SEC’s Slimmed Down Climate-Related Disclosures Finally Adopted

On March 6, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted regulations[1] that will require public companies to file mandatory climate-related disclosures with the SEC beginning in 2026. First proposed in March 2022, the climate-related disclosure rules were finalized after consideration of over 24,000 comment letters and active lobbying of the SEC by business and public interest groups alike. These new rules are aimed at eliciting more consistent, comparable, and reliable information for investors to make informed decisions related to climate-related risks on current and potential investments.

The new rules require a registrant to disclose material climate-related risks and activities to mitigate or adapt to those risks; information about the registrant’s oversight of climate-related risks and management of those risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. In addition, these new rules require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions with attestation by certain registrants when emissions are material; and disclosure of the financial effects of extreme weather events.

Unlike the initial proposal, the EU Climate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”) and the California Climate Data Accountability Act, the new rules do not require disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions. The new rules require reporting based upon financial materiality, not the double-materiality (impact and financial) standard utilized by the EU under the CSRD. Whether registrants will ultimately be required to comply with the new rules depend upon the outcome of anticipated challenges, such as the challenge to the SEC’s authority to promulgate the rule filed in the Eleventh Circuit on March 6th by a coalition of ten states.

Highlights of the New Rule

In the adopting release, the SEC notes that companies are increasingly disclosing climate-related risks, whether in their SEC filings or via company websites, sustainability reports, or elsewhere; however, the content and location of such disclosures have been varied and inconsistent.[2] The new rules not only specify the content of required climate-related disclosures but also the presentation of such disclosures.

The new rules amend the SEC rules under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), creating a new subpart 1500 of Regulation S-K and Article 14 of Regulation S-X. As a result, registrants, companies that are registered under the Exchange Act, will need to:

  • File climate-related disclosures with the SEC in their registration statements and Exchange Act annual reports;
  • Provide the required climate-related disclosures in either a separately captioned section of the registration statement or annual report, within another appropriate section of the filing, or the disclosures may be included by reference from another SEC filing so long as the disclosure meets the electronic tagging requirements; and
  • Electronically tag climate-related disclosures in Inline XBRL.

The rules require a registrant to disclose:

  • Climate-related risks that have had or are reasonably likely to have a material impact on the registrant’s business strategy, results of operations, or financial condition;
  • The actual and potential material impacts of any identified climate-related risks on the registrant’s strategy, business model, and outlook;
  • Specified disclosures regarding a registrant’s activities, if any, to mitigate or adapt to a material climate-related risk including the use, if any, of transition plans, scenario analysis, or internal carbon prices;
  • Any oversight by the board of directors of climate-related risks and any role by management in assessing and managing the registrant’s material climate-related risks;
  • Any processes the registrant has for identifying, assessing, and managing material climate-related risks and, if the registrant is managing those risks, whether and how any such processes are integrated into the registrant’s overall risk management system or processes;
  • Information about a registrant’s climate-related targets or goals, if any, that have materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. Disclosures would include material expenditures and material impacts on financial estimates and assumptions as a direct result of the target or goal or actions taken to make progress toward meeting such target or goal;
  • For large accelerated filers (“LAFs”) and accelerated filers (“AFs”) that are not otherwise exempted, information about material Scope 1 emissions and/or Scope 2 emissions;
  • For those required to disclose Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, an assurance report at the limited assurance level, which, for an LAF, following an additional transition period, will be at the reasonable assurance level;
  • The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, drought, wildfires, extreme temperatures, and sea level rise, subject to applicable one percent and de minimis disclosure thresholds, disclosed in a note to the financial statements;
  • The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, and losses related to carbon offsets and renewable energy credits or certificates (“RECs”) if used as a material component of a registrant’s plans to achieve its disclosed climate-related targets or goals, disclosed in a note to the financial statements; and
  • If the estimates and assumptions a registrant uses to produce the financial statements were materially impacted by risks and uncertainties associated with severe weather events and other natural conditions or any disclosed climate-related targets or transition plans, a qualitative description of how the development of such estimates and assumptions was impacted, disclosed in a note to the financial statements.

Highlights of what did not get adopted

In its adopting release, the SEC described various modifications it made to its March 2022 proposed rules. The SEC explained that it made many of these changes in response to various comment letters it received. Some of the proposed rules that did not get adopted are:[3]

  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement to provide Scope 3 emissions disclosure.
  • The adopted rules in many instances now qualify the requirements to provide certain climate-related disclosures based on materiality.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement for all registrants to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions in favor of requiring such disclosure only by large accelerated filers and accelerated filers on a phased in basis and only when those emissions are material and with the option to provide the disclosure on a delayed basis.
  • The SEC also exempted emerging growth companies and smaller reporting companies from the Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirement.
  • The SEC modified the proposed assurance requirement covering Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for accelerated filers and large accelerated filers by extending the reasonable assurance phase in period for LAFs and requiring only limited assurance for AFs.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirements for registrants to disclose their GHG emissions in terms of intensity.[4]
  • The SEC removed the requirement to disclose the impact of severe weather events and other natural conditions and transition activities on each line item of a registrant’s financial statements. The SEC now requires disclosure of financial statement effects on capitalized costs, expenditures, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions in the notes to the financial statements.
  • The adopted rules are less prescriptive than certain of those that were proposed. For example, the former now exclude in Item 1502(a) of Regulation S-K negative climate-related impacts on a registrant’s value chain from the definition of climate-related risks required to be disclosed. Similarly, this definition no longer includes acute or chronic risks to the operations of companies with which a registrant does business. Also, Item 1501(a) as adopted omits the originally proposed requirement for registrants to disclose (a) the identity of board members responsible for climate-risk oversight, (b) any board expertise in climate-related risks, (c) the frequency of board briefings on such risks, and (d) the details on the board’s establishment of climate-related targets or goals. Along the same lines, Item 1503 as adopted requires disclosure of only those processes for the identification, assessment, and management of material climate-related risks as opposed to a broader universe of climate-related risks. The rule as adopted does not require disclosure of how the registrant (a) determines the significance of climate-related risks compared to other risks, (b) considers regulatory policies, such as GHG limits, when identifying climate-related risks, (c) considers changes to customers’ or counterparties’ preferences, technology, or market prices in assessing transition risk, and (d) determines the materiality of climate-related risks. In the same vein, the adopted rules, unlike the proposed rules, do not require disclosure of how the registrant determines how to mitigate any high priority risks. Nor do the new rules retain the proposed requirement for a registrant to disclose how any board or management committee responsible for assessing and managing climate-related risks interacts with the registrant’s board or management committee governing risks more generally.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposal to require a private company that is a party to a business combination transaction, as defined by Securities Act Rule 165(f), registered on Form S-4 or Form F-4, to provide the subpart 1500 and Article 14 disclosures.

Timing of Implementation

The new rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Compliance with the rules will not be required until much later, however.

Consistent with its earlier proposal, and in response to comments that the SEC received concerning the timing of implementing the proposed rule, the new rules contain delayed and staggered compliance dates that vary according to the registrant’s filing status and the type of disclosure.

The below table from the SEC’s new release summarizes the phased-in implementation dates.[5]

FILING STATUS

Large Accelerated Filers (“LAFs”)—a group whom the SEC believed most likely to be already collecting and disclosing climate-related information—will be the first registrants required to comply with the rule. The earliest that an LAF would be required to comply with the climate-disclosure rules would be upon filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025, which would be due no later than March 2026.[6]

Accelerated Filers (“AFs”) are not required to comply with the new rules for yet another year after LAFs. Climate-related disclosures for AFs must be included upon filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due no later than March 2027. Smaller Reporting Companies (“SRCs”), Emerging Growth Companies (“EGCs”), and Non-Accelerated Filers (“NAFs”) have yet another year to meet the first compliance deadline for climate-related disclosures. These types of filers need not include their climate-related disclosures until filing their Form 10-Ks for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2027, which, again, would be due no later than March 2028.

TYPES OF DISCLOSURES

The new rules also phase in the requirements to include certain disclosures over time. The requirements to provide quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning material expenditures and material impacts to financial estimates or assumptions under Items 1502(d)(2), 1502(e)(2), and 1504(c)(2) are not applicable until the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year in which the registrant’s initial compliance is required. LAFs, for example, are not required to report these qualitative and quantitative disclosures until filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. That should be one year after an LAF files its first Form 10-K with climate-related disclosures. The SEC adopted this phased-in approach to respond to commentators’ concerns regarding the availability (or current lack thereof) of policies, processes, controls, and system solutions necessary to support these types of disclosures.

Likewise, the new rules provide for a further phased-in compliance date for those registrants required to report their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions and an even later date for those filers to obtain limited or reasonable assurance for those emissions disclosures. An LAF, for example, is not required to disclose its Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions until filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. And those disclosures would not be required to be subject to the limited-assurance or reasonable-assurance requirements until filing the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2029 or December 31, 2033, respectively.

In accordance with the table above, AFs, SRCs, EGCs, and NAFs have even more time to meet these additional disclosure requirements, if they are required to meet them at all.

It should be noted that the SEC recognized that registrants may have difficulty in obtaining GHG emission metrics by the date their 10-K report would be due. As a result, the rule contains an accommodation for registrants required to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, allowing domestic registrants, for example, to file those disclosures in the Form 10-Q for the second fiscal quarter in the fiscal year immediately following the year to which the GHG emissions disclosure relates. This disclosure deadline is permanent and not for a transition period.

Liability for Non-Compliance

In the introduction to the adopting release, the SEC explains that requiring registrants to provide certain climate-related disclosures in their filings will, among other things, “subject them to enhanced liability that provides important investor protections by promoting the reliability of the disclosures.”[7] This enhanced liability stems from the treatment of the disclosures as “filed” rather than “furnished” for purposes of Exchange Action Section 18 and, if included or otherwise incorporated by reference into a Securities Act registration statement, Securities Act Section 11.[8] According to the SEC, “climate-related disclosures should be subject to the same liability as other important business or financial information” that registrants include in registration statements and periodic reports and, therefore, should be treated as filed disclosures.[9]

In an attempt to balance concerns about the complexities and evolving nature of climate data methodologies and increased litigation risk, the SEC, in the adopting release, emphasizes certain modifications made in the new rules including:

  • limiting the scope of the GHG emissions disclosure requirement;
  • revising several provisions regarding the impacts of climate-related risks on strategy, targets and goals, and financial statement effects so that registrants will be required to provide the disclosures only in certain circumstances, such as when material to the registrant; and
  • adopting a provision stating that disclosures (other than historic facts) provided pursuant to certain of the new subpart 1500 provisions of Regulation S-K constitute “forward-looking statements” for the purposes of the PSLRA safe harbors.[10]

Registrants are subject to liability under Securities Act Section 17(a), Exchange Act Section 10(b), and/or Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading material statements in the information disclosed pursuant to the new rules.[11]

Observations

Consistent with its recent trajectory, the SEC continues to be a kinder, gentler regulator on climate disclosure requirements. Although the new rules will apply broadly to publicly traded companies, their scope is less demanding than the requirements under recent similar laws enacted in California or the EU. Under the California Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (the “CCDA”), companies with annual revenues in excess of $1 billion and “doing business in California”[12] will be required to publicly disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions beginning in 2026, and Scope 3 emissions beginning in 2027. And because the California law applies to all companies, not just those that are publicly traded, it is also more broadly applicable and will trigger assessments and compliance for companies that are not subject to the SEC’s rule. The CCDA is currently the subject of legal challenge that includes questions of whether the required disclosures violate the First Amendment right to free speech, as well as possible federal preemption. As a result, there is a chance that the CCDA may yet be diluted or found unconstitutional. But in light of the imminent timeline for compliance, many companies subject to the CCDA are already developing programs to facilitate and ensure timely compliance with the requirements.

Similarly, the EU has broader reporting obligations under the CSRD than the SEC’s new rules. Compliance with the CSRD is required for both public and private EU companies as well as for non-EU companies with certain net annual turnovers, certain values of assets, and a certain number of employees. Under the CSRD, companies must publish information across a wide spectrum of subjects, including emissions, energy use, diversity, labor rights, and governance. Initial reporting under the CSRD begins to phase-in in 2025.

A key takeaway here is that although the SEC rules may have taken a lighter approach to climate disclosures, many large companies are likely to be subject to more stringent requirements under either the CCDA or the EU CSRD. And as some companies begin to comply to provide this information and data, the market may drive demand and an expectation that other companies, not otherwise subject to these various reporting regimes, follow suit. While the SEC rules may be a slimmed down version of what could have been, it is likely that the trend toward transparency and disclosure will continue to be driven by other regulatory bodies and market forces alike.


[1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.

[2] Id. at 48.

[3] Id. at 31-33.

[4] Id. at 225.

[5] Id. at 589.

[6] The new rules’ compliance dates apply to annual reports and registration statements. But, in the case of registration statements, compliance is required beginning with any registration statement that is required to include financial information for the full fiscal year indicated in the table above.

[7] Id. at 13.

[8] Id. at 584. At a high level, Section 18 imposes liability for false and misleading statements with respect to any material fact in documents filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act and Section 11 imposes liability for material misstatements or omissions made in connection with registered offerings conducted under the Securities Act.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 803.

[11] Id.

[12] A term which is not defined in the law, but is likely intentionally very broad, and is expected to be interpreted in that way.

SEC Issues Long-Awaited Climate Risk Disclosure Rule

INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, 6 March 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved its highly anticipated final rules on “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” by a vote of 3-2, with Republican Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissenting. Accompanying the final rules was a press release and fact sheet detailing the provisions of the rulemaking. The final rules will go into effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register and will include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants.

This is likely to be one of the most consequential rulemakings of Chairman Gary Gensler’s tenure given the prioritization of addressing climate change as a key pillar for the Biden administration. However, given the significant controversy associated with this rulemaking effort, the final rules are likely to face legal challenges and congressional oversight in the coming months. As such, it remains unclear at this point whether the final rules will survive the forthcoming scrutiny.

WHAT IS IN THE RULE?

According to the SEC’s fact sheet:

  • “The final rules would require a registrant to disclose, among other things: material climate-related risks; activities to mitigate or adapt to such risks; information about the registrant’s board of directors’ oversight of climate-related risks and management’s role in managing material climate-related risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition.
  • Further, to facilitate investors’ assessment of certain climate-related risks, the final rules would require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a phased-in basis by certain larger registrants when those emissions are material; the filing of an attestation report covering the required disclosure of such registrants’ Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, also on a phased-in basis; and disclosure of the financial statement effects of severe weather events and other natural conditions including, for example, costs and losses.
  • The final rules would include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants, with the compliance date dependent on the registrant’s filer status and the content of the disclosure.”

NEXT STEPS

The final rules are likely to face significant opposition, including legal challenges and congressional oversight. It is expected that there will be various lawsuits brought against the final rules, which are likely to receive support from several industry groups, or potentially GOP-led state attorneys general who have been active in litigating against environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and regulations. It is also possible that the final rules could face criticism from some climate advocates that the SEC did not go far enough in its disclosure requirements.

Further, it is expected that the House Financial Services Committee (HFSC) will conduct oversight hearings, as well as introduce a resolution under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), to attempt to block the regulations from taking effect. HFSC Chairman Patrick McHenry (R-NC) indicated that the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee will hold a field hearing on March 18 and the full Committee will convene a hearing on April 10 to discuss the potential implications of the rules. If a CRA resolution were to pass the House and garner sufficient support from moderate Democrats in the Senate to pass, it would likely be vetoed by President Biden.

Ultimately, the SEC climate risk disclosure rules are unlikely to significantly change the trajectory of corporate disclosures made by multinational companies based in the U.S., most of whom have already been making sustainability disclosures in accordance with the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. The ongoing problem for investors is that such disclosures are not standardized and therefore are not comparable. Consequently, many of these large issuers may continue to enhance their sustainability disclosures in accordance with standards issued by the International Sustainability Standards Board and the Global Reporting Initiative as an investor relations imperative notwithstanding the SEC’s timetable for implementation of these final rules.

A more detailed analysis of the SEC rules is forthcoming from our Corporate and Asset Management and Investment Funds practices in the coming days.

President Biden Nominates Three FERC Commissioners

On February 29, 2024, President Biden nominated three new commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). The nominations will be reviewed and voted on by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and are subject to confirmation by the full Senate. If approved, the nominees will provide FERC with a full slate of five commissioners, including three Democrats and two Republicans.

Judy Chang is the Managing Principal of the Analysis Group in Boston and former Undersecretary of Energy and Climate Solutions of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources. She is a Democrat and will succeed Commissioner Allison Clements with a term ending June 30, 2029. Commissioner Clements has announced that she would not serve a second term, but she may remain on FERC after June 30, 2024, until replaced or through December 31, 2024. Ms. Chang was the keynote speaker at Pierce Atwood’s 2022 Energy Infrastructure Symposium.

Lindsay See is the Solicitor General of the State of West Virginia. Ms. See is a Republican, recommended to the President by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, and will succeed former Commissioner James Danly with a term ending June 30, 2028. Ms. See has represented West Virginia in many multi-state legal coalitions on a variety of national issues, including energy and environmental rules and policies.

David Rosner is a member of the FERC staff, an energy industry analyst who has been on loan to the majority staff of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which is chaired by Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia. Mr. Rosner will succeed former Chairman Richard Glick with a term ending June 30, 2027.

All three nominations have been received by the Senate and referred to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which will hold a hearing on each nominee. The Committee has not yet scheduled any hearings.

FERC Chairman Willie L. Phillips was designated as chairman on February 9, 2024. He was previously acting chairman. His term ends June 30, 2026. Commissioner Mark C. Christie’s term ends on June 30, 2025.

EPA Emphasizes its Criminal Enforcement Program

This Alert Update supplements a recent VNF alert analyzing the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) enforcement priorities for fiscal years (FY) 2024-2027. EPA recently announced that its criminal program helped to develop the Agency’s national enforcement compliance initiatives and strongly suggested that it would look to pursue criminal cases under each initiative.

Previously announced National Enforcement and Compliance Initiatives (NECIs) for FY 2024-2027 include climate change, coal ash landfills and impoundments, a new focus on contaminants such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), and environmental justice initiatives. Current NECIs address aftermarket defeat devices for mobile sources, hazardous air pollutant (HAP) emissions, and compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program.

EPA’s head of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), David Uhlmann, stated the agency is “promoting far greater strategic coordination between our criminal and civil enforcement programs” when speaking to the American Legal Institute-Continuing Legal Education’s (ALI-CLE) Environmental Law 2024 meeting on February 22, 2024.

Uhlmann highlighted that some prior cases handled civilly should have been potentially handled criminally, and that this may change moving forward. The practical implications for companies of the shift to a more active EPA criminal program may include significantly higher penalties and potential jail time for violations. Uhlmann also noted that “EPA will continue to reserve criminal enforcement for the most egregious violations.” His comments suggest that “egregiousness” will be evaluated based on the adverse effects of the violation, particularly on disproportionately overburdened communities, and the degree of intent. Uhlmann also added that companies could avoid criminal prosecution if they are “honest with the government” and have “strong ethics, integrity, and sustainability programs.”

The U.S. Justice Department’s Environment and National Resources Division (ENRD) litigates both civil and criminal cases for EPA and closely coordinates on enforcement initiatives. The Assistant Attorney General of ENRD, Todd Kim, also spoke during the February 22 ALI-CLE panel, and focused some of his remarks on the enforcement of environmental laws in the online marketplace. He cautioned that “online companies, just like brick-and-mortar companies, would do well to take pains to ensure that they are complying with environmental laws in selling and distributing products,” because EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) will enforce such laws in all market settings.

Both Uhlmann and Kim highlighted “21st century” challenges and opportunities, with NECIs addressing challenges and new opportunities such as data availability and analysis allowing EPA and DOJ to better enforce environmental laws and regulations in a targeted and effective manner. Some of the newest data and data analytics are being used to advance EPA’s environmental justice priorities. “So again, companies would do well to think about the ways we use data and to be talking with their neighbors to ensure that they’re doing what they can to ensure that disproportionately overburdened communities are getting the help they need,” Kim stated.

These EPA and DOJ statements clearly signal a potential increase in criminal environmental enforcement actions, creating additional risks for companies that run afoul of regulatory requirements. These corporate risks, which also may also be borne by executives and other employees, may be mitigated through the prompt detection and reporting of non-compliant conduct and through the development and maintenance of robust compliance programs. The ability to conduct prompt and thorough internal investigations and compliance audits should be a central part of an effective corporate compliance program.

OECD Tour de Table Includes Information on U.S. Developments on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has published the latest edition of the Developments in Delegations on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials and Advanced Materials — Tour de Table. The Tour de Table compiles information provided by delegations on the occasion of the 23rd meeting of the OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN) in June 2023. The Tour de Table lists U.S. developments on the human health and environmental safety of nanomaterials. Risk assessment decisions, including the type of nanomaterials assessed, testing recommended, and outcomes of the assessment include:

  • The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completed review of four low volume exemptions (LVE) that included a graphene material, a titanium dioxide material, and two graphene oxide materials, one of which was a modification to an existing exemption. EPA denied two of the LVEs and granted two under conditions that limited human and environmental exposures to prevent unreasonable risks.
  • According to the Tour de Table, EPA has under review 17 premanufacture notices (PMN), 16 of which are for multi-walled carbon nanotube chemical substances and one of which is for a graphene material. The Tour de Table states that EPA is still reviewing these 17 chemical substances for potential risks to human health and the environment. EPA completed its review of one significant new use notice (SNUN) for a single-walled carbon nanotube, regulating it with a consent order due to limited available data on nanomaterials. The consent order limits uses and human and environmental exposures to prevent unreasonable risks.

The Tour de Table includes the following information regarding risk management approaches in the United States:

  • Between June 2022 and June 2023, EPA received notification of two nanoscale substances based on metal oxides that met reporting criteria pursuant to its authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 8(a), bringing the total number of notifications to 87. Reporting criteria exempted nanoscale chemical substances already reported as new chemicals under TSCA and those nanoscale chemical substances that did not have unique or novel properties. According to the Tour de Table, most reporting was for metals or metal oxides.
  • Since January 2005, EPA has received and reviewed more than 275 new chemical notices for nanoscale materials under TSCA, including fullerenes and carbon nano-onions, quantum dots, semiconducting nanoparticles, and carbon nanotubes. EPA has issued consent orders and significant new use rules (SNUR) permitting manufacture under limited conditions. A manufacturer or processor wishing to engage in a designated significant new use identified in a SNUR must submit a SNUN to EPA at least 90 days before engaging in the new use. The Tour de Table notes that because of confidential business information (CBI) claims by submitters, EPA may not be allowed to reveal to the public the chemical substance as a nanoscale material in every new chemical SNUR it issues for nanoscale materials. EPA will continue to issue SNURs and consent orders for new chemical nanoscale materials in the coming year.
  • Because of limited data to assess nanomaterials, the consent orders and SNURS contain requirements to limit exposure to workers through the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), limit environmental exposure by not allowing releases to surface waters or direct releases to air, and limit the specific applications/uses to those described in the new chemical notification.

Regarding updates, including proposals, or modifications to previous regulatory decisions, the Tour de Table states that “[t]he approaches used, given the level of available information, are consistent with previous regulatory decisions. EPA’s assessments now assume that the environmental hazard of a nanomaterial is unknown unless acceptable hazard data is submitted with nanomaterial submission.”

The Tour de Table lists the following new regulatory challenge(s) with respect to any action for nanomaterials:

  • Standards/methods for differentiating between different forms of the same chemical substance that is a nanomaterial;
  • Standardized testing for the physical properties that could be used to characterize/identify nanomaterials; and
  • Differentiation between genuinely new nanoscale materials introduced in commerce and existing products that have been in commerce for decades or centuries.

Striking a Balance: The Supreme Court and the Future of Chevron Deference

In its frequent attempts to enforce the separation of powers that the Constitution’s framers devised as a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, it is often the so-called “Fourth Branch”—that includes the varied administrative agencies—that is at the heart of things.[1]

These agencies possess a level of technical and scientific expertise that the federal courts generally lack. And, without reference to expertise, Congress often leaves it to agencies and the courts to interpret and apply statutes left intentionally vague or ambiguous as the product of the legislative compromise required to gain passage. This phenomenon begs the question of the extent to which the federal courts may defer to administrative agencies in interpreting such statutes, or whether such deference abnegates the judicial prerogative of saying what the law is. Having passed on several opportunities to revisit this question, the Supreme Court of the United States has finally done so.

In what potentially will lead to a decision that might substantially change the face of federal administrative law generally while voiding an untold number of agency regulations, the Supreme Court, on January 17, 2024, heard oral argument in a pair of appeals, Loper Bright Enterprises, et al., v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, and Relentless, Inc., et al. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, focusing on whether the Court should overrule or limit its seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense CouncilInc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Almost 40 years ago, the Chevron decision articulated the doctrine commonly known as “Chevron deference,” which involves a two-part test for determining when a judicial determination must be deferential to the interpretation of a statute. The first element requires determining what Congress has spoken directly to the specific issue in question, and the second is “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Among the most cited Supreme Court cases, Chevron has become increasingly controversial, especially within the conservative wing of the Court, with several Justices having suggested that the doctrine has led to the usurpation of the essential function of the judiciary.

Chevron deference affects a wide range of federal regulations, and the Court’s ruling, whether or not Chevron is retained in some form, is likely to result in significant changes to how agencies may implement statutes and how parties affected by regulations may seek relief from the impact of those regulations. Interestingly, commentators on the recent oral argument in the case are widely divided in their predictions as to the outcome—some suggesting that the conservative majority of the Court will overrule Chevron outright, others suggesting that the Court has no intention at all to do so.

Based on remarks made during the oral arguments by Justice Gorsuch, and by Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Elena Kagan, as well as Justice Kagan’s fashioning of a majority that clarified a related interpretive rule in an earlier case focusing on agencies’ authority to interpret their own regulations, we suggest that there is a substantial possibility that the Court will take a moderate path by strengthening judicial scrutiny at the “Step One” level while recognizing that there are technical and scientific matters as to which courts have no expertise. At the same time, the Court may make it clear that, essentially, legal issues are within its prerogatives and are not subject to agency interpretation.

We examine how the Court might find a path to a better balancing of agency and judicial functions that is consistent with and builds upon other recent rulings involving the review of actions taken by administrative agencies. Whatever the outcome, the Court’s ruling in these cases will have a profound impact on individuals and entities that are regulated by federal agencies or that depend on participation in government programs, such as Medicare and Social Security.

Chevron Refresher

Most law students and lawyers have some familiarity with the touchstone for judicial review of agency rules that was articulated in Chevron, a case that dealt with regulations published by the Environmental Protection Agency to implement a part of the Clean Air Act.[2] The Supreme Court explained that judicial review of an agency’s final rule should be based on the two-part inquiry that we mentioned earlier. First, the reviewing court should determine whether Congress made its intent unambiguously clear in the text of the statute; if so, the inquiry ends, and both the agency and the reviewing court must give effect to Congress’s intent. This has become known by the shorthand phrase “Step One.”

If Congress’s intent is not clear, either because it did not address a specific point or used ambiguous language, then the court should defer to the agency’s construction if it is based on a permissible reading of the underlying statute. This has become known as “Step Two.”

In applying Step Two, a reviewing court should determine if the gap left by Congress was explicit or implicit. If the ambiguity is explicit, then the agency’s regulations should be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.[3] If the ambiguity is implicit, then the “court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”[4]

Chevron deference is not a blank slate for courts to find ambiguity. It recognized that the judiciary “is the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and instructed that in applying Step One, judges are expected to apply the “traditional tools of statutory construction.”[5] It also recognized that any deference analysis should fit within the balance among the branches of government. The Supreme Court explained that while Congress sets an overall policy, it may not reach specific details in explaining how that policy is to be executed in particular contexts. In these situations, the executive branch may have the necessary technical expertise to fill in the details, as it is charged with administering the policy enacted into law. The Court noted that the judiciary was not the ideal entity to fill in any gaps left in legislation because “[j]udges are not experts in the field” and that courts are not political entities. As a result, agencies with expertise are better suited to carry out those policies. Moreover, even if agencies are not accountable to the public, they are part of the executive branch headed by the President, who (unlike judges with life tenure) is directly accountable to the electorate.[6]

Nevertheless, during the recent oral arguments, the Chief Justice stated that the Court had not in recent years employed Chevron itself in its analysis of agency action. The reason why the issue of whether Chevron unduly intrudes upon the judicial function, and whether it should be overruled or modified, relates to the fact that it is widely used in lower court review of administrative actions. Its reconsideration also relates to increasing jurisprudential conservatism on the Supreme Court and the application of originalism and, more widely, textualism.

The Chevron concept of deference to agency regulations exists alongside a line of cases in which courts have deferred to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. In both Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.[7] and Auer v. Robbins,[8] the Supreme Court developed the principle that courts are not supposed to substitute their preference for how a regulation should be interpreted; instead, a court should give “controlling weight” to that interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”[9] Nevertheless, the Court has refused to extend that form of deference to subregulatory guidelines and manuals where there is little or no evidence of a formal process intended to implement Congress’s expressed intent.[10]

The Chevron framework has generated criticism, including statements by several current Justices. Their position relies on an argument that Chevron distorts the balance of authority in favor of the executive and strips courts of their proper role. In a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch complained that Chevron creates a bias in favor of the federal government and that instead of having a neutral judge determine rights and responsibilities, “we outsource our interpretive responsibilities. Rather than say what the law is, we tell those who come before us to go ask a bureaucrat.”[11] Justice Thomas has written that the Administrative Procedure Act does not require deference to agency determinations and raises constitutional concerns because it undercuts the “obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”[12]

Chevron and the Herring Fishermen

The dispute that has brought Chevron deference to the Supreme Court in 2024 starts with the business of commercial fishing for herring. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a regulation in 2020 that requires operators of certain fishing vessels to pay the cost of observers who work on board those vessels to ensure compliance with that agency’s rules under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (“Act”). Several commercial fishing operators challenged the regulations, which led to two decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit. Both courts upheld the regulations, but on slightly different grounds. In the first decision, Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo,[13] the District of Columbia Circuit followed the traditional Chevron analysis and concluded that the Act did not expressly address who would bear the cost of the monitors. The NMFS’s interpretation of the statute in the regulation was found to be reasonable under Step Two of Chevron based on the finding that the agency was acting within the scope of a broad delegation of authority to the agency to further the Act’s conservation and management goals, and on the established precedent concluding that the cost of compliance with a regulation is typically borne by the regulated party.

The second decision by the First Circuit, Relentless, Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce,[14] took a slightly different approach. That court focused on the text of the Act and concluded that the agency’s interpretation was permissible. It did not anchor its decision in a Chevron analysis and stated that “[w]e need not decide whether we classify this conclusion as a product of Chevron step one or step two.”[15] The First Circuit also emphasized that the operators’ arguments did not overcome the presumption that regulated entities must bear the cost of compliance with a relevant statute or regulation.

The parties have staked out starkly different views of Chevron’s legitimacy and whether it is compatible with the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution. The fishermen petitioners argue that Chevron is not entitled to respect as precedent because the two-part test was only an interpretive methodology and not the holding construing the Clean Air Act. Their core argument is that Chevron improperly and unconstitutionally shifts power to the executive branch by giving more weight to the agencies in rulemaking and in resolving disputes where the agency is a party and shifts power away from the judiciary’s role under Article III to interpret laws and Congress’s legislative authority power under Article I. Taking this one step further, the petitioners argue that this shift violates the due process rights of regulated parties. They also argue that Chevron is unworkable in practice, citing instances where the Supreme Court itself has declined to apply the two-part test and the lack of a consensus as to when a statute is clear or ambiguous, making the application of Chevron inconsistent. Put another way, according to the petitioners, the problem with Chevron is that there is no clear rule spelling out how much ambiguity is needed to trigger deference to an agency’s rule. Next, they argue that Chevron cannot be applied when an underlying statute is silent because this allows agencies to legislate when there is a doubt as to whether Congress delegated that power to the agency at all and that it would run counter to accepted principles of construction that silence can be construed to be a grant of power to an agency. Finally, they contend that Chevron deference to agencies conflicts with Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress authorized courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”[16]

The Secretary of Commerce argues that there are multiple reasons to preserve Chevron deference. First, the Secretary argues that Chevron fits within the balance of power between the branches of the federal government. In the Secretary’s view, Chevron deference is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, as it respects (1) Congress’s authority to legislate and to delegate authority to an administrative agency, (2) the agency’s application of its expertise in areas that may be complex, and (3) the judiciary’s authority to resolve disputed questions of law. Therefore, the Chevron framework avoids situations where courts may function like super-legislatures in deciding how a statute should be implemented or administered and second-guess policy decisions.

According to the Secretary, courts know how to apply the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if an ambiguity exists after that exercise is complete, it is appropriate to defer to an administrative agency that has technical or scientific experience with the subject matter being regulated. In addition, the Secretary contends that Chevron promotes consistency in the administration of statutes and avoids a patchwork of court rulings that may make it difficult or impossible to administer a nationwide program, such as Social Security or Medicare. Third, the Secretary notes that Chevron is a doctrine that has been workable for 40 years and that over those decades, Congress has not altered or overridden its holding, even as it has enacted thousands of statutes since 1984 that either require rulemaking or have gaps that have been filled by rulemaking. As a result, the Secretary argues that there are settled interpretations that agencies and regulated parties rely on, and overruling Chevron would lead to instability and relitigating settled cases. Finally, the Secretary argues that Chevron deference cannot be limited to interpretations of ambiguous language alone, as there are no accepted criteria for distinguishing ambiguous statutory language from statutory silence.

The Oral Argument

The Supreme Court heard arguments in both cases on January 17, 2024. Over more than three hours of argument, the Justices focused on several questions. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson expressed concerns that abandoning the Chevron framework would put courts in the position of making policy rather than just ruling on questions of law. In their view, courts lack the skills and expertise to craft policy and should not act as super-legislators. They also stressed that there are situations in which the tools of statutory construction do not yield a single answer or that Congress has not addressed the question either because it left some matters unresolved in the statute or through other subsequent changes not contemplated by Congress, such as the adoption of new technologies. In these cases, the Justices wanted to know why deference to an agency was not appropriate and did not see any clear indication that Congress intended that courts, not agencies, should make determinations when the statutory language is ambiguous or silent. They also questioned why the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron when Congress has been fully aware of the decision for 40 years and has not enacted legislation to eliminate the ability of a court to defer to an agency’s determinations.

The members of the more conservative wing of the Supreme Court questioned counsel about weaknesses in the Chevron framework. Justice Gorsuch returned to his earlier criticism of Chevron and asked the parties to define what constitutes enough ambiguity to allow a court to move from Step One to Step Two. He further questioned whether there was sufficient evidence that Congress ever intended to give the government the benefit of the doubt when an individual or regulated entity challenges agency action. Justice Gorsuch, along with Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, asked whether Chevron actually resulted in greater instability and whether it was appropriate to abandon Chevron in favor of the lesser form of deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., where deference is not a default outcome and a court is supposed to exercise its independent judgment to give weight to agency determinations based on factors including the thoroughness of the agency’s analysis, the consistency and validity of the agency’s position, and the agency’s “consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”[17] The follow-up questions asked whether it was correct to accord deference to agency regulations when the agency’s policy can shift from administration to administration.

Where Is the Conservative Court Likely to Go?

The length of the argument and the alacrity of questioning do not mean that the Supreme Court is going to overrule the 40-year-old, highly influential Chevron doctrine. It is, however, quite likely that the doctrine will be narrowed and clarified. To say nothing of the recent oral argument, several recent decisions evidence a reluctance to abandon deference altogether. In a pair of decisions issued in 2022 involving Medicare reimbursement to hospitals, the Court resolved deference questions by relying on the statutory text alone.

Those decisions involved challenges to a Medicare regulation governing hospital reimbursement, and a published interpretation of a section of the Medicare statute governing reimbursement for outpatient drugs. Although the Court ruled in the government’s favor in the former case and against the government in the latter case, neither decision relies on Chevron—even though in one case, the petitioner’s counsel expressly asked the Court to overrule Chevron during the oral argument.[18] Yet, by relying on the text of each statute to resolve a regulatory dispute, the Court’s reasoning in both decisions is consistent with Step One of the Chevron test and demonstrates that it is workable in practice and need not result in a dilution of judicial review. In addition, the Court has developed another limit to agency action in its decisions, finding that when a regulatory issue presents a “major question,” deference is irrelevant unless the agency can show that Congress expressed a clear intent that the agency exercise its regulatory authority. This concept remains a work in progress because the Court has not defined criteria that make an issue a major question.[19]

These cases provide a useful background to an increasingly jurisprudentially conservative, textually oriented Court. Two cases that were specifically discussed during oral argument are particularly significant in plotting the Court’s landing place with regard to Chevron. Justice Gorsuch made multiple references to Skidmore, which sets forth the principle that a federal agency’s determination is entitled to judicial respect if the determination is authorized by statute and made based on the agency’s experience and informed judgment. Unlike the Chevron standard, the Skidmore standard considers an agency’s consistency in interpreting a law it administers.

The second, and more recent, precedent that is even more likely to guide the narrowing of Chevron is Kisor v. Wilkie.[20] There, a 5-4 divided Court adopted a multi-stage regime for reviewing an agency’s reliance upon arguably ambiguous regulations that is roughly analogous to Chevron’s two-stage analytical modality. In doing so, it modified, but did not overrule, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and its doctrinal predecessor, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which permit a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, so long as that interpretation is reasonable, even if the court believes another reasonable reading of the regulation is the better reading.

Kisor saw a mixed bag of Justices joining, or dissenting from, various parts of the Kagan opinion. What made the majority as to its operative section was the Chief Justice’s joining Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. With Justice Ginsburg having been succeeded by Justice Barrett, and Justice Breyer having been succeeded by Justice Jackson, one might hypothesize that there now would be a conservative 5-4 majority that would have overruled Auer. However, it was Justice Barrett who raised the possibility of “Kisorizing” Chevron, a suggestion quickly adopted by Justice Kagan. Justice Gorsuch, a longtime opponent of Chevron, is likely amenable to a Skidmore-oriented result.

The Kagan opinion cabins and arguably lowers the level of deference an agency’s interpretation of a rule should receive. Thus, with a strong nod to the Court’s jurisprudential drift to the right, Justice Kagan begins with the truism that whatever discretion an agency might claim, the Court’s analysis must proceed under the proposition that an unambiguous rule must be applied precisely as its text is written. It is not unlikely that, if the Court narrows Chevron (as we predict it shall), it also will begin with a more robust requirement to apply the statutory text in Step One and re-emphasize the need to exhaust all of the tools of statutory construction; in other words, there is no need for deference unless there is genuine ambiguity. If an agency’s determination is to become relevant, it only becomes so after ambiguity is established.[21]

In short, if the law gives a definitive answer on its face, there is nothing to which a court should defer, even if the agency argues that there is an interpretation that produces a better, more reasonable result. This is a textual determination that addresses the criticism of the so-called Administrative State’s acting as a quasi-legislature to which the Court yields its own power to say what the law is.

However, even a reasonable agency interpretation, the Kagan opinion notes, might not be dispositive. The opinion must be the agency’s official position, not one ginned up for litigation purposes, and it must reflect the agency’s particular expertise.

­Conclusion

In its 40-year life, Chevron deference has been at the heart of the application of federal administrative law. No case among all of the many governmental functions that the Supreme Court considers has been more widely cited, and no administrative law case has been more controversial, especially among jurisprudential conservatives. While asked by various parties to do so, the Court has declined, and the Chevron structure has been applied, often inconsistently, by federal courts. Perhaps reflecting the increasingly conservative direction of the Court, we have reached a point where the Court will consider retiring this long-standing precedent or, alternatively, refreshing it based on the experience of courts and agencies since 1984.

Justice Kagan’s analytic method in Kisor v. Wilkie could also apply to tightening Chevron. In her decisions, she has exhibited great fidelity to reading text literally, avoiding the perils of legislation from the bench. As she wrote in Kisor:

[B]efore concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the traditional tools of construction. . . . For again, only when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has no single right answer can a judge conclude that it is more one of policy than of law. That means a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation impenetrable on first read. Agency regulations can sometimes make the eyes glaze over. But hard interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often be solved. A regulation is not ambiguous merely because discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry. To make that effort, a court must carefully consider the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on. . . . Doing so will resolve many seeming ambiguities out of the box, without resort to . . . deference” (citations and internal punctuation omitted).[22]

Text alone might not provide the answer in every case, as Justice Kagan recognizes as she outlines four additional steps that might lead to judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. However, to the extent that a majority of the Court elects to retain Chevron, though narrowing it, her approach in the analogous setting reflected in Kisor would be effective in resolving the two cases now at bar—recognizing agency expertise in technical and scientific matters beyond the competency of the judiciary while preserving the function of the courts to determine what the legislature actually wrote, not to write it themselves.

* * * *

ENDNOTES

[1] Besides the administrative bureaucracy, various jurists and commentators have, under this rubric, included the press, the people acting through grand juries, and interest or pressure groups. Those institutions represent the arguable influence of extra-governmental sources. We are focused here on the level of judicial deference afforded to federal administrative agencies.

[2] 467 U.S. at 842-43.

[3] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

[4] Id. at 844.

[5] Id. at 843, fn.9.

[6] Id. at 865-66.

[7] 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).

[8] 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

[9] Id.

[10] United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).

[11] Buffington v. McDonough, No. 21-972 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting at 9) (2022).

[12] Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199,1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

[13] 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

[14] 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023).

[15] Id. at 634.

[16] 5 U.S.C. § 706.

[17] 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

[18] Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, 142 S.Ct. 2354 (2022), and American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S.Ct. 1896 (2022). The request to overrule Chevron appears in the transcript of the American Hospital Ass’n oral argument, at 30.

[19] West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

[20] 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

[21] Kisor predicated deference, if at all, upon five preliminary stages. First, as noted, the reviewing court should determine that a genuine ambiguity exists after applying all of the tools of statutory construction. This is consistent with Step One of Chevron, but Justice Kagan makes it clear that this is a heightened textual barrier. Second, the agency’s construction of the regulation must be “reasonable”; this is a restatement of Step Two of Chevron. The Court cautioned that an agency can fail at this step. Third, the agency’s construction must be “the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’” which was explained as an interpretation that is authorized by the agency’s head or those in a position to formulate authoritative policy. Fourth, the regulatory interpretation must implicate the agency’s “substantive expertise.” Finally, the regulatory interpretation must reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and that a court should decline to defer to a merely “convenient litigating position” or “post hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced” to “defend past agency action against attack.”

[22] 139 S.Ct. at 2415.

Oil Pollution Act: Tips for Spill Response, Compliance, and Enforcement

Oil spills commonly occur when least expected and, even in smaller quantities can significantly disrupt business operations and create risks for enforcement and/or litigation. It’s important that companies are prepared and know the environmental requirements for when the least expected happens, including understanding what actually is “oil” (hint: it’s broader than you might think!), who to notify, legal authorities at play, and best practices to ensure compliance and minimize exposure to regulators and/or private parties.

What is “Oil” Anyway?

Section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. However, many companies may not realize that both petroleum-based and non-petroleum-based substances are regulated as “oil” under the CWA and OPA. As a result, many companies may not realize that they are subject to these laws and, therefore, fail to adequately prepare for compliance and/or response both pre- and post-spill.

Specifically, Section 311(a)(1) of the CWA defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” 40 CFR § 112.2 further defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to: fats, oils, or greases of animal, fish, or marine mammal origin; vegetable oils, including oils from seeds, nuts, fruits, or kernels; and, other oils and greases, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, synthetic oils, mineral oils, oil refuse, or oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” This definition is notably broader than what many may consider “oil” (i.e., crude oil and refined petroleum products) and encompasses animal fats, vegetable oils, and non-petroleum oils.

When to Notify?

The CWA and OPA require companies to notify the National Response Center (NRC) of oil spills as soon as they are discovered (i.e., within 15 minutes). This applies to all discharges that reach navigable waters of the U.S. (WOTUS) or adjoining shorelines and (1) cause a sheen; (2) violate applicable water quality standards; or (3) cause a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines. In practice, this typically results from a sheen, which 40 C.F.R. § 110.1 defines as an “iridescent appearance on the surface of water.” The Oil Pollution Prevention regulations (discussed further below) also identify discharges from regulated facilities that require reporting, though there are exceptions—for example, when the discharge is in compliance with a permit under Section 402 of the CWA.

Under state and local laws, notification may be much more stringent. For example, California requires immediate reporting of “any significant release or threatened release” of a hazardous material, which includes oil. This can be subjective and requires a fact- and legal-specific evaluation of whether the release qualifies as “threatened” and/or “significant.” In Georgia, immediate notification is required either when the oil creates a “significant sheen on top of state waters” or when the amount discharged is unknown—further creating different criteria for when reporting is required. Regardless of what triggers notification, it is important that companies understand that different agencies—federal, state, and local—may each have different reporting requirements, and accurate and timely reporting is absolutely crucial. Often, failure to timely report is the first violation sought by agencies and can result in increased penalties and additional scrutiny.

What Authorities Are at Play?

At the federal level, two agencies primarily exercise authority over oil spills—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Coast Guard (CG). Depending on the location of the spill, the EPA or CG may lead federal oversight with the EPA overseeing inland spills and CG overseeing offshore spills. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Federal Railroad Administration may also exercise authority for pipeline or railroad releases, respectively.

As mentioned above, Section 311 of the CWA and OPA—enacted in 1990 in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill—make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. In practice, these authorities are best categorized into two areas: (1) oil spill response; and (2) oil spill prevention and preparedness. It is important for companies to understand the expectations for both (discussed in more detail below), and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (often referred to as the National Contingency Plan or NCP), which outlines the federal government’s cleanup strategy for responding to oil spills, including other cleanups under CERCLA. The goal of the NCP is to ensure that resources are available and responses are consistent. Thus, when the federal government oversees a cleanup, the federal On-Scene Coordinator will expect that all response efforts, including those conducted by the responsible party, are consistent with the NCP.

At the state level, most utilize their respective water laws to address oil spills, though some states, like Louisiana, have laws comparable to OPA. At the local level, municipalities have notification and emergency response authorities that will be applicable. In the end, it’s very important that companies understand that several layers of government may have some form of oversight depending on the size, impact, and location of an oil spill.

OPA v. CWA

While the CWA and OPA are complimentary, including OPA amending the CWA, companies should understand the goals and implications of both. Generally, the CWA focuses on oil spill enforcement for cleanups and penalties, and the OPA broadens national and regional capability for preventing, responding to, and paying for oil spills.

For the CWA, Section 311(b)(3) expressly prohibits the discharge of oil (or hazardous substances) into or upon WOTUS and adjoining shorelines in quantities that may be harmful.1 For oil, this generally means discharges to WOTUS that cause sheening or violate applicable water quality standards. Sections 311(c) and (e) of the CWA provide extensive authority to the federal government to respond to these discharges, including threatened discharges, by issuing orders—either unilaterally or by consent—to owners, operators, or persons in charge of the facility from which the discharge occurs.

Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA further empower the federal government to pursue significant penalties—both administrative and civil—for spills that reach WOTUS and/or when responsible parties fail to comply with an order. If gross negligence or willful misconduct is involved, you can expect even greater penalties—commonly more than three-fold—not to mention possible criminal liability. Internally, the EPA utilizes the Civil Penalty Policy for Sections 311(b)(3) and (j) of the CWA and factors outlined in Section 311(b)(8) of the CWA, including the seriousness of the violation, economic benefit to the responsible party, history of prior violations, and efforts to minimize or mitigate the discharge, to evaluate enforcement and penalty calculations.

Akin to the CWA, Section 2702(a) of OPA also makes responsible parties liable for removal costs and natural resource damages resulting from any discharge of oil, including a substantial threat of discharge, to WOTUS and adjoining shorelines. Notably, this includes not only costs incurred by the federal government, but also costs or damages to private parties, including damages for the loss of personal property, loss of revenues/profits due to injury, and cost of additional services during or after a spill. OPA further aims to strengthen national and regional response strategies, amend the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, require facilities to develop prevention and response plans, and establish a fund for damages and cleanup costs—each discussed below.

While it is typically always the priority of the federal government to have responsible parties pay for and conduct their own spill cleanups, when a responsible party is unknown, unable, or refuses to pay, funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) can be utilized to pay for the response. The OSLTF is managed by the CG’s National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) and the NPFC thereby manages any oversight or cleanup costs incurred by the federal government. Thus, if an oil spill occurs at your facility and the federal government incurs costs responding or overseeing, the NPFC will be the entity that seeks recovery of those costs—even if the EPA later pursues penalties for the same discharge pursuant to Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA. In addition, when a non-liable party performs a cleanup or incurs damages as a result of an oil spill, that party may file a claim for reimbursement directly against the responsible party and/or seek reimbursement from the NPFC.

Lastly, regarding liability, both the CWA and OPA are strict liability and provide limited liability defenses for acts of God, acts of war, or acts/omissions of third parties—comparable to CERCLA. Even so, it’s important to note that Section 309(g)(6) of the CWA states that the federal government may not seek enforcement, including penalties, if the state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action” under a comparable state law. This includes issuing a final order or directing a responsible party to pay a penalty. As mentioned above, states typically pursue oil spill violations via their respective water laws, which may be considered comparable. State penalties may often be substantially less than those sought by the federal government—thus, early engagement with the state can be advantageous depending on the circumstances.

Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations

Section 311(j) of the CWA and OPA, as outlined in 40 C.F.R. Part 112, require facilities that store oil in significant quantities to prepare Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans to prevent accidental releases from reaching WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. Facilities with a greater risk of release and impact to WOTUS may also be required to develop a Facility Response Plan (FRP) to prepare for “worst-case spills.” At the outset, companies should confirm whether these regulations are applicable to their operations and facilities.

SPCC plans are required for facilities that are: (1) non-transportation-related (i.e., they store, process, or consume oil rather than simply move it from one facility to another); and (2) collectively store more than 1,320 gallons of oil above ground or 42,000 gallons below ground that could reasonably be expected to discharge oil to a WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. This can include oil drilling and production facilities, oil refineries, industrial, commercial, and agricultural facilities storing/using oil, facilities that transfer oil via pipelines or tank trucks (including airports), and facilities that sell or distribute oil, like marinas. Practically, these regulations require facilities to have a written plan certified by a professional engineer (apart from qualified facilities), maintain adequate secondary containment for oil storage, maintain updated lists of the federal, state, and local agencies that must be contacted in case of a spill, and follow regular inspection requirements, among other requirements.

In addition to SPCC, FRP plans are required for facilities that could reasonably expect to cause “substantial harm” to the environment by discharging oil into or upon WOTUS. They either have: (1) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 42,000 gallons and transfer oil over water to/from vessels; or (2) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 1 million gallons and either do not have sufficient secondary containment, are located at a distance such that a discharge could cause “injury” to habitat or shut down a drinking water intake, or within the past five years, have had a reportable discharge greater than or equal to 10,000 gallons. If so, given that FRP is self-identifiable, the facility must prepare and submit its FRP plan to its applicable EPA regional office. Among other things, these plans include evaluating , medium, and worst-case discharge scenarios, descriptions and records of self-inspections, drills, and response training, and diagrams of the facility site plan, drainage, and evacuation plan.

EPA commonly conducts inspections at subject facilities to ensure that SPCC and FRP plans are effectively implemented. Should your facility have an oil spill, plan on an inspection very soon to evaluate compliance and mitigation efforts with your respective requirements.

Suggested Actions

Beyond being aware of the above implications and requirements, below are several actions to consider to ensure compliance and minimize possible enforcement and/or litigation when the least expected occurs.

  • Act Fast: Should an oil spill occur, regardless of size, act fast to respond, mitigate, and determine if notification is required. This includes immediate internal coordination with those responsible for responding, as well as outreach to your environment counsel and/or consultant. If the determination for reporting is close, it is recommended that you report (with a qualified caveat) rather than withhold.
  • Education and Training: Ensure your staff is trained to effectively respond to, report, and prevent oil spills. Oil spills happen despite best attempts otherwise. When the inevitable happens, make sure facility staff are prepared to respond and mitigate the potential impacts of the spill, including having spill reporting hotlines and other contact numbers easily accessible and staff trained on where all information is located. Also, learn from past spills and/or near spills by conducting evaluations and identifying lessons learned to be utilized to prevent future spills.
  • Prepare for Outside Communication: If the spill is significant or causes public impacts, be prepared for outreach by the public, including local news and community groups. Notifications to the NRC are available online and impacts to public or private property often lead to alerts to local news and organizations. Ensure your public affairs contact(s) are aware and develop necessary communication, including desk statements, should the spill create public attention.
  • Review Compliance: Evaluate your current compliance with federal, state, or local requirements, including the development, assessment, and update (if needed) of SPCC and/or FRP response plans. This includes determining if either or both are required at your facility. Should a spill occur, it is important to make sure your response plans are up-to-date and ready for implementation.
  • Regular Audits and Updates: Periodically audit your spill response and prevention measures (SPCC and FRP plans), including any changes to facility operations, secondary containment features, or volumes of oil stored, to identify and correct inaccuracies and ensure that your plans are up-to-date. For FRP, this includes submitting updates to the appropriate EPA regional office within 60 days of each change that may materially affect the response to a worst-case discharge.
  • Insurance: Though not always necessary, consider appropriate insurance coverage to mitigate potential financial liabilities.
  • Consultation: If you have any doubts about your obligations during an oil spill or need assistance with compliance, please do not hesitate to contact your environment counsel or consultants for guidance and support.

1 While this discussion focuses on the impacts of oil spills, it’s important to remember that Section 311 of the CWA (though not OPA) also applies to hazardous substances—discharges to a WOTUS that exceed a reportable quantity pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 117.3—though the federal government may typically utilize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), or combination thereof, to pursue such releases.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

As Foretold, California’s New Forced Speech Laws Are Being Challenged

Last year, I commented on the likely unconstitutionality of two California laws compelling forced speech:

The California legislature has of late adopted the tactic of driving behavior by compelling speech. SB 253 (Wiener), for example, compels disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and SB 261 (Stern) requires disclosure of climate-related financial risks. Both of these requirements clearly compel speech arguably in contravention of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.”).

I had previously noted that SB 253 was very similar to an earlier bill that did not make it into law.

Yesterday, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and several others filed suit in the Central District Court challenging these laws. In its complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the “State’s plan for compelling speech to combat climate change is unconstitutional – twice over.” The plaintiffs urge the court to apply “strict scrutiny” to both laws because they compel speech about a controversial subject – climate change. If the court applies strict scrutiny, the bills would be presumptively unconstitutional and may be upheld only by proof that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. That is an exceedingly high hill to climb.

Because both bills quite obviously violate basic free speech rights, the question arises whether the authors knew or were grossly negligent in not knowing of the constitutional infirmities of the legislation. In 2020, I wrote Senator Wiener, the author of SB 253, that SB 260, “abridges free speech rights guaranteed by the U.S. and California Constitutions”. At the time, I was distressed that the legislative analyses for SB 260 failed to mention the constitutional infirmities of the bill. See Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities Of Climate Corporate Accountability Act and Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities of Climate Corporate Accountability Act.

For more news on California Free Speech Laws regarding Climate Change, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

CalRecycle Seeks Stakeholder Feedback on Single-Use Packaging EPR Program

Tomorrow, February 1, the California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle) will host a hybrid question and answer session to discuss the draft rulemaking on their extended producer responsibility (EPR) program, as discussed below. A 45-day public comment period will follow. Members of the regulated community who wish to attend can find in-person and virtual information on the session here.

Members of B&D’s Plastics and Packaging team will attend the public meeting and will be prepared to answer any questions clients and contacts may have. A more substantive update on what to expect from CalRecycle and the rulemaking process is forthcoming.

Background

In June 2022, the California legislature passed a transformational law creating an EPR program with ambitious goals to ensure 100% of single-use packaging and plastic food ware is recyclable or compostable by 2032. The law creates responsibility for producers, typically manufacturers that are brand owners (although it applies to others as well), to join a producer responsibility organization (PRO) that will develop a plan to implement the law, including raising $5 billion from industry members over 10 years. CalRecycle has selected the Circular Action Alliance (CAA) as the PRO and is developing regulations to implement the law.

Companies potentially impacted by the SB 54 regulations should monitor the rulemaking process and prepare to submit comments within the upcoming 45-day public comment period. To receive periodic updates on CalRecycle’s implementation of SB 54, subscribe to the Agency’s SB 54 listserv here.