  He said that for purposes of a criminal conviction under the CSA, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.”  To hold otherwise “would turn a defendant’s criminal liability on the mental state of a hypothetical ‘reasonable’ doctor” and “reduce culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence,” he explained.  The Court has “long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes,” wrote Justice Breyer.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined and Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined in part.  Although Justice Alito would vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings, he would hold that the “except as authorized” clause of the CSA creates an affirmative defense that defendant doctors must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Court’s decision will protect patient access to prescriptions written in good faith.  However, for the government, the Court’s decision means prosecutors face an uphill battle in charging, much less convicting, physicians under the CSA.  Indeed, the Court’s decision may have a chilling effect on the recent surge in DOJ prosecutions of medical practitioners and pain clinics.

Article By Lindsay K. Gerdes and Madeline R. Pinto of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

Preparing Corporate Messaging in the Wake of Dobbs

The United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, has held that there is no constitutional right to abortion, overruling Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood.

Employers, who increasingly are finding themselves on the front lines of many societal issues, will need to decide quickly whether and how they might address the Dobbs decision, as public reaction has been and is likely to remain strong. Board members, employees, and shareholders may advocate for corporations to take a visible stand on the issue of abortion and reproductive rights. And employees may want to speak up themselves (possibly via employer social media accounts).

It is important to remember that company communication decisions and actions regarding the Dobbs ruling, as well as other political and social issues, can have practical and legal implications.

The first question is whether your company will comment on Dobbs. If you decide to comment, there are many factors to consider. Your message is an important starting point. Who is your intended audience? Will your employees consider it an opportunity to join in the conversation? What will you say? Even if your message is internal, keep in mind that it may not stay that way, given the nature of social media. And before you think, “I’ll just stay out of it,” remember that some will view silence or neutrality as a statement in and of itself. If you choose not to speak, are you prepared to deal with any potential reaction from customers, employees, or shareholders?

Internally, employees may have questions about health benefits or other terms and conditions of employment because of Dobbs. It will be important to arm all key stakeholders, including leadership, corporate communications, and human resources, with tools to consistently manage these communications and responses.

Whether it’s internal or external communications, expect feedback! How that feedback is handled is as important as the initial communication (or lack thereof).

Certain industries, like healthcare and insurance, may also feel compelled to make an affirmative statement if the Dobbs decision has a direct impact on services and/or products. In those cases, the need to consider all implications is even more pressing.

In thinking through these decisions, employers should also consider who may need to approve any messaging. The board of directors, senior executives, legal, and marketing and communications teams are among the key stakeholders who may need to be consulted. And don’t forget that your public-facing employees may bear the brunt of your response. Are they prepared?

Employers should also keep in mind various laws that may govern their reaction, including those they might otherwise not consider. For example, the National Labor Relations Act protects employees’ rights to collectively discuss terms and conditions of employment at work and off duty – and that applies to employers with and without a unionized workforce. The current Biden-appointed General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has taken an expanded view of topics that are connected to the workplace. Moreover, some states, including California and New York, have enacted off-duty conduct laws that prohibit employers from disciplining employees for lawful conduct outside of work, which may include political advocacy. There may also be anti-discrimination laws and potential civil and criminal liability associated with your statements, depending on their wording.

Reactions to the Dobbs decision may vary. Some reaction may be comparable to what we’ve seen with respect to other recent political and/or social justice movements, such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo; others may react differently, or not at all. In these rapidly changing times, companies — particularly publicly traded and consumer-facing ones — need to be make informed decisions. Clear, consistent messaging is key to establishing confident and consistent responses to potential concerns by employees and other stakeholders.

Article By M. Carter DeLorme, Frank C. Morris, JR, Susan Gross Sholinsky, Jennifer Barna, and Erin E. Schaefer of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more civil rights legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Roe and Casey: What This Decision Means for Employers

As many expected based on the draft opinion that was leaked months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to obtain an abortion. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June 24, 2022).

Dobbs overturns nearly 50 years of precedent from the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania v. Casey on the issue.

The impact of Dobbs will vary, as states are now at liberty to enforce and create abortion legislation without restrictions arising out of constitutional protections.

What does this mean for employers?

As pressure mounts on this issue, some employers may be considering what, if anything, they can or should do. Many states have enacted legislation that restricts individual abortion rights and potentially third parties who assist individuals who seek abortions. To the extent any state laws were not enforced because of the Court’s holding in Roe or Casey, states can move forward now to implement and enforce those laws.

Laws often referred to as “trigger laws,” those that are in place but unenforceable due to overriding federal restrictions, become enforceable once those federal restrictions are lifted. As a result of Dobbs, abortion-related “trigger laws” previously unenforceable can take effect, creating new standards for individuals and others that will redefine the national abortion law landscape.

Some existing state laws and trigger laws may affect employers and put employers at risk of violating state law if they implement policies to assist employees seeking an abortion or even continue to cover abortions under group health plans. For example, a state law may create liability for anyone who “aids or abets” a person who obtains an abortion. Employers also must be cognizant of how they apply their leave policies, who may seek accommodations based on a sincerely held religious belief, and whether certain provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act apply to women who are seeking or who have had an abortion.

In addition, the Court’s ruling may affect employee benefit plans. Many employers are considering additional benefits for their employees, and their covered dependents, such as travel reimbursement for seeking an abortion outside of the local jurisdiction due to state law restrictions. There are many legal issues to consider in connection with the coverage of abortion-related services under employee benefit plans. (For additional guidance on the issue, see our article, Group Health Plan Considerations in the Face of (Potentially) Changing Abortion Laws.) Depending on how the state laws are enacted, there also may be issues with relying on ERISA preemption provisions to avoid these obligations.

Corporate management and directors should plan for changes and be aware of policies and fiduciary responsibilities. This can include preparing for public and employee reactions (for and against), legislative and law enforcement threats, social media posts, and other employee demonstrations. Pressure from a variety of groups to take a corporate public opinion also may occur.

Whether changes to leave policies, employee benefits, travel reimbursement, or handling accommodation requests, employers considering policies or benefit offerings in response to Dobbs must carefully review and consider federal and state laws, including state abortion-related legislation to evaluate the risk of potential liability.

Article By Patricia Anderson Pryor, Joy Napier-Joyce, Melissa Ostrower, and Tasos C. Paindiris of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

CMS Reduces COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate Surveys and Rescinds Surveyor Vaccination Requirements

In two recent memoranda, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made changes to previously issued survey guidance related to COVID-19 vaccination issues.

In QSO-22-17-ALL, CMS modified the frequency by which State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations will survey for compliance with the federal staff vaccine mandate applicable to health care providers and suppliers (discussed in a prior post).  Noting that 95% of providers and suppliers surveyed have been found in substantial compliance with the rule, CMS is eliminating the previous requirement that State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations survey for compliance with the vaccine mandate during every survey.  Review of compliance with vaccine mandate is still required, however, during initial surveys, recertification surveys, and in response to specific complaint allegations that allege non-compliance with the staff vaccination requirement.  This means that a State Agency or Accreditation Organization is not required to review compliance with the staff vaccination requirement during, for example, a validation survey or a complaint survey unrelated to compliance with the staff vaccination requirement.  A State Agency or Accreditation Organization may still choose to expand any survey to include review of vaccine mandate compliance; however, the new guidance should result in a reduction in survey frequency of this issue for providers and suppliers.

In QSO-22-18-ALL, CMS rescinded, in its entirety, the previously issued QSO-22-10-ALL memorandum, which had mandated that surveyors of State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations be vaccinated for COVID-19.  However, CMS noted that the State Agencies and Accreditation Organizations were responsible for compliance and prohibited providers and suppliers from asking surveyors for proof of vaccination.  While CMS is now encouraging vaccination of surveyors performing federal oversight surveys, the mandate for vaccination is no longer in effect.

Article By Allen R. Killworth of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Health Care Providers on Alert: Two Hospitals Penalized for Continuous Noncompliance with the Hospital Price Transparency Rule

We previously discussed the requirements of the Hospital Price Transparency Rule (“Rule”) on health care providers and health plans, as well as CMS’s proposal to increase penalties for a hospital’s failure to comply with the Rule.  About a year and a half after the Rule became effective, CMS has now imposed its first set of civil monetary penalties (“CMPs”) on Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee, which have been fined $883,180 and $214,320, respectively.

The Rule requires, in part, hospitals to make public a machine-readable file containing a list of all standard charges for all items and services, such as, e.g., supplies, room and board, and use of the facility, among other items.  See 45 C.F.R. § 180.40(a); id. at § 180.20.  The Rule also requires hospitals to display shoppable services in a consumer-friendly manner.  See id. at § 180.60(d)(2); id. at § 180.60(b).  The goal of these specific requirements, in addition to those set forth in the remainder of the Rule, is to provide consumers with sufficient information about the charges for certain items and services by requiring health care providers and health plans to be publicly transparent about such charges.

Based on CMS’s CMP letters, dated June 7, 2022, Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee were non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.  The chronology of events is important to understand how CMS ended up issuing its CMP letters.

Northside Hospital Atlanta

For Northside Hospital Atlanta:

  • CMS documented the hospital’s non-compliance since March 24, 2021.
  • CMS issued a Warning Letter, dated April 19, 2021, to the hospital and provided it the opportunity to respond and to provide supporting documentation to CMS.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On September 2, 2021, CMS reviewed the hospital’s website and determined that the non-compliance persisted.
  • On September 30, 2021, CMS issued a Request for Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to the hospital, stating that it was non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.
  • On November 15, 2021, in response to the Request for CAP, the hospital stated that patients could request specific price estimate quotes by calling or emailing Northside Hospital Atlanta, which CMS determined was insufficient in response to its Request for CAP and to comply with the Rule.
  • On December 20, 2021, CMS requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On January 11, 2022, CMS conducted a technical assistance call with the hospital, during which the hospital confirmed that it was non-compliant with the Rule and explained that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.
  • On January 24, 2022, CMS, again, requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.

Based on the foregoing, CMS imposed an $883,180 CMP on Northside Hospital Atlanta, calculated as follows, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90:

  • $36,300
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 121 days.
    • 121 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (September 2, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

 plus

  • $846,880
    • $10 per bed per day times 536 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Northside Hospital Atlanta has until 60 calendar days from the date of CMS’s CMP letter to pay.  Until the hospital notifies CMS that all non-compliance has been corrected, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Northside Hospital Cherokee

For similar reasons as Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was fined $214,320.  CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant since April 16, 2021, and notified the hospital by Warning Letter, dated May 18, 2021.  CMS reviewed the hospital’s website on September 9, 2021, and issued a Request for CAP on October 27, 2021—to which the hospital did not respond.  Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS held a technical assistance call on January 11, 2022, during which Northside Hospital Cherokee notified CMS that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.  CMS requested a Request for CAP on January 24, 2022—to which the hospital did not respond.

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was penalized $214,320, calculated as follows:

  • $34,200
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 114 days.
    • 114 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (September 9, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

plus

  • $180,120
    • $10 per bed per day times 114 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee continues to be non-compliant and, thus, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Takeaways

These fines reflect CMS’s willingness to take material enforcement action where the Rule’s regulatory requirements are largely ignored and CMS’s subsequent efforts to obtain compliance are rejected.  Non-compliance carries heavy fines that are calculated, in part, by the number of days of non-compliance and by bed count.  Health care providers should take notice and ensure that they are compliant or, at least, making efforts towards compliance with the Rule’s requirements.  Critically, CMS will not accept a refusal to comply, as reflected in CMS’s responses to Northside Hospital Atlanta’s and Northside Hospital Cherokee’s refusals to submit CAPs.  As noted in CMS’s CMP letters to these providers, CMS is scanning websites and subsequently notifying providers that appear to be non-compliant with the Rule—which are ignored at the provider’s peril.

Article By Edward S. Kornreich and Matthew J. Westbrook of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Privacy Tip #335 – Health Care Sector Continues to Be Hit with Ransomware

According to the 2022 State of Ransomware Report issued recently by Sophos, it surveyed 5,600 IT professionals from 31 countries, including professionals in the health care sector. Those professionals in the health care sector shared that 66 percent of them had experienced a ransomware attack in 2021, which was an increase of 69 percent over 2020. This was the largest increase of all sectors surveyed.

If you look at the Office for Civil Rights data breach portal, you will see that a vast majority of breaches reported by health care providers and business associates are related to “Hacking/IT incident.” This confirms that the health care sector continues to be attacked by threat actors seeking to steal protected health information of patients.

If you are a patient who receives a breach notification letter from a health care provider or business associate, the letter will provide guidance on how to protect yourself following a data breach and may offer some protection guidance, including credit monitoring or fraud resolution. Such a letter has been sent to patients to comply with the breach notification requirements of HIPAA and state law. Part of those requirements includes that the patients be provided mitigation steps following the breach to protect themselves from fraud. Avail yourself of these protections in the event your information is compromised. Take the time to sign up for the mitigation offered. It is clear that these attacks will not subside any time soon.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit, Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

Read on below for coverage of recent law firm news from McDermott Will & Emery.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit

McDermott Will & Emery’s Andrew C. Liazos, Michael B. Kimberly and Charlie Seidell recently filed an amicus brief in the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). McDermott filed the brief in response to a US Department of Labor (DOL) amicus brief that advanced a novel interpretation of its regulations which, if adopted through litigation, would change longstanding procedures for benefit determinations under self-funded medical plans sponsored by large employers. The amicus brief focuses on key arguments against the DOL’s attempted regulatory reinterpretation, including that:

  • DOL may not rewrite its regulations outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking;
  • DOL’s interpretation of its own regulations is inconsistent with the plain text of the regulations;
  • There are good policy reasons underlying differential treatment of healthcare and disability benefits determinations; and
  • DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in its amicus brief is not entitled to deference under the Supreme Court decision in Kisor.

Read ERIC’s amicus brief here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

ERIC Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

McDermott Will & Emery’s Michael B. Kimberly, Sarah P. Hogarth and Andrew C. Liazos, are co-counsel on a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). The petition calls for review of ERIC’s legal challenge to the City of Seattle’s hotel healthcare “play or pay” ordinance. The ordinance mandates hospitality employers make specified monthly healthcare expenditures for their covered local employees if their healthcare plans do not meet certain requirements. The petition demonstrates that Seattle’s ordinance is a clear attempt to control the benefits provided under medical plans in violation of the preemption provision under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA). This case is of significant national importance. Several other cities have proposed making similar changes, and complying with these types of ordinances will substantially constrain the ability of employers to control the terms of their medical plans on a uniform basis. ERIC’s petition is joined by several trade associations, including the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Benefits Council and the Retail Industry Leaders Association.

Read ERIC’s petition for writ of certiorari here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

 

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Employers Beware: Take-Home COVID Cases are on the Rise (US)

You’ve just been informed that an employee who apparently contracted COVID-19 from exposure in your workplace brought the virus home, and now his spouse, who is in a high-risk category, has contracted the virus and is in the hospital.  Do you as the employer face potential liability for the spouse’s illness?

More than two dozen so-called “take-home” COVID-19 lawsuits have been filed across the country, including against some of the largest employers in the US. This alarming pattern has prompted trade groups to warn employers of the potential for lawsuits stemming from COVID infections filed not only by workers’ family and friends but by anyone infected by that circle of people, creating a seemingly endless chain of liability for employers. Some states have enacted laws shielding employers from such suits, but where that is not the case, the legal theories and procedural paths under which these suits have proceeded vary – including some being brought in state courts, some in federal courts, and others brought under claims within the worker’s compensation system.

The issue is currently being tested in California, where the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently certified questions to the California Supreme Court seeking guidance on the state’s laws. The case, Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., arose after Mr. Kuciemba allegedly was exposed to COVID-19 through his work at one of his employer’s job sites.  According to the Kuciembas, Victory knowingly transferred workers from an infected construction site to the job site where Mr. Kuciemba was assigned without following the safety procedures required by the San Francisco Health Order. He was forced to work in close contact with these employees, and soon developed COVID-19, which he brought back home. His wife is over 65 years old and was at high risk from COVID-19, and the family had been careful to limit their exposure to the virus, with the exception of Mr. Kuciemba going to work. Mrs. Kuciemba subsequently tested positive for the disease and was hospitalized for over a month after developing severe symptoms. The Kuciembas filed suit, alleging that Victory caused Mrs. Kuciemba’s injuries by violating the Health Orders, and negligently allowed COVID-19 to spread from its worksite into their household.

The lower court dismissed the case, which was then appealed to the federal appeals court. After hearing the argument, the court asked the California Supreme Court to answer two questions of state law. First, whether Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness was an “injury” that was “derivative” of Mr. Kuciemba’s work-related injury, and therefore, Mrs. Kuciemba’s claims would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker’s Compensation Act (“WCA”); and second, assuming that the WCA is not the exclusive remedy, whether the employer owed a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Neither question has been squarely answered by the California Supreme Court, although, as noted by the federal appeals court, in a somewhat analogous situation, California courts have allowed suits against employers who negligently allowed their employees to carry asbestos fibers home to their families.

While the Kuciemba case was pending, a California Court of Appeal in another case, See’s Candies v. Superior Court, ruled that the derivative injury doctrine does not bar third-party COVID-related claims. Under a similar fact pattern, the court allowed the negligence case to go forward while noting that the plaintiff would still need to prove that the employer owed a duty of care to non-employees infected with COVID-19 due to an employee contracting the virus at work. Acknowledging that an analysis of this duty “appear[s] worthy of exploration,” the state appellate court said the analysis would include an assessment of “public policy concerns that might support excluding certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries from relief.” The California Supreme Court declined to review the See’s case, meaning that it’s holding still stands.

The California Supreme Court has not yet announced whether it will use its discretion to respond to the Ninth Circuit’s certified questions in the Kuciembas’ case. In the meantime, California employers cannot automatically rely on the exclusive remedial scheme provided under the worker’s compensation system to cover these claims and are not necessarily shielded from COVID-19 lawsuits brought by employees’ family members (and perhaps others). That said, even if employers owe their employees’ families a duty of care, affected employees will still have to prove that it was the employer’s negligence that caused the illness and that the virus was not contracted from another source – a tall order for a highly transmissible virus like COVID-19. In the meantime, however, it behooves all California employers to continue maintaining health and safety measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and react quickly and appropriately in the event of an outbreak of COVID-19 in the workplace.

Article By Karen E. Wentzel and Cristen R. Hintze of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

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