Category: Civil Rights

State Voting Leave Requirements: A Refresher in Preparation for the 2022 Midterm Elections

Millions of workers across the United States will be headed to the polls on Tuesday, November 8, 2022, for the midterm elections. With control of Congress up for grabs for the final two years of President Joe Biden’s first term, several close Senate races, five states considering ballot measures to legalize recreational marijuana, and 36 states holding elections for governor, this midterm election is one of the most highly-anticipated in decades. Early voting numbers in some states already suggest there could be record turnout.

Despite the proliferation of early and mail-in voting, increased interest in this election could drive more employees to request time off from work to vote. Most states require employers to provide at least unpaid leave from work when polls are not open for a reasonable amount of time outside of employees’ work hours. Here is an overview of voting leave requirements across the United States to help employers prepare for Election Day.

States Without Specific Voting Time Off Requirements

Several states do not require employers to provide any specific leave to allow employees to vote. These include Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.

While not requiring leave, some of those states more generally protect employees’ rights to vote or participate in politics more generally. For instance, Florida and Mississippi prevent employers from discharging an employee for voting or based on how they voted. Similarly, in Idaho and Michigan, employers may not attempt to influence an employee’s vote by discharging or threatening to discharge an employee from employment.

Delaware and New Jersey prohibit employers from intimidating employees into how to vote or not to vote, and Pennsylvania prohibits employers from interfering with an employee’s right to vote. Louisiana requires that employers with 20 or more employees not make any rule that prohibits an employee from participating in politics. In North Dakota, employers are encouraged, but not required, to allow employees to take leave to vote in all elections when employees’ regular work schedules conflict with the time the polls are open.

Finally, Washington and Hawaii do not have specific voting leave laws, but both conduct elections by mail, eliminating the need to take leave to wait at the polls. Hawaii repealed a prior law providing for up to two hours of voting leave when it switched to vote-by-mail for all statewide elections with the 2020 primary election.

Voting Leave Laws Map

States With Unpaid Voting Leave Laws

Several states require employers to provide employees with some amount of unpaid leave to allow them to vote. Connecticut joined this list of states in June 2021, requiring employers to provide all employees with two hours of unpaid leave to vote in a covered election, though employees must provide the employer notice of the need to take the time off at least two days prior to the election. However, the law is set to sunset on June 30, 2024.

Arkansas and Ohio generally require employees to allow employees to take a reasonable amount of time off, unpaid, to vote on Election Day. In Alabama, employees are allowed to take up to one hour of leave to vote in primary and general elections if the polls are not open at least two hours before or one hour after an employee’s work shift.

In Georgia, employers must give employees “necessary” time off to vote when employees provide reasonable notice of the need for the leave, however, employers are not required to provide time off for employees who have at least two hours before or after their work shift when polls are open to vote. In Massachusetts, unpaid voting leave applies only to employees working in manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishments, and employers are not required to pay for this leave. Further, employees may only request leave for the first two hours after the polls are open.

Some states provide more than two hours of leave for employees to vote, though employers are not required to pay for it. In Wisconsin, employers must allow employees to take up to three consecutive hours of unpaid leave to vote. Employers may not deny a request for this leave, but may designate the specific time of the absence. Kentucky provides the most time for voting leave, requiring employers to allow employees to take unpaid leave for a reasonable time, but not less than four hours, to vote or apply for an absentee ballot. Still, employees must request leave in advance and specify the hours to be used.

States With Paid Voting Leave Laws

Employers in a number of states are required to provide paid time off for employees to vote, at least in circumstances where polls are not open outside of an employee’s regular work hours. Alaska requires employers to allow employees who do not have two consecutive nonworking hours while the polls are open to take off as much work time as necessary to vote “without loss of pay.” Similarly, in Texas, employers must allow employees to take paid time off to vote, unless the polls are not open for two consecutive hours outside of an employee’s working hours.

In Minnesota, employees must have “the time necessary” to go to their designated polling place and return to work on Election Day. In Nevada, employees may request “sufficient” leave time to vote on Election Day, which is determined by the distance of the polling place from the employee’s workplace (1 hour for up to 2 miles; 2 hours for greater than 2 and up to 10 miles; and 3 hours for more than 10 miles). Wyoming requires employers to provide for one hour of leave other than a meal break to vote in a general, primary, or special congressional election unless polls are open for at least three consecutive hours outside of an employee’s work shift.

Many states provide for up to two paid hours of leave for voting. These include: California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah. Iowa, in 2021, reduced the paid leave from three hours to two. On the other hand, D.C. joined the states providing for up to two hours of paid leave for voting in October 2020. The D.C. law further requires employers to post a “Time Off to Vote” notice in a conspicuous location in the workplace. In New York, employers must give employees two hours of paid leave if employees do not have at least four consecutive nonworking hours to vote while polls are open. New Mexico’s leave law includes elections for Native American nations, tribes, or pueblos.

A handful of states provide for up to three hours of paid leave to vote if necessary, including Arizona, Missouri, Tennessee, and West Virginia. These states require employees provide notice of the need for leave prior to Election Day.

Employers may want to prepare for employees to take the leave time afforded by these laws to vote in the November elections.

Article By Ashley Prickett Cuttino and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more election law and legislative news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Chamber of Commerce Challenges CFPB Anti-Bias Focus Concerning AI

The end of last month the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers Association and other industry groups (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in Texas federal court challenging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) update this year to the Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices section of its examination manual to include discrimination.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Case No. 6:22-cv-00381 (E.D. Tex.)

By way of background, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which is Title X of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (the “Act”), prohibits providers of consumer financial products or services or a service provider from engaging in any unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice (“UDAAP”).  The Act also provides the CFPB with rulemaking and enforcement authority to “prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”  See, e.g., https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaaps_procedures.pdf.  In general, the Act provides that an act or practice is unfair when it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

The CFPB earlier this spring published revised examination guidelines on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices, or UDAAPs.  Importantly, this set forth a new position from the CFPB, that discrimination in the provision of consumer financial products and services can itself be a UDAAP.  This was a development that was surprising to many providers of financial products and services.  The CFPB also released an updated exam manual that outlined its position regarding how discriminatory conduct may qualify as a UDAAP in consumer finance.  Additionally, the CFPB in May 2022 additionally published a Consumer Financial Protection Circular to remind the public of creditors’ adverse action notice requirements under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).  In the view of the CFPB, creditors cannot use technologies (include algorithmic decision making) if it means they are unable to provide required explanations under the ECOA.

In July 2022, the Chamber and others called on the CFPB to rescind the update to the manual.  This included, among other arguments raised in a white paper supporting their position, that in conflating the concepts of “unfairness” and “discrimination,” the CFPB ignores the Act’s text, structure, and legislative history which discusses “unfairness” and “discrimination” as two separate concepts and defines “unfairness” without mentioning discrimination

The Complaint filed this fall raises three claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in relation to the updated manual as well as others.  The Complaint contends that ultimately it is consumers that will suffer as a result of the CFPB’s new position, as “[t]hese amendments to the manual harm Plaintiffs’ members by imposing heavy compliance costs that are ultimately passed down to consumers in the form of higher prices and reduced access to products.”

The litigation process started by Plaintiffs in this case will be time consuming (a response to the Complaint is not expected from Defendants until December).  In the meantime, entities in the financial sector should be cognizant of the CFPB’s new approach and ensure that their compliance practices appropriately mitigate risk, including in relation to algorithmic decision making and AI.  As always, we will keep you up to date with the latest news on this litigation.

For more Consumer Finance Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

California Law Prohibits Cooperation with Out-of-State Entities Regarding Lawful Abortion

In response to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, California Governor Gavin Newsom recently signed AB 1242 into law, which “prohibits law enforcement and California corporations from cooperating with out-of-state entities regarding a lawful abortion in California.”

In particular, AB 1242 prohibits California companies that provide electronic communication services from complying with out-of-state requests from law enforcement regarding an investigation into, or enforcement of, laws restricting abortion.

Sponsored by California Assembly member Rebecca Bauer-Kahan and California Attorney General Rob Bonta, AB 1242:

takes an innovative legal approach to protect user data. The bill prohibits California law enforcement agencies from assisting or cooperating with the investigation or enforcement of a violation related to abortion that is lawful in California. This law thereby blocks out-of-state law enforcement officers from executing search warrants on California corporations in furtherance of enforcing or investigating an anti-abortion crime. For example, if another state wants to track the movement of a woman traveling to California seeking reproductive health care, the state would be blocked from accessing cell phone site tower location data of the woman by serving a warrant to the tech company in California. In addition, if another state wants Google search history from a particular IP address, it could not serve an out-of-state search warrant at Google headquarters in CA without an attestation that the evidence is not related to investigation into abortion services. Although the first state to enact such a law, as California often is when it comes to privacy rights, we anticipate that other states will follow suit and that these laws will be hotly contested in litigation.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more data privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

What Employers Need to Know in a Post-Dobbs Landscape

On June 24, 2022, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the United States Supreme Court overturned both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey and held the access to abortion is not a right protected by the United States Constitution. This article analyzes several employment law issues employers may face following the Dobbs decision.

Federal Law

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) prohibits employment discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” In construing the PDA’s reference to “childbirth”, federal courts around the country have held the PDA prevents employers from taking adverse employment actions (including firing, demotion, or preventing the opportunity for advancement) because of an employee’s decision to have an abortion as well as an employee’s contemplation of an abortion. The PDA also prohibits adverse employment actions based upon an employee’s decision not to have an abortion. So, for example, an employer would violate the PDA if it pressured an employee to have, or not to have, an abortion in order to keep her job or be considered for a promotion.

State Law

Several states have implemented “trigger laws,” which impose restrictions or categorical bans on abortion following Dobbs. In addition, states such as Texas have enacted laws that allow individuals to file civil actions against entities that “knowingly engage in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying for or reimbursing the cost of an abortion through insurance or otherwise.” Relying on that law, Texas legislators have already threatened at least two high profile employers for implementing policies which reimburse travel costs for abortion care unavailable in an employee’s home state. Although the Texas statute is currently being challenged in court, its text provides for statutory damages “in an amount of not less than $10,000” for “each abortion . . . induced.”

Although the issue has not been litigated yet, courts will likely have to decide how the PDA’s protections interact with a state’s anti-abortion laws.

Employer Handbook Policies and Procedures

The Dobbs decision may also impact workplace morale and productivity. Accordingly, employers should consider reviewing their handbooks as well as policies and procedures, with human resources and managers to ensure requisite familiarity with the employer’s social media policy, dress code, code of conduct, and how the employer handles confidential health information. Employers should be prepared for increased public expression from the workforce—including social media posts, discussions with other employees and third parties, and wearing clothing or other accessories reflecting strong opinions. Human resources should also be prepared for an increase in leave requests and employee resignations.

Travel Benefits for Employees Seeking Reproductive Care

In the wake of Dobbs, many businesses in states where access to abortion will be prohibited or highly restricted are considering—or have already implemented—benefit or employee expense plan amendments that would cover travel and lodging for out-of-state abortions. Ultimately, the legal and regulatory future for such plans remains unclear; especially in states where abortion laws are the most restrictive and contain “aiding and abetting” liability.

At a high level, employers seeking to enact such benefit or expense plans may find some comfort in a statement contained in Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Dobbs. Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:

  • Some of the other abortion related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.

Thus, it appears that outright travel bans or similar prohibitive restrictions would face significant legal challenges, and could be declared void.

At this early stage in the post-Roe era, there appear to be several ‘paths’ emerging for employers seeking to provide travel benefits. Each comes with its own set of potential issues and considerations that employers, in conjunction with their counsel and benefit providers, should evaluate carefully. Below is a brief discussion of some of the travel-reimbursement plans employers have begun to implement or consider in the wake of Dobbs:

  1. Travel and lodging benefits under existing group health plans.
    • Assuming the plans are self-funded and subject to ERISA, they must also comply with other applicable rules such as HIPAA and the ACA.
    • Such benefits may not be available under non-ERISA plans in states restricting abortion access.
    • Generally would be limited to individuals enrolled in the employer’s plan.
  2. Travel and lodging benefits under Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRA’s).
    • An HRA is a type of health savings account offering tax-free reimbursement up to a fixed amount each year.
    • HRA’s are generally subject to ERISA and cannot reimburse above the very minimal IRS limits (Section 213), such as mileage (.18 cents) and lodging ($50/per day).
    • Should be integrated with other coverage or qualify as an “Excepted Benefit HRA” or else it may violate certain ACA rules that prohibit lifetime annual dollar limits for certain benefits.
  3. Employee Assistance Programs (EAP’s).
    • EAP’s are voluntary benefit programs some employers use to allow employees access to certain types of care without accruing co-pays, deductibles, or out of pocket costs. Historically, EAP’s have been predominately used for mental health benefits such as therapy or substance abuse counseling.
    • In certain circumstances, EAP’s are exempt from the ACA. To be an “excepted benefit,” the EAP:
      • Cannot provide significant benefits in the nature of medical care or treatment;
      • Cannot be coordinated with benefits under another group health plan;
      • Cannot charge a premium for participation; and
      • Cannot require cost sharing for offered services.
    • The first of the above requirements (significant benefits of a medical nature) is highly subjective and may create risk for employers because it is difficult to determine whether a benefit is “significant.” Accordingly, it may be difficult to locate a third-party vendor or provider that would administer travel and lodging benefits through an EAP.
  4. Travel and lodging benefits to employees as taxable reimbursements.
    • Taxable reimbursements—up to a certain amount annually—for travel to obtain abortion or other medical care not available in the employee’s place of residence.
    • Some employers are requiring only receipts for lodging, but are not requesting substantiation of the employee’s abortion procedure. Some argue this might insulate an employer from liability in states with statutes prohibiting “aiding or abetting” an abortion, on the grounds that the employer does not know what the employee is using the benefit for. Ultimately, whether that is true remains largely untested and unclear.
    • Likely more costly for the employer, because the benefit is broader in scope. In addition, employers may run the risk that a payroll reimbursement of this kind could qualify as setting up a “new medical plan,” thereby raising compliance and other related issues.

Additionally, employer travel-and-lodging benefits of this type present innumerable other questions and issues. Such questions should include:

  1. Is the employer’s benefit plan subject to ERISA?
    • ERISA is the federal law applicable to qualifying employee benefits plans, including employer-sponsored group health plans. Plans subject to ERISA must also comply with HIPAA, the ACA, and other applicable rules and regulations. So-called self-funded employer plans are subject to ERISA.
    • With some exceptions, ERISA preempts or blocks the implementation of state laws that ”relate to” the ERISA plan.
    • However, ERISA does not:
      • Preempt a state law that regulates insurance companies operating in the state; or
      • Preempt state criminal laws of general applicability.
    • If a plan is self-insured and subject to ERISA it may not be required to comply with state laws related to abortion services based on ERISA preemption.
    • However, the impact of new and untested civil and/or criminal penalties remains unclear.
  2. What procedures does the plan cover?
    • In this environment—especially in states with the most restrictive abortion laws—employers should have a firm understanding of what specific type of abortion procedures the plan covers.
  3. Specific or “general” travel stipends?
    • As noted above, some companies are choosing to provide travel/lodging stipends and benefits to access abortion care in jurisdictions where the procedure is lawful.
    • Some employers are making this travel stipend more general—i.e., not requiring the stipend be used for abortion, or otherwise naming abortion in the benefit program. As an example, a policy that provides a stiped for an employee to “travel to receive medical care that is unavailable within 100 miles of the employee’s place of residence.”
    • Note that out-of-plan reimbursements to employees are likely taxable as wages. Some employees may choose to gross up such stipends to compensate.
  4. What about privacy concerns?
    • Employers should think carefully about how to provide any benefits or stipends while protecting employee privacy, not violating HIPAA, and—where applicable—not running afoul of so-called ‘aiding and abetting’ legislation.
    • To that end, as noted above, some companies are requiring only that employees provide travel receipts—not documentation of the underlying procedure—to qualify for the benefit, reimbursement, or stipend.
    • Of course, without any verification, there is always the potential for abuse—or otherwise using the program for something well beyond its core intent, such as travel, elective plastic surgery, etc. However, some employers may evaluate the risk of abuse as worth the potential lessening of privacy and other concerns.

Protected Activity

Employers must also be aware that certain speech in the workplace—including speech about abortion—may be legally protected. Although the First Amendment generally does not extend to private companies, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits retaliation against employees who discuss the terms and conditions of employment, commonly referred to as “protected concerted activity.” Thus, employees (1) discussing or advocating for an employer to provide benefits to women seeking reproductive and abortion-related healthcare services, (2) advocating for the employer to take a certain public stance on the issue, or (3) protesting the employer’s public position on the issue, may constitute protected activity under the NLRA.

Contacts and Next Steps

Employment law issues will continue to arise and evolve in the coming months following the Dobbs decision. The EEOC, DOL, and HHS may provide further guidance on how Dobbs impacts employment laws such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and PDA. Employers should consult with legal counsel concerning these developments.

Article By Denise E. Giraudo, Stephen E. Fox, Jonathan E. Clark, and Dan Syed of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Nonbinary Pronoun Usage in the Workplace: What Employers Are Doing to Promote Inclusivity

Using the correct pronouns and honorifics in the workplace has become an increasingly important part of maintaining an inclusive workplace. At the same time, the sensitive nature of this trend and the many variations of pronouns and honorifics in use may leave employers confused as to how to accomplish that goal. Moreover, employers may be concerned with how to comply with employees’ requests in an ever-evolving space and with the increasing use of nonbinary pronouns.

Nonbinary Pronouns and Honorifics

Individuals have traditionally identified with binary sets of pronouns based on male and female gender expressions (i.e. he/him/his and she/her/hers). Increasingly, many individuals are expressing that they do not identify as either a “man” or “woman.” An estimated 11 percent of individuals who identity as LGBTQ in the United States (i.e., approximately 1.2 million people), identity as nonbinary, according to a recent study. The vast majority (76 percent) are between the ages of 18 and 29, the study found.

It is increasingly common for these individuals to go by gender-neutral, nonbinary pronouns, including they/them/theirs. Many others go by other nonbinary pronouns, such as ze (or zie)/zir/zirs; ne/nir/nirs; xe/xem/xir; and ve/ver/vis, or a growing set of nonbinary pronouns that are resurfacing or newly appearing within the U.S. vernacular. Similarly, honorifics, such as Mr., Miss, Mrs., Ms., Sir, and Madame reflect a binary gender view leading some individuals to go by “Mx.,” “Fren,” or another gender-neutral honorific.

The issue has particular significance for employers since the June 2020 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which found that discrimination against gay and transgender individuals is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The high court reasoned that an adverse action against an individual because the individual is gay or transgender is a form of discrimination based on sex “because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” However, the Court left open several questions on how the ruling applies to sex-segregated restrooms, dress codes, grooming standards, and pronouns.

Following the decision, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued new guidance on June 15, 2021, taking the position that “intentionally and repeatedly using the wrong name and pronouns to refer to a transgender employee could contribute to an unlawful hostile work environment” in violation of Title VII. This suggests there could be potential liability for employers who refuse to use a nonbinary employee’s correct pronouns. Further, while Title VII does not cover every employee in the United States, many state and local laws, such as California’s Fair Employment and Housing Council’s regulations and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), provide similar or greater protection from gender identity discrimination.

Best Practices

It is increasingly becoming a commonplace practice for companies to permit employees to include their pronouns in their email signatures or on their social media profiles. This trend might just be the start. In light of the evolving movements in these areas, some employers may be struggling with how to support nonbinary individuals in their workplaces.

Safe Spaces

Some employers will take the stance that it is important to provide safe spaces for employees to identify their pronouns without pressure or the worry of retaliation in order to maintain an inclusive environment. Employers may further want to consider additional training for supervisors and other employees on how to handle everyday interactions regarding pronoun use. For example, employers may want to encourage employees to be comfortable with apologizing and correcting themselves if the wrong pronoun is used. This may be an especially important subject if an employee had started at the company using one set of pronouns and later realizes a different gender identity during the course of employment. A diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) committee or diversity liaisons can guide employers in facilitating these conversations.

Privacy Concerns

At the same time, employers are faced with the tension of ensuring respect for each individual’s privacy. In this regard, employers may want to be conscious that individuals generally will not want to be into a situation in which they must choose between using a nonbinary pronoun or facing inappropriate questions about their choice from management or co-workers. It may be necessary to keep pronoun sharing optional and to encourage employees to default to gender-neutral language where possible.

Gender-Neutral Corporate Communications and Record-Keeping

The Biden Administration, in March 2022, announced a series of federal government policy changes to allow U.S. citizens to identify as nonbinary, including allowing U.S. citizens to select an “X” gender marker on their U.S. passport applications. In accordance, the EEOC also announced that it would provide the option to use a nonbinary gender marker in the filing of a charge of discrimination. Several states have further allowed the use of a gender-neutral marker on state identity documents, including drivers’ licenses. Given these developments, employers may also want to consider using gender-neutral language in communications and updating their human resources demographic record-keeping procedures to allow for employees to be identified as nonbinary or with a gender-neutral marker.

Key Takeaways

The Bostock decisions and the proliferation of state and local anti-discrimination laws may require that employers make efforts to allow employees to share and be addressed by nonbinary pronouns. This could be critical in employer recruiting and retention with younger generations entering the workplace that are increasingly comfortable with expressing their nonbinary gender. Also, it is clear that accurate or appropriate pronouns and honorifics will continue to change. Employers may want to remain ready to adjust in this rapidly evolving space in order to provide inclusive environments and keep workplaces free of harassment and discrimination.

Companies seeking to create more inclusive workplaces for nonbinary individuals can find further information and guidance from a number of organizations that provide educational resources and technical assistance.

Article By Kelly S. Hughes, Alan J. Brozovich, and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

District Court Rules Most Plaintiffs in Case Do Not Have Standing to Block Florida Stop W.O.K.E. Act

There are two key cases pending before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on Florida’s “Stop W.O.K.E. Act”: the Falls, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00166) and the Honeyfund.com, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00227). The Northern District of Florida has issued its first order on the Act, which went into effect on July 1, 2022.

In an Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, in Part, in the Falls matter, the court concluded that the K-12 teachers, the soon-to-be kindergartner, and the diversity and inclusion consultant who sued Governor Ron DeSantis and other officials to block the Stop W.O.K.E. Act did not have standing to pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The court reserved ruling pending additional briefing on the question of whether the college professor, who also sued, has standing.

Stop W.O.K.E. Act

The Stop W.O.K.E. Act expands an employer’s civil liability for discriminatory employment practices under the Florida Civil Rights Act if the employer endorses certain concepts in a “nonobjective manner” during training or other required activity that is a condition of employment.

Court Order

In the Falls case, a diverse group of plaintiffs claiming they were regulated by the Stop W.O.K.E. Act filed a lawsuit challenging the Act on the grounds that it violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to free expression, academic freedom, and to access information.

The court, however, did not reach the question of constitutionality. It also did not determine whether the case can move forward, an issue that will be decided when the court rules on the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss.

Instead, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on the threshold question of standing. It found the plaintiffs (other than the college professor) did not show they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to DeSantis or another defendant that can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling.

The court found the consultant is not an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act. Therefore, she could not assert standing on that basis. Instead, she argued she has third-party standing to assert the rights of the employers who would otherwise hire her, and she is harmed by the Act because employers will no longer hire her. The court rejected both theories, finding the consultant-employer relationship is not sufficiently “close” to create standing; employers are not hindered in raising their First Amendment rights on their own; and, based on the evidence presented, the court could not reasonably infer that the consultant has lost or will lose business because of the Act.

Importantly, the court specifically held that it was not ruling on the legality of the Act, whether it was moral, or whether it constituted good policy.

Private Employer

The court highlighted that the sister case pending in the Northern District of Florida (Honeyfund.com) involves a private employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In that case, the plaintiffs allege the Stop W.O.K.E. Act violates their right to free speech by restricting training topics and their due process rights by being unconstitutionally vague. Honeyfund.com, Inc. and its co-plaintiffs request that the court enjoin enforcement of the law. The case has been transferred to District Court Judge Mark Walker. The Honeyfund.com case will likely have the largest effect on Florida employers and questions surrounding the enforceability of the Act as to diversity and inclusion training.

***

Since the Stop W.O.K.E. Act took effect, employers are understandably unclear how to proceed with training. Employers should continue to train their employees, but review their training programs on diversity, inclusion, bias, equal employment opportunity, and harassment prevention through the lens of the new law. Employers should also ensure they train the trainers who are conducting these important programs. Finally, employers should understand potential risks associated with disciplining or discharging employees who refuse to participate in mandatory training programs, even if employers do not consider the programs to violate the new law.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris, Samia M. Kirmani, Amanda Simpson, and Lindsay Dennis Swiger of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

  1. The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
  2. How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
  3. The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
  4. What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
  5. When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

  • In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
  • Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

  • In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
  • Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
  • On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions? 

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

  • Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
  • No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
  • The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

Article By J. Michael Showalter, Samuel A. Rasche, and Rachael A. Bryan of ArentFox Schiff LLP

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© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

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© 2022 Vedder Price

Why ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Bills are Antithetical to an Equitable and Inclusive Education

According to a 2019 GLSEN national survey of LGBTQ+ students, nearly 60% of surveyed students reported they felt unsafe at school because of their sexual orientation and 43% because of their gender expression. Within the same survey, nearly all (98.8%) LGBTQ+ students reported hearing “gay” used in a negative way at school, 95% heard other homophobic remarks, and 87% heard transphobic remarks.

When I was an educator, it was essential to my practice that all my students felt safe. If I were to hear any negative remarks about a student or become aware one of my students felt unsafe due to their identity, it would be my ethical, and moral, obligation to do something to create a safer and more inclusive learning environment; a core part of my role as an educator was to teach empathy and compassion in my students. This could be as simple as having a classroom discussion about the choices of language and how using words such as “gay” with a negative connotation can be hurtful to their classmates. This could also mean sharing my own identity as a queer man so my LGBTQ+ students knew they had someone they could turn to for support, and to normalize queer identities for all my students and their families. Either of these actions would require I discuss the importance of accepting all sexual orientations and gender identities.

In other words, I would have to say “gay.” But in six states — as of now — I would not have been able to do this.

The state of Florida attracted national attention earlier this year with the adoption of H.B. 1557, the “Parental Rights in Education” bill, more commonly known as the “Don’t Say Gay” bill. The bill, which has since been signed into law, dictates classroom instruction by “school staff” on “sexual orientation or gender identity may not occur in kindergarten through grade 3 or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students.” Five other states, according to the Movement Advancement Project, have similar laws enacted and several more have bills pending in their state legislatures. Some proponents of these bills argue the legislation is necessary to ensure parents have greater say when, if, and how LGBTQ+ issues are discussed with their children.

Yet these laws are designed to ensure only some parents have greater say, as the parents of LGBTQ+ children are certainly not reflected in these efforts.

At a time when youth mental health is reaching a crisis, state legislatures are advancing bills that would perpetuate, and arguably exacerbate, harmful school-based experiences for LGBTQ+ youth and worsen their well-being. A 2022 survey by the Trevor Project found 45% of LGBTQ+ youth seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year, and over half of transgender and nonbinary youth considered suicide. The 2019 GLSEN survey also found LGBTQ+ students who experienced forms of victimization based on their sexual orientation or gender identity (e.g., being bullied, hearing homophobic or transphobic remarks, etc.) had lower levels of self-esteem, higher levels of depression, and were less likely to say they belonged in school.

Some may argue “Don’t Say Gay” bills would not preclude educators from addressing instances of homophobia or transphobia in their classrooms and try to suggest that prohibitions on such actions are not the intent of the bills. However, regardless of intent, these bills often have the insidious impact to “chill” educators’ actions out of fear they may run afoul of the law and open themselves to reprimands, including being terminated.

All students deserve to have a safe, supportive, and affirming learning environment. All educators should be empowered to protect their students, and not feel afraid to step in when they notice a student being bullied because of their identity. And every parent should have the resources to be a partner in their child’s education. Unfortunately, state laws such as the “Don’t Say Gay” bills will only stand in way of these notions from becoming realities.

It is impossible to support all students when LGBTQ+ children continue to be targeted merely because of their identities.

Article By Sean A. Worley of Nelson Mullins

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Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP