Entertainment Law Archives - Page 5 of 10

Sex Education for Minors?

As we previously reported, this past fall, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law AB 2338, which includes a provision requiring minors 14-17 years of age and their parents/guardians to receive sexual harassment prevention training prior to the issuance of an entertainment work permit by the California Labor Commissioner. Earlier this week, the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) published its guidance regarding AB 2338 on its website. The DLSE’s very brief guidance does answer some questions regarding the new law, yet leaves some unanswered.

First, the DLSE’s guidance notes that applicants for 10-day temporary entertainment work permits are exempt from the training requirement.

Second, it provides two options for 13-year-old minors who will reach their 14th birthday during the period of a six-month entertainment work permit: (1) apply for a permit which will expire on the minor’s 14th birthday; or (2) the Labor Commissioner will issue permits to minors at least 13 years and six months of age, who provide satisfactory proof of sexual harassment prevention training as an age-eligible minor.

Third, the DLSE’s guidance specifies that the sexual harassment prevention training must at a minimum include the components specified in the Department of Fair Employment and Housing’s form, DFEH Form 185. This form includes general information regarding sexual harassment as well as employers’ responsibilities related to sexual harassment. The training must be administered by a third-party vendor and may be provided electronically or on site, in a language the participants understand.

Although AB 2338 went into effect on January 1, 2019, the DLSE has stated that, due to the “unavailability of third-party vendors and applicable materials at this time,” the Labor Commissioner will not enforce the new law until June 30, 2019. Even following the DLSE’s guidance, questions remain regarding the new law, such as the required length of the trainings and which vendors will be deemed acceptable. MSK will continue to monitor this area and will provide an update via its blog upon any further developments.

This post was written by Jeremy Mittman and Hilary E. Feybush of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP.

Nazi-Looted Art: Cranach Paintings to Remain at Norton Simon Museum

Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Adam^[1]and Eve^[2]have hung in the Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena for nearly 50 years. Since 2007, though, they have been the subject of a dispute between the museum and Marei von Saher. Von Saher is the daughter-in-law and surviving heir of Jacques Goudstikker, a Jewish art dealer who fled the Nazi-occupied Netherlands with his family in 1940. Goudstikker’s gallery and the family’s other assets were then acquired by members of Nazi leadership through a series of forced sales, with the gallery and the family’s residence being purchased by Alois Meidl, and more than 800 of the Goudstikker paintings – including Adam and Eve – being acquired by Hermann Goering.

The story of the Nazi seizure of artworks from public and private art collections in Europe has by now become a commonplace of popular culture.^[3] Scholars have noted that “as many works of art were displaced, transported, and stolen as during the entire Thirty Years War or all the Napoleonic Wars.”^[4] It has been estimated that “[o]ne-third of all of the art in private hands had been pillaged by the Nazis.”^[5] Nazi looting of art took a number of forms: direct confiscation (seized by government officials and agents); “abandoned” objects (seized after being left behind as their owners fled persecution);^[6] forced sales;^[7] and what are sometimes called “fluchtgut” or “fluchtkunst”^[8] (“flight goods” or “flight art,” which are cultural objects sold, generally at a steep discount, by owners desperate to finance their escape from Nazi-occupied or threatened areas). For background on Nazi-looted art, see my previous discussions here and here.

That the Cranach panels were looted by the Nazis is not disputed. Rather, the question for the court was whether the post-war restitution processes properly vested ownership of the paintings in the Dutch government such that its 1966 sale of those paintings to George Stroganoff-Sherbatoff (Stroganoff) (from whom the museum purchased them in 1971) was a valid governmental action, and so is not reviewable by U.S. courts. With a decision issued by the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on July 30, the case may have reached its conclusion.^[9]

In 1931 in Berlin, Goudstikker purchased the panels from the Soviet Union at an auction of objects the Soviets had seized from the Stroganoff family (and others).^[10] Although the district court, in its 2016 decision, ^[11]had found that the Stroganoff family never owned the panels, Stroganoff ownership of the panels is unclear from the evidence presented. The question of Stroganoff ownership of the panels was ultimately not germane to the 9th Circuit’s decision. The panels were recovered by U.S. forces at the end of the war and returned to the Dutch government. Rather, the issue was whether the Dutch government had good title to the panels at the time it sold them to Stroganoff.

When the war was over, and the panels were recovered by U.S. forces., it was U.S. policy to return recovered Nazi-looted objects to the governments of the countries from which they had been taken, for ultimate restitution or other disposition.

The 9th Circuit’s analysis focuses on three aspects of Dutch law relating to Nazi agreements and confiscated property: (1) a wartime law nullifying Nazi agreements; (2) the post-war restitution regime; and (3) a post-war law forfeiting to the Dutch government property owned by enemies during the war.

During the war, the Dutch government (then in exile) enacted a law that nullified wartime agreements with the Nazis. After the war, however, that automatic nullification was revoked. The Dutch government instead put in place a formal restitution and restoration of rights process.^[12]Claimants had until 1951 to file a petition for restoration of rights, after which the presiding council “could still order restoration of rights of its own accord, but claimants were no longer entitled to demand restitution.”^[13] Finally, to compensate the Netherlands for its losses during the war, the government also enacted Royal Decree E133, which forfeited to the Dutch government all property “belonging to an enemy state or to an enemy national.”^[14] Under Royal Decree E133, the paintings owned by Goering were forfeited to the Dutch government.

Goudstikker’s widow, Desi, returned to the Netherlands after the war and took on leadership of the firm. She petitioned for restoration of rights for the assets that had been purchased by Meidl, but, on advice, she decided not to petition for return of the paintings purchased by Goering.

In 1961, however, Stroganoff filed a claim for restitution of a number of artworks then owned by the Dutch government, including the Cranach panels, arguing that they had been expropriated from his family by the Soviet Union. The Dutch government and Stroganoff reached an agreement whereby Stroganoff relinquished his claim to certain of the works, and the government agreed to sell him several pieces, including the Cranach panels.

In the 1990s, von Saher filed a petition with the Dutch government for restitution of those Goudstikker works that had been purchased by Goering, but that petition was denied. However, in 2001, the government reevaluated its prior restitution process and, on the basis of “moral policy” turned over to von Saher those paintings from the Goering collection that were still in the Dutch government’s possession. This did not, of course, include the Cranach panels, which were in the museum’s collection in California. In 2007, von Saher commenced the first of her actions for return of the Cranach panels, arguing that the Dutch government could never have taken ownership of the panels, but merely served as custodian of the paintings until the original owners or their heirs claimed them.

Timeliness: Statute of Limitations

From 2007 until 2015, the question of the Cranach panels’ ownership played out in the context of motions to dismiss – first with respect to whether the suit was barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations, and then with respect to whether it was barred by the act of state doctrine.

Concerned that California’s three-year statute of limitations was presenting an unfair burden on claimants with respect to Holocaust and in Nazi-era looting cases, the California legislature extended that statute of limitations, but only for such Holocaust and Nazi-era looting claims. The museum filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the California statute extending the limitations period unconstitutionally intruded upon the federal government’s “exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims.”^[15] The district court agreed, and dismissed the case; however, the 9th Circuit reversed, finding the California extension of its statute of limitations unconstitutional. The Circuit Court granted leave for von Saher to amend her complaint.^[16] The museum amended its motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations applicable to the Cranach panels had long since expired, since it had begun to run at the time that Goudstikker’s widow, Desi, had discovered the location of the panels after the war. The district court, in a 2015 decision,^[17] disagreed with the museum’s position, holding that, under California law, the statute of limitations for the return of stolen property begins to run anew against each subsequent owner of the property. To review an extended discussion of statutes of limitations as they relate to Nazi-looted art (and to the von Saher case specifically), see my previous discussion here.

Foreign State and Finality: Act of State Doctrine

With respect to von Saher’s amended complaint, the district court granted the museum’s second motion to dismiss, holding that von Saher’s claims were preempted by the act of state doctrine.^[18] Quoting the Solicitor General’s brief with approval, the district court found that “[w]hen a foreign nation, like the Netherlands here, has conducted bona fide post-war internal restitution proceedings following the return of Nazi-confiscated art to that nation under the external restitution policy, the United States has a substantial interest in respecting the outcome of that nation’s proceedings.”^[19] The 9th Circuit, however, reversed that decision, remanding the case for development of the parties’ factual positions via discovery. The court stated that “[t]he Museum has not yet developed its act of state defense, and von Saher has not had the opportunity to establish the existence of an exception to that doctrine should it apply.”^[20]

Summary Judgment: Act of State

After the parties had the opportunity to flesh out their factual arguments, the district court once again considered the question of whether the action was barred by the act of state doctrine. On Aug. 9, 2016, the district court issued a decision granting the museum’s motion for summary judgment,^[21] finding that after the Goudstikker firm decided not to file a claim for return of the paintings, title passed to the Dutch government, and the Dutch government had good title to the paintings at the time it transferred the paintings to Stroganoff. Stroganoff, in turn, passed good title to the paintings to the museum.

In affirming the district court’s decision granting the museum’s motion for summary judgment, the 9th Circuit relied upon the act of state doctrine, which is “a ‘rule of decision’ requiring that ‘acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid’” and are not to be overturned by U.S. courts.^[22] The court explained that “we apply the doctrine here, because ‘the relief sought’ by von Saher would necessitate our ‘declar[ing] invalid’ at least three ‘official act[s] of’ the Dutch government ‘performed within its own territory.’”^[23]Von Saher has petitioned the 9th Circuit for a rehearing of the motion for summary judgment. Such rehearing petitions are rarely granted, and von Saher’s previous petitions for rehearing at earlier stages in the case were unsuccessful. Absent a rehearing, von Saher’s likely recourse would be an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Even if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari, von Saher faces stiff odds against a reversal of the decision on the act of state doctrine.

_{[1] Lucas Cranach the Elder, Adam (c. 1530), oil on panel, 75 x 27-1/2 in. (190.5 x 69.9 cm), available at https://www.nortonsimon.org/art/detail/M.1971.1.P.}

_{[2] Lucas Cranach the Elder, Eve (c. 1530), oil on panel, 75 x 27-1/2 in. (190.5 x 69.9 cm), available at https://www.nortonsimon.org/art/detail/M.1991.1.P.}

_{[3] See, e.g., “Woman in Gold” (2015), available at https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2404425/; “Monuments Men” (2014), available at https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2177771/.}

_{[4] Hector Feliciano, “The Lost Museum,” p. 23 (1997).}

_{[5] Id. at 4.}

_{[6] See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. 1966) (seeking to recover a painting by Marc Chagall that hung in the Menzel’s Brussels apartment when they fled Belgium before the Nazi occupation).}

_{[7] See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonette, 529 F.Supp.2d 300, 307 (D.R.I. 2007) (noting that “the Nazi government forced Dr. Stern to liquidate inventory in his art gallery and controlled the manner of the forced sale,” and concluding that “Dr. Stern’s surrender of the painting to [the auction house] for auction was ordered by the Nazi authorities and therefore the equivalent of an official seizure or a theft.”). But see Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 770 F.Supp.2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction, because “[p]laintiff does not allege that Reinhart acted in any capacity other than as a private individual.” The court noted that “[i]n 1933, [Plaintiff’s grandmother] sold the drawing to Swiss art collector Oskar Reinhart for 8,000 Reichsmarks to help fund her family’s escape from the Nazis’ persecution of German Jews.”).}

_{[8] See, e.g., Florian Weiland, “Ist Fluchtkunst}_dasselbe_wie_{Raubkunst?” (Is flight art the same as looted art?), Sudkurier, Sept. 3, 2014, available at http://www.suedkurier.de/nachrichten/kultur/themensk/Ist-Fluchtkunst-dasselbe-wie-Raubkunst;art410935,7218364.}

_{[9] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20989, Case No. 16-56308 (9th Cir. July 30, 2018).}

_{[10] Although the district court found that the Stroganoff family never owned the panels, Stroganoff ownership of the panels is unclear from the evidence presented.}

_{[11] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187490, Case No. CV 07-2866 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016).}

_{[12] The Dutch restitution and restoration of rights regime}_was_{re-assessed in the 2000s, and that reassessment resulted in the Dutch government turning over to von Saher those Goudstikker works that were at that time still held by the Dutch government.}

_{[13] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20989 at *9.}

_{[14] Id. at *10.}

_{[15] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, Case No. CV-07-2866-JFW, 2007 WL 4302726 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007).}

_{[16] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).}

_{[17] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, Case No. CV 07-2866-JFW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188627 (C.D. Cal. April 2, 2015).}

_{[18] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena, 862 F.Supp.2d 1044 (2012).}

_{[19] Id. at 1051.}

_{[20] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712, 727 (9^th Cir. 2014).}

_{[21] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum at Pasadena, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187490, Case No. CV 07-2866 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016).}

_{[22] von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20989, Case No. 16-56308, at *19 (9^th Cir. July 30, 2018).}

_[23] Id.

ARTICLE BY

Kevin P. Ray

Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Continue reading Nazi-Looted Art: Cranach Paintings to Remain at Norton Simon Museum

“Inclusion Riders” On The Storm

Oscar-winner Frances McDormand ended her acceptance speech with a reference to two words – “Inclusion Rider” – that sent many Oscar viewers scrambling to Google her cryptic message. But the term, and its legal implications, are somewhat more complicated than several news and entertainment outlets are reporting today. The term “inclusion rider” was coined a few years ago by Dr. Stacy Smith, the founder and director of the Annenberg Inclusion Initiative at USC. Dr. Smith delivered a Ted Talk in 2016 describing an inclusion rider as a potential solution to ongoing diversity issues and concerns in Hollywood. Specifically, she described the idea of having A-list actors demand provisions in their contracts that call for all the roles in whatever project they are working on to reflect broader demographics.

There is likely nothing wrong with a narrowly-tailored and creative provision like the one Dr. Smith described in her Ted Talk. Creative types already have in some instances exercised considerable leeway in setting their own casting criteria, and one need look no further than the hit Broadway musical “Hamilton” with its famously diverse casting to understand that under the rubric of creative choice, such standards can pass muster (although they may still face opposition).

Notwithstanding what may happen in the creative/artistic space, explicit demands or requirements based on race, religion, gender, or any other protected characteristic could run into challenges. In an interview backstage last night, McDormand told reporters “I just found out about this last week. It means you can ask for and/or demand at least 50 percent diversity in, not only casting, but also the crew.” When it comes to a film or television crew, although an actor may request that good faith effort be undertaken to hire a diverse crew, demanding that certain race or gender quotas be met could run afoul of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and comparable state law, which generally bans employment discrimination and quotas by private employers.

An inclusion rider like the one described by Dr. Smith might work in the entertainment industry based on First Amendment and creative license protections. But employers, both in the entertainment industry and outside of it, should be wary of agreeing to riders demanding that specific quotas be met. Those demands, no matter how well-intentioned, could be challenged as being discriminatory.

Written by Tony Oncidi and Pietro A Deserio of Proskauer Rose LLP.

For more entertainment legal news go to the National Law Reviews Entertainment Law Page.

EPA Approves Flint Hills Resources’ Plant For Cellulosic Ethanol Production

On October 12, 2017, Edeniq, Inc., a leading cellulosic and biorefining technology company, announced that Flint Hills Resources, a member of the Biobased and Renewable Products Advocacy Group (BRAG^®), received approval from EPA for cellulosic ethanol production at its Iowa Falls ethanol plant. The 100 million gallons per year plant will use Edeniq’s Pathway technology to produce the cellulosic ethanol and will be eligible to qualify its cellulosic gallons for generating D3 Renewable Identification Numbers (RIN). Iowa Falls is the second Flint Hills Resources plant, and the fifth overall, to receive approval for cellulosic ethanol production using Edeniq’s technology. Edeniq announced in December 2016 that EPA approved Flint Hills Resources’ registration of its Shell Rock ethanol plant for cellulosic ethanol production. According to Edeniq, its Pathway technology “remains the lowest-cost solution for producing and measuring cellulosic ethanol from corn kernel fiber utilizing existing fermenters at existing corn ethanol plants, and has already proven cellulosic ethanol yields of up to 2.5% or higher, as a percentage of its customers’ total volume output.” Additionally, the technology allows for increases in corn oil production and greater overall ethanol yields.

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

EPA Announces Updates to Pesticide Label Review Manual

On September 19, 2017, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced an update to Chapters 15 and 16 of the Office of Pesticide Programs’ (OPP) Label Review Manual.

Updates to Chapter 15: Company Name and Address, include removing non-label related instructions on submitting address change requests and updating the National Pesticide Information Center’s contact information, including new hours of operation. Updates to Chapter 16: Graphics and Symbols, include adding hyperlinks to graphic and logo examples and allowing a QR (Quick Response) code as an acceptable symbol when used only for retail pricing.

EPA states that the Label Review Manual, which began as a guide for EPA label reviewers, serves as a tool to assist registrants in understanding the pesticide labeling process and assists registrants in understanding approaches for how labels should generally be drafted. Pesticide product labels provide critical information about how to safely and legally handle and apply pesticides. EPA directs registrants to submit questions or comments on the Label Review Manual by using its Pesticide Labeling Questions & Answers — Form.

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Donald Trump, Mike Pence Pledged To Limit Gaming, Then Helped Casinos After Campaign Donations

At first glance, gambling appears to be one of the many issues on which Donald Trump and Mike Pence differ. Trump is an East Coast casino magnate who has boasted of using his fortune to influence lawmakers. Pence is a socially conservative Midwesterner who says he has never even bought a lottery ticket. He has cast himself as an opponent of expanding gaming in a state whose campaign finance laws aim to limit casino moguls’ political power.

But a closer look shows the Republican standard-bearers have plenty in common: As casino industry cash went around Indiana’s anti-corruption laws and into groups supporting Pence’s campaigns, the GOP governor used his power to help gambling interests. While Trump has promised throughout the 2016 presidential campaign that his personal wealth would insulate his administration from donor influence, the actions of his running mate on the gaming issue challenge that pledge.

A review of campaign finance records shows that despite Indiana statutes officially banning gaming industry donations to state officials, Indiana gaming interests gave more than $2 million to groups supporting Pence since he first began running for governor. That includes gaming-linked lobbying firms and their employees donating nearly a half-million dollars directly to Pence’s campaign account.

Mike Pence, Gambling, campaign donations — Photo Credit: Darren Hauck, Getty Images News

During much of Pence’s term, he was serving in a leadership and fundraising role at the Republican Governors Association while the group raised money from Indiana gaming operators. Meanwhile, casinos hit a legislative jackpot at Indiana’s state Capitol: Pence signed tax legislation benefiting the gaming industry; and, by not vetoing the bill, he allowed for the passage of separate landmark legislation permitting riverboat operators to move casinos on shore. His administration also helped a major RGA donor from the lottery industry, GTECH. (That company has since merged with a competitor, International Game Technology.)

In an emailed statement, Pence’s 2016 campaign spokesperson, Marc Lotter, said the gaming companies in question “have a long history, dating back a decade, of supporting the Republican Governors Association because they want to see the type of strong, pro-growth leadership that has led to Indiana becoming one of the best states in the nation for business continue and expand to other states. Gov. Pence is proud to support and have received support from the RGA.”

Referring to the gaming-backed bills that became law under Pence, Lotter added: “Since taking office, Gov. Pence has held the position that gaming should not be expanded in Indiana and every executive action he has taken on legislation has been consistent with that principle.”

This look at Pence’s relationship with the gaming industry is the first in a series on how companies are circumventing longstanding anti-corruption laws designed to restrict their election spending and political influence. The trend has occurred just as court decisions deregulating the nation’s campaign finance laws have let a torrent of cash into state and local races. In many cases, the donations arrived shortly before or after governments cemented everything from road contracts to economic development subsidies to pension deals. The continued flow of cash has defanged pay-to-play laws that were supposed to make sure government decisions are based on the public’s best interest — not political favoritism.

In Indiana, that larger trend has played out in gaming policy. Pence initially pledged to oppose efforts to grow the state’s gambling industry. “I do not support an expansion of gaming in Indiana,” he said in March of 2013, just two months after becoming governor. The statement won praise from a major religious group in the state. Pence also trumpeted his congressional efforts to outlaw Internet gaming, and said, “I’ve never bought a lottery ticket.”

Our review, however, shows that since 2011, Pence received roughly $2.2 million from Indiana gaming operators and their lobbying firms. That includes about $490,000 from nine gaming-linked lobbying firms and their employees directly to Pence’s campaign; at least $360,000 more from gaming industry lobbying firms and their employees to the Indiana Republican Party; and $1.4 million from Indiana gaming interests and their lobbying firms to the RGA, which backed Pence’s gubernatorial bids.

With that money flooding into the state, the governor helped Indiana’s gaming industry just when it was facing increased competition from neighboring states.

Continue reading on the National Law Review…

ARTICLE BY MapLight
© Copyright MapLight

Led Zeppelin Prevails in Copyright Infringement Case: Now on Appeal in Ninth Circuit

In May 2014, the Trust acting on behalf of the estate of Randy Wolfe (a/k/a Randy California) of the rock group Spirit filed a copyright infringement suit against Led Zeppelin related to the first chords in the band’s most famous song, “Stairway to Heaven.” See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 15-cv-03462, U.S. District Court, Central District of California(Los Angeles). The Trust brought the case against Led Zeppelin after a 2014 Supreme Court decision opened the door for a broader interpretation of the time frame to seek damages for copyright infringement under the U.S. Copyright Act. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1962 (2014). The Petrella decision limited the application of the defense of laches and permitted lawsuits to be brought involving older copyrighted works with more recent acts of infringement that fall within the statute of limitations pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). Hence, in the Skidmore case, despite the decades-old circulation of “Stairway to Heaven,” the plaintiffs decided to bring suit against Led Zeppelin within three years after the release of a re-mastered version of the famous song.

In Skidmore, the crux of the plaintiffs’ case was that Led Zeppelin (with Jimmy Page and Robert Plant as co-authors) allegedly stole the opening passage of “Stairway to Heaven” from “Taurus,” an instrumental by Randy Wolfe that can be found on Spirit’s 1968 debut album. The dispute largely concerned a brief musical passage 45 seconds into “Taurus.” It was alleged that the iconic opening guitar sequence of “Stairway to Heaven” (which was released in 1971, three years after “Taurus”) was copied from “Taurus.”

The Trust also sought an injunction against the release of any additional albums containing the song “Stairway to Heaven” in an attempt to obtain a writing credit for Wolfe, who died in 1997. This case was not the first time Led Zeppelin had been accused of copying another artist’s work. The Trust’s lawsuit listed other songs for which Led Zeppelin had paid settlements over songwriting credits, including “The Lemon Song,” “Babe I’m Gonna Leave You,” “Whole Lotta Love,” and “Dazed and Confused.”

On April 11, 2016, Los Angeles District Judge Gary Klausner ruled that there were enough similarities between “Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven” for a jury to decide the claim. On June 23, 2016, following a trial, an eight-member panel jury unanimously found that the similarities between the songs did not amount to copyright infringement. The decision came one year after a jury (in a lawsuit filed in the Central District of California before Judge John A. Kronstadt) ruled that Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines” (produced by Pharrell Williams) infringed Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up.” In the Blurred Lines case, Thicke and Williams were ordered to pay $7.4 million (reduced to $5.3 million) and ongoing royalties to Gaye’s family. The Blurred Lines decision is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

The Trial

Jurors in the Led Zeppelin case had to decide two issues: First, was it plausible that members of Led Zeppelin had sufficient opportunity (i.e., access) to hear “Taurus” before they wrote “Stairway to Heaven”? Second, if so, were the opening chords of “Stairway to Heaven” “substantially similar” to “Taurus”?

Issue 1: Access

Led Zeppelin’s guitarist, Jimmy Page, singer, Robert Plant, and bassist, John Paul Jones, all took the stand to testify about their recollections of Spirit and whether they attended Spirit performances, listened to Spirit music or recalled playing the same shows. The Led Zeppelin band members also were questioned by the plaintiffs’ counsel on how “Stairway to Heaven” was created 45 years ago. The jurors sided with the plaintiffs on the issue of access, finding that Page and Plant would have been familiar with “Taurus.” Specifically, the jury relied on the evidence presented in court that (1) Page had the Spirit record in his collection of more than 10,000 records and CDs, (2) Spirit had appeared as an opening act for Led Zeppelin and (3) other members of Spirit testified to encounters with Led Zeppelin members.

Issue 2: Substantial Similarity

The jury next had to determine whether the famous opening to “Stairway to Heaven” was substantially similar to the instrumental opening portion in “Taurus.” Both sides presented expert musicologists, who offered divergent opinions on the musical composition of “Taurus.” Defense experts testified that the two songs shared little in common other than a chord sequence that dates back 300 years. Plaintiffs’ experts said there were significant other likenesses, including the use of arpeggios, similar note combinations, pitch and note durations.

However, the jury never heard the original recording of “Taurus,” notwithstanding its conclusion that Led Zeppelin had access to the recording. The original recording of “Taurus” was made prior to 1972, when sound recordings were not subject to federal copyright protection. The Sound Recording Act of 1971 (effective February 15, 1972) changed federal copyright law to include protection for sound recordings. Instead, jurors had to hear and rely on expert renditions of the sheet music (i.e., the underlying musical notes) for “Taurus” to assess and decide the issue of “substantial similarity” to “Stairway to Heaven.”

Notably, the Trust’s expert played the sheet music on guitar, the instrument used in recorded versions for both “Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven,” whereas Led Zeppelin’s expert decided to play the sheet music on piano. Irrespective of similarities in the sound recordings, theSkidmore case was decided based on the only protectable aspect – the musical composition of “Taurus” and not the sound recording. During deliberations, the jurors asked to see clips of each expert rendition more than once. Ultimately, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Led Zeppelin.

**Comparisons and Impact: Blurred Lines and Led Zeppelin Cases**

The “Stairway to Heaven” infringement decision came one year after a jury ruled Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines” infringed Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up.” In the Blurred Lines case, the eight-member jury also returned a unanimous decision based on the musical composition of “Got to Give It Up” and not the actual recorded version of Gaye’s song. However, the outcome for Led Zeppelinwas decidedly different from the Blurred Lines ruling.

The Blurred Lines decision, and its large award of damages, has been followed by a noticeable uptick in copyright infringement claims surrounding popular songs and recordings. Well-known artists such as Sam Smith, Ed Sheeran, Robin Thicke and Justin Beiber are making news for copyright infringement claims being brought against them. However, the recent verdict in favor of Led Zeppelin suggests that limitations inherent in protected music can limit a determination of infringement. Even though the jury sided with the plaintiffs regarding Led Zeppelin’s access to Spirit’s “Taurus,” the jury concluded that the protected elements of “Taurus” − the musical composition in the sheet music and not the sound recording − were not “substantially similar” to “Stairway to Heaven.” It is too soon to say whether the Blurred Lines outcome or the Led Zeppelinresult will be the norm.

Notwithstanding the appeal, the Led Zeppelin case reinforces the notion that different aspects of an entire song, specifically the musical composition, the instrumentation and the final recording, each are subject to analysis in a potential copyright infringement claim, and the analysis can dictate different outcomes in claims of infringement.

As for the appeal, the Trust’s attorneys are challenging the jury verdict in the Ninth Circuit. The notice of appeal reads:

Please take notice that Plaintiff Michael Skidmore, Trustee for the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the final judgment entered on June 23, 2016, as well as any and all interlocutory rulings, decisions, and orders that gave rise to the judgment and are merged therein.

The filing does not provide legal arguments for why the case should be reconsidered, making it difficult to anticipate the basis for appeal. Furthermore, Led Zeppelin’s publishing company is seeking more than half a million dollars from the Trust in legal fees already incurred for the defense, triggered by a 2016 U.S. Supreme Court decision that allows prevailing parties in copyright cases to seek legal fees. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979 (2016). Given the appeal, these fees will only increase. This case and the Blurred Linescase are ones to watch as their outcomes could impact the music industry and copyright law in general.

ARTICLE BY Lamis G. Eli of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

Pokémon GO – Next Stop: Regulation & Litigation

As everyone is aware, the Pokémon GO craze has taken the world by storm in the past month. Reports estimate there have been over 75 million downloads of the digital game since the program became available on July 6. Apple has not issued any concrete numbers, but has confirmed that it was the most downloaded app ever in its first week of availability.

When the game was first offered, users were required to grant permission not only to use a player’s smartphone camera and location data but also to gain full access to the user’s Google accounts — including email, calendars, photos, stored documents and any other data associated with the login. The game’s creator, Niantic, responded to a public outcry – including a letter from Minnesota Senator Al Franken – stating that the expansive permission requests were “erroneous” and that Pokémon GO did not use anything from players’ accounts other than basic Google profile information. The company has since issued a fix to reduce access only to users’ basic Google account profile information.

As is often the case, remarkable success naturally attracts critics who take aim. In a letter dated July 22, 2016, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) wrote to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requesting government oversight on Niantic’s data collection practices. EPIC is a non-profit public interest research center in Washington, D.C., focusing public attention on privacy and civil liberties issues.

Niantic’s Privacy Policy

EPIC’s letter highlighted a number of alleged issues with Niantic’s privacy policy:

Niantic does not explain the scope of information gathered from Google profiles or why this is necessary to the function of the Pokémon GO app.
Niantic collects users’ precise location information through “cell/mobile tower triangulation, wifi triangulation, and/or GPS.” The Company’s Privacy Policy states Niantic will “store” location information and “some of that location information, along with your … user name, may be shared through the App.” The Privacy Policy does not indicate any limitations on how long Niantic will retain location data or explain how indefinite retention of location data is necessary to the functionality of the Pokémon GO app.
With Pokémon GO, Niantic has access to users’ mobile device camera. The Terms of Service for Pokémon GO grant Niantic a “nonexclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, transferable, sublicensable, worldwide, royalty-free license” to “User Content.” The Terms do not define “User Content” or specify whether this includes photos taken through the in-app camera function.
The Pokémon GO Privacy Policy grants Niantic wide latitude to disclose user data to “third-party service providers,” “third parties,” and “to government or law enforcement officials or private parties as [Niantic], in [its] sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate.” Niantic also deems user data, including personally identifiable information, to be a “business asset” that it can transfer to a third party in the event the company is sold. This issue has been identified as a particular concern to another non-profit organization – Common Sense Media, an independent non-profit organization focusing on children and technology. According to Common Sense Media, location information and history of children should not be considered a “business asset.”

EPIC’s Request to the FTC

Based on the issues highlighted above, EPIC requested that the FTC use its authority to regulate unfair competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) to prohibit practices by Niantic and other similar apps that fail to conform with FTC’s Fair Information Practices and the principles set forth in The White House 2012 report, “Consumer Data Privacy In A Networked World.”

According to EPIC, Niantic’s unlimited collection and indefinite retention of detailed location data, violates 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) because it is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”

EPIC also contends that the unlimited collection and indefinite retention of detailed location data violate the data minimization requirements under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which requires providers to “retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.

Private Lawsuit Filed Against Niantic

Subsequently, a Pokémon GO user has filed suit in Florida State Court alleging that the terms of service and privacy policy are deceptive and unfair, which violates the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Beckman v. Niantic Inc., case number 50-2016-CA-008330, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit for Palm Beach County, Florida.

Practice Pointer

The issue of consumer privacy continues to garner significant attention. Whether you are an app developer or any other company that collects and retains personal information, it is time to review your applicable policies and take appropriate steps to ensure that your company is not the subject of government agency inquiry, litigation, or a data breach.

For employers whose employees may be bumping into each other in the hallway while playing the game, consideration should be given to ban or otherwise regulate employee involvement. Certainly a drop in productively is a concern. However, even if accessing the game during work time is barred, employers should be concerned about the potential compromise to proprietary and confidential information that could occur as the result of data breaches or through counterfeit games that are designed to allow hackers access to your protected information.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey M. Schlossberg of Jackson Lewis P.C.

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Short Samplings of Songs May Not Be Considered Copyright Infringement After All

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals just decided that song sampling without permission does not necessarily infringe the copyright. Many artists have built careers by sampling an old song to create a new work. Until now, courts have told the artist to “get a license or do not sample.”

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2005 that there is no de minimus exception to sampling. The de minimus exception, which applies to the copyright law generally, states that if an artist borrowed an insignificant portion of an existing work, the artist did not infringe. The Sixth Circuit held that this exception did not apply to sampling. This meant that if an artist sampled a portion of a song that lasted a fraction of a second, the artist nonetheless infringed.

Now, the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul, LLC v Madonna Ciccone (“Salsoul”)took “the unusual step of creating a circuit split” and decided that thede minimus exception does apply to sampling. In Salsoul, Madonna sampled a 0.23-second “horn blast” from a disco song and incorporated the blast into her 1990 song “Vogue.” The Ninth Circuit explained that Madonna did not infringe because “a reasonable juror could not conclude that the average audience would recognize the appropriation of the horn sound.” Therefore, her sampling was de minimus and did not infringe.

This Ninth Circuit decision will impact the music world and likely lead to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that clarifies the legal limits of unauthorized sampling.

Category: Entertainment Law

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