Congratulations Bankruptcy Graduates! You Are Now Eligible for PPP Loans.

To be eligible for a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan, the applicant must certify on the borrower application that the applicant and any owner of 20% or more of the applicant are not “presently involved in any bankruptcy.”  This eligibility requirement spawned numerous lawsuits between debtors and the United States Small Business Administration (“SBA”) in the year since the SBA took this position.  In every case under the first round of funding under the CARES Act, the SBA argued that entities in bankruptcy were not eligible for PPP loans.  And with the second round of funding arriving in 2021, the SBA did not change its position.

Now, with the May 31 deadline for PPP loan applications looming, the SBA has published additional guidance, which provides that entities that have concluded a bankruptcy proceeding are not, for PPP eligibility, considered “presently involved in any bankruptcy.”

In its answer to Frequently Asked Question Number 67 about the PPP loan program, the SBA states that, for PPP eligibility purposes, a party is no longer involved in bankruptcy under these circumstances:

Chapter 7 – The Bankruptcy Court has entered a discharge order.

Chapters 11, 12 and 13 – The Bankruptcy Court has entered an order confirming the plan.

Any Chapter – The Bankruptcy Court has entered an order dismissing the case.

For an entity to be eligible for a PPP loan, the above orders must be entered before the date of the PPP loan application.  If an entity is permanently closed, through bankruptcy or otherwise, it is not eligible for a PPP loan.

Consequently, if you have resolved a bankruptcy case in the past year, and you are otherwise eligible for a PPP loan, you can apply for a loan.  The SBA’s full statement can be found here: https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/PPP%20FAQs%204.6.21%20FINAL-508.pdf.

© 2021 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.


For more articles on bankruptcy, visit the NLRBankruptcy & Restructuring section.

 

 

Bradley’s Bankruptcy Basics: COVID-19 Bankruptcy Relief Extension Act Extends Various CARES Act Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code

Last March, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) made several changes to the Bankruptcy Code, including those changes discussed in more detail here. As it became clear that we would be dealing with COVID-19 for much longer than previously anticipated, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA), which made additional changes to the Bankruptcy Code, including those explored in more detail in this article.

Originally, several of the Bankruptcy Code amendments included in the prior legislation were scheduled to sunset in March 2021, on the first anniversary of the CARES Act. However, on March 27, 2021, hours before the originally scheduled sunsets, the COVID-19 Bankruptcy Relief Extension Act of 2021 (Extension Act) was passed. While the Extension Act extended certain aspects of the Bankruptcy Code amendments included in the CARES Act, it did not extend any of the amendments in the CAA.

Below is a summary of various CARES Act and CAA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and their respective sunset dates as modified by the Extension Act.

Set to Sunset on December 27, 2021

  • COVID stimulus payments do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate.
    • CAA Section 1001(a)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 541(b)(11)
  • Chapter 13 debtors who have missed three (3) or fewer mortgage payments due to COVID-19 or have entered into a loan forbearance or mortgage modification agreement can seek an early bankruptcy discharge.
    • CAA Section 1001(b)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 1328(i)(1)
  • Debtors in bankruptcy or individuals who have received bankruptcy discharges cannot be denied relief under the CARES Act or denied a mortgage forbearance or protection under foreclosure and eviction moratoria.
    • CAA Section 1001(c)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code section 525(d)
  • Mortgage servicers can file a Supplemental Proof of Claim for forborne amounts pursuant to a CARES Act forbearance within 120 days of the expiration of the forbearance period.
    • CAA Section 1001(d)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Sections 501(f) and 502(b)(9)
  • Any party in standing, including a mortgage servicer, can file a motion to modify a Chapter 13 plan to provide for payment for a CARES Act Supplemental Proof of Claim.
    • CAA Section 1001(e)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 1329(e)

Set to Sunset on March 27, 2022

  • COVID-19-related income is not included when calculating a debtor’s “current monthly income.”
    • CARES Act Section 1113(b)(1)(A)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 101(10A)(B)(ii)(V)
  • COVID-19-related income does not constitute a Chapter 13 debtor’s “disposable income.”
    • CARES Act Section 1113(b)(1)(B)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 1325(b)(2)
  • A Chapter 13 debtor whose plan was confirmed prior to March 27, 2021, and who is experiencing a COVID-19-related hardship can move to modify his plan to allow for plan payments over a period of seven (7) years, rather than a period of three (3) or five (5) years.
    • CARES Act Section 1113(b)(1)(C)
    • Modifies Bankruptcy Code Section 1329(d)(1)

© 2021 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP


For more articles on bankruptcy, visit the NLR Bankruptcy & Restructuring section.

Executive Summary: COVID-19 Pandemic Spurs Wave of Mega Corporate Bankruptcies

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the global economy and triggered a wave of large corporate bankruptcies. In particular, the number of mega bankruptcies (over $1 billion in reported assets) increased dramatically in the second and third quarters of 2020.

This report examines trends in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings between January 2005 and September 2020 by companies with over $100 million in assets.[i]

In the first three quarters of 2020, 34, 55, and 49 companies with over $100 million in assets filed for bankruptcy, respectively, compared to the quarterly average of 19 for the 2005–2019 period. The 55 bankruptcy filings in Q2 2020 was the second-highest total for any quarter since 2005, only behind the 65 bankruptcies in Q1 2009.

A total of 138 companies with over $100 million in assets filed for bankruptcy in the first three quarters of 2020. This number is 84 percent higher than the number of bankruptcies (75) filed during the same period last year.

There was a substantial increase in the number of “mega bankruptcies” (i.e., those filed by companies with over $1 billion in reported assets) in Q2 2020. In Q2 and Q3 2020, there were 31 and 15 mega bankruptcies or roughly six and three times the quarterly average (five) during the 2005–2019 period, respectively.

Mega bankruptcies were concentrated in two industries: Mining, Oil, and Gas; and Retail Trade. These two industries accounted for 58 percent of the mega bankruptcies in Q1–Q3 2020.

The largest bankruptcy in the first three quarters of 2020 was filed by The Hertz Corporation, which had an estimated $25.84 billion in assets at the time of filing.

Figure 1: Key Trends in Bankruptcy Filings

2005–Q3 2020

2005–2019
Quarterly Average

Q1 2020

Q2 2020

Q3 2020

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filings

18

33

54

49

Chapter 11 Mega Bankruptcies

5

6

31

15

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filings by Public Companies

11

8

34

26

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filings by Private Companies

7

25

20

23

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Filings

1

1

1

0

Average Asset Value at Time of Filing (Billions)

$2.21

$0.66

$3.01

$1.52

Source: BankruptcyData

Note: Only Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings by companies (both public and private) with over $100 million in reported assets are included. For companies where exact assets are not known, the lower bound of the estimated range is used. Asset values are not adjusted for inflation. Mega bankruptcies are defined as those for companies with over $1 billion in reported assets at the time of their bankruptcy filings.

Read COVID-19 Pandemic Spurs Wave of Mega Corporate Bankruptcies


[i]      This report relies on data obtained from BankruptcyData. It focuses on asset values at the time of bankruptcy filings due to the higher prevalence of missing information on liabilities in BankruptcyData. Some other publications have focused on liabilities due to potential concerns over whether book values of assets overstate valuations for bankrupt firms (see, e.g., Edward Altman, “COVID-19 and the Credit Cycle,” Journal of Credit Risk 16, no. 2 (2020): 1–28 at 13–14). Using available data on liabilities in this report would not meaningfully change any of the findings.

Copyright ©2020 Cornerstone Research


For more articles on bankruptcy, visit the National Law Review Bankruptcy & Restructuring section.

With Retail Bankruptcies on the Rise, Opportunities for Distressed M&A Increase

While there were already a number of high profile retail bankruptcies in 2019, current economic conditions and pandemic-related market challenges have exacerbated an already difficult retail environment, which has led to a significant increase in bankruptcies in 2020. Year to date, more than 30 major retail and restaurant chains have filed for bankruptcy, which is more than in all of 2019. Furthermore, 2020 is on track to have the highest number of retail bankruptcies in 10 years. Although the Q4 holiday season often provides the strongest quarterly financial performance for many retailers, which may slow the pace of bankruptcy filings, projected holiday sales numbers may be uncertain this year, and additional bankruptcies are still likely to follow by year end.

Despite these bleak statistics, distressed companies may present attractive targets for strategic and private equity buyers with available cash or access to financing on favorable terms. Distressed M&A transactions may offer certain advantages that can be attractive to buyers, such as the potential to purchase at a discounted price or the ability to complete a transaction on an accelerated timetable. Already, the retail market has begun to see the reemergence under new ownership of some shuttered companies that were the targets of liquidation sales and distressed M&A transactions within the past two years. Some of these retailers have relaunched with modified business strategies, such as a significantly reduced number of brick and mortar locations or an exclusively online presence. The distressed M&A transaction opportunities resulting from existing market conditions will likely play an increasingly important role in overall M&A deal activity and could lead to a reshaping of the retail landscape in the near future.


Copyright © 2020, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles on bankruptcy, visit the National Law Review Bankruptcy & Restructuring section.

Confusion in Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debtor Eligibility for PPP Loans

The Small Business Administration’s (SBA) rules and regulations concerning the eligibility of businesses for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans when the business is involved in bankruptcy have recently been a source of substantial uncertainty, with the nationwide split of authority in bankruptcy courts. While these cases deal with a very small minority of PPP recipients and are a relative novelty in that regard, these decisions could foretell future issues for companies who have received PPP loans but are later forced to file Chapter 11, specifically regarding their eligibility for loan forgiveness.

The SBA is enabled with emergency rulemaking authority to adopt rules and regulations to manage application and qualifications for PPP loans under the CARES Act. Pursuant to this authority, the SBA publishes Interim Final Rules (IFR). The SBA’s April 28, 2020 IFR expressly disqualified applicants who are debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding at any time between the date of application and when the loan is disbursed.[1] Several companies in bankruptcy proceedings, whose loans have been denied, have challenged the SBA’s rulemaking authority in this regard, leading to a nationwide split on this issue in bankruptcy courts.

Specifically, these courts have rendered opinions to decide whether the SBA can impose a policy disqualifying a business in bankruptcy proceedings from participating in the PPP and whether the SBA violates other laws for doing so.[2] More than a dozen cases have been decided in the last two months, with the recent decisions highlighting the confusion that bankruptcy courts face in discerning the intent of Congress and the purpose of the CARES Act.

In decisions amounting to a majority of court decisions to date, bankruptcy courts have ruled in favor of the debtor on the merits or a request for injunctive relief.[3] One decision in favor of the debtor, with detailed analysis, has been rendered in the In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A. bankruptcy case. In that case, the bankruptcy court concluded that excluding Chapter 11 debtors conflicts with the intent of Congress and the purpose of the CARES Act. The bankruptcy court determined that collectability was not a criterion for a qualification which Congress intended to focus on and rejected the SBA’s argument that debtors had a higher risk of misusing PPP funds for non-covered expenses.[4]

On the other hand, in a minority stance are bankruptcy courts that have found that the IFR is not in violation of the CARES Act, and that the SBA has not exceeded its statutory authority under the APA. Some of these courts point to the extreme urgency with which the CARES Act was enacted, which they say necessitated clarifying rulemaking, as well as the historical broad authority granted by Congress to the SBA which allows for such rulemaking in areas where the CARES Act is silent.[5]

Given the large number of PPP recipients and the potential for a dramatic increase in the number of companies forced to file for bankruptcy protection in the near future, the ultimate resolution of this issue may have significant implications for the future. Varnum will continue to follow the current case split, as well as their possible implications for other debtors that may have received a PPP loan pre-filing and will seek to have the loans forgiven as part of the Chapter 11 process.


[1] See Interim Final Rule, 13 C.F.R. Parts 120-21, Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program – Requirements – Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility (RIN 3245-AH37), at p. 8-9.
[2] The laws invoked are under the Administrative Procedures Act (the “APA”) 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), APA 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and under the Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provision, 11 U.S.C. § 525.
[3] In re Skefos, No. 19-29718-L, 2020 WL 2893413 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 2, 2020) (order granting the Debtor’s motion for PI); In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., No. 8:19-BK-04971-MGW, 2020 WL 3048197 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 8, 2020) (enjoining the SBA from disqualifying the Debtor and finding that the decision-making of the SBA was not reasoned); Diocese of Rochester v U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 6:20-CV-06243 EAW, 2020 WL 3071603 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020).
[4] In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., No. 8:19-BK-04971-MGW, 2020 WL 3048197, at *15-17.
[5] Schuessler v United States Small Bus. Admin., No. AP 20-02065-BHL, 2020 WL 2621186 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 22, 2020) (denying declaratory and injunctive relief and dismissing the complaints in three consolidated Chapter 12 cases); In re iThrive Health, LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 20-00151 (Bankr. D. Md. June 8, 2020) (finding Debtor would not prevail on the merits and denying preliminary injunction; but granting Debtor’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy without disclosing if Debtor intends to move to reinstate the bankruptcy after PPP funding is approved as contemplated by Debtors in Arizona and S.D. Florida); In re Henry Anesthesia Assoc., 2020 WL 3002124 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 4, 2020).

© 2020 Varnum LLP
For more on the topic, see the National Law Review Bankruptcy & Restructuring law section.

“Caveat Emptor”: New York Bankruptcy Court Disallows Bankruptcy Claims Purchased from Recipients of Avoidable Transfers; Is Enron Going, Going, . . . ?

A recent Bankruptcy Court decision, In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., out of the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) by Bankruptcy Judge Sean H. Lane, disallowed creditors’ bankruptcy claims purchased from sellers who allegedly received (and had not repaid) avoidable preferences and fraudulent transfers from the debtors.1 Judge Lane provides a cogent warning to claims purchasers that they bear the risk of Bankruptcy Code section 502(d) disallowance.

Judge Lane based the Firestar Diamond decision on Bankruptcy Code section 502(d), which mandates disallowance of claims of an entity that has received property that the estate may recover (e.g., avoidable transfers) unless that entity or its transferee has repaid the avoidable or recoverable amount.2  Further, in so ruling, Judge Lane aligned his Court with the view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re KB Toys Inc.3  There, when faced with the same issue, the Third Circuit held that the taint of section 502(d) disallowance risk travels with the claim itself and the taint cannot be cleansed through a subsequent transfer of the claim to a third-party transferee.

Notably, in reaching its holding in Firestar Diamond, Judge Lane rejected a holding by a District Court in its own district.  Thirteen years ago, in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy, District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin held that Bankruptcy Code section 502(d) is a “personal disability and does not travel with the ‘claim,’ but with the ‘claimant.’”  In a decision that was regarded as a boon to the secondary bankruptcy claims trading market, Judge Scheindlin ruled that purchasers of claims (not mere assignees) would take free from the risk of section 502(d) disallowance.4 The District Court vacated the Bankruptcy Court’s order disallowing claims and remanded to determine the nature of the transfer.  If the transfer were a sale, rather than an assignment, it would not be disallowed under section 502(d).5  But the Enron decision found few adherents.  Firestar Diamond joins a lengthening line of decisions criticizing or declining to follow it.

Some risk mitigation suggestions are set forth in the “Implications” section below.

Background:

In Firestar Diamond, the Debtors were three wholesalers of jewelry – Firestar Diamond, Inc., Fantasy, Inc., and A. Jaffee, Inc. (collectively, “Firestar” or the “Debtors”) – who sold mainly to department stores and specialty chain stores in the United States.  Firestar filed for Chapter 11 protection in February of 2018 in the SDNY in the “shadows of an alleged massive fraud” conducted by Firestar’s owner, Nirav Modi, who allegedly used a number of shadow entities (“Non-debtor Entities”) to pose as independent third parties in sham transactions in order to obtain billions of dollars in bank financing.

The SDNY Bankruptcy Court appointed an examiner to look into these allegations.  The examiner found “substantial evidence” of the Debtors’ “knowledge and involvement” in the alleged criminal conduct.  As a result, the court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Debtors’ estates.6

A number of banks filed proofs of claims in the Chapter 11 case.  The banks’ claims were not based on their dealings with the Debtors.  Instead, the banks’ claims were based on amounts that the Debtors owed to the Non-debtor Entities, which had pledged their receivables or sold their invoices to the banks at a discounted price for amounts the Debtors owed.

The Chapter 11 trustee objected to the banks’ claims under section 502(d) because the claims had been acquired from claim sellers who had received fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors.  The banks opposed the trustee’s argument based on Enron, arguing instead that “disallowance under Section 502(d) is a personal disability and does not travel with the ‘claim,’ but with the ‘claimant’” and that the banks had “acquired rights to payment from the Debtors through a ‘sale’ rather than an ‘assignment’.” Therefore, the claims had been washed clean.8

In contrast, the trustee argued that “sale” or “assignment” was of no import and urged the Court to reject Enron and follow rulings by other courts, including the Third Circuit’s decision in KB Toys.  In the trustee’s view, the banks’ claims should be treated the same as if they had been filed by the Non-debtor Entities and disallowed.

Ultimately, Judge Lane agreed with the trustee and held that the banks’ claims should be disallowed because section 502(d) focuses on the claims themselves rather than who holds them. The original claims were disallowable and, therefore, remained disallowable even after their sale to the banks.

Enron and KB Toys:

Enron and KB Toys represent opposing views interpreting section 502(d).  Generally, Enron attributed disallowance under section 502(d) to the claimant rather than a feature that transfers with a claim. On the other hand, KB Toys viewed section 502(d) disallowance as an attribute of the claim and therefore a feature that travels with the claim upon transfer.

In Enron, the court also held that when a claim is transferred, the “nature of that transfer” will dictate whether there may be a disallowance under section 502(d).  Indeed, a transfer of a claim by assignment would allow the personal disability to transfer with the claim because an assignee “stands in the shoes of the assignor” and would, therefore, take on the transferred property with “whatever limitations it had in the hands of the assignor[.]”  Meanwhile, a transfer by a sale would allow the purchaser only to receive the claim, washing the claim of the disability.  Judge Scheindlin reasoned that recovery of property under the threat of section 502(d) disallowance would not be achieved if the claim was held by a creditor who had not received the preference.9

KB Toys rejected the distinction between “assignment” and “sale,” noting that there is no support for this distinction in the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit concluded that “claims that are disallowable under [section] 502(d) must be disallowed no matter who holds them.”10  The Third Circuit reasoned that allowing a claim originally held by the recipient of a fraudulent or preferential transfer to be washed clean of section 502(d) disabilities would “contravene” the purpose of section 502(d), “which is to ensure equality of distribution of estate assets.”11  If the original claimant could rid the claim of its disabilities by selling the claim to a transferee, trustees would be “deprive[d] . . . of one of the tools the Bankruptcy Code gives trustees to collect assets—asking the bankruptcy court to disallow problematic claims.”12

A number of other courts and scholars alike have agreed with the Third Circuit, thereby concluding that section 502 follows the claim rather than the claimant.13

In re Firestar Diamond:

Judge Lane’s recent decision in Firestar Diamond continues that trend.  Indeed, Firestar Diamond adopted KB Toys’ reasoning and rejected the banks’ position and reliance on Enron.14  Judge Lane, focusing on the claims rather than the claimants, granted the trustee’s section 502(d) claim objections.  The banks’ claims were tainted by fraudulent and preferential transfers received by participants in Firestar’s bank fraud scheme.  Those Non-debtor Entities could not cleanse their other claims against the debtor by selling them to third parties, unless they repaid the avoidable transfers.

In addition, Judge Lane rebuffed the banks’ argument that disallowance of their claims would “wreak havoc in the claims trading market or unfairly punish good faith transferees.”  Rather, the Court explained that it would be “inequitable” to favor the banks over other creditors.15

Following KB Toys, Judge Lane thus concluded that claims purchasers should bear that risk because (i) they voluntarily chose to participate in the bankruptcy and were aware of the risks of doing so, and (ii) they are able to mitigate that risk through due diligence and including an indemnity clause in the transfer agreement.  On the other hand, other creditors in a bankruptcy “have no way to protect themselves against the risk that claims with otherwise avoidable transfers will be washed clean by a sale or assignment.”16

Implications

Firestar Diamond continues the trend of disallowing creditor claims acquired from sellers who received avoidable or preferential transfers from the debtor. In light of yet another decision coming out this way, claims purchasers need to transact with eyes wide open and be mindful of potential consequences pursuant to section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Duly informed claims purchasers may mitigate some risk by, among other things, considering the following measures:

  • Conduct due diligence with the goal of aiming to minimize disallowance risk under section 502(d) by investigating and inquiring into the seller’s relationship and transactions with the debtor.
  • Consider including protections in claim transfer agreements, such as indemnification language in the event of a claim objection based on section 502(d).
  • Consider documenting transfers as “sales” rather than assignments to take advantage of whatever protection or benefit the Enron rationale may still bestow and provide.

1   In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., No. 18-10509 (SHL), 2020 WL 1934896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (“Firestar Diamond”).

2   Section 502(d) provides, in part, “[T]he court shall disallow any claim of an entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 or this title.”

3   736 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (“KB Toys”).

4 Judge Scheindlin limited protection from section 502(d) disallowance to claims held by creditors who acquired their claims by “sale” rather than “assignment.”  The District Court reasoned that a transfer by assignment will not grant the assignee more rights than possessed by the assignor – an assignee “stands in the shoes of the assignor” and takes with the assignor’s limitations.  379 B.R. at 435.  But a claim that is “sold” is not subject to the personal disabilities of the transferor.  Id. at 436.

5   In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Enron”) (“the nature of the transfer will determine whether [the] claims can be subject to . . . disallowance based on [Debtor]’s conduct”).  The Third Circuit, other courts, and bankruptcy commentators have questioned the distinction between “sale and “assignment,” finding it “problematic” and unsupported by state law.  See KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 254; Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *9-12.

6   Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *2-3.

7   Id. at *4 n.3.

8   Id. at *4-6.

9   Enron, 379 B.R. at 443 (The purpose of section 502(d) is to “coerce the return of assets obtained by preferential transfer. That purpose would not be served if a claim in the hands of a claimant could be disallowed even where that claimant had never received the preference to begin with, and as a result, could not be coerced to return it. It seems implausible that Congress would have intended such a result.”).

10 KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252.

11 Id. at 252.

12 Id.

13 See Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *10-11 (collecting cases and scholarly articles); In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012); Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 67, 92 (2009); Jennifer W. Crastz, Can a Claims Purchaser Receive Better Rights (Or Worse Rights) Than Its Transferor in a Bankruptcy?, 29 Cal. Bankr. J. 365, 637 (2007); Roger G. Jones & William L. Norton, III, Norton Creditor’s Rights Handbook § 8:8 (2008).

14 Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *9.

15 Id.

16 Id. at *13-14.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Boy Scouts File for Bankruptcy Amidst Wave of Sexual Abuse Charges

In the face of approximately 300 sexual abuse lawsuits from former Boy Scouts, the Boy Scouts of America has filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Boy Scouts of America is the nation’s largest scouting organization and one of the largest youth organizations. Because Chapter 11 allows an organization to continue operations, scouting programs are expected to proceed at this time.

Officials with the organization said in a statement on Tuesday, February 19, “Our plan is to use this Chapter 11 process to create a Trust that would provide equitable compensation to these individuals.”

The national landscape has shifted significantly in recent years as large, influential organizations like the Catholic Church and USA Gymnastics have become the subject of sexual abuse scandals. One of the most important ways laws have changed has been the extension of the statute of limitations. Many states, including New Jersey and Pennsylvania, have chosen to grant sexual abuse victims longer timeframes to seek damages in sexual abuse and assault cases.


COPYRIGHT © 2020, STARK & STARK

See the National Law Review Bankruptcy & Restructuring Law section for more information.

HAVEN ACT Provides Military Veterans With Increased Income Protections In Bankruptcy

Military veterans often pay a heavy toll for their service from a physical, emotional and even financial standpoint. A new federal law— the Honoring American Veterans in Extreme Need Act of 2019 or the HAVEN Act— aims to address the latter hardship, providing disabled military veterans with greater protections in bankruptcy proceedings.

Prior to the passage of the HAVEN Act, federal Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Defense disability payments were included when calculating a debtor’s disposable income when in bankruptcy. In other words, this income is subject to the reach of creditors.

By contrast, Social Security disability benefits are exempt from calculating a debtor’s disposable income. The HAVEN Act places military disability benefits in the same protected category as Social Security disability.

The actual language of the new exception reads as follows:

“(IV) any monthly compensation, pension, pay, annuity, or allowance paid under title 10, 37, or 38 in connection with a disability, combat-related injury or disability, or death of a member of the uniformed services, except that any retired pay excluded under this subclause shall include retired pay paid under chapter 61 of title 10 only to the extent that such retired pay exceeds the amount of retired pay to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled if retired under any provision of title 10 other than chapter 61 of that title.”

The HAVEN Act received strong bipartisan support in both the House and Senate, and was endorsed by both the American Bankruptcy Institute and a host of veterans’ advocacy organizations, including the American Legion and VFW. Reps. Lucy McBath (D-GA) and Greg Steube (R-FL) co-sponsored the legislation in the House, while Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and John Cornyn (R-TX) co-sponsored the Senate legislation. President Donald Trump signed the HAVEN Act into law August 23, 2019 and it became effective immediately.

Specific benefits protected under the Haven Act are:

  • Permanent Disability Retired Pay

  • Temporary Disability Retired Pay

  • Retired or Disability Severance Pay for Pre-Existing Conditions

  • Disability Severance Pay

  • Combat Related Special Compensation

  • Survivor Benefit Plan for Chapter 61 Retirees

  • Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance

  • Special Compensation for Assistance with Activities of Daily Living

  • VA Veterans Disability Compensation

  • VA Dependency and Indemnity Compensation, and

  • VA Veterans Pension.

Veterans advocates pushed for the HAVEN Act following five recent Bankruptcy Court Decisions that held that under previous bankruptcy law, disabled veterans were required to include military disability in their disposable income in bankruptcy proceedings.

The new law also provides relief to a segment of the population that needs assistance. According to the 2018 VA Annual Benefits Report, 4.74 million US veterans—or 25 percent of the total veteran population—receive VA disability benefits.

Veterans also make up a disproportionate share of bankruptcy filers. Nearly 15 percent of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers are veterans, who make up approximately 10 percent of the overall population. Approximately 125,000 veterans filed for bankruptcy in 2017 alone.


Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

For more on veteran’s affairs, see the Government Contracts, Maritime & Military Law page on the National Law Review.

When Your Customer is In Bankruptcy, There Are Two Major No-Nos That You Must Remember.

First, don’t violate the automatic stay, which prevents a creditor from attempting to collect a debt while the debtor is in bankruptcy unless the creditor gets prior court approval.  Second, don’t violate the discharge injunction, which absolves a debtor of liability for those debts covered by the bankruptcy court’s discharge order.  The automatic stay takes effect when the debtor files bankruptcy, while the discharge injunction typically comes at the end of the case.

The United States Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the discharge injunction.  In Taggart v. Lorenzen, the issue was the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt when the creditor violates the bankruptcy discharge order.  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.

Bradley Taggart was a part owner of an Oregon company called Sherwood Park Business Center.  He got into a dispute with some of the other owners, and they sued him in state court for breach of Sherwood’s operating agreement.  During the lawsuit, Taggart filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Chapter 7, a debtor discharges his debts by liquidating assets to pay creditors.   Taggart ultimately obtained a discharge.  After the bankruptcy court entered the discharge order, the parties returned to the state court lawsuit.  The parties who had sued Taggart before he filed bankruptcy obtained an order from the state court requiring him to pay post-bankruptcy attorneys’ fees of $45,000.00.  Taggart contended this debt had been discharged and the parties’ actions violated his bankruptcy discharge.

Multiple appellate courts reached different conclusions as to whether – and why or why not – the parties had violated the discharge order.  One issue the courts struggled with was the standard to apply to the parties’ conduct.  Should the courts apply an objective test based solely on their conduct or should they consider their subjective beliefs and motivations?  Should the courts impose strict liability for discharge violations or should they let creditors off the hook if they didn’t realize their conduct was improper?  The Supreme Court agreed to resolve these questions.

In adopting the “no fair ground of doubt” standard, the Supreme Court noted that civil contempt is a severe remedy and basic fairness requires those enjoined know what conduct is outlawed before being held in contempt.  The standard is generally an objective one.  A party’s subjective belief he was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate him from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.  Bad faith conduct, and repeated or persistent violations can warrant civil contempt.  Good faith can mitigate against contempt and factor into the appropriate remedy.

Although a discharge order often has little detail, the Supreme Court pointed out that, under the Bankruptcy Code, all debts are discharged unless they are a debt listed as exempt from discharge under Section 523.  A domestic support obligation, for instance, is exempt from discharge.  (This recent article discusses how debts involving intentional, fraud-like conduct may be exempted from discharge.)  In other words, ignorance of the bankruptcy law is no excuse.

In adopting the “no fair ground of doubt standard,” the Supreme Court rejected two other standards, one more lenient and one more harsh.  First, the Supreme Court rejected a pure “good faith” test – a creditor’s good faith belief that its actions did not violate the discharge would absolve it of contempt. Second, the Supreme Court rejected a strict liability test – if a creditor violated the discharge, he would be in contempt regardless of his subjective beliefs about the scope of the discharge order or whether there was a reasonable basis for concluding that his conduct did not violate the discharge order.

The discharge injunction is no joke, and creditors violate it at their peril.  A debtor can be compensated for damages resulting from a discharge violation.  In this case, the bankruptcy court initially awarded Taggart over $100,000 for attorneys’ fees, emotional distress, and punitive damages.  Creditors with customers in bankruptcy, or who have filed bankruptcy in the past, should consult counsel who can advise them on what debts they can pursue.  And if a creditor finds itself accused of violating the discharge injunction, it should contact counsel to assess its chances of passing or failing the “no fair ground of doubt” test.

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

The Tail of a Dog with Two Hats: Fifth Circuit Upholds “Golden Share” Held by Creditor Affiliate

On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.

The backdrop of mergers and acquisitions leading up to this case need not be retold in detail to understand the holding’s significance, but some context is helpful. Franchise Services of North America, Inc. (“FSNA”), one of North America’s largest car rental companies, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy without the required consent of its sole holder of preferred stock, Boketo, LLC (“Boketo”). Boketo was a minority shareholder that had invested $15 million in FSNA  making it FSNA’s single largest investor. Boketo is a wholly-owned subsidiary of investment bank Macquarie Capital (U.S.A.) (“Macquarie”), an unsecured creditor of FSNA’s by virtue of an alleged $3 million claim for fees incurred in connection with the aforementioned transactions. When Boketo invested $15 million in FSNA, it required FSNA to re-incorporate in Delaware and add a “golden share” provision to its corporate documents, i.e. Boketo’s affirmative vote of its preferred share was required for certain corporate events, such as filing bankruptcy. Nonetheless, FSNA eventually filed for chapter 11 in the Southern District of Mississippi without seeking Boketo’s consent, fearing that shareholder Boketo—controlled by creditor Macquarie—would not consent to filing.

Macquarie and Boketo filed motions to dismiss the case for a lack of corporate authority under FSNA’s amended corporate charter. In doing so, Macquarie donned two hats—that of a shareholder through Boketo and that of an unsecured creditor with a $3 million claim. FSNA asserted that Macquarie used Boketo as a “wolf in a sheep’s clothing” to equip a creditor with shareholders’ blocking rights under an allegedly unenforceable “blocking provision” or “golden share.” FSNA implied the tail had been wagging the dog—that Macquarie made the $15 million investment through Boketo to avoid the cost and inconvenience of trying to collect some portion of its $3 million claim in FSNA’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court denied Macquarie’s motion because case law and public policy forbid a creditor from preventing a debtor’s bankruptcy filing. However, it granted Boketo’s motion, given its status as a voting shareholder. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and found FSNA’s theory that Macquarie chased $3 million with $15 million “strain[ed] credulity.”

FSNA’s various legal arguments each fell flat. First, FSNA sought a ruling that “blocking provisions” or “golden shares” (similar, but not identical, concepts), in general, are unenforceable under Delaware law. The Fifth Circuit declined to offer such an advisory opinion. Second, FSNA contended that even if Delaware law allowed these types of provisions, federal policy forbids them. This, too, failed to move the court, since the corporate charter did not eliminate FSNA’s ability to file bankruptcy. Instead, it specified which parties’ consent was necessary to authorize a bankruptcy filing, placing the decision with shareholders. Third, because authority to file bankruptcy is a matter of state law, FSNA argued that Boketo could not exercise its blocking right under Delaware law, and that Boketo had owed a fiduciary duty to facilitate the filing. The Fifth Circuit held that Delaware law, flexible by nature, allows a corporate charter to assign rights to shareholders that would ordinarily be assigned to directors/management, but declined to go so far as to determine whether such provision was valid under Delaware law. In addition, the court refuted FSNA’s fiduciary duty argument because only controlling minority shareholders owe fiduciary duties, and here, Boketo was a non-controlling minority shareholder. The court explained that the standard for minority control is a “steep one,” and that courts focus on control of the board—i.e., whether the minority shareholder can exert actual control over the company. While Boketo made a sizeable investment in FSNA, it only had the right to appoint 2 out of 5 directors and therefore could not exert actual control over the board. FSNA pointed to Boketo’s hypothetical ability to prevent bankruptcy as evidence of actual control, but the court distinguished such theoretical control from actual exertion thereof. The court keenly noted that FSNA defeated its own control argument when it filed bankruptcy without Boketo’s consent—if Boketo was a controlling shareholder, then once again the tail must have been wagging the dog.

Franchise Services highlights the potential for a creditor to essentially step into a shareholder’s shoes and assert shareholder rights pursuant to a corporate charter’s blocking provision or “golden share” by virtue of wearing two hats through a parent and subsidiary.

© 2018 Bracewell LLP.

This post was written by Logan Kotler and Jason G. Cohen of Bracewell LLP.