Crying Over Spilled Milk: What Companies Can Learn from the Paula Deen Disaster

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Paula Deen may be the most recent celebrity to ruin the brand she built, but she is certainly not the first. Consider Martha Stewart, Tiger Woods, and Lance Armstrong. At one point, all had an empire built around their name and reputation. And, just like that, all were vehemently vilified by the press and public when an aspect of their personal lives became front-page news, resulting in the swift destruction of their businesses.

PR disasters can happen faster than a boiling pot can run over, and as Paula Deen is learning, it is hard to contain the mess once it has been unleashed. Even if companies do not have a national celebrity as the face of their business, there is a lot they can learn from the Calorie Queen’s downfall.

Separate the brand from the CEO (or other high-powered figure)

We are all human. What happened to Paula Deen can happen to any business owner.  People make inappropriate comments, go to prison, sleep around, and take steroids (see above-named individuals). When your face is more than just who you are, though, you have to tread lightly in the public eye.  When your face is your brand, negative publicity affects business.

Food Network, Smithfield Foods, Wal-Mart, Novo Nordisk, and Home Depot did not drop Paula Deen because her products were not up-to-par. They dropped Paula Deen because her public image tarnished her brand.

A company should not rest on one person’s reputation, but should be built around principles, a mission, or a niche. That way, when the higher-ups make a mistake, the company can continue. With that being said, management and boards should be concerned with how the highly visible, well-known figures in their companies are behaving, whether they are on national TV or at a local charity gala. Employment agreements should always include expectations regarding behavior and how one represents the company. Extensive background checks should occur for any employee who could potentially taint the brand.

Act fast, but fully assess the situation

In the age of social media, an incident can lead to pandemonium in no time. Allegations can spread quickly and extensively. Whether, when, and why Deen may have uttered an offensive racial slur is of no matter because Facebook and Twitter reported that she did; that was enough for public conviction. If gossip is spreading about your business, do not be afraid to address it head-on through social media or a press release. But do not fall victim to knee-jerk reactions. Take time to investigate, come up with a game plan, and take necessary action before addressing the publicity. If the incident is so bad that your company’s future is on the line, then hire a PR team to step in.

Thank employees, customers and clients for loyalty

There are a lot of angry fans out there who think Paula Deen was thrown under the milk truck. In the midst of almost every PR crisis, there will be supporters. These people will stand by the company when others are jumping ship. Make your gratitude to them known, whether it is in the form of a bonus, sincere message on your company Facebook page, or a customer appreciation day. Find some way to turn the situation into a positive one.

We have likely not heard the last of Paula Deen. Her brand, though in the trenches now, may pull through. And there is always a scorned celebrity book deal to be made. Smaller companies may not recover so easily from PR blows. Business owners should always be monitoring their image and employees to minimize risks. HR departments should be pro-active. Expectations should be communicated. Professionals should be consulted if needed.

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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Sanctions Revlon Financial Makeover; Tips for Setting a Strong Foundation for Going Private Transaction Success

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On June 13, 2013, the SEC entered into a cease and desist order and imposed an $850,000 civil money penalty against Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) in connection with a 2009 “going private” transaction (the Revlon SEC Order).  This article identifies some of the significant challenges in executing a going private transaction and highlights particular aspects of the Revlon deal that can serve as a teaching lesson for planning and minimizing potential risks and delays in future going private transactions.

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Background of Revlon Going Private Transaction.

The controlling stockholder of Revlon, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (M&F), made a proposal to the independent directors of Revlon in April of 2009 to acquire, by way of merger (the Merger Proposal), all of the Class A common stock not currently owned by M&F (the Revlon Minority Stockholders).  The Merger Proposal was submitted as a partial solution to address Revlon’s liquidity needs arising under an impending maturity of a $107 million senior subordinated term loan that was payable to M&F by a Revlon subsidiary.  A portion of this debt (equal to the liquidation value of the preferred stock issued in the Merger Proposal) would be contributed by M&F to Revlon, as part of the transaction.  This was submitted as an alternative in lieu of potentially cost-prohibitive and dilutive financing alternatives (or potentially unavailable financing alternatives) during the volatile credit market following the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis.

In response to the Merger Proposal, Revlon formed a special committee of the Board (the Special Committee) to evaluate the Merger Proposal.  The Special Committee retained a financial advisor and separate counsel to assist in its evaluation of the Merger Proposal.  Four lawsuits were filed in Delaware between April 24 and May 12 of 2009 challenging various aspects of the Merger Proposal.

On May 28, 2009, the Special Committee was informed by its financial advisor that it would be unable to render a fairness opinion on the Merger Proposal, and thereafter the Special Committee advised M&F that it could not recommend the Merger Proposal.  In early June of 2009, the Special Committee disbanded, but the independent directors subsequently were advised that M&F would make a voluntary exchange offer proposal to the full Revlon Board of Directors (the Exchange Offer). Revlon’s independent directors thereafter chose to continue to utilize counsel that served to advise the Special Committee, but they elected not to retain a financial advisor for assistance with the forthcoming M&F Exchange Offer proposal, because they were advised that the securities to be offered in the Exchange Offer would be substantially similar to those issuable through Merger Proposal.  As a result, they did not believe they could obtain a fairness opinion for the Exchange Offer consideration.  The Board of Directors of Revlon (without the interested directors participating in the vote) ultimately approved the Exchange Offer without receiving any fairness opinion with respect to the Exchange Offer.

On September 24, 2009, the final terms of the Exchange Offer were set and the offer was launched.  The Exchange Offer, having been extended several times, finally closed on October 8, 2009, with less than half of the shares tendered for exchange out of all Class A shares held by the Revlon Minority Stockholders.  On October 29, 2009, Revlon announced third quarter financial results that exceeded market expectations, but these results were allegedly consistent with the financial projections disclosed in the Exchange Offer.  Following these announced results, Revlon’s Class A stock price increased.  These developments led to the filing of additional litigation in Delaware Chancery Court.

The Revlon SEC Order and Associated Rule 13e-3 Considerations.

A subset of the Revlon Minority Stockholders consisted of participants in a Revlon 401(k) retirement plan, which was subject to obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA) and a trust agreement (the Trust Agreement) between Revlon and the Plan’s trustee (the Trustee).  Provisions of ERISA and the Trust Agreement prohibited a 401(k) Plan participant’s sale of common stock to Revlon for less than “adequate consideration.”

During July of 2009, Revlon became actively involved with the Trustee to control the flow of information concerning any adequate consideration determination, to prevent such information from flowing back to Revlon and to prevent such information from flowing to 401(k) participants (and ultimately Revlon Minority Stockholders); certain amendments to the Trust Agreement were requested by Revlon and agreed to by the Trustee to effect these purposes.  This also had the additional effect of preventing the independent directors of Revlon from being aware that an adequate consideration opinion would be rendered for the benefit of Revlon’s 401(k) Plan participants.

On September 28, 2009, the financial advisor to the 401(k) Plan rendered an adverse opinion that the Exchange Offer did not provide adequate consideration to 401(k) Plan participants.  As a result, the Trustee informed 401(k) Plan participants, as previously directed by Revlon, that the 401(k) Plan Trustee could not honor tender instructions because it would result in a “non-exempt prohibited transaction under ERISA.”  Revlon Minority Stockholders, including 401(k) Plan participants, were generally unaware that an unfavorable adequate consideration opinion had been delivered to the Trustee.

In the Revlon SEC Order, the SEC concluded that Revlon engaged in a series of materially misleading disclosures in violation of Rule 13e-3.  Despite disclosure in the Exchange Offer that the Revlon Board had approved the Exchange Offer and related transactions based upon the “totality of information presented to and considered by its members” and that such approval was the product of a “full, fair and complete” process, the SEC found that the process, in fact, was not full, fair and complete.  The SEC particularly found that the Board’s process “was compromised because Revlon concealed from both minority shareholders and from its independent board members that it had engaged in a course of conduct to ‘ring-fence’ the adequate consideration determination.”  The SEC further found that “Revlon’s ‘ring-fencing’ deprived the Board (and in turn Revlon Minority Stockholders) of the opportunity to receive revised, qualified or supplemental disclosures including any that might have informed them of the third party financial advisor’s determination that the transaction consideration to be received by the 401(k) members . . . was inadequate.”

Significance of the Revlon SEC Order.

The Revlon Order underscores the significance of transparency and fairness being extended to all unaffiliated stockholders in a Rule 13e-3 transaction, including the 401(k) Plan participants whose shares represented only 0.6 percent of the Revlon Minority Stockholder holdings.  Importantly, the SEC took exception to the fact that Revlon actively prevented the flow of information regarding fairness and found that the information should have been provided for the benefit of these participants, as well as all Revlon Minority Stockholders.  This result ensued despite the fact that Revlon’s Exchange Offer disclosures noted in detail the Special Committee’s inability to obtain a fairness opinion for the Merger Proposal and the substantially similar financial terms of the preferred stock offered in both the Merger Proposal and the Exchange Offer transactions.

Going Private Transactions are Subject to Heightened Review by the SEC and Involve Significant Risk, Including Personal Risk.

Going private transactions are vulnerable to multiple challenges, including state law fiduciary duty claims and wide ranging securities law claims, including claims for private damages as well as SEC civil money penalties.  In the Revlon transaction, the SEC Staff conducted a full review of the going private transaction filings.  Despite the significant substantive changes in disclosure brought about through the SEC comment process, the SEC subsequently pursued an enforcement action and prevailed against Revlon for civil money penalties.

Although the SEC sanction was limited in scope to Revlon, it is worth noting that the SEC required each of Revlon, M&F and M&F’s controlling stockholder, Ronald Perelman, to acknowledge (i) personal responsibility for the adequacy and accuracy of disclosure in each filing; (ii) that Staff comments do not foreclose the SEC from taking action including enforcement action with regard to the filing; and (iii) that each may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the SEC or any other person under securities laws.  Thus, in planning a going private transaction, an issuer and each affiliate engaged in the transaction (each, a Filing Person) must make these acknowledgements, which expose each Filing Person (including certain affiliates who may be natural persons) to potential damages and sanctions.

The SEC also requires Filing Persons to demonstrate in excruciating detail the basis for their beliefs regarding the fairness of the transaction.  These inquiries typically focus on the process followed in pursuing and negotiating the transaction, the procedural fairness associated with such process, and the substantive fairness of the overall transaction, including financial fairness.  As a result of this, each Filing Person (including certain natural persons) in a going private transaction should be prepared to diligently satisfy cumbersome process and fairness requirements as part of the pre-filing period deliberative process, and later stand behind extensive and detailed disclosures that demonstrate and articulate the basis of the procedural and substantive fairness of the transaction, including financial fairness.

Damages and Penalties in Going Private Transactions Can Be Significant.

It is worth noting that civil money penalties and settlements that have been announced to date by Revlon for its Exchange Offer going private transaction is approximately $30 million.  After factoring in professional fees, it would not be surprising that the total post-closing costs, penalties and settlements approach 50 percent of the implied total transaction value of all securities offered in the Exchange Offer transaction.  From this experience, it is obvious that costs, damages and penalties can be a significant component of overall transaction consideration, and these risks must be factored in as part of overall transaction planning at the outset.

Given the risks of post-transaction damages and costs, it is essential that future going private transactions be structured and executed by Filing Persons with the foregoing considerations in mind in order to advance a transaction with full transparency, a demonstrably fair procedural process and deal consideration that is substantively fair and demonstrably supportable as fair from a financial point-of-view.

Does a Valid Copyright Exist in the Song “Happy Birthday To You”?

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Ownership of a copyright in one of the most popular songs in the English language has recently been challenged in several lawsuits around the country.  At the heart of the dispute is whether the music publisher Warner Chappell legitimately owns a copyright in, and thus has the right to license (and enforce) the rights to, the ubiquitous song “Happy Birthday to You.”  Since it acquired a company in 1998 that claimed to own the rights in this song, some have estimated that Warner makes as much as $2M per year licensing the rights to use this song in various movies and television shows.  Two recently filed lawsuits are challenging this ownership claim and seek a ruling that the rights to the song have passed into the public domain.

The long and tortured history of the song, which has been methodically detailed by Professor Robert Brauneis in his excellent article on the topic, begins with the melody of the song which was originally written in the late 19th Century by two sisters, Mildred and Patty Hill.  Although there is still some dispute over the originality of the melody, Professor Bauneis’s research indicates it may have been wholly original even if loosely based on prior folk songs. What is undisputed, however, is that the Hill sisters’ melody was first published in a collection of children’s songs in 1893.  That melody (with different lyrics) was originally titled “Good Morning to All,” and was intended to be used as a greeting by teachers to their students.  What may be forever lost to history is who combined the current words with the Hill sisters’ melody and when. There is evidence from as early as 1911 that the current words and melody (i.e., the “Good Morning to All” melody) were being used together.

 Warner argues that its rights stem from two principal sources acquired over the years through many corporate mergers: (1) a 1935 piano arrangement of the melody of the song, which critics have noted is a specific arrangement of the song that is not the popular version known today, and (2) a copyright registration in a 1924 songbook containing the lyrics.

The suits challenge Warner’s claimed rights on several grounds. One is lack of originality. To be protected by copyright, a work must be sufficiently “original.”  Plaintiffs allege that Warner’s claimed versions of the song are not original enough, and do not protect the version of the song we know today.  Second, they allege that the version of the music in which Warner claims rights, the specific 1935 piano arrangement of the song, is not sufficiently similar to the current version to enable it to claim any rights in the current version. Finally, according to the Plaintiffs, any copyright in the prior versions expired long ago, either through term limits on copyright protection or through the failure of the original owners to properly renew those rights many years ago.

Since the license fees Warner charges for use of the song are not exorbitant, there has been little financial incentive for anyone to take Warner to court over the rights to the song. Since multiple litigations are now pending, there will likely be amicus briefs filed on plaintiffs’ side from many sources. This “crowdsourcing” of history, knowledge and effort (and cost) in re-creating as accurate a picture as possible of the history of the rights of this song is probably the best chance yet of getting to the bottom of the long open question regarding the ownership of “Happy Birthday to You.”

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Handbags and High-Heeled Shoes: Recent Trademark Disputes in the World of Fashion

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When Paul Simon first sang about “diamonds on the soles of her shoes” in the 1980’s, he was apparently more fashion forward than we realized.  Less than a decade later, in the early 1990’s, the fashion house of Christian Louboutin began selling women’s high-fashion designer footwear displaying a distinctive red, glossy sole on the bottom of high-heeled shoes. Legend has it, Louboutin came up with the idea when he painted red nail polish on a pair of women’s shoes because they “lacked energy.”  These shoes soon became highly sought after by celebrities and consumers of haute couture everywhere.

Louboutin federally registered its red-colored sole for footwear as a trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 2008. In 2011, Louboutin sought to enforce those rights by suing Yves Saint Laurent for selling red shoes that displayed red soles. In its Resort 2011 collection, the American branch of YSL featured purple, navy, green…and red shoes that all had soles of matching color. Louboutin took exception to the red-soled shoes and tried to stomp out YSL’s allegedly infringing activity.

At the district court level, a New York judge ruled against Louboutin’s request that YSL be enjoined from selling red-soled shoes. On appeal in September of 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly held that Louboutin could protect its iconic red-soled shoes, except when the entire shoe itself is red.  Therefore, YSL was allowed to continue selling its monochromatic red shoes. Both parties have claimed victory and the case was dismissed in December.

The defendant in a case brought by Coach, Inc., and recently decided, did not fare quite so well. In 2010, Coach sued the owner of the Southwest Flea Market located in Memphis, Tennessee for contributory trademark infringement, claiming he knew, or should have known, that some of the vendors at the flea market were selling counterfeit Coach Handbags and other infringing products. Prior to filing suit, Coach had sent letters to the defendant, putting him on notice of the infringement. Even after the filing of the suit, multiple raids were conducted at the flea market, and more than 4,600 counterfeit Coach products were seized.

In the case pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, the magistrate judge granted summary judgment to Coach in 2012, ruling that the owner of the flea market was contributorily liable for the infringement, and the jury awarded Coach more than $5 million in damages. The case was appealed and last month the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled, for the first time ever, on the question of whether the owner of a flea market can be held liable for contributory trademark infringement. The answer was a resounding “yes”, as the court upheld the lower court’s ruling and the $5.04 million damage award. In its ruling, the court admonished the flea market owner for engaging in “ostrich-like behavior”, willfully ignoring the infringing activities occurring at the market, showing that the high price of fashion applies not just to the cost of the merchandise, but also to not respecting the trademarks by which that merchandise is known.

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Costco Claims Tiffany & Co. is Generic Re: Trademark Infringement and Genericide

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One of the biggest threats to a brand owner is genericide, whereby widespread usage of a mark in the marketplace causes the term to be considered by the public to be a generic term for a particular product rather than a source identifier. Some well-known examples of marks which became generic over time in certain jurisdictions are “aspirin” and “escalator”. When genericide occurs, a mark can no longer function as a trade mark, as it ceases to identify a particular source or to distinguish the origin of the product from competing products. Once a mark has become generic, the law deems it available for all parties to use and the now-former brand owner no longer has exclusive rights to it.

The threat of genericide is something that brand owners work very hard to try and avoid, since the result would be that they no longer have a trade mark.  Similarly, if a mark has become generic, third parties have the right to use it.  Therefore, a claim that a particular mark has become generic is a defense to an allegation of trade mark infringement.

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The general test for whether a designation has become generic is whether the public believes that such designation connotes the generic name of a product or a brand indicating the source of the product. This issue will soon be considered by the courts in a lawsuit initiated by Tiffany & Co against Costco.

In the lawsuit, Tiffany accused Costco of trade mark infringement and false advertising, objecting to Costco’s offering of rings which were promoted as “Tiffany diamond engagement rings”. Rather than deny Tiffany’s accusations, Costco took an aggressive defensive position, claiming that a “Tiffany setting” is generic for an engagement ring setting comprised of multiple slender prongs extending upward from a base to hold a single gemstone. Costco further alleged that although a design called a “Tiffany setting” may have started out as a trademark, frequent third-party use had caused it to become genericide. As part of its counterclaims, Costco claimed that certain of Tiffany’s trade mark registrations are invalid. Not surprisingly, Tiffany has vehemently objected to Costco’s claims of genericide. The legal battle is just getting underway but this matter will be one that is highly publicized and closely monitored.

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No “Safe Harbor” for BitTorrent Website Operator

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of seven film studios finding that the defendant induced third parties to download infringing copies of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., et al.  v. Gary Fung, et al., Case No. 10-55946 (9th Cir., Mar.21, 2013) (Berzon, J.).

Seven film studios—including Columbia Pictures, Disney and Twentieth Century Fox—sued Gary Fung and his company isoHunt Technologies, claiming that Fung induced third parties to download infringing copies of the studios’ copyrighted works through Fung’s websites, such as torrentbox.com and isohunt.com—websites that help users find copies of videos to download and stream through a type of peer-to-peer file sharing network.

The district court found Fung liable for contributory copyright infringement for inducing others to infringe the studios’ copyrights and also found that Fung was not entitled to protection from damages liability under the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  After a permanent injunction was issued, Fung appealed.

On appeal, Fung challenged the full holding, including the scope of the injunction claiming that it was vague, punitive and an impediment to free speech.  The 9th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court decision in Grokster III (which also dealt with peer-to-peer file sharing technology), analyzed the facts of the present case under the four elements of the Grokster III inducement principle:  the distribution of a device or product, acts of infringement, an object of promoting its use to infringe copyright and causation.

Inducement Liability Under Grokster III

With respect to the first element of the Grokster III inducement liability standard, Fung argued that he did not develop or distribute products, nor did he develop the BitTorrent protocol used by his websites.  The 9th Circuit, however, distinguished copyrights as expression that are not necessarily in the form of products or devices. Thus, the court concluded that a copyright can be infringed through “culpable actions resulting in impermissible reproductions of copyrighted expression,” even if such actions are the provision of services used in accomplishing the infringement.

Fung was not able to rebut the second “acts of infringement” Grokster III factor after the studios presented evidence that Fung’s services were widely used to infringe copyrights by allowing uploading and downloading of copyrighted material. Accordingly, the court found for the studios on the second factor, noting that the “predominant use” of Fung’s services was for copyright infringement.

As to the third Grokster III factor, the court agreed with Fung that mere knowledge of a potential to infringe, or knowledge of actual infringing uses of a product or service, is not enough for liability.  Nevertheless, the court found there was more than enough evidence that Fung offered his services with the object to promote their use to infringe copyrighted material.  Specifically, the court found that the evidence showed Fung actively encouraged uploading files of specific copyrighted material; he provided links for certain movies and urged users to download those movies; he affirmatively responded to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted materials; and, he even personally instructed users on how to burn infringing files to DVDs.  The court also referenced two points of circumstantial evidence raised by the Grokster III opinion, namely, that Fung took no steps to develop filtering tools to diminish infringing activity and that he generated revenue by selling advertising space on his websites.

Finally, as to causation, the court adopted the studios’ interpretation of causation and held that the acts of infringement by third parties need only be caused by the product distributed or services provided.  This was contrary to Fung’s theory of causation (which was also joined by amicus curiae, Google) wherein Fung claimed that the infringement must be directly caused by a defendant’s inducing messages.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act “Safe Harbor” Provisions

Fung also asserted affirmative defenses under three of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, 17 U.S.C. §512(a), (c) and (d). Although the studios argued that there can never be a DMCA safe harbor defense to contributory copyright liability inducement, the 9th Circuit disagreed, noting that the safe harbor provisions do not exclude vicarious or contributory liability from its protections. Even so, the court denied all of Fung’s safe harbor defenses.

In particular, the court concluded that Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(a) for transitory digital network communications because Fung’s torrent file trackers, not the third party users, were responsible for selecting the copyrighted data to be transmitted.

The court also concluded that § 512(c), relating to information residing on networks or systems at the direction of the users, was also not applicable because Fung had actual and “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity on his system due to his own active encouragement of infringement, as well as the fact that Fung did not dispute evidence that he personally used his isohunt.com website to download infringing material.

According to the 9th Circuit, Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(c) or §512(d) (for providers of information location tools) because Fung received a “financial benefit” from his services by selling ad space and because he had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, which was shown through evidence that Fung exerted substantial influence on the activities of the users of his websites.

Finding no available defenses under the DMCA safe harbors, the court affirmed summary judgment for the studios on the issue of liability under contributory copyright infringement.  However, the court found various terms of the lower court’s permanent injunction to be vague and unduly burdensome and remanded to the district court to modify certain employment prohibitions and to provide more specific language for several terms in the injunction.

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East Coast Spotlight on Design Patents: Spanx v. Yummie Tummie

The National Law Review recently featured an article, East Coast Spotlight on Design Patents: Spanx v. Yummie Tummie, written by Michael A. Cicero with Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC:

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Certainly the recent design patent litigation between Apple and Samsung in the Northern District of California garnered significant media attention.  Design patents now reside in the media spotlight once again, but this time through East Coast litigants.  The president of a New York-based maker of women’s control tops that is a named owner of several design patents openly declared that she hopes her Georgia-based competitor “is ready for war because [she] will not lie down.”  The accused infringer actually started the litigation following its receipt of a cease-and-desist letter from the New York company’s legal counsel.

On March 5, 2013, Spanx, Inc. (“Spanx”) filed a declaratory judgment complaint in the Northern District of Georgia against Times Three Clothier, LLC d/b/a Yummie Tummie (“Yummie Tummie”), requesting the court to declare that three Spanx products do not infringe seven design patentsclaimed to be owned by Yummie Tummie.  The lawsuit has already generated a considerable amount of media coverage, including sources cited below and NBC’s Today Show.

The lawsuit pits two prominent entrepreneurs against one another.  Heather Thomson, the president of Yummie Tummie, is not only the sole inventor named in each of the patents-in-suit (as Heather Thomson Schindler), but was also one of the “Real Housewives of New York.”[1]  Sara Blakely, according to ABC News, “founded Spanx in 2000, introducing what Spanx calls a shaping camisole in 2005,” and is “the youngest woman on Forbes’ billionaires list.”

Referring to an interview Thomson gave to the publication WWD (Women’s Wear Daily),lifeinc.today.com reports:

Thomson told WWD that she first learned of the product this past November when she received an anonymous package containing the Spanx Total Taming Tank and a note saying it was on sale at QVC.  “I immediately recognized it as my original Yummie Tummie tank,” Thomson told WWD.  The unsigned note said Spanx was selling it at QVC.  A spokeswoman for Thomson declined to comment further.

“The Patents-in-Suit are related to one another,” states Spanx’s complaint, “in that [six of the patents] all claim priority to the [oldest] Patent.”  Excerpts from two of these patents appear in Figure 1, below, for purposes of illustration.

The complaint alleges that Yummie Tummie’s counsel sent Spanx a cease-and-desist letter on or around January 18, 2013, identifying the accused products as Spanx’s “Total Taming Tank,” the “Top This Tank Style 1847,” and the “Top This Cami Style 1846.”  (See Figure 2 below, depicting two of those products.)  Spanx responded to that letter on or around February 14, 2013, according to the complaint, “describing in detail significant differences between the Accused Products and the Patents-in-Suit and stating, among other things, that it does not believe the Accused Products infringe the Patents-in-Suit.”

Figure 1: Depictions of Fig. 1 from Yummie Tummie’s U.S. Patents Nos. D606,285S (left) and D632,052S (right)
Figure 2: Two accused Spanx products as shown in its website: Styles Nos. 1846 (left) and 1847 (right)

Counsel for each party then communicated with one another several times but, states the complaint, Yummie Tummie “continued to maintain that the Accused Products infringe the Patents-in-Suit and expressed a willingness to enforce its patents against Spanx.”  Thus, Spanx alleges, it has grounds for seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the Patents-in-Suit.  The complaint requests such declaratory relief plus “costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by law.”

As of the time of this writing, Yummie Tummie has not yet filed a formal answer to the complaint (its allotted time for doing so under procedural rules has not yet expired).  Yummie Tummie has, though, already  issued a public statement regarding the lawsuit.  In a March 14, 2013 letter addressed directly to Blakely and published on Yummie Tummie’s website, Thomson states, among other things: “We brought this to your attention expecting you to stop.  Instead you’ve chosen to sue us, no doubt thinking that your massive company could intimidate ours.  We have successfully enforced our design patents in the past and will continue to do so.”

The case is Spanx, Inc. v. Times Three Clothier, LLC d/b/a Yummie Tummie, No. 1:13-cv-0710-WSD,filed 03/05/13 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, assigned to U.S. District Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.


[1] Coincidentally, the Northern District of Georgia is also the site of a legal battle between two “Real Housewives of Atlanta,” filed just one week after the Spanx lawsuit.  See prior post.

Copyright © 2013 Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

ABA Gaming Law Minefield Conference – February 14-15, 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming ABA Gaming Law Minefield Conference:

ABA Gaming Law Feb 14-15, 2013

When

February 14 – 15, 2013

Where

  • Green Valley Ranch Resort & Spa
  • 2300 Paseo Verde Pkwy
  • Las Vegas, NV 89101
  • United States of America
 
The program will discuss revolutionary legal, regulator, and ethical issues confronting both commercial and Native American gaming.  Attendees will learn about global anti-corruption initiatives, Internet gaming, and the challenges faced by commercial and Native American gaming.

ABA Gaming Law Minefield Conference – February 14-15, 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming ABA Gaming Law Minefield Conference:

ABA Gaming Law Feb 14-15, 2013

When

February 14 – 15, 2013

Where

  • Green Valley Ranch Resort & Spa
  • 2300 Paseo Verde Pkwy
  • Las Vegas, NV 89101
  • United States of America
 
The program will discuss revolutionary legal, regulator, and ethical issues confronting both commercial and Native American gaming.  Attendees will learn about global anti-corruption initiatives, Internet gaming, and the challenges faced by commercial and Native American gaming.

Controversial Film “Escape From Tomorrow” Shows Need to Protect Intellectual Property

The National Law Review recently published an article written by Matthew J. Kreutzer with Armstrong Teasdale regarding Intellectual Property Protection:

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“Escape From Tomorrow,” one of the most controversial films at the 2013 Sundance Film Festival, has put copyright and trademark law, as well as the question of what constitutes parody, in the spotlight. The film reminds companies why it is important to protect their intellectual property: to prevent use (or misuse) by others.

“Escape” tells the story of a family on vacation at Disney World during the outbreak of a mysterious new flu virus. As family members tour the park, they are plagued by increasingly bizarre events that make the rides at the “Happiest Place on Earth” appear to have sinister undertones. As the film progresses, the audience is forced to question whether there really is something unpleasant lurking beneath the famously joyful facade, or if instead, the parents themselves are slowly losing their grip on reality.

Although the film is interesting in its own right, it has become both controversial and noteworthy because it was made “guerilla-style” at the Disney World and Disneyland theme parks without the knowledge or consent of Disney. The cast and crew are seen in the film walking the parks, riding the famous rides, and interacting with the beloved Disney characters without having names, likenesses or locations blurred or obscured. Moreover, ordinary park visitors, who did not know they were being filmed or consent to being in the movie, appear as the background actors.

In the end, Disney may not choose, and ultimately may not be able, to stop the general release of “Escape,” but the specter of IP protection at least gives Disney a possible avenue to pursue. Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists the various purposes for which the reproduction of a particular work may be considered fair use, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. The section also sets out factors to be considered in determining whether a particular use is fair including whether the work is of commercial nature.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court considers parody to be fair use, the particular facts are critical to the final outcome since there is a fine line between parody and a derivative work. Thus, whether the depiction of the Disney parks in “Escape” constitutes fair use could be a matter of interpretation.

“Escape” serves as a warning to those in marketing and sales about the risks of using intellectual property owned by others, such as copyrighted images, when developing promotional materials and webpages. Use of protected images, for example, may not be fair when designed for commercial gain.

Finally, the controversy surrounding “Escape” is a reminder about the danger of showing people in commercial videos, including those used in social media, who have not given their consent to being filmed. Those individuals may have a right of publicity or even claims based on a violation of a right to privacy.

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