Regeneron v Novartis and Vetter: Walker Process Client Update

In an appeal that attracted a dozen amici, including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, five states, and the District of Columbia, the Second Circuit gave the Walker Process antitrust doctrine a shot in the arm in a patent dispute related to pre-filled syringes (“PFSs”) used for injection of anti-VEGF biologic medicines into patients’ eyeballs (i.e., intravitreal injections).1 Under Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), patentees who obtain patents through fraudulent behavior or inequitable conduct can be liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a complaint filed in the Northern District of New York, Regeneron alleged Novartis and Vetter committed a Walker Process violation by obtaining and asserting patents for PFSs. The Second Circuit held that the district court made a mistake by dismissing Regeneron’s suit because it focused on the functional similarities in the markets for anti-VEGF medicines in PFSs and vials. In reversing, the Second Circuit held that the correct approach must focus on an economic market analysis rather than a functional market analysis, and that Regeneron’s complaint plausibly alleged that anti-VEGF PFSs constituted their own economic product market. As the amicus interest signals, the decision may have significant implications, both for the blockbuster market for anti-VEGF medicines and, more broadly, for defining the markets for different pharmaceutical methods of administration.

In its complaint, Regeneron alleges that in 2005, it had contracted with Vetter, a company providing pharmaceutical filling services, to collaborate on a PFS for its blockbuster anti-VEGF product, EYLEA.2 It alleges that its agreement with Vetter granted Regeneron ownership in any patent related to EYLEA PFSs. Id. Notwithstanding its agreement with Regeneron, Vetter later entered into a confidential agreement with Novartis to develop a PFS for anti-VEGF biologics, which are used to treat macular degeneration and other retinal conditions. Id. Indeed, both parties agree on the benefits of PFSs for patients and providers of anti-VEGF medicines—ease in administration, improved safety, and greater efficiency—compared to vials, which must be used to fill a separate syringe.3 Novartis has an anti-VEGF biologic, LUCENTIS, which Genentech markets in the United States.

Regeneron alleges that Vetter contributed to Novartis’s invention of U.S. Patent No. 9,220,631 (the “’631 Patent”) and that Novartis concealed Vetter’s contribution to inventorship from the PTO to avoid alerting Regeneron to its contractual violations. Id. Concealing inventorship from the PTO can constitute inequitable conduct and form the basis for a Walker Process claim. (Regeneron also alleges Novartis improperly withheld key prior art references from the PTO during prosecution.) Novartis’s resulting ’631 Patent specifically claims EYLEA’s active ingredient as a treatment for use in Novartis’s patented syringe.4 Regeneron contends that the defendants’ pattern of conduct delayed its entry into the PFS market, resulting in significant damages.5 Regeneron also alleges that, after the ’631 Patent issued, Vetter leaned on it in contract negotiations to enter a long-term deal and to agree not to challenge the validity of the ’631 Patent.6 Novartis sued Regeneron on the ’631 Patent in the ITC and the Northern District of New York in 2020, and there is a pending Federal Circuit appeal regarding the validity of the patent.7

The Second Circuit held that “the district court improperly concluded that Regeneron failed to plead adequately the existence of a distinct anti-VEGF PFS market because it… placed improper weight on the functional, rather than economic, similarities between anti-VEGF PFSs and vials.”8 Rather than look to the functional similarities in the markets for PFSs and vials (i.e., same drug, same medical condition), the Second Circuit held that the proper analysis was economic. That is, whether products are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,” as assessed by examining “sufficient cross-elasticity of demand.”9 Regeneron’s complaint alleges that physicians transferred 80% of patients from vials to PFSs when they were offered for LUCENTIS. The Second Circuit found Regeneron’s allegation adequately pled a hypothetical monopoly market by pleading that the physicians’ switching behavior showed that a “small, but significant, price increase in the PFS version would not cause physicians to substitute the vial version for PFS.”10

Second, the Second Circuit held that the district court was wrong to decide that an antitrust market cannot be coextensive with a patent’s scope. Instead, “once an antitrust plaintiff has demonstrated that [1] a patent was obtained through fraud, it must [2] separately explain how the fraudulently obtained patent enabled the defendants to achieve market power within the relevant market.”11 Regeneron’s allegations regarding inventorship and improperly withheld prior art satisfied the “fraudulently obtained” prong of the test.12 Next, the Second Circuit found that Regeneron’s complaint adequately pled the “market power” prong, crediting Regenoron’s allegation that Novartis and Vetter attempted to use the ’631 patent to coerce Regeneron into a long-term exclusive PFS filling relationship and demanding other modifications to Regeneron and Vetter’s 2005 agreement.13

Why the Decision Matters

The Second Circuit’s decision stands out for two reasons. First, anti-VEGF biologics are a big business for innovator companies, biosimilar makers, and government payers. EYLEA’s total revenue for 2023 was nearly $5.9 billion.14 Roche, which through its subsidiary Genentech commercializes LUCENTIS in the US, reported $460 million CHF in 2023 revenue, down from approximately $1 billion CHF in 2022 after entry from two biosimilars, with more pending.15 Biosimilars referencing EYLEA are also pending FDA approval or in clinical trials.16 Government payers are naturally interested in age-related macular degeneration (AMD) medications: among Americans over 65, the CDC estimates that approximately 1.3 million have vision-threatening AMD, with another 10.9 million having milder AMD.17 Indeed, the state amici’s brief supporting Regeneron noted the states’ interest in the markets for AMD drugs.18

Second, and more broadly, a product’s presentation or method of administration—pill vs. liquid; standard vs. extended release; IV vs. subcutaneous injection—has major implications for patients, providers, and product lifecycle. Different methods of administration may expand a product’s commercial reach and, as this case shows, provide additional patent protection (and possibly market exclusivity). Antitrust scrutiny directed to narrowly defined markets for methods of administration—here PFSs—is noteworthy. The amicus brief from the DoJ and FTC makes clear that it is supporting neither side and “take[s] no position as to whether the complaint adequately pleads a relevant antitrust market or states an antitrust claim.”19 However, the Federal government’s amicus brief also stated that the district court erred in its decision, and the brief’s analysis of the proper market definition parallels the reasoning ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit.20

This decision relates to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court only looks for a plausible, well-pled complaint. Novartis will have its day in court at the summary judgment and trial stages, where Regeneron will owe a higher burden of proof. However, antitrust claims are powerful tools because they carry the monetary risk of treble damages as well as the possibility of scrutiny from regulators. These risks must be weighed, not just by outside counsel and CLOs, but by CEOs and boards of directors.

Footnotes

[1] See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG et al., No. 22-427, slip op. at 1 (March 18, 2024). As the Second Circuit explains, “[t]he products in question are prescription medications used to treat the overproduction of vascular endothelial growth factor (‘VEGF’), a naturally occurring protein that, if overproduced, can lead to various eye disorders and, in some cases, to permanent blindness.”

[2] Slip op. at 9

[3] Id. at 8-9

[4] See ’631 Patent at Claim 12

[5] See slip op. at 10-11.

[6] Id. at 13-14.

[7] Id. at 15-16.

[8] Id. at 19.

[9] Id. at 20-21 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and United States v. Am. Express. Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016)).

[10] Slip op. at 26; see, e.g., Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 199 (small but significant non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) may demonstrate that the proposed market is relevant market).

[11] Slip op. at 30(citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177).

[12] Id. at 30-31.

[13] Id. at 31-32. In addition to reversing the district court’s decision on the antitrust claim, the Second Circuit reversed the court’s dismissal of Regeneron’s claim for tortious interference with contract as time barred, crediting Regeneron’s equitable estoppel arguments.

[14] “Regeneron Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2023 Financial and Operating Results,” Feb. 2, 2024, https://investor.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/regeneron-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2023-financial (last visited March 20, 2024).

[15] “Roche Finance Report 2023,” at 16, https://assets.roche.com/f/176343/x/3b1fb647e2/fb23e.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[16] See, e.g., “New and Upcoming biosimilar launches,” at 6 https://www.cardinalhealth.com/content/dam/corp/web/documents/Report/cardinal-health-biosimilar-launches.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[17] See “Prevalence of Age-Related Macular Degeneration (AMD), at Table 1, https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/vehss/estimates/amd-prevalence.html (last visited March 20, 2024).

[18] See Brief of Amici Curiae Nevada, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case 22-427, Dkt. 106 at 2.

[19] See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Case 22-427, Dkt. 90 at 1.

[20] Id. at 12.

The Antitrust Investigator Will See You Now: What Healthcare And Pharma Should Expect In A World Of Enhanced Antitrust Scrutiny

Highlights

  • Healthcare entities should expect heightened government scrutiny of mergers, acquisitions, and business behaviors that could be construed as restricting competition in healthcare and pharma
  • The FTC, DOJ, and HHS have advanced a “whole-of-government approach,” including data sharing, cooperative enforcement, and enhanced antitrust training
  • Businesses should take note of practices that are likely to trigger investigatory and enforcement actions

According to media reports, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has opened an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group, which is the owner of the United States’ largest health insurer, UnitedHealthcare. The focus of the inquiry appears to be the relationship between the UnitedHealthcare insurance plan and one of its health services divisions, Optum, and the potential impact on rivals and consumers.

While tech giants have grabbed most of the headlines when it comes to enhanced antitrust scrutiny, this new matter is the DOJ’s second antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group in recent years, giving teeth to the administration’s claim that it has an aggressive antitrust policy in the healthcare sector.

In another example of increased antitrust scrutiny, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced a new initiative in partnership with the DOJ and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to address what they consider to be the effects of anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare and pharmaceutical spaces. According to the government, these new efforts are aimed at lowering consumer costs and will include “partnering on new initiatives which include a joint Request for Information to seek input on how private-equity and other corporations’ control of health care is impacting Americans.”

Although interagency cooperation is the focus of the recent push to ramp up antitrust investigations and enforcement, each agency will still spearheaded their own regulatory activity.

Federal Trade Commission

FTC Chair Lina Khan has made it clear that her agency will devote more resources to enforcement in the healthcare industry, and emphasized that “safeguarding fair competition and rooting out unlawful business practices in health care markets is a top priority for the FTC.” In furtherance of these priorities, the commission has recently taken the following actions:

  • Orange Book Policy: The FTC challenged more than 100 patents held by pharmaceutical companies that they claim are inaccurately or improperly listed in the FDA’s Orange Book. The commission also released a policy statement explaining its renewed focus on Orange Book infractions.
  • Proposed Non-compete Rule: The FTC presented a new rule that would place a ban on non-compete clauses in employee contracts.

U.S. Department of Justice

Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, highlighted the division’s emphasis on the healthcare space when he said, “we are committed to weeding out anticompetitive practices and market consolidation that hinder Americans’ access to quality care at affordable rates, or deprive health care workers of fair wages and opportunity.” The following are just a few examples of how the DOJ has implemented this renewed focus:

  • Criminal Penalties: Recently, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division successfully secured a deferred prosecution agreement against Teva Pharmaceuticals, obtaining the largest monetary penalty ever (over $200 million) against a purely domestic producer that was allegedly operating an antitrust cartel.
  • Blocked Mergers: The Antitrust Division filed a suit to stop Aon plc’s $30 billion proposal to acquire Willis Towers Watson, two of the three largest brokers of health insurance and retirement benefits consulting. The companies later ceased their pursuit of the merger.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra made his agency’s priorities clear when he recently stated that “the Biden-Harris Administration remains laser-focused on increasing access to high-quality, affordable health care for all Americans, like by making hearing aids available for sale over the counter and lowering prescription drug costs through the Inflation Reduction Act.” The department’s initiatives have included:

  • Ownership Transparency: For the first time, HHS, via the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, made ownership data available on federal qualified health centers and rural health clinics on data.cms.gov. HHS hopes the release of this data will help catalyze enforcement actions by identifying common ownership.
  • Medicare Advantage Marketing: HHS also announced new efforts to crack down on what it considers “predatory marketing” that seeks to steer patients towards Medicare Advantage plans that “may not best meet their needs.”

Takeaways

In light of the government’s renewed focus on increased competition, expanded enforcement actions, access to quality care, more affordable services and products, and transparency of ownership in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, legal and compliance departments should consider being proactive about conducting thorough reviews of current practices. This is particularly true for mergers and acquisitions, competitive strategies, and pricing decisions, which are the business activities most likely to conflict with these recently energized regulatory bodies. Even healthcare providers with stellar compliance programs should expect to receive more frequent and targeted requests for information from enforcement authorities about their business partners, payors, and marketing practices.

Understanding How U.S. Export Controls Affect Manufacturers’ Hiring Practices

The U.S. government has adjusted export control regulations in an effort to protect U.S. national security interests. The revisions primarily affect export of electronic computing items and semiconductors to prevent foreign powers from obtaining critical technologies that may threaten national security. As manufacturers are facing increased demand for their products and critical labor shortages, they may find themselves seeking to hire foreign national talent and navigating U.S. export control and immigration and anti-discrimination laws.

Export Control Laws in United States

The primary export control laws in the United States are the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Under these regulations, U.S. Persons working for U.S. companies can access export-controlled items without authorization from the U.S. government. U.S. Persons include: U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, Lawful permanent residents, Refugees, and Asylees. Employers might need authorization from the appropriate federal agency to “export” (in lay terms, share or release) export-controlled items to workers who are not U.S. Persons, which the regulations call foreign persons. Employers apply for such authorization from either the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Department of Commerce, depending on the item.

The release of technical data or technology to a foreign person that occurs within the United States is “deemed” to be an export to the foreign person’s “home country.” Whether an export license is required for a particular release may depend on both the nature of export controls applicable to the technology or technical data (including whether it is subject to the ITAR or EAR) and the citizenship of the foreign person.

Recent revisions to the EAR cover controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items, among other controls. These revisions particularly affect semiconductor and chip manufacturers and exporters.

Intersection With Immigration and Anti-Discrimination Laws

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 prohibit discrimination based on protected characteristics.

The INA prohibits discrimination based on national origin or citizenship, among other characteristics. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race and national origin, which typically includes discrimination based on citizenship or immigration status. Furthermore, the INA prohibits “unfair documentary practices,” which are identified as instances where employers request more or different documents than those necessary to verify employment eligibility or request such documents with the intent to discriminate based on national origin or citizenship.

The intersection of export control laws, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws can create a confusing landscape for employers, particularly manufacturers or exporters of export-controlled items. Manufacturers and exporters, like all employers, must collect identity and employment authorization documentation to ensure I-9 compliance. At the same time, however, they must collect information relating to a U.S. Person in connection with export compliance assessments. To address these areas of exposure for employers, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division released an employer fact sheet to provide guidance for employers that includes best practices to avoid discrimination.

Implications

To ensure compliance under these rules, employers should separate the I-9 employment authorization documentation process from the export control U.S. Person or foreign person identification process. Employers should implement or revisit internal procedures and provide updated training to employees.

The export rule revisions highlight the challenges for employers in avoiding discrimination when complying with export control laws. Manufacturers and exporters should review their compliance practices regarding U.S. export control, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws with experienced counsel. Employers should implement policies and procedures reasonably tailored to address export control compliance requirements while not engaging in discrimination on the basis of citizenship or national origin.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

by: Maurice G. Jenkins , Kimberly M. Bennett of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more news on Export Control Laws, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

Introduction

When it comes to antitrust criminal enforcement, 2023 will be remembered as the year when the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division redefined and tested the outer boundaries of its authority. Here is a look back at the key events that defined the DOJ’s year in criminal antitrust enforcement.

Losses in Labor Markets

The DOJ continued its focus on labor markets in 2023 by pursuing per se no-poach and wage-fixing prosecutions despite resounding resistance by fact finders. In these cases, the DOJ alleged that companies and executives restrained trade in labor markets in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act through agreements that restricted movement and suppressed the wages of workers.

Courts have allowed these per se no-poach and wage-fixing cases to survive the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, but the DOJ’s success has routinely ended there. In 2022, the DOJ tried its first criminal no-poach case in US v. DaVita, which was successfully defended by McDermott and resulted in a complete acquittal of both corporate and individual defendants. In 2023, the DOJ fared no better:

  • In US v. Manahe (D. Maine), the DOJ charged four business managers in an alleged conspiracy to fix the wages and restrict the hiring of personal support specialist workers for two months during the pandemic. The government presented evidence such as text messages discussing hourly wages and recordings of meetings between the defendants, while the defendants countered by showing that the discussed prices were not implemented, and a draft agreement went unsigned. The jury acquitted all four defendants following a two-week trial in March 2023.
  • As we previously reported, the DOJ suffered a blow in US v. Patel (D. Connecticut) in April 2023. During a four-week trial, the government alleged that defendants conspired to restrict the hiring and recruiting of skilled workers and engineers in the aerospace industry. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an extreme lever that judges rarely pull to end a trial before it reaches the jury. Judge Victor A. Bolden granted the motion and acquitted all the defendants. He found that the engineers’ freedom to switch companies and the number of exceptions to the agreements could not support finding market allocation as a matter of law.
  • In November 2023, the DOJ stunningly moved to dismiss its own case alleging a conspiracy by outpatient medical care competitors not to solicit senior-level employees. The case was three years into litigation; in its motion, the DOJ simply stated that dismissal would conserve court time and resources. This was the DOJ’s last pending no-poach case against a corporation.

If the DOJ’s labor markets cases have a theme, it is this: If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again. Despite four straight losses and a voluntary dismissal, the DOJ remains undeterred in bringing additional criminal wage-fixing and no-poach suits. The Biden administration’s “whole of government” approach to enforcement means that shared resources and collaboration among agencies, including the DOJ and the National Labor Relations Board, will continue into 2024. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter left no doubt that the DOJ is doubling down on its executive authority despite a losing track record in court: “Let me confirm: We are just as committed as ever to, when appropriate, using our congressionally given authority to prosecute criminal violations of the Sherman Act in labor markets.” Addressing the Women’s White Collar Defense Association in December 2023, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki echoed, “We look forward to charging more no-poach and wage-fixing cases.”

Per Se Problems

The DOJ stumbled in a different per se setting in December 2023, when a three-judge panel on the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed fraud charges but reversed the per se bid-rigging conviction of a steel and aluminum manufacturing sales manager turned executive. In US v. Brewbaker, the appellate panel found that “caselaw and economics show that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do.”

In its 2020 indictment, the DOJ alleged that Brent Brewbaker of Contech Engineered Solutions conspired with a North Carolina distributor and exclusive dealer, Pomona Pipe Products, to share total bid pricing information on North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) aluminum projects and use that information to purposefully submit losing bids. This allegedly appeased Pomona and maintained Contech’s status on NCDOT’s “emergency bid list.” Contech pled guilty, but Brewbaker continued to trial. A jury found him guilty of bid rigging and other fraud charges; he appealed.

The Fourth Circuit held that the DOJ’s indictment implicated Contech and Pomona as horizontal competitors in NCDOT aluminum projects and as vertical competitors through their manufacturer-dealer relationship, resulting in a “hybrid” restraint. The DOJ sought to isolate Contech’s role as a manufacturer and competing bidder for NCDOT aluminum projects, focusing solely on the horizontal nature of the restraint and subsequently arguing for per se treatment.

The panel did not accept the DOJ’s argument that the conspiracy itself involved only horizontal conduct and instead considered the parties’ competitive relationship, which involved both horizontal and vertical aspects. The panel found that “agreements that look otherwise identical in form produce different economic effects based on how the parties relate to one another,” and stated that the DOJ’s theory would “force . . . arbitrary and likely impossible line-drawing” to determine which “part” of the entity to consider. The court continued, “The Sherman Act doesn’t ignore reality; it treats the entire business entity as the single party it is. . . . Antitrust law does not turn on such artificial mental gymnastics.”

Under this premise, the court moved through an analysis of case law and economic rationale to determine appropriate scrutiny. Although there is no direct guidance on hybrid restraints in the bid rigging context, the panel contrasted the present case with Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877 (2007), where the Supreme Court of the United States applied per se scrutiny to a price fixing case despite both horizontal and vertical elements. In Brewbaker, the court found instead that the restraint in the indictment should not have been subject to the per se standard based on precedent, nor would it invariably lead to anticompetitive effects upon economic analysis—all making per se scrutiny inappropriate. As a result, and in a blow to the DOJ, the court reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction.

In Full (Strike) Force

The DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) succeeded in securing several guilty pleas and stiff penalties in 2023. The PCSF is tasked with training government personnel and enforcing antitrust and fraud laws related to government contract bidding, grants and program funding.

PCSF Director Daniel Glad spoke to the National Association of State Procurement Officials in November 2023, highlighting the state and agency partnerships that comprise the PCSF. He pushed for even greater collaboration with state officials in 2024 and coming years, noting the recent influx of funds from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which authorized billions of dollars in transportation and infrastructure programs. Later that month, the PCSF held its first summit to discuss strategies, priorities and resources. As reported by the DOJ, attendees included 11 “law enforcement partners” from across the country and 22 US Attorneys’ Offices.

These partnerships have surely strengthened the PCSF, and it has an extensive track record of successful convictions and guilty pleas. Among them are the following:

  • In January 2023, military contractor Aaron Stephens pleaded guilty to rigging bids related to the maintenance and repair of military tactical vehicles, following his alleged co-conspirator Mark Leveritt’s guilty plea July 2022. In August 2023, Stephens received an 18-month prison sentence and a $50,000 criminal fine. Leveritt received a six-month sentence and a $300,000 fine.
  • Also in January 2023, a construction company owner received a 27-month sentence and was ordered to pay a $1.75 million fine for fraudulently securing government contracts meant for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses.
  • A Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) employee out of New York pleaded guilty to engaging in wire fraud related to MTA excess vehicle auctions. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter described the conduct as “stealing from the public” and promised that the DOJ would continue to “detect and punish” those who abuse the public trust. Two additional guilty pleas by fellow MTA employees followed.
  • An insulation contractor out of Connecticut was the seventh person sentenced in a bid rigging and contract fraud investigation, resulting in a 15-month prison sentence and a restitution fine of more than $1 million. The alleged scheme related to insulation contracting at both public and private institutions, including universities and hospitals.
  • In March 2023, a Georgia jury found three military contractors guilty of conspiring to defraud the United States and two counts of major fraud related to two years of conduct.
  • A construction company owner faced a 78-month prison sentence and an almost $1 million restitution fine for bid rigging and bribery involving the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Defendant Bill Miller previously pled guilty to recruiting others to submit sham bids and to paying almost $1 million in cash bribes to a Caltrans contract manager. The manager himself received a 49-month prison sentence and a similar restitution fine, and a co-conspirator who submitted false bids received 45 months in jail and a $797,940 restitution fine.
  • A Texas judge ordered corporate defendant J&J Korea to pay almost $9 million for wire fraud and conspiracy to restrain trade related to subcontract work for US military hospitals in South Korea. A grand jury indicted two corporate officers for the same conduct in 2022.
  • Three military contractors received their sentences in December 2023 following a jury trial related to their alleged procurement fraud scheme. The defendants’ sentences included prison, supervised release and fines ranging from $50,000 to $250,000.

In December 2023, the PCSF also secured a seven-count indictment using wiretap evidence to charge two forest firefighting services executives with bid rigging, allocating markets and fraud. Wiretap evidence is rarely used in cartel investigations and marks a meaningful step in PCSF’s investigative approach. PCSF likely has already begun obtaining wiretap evidence in other cases and, based on its success in 2023, will continue pursuing aggressive investigative and litigation strategies moving forward.

Partnerships and Collaboration

Taking the PCSF to the global stage, the DOJ announced a joint initiative with Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau to collaborate on “outreach to the public and business community about anti-competitive conduct, as well as on investigations, using intelligence sharing and existing international cooperation tools” in the run-up to the 2026 FIFA World Cup to be hosted across the three countries.

In addition to its international partnerships for the World Cup, the DOJ is tackling technology with global efforts. In November 2023, DOJ leaders met with G7 competition authorities in Tokyo to discuss competition in digital markets and enforcement priorities. This was one in a series of meetings among authorities that have taken place since 2019 with a goal of setting and issuing guidance on shared priorities for regulating competition in tech. Following the summit, the group published a “communique” grounded in concern around emerging technologies, including risks in the criminal realm. The leaders noted, “As firms increasingly rely on AI to set prices to consumers, there is risk that such tools could facilitate collusion or unfairly raise prices.”

This sentiment is consistent with statements made earlier in the year by DOJ leadership. For example, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki highlighted the role of technology in information exchanges. She described the current “inflection point” of algorithms, data and cloud computing as creating new market realties. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter stated that artificial intelligence’s “boundless potential” comes with “risks [that] transcend borders.” The consistency of rhetoric and global dedication to tackling the risks of emerging technology signals a potentially busy 2024 in this space.

The DOJ also continued its practice of partnering with fellow domestic law enforcement agencies. For example, the DOJ secured three guilty pleas in August 2023 for bid rigging asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan from 2013 to 2021. The DOJ worked with the Offices of Inspector General for the US Department of Transportation and the US Postal Service, and highlighted the partnership in public statements on the pleas. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar said, “Along with our law enforcement partners, the division will continue to seek justice when corporations and their leaders deprive customers of fair and open competition.” Cross-agency collaboration is a hallmark of the DOJ’s criminal enforcement and there is no reason to believe this practice will change in 2024.

Anything but Generic Remedies

In August 2023, the DOJ announced that it had entered into two unprecedented deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve price fixing charges in the generic drug industry against Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Teva and Glenmark agreed to pay $250 million and $30 million, respectively, in criminal penalties and compliance monitoring, with Teva also obligated to donate $50 million worth of drugs to aid organizations. These agreements included divestitures of the companies’ product lines for the cholesterol drug pravastatin, alleged as central to the alleged price fixing conspiracy underlying the agreements. These arrangements are unusual for two reasons.

DPAs

First, DPAs are typically unfavored by the government and used as incentives for cooperation early in investigations. It is striking that the DOJ entered into these agreements in such an advanced stage of litigation, where five other corporations and three individuals had already admitted to the implicated conspiracy. DPAs are agreements between the government and defendants in which the defendants accept certain penalties in exchange for prosecutors stopping their pursuit of the underlying charges. Prosecutions are “deferred” indefinitely while defendants fulfill their end of the bargain. Although both DPAs and plea agreements involve admitting wrongdoing, DPAs allow defendants resolution without admission of legal guilt. In the event defendants fail to meet the terms of the agreement, the government resumes its prosecution and seeks convictions.

“Extraordinary” Remedial Measures

Second, both DPAs involved unheard of divestitures of product interests in the cholesterol drug pravastatin, with Teva’s DPA requiring an additional measure of $50 million in donated clotrimazole and tobramycin to humanitarian organizations. All three generic drugs were impacted by the charged conspiracy. This remedy is first of its kind—criminal antitrust enforcers historically have sought monetary and prison sentences only. However, DOJ criminal enforcers driving outside of their historic lane is not necessarily inconsistent or surprising. The current administration has repeatedly committed to “using the whole legislative toolbox” in litigation.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar stated in October 2023 that these divestitures were appropriate in the “heavily regulated” context of generic pharmaceuticals, where a corporate conviction could have precluded Teva and Glenmark’s participation in federal drug programs to such an extent that the companies would have gone out of business. Of course, these are not the first defendants to face corporate convictions in heavily regulated industries, and they are not even the first to do so in this specific alleged conspiracy.

Whether this specific tool will build or break down competition, whether criminal enforcers are equipped to evaluate the impact of divestiture, and whether it is appropriate to test this novel approach in an industry with an alleged prolific conspiracy among major players and thus among potential buyers remains to be seen. For better or worse there will be more data points to answer these and other uncertainties: Kumar noted that the DOJ hopes to implement divestitures as criminal remedies “in other contexts” moving forward.

Investigation Nearing Its End

On November 16, 2023, in a surprising turn of events shortly after the DOJ announced the resolutions with Teva and Glenmark, the DOJ moved to dismiss a February 2020 indictment against Ara Aprahamian, a former senior executive of Taro Pharmaceutical Industries charged with fixing prices, rigging bids and allocating markets for generic drugs. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Prior to filing the motion, the DOJ had been preparing for a February 2024 criminal trial against Aprahamian. As a result of these recent actions, the DOJ has no remaining public proceedings in connection with its investigation of pricing in the generic drug industry. And, in December 2023, a district court overseeing the multidistrict civil litigation against generic drug manufacturers for the same alleged conduct terminated the DOJ’s intervenor status in the case. Thus, the DOJ’s nearly decade-long investigation of the generic drug industry appears to be ending.

Monaco on Mergers and Corporate Compliance 

In a speech at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics’ Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco emphasized the importance of compliance programs and announced a safe harbor policy for voluntary self-disclosures of antitrust wrongdoing by companies engaged in mergers and acquisitions.

Compliance

Deputy Attorney General Monaco focused her remarks on the increased importance of, and scrutiny on, corporate compliance programs. She noted that under a new initiative, every resolution by the Criminal Division requires companies to add compliance-promoting criteria to compensation systems. She also shared that the Division is enacting “clawback credits” to incentivize tying executive compensation to compliance. Remaining focused on bottom lines, she warned: “Invest in compliance now or your company may pay the price—a significant price—later.” These sharp words are consistent with the DOJ’s increased rhetoric on and policy prioritization of compliance programs throughout 2023.

Mergers & Acquisitions Safe Harbor Policy

Deputy Attorney General Monaco also commented on the recently unveiled DOJ-wide safe harbor allowing companies to report misconduct by the companies they seek to acquire or merge with. The covered conduct must be discovered through the M&A process. Conduct that should have otherwise been disclosed or which could have been publicly known does not count. Conduct already known to the DOJ is not entitled to safe harbor protection either.

Monaco stated, “Going forward, acquiring companies that promptly and voluntarily disclose criminal misconduct within the Safe Harbor period [six months from date of closing], and that cooperate with the ensuing investigation, and engage in requisite, timely and appropriate remediation, restitution, and disgorgement [within one year of closing]—they will receive the presumption of a declination.” In line with remarks by enforcers earlier in the year, Monaco specifically highlighted cybersecurity, tech and national security as areas of heightened risk and thus heightened scrutiny. Corporations in these markets should take heed of the DOJ’s emphasis on corporate compliance in 2024.

Looking Ahead

In 2023, criminal antitrust authorities used novel approaches at every stage of enforcement—from charging decisions to partnerships, to litigation, to remedies— and they show no sign of slowing down in 2024. The emergence of new technologies and a policy promise to forego old guideposts takes the DOJ further from the familiar, and perhaps further from its expertise.

In a high-stakes election year and with an influx of federal funds in infrastructure and defense spaces, the DOJ will likely hit the accelerator sooner than it hits the breaks. Markets that impact maximum voters, including employment, tax-funded government contracts, national security and healthcare, are likely focuses. All considered, it is more important than ever for businesses and individuals to stay up to date on policy priorities, revamp and champion internal compliance programs, and seek agile counsel in the ever-changing landscape of criminal enforcement to avoid costly investigations.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

FTC Announces 2024 Increase in HSR Notification Thresholds and Filing Fees

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced the annual revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) thresholds and HSR filing fees, which will become effective on March 6, 2024. The revised thresholds will apply to any merger or acquisition closing on or after the effective date.

The FTC is required to adjust the HSR thresholds annually based upon the change in gross national product. This year, the change in the “size of transaction” threshold has increased from $111.4 million to $119.5 million.

Under the HSR Act, when a deal satisfies the “size of person” and “size of transaction” thresholds, and no exemption from reporting is available, the deal must be reported to the FTC and the US Department of Justice, and the parties must wait for a designated period of time before closing the transaction.

Size of Person. The revised size of person thresholds will generally be met if one party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales totaling $239 million or more and one other party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales of at least $23.9 million. Satisfaction of the size of person thresholds is not required, however, if the transaction is valued at more than $478 million.

Size of Transaction. The revised size of transaction threshold will be met if the buyer will hold an aggregate amount of stock, non-corporate interests and/or assets of the seller valued at more than $119.5 million as a result of the deal.

The notification thresholds applicable to purchases of voting securities will increase as follows:

February 1, 2001 Thresholds (Original) Current Thresholds as of February 27, 2023 New Thresholds Effective March 6, 2024
$50 million $111.4 million $119.5 million
$100 million $222.7 million $239 million
$500 million $1.1137 billion $1.195 billion
25% if worth more than
$1 billion
25% if worth more than $2.2274 billion 25% if worth more than $2.39 billion
50% if worth more than
$50 million
50% if worth more than $111.4 million 50% if worth more than $119.5 million

The thresholds applicable to many exemptions, including those governing foreign acquisitions, also will increase. However, the $500 million threshold applicable to acquisitions of producing oil and gas reserves and associated assets will not change.

The civil penalty for failing to comply with the notification and waiting period requirements of the HSR Act has also increased to up to $51,744 per day for each day a party is in violation.

HSR Filing Fees. Additionally, the HSR filing fee thresholds and filing fee amounts have increased as follows:

Original Filing Fee Original Applicable Size of Transaction 2024 Adjusted Filing Fee 2024 Adjusted Applicable Size of Transaction
$30,000 Less than $161.5 million $30,000 Less than $173.3 million
$100,000 Not less than $161.5 million but less than $500 million $105,000 Not less than $173.3 million but less than $536.5 million
$250,000 Not less than $500 million but less than $1 billion $260,000 Not less than $536.5 million but less than $1.073 billion
$400,000 Not less than $1 billion but less than $2 billion $415,000 Not less than $1.073 billion but less than $2.146 billion
$800,000 Not less than $2 billion but less than $5 billion $830,000 Not less than $2.146 billion but less than $5.365 billion
$2,250,000 $5 billion or more $2,335,000 $5.365 billion or more

The new fees also will become effective on March 6, 2024.

As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

FTC Announces 2024 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has increased the dollar jurisdictional thresholds necessary to trigger the reporting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”), and the dollar value of each of the six filing fee thresholds; the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register. The daily maximum civil penalty for being in violation of the HSR Act has increased, and is, as of January 10, 2024, $51,744.

The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act; these revised thresholds are in effect as of January 22, 2024.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the proposed transaction to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies. The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing. Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $119.5 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size-of-Transaction Test The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $478 million;

or

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $119.5 million but not more than $478 millionand the Size-of-Person thresholds below are met.

Size-of-Person
Test
One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $239 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $23.9 million in total assets or annual sales.

The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold 2023 Threshold 2024 Revised Threshold
$10 million $22.3 million $23.9 million
$50 million $111.4 million $119.5 million
$100 million $222.7 million $239 million
$110 million $245 million $262.9 million
$200 million $445.5 million $478 million
$500 million $1,113.7 million $1,195 million
$1 billion $2,227.4 million $2,390 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions and the six filing fee tiers also have been updated, as follows:

Filing Fee Size of Transaction under the Act
$30,000 For transactions valued in excess of $119.5 million but less than $173.3 million
$105,000 For transactions valued at $173.3 million or greater but less than $536.5 million
$260,000 For transactions valued at $536.5 million or greater but less than $1,073 million
$415,000 For transactions valued at $1,073 million or greater but less than $2,146 million
$830,000 For transactions valued at $2,146 million or greater but less than $5,365 million
$2.335 million For transactions valued at $5,365 million or more

The filing fee tiers, introduced in 2023, are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the GNP for the previous year.

The HSR Act’s dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ; a full analysis requires consideration of exemptions to the filing requirements that may be available to an acquiror. Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $51,744 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) each of the “interlocked” corporations has combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $48,559,000 (up from $45,257,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”1

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”2 A corporate interlock does not violate the statute if (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $4,855,900 (up from $4,525,700); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales. The DOJ has been active recently in identifying and achieving remediation of interlocks that may violate Section 8.3

1 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2 S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.

3 Department of Justice, Two Pinterest Directors Resign from Nextdoor Board of Directors in Response to Justice Department’s Ongoing Enforcement Efforts Against Interlocking Directorates (Aug. 16, 2023); Department of Justice, Justice Department’s Ongoing Section 8 Enforcement Prevents More Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Mar. 9, 2023); Department of Justice, Directors Resign from the Boards of Five Companies in Response to Justice Department Concerns about Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Oct. 19, 2022).

Becoming Antitrust Aware in 2024: Top Five Recommendations for the New Year

A new year means resolutions which are often centered around self-improvement measures like weight loss, exercise plans, and other health improvement measures. Companies can also benefit from resolutions. Increasing antitrust awareness is not usually on the resolution list but here we offer some ideas for companies as they embark on a new year.

Treat antitrust as a priority in 2024.

As antitrust lawyers, our viewpoint may be biased, and we certainly appreciate that most companies already have a lengthy list of priorities for their in-house and outside legal teams. Given that all companies, regardless of their size, are subject to the antitrust laws, and given the high stakes involved (including criminal penalties and treble damages awards), antitrust certainly deserves to be on the priority list. One relatively easy way to get the ball rolling is to put fresh eyes on your company’s antitrust policy. When was the last time it was updated? What type of trainings does your company use to teach the concepts contained in the policy? The training doesn’t need to be – and shouldn’t be – boring or esoteric. Instead, trainings should be engaging and tailored to the specific antitrust risks that workgroups may face. For example, the sales team will need different antitrust training than those working on supply chain or environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives. Ask your antitrust lawyer to create easy-to-follow, lively online trainings that can be viewed on demand. And if your company doesn’t have an antitrust policy, we suggest that creating one be moved to the top (or near top) of the legal department’s to-do list in 2024.

Understand the current antitrust enforcement priorities.

2024 will be a significant year for antitrust. It’s an election year, which means 2024 may be the Biden Administration’s last year to execute on plans that have been in the works since President Biden issued Executive Order 14036, “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” in July 2021. Some of the Administration’s more dramatic plans include significant revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification process. While we don’t expect all the FTC and DOJ’s sweeping proposals to make it into the HSR final rule, we do expect some changes to be made, and they will likely mean significant additional burdens for filing parties. We also expect to see the FTC’s new rule on non-compete agreements. The FTC’s proposal would ban most non-compete agreements, and some states have already enacted their own prohibitions on non-compete agreements.

If your company engages in M&A, be aware of the new Merger Guidelines.

The newest Merger Guidelines, addressing both horizontal and vertical mergers, were unveiled in December 2023 . One of the most significant changes announced in the 2023 Merger Guidelines are the decreased levels of concentration that will trigger a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Under the new Guidelines, a market share of greater than 30% and a concentration increase of 100 points will be enough to trigger that rebuttable presumption. That is not to say the presumption is the death knell for a transaction, but it does mean that the government enforcement will be aggressive. Also be aware that the 2023 Guidelines introduce new topics, such as labor markets. Early analysis and planning will be critical, requiring involvement of skilled antitrust counsel.

Understand that application of the antitrust laws is constantly evolving.

The language of the core U.S. antitrust laws – the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act, hasn’t changed, but the application of these laws is always evolving. For example, the antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs are increasingly focused on labor issues, such as “no poach” agreements and wage fixing. Antitrust enforcers are also focused on private equity, as evidenced by the FTC’s recent lawsuit against Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe and some of the changes contained in the proposed revisions to the HSR Rules. Technology is also a significant factor that provokes interesting questions that don’t have answers, at least not currently. For example, do pricing algorithms lead to price fixing? How will antitrust enforcers deal with artificial intelligence?

Pay attention to state antitrust enforcers.

The federal regulators at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may get most of the attention, but we must never forget that states have their own antitrust laws and their own antitrust enforcers, who have the power to investigate and bring legal action. Often, the state regulators work collaboratively with their federal counterparts, but the state regulators are free to go their own way, such as those targeting various ESG initiatives. Also bear in mind that states are increasingly blazing new trails, such as bans on non-competes. Thirteen states have also enacted “mini” HSR premerger notification statutes for health care deals. It’s always prudent to check the laws of the state or states where business is conducted to determine if there are any state-specific antitrust considerations.

Updated Merger Guidelines Finalized

On December 18, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly issued a significantly revised version of the Merger Guidelines that describes the frameworks the enforcement agencies use when evaluating potential mergers.

The newly finalized Merger Guidelines are the result of a nearly two-year effort that involved both agencies soliciting public input via listening sessions, written comments, and workshops.

The agencies describe the new Merger Guidelines as necessary to address the modern economy and how firms now do business. The Merger Guidelines are broken into multiple sections: Guidelines 1–6 describe the frameworks the agencies use when attempting to identify a merger that the agencies believe raises a prima facie concern, while Guidelines 7–11 explain how to apply those frameworks in specific settings. The guidelines also identify evidence the agencies will consider to potentially rebut an inference of competitive harm. Finally, these guidelines include a discussion of the tools the agencies use when evaluating the relevant facts, the potential harm to competition, and how to define the relevant markets.

The Merger Guidelines are notable for signaling the FTC’s and DOJ’s desire to pursue a more aggressive enforcement agenda, specifically, by lowering the threshold at which proposed mergers will be deemed presumptively anticompetitive by those enforcement agencies. The new guidelines also seek to address relatively new concerns the agencies have identified, such as cross-market transactions and sequences of smaller transactions.