In the Coming ‘Metaverse’, There May Be Excitement but There Certainly Will Be Legal Issues

The concept of the “metaverse” has garnered much press coverage of late, addressing such topics as the new appetite for metaverse investment opportunities, a recent virtual land boom, or just the promise of it all, where “crypto, gaming and capitalism collide.”  The term “metaverse,” which comes from Neal Stephenson’s 1992 science fiction novel “Snow Crash,” is generally used to refer to the development of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies, featuring a mashup of massive multiplayer gaming, virtual worlds, virtual workspaces, and remote education to create a decentralized wonderland and collaborative space. The grand concept is that the metaverse will be the next iteration of the mobile internet and a major part of both digital and real life.

Don’t feel like going out tonight in the real world? Why not stay “in” and catch a show or meet people/avatars/smart bots in the metaverse?

As currently conceived, the metaverse, “Web 3.0,” would feature a synchronous environment giving users a seamless experience across different realms, even if such discrete areas of the virtual world are operated by different developers. It would boast its own economy where users and their avatars interact socially and use digital assets based in both virtual and actual reality, a place where commerce would presumably be heavily based in decentralized finance, DeFi. No single company or platform would operate the metaverse, but rather, it would be administered by many entities in a decentralized manner (presumably on some open source metaverse OS) and work across multiple computing platforms. At the outset, the metaverse would look like a virtual world featuring enhanced experiences interfaced via VR headsets, mobile devices, gaming consoles and haptic gear that makes you “feel” virtual things. Later, the contours of the metaverse would be shaped by user preferences, monetary opportunities and incremental innovations by developers building on what came before.

In short, the vision is that multiple companies, developers and creators will come together to create one metaverse (as opposed to proprietary, closed platforms) and have it evolve into an embodied mobile internet, one that is open and interoperable and would include many facets of life (i.e., work, social interactions, entertainment) in one hybrid space.

In order for the metaverse to become a reality, that is, successfully link current gaming and communications platforms with other new technologies into a massive new online destination – many obstacles will have to be overcome, even beyond the hardware, software and integration issues. The legal issues stand out, front and center. Indeed, the concept of the metaverse presents a law school final exam’s worth of legal questions to sort out.  Meanwhile, we are still trying to resolve the myriad of legal issues presented by “Web 2.0,” the Internet we know it today. Adding the metaverse to the picture will certainly make things even more complicated.

At the heart of it is the question of what legal underpinnings we need for the metaverse infrastructure – an infrastructure that will allow disparate developers and studios, e-commerce marketplaces, platforms and service providers to all coexist within one virtual world.  To make it even more interesting, it is envisioned to be an interoperable, seamless experience for shoppers, gamers, social media users or just curious internet-goers armed with wallets full of crypto to spend and virtual assets to flaunt.  Currently, we have some well-established web platforms that are closed digital communities and some emerging ones that are open, each with varying business models that will have to be adapted, in some way, to the metaverse. Simply put, the greater the immersive experience and features and interactions, the more complex the related legal issues will be.

Contemplating the metaverse, these are just a few of the legal issues that come to mind:

  • Personal Data, Privacy and Cybersecurity – Privacy and data security lawyers are already challenged with addressing the global concerns presented by varying international approaches to privacy and growing threats to data security. If the metaverse fulfills the hype and develops into a 3D web-based hub for our day-to-day lives, the volume of data that will be collected will be exponentially greater than the reams of data already collected, and the threats to that data will expand as well. Questions to consider will include:
    • Data and privacy – What’s collected? How sensitive is it? Who owns or controls it? The sharing of data will be the cornerstone of a seamless, interoperable environment where users and their digital personas and assets will be usable and tradeable across the different arenas of the metaverse.  How will the collection, sharing and use of such data be regulated?  What laws will govern the collection of data across the metaverse? The laws of a particular state?  Applicable federal privacy laws? The GDPR or other international regulations? Will there be a single overarching “privacy policy” governing the metaverse under a user and merchant agreement, or will there be varying policies depending on which realm of the metaverse you are in? Could some developers create a more “privacy-focused” experience or would the personal data of avatars necessarily flow freely in every realm? How will children’s privacy be handled and will there be “roped off,” adults-only spaces that require further authentication to enter? Will the concepts that we talk about today – “personal information” or “personally identifiable information” – carry over to a world where the scope of available information expands exponentially as activities are tracked across the metaverse?
    • Cybersecurity: How will cybersecurity be managed in the metaverse? What requirements will apply with respect to keeping data secure? How will regulation or site policies evolve to address deep fakes, avatar impersonation, trolling, stolen biometric data, digital wallet hacks and all of the other cyberthreats that we already face today and are likely to be exacerbated in the metaverse? What laws will apply and how will the various players collaborate in addressing this issue?
  • Technology Infrastructure: The metaverse will be a robust computing-intensive experience, highlighting the importance of strong contractual agreements concerning cloud computing, IoT, web hosting, and APIs, as well as software licenses and hardware agreements, and technology service agreements with developers, providers and platform operators involved in the metaverse stack. Performance commitments and service levels will take on heightened importance in light of the real-time interactions that users will expect. What is a meaningful remedy for a service level failure when the metaverse (or a part of the metaverse) freezes? A credit or other traditional remedy?  Lawyers and technologists will have to think creatively to find appropriate and practical approaches to this issue.  And while SaaS and other “as a service” arrangements will grow in importance, perhaps the entire process will spawn MaaS, or “Metaverse as a Service.”
  • Open Source – Open source, already ubiquitous, promises to play a huge role in metaverse development by allowing developers to improve on what has come before. Whether or not the obligations of common open source licenses will be triggered will depend on the technical details of implementation. It is also possible that new open source licenses will be created to contemplate development for the metaverse.
  • Quantum Computing – Quantum computing has dramatically increased the capabilities of computers and is likely to continue to do over the coming years. It will certainly be one of the technologies deployed to provide the computing speed to allow the metaverse to function. However, with the awesome power of quantum computing comes threats to certain legacy protections we use today. Passwords and traditional security protocols may be meaningless (requiring the development of post-quantum cryptography that is secure against both quantum and traditional computers). With raw, unchecked quantum computing power, the metaverse may be subject to manipulation and misuse. Regulation of quantum computing, as applied to the metaverse and elsewhere, may be needed.
  • Antitrust: Collaboration is a key to the success of the metaverse, as it is, by definition, a multi-tenant environment. Of course collaboration amongst competitors may invoke antitrust concerns. Also, to the extent that larger technology companies may be perceived as leveraging their position to assert unfair control in any virtual world, there may be additional concerns.
  • Intellectual Property Issues: A host of IP issues will certainly arise, including infringement, licensing (and breaches thereof), IP protection and anti-piracy efforts, patent issues, joint ownership concerns, safe harbors, potential formation of patent cross-licensing organizations (which also may invoke antitrust concerns), trademark and advertising issues, and entertaining new brand licensing opportunities. The scope of content and technology licenses will have to be delicately negotiated with forethought to the potential breadth of the metaverse (e.g., it’s easy to limit a licensee’s rights based on territory, for example, but what about for a virtual world with no borders or some borders that haven’t been drawn yet?). Rightsholders must also determine their particular tolerance level for unauthorized digital goods or creations. One can envision a need for a DMCA-like safe harbor and takedown process for the metaverse. Also, akin to the litigation that sprouted from the use of athletes’ or celebrities’ likenesses (and their tattoos) in videogames, it’s likely that IP issues and rights of publicity disputes will go way up as people’s virtual avatars take on commercial value in ways that their real human selves never did.
  • Content Moderation. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) has been the target of bipartisan criticism for several years now, yet it remains in effect despite its application in some distasteful ways. How will the CDA be applied to the metaverse, where the exchange of third party content is likely to be even more robust than what we see today on social media?  How will “bad actors” be treated, and what does an account termination look like in the metaverse? Much like the legal issues surrounding offensive content present on today’s social media platforms, and barring a change in the law, the same kinds of issues surrounding user-generated content will persist and the same defenses under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act will be raised.
  • Blockchain, DAOs, Smart Contract and Digital Assets: Since the metaverse is planned as a single forum with disparate operators and users, the use of a blockchain (or blockchains) would seem to be one solution to act as a trusted, immutable ledger of virtual goods, in-world currencies and identity authentication, particularly when interactions may be somewhat anonymous or between individuals who may or may not trust each other and in the absence of a centralized clearinghouse or administrator for transactions. The use of smart contracts may be pervasive in the metaverse.  Investors or developers may also decide that DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations) can be useful to crowdsource and fund opportunities within that environment as well.  Overall, a decentralized metaverse with its own discrete economy would feature the creation, sale and holding of sovereign digital assets (and their free use, display and exchange using blockchain-based payment networks within the metaverse). This would presumably give NFTs a role beyond mere digital collectibles and investment opportunities as well as a role for other forms of digital currency (e.g., cryptocurrency, utility tokens, stablecoins, e-money, virtual “in game” money as found in some videogames, or a system of micropayments for virtual goods, services or experiences).  How else will our avatars be able to build a new virtual wardrobe for what is to come?

With this shift to blockchain-based economic structures comes the potential regulatory issues behind digital currencies. How will securities laws view digital assets that retain and form value in the metaverse?  Also, as in life today, visitors to the metaverse must be wary of digital currency schemes and meme coin scams, with regulators not too far behind policing the fraudsters and unlawful actors that will seek opportunities in the metaverse. While regulators and lawmakers are struggling to keep up with the current crop of issues, and despite any progress they may make in that regard, many open issues will remain and new issues will be of concern as digital tokens and currency (and the contracts underlying them) take on new relevance in a virtual world.

Big ideas are always exciting. Watching the metaverse come together is no different, particularly as it all is happening alongside additional innovations surrounding the web, blockchain and cryptocurrency (and, more than likely, updated laws and regulations). However, it’s still early. And we’ll have to see if the current vision of the metaverse will translate into long-term, concrete commercial and civic-minded opportunities for businesses, service providers, developers and individual artists and creators.  Ultimately, these parties will need to sort through many legal issues, both novel and commonplace, before creating and participating in a new virtual world concept that goes beyond the massive multi-user videogame platforms and virtual worlds we have today.

Article By Jeffrey D. Neuburger of Proskauer Rose LLP. Co-authored by  Jonathan Mollod.

For more legal news regarding data privacy and cybersecurity, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Privacy Tip #309 – Women Poised to Fill Gap of Cybersecurity Talent

I have been advocating for gender equality in Cybersecurity for years [related podcast and post].

The statistics on the participation of women in the field of cybersecurity continue to be bleak, despite significant outreach efforts, including “Girls Who Code” and programs to encourage girls to explore STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects.

Women are just now rising to positions from which they can help other women break into the field, land high-paying jobs, and combat the dearth of talent in technology. Judy Dinn, the new Chief Information Officer of TD Bank NA, is doing just that. One of her priorities is to encourage women to pursue tech careers. She recently told the Wall Street Journal that she “really, really always wants to make sure that female representation—whether they’re in grade school, high school, universities—that that funnel is always full.”

The Wall Street Journal article states that a study by AnitaB.org found that “women made up about 29% of the U.S. tech workforce in 2020.”  It is well known that companies are fighting for tech and cybersecurity talent and that there are many more open positions than talent to fill them. The tech and cybersecurity fields are growing with unlimited possibilities.

This is where women should step in. With increased support, and prioritized recruiting efforts that encourage women to enter fields focused on technology, we can tap more talent and begin to fill the gap of cybersecurity talent in the U.S.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2021 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Continuing Effort to Protect National Security Data and Networks

CMMC 2.0 – Simplification and Flexibility of DoD Cybersecurity Requirements

Evolving and increasing threats to U.S. defense data and national security networks have necessitated changes and refinements to U.S. regulatory requirements intended to protect such.

In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARs) intended to better protect defense data and networks. In 2017, DoD began issuing a series of memoranda to further enhance protection of defense data and networks via Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC). In December 2019, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued long-awaited guidance in part governing the minimum encryption requirements for storage, transport and/or transmission of controlled but unclassified information (CUI) and technical defense information (TDI) otherwise restricted by ITAR.

DFARs initiated the government’s efforts to protect national security data and networks by implementing specific NIST cyber requirements for all DoD contractors with access to CUI, TDI or a DoD network. DFARs was self-compliant in nature.

CMMC provided a broad framework to enhance cybersecurity protection for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). CMMC proposed a verification program to ensure that NIST-compliant cybersecurity protections were in place to protect CUI and TDI that reside on DoD and DoD contractors’ networks. Unlike DFARs, CMMC initially required certification of compliance by an independent cybersecurity expert.

The DoD has announced an updated cybersecurity framework, referred to as CMMC 2.0. The announcement comes after a months-long internal review of the proposed CMMC framework. It still could take nine to 24 months for the final rule to take shape. But for now, CMMC 2.0 promises to be simpler to understand and easier to comply with.

Three Goals of CMMC 2.0

Broadly, CMMC 2.0 is similar to the earlier-proposed framework. Familiar elements include a tiered model, required assessments, and contractual implementation. But the new framework is intended to facilitate three goals identified by DoD’s internal review.

  • Simplify the CMMC standard and provide additional clarity on cybersecurity regulations, policy, and contracting requirements.
  • Focus on the most advanced cybersecurity standards and third-party assessment requirements for companies supporting the highest priority programs.
  • Increase DoD oversight of professional and ethical standards in the assessment ecosystem.

Key Changes under CMMC 2.0

The most impactful changes of CMMC 2.0 are

  • A reduction from five to three security levels.
  • Reduced requirements for third-party certifications.
  • Allowances for plans of actions and milestones (POA&Ms).

CMMC 2.0 has only three levels of cybersecurity

An innovative feature of CMMC 1.0 had been the five-tiered model that tailored a contractor’s cybersecurity requirements according to the type and sensitivity of the information it would handle. CMMC 2.0 keeps this model, but eliminates the two “transitional” levels in order to reduce the total number of security levels to three. This change also makes it easier to predict which level will apply to a given contractor. At this time, it appears that:

  • Level 1 (Foundational) will apply to federal contract information (FCI) and will be similar to the old first level;
  • Level 2 (Advanced) will apply to controlled unclassified information (CUI) and will mirror NIST SP 800-171 (similar to, but simpler than, the old third level); and
  • Level 3 (Expert) will apply to more sensitive CUI and will be partly based on NIST SP 800-172 (possibly similar to the old fifth level).

Significantly, CMMC 2.0 focuses on cybersecurity practices, eliminating the few so-called “maturity processes” that had baffled many DoD contractors.

CMMC 2.0 relieves many certification requirements

Another feature of CMMC 1.0 had been the requirement that all DoD contractors undergo third-party assessment and certification. CMMC 2.0 is much less ambitious and allows Level 1 contractors — and even a subset of Level 2 contractors — to conduct only an annual self-assessment. It is worth noting that a subset of Level 2 contractors — those having “critical national security information” — will still be required to seek triennial third-party certification.

CMMC 2.0 reinstitutes POA&Ms

An initial objective of CMMC 1.0 had been that — by October 2025 — contractual requirements would be fully implemented by DoD contractors. There was no option for partial compliance. CMMC 2.0 reinstitutes a regime that will be familiar to many, by allowing for submission of Plans of Actions and Milestones (POA&Ms). The DoD still intends to specify a baseline number of non-negotiable requirements. But a remaining subset will be addressable by a POA&M with clearly defined timelines. The announced framework even contemplates waivers “to exclude CMMC requirements from acquisitions for select mission-critical requirements.”

Operational takeaways for the defense industrial base

For many DoD contractors, CMMC 2.0 will not significantly impact their required cybersecurity practices — for FCI, focus on basic cyber hygiene; and for CUI, focus on NIST SP 800-171. But the new CMMC 2.0 framework dramatically reduces the number of DoD contractors that will need third-party assessments. It could also allow contractors to delay full compliance through the use of POA&Ms beyond 2025.

Increased Risk of Enforcement

Regardless of the proposed simplicity and flexibility of CMMC 2.0, DoD contractors need to remain vigilant to meet their respective CMMC 2.0 level cybersecurity obligations.

Immediately preceding the CMMC 2.0 announcement, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a new Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative on October 6 to combat emerging cyber threats to the security of sensitive information and critical systems. In its announcement, the DOJ advised that it would pursue government contractors who fail to follow required cybersecurity standards.

As Bradley has previously reported in more detail, the DOJ plans to utilize the False Claims Act to pursue cybersecurity-related fraud by government contractors or involving government programs, where entities or individuals, put U.S. information or systems at risk by knowingly:

  • Providing deficient cybersecurity products or services
  • Misrepresenting their cybersecurity practices or protocols, or
  • Violating obligations to monitor and report cybersecurity incidents and breaches.

The DOJ also expressed their intent to work closely on the initiative with other federal agencies, subject matter experts and its law enforcement partners throughout the government.

As a result, while CMMC 2.0 will provide some simplicity and flexibility in implementation and operations, U.S. government contractors need to be mindful of their cybersecurity obligations to avoid new heightened enforcement risks.

© 2021 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more articles about cybersecurity, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

OFAC Reaffirms Focus on Virtual Currency With Updated Sanctions Law Guidance

On October 15, 2021, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced updated guidance for virtual currency companies in meeting their obligations under US sanctions laws. On the same day, OFAC also issued guidance clarifying various cryptocurrency-related definitions.

Coming on the heels of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020—and in the context of the Biden administration’s effort to crackdown on ransomware attacks—the recent guidance is the latest indication that regulators are increasingly focusing on virtual currency and blockchain. In light of these developments, virtual currency market participants and service providers should ensure they are meeting their respective sanctions obligations by employing a “risk-based” anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance program.

This update highlights the government’s continued movement toward subjecting the virtual currency industry to the same requirements, scrutiny and consequences in cases of noncompliance as applicable to traditional financial institutions.

IN DEPTH

The release of OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry indicates an increasing expectation for diligence as it has now made clear on several occasions that sanctions compliance “obligations are the same” for virtual currency companies who must employ an unspecified “risk-based” program (See: OFAC Consolidated Frequently asked Questions 560). OFAC published it with the stated goal of “help[ing] the virtual currency industry prevent exploitation by sanctioned persons and other illicit actors.”

With this release, OFAC also provided some answers and updates to two of its published sets of “Frequently Asked Questions.”

FAQ UPDATES (FAQ 559 AND 546)

All are required to comply with the US sanctions compliance program, including persons and entities in the virtual currency and blockchain community. OFAC has said time and again that a “risk-based” program is required but that “there is no single compliance program or solution suitable for all circumstances” (See: FAQ 560). While market participants and service providers in the virtual currency industry must all comply, the risk of violating US sanctions are most acute for certain key service providers, such as cryptocurrency exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) desks that facilitate large volumes of virtual currency transactions.

OFAC previously used the term “digital currency” when it issued its first FAQ and guidance on the subject (FAQ 560), which stated that sanctions compliance is applicable to “digital currency” and that OFAC “may include as identifiers on the [Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons] SDN List specific digital currency addresses associated with blocked persons.” Subsequently, OFAC placed certain digital currency addresses on the SDN List as identifiers.

While OFAC previously used the term “digital currency,” in more recent FAQs and guidance, it has used a combination of the terms “digital currency” and “virtual currency” without defining those terms until it released FAQ 559.

In FAQ 559, OFAC defines “virtual currency” as “a digital representation of value that functions as (i) a medium of exchange; (ii) a unit of account; and/or (iii) a store of value; and is neither issued nor granted by any jurisdiction.” This is a broad definition but likely encompasses most assets, which are commonly referred to as “cryptocurrency” or “tokens,” as most of these assets may be considered as “mediums of exchange.”

OFAC also defines “digital currency” as “sovereign cryptocurrency, virtual currency (non-fiat), and a digital representation of fiat currency.” This definition appears to be an obvious effort by OFAC to make clear that its definitions include virtual currencies issued or backed by foreign governments and stablecoins.

The reference to “sovereign cryptocurrency” is focused on cryptocurrency issued by foreign governments, such as Venezuela. This is not the first time OFAC has focused on sovereign cryptocurrency. It ascribed the use of sovereign backed cryptocurrencies as a high-risk vector for US sanctions circumvention. Executive Order (EO) 13827, which was issued on March 19, 2018, explicitly stated:

In light of recent actions taken by the Maduro regime to attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions by issuing a digital currency in a process that Venezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly has denounced as unlawful, hereby order as follows: Section 1. (a) All transactions related to, provision of financing for, and other dealings in, by a United States person or within the United States, and digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018, are prohibited as of the effective date of this order.

On March 19, 2018, OFAC issued FAQs 564, 565 and 566, which were specifically focused on Venezuela issued cryptocurrencies, stating that “petro” and “petro gold” are considered a “digital currency, digital coin, or digital token” subject to EO 13827. While OFAC has not issued specific FAQs or guidance on other sovereign backed cryptocurrencies, it may be concerned that a series of countries have stated publicly that they plan to test and launch sovereign backed securities, including Russia, Iran, China, Japan, England, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands, Singapore and India. With the release if its most recent FAQs, OFAC is reaffirming that it views sovereign cryptocurrencies as highly risky and well within the scope of US sanctions programs.

The reference to a “digital representation of fiat currency” appears to be a reference to “stablecoins.” In theory, stablecoins are each worth a specified value in fiat currency (usually one USD each). Most stablecoins were touted as being completely backed by fiat currency stored in segregated bank accounts. The viability and safety of stablecoins, however, has recently been called into question. One of the biggest players in the stablecoin industry is Tether, who was recently fined $41 million by the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission for failing to have the appropriate fiat reserves backing its highly popular stablecoin US Dollar Token (USDT). OFAC appears to have taken notice and states in its FAQ that “digital representations of fiat currency” are covered by its regulations and FAQs.

FAQ 646 provides some guidance on how cryptocurrency exchanges and other service providers should implement a “block” on virtual currency. Any US persons (or persons subject to US jurisdiction), including financial institutions, are required under US sanctions programs to “block” assets, which requires freezing assets and notifying OFAC within 10 days. (See: 31 C.F.R. § 501.603 (b)(1)(i).) FAQ 646 makes clear that “blocking” obligations applies to virtual currency and also indicates that OFAC expects cryptocurrency exchanges and other service providers be required to “block” the virtual currency at issue and freeze all other virtual currency wallets “in which a blocked person has an interest.”

Depending on the strength of the anti-money laundering/know-your-customer (AML/KYC) policies employed, it will likely prove difficult for cryptocurrency exchanges and other service providers to be sure that they have identified all associated virtual currency wallets in which a “blocked person has an interest.” It is possible that a cryptocurrency exchange could onboard a customer who complied with an appropriate risk-based AML/KYC policy and, unbeknownst to the cryptocurrency exchange, a blocked person “has an interest” in one of the virtual currency wallets. It remains to be seen how OFAC will employ this “has an interest” standard and whether it will take any cryptocurrency exchanges or other service providers to task for not blocking virtual currency wallets in which a blocked person “has an interest.” It is important for cryptocurrency exchanges or other service providers to implement an appropriate risk-based AML/KYC policy to defend any inquiries from OFAC as to whether it has complied with the various US sanctions programs, including by having the ability to identify other virtual currency wallets in which a blocked person “has an interest.”

UPDATED SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

OFAC’s recent framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments outlines five essential components for a virtual currency operator’s sanctions compliance program. These components generally track those applicable to more traditional financial institutions and include:

  1. Senior management should ensure that adequate resources are devoted to the support of compliance, that a competent sanctions compliance officer is appointed and that adequate independence is granted to the compliance unit to carry out their role.
  2. An operative risk assessment should be fashioned to reflect the unique exposure of the company. OFAC maintains both a public use sanctions list and a free search tool for that list which should be employed to identify and prevent sanctioned individuals and entities from accessing the company’s services.
  3. Internal controls must be put in place that address the unique risks recognized by the company’s risk assessment. OFAC does not have a specific software or hardware requirement regarding internal controls.
    1. Although OFAC does not specify required internal controls, it does provide recommended best practices. These include geolocation tools with IP address blocking controls, KYC procedures for both individuals and entities, transaction monitoring and investigation software that can review historically identified bad actors, the implementation of remedial measures upon internal discovery of weakness in sanction compliance, sanction screening and establishing risk indicators or red flags that require additional scrutiny when triggered.
    2. Additionally, information should be obtained upon the formation of each new customer relationship. A formal due diligence plan should be in place and operated sufficiently to alert the service provider to possible sanctions-related alarms. Customer data should be maintained and updated through the lifecycle of that customer relationship.
  4. To ensure an entity’s sanctions compliance program is effective and efficient, that entity should regularly test their compliance against independent objective testing and auditing functions.
  5. Proper training must be provided to a company’s workforce. For a company’s sanctions compliance program to be effective, its workforce must be properly outfitted with the hard and soft skills required to execute its compliance program. Although training programs may vary, OFAC training should be provided annually for all employees.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

As noted in OFAC’s press release issued simultaneously with the updated FAQ’s, “[t]hese actions are a part of the Biden Administration’s focused, integrated effort to counter the ransomware threat.” The Biden administration’s increased focus on regulatory and enforcement action in the virtual currency space highlights the importance for market participants and service providers to implement a robust compliance program. Cryptocurrency exchanges and other service providers must take special care in drafting and implementing their respective AML/KYC policies and in ensuring the existence of risk-based AML and sanctions compliance programs, which includes a periodic training program. When responding to inquiries from OFAC or other regulators, it will be critical to have documented evidence of the implementation of a risk-based AML/KYC program and proof that employees have been appropriately trained on all applicable policies, including a sanctions compliance policy.

Ethan Heller, a law clerk in the firm’s New York office, also contributed to this article.

© 2021 McDermott Will & Emery
For the latest in Financial, Securities, and Banking legal news, read more at the National Law Review.

Legal Implications of Facebook Hearing for Whistleblowers & Employers – Privacy Issues on Many Levels

On Sunday, October 3rd, Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen publicly revealed her identity on the CBS television show 60 Minutes. Formerly a member of Facebook’s civic misinformation team, she previously reported them to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a variety of concerning business practices, including lying to investors and amplifying the January 6th Capitol Hill attack via Facebook’s platform.

Like all instances of whistleblowing, Ms. Haugen’s actions have a considerable array of legal implications — not only for Facebook, but for the technology sectors and for labor practices in general. Especially notable is the fact that Ms. Haugen reportedly signed a confidentiality agreement or sometimes call a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with Facebook, which may complicate the legal process.

What are the Legal Implications of Breaking a Non-Disclosure Agreement?

After secretly copying thousands of internal documents and memos detailing these practices, Ms. Haugen left Facebook in May, and testified before a Senate subcommittee on October 5th.  By revealing information from the documents she took, Facebook could take legal action against Ms. Haugen if they accuse her of stealing confidential information from them. Ms. Haugen’s actions raise questions of the enforceability of non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements when it comes to filing whistleblower complaints.

“Paradoxically, Big Tech’s attack on whistleblower-insiders is often aimed at the whistleblower’s disclosure of so-called confidential inside information of the company.  Yet, the very concerns expressed by the Facebook whistleblower and others inside Big Tech go to the heart of these same allegations—violations of privacy of the consuming public whose own personal data has been used in a way that puts a target on their backs,” said Renée Brooker, a partner with Tycko & Zavareei LLP, a law firm specializing in representing whistleblowers.

Since Ms. Haugen came forward, Facebook stated they will not be retaliating against her for filing a whistleblower complaint. It is unclear whether protections from legal action extend to other former employees, as is the case with Ms. Haugen.

Other employees like Frances Haugen with information about corporate or governmental misconduct should know that they do not have to quit their jobs to be protected. There are over 100 federal laws that protect whistleblowers – each with its own focus on a particular industry, or a particular whistleblower issue,” said Richard R. Renner of Kalijarvi, Chuzi, Newman & Fitch, PC, a long-time employment lawyer.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Ms. Haugen’s confidentiality agreement permits her to disclose information to regulators, but not to share proprietary information. A tricky balancing act to navigate.

“Big Tech’s attempt to silence whistleblowers are antithetical to the principles that underlie federal laws and federal whistleblower programs that seek to ferret out illegal activity,” Ms. Brooker said. “Those reporting laws include federal and state False Claims Acts, and the SEC Whistleblower Program, which typically feature whistleblower rewards and anti-retaliation provisions.”

Legal Implications for Facebook & Whistleblowers

Large tech organizations like Facebook have an overarching influence on digital information and how it is shared with the public. Whistleblowers like Ms. Haugen expose potential information about how companies accused of harmful practices act against their own consumers, but also risk disclosing proprietary business information which may or may not be harmful to consumers.

Some of the most significant concerns Haugen expressed to Congress were the tip of the iceberg according to those familiar with whistleblowing reports on Big Tech. Aside from the burden of proof required for such releases to Congress, the threats of employer retaliation and legal repercussions may prevent internal concerns from coming to light.

“Facebook should not be singled out as a lone actor. Big Tech needs to be held accountable and insiders can and should be encouraged to come forward and be prepared to back up their allegations with hard evidence sufficient to allow governments to conduct appropriate investigations,’ Ms. Brooker said.

As the concern for cybersecurity and data protection continues to hold public interest, more whistleblower disclosures against Big Tech and other companies could hold them accountable are coming to light.

During Haugen’s testimony during  the October 5, 2021 Congressional hearing revealed a possible expanding definition of media regulation versus consumer censorship. Although these allegations were the latest against a large company such as Facebook, more whistleblowers may continue to come forward with similar accusations, bringing additional implications for privacy, employment law and whistleblower protections.

“The Facebook whistleblower’s revelations have opened the door just a crack on how Big Tech is exploiting American consumers,” Ms. Brooker said.

This article was written by Rachel Popa, Chandler Ford and Jessica Scheck of the National Law Review. To read more articles about privacy, please visit our cybersecurity section.

Ransom Demands: To Pay or Not to Pay?

As the threat of ransomware attacks against companies has skyrocketed, so has the burden on companies forced to decide whether to pay cybercriminals a ransom demand. Corporate management increasingly is faced with balancing myriad legal and business factors in making real-time, high-stakes “bet the company” decisions with little or no precedent to follow. In a recent advisory, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has once again discouraged companies from making ransom payments or risk potential sanctions.

OFAC Ransom Advisory

On September 21, 2021, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an Advisory that updates and supersedes OFAC’s Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, issued on October 1, 2020. This updated OFAC Advisory follows on the heels of the Biden Administration’s heightened interest in combating the growing risk and reality of cyber threats that may adversely impact national security and the economy.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics from 2019 to 2020 on ransomware attacks, there was a 21 percent increase in reported ransomware attacks and a 225 percent increase in associated losses. All organizations across all industry sectors in the private and public arenas are potential targets of such attacks. As noted by OFAC, cybercriminals often target particularly vulnerable entities, such as schools and hospitals, among others.

While some cybercriminals are linked to foreign state actors primarily motivated by political interests, many threat actors are simply in it “for the money.” Every day cybercriminals launch ransomware attacks to wreak havoc on vulnerable organizations, disrupting their business operations by encrypting and potentially stealing their data. These cybercriminals often demand ransom payments in the millions of dollars in exchange for a “decryptor” key to unlock encrypted files and/or a “promise” not to use or publish stolen data on the Dark Web.

The recent OFAC Advisory states in no uncertain terms that the “U.S. government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying ransom or extortion demands.” OFAC notes that such ransomware payments could be “used to fund activities adverse to the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.” The Advisory further states that ransom payments may perpetuate future cyber-attacks by incentivizing cybercriminals. In addition, OFAC cautions that in exchange for payments to cybercriminals “there is no guarantee that companies will regain access to their data or be free from further attacks.”

The OFAC Advisory also underscores the potential risk of violating sanctions associated with ransom payments by organizations. As a reminder, various U.S. federal laws, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, prohibit U.S. persons or entities from engaging in financial or other transactions with certain blacklisted individuals, organizations or countries – including those listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blacked Persons List or countries subject to embargoes (such as Cuba, the Crimea region of the Ukraine, North Korea and Syria).

Penalties & Mitigating Factors

If a ransom payment is deemed to have been made to a cybercriminal with a nexus to a blacklisted organization or country, OFAC may impose civil monetary penalties for violations of sanctions based on strict liability, even if a person or organization did not know it was engaging in a prohibited transaction.

However, OFAC will consider various mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose penalties against organizations for sanctioned transactions, including if the organizations adopted enhanced cybersecurity practices to reduce the risk of cyber-attacks, or promptly reported ransomware attacks to law enforcement and regulatory authorities (including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and/or Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection).

“OFAC also will consider a company’s full and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement both during and after a ransomware attack” as a “significant” mitigating factor. In encouraging organizations to self-report ransomware attacks to federal authorities, OFAC notes that information shared with law enforcement may aid in tracking cybercriminals and disrupting or preventing future attacks.

Conclusion

In short, payment of a ransom is not illegal per se, so long as the transaction does not involve a sanctioned party on OFAC’s blacklist. Moreover, the recent ransomware Advisory “is explanatory only and does not have the force of law.” Nonetheless, organizations should consider carefully OFAC’s advice and guidance in deciding whether to pay a ransom demand.

In addition to the OFAC Advisory, management should consider the following:

  • Ability to restore systems from viable (unencrypted) backups

  • Marginal time savings in restoring systems with a decryptor versus backups

  • Preservation of infected systems in order to conduct a forensics investigation

  • Ability to determine whether data was accessed or exfiltrated (stolen)

  • Reputational harm if data is published by the threat actor

  • Likelihood that the organization will be legally required to notify individuals of the attack regardless of whether their data is published on the Dark Web.

Should an organization decide it has no choice other than to make a ransom payment, it should facilitate the transaction through a reputable company that first performs and documents an OFAC sanctions check.

© 2021 Wilson Elser

For more articles about ransomware attacks, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

Illinois Appellate Panel Splits the Difference for BIPA Statute of Limitations in Closely Watched Decision

Currently pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is the important question of when a claim under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) accrues.  Cothron v. White Castle, No. 20-3202 (7th Cir.)  In another litigation CPW previously identified, a panel for the Illinois Court of Appeals recently addressed whether BIPA claims are potentially subject to a one-, two-, or five-year statute of limitations.  Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 200563 (Sep. 17, 2021).  The answer is apparently “it depends,” based on the particular claims a plaintiff asserts under the statute.

The underlying facts of the case, as with many BIPA litigations, arose in the employer-employee context.  Plaintiff filed a putative class action Complaint in March 2019.  Plaintiff alleged that he worked for Defendant from June 2017 until January 2018. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “scanned and was still scanning the fingerprints of all employees, including Plaintiff, and was using and had used fingerprint scanning in its employee timekeeping,” in violation of BIPA.

Count I of the Complaint alleged that Defendant violated Section 15(a) of BIPA by failing to institute, maintain, and adhere to a retention schedule for biometric data.  Count II of the alleged that Defendant violated BIPA Section 15(b) by failing to obtain an informed written consent and release before obtaining biometric data. Finally, Count III of the Complaint alleged that Defendant violated BIPA Section 15(d) by disclosing or disseminating biometric data without first obtaining consent.

Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, asserting that Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed outside BIPA’s limitation period.  The motion noted that BIPA itself has no limitation provision and argued that the one-year limitation period for privacy actions under Illinois Code Section 13-201 applies to causes of action under the BIPA.

Plaintiff opposed, arguing that: (1) BIPA’s purpose is (in part) to prevent or deter security breaches regarding biometric data and therefore (2) in the absence of a limitation period expressly contained in BIPA itself, the five-year period in Illinois Code Section 13-205 for all civil actions not otherwise provided for should apply.  Plaintiff also argued that the one-year limitations period applied to actions only involving publication of information—which was not implicated for all claims under BIPA

The statute of limitations issue was eventually certified to a panel of the Illinois Court of Appeals.  The Court noted at the onset that Section 15 of BIPA “imposes various duties upon which an aggrieved person may bring an action” and “[t]hough all relate to protecting biometric data, each duty is separate and distinct.”

The Court ultimately found the publication-based distinction raised in the parties’ briefing a useful construct for categorizing claims under BIPA: “[a] plaintiff could therefore bring an action under the Act alleging violations of section 15(a), (b), and/or (e) without having to allege or prove that the defendant private entity published or disclosed any biometric data to any person or entity beyond or outside itself.  Stated another way, an action under section 15(a), (b), or (e) of the Act is not an action ‘for publication of matter violating the right of privacy.’” (quotation omitted).

The end result reached was that the Court held Section 13-201 (the one-year limitations period) governs BIPA actions under Section 15(c) and (d) while Section 13-205 (the five-year limitations period) governs BIPA actions under Sections 15(a), (b), and (e).

Although the shorter limitations period adopted for BIPA claims under Section 15(c) and 15(d) is a welcome ruling for defendants named in BIPA class actions, this ruling will have a limited impact on pending and future-filed BIPA cases.  This is because with the statute’s generous liquidated damages, class actions (even if defined depending on the claim asserted to include only a 1-year period) will still potentially bring a significant payoff for determined class counsel.  The bigger question—pending before the Seventh Circuit—is when BIPA claims accrue in the first place.  For more on this, stay tuned.  CPW will be there to keep you in the loop.

© Copyright 2021 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP


For more on BIPA, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Get with The Program – China’s New Privacy Laws Are Coming

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) on Friday the 20th of August 2021. The new privacy regime strengthens the protection around the use and collection of personal data and introduces a new requirement for user consent.

The PIPL, closely resembling the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, prevents the personal data of PRC nationals from being transferred to countries with lower standards of data security; a rule that may pose inherent problems for foreign businesses. The PIPL was introduced following an increase in online scamming and individual service price discrimination – where the same service is offered at different prices based on a user’s shopping profile. However, while businesses and some state entities face stronger collection obligations, the PRC state security department will maintain full access to personal data.

Although the final draft of the PIPL is yet to be released, the new law is set to commence on the 1st of November 2021. Companies will face fines of up to 50 million yuan ($7.6 million USD), or 5% percent of their annual turnover if they fail to comply. For an in-depth discussion of the Draft PIPL released in August 2020, see our K&L Gates publication here.

Ella Richards also contributed to this article.

Copyright 2021 K & L Gates

Article by Cameron Abbott with K&L Gates.
For more articles on international privacy law, visit NLR Section Cybersecurity Media & FCC.

5 Cybersecurity Risks and 3 Obligations for Law Firms

Law firms have recently become prime targets for cybercriminals seeking to steal, expose, sell, or otherwise extort confidential information.  Both the digitalization of law firms’ sensitive documents and the increase in means available to perpetrate an online crime exacerbate these risks.  Law firms encounter various cybersecurity risks from “insiders”—personnel within the company—and external persons.

As a response, many law firms have adopted cybersecurity obligations to protect its clients’ data and the firm’s integrity and reputation.

Main Cybersecurity Risks Facing Law Firms

Law firms naturally handle sensitive client data and confidential company information.  The lack of strong internal controls and compliance programs leaves law firms open to cyber-attacks. These attacks can be committed by insiders within the firm as well as external actors.  Some examples of cybersecurity risks for law firms include the following:

  • Data breaches: This risk involves the theft of personal or sensitive data from law firms and can be perpetrated for a variety of reasons including financial gain or retaliatory purposes.  Cyber criminals will typically execute these attacks by accessing the law firm’s computer from a remote location, collecting the personal or sensitive data, and distributing it to third parties.

  • Ransomware: Ransomware involves encrypting the law firm’s important files and demanding a fee—or ransom—in order for the cyber criminal to restore the file for the law firm’s use.

  • Phishing: This scam involves sending a scam message to an individual(s) in the hopes of getting them to send back confidential information.  This risk is especially prevalent in law firms due to the high volume of emails sent from external persons.  If severe, the attorney’s entire email account could be hacked, thus revealing mounds of sensitive client details.

  • Website attacks: Attorneys visit multiple legitimate websites in a day as a part of their daily responsibilities.  Criminals and hackers exploit this by infecting the computers of individuals who visit less secured websites.

  • Miscellaneous cyber threats: Additional threats to law firms’ security include (1) malpractice lawsuits that follow a breach and (2) cyber-crimes committed by insiders.  A client can file a malpractice lawsuit where they believe their attorney has failed to maintain adequate safeguards over their sensitive information.  Further, insider threats can originate from former disgruntled employees or current personnel members and are often very challenging to detect because these individuals often have access to the computers storing the data.

“By the time law firms notice the breach, it may have already suffered financial loss, and, consequently, media attention and reputational harm.  A robust cybersecurity compliance program would help the firm secure the data against improper access and use.  In other words, maintaining strong cybersecurity policies within your firm is key to mitigating liability exposure.” – Dr. Nick Oberheiden, Founding Attorney of Oberheiden P.C.

2020 Statistics on Cybersecurity and Law Firms

The American Bar Association’s Legal Technology Resource Center compiles an annual report on cybersecurity for law firms that discusses the adoption of compliance programs, types of cyber risks, and injuries caused from cybersecurity breaches.  The number of law firms reporting a security breach increased from 26% in 2019 to 29% in 2020.  Some of these results may have been impacted by COVID-19 since many law firms moved operations online—thus necessitating virtual work environments and online communications.

Security breaches analyzed in the ABA’s report were broad and included stolen computers, exploiting vulnerabilities in websites, and hacking.  Law firms experiencing viruses, spyware, or other infection within their company must expend significant amounts of time, energy, and money in correcting the issue.

A recent example, in 2019, a senior director of corporate law and lawyer at Apple was charged and indicted on insider trading charges.  The indictment alleged that the lawyer traded confidential information during a blackout period where no stock can be bought or sold.

Legal Obligations for Law Firms: Statutes on Cybersecurity

There is no federal law regulating a law firm’s cybersecurity practices and policies.  However, federal law does regulate specific industry practices.  For instance, if a law firm has a client within the healthcare, accounting, or financial industry sectors, additional federal obligations may apply.

Clients in the financial industry sector may require that their law firms maintain extra security protection due to the sensitive nature of financial data.  The same applies for healthcare companies who store confidential health records of the public.  Clients that specialize in accounting practices must comply with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, which could impose additional obligations on the law firms representing those clients.

The failure of the law firms to properly safeguard client data in these circumstances could lead to federal investigations, lawsuits, loss of future clients, fines and penalties, and significant reputational harm.

In addition to industry standards encompassed by federal law, each state has its own laws regulating data protection.  Law firms in California must be mindful of the California Consumer Privacy Act, while law firms in New York must take account of the regulations of the New York State Department of Financial Services as well as the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security (“SHEILD”) Act.

Law firms may also find it beneficial to adhere to cybersecurity guidelines.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) is a non-regulatory agency within the Department of Commerce that provides guidelines for cybersecurity regulations for the federal government.  NIST standards are voluntary but compliance with NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework is good practice for law firms and provides good evidence that the law firm took sufficient measures to comply with cybersecurity-related laws and industry practices.

Ethical Obligations for Law Firms: Protecting Client Data and Maintaining Confidentiality

State boards are responsible for regulating the conduct of lawyers and law firms.  To do this, state boards often issue ethical opinions to guide them on appropriate cybersecurity practices within their law firms.  Specifically, U.S. law firms have to adhere to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 requires attorneys to make sure that clients are “reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”

Further, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 states that lawyers must make “reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”  Comment 8 to Model Rule 1 explains that, in order to maintain the required knowledge and skill, lawyers should stay abreast of all changes “including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”

ABA Formal Opinion 483 on “Lawyers’ Obligations After an Electronic Data Breach or Cyberattack” provides that lawyers have a duty to make “reasonable efforts to avoid data loss or to detect cyber-intrusion” and that an ethical violation may occur if the lawyer does not undertake these steps.

Thus, because law firms often do business with colleagues, opposing counsel, federal agencies, and clients via electronic communications, they have an obligation to ensure that all data is properly stored, secured, and safeguarded

Internal Obligations for Law Firms: Strengthening Cybersecurity from the Inside

Law firms are finding it beneficial to adopt or strengthen their internal practices to strengthen overall cybersecurity.  Examples of supplements to a law firm’s cybersecurity include the following:

  • Cyber insurance

  • Cloud backup

  • Encryption software

  • Reboot and backup policies

  • Strong firewalls

  • Risk assessment and internal controls

  • Robust cybersecurity compliance program

  • Crisis response plan for cyberattacks

  • Reliable antivirus software

  • Strong password combination

  • Strict controls over personnel access to sensitive information

  • Using only secured Wi-Fi

Conclusion

Cybersecurity breaches of a law firm’s sensitive or confidential data can lead to lawsuits, investigations, fines and penalties, and unwanted media attention.  It can not only hurt the law firm’s ability to attract clients in the future but also the reputation of the individual attorneys.

Attorneys implicated in data breaches and other cybersecurity risks undermine the attorney’s duties of competency and confidentiality.

To prevent such disastrous consequences that will follow from these breaches, many law firms follow strict legal, ethical, and internal obligations regarding strong cybersecurity practices.  Obligations such as compliance with industry standards and state laws; ABA ethical rules, and internal best practices within the law firm enable the law firm to mitigate cybersecurity risk.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2021

For more articles on cybersecurity,  visit the NLRCommunications, Media & Internet section.

Ancestry.com Prevails in Yearbook Database Class Action

This week, Ancestry.com Inc. prevailed in a class action which alleged that it misappropriated consumers’ images and violated their privacy by using such data to solicit and sell their services and products. The court granted Ancestry.com’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice because the plaintiffs “did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies” after being granted leave to amend the first complaint.

As we previously wrote in November 2020, Ancestry.com was hit with a class action in the Northern District of California for “knowingly misappropriating the photographs, likenesses, names, and identities of Plaintiff and the class; knowingly using those photographs, likenesses, names, and identities for the commercial purpose of selling access to them in Ancestry products and services; and knowingly using those photographs, likenesses, names and identities to advertise, sell and solicit purchases of Ancestry services and products; without obtaining prior consent from Plaintiffs and the class.” In March 2021, the court dismissed the lawsuit based on lack of standing, but allowed the plaintiffs to amend and address the deficiencies. Although the plaintiffs added allegations of emotional harm, lost time, and theft of intellectual property, that didn’t sway the court. U.S. Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler said that the new allegations “do not change the analysis in this court’s earlier order.” The court held that the plaintiffs still did not establish Article III standing because they had not alleged a concrete injury.

Additionally, the court noted that even if standing were established, Ancestry.com is immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) because it is not a content creator. Magistrate Beeler said that Ancestry.com “obviously did not create the yearbooks [. . .] [i]nstead, it necessarily used information provided by another information content provider and is immune under [the CDA].”

Copyright © 2021 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

For more articles on cybersecurity litigation, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.