Oil Pollution Act: Tips for Spill Response, Compliance, and Enforcement

Oil spills commonly occur when least expected and, even in smaller quantities can significantly disrupt business operations and create risks for enforcement and/or litigation. It’s important that companies are prepared and know the environmental requirements for when the least expected happens, including understanding what actually is “oil” (hint: it’s broader than you might think!), who to notify, legal authorities at play, and best practices to ensure compliance and minimize exposure to regulators and/or private parties.

What is “Oil” Anyway?

Section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. However, many companies may not realize that both petroleum-based and non-petroleum-based substances are regulated as “oil” under the CWA and OPA. As a result, many companies may not realize that they are subject to these laws and, therefore, fail to adequately prepare for compliance and/or response both pre- and post-spill.

Specifically, Section 311(a)(1) of the CWA defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” 40 CFR § 112.2 further defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to: fats, oils, or greases of animal, fish, or marine mammal origin; vegetable oils, including oils from seeds, nuts, fruits, or kernels; and, other oils and greases, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, synthetic oils, mineral oils, oil refuse, or oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” This definition is notably broader than what many may consider “oil” (i.e., crude oil and refined petroleum products) and encompasses animal fats, vegetable oils, and non-petroleum oils.

When to Notify?

The CWA and OPA require companies to notify the National Response Center (NRC) of oil spills as soon as they are discovered (i.e., within 15 minutes). This applies to all discharges that reach navigable waters of the U.S. (WOTUS) or adjoining shorelines and (1) cause a sheen; (2) violate applicable water quality standards; or (3) cause a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines. In practice, this typically results from a sheen, which 40 C.F.R. § 110.1 defines as an “iridescent appearance on the surface of water.” The Oil Pollution Prevention regulations (discussed further below) also identify discharges from regulated facilities that require reporting, though there are exceptions—for example, when the discharge is in compliance with a permit under Section 402 of the CWA.

Under state and local laws, notification may be much more stringent. For example, California requires immediate reporting of “any significant release or threatened release” of a hazardous material, which includes oil. This can be subjective and requires a fact- and legal-specific evaluation of whether the release qualifies as “threatened” and/or “significant.” In Georgia, immediate notification is required either when the oil creates a “significant sheen on top of state waters” or when the amount discharged is unknown—further creating different criteria for when reporting is required. Regardless of what triggers notification, it is important that companies understand that different agencies—federal, state, and local—may each have different reporting requirements, and accurate and timely reporting is absolutely crucial. Often, failure to timely report is the first violation sought by agencies and can result in increased penalties and additional scrutiny.

What Authorities Are at Play?

At the federal level, two agencies primarily exercise authority over oil spills—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Coast Guard (CG). Depending on the location of the spill, the EPA or CG may lead federal oversight with the EPA overseeing inland spills and CG overseeing offshore spills. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Federal Railroad Administration may also exercise authority for pipeline or railroad releases, respectively.

As mentioned above, Section 311 of the CWA and OPA—enacted in 1990 in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill—make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. In practice, these authorities are best categorized into two areas: (1) oil spill response; and (2) oil spill prevention and preparedness. It is important for companies to understand the expectations for both (discussed in more detail below), and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (often referred to as the National Contingency Plan or NCP), which outlines the federal government’s cleanup strategy for responding to oil spills, including other cleanups under CERCLA. The goal of the NCP is to ensure that resources are available and responses are consistent. Thus, when the federal government oversees a cleanup, the federal On-Scene Coordinator will expect that all response efforts, including those conducted by the responsible party, are consistent with the NCP.

At the state level, most utilize their respective water laws to address oil spills, though some states, like Louisiana, have laws comparable to OPA. At the local level, municipalities have notification and emergency response authorities that will be applicable. In the end, it’s very important that companies understand that several layers of government may have some form of oversight depending on the size, impact, and location of an oil spill.

OPA v. CWA

While the CWA and OPA are complimentary, including OPA amending the CWA, companies should understand the goals and implications of both. Generally, the CWA focuses on oil spill enforcement for cleanups and penalties, and the OPA broadens national and regional capability for preventing, responding to, and paying for oil spills.

For the CWA, Section 311(b)(3) expressly prohibits the discharge of oil (or hazardous substances) into or upon WOTUS and adjoining shorelines in quantities that may be harmful.1 For oil, this generally means discharges to WOTUS that cause sheening or violate applicable water quality standards. Sections 311(c) and (e) of the CWA provide extensive authority to the federal government to respond to these discharges, including threatened discharges, by issuing orders—either unilaterally or by consent—to owners, operators, or persons in charge of the facility from which the discharge occurs.

Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA further empower the federal government to pursue significant penalties—both administrative and civil—for spills that reach WOTUS and/or when responsible parties fail to comply with an order. If gross negligence or willful misconduct is involved, you can expect even greater penalties—commonly more than three-fold—not to mention possible criminal liability. Internally, the EPA utilizes the Civil Penalty Policy for Sections 311(b)(3) and (j) of the CWA and factors outlined in Section 311(b)(8) of the CWA, including the seriousness of the violation, economic benefit to the responsible party, history of prior violations, and efforts to minimize or mitigate the discharge, to evaluate enforcement and penalty calculations.

Akin to the CWA, Section 2702(a) of OPA also makes responsible parties liable for removal costs and natural resource damages resulting from any discharge of oil, including a substantial threat of discharge, to WOTUS and adjoining shorelines. Notably, this includes not only costs incurred by the federal government, but also costs or damages to private parties, including damages for the loss of personal property, loss of revenues/profits due to injury, and cost of additional services during or after a spill. OPA further aims to strengthen national and regional response strategies, amend the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, require facilities to develop prevention and response plans, and establish a fund for damages and cleanup costs—each discussed below.

While it is typically always the priority of the federal government to have responsible parties pay for and conduct their own spill cleanups, when a responsible party is unknown, unable, or refuses to pay, funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) can be utilized to pay for the response. The OSLTF is managed by the CG’s National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) and the NPFC thereby manages any oversight or cleanup costs incurred by the federal government. Thus, if an oil spill occurs at your facility and the federal government incurs costs responding or overseeing, the NPFC will be the entity that seeks recovery of those costs—even if the EPA later pursues penalties for the same discharge pursuant to Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA. In addition, when a non-liable party performs a cleanup or incurs damages as a result of an oil spill, that party may file a claim for reimbursement directly against the responsible party and/or seek reimbursement from the NPFC.

Lastly, regarding liability, both the CWA and OPA are strict liability and provide limited liability defenses for acts of God, acts of war, or acts/omissions of third parties—comparable to CERCLA. Even so, it’s important to note that Section 309(g)(6) of the CWA states that the federal government may not seek enforcement, including penalties, if the state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action” under a comparable state law. This includes issuing a final order or directing a responsible party to pay a penalty. As mentioned above, states typically pursue oil spill violations via their respective water laws, which may be considered comparable. State penalties may often be substantially less than those sought by the federal government—thus, early engagement with the state can be advantageous depending on the circumstances.

Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations

Section 311(j) of the CWA and OPA, as outlined in 40 C.F.R. Part 112, require facilities that store oil in significant quantities to prepare Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans to prevent accidental releases from reaching WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. Facilities with a greater risk of release and impact to WOTUS may also be required to develop a Facility Response Plan (FRP) to prepare for “worst-case spills.” At the outset, companies should confirm whether these regulations are applicable to their operations and facilities.

SPCC plans are required for facilities that are: (1) non-transportation-related (i.e., they store, process, or consume oil rather than simply move it from one facility to another); and (2) collectively store more than 1,320 gallons of oil above ground or 42,000 gallons below ground that could reasonably be expected to discharge oil to a WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. This can include oil drilling and production facilities, oil refineries, industrial, commercial, and agricultural facilities storing/using oil, facilities that transfer oil via pipelines or tank trucks (including airports), and facilities that sell or distribute oil, like marinas. Practically, these regulations require facilities to have a written plan certified by a professional engineer (apart from qualified facilities), maintain adequate secondary containment for oil storage, maintain updated lists of the federal, state, and local agencies that must be contacted in case of a spill, and follow regular inspection requirements, among other requirements.

In addition to SPCC, FRP plans are required for facilities that could reasonably expect to cause “substantial harm” to the environment by discharging oil into or upon WOTUS. They either have: (1) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 42,000 gallons and transfer oil over water to/from vessels; or (2) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 1 million gallons and either do not have sufficient secondary containment, are located at a distance such that a discharge could cause “injury” to habitat or shut down a drinking water intake, or within the past five years, have had a reportable discharge greater than or equal to 10,000 gallons. If so, given that FRP is self-identifiable, the facility must prepare and submit its FRP plan to its applicable EPA regional office. Among other things, these plans include evaluating , medium, and worst-case discharge scenarios, descriptions and records of self-inspections, drills, and response training, and diagrams of the facility site plan, drainage, and evacuation plan.

EPA commonly conducts inspections at subject facilities to ensure that SPCC and FRP plans are effectively implemented. Should your facility have an oil spill, plan on an inspection very soon to evaluate compliance and mitigation efforts with your respective requirements.

Suggested Actions

Beyond being aware of the above implications and requirements, below are several actions to consider to ensure compliance and minimize possible enforcement and/or litigation when the least expected occurs.

  • Act Fast: Should an oil spill occur, regardless of size, act fast to respond, mitigate, and determine if notification is required. This includes immediate internal coordination with those responsible for responding, as well as outreach to your environment counsel and/or consultant. If the determination for reporting is close, it is recommended that you report (with a qualified caveat) rather than withhold.
  • Education and Training: Ensure your staff is trained to effectively respond to, report, and prevent oil spills. Oil spills happen despite best attempts otherwise. When the inevitable happens, make sure facility staff are prepared to respond and mitigate the potential impacts of the spill, including having spill reporting hotlines and other contact numbers easily accessible and staff trained on where all information is located. Also, learn from past spills and/or near spills by conducting evaluations and identifying lessons learned to be utilized to prevent future spills.
  • Prepare for Outside Communication: If the spill is significant or causes public impacts, be prepared for outreach by the public, including local news and community groups. Notifications to the NRC are available online and impacts to public or private property often lead to alerts to local news and organizations. Ensure your public affairs contact(s) are aware and develop necessary communication, including desk statements, should the spill create public attention.
  • Review Compliance: Evaluate your current compliance with federal, state, or local requirements, including the development, assessment, and update (if needed) of SPCC and/or FRP response plans. This includes determining if either or both are required at your facility. Should a spill occur, it is important to make sure your response plans are up-to-date and ready for implementation.
  • Regular Audits and Updates: Periodically audit your spill response and prevention measures (SPCC and FRP plans), including any changes to facility operations, secondary containment features, or volumes of oil stored, to identify and correct inaccuracies and ensure that your plans are up-to-date. For FRP, this includes submitting updates to the appropriate EPA regional office within 60 days of each change that may materially affect the response to a worst-case discharge.
  • Insurance: Though not always necessary, consider appropriate insurance coverage to mitigate potential financial liabilities.
  • Consultation: If you have any doubts about your obligations during an oil spill or need assistance with compliance, please do not hesitate to contact your environment counsel or consultants for guidance and support.

1 While this discussion focuses on the impacts of oil spills, it’s important to remember that Section 311 of the CWA (though not OPA) also applies to hazardous substances—discharges to a WOTUS that exceed a reportable quantity pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 117.3—though the federal government may typically utilize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), or combination thereof, to pursue such releases.

Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

Introduction

When it comes to antitrust criminal enforcement, 2023 will be remembered as the year when the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division redefined and tested the outer boundaries of its authority. Here is a look back at the key events that defined the DOJ’s year in criminal antitrust enforcement.

Losses in Labor Markets

The DOJ continued its focus on labor markets in 2023 by pursuing per se no-poach and wage-fixing prosecutions despite resounding resistance by fact finders. In these cases, the DOJ alleged that companies and executives restrained trade in labor markets in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act through agreements that restricted movement and suppressed the wages of workers.

Courts have allowed these per se no-poach and wage-fixing cases to survive the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, but the DOJ’s success has routinely ended there. In 2022, the DOJ tried its first criminal no-poach case in US v. DaVita, which was successfully defended by McDermott and resulted in a complete acquittal of both corporate and individual defendants. In 2023, the DOJ fared no better:

  • In US v. Manahe (D. Maine), the DOJ charged four business managers in an alleged conspiracy to fix the wages and restrict the hiring of personal support specialist workers for two months during the pandemic. The government presented evidence such as text messages discussing hourly wages and recordings of meetings between the defendants, while the defendants countered by showing that the discussed prices were not implemented, and a draft agreement went unsigned. The jury acquitted all four defendants following a two-week trial in March 2023.
  • As we previously reported, the DOJ suffered a blow in US v. Patel (D. Connecticut) in April 2023. During a four-week trial, the government alleged that defendants conspired to restrict the hiring and recruiting of skilled workers and engineers in the aerospace industry. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an extreme lever that judges rarely pull to end a trial before it reaches the jury. Judge Victor A. Bolden granted the motion and acquitted all the defendants. He found that the engineers’ freedom to switch companies and the number of exceptions to the agreements could not support finding market allocation as a matter of law.
  • In November 2023, the DOJ stunningly moved to dismiss its own case alleging a conspiracy by outpatient medical care competitors not to solicit senior-level employees. The case was three years into litigation; in its motion, the DOJ simply stated that dismissal would conserve court time and resources. This was the DOJ’s last pending no-poach case against a corporation.

If the DOJ’s labor markets cases have a theme, it is this: If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again. Despite four straight losses and a voluntary dismissal, the DOJ remains undeterred in bringing additional criminal wage-fixing and no-poach suits. The Biden administration’s “whole of government” approach to enforcement means that shared resources and collaboration among agencies, including the DOJ and the National Labor Relations Board, will continue into 2024. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter left no doubt that the DOJ is doubling down on its executive authority despite a losing track record in court: “Let me confirm: We are just as committed as ever to, when appropriate, using our congressionally given authority to prosecute criminal violations of the Sherman Act in labor markets.” Addressing the Women’s White Collar Defense Association in December 2023, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki echoed, “We look forward to charging more no-poach and wage-fixing cases.”

Per Se Problems

The DOJ stumbled in a different per se setting in December 2023, when a three-judge panel on the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed fraud charges but reversed the per se bid-rigging conviction of a steel and aluminum manufacturing sales manager turned executive. In US v. Brewbaker, the appellate panel found that “caselaw and economics show that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do.”

In its 2020 indictment, the DOJ alleged that Brent Brewbaker of Contech Engineered Solutions conspired with a North Carolina distributor and exclusive dealer, Pomona Pipe Products, to share total bid pricing information on North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) aluminum projects and use that information to purposefully submit losing bids. This allegedly appeased Pomona and maintained Contech’s status on NCDOT’s “emergency bid list.” Contech pled guilty, but Brewbaker continued to trial. A jury found him guilty of bid rigging and other fraud charges; he appealed.

The Fourth Circuit held that the DOJ’s indictment implicated Contech and Pomona as horizontal competitors in NCDOT aluminum projects and as vertical competitors through their manufacturer-dealer relationship, resulting in a “hybrid” restraint. The DOJ sought to isolate Contech’s role as a manufacturer and competing bidder for NCDOT aluminum projects, focusing solely on the horizontal nature of the restraint and subsequently arguing for per se treatment.

The panel did not accept the DOJ’s argument that the conspiracy itself involved only horizontal conduct and instead considered the parties’ competitive relationship, which involved both horizontal and vertical aspects. The panel found that “agreements that look otherwise identical in form produce different economic effects based on how the parties relate to one another,” and stated that the DOJ’s theory would “force . . . arbitrary and likely impossible line-drawing” to determine which “part” of the entity to consider. The court continued, “The Sherman Act doesn’t ignore reality; it treats the entire business entity as the single party it is. . . . Antitrust law does not turn on such artificial mental gymnastics.”

Under this premise, the court moved through an analysis of case law and economic rationale to determine appropriate scrutiny. Although there is no direct guidance on hybrid restraints in the bid rigging context, the panel contrasted the present case with Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877 (2007), where the Supreme Court of the United States applied per se scrutiny to a price fixing case despite both horizontal and vertical elements. In Brewbaker, the court found instead that the restraint in the indictment should not have been subject to the per se standard based on precedent, nor would it invariably lead to anticompetitive effects upon economic analysis—all making per se scrutiny inappropriate. As a result, and in a blow to the DOJ, the court reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction.

In Full (Strike) Force

The DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) succeeded in securing several guilty pleas and stiff penalties in 2023. The PCSF is tasked with training government personnel and enforcing antitrust and fraud laws related to government contract bidding, grants and program funding.

PCSF Director Daniel Glad spoke to the National Association of State Procurement Officials in November 2023, highlighting the state and agency partnerships that comprise the PCSF. He pushed for even greater collaboration with state officials in 2024 and coming years, noting the recent influx of funds from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which authorized billions of dollars in transportation and infrastructure programs. Later that month, the PCSF held its first summit to discuss strategies, priorities and resources. As reported by the DOJ, attendees included 11 “law enforcement partners” from across the country and 22 US Attorneys’ Offices.

These partnerships have surely strengthened the PCSF, and it has an extensive track record of successful convictions and guilty pleas. Among them are the following:

  • In January 2023, military contractor Aaron Stephens pleaded guilty to rigging bids related to the maintenance and repair of military tactical vehicles, following his alleged co-conspirator Mark Leveritt’s guilty plea July 2022. In August 2023, Stephens received an 18-month prison sentence and a $50,000 criminal fine. Leveritt received a six-month sentence and a $300,000 fine.
  • Also in January 2023, a construction company owner received a 27-month sentence and was ordered to pay a $1.75 million fine for fraudulently securing government contracts meant for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses.
  • A Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) employee out of New York pleaded guilty to engaging in wire fraud related to MTA excess vehicle auctions. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter described the conduct as “stealing from the public” and promised that the DOJ would continue to “detect and punish” those who abuse the public trust. Two additional guilty pleas by fellow MTA employees followed.
  • An insulation contractor out of Connecticut was the seventh person sentenced in a bid rigging and contract fraud investigation, resulting in a 15-month prison sentence and a restitution fine of more than $1 million. The alleged scheme related to insulation contracting at both public and private institutions, including universities and hospitals.
  • In March 2023, a Georgia jury found three military contractors guilty of conspiring to defraud the United States and two counts of major fraud related to two years of conduct.
  • A construction company owner faced a 78-month prison sentence and an almost $1 million restitution fine for bid rigging and bribery involving the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Defendant Bill Miller previously pled guilty to recruiting others to submit sham bids and to paying almost $1 million in cash bribes to a Caltrans contract manager. The manager himself received a 49-month prison sentence and a similar restitution fine, and a co-conspirator who submitted false bids received 45 months in jail and a $797,940 restitution fine.
  • A Texas judge ordered corporate defendant J&J Korea to pay almost $9 million for wire fraud and conspiracy to restrain trade related to subcontract work for US military hospitals in South Korea. A grand jury indicted two corporate officers for the same conduct in 2022.
  • Three military contractors received their sentences in December 2023 following a jury trial related to their alleged procurement fraud scheme. The defendants’ sentences included prison, supervised release and fines ranging from $50,000 to $250,000.

In December 2023, the PCSF also secured a seven-count indictment using wiretap evidence to charge two forest firefighting services executives with bid rigging, allocating markets and fraud. Wiretap evidence is rarely used in cartel investigations and marks a meaningful step in PCSF’s investigative approach. PCSF likely has already begun obtaining wiretap evidence in other cases and, based on its success in 2023, will continue pursuing aggressive investigative and litigation strategies moving forward.

Partnerships and Collaboration

Taking the PCSF to the global stage, the DOJ announced a joint initiative with Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau to collaborate on “outreach to the public and business community about anti-competitive conduct, as well as on investigations, using intelligence sharing and existing international cooperation tools” in the run-up to the 2026 FIFA World Cup to be hosted across the three countries.

In addition to its international partnerships for the World Cup, the DOJ is tackling technology with global efforts. In November 2023, DOJ leaders met with G7 competition authorities in Tokyo to discuss competition in digital markets and enforcement priorities. This was one in a series of meetings among authorities that have taken place since 2019 with a goal of setting and issuing guidance on shared priorities for regulating competition in tech. Following the summit, the group published a “communique” grounded in concern around emerging technologies, including risks in the criminal realm. The leaders noted, “As firms increasingly rely on AI to set prices to consumers, there is risk that such tools could facilitate collusion or unfairly raise prices.”

This sentiment is consistent with statements made earlier in the year by DOJ leadership. For example, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki highlighted the role of technology in information exchanges. She described the current “inflection point” of algorithms, data and cloud computing as creating new market realties. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter stated that artificial intelligence’s “boundless potential” comes with “risks [that] transcend borders.” The consistency of rhetoric and global dedication to tackling the risks of emerging technology signals a potentially busy 2024 in this space.

The DOJ also continued its practice of partnering with fellow domestic law enforcement agencies. For example, the DOJ secured three guilty pleas in August 2023 for bid rigging asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan from 2013 to 2021. The DOJ worked with the Offices of Inspector General for the US Department of Transportation and the US Postal Service, and highlighted the partnership in public statements on the pleas. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar said, “Along with our law enforcement partners, the division will continue to seek justice when corporations and their leaders deprive customers of fair and open competition.” Cross-agency collaboration is a hallmark of the DOJ’s criminal enforcement and there is no reason to believe this practice will change in 2024.

Anything but Generic Remedies

In August 2023, the DOJ announced that it had entered into two unprecedented deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve price fixing charges in the generic drug industry against Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Teva and Glenmark agreed to pay $250 million and $30 million, respectively, in criminal penalties and compliance monitoring, with Teva also obligated to donate $50 million worth of drugs to aid organizations. These agreements included divestitures of the companies’ product lines for the cholesterol drug pravastatin, alleged as central to the alleged price fixing conspiracy underlying the agreements. These arrangements are unusual for two reasons.

DPAs

First, DPAs are typically unfavored by the government and used as incentives for cooperation early in investigations. It is striking that the DOJ entered into these agreements in such an advanced stage of litigation, where five other corporations and three individuals had already admitted to the implicated conspiracy. DPAs are agreements between the government and defendants in which the defendants accept certain penalties in exchange for prosecutors stopping their pursuit of the underlying charges. Prosecutions are “deferred” indefinitely while defendants fulfill their end of the bargain. Although both DPAs and plea agreements involve admitting wrongdoing, DPAs allow defendants resolution without admission of legal guilt. In the event defendants fail to meet the terms of the agreement, the government resumes its prosecution and seeks convictions.

“Extraordinary” Remedial Measures

Second, both DPAs involved unheard of divestitures of product interests in the cholesterol drug pravastatin, with Teva’s DPA requiring an additional measure of $50 million in donated clotrimazole and tobramycin to humanitarian organizations. All three generic drugs were impacted by the charged conspiracy. This remedy is first of its kind—criminal antitrust enforcers historically have sought monetary and prison sentences only. However, DOJ criminal enforcers driving outside of their historic lane is not necessarily inconsistent or surprising. The current administration has repeatedly committed to “using the whole legislative toolbox” in litigation.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar stated in October 2023 that these divestitures were appropriate in the “heavily regulated” context of generic pharmaceuticals, where a corporate conviction could have precluded Teva and Glenmark’s participation in federal drug programs to such an extent that the companies would have gone out of business. Of course, these are not the first defendants to face corporate convictions in heavily regulated industries, and they are not even the first to do so in this specific alleged conspiracy.

Whether this specific tool will build or break down competition, whether criminal enforcers are equipped to evaluate the impact of divestiture, and whether it is appropriate to test this novel approach in an industry with an alleged prolific conspiracy among major players and thus among potential buyers remains to be seen. For better or worse there will be more data points to answer these and other uncertainties: Kumar noted that the DOJ hopes to implement divestitures as criminal remedies “in other contexts” moving forward.

Investigation Nearing Its End

On November 16, 2023, in a surprising turn of events shortly after the DOJ announced the resolutions with Teva and Glenmark, the DOJ moved to dismiss a February 2020 indictment against Ara Aprahamian, a former senior executive of Taro Pharmaceutical Industries charged with fixing prices, rigging bids and allocating markets for generic drugs. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Prior to filing the motion, the DOJ had been preparing for a February 2024 criminal trial against Aprahamian. As a result of these recent actions, the DOJ has no remaining public proceedings in connection with its investigation of pricing in the generic drug industry. And, in December 2023, a district court overseeing the multidistrict civil litigation against generic drug manufacturers for the same alleged conduct terminated the DOJ’s intervenor status in the case. Thus, the DOJ’s nearly decade-long investigation of the generic drug industry appears to be ending.

Monaco on Mergers and Corporate Compliance 

In a speech at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics’ Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco emphasized the importance of compliance programs and announced a safe harbor policy for voluntary self-disclosures of antitrust wrongdoing by companies engaged in mergers and acquisitions.

Compliance

Deputy Attorney General Monaco focused her remarks on the increased importance of, and scrutiny on, corporate compliance programs. She noted that under a new initiative, every resolution by the Criminal Division requires companies to add compliance-promoting criteria to compensation systems. She also shared that the Division is enacting “clawback credits” to incentivize tying executive compensation to compliance. Remaining focused on bottom lines, she warned: “Invest in compliance now or your company may pay the price—a significant price—later.” These sharp words are consistent with the DOJ’s increased rhetoric on and policy prioritization of compliance programs throughout 2023.

Mergers & Acquisitions Safe Harbor Policy

Deputy Attorney General Monaco also commented on the recently unveiled DOJ-wide safe harbor allowing companies to report misconduct by the companies they seek to acquire or merge with. The covered conduct must be discovered through the M&A process. Conduct that should have otherwise been disclosed or which could have been publicly known does not count. Conduct already known to the DOJ is not entitled to safe harbor protection either.

Monaco stated, “Going forward, acquiring companies that promptly and voluntarily disclose criminal misconduct within the Safe Harbor period [six months from date of closing], and that cooperate with the ensuing investigation, and engage in requisite, timely and appropriate remediation, restitution, and disgorgement [within one year of closing]—they will receive the presumption of a declination.” In line with remarks by enforcers earlier in the year, Monaco specifically highlighted cybersecurity, tech and national security as areas of heightened risk and thus heightened scrutiny. Corporations in these markets should take heed of the DOJ’s emphasis on corporate compliance in 2024.

Looking Ahead

In 2023, criminal antitrust authorities used novel approaches at every stage of enforcement—from charging decisions to partnerships, to litigation, to remedies— and they show no sign of slowing down in 2024. The emergence of new technologies and a policy promise to forego old guideposts takes the DOJ further from the familiar, and perhaps further from its expertise.

In a high-stakes election year and with an influx of federal funds in infrastructure and defense spaces, the DOJ will likely hit the accelerator sooner than it hits the breaks. Markets that impact maximum voters, including employment, tax-funded government contracts, national security and healthcare, are likely focuses. All considered, it is more important than ever for businesses and individuals to stay up to date on policy priorities, revamp and champion internal compliance programs, and seek agile counsel in the ever-changing landscape of criminal enforcement to avoid costly investigations.

March Visa Bulletin: Priority Date Cutoffs Move Back with Switch to Final Action Dates

The U.S. State Department released the March Visa Bulletin Friday, showing little movement in the employment-based Final Action Dates and Dates for Filing charts. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that in March it will use Final Action Dates to determine filing eligibility.

Because Dates for Filing are generally more progressive, the switch to Final Action Dates means that priority date cutoffs will move back next month—and fewer applicants will be eligible to file for employment-based green cards.

When comparing February’s Dates for Filing chart to March’s Final Action Date chart, the movement of cutoffs for being eligible to file for employment-based green cards is as follows:

EB-1

  • China EB-1 will move back 5½ months to July 15, 2022.
  • India EB-1 will move back three months to Oct. 10, 2020.
  • All other countries under EB-1 will remain current.

EB-2

  • China EB-2 will move back five months to Jan. 1, 2020.
  • India EB-2 will move back 2½ months to March 1, 2012.
  • All other countries under EB-2 will move back nearly three months to Nov. 22, 2022.

EB-3

  • China EB-3 will move back 10 months to Sept. 1, 2020.
  • India EB-3 will move back one month to July 1, 2012.
  • Philippines EB-3 will move back almost four months to Sept. 8, 2022.
  • All other countries under EB-3 will move back almost five months to Sept. 8, 2022.

Final Action Dates for Employment-Based Preference Cases:

Preference All Other Countries China India Mexico Philippines
EB-1 Current July 15, 2022 Oct. 1, 2020 Current Current
EB-2 Nov. 22, 2022 Jan. 1, 2020 March 1, 2012 Nov. 22, 2022 Nov. 22, 2022
EB-3 Sept. 8, 2022 Sept. 1, 2020 July 1, 2012 Sept. 8, 2022 Sept. 8, 2022

Additional Information: The March Visa Bulletin and the switch to Final Action Dates come after employment-based priority date cutoffs advanced key categories in January and saw no movement in February. This is the first time this fiscal year that USCIS has used the Final Action Dates to determine filing eligibility for employment-based applicants. USCIS will continue using the Dates for Filing chart to determine family-based filing eligibility next month.

Supreme Court Upholds Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Landmark Ruling

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling holding that whistleblowers do not need to prove that their employer acted with “retaliatory intent” to be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The decision in the case, Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, has immense implications for a number of whistleblower protection laws.

“This is a major win for whistleblowers and thus a huge win for corporate accountability,” said leading whistleblower attorney David Colapinto, a founding partner of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto.

“A ruling in favor of UBS would have overturned more than 20 years of precedent in SOX whistleblower cases and made it exceedingly more difficult for whistleblowers who claim retaliation under many similarly worded federal whistleblower statutes,” Colapinto continued.

“Thankfully, the Court was not swayed by UBS’ attempt to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and instead upheld the burden of proof that Congress enacted to protect whistleblowers who face retaliation,” added Colapinto.

In an amicus curiae brief filed in the case on behalf of the National Whistleblower Center, the founding partners of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto outlined the Congressional intent behind the burden of proof standard in SOX.

“In crafting the unique ‘contributing factor’ test for whistleblowers, Congress left an incredibly straight-forward legislative history documenting the value of whistleblowers’ contributions, the risks and retaliation whistleblowers faced, the barriers the previous burden of proof presented for whistleblowers, and Congress’ explicit intention to lower that burden of proof for whistleblowers,” the brief states.

In the Court’s opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor likewise pointed to the Congressional intent of SOX’s contributing-factor burden of proof standard:

“To be sure, the contributing-factor framework that Congress chose here is not as protective of employers as a motivating-factor framework. That is by design. Congress has employed the contributing-factor framework in contexts where the health, safety, or well-being of the public may well depend on whistleblowers feeling empowered to come forward. This Court cannot override that policy choice by giving employers more protection than the statute itself provides.”

This article was authored by Geoff Schweller.

House Passes $78 Billion Tax Bill that Includes Affordable Housing Help

How long is something called a “crisis” before it just becomes the “new normal?” It is apparent there has been an affordable housing crisis in the United States for decades. One way that the federal government has addressed this is by motivating developers with the 9% Low Income Housing Tax Credit (the “9% LIHTC”) and the 4% Low Income Housing Tax Credit (the “4% LIHTC”) that a developer can receive for building a “qualified low-income building” described under Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”).

These LIHTCs are awarded by a state government (or political subdivision thereof) to eligible participants to offset a portion of their federal tax liability in exchange for the production or preservation of affordable housing. On average, 50% of the total financing for 9% LIHTC projects comes from equity derived from the credit. Many states have used the 9% LIHTC as their primary tool to facilitate the production and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing. However, the 9% LIHTC is incredibly competitive. Each year the federal government allocates 9% LIHTC to each state on the basis of population.

The 4% LIHTC is another viable (and slightly less competitive) option. Currently, the 4% LIHTC is available for acquisition and rehabilitation of existing buildings and for new construction where 50% of the aggregate basis of the land and the building is financed with proceeds of tax-exempt bonds issued pursuant to Section 142(d) of the Code (“Affordable Housing PABs”). Unlike the 9% LIHTC, the amount of 4% LIHTC available is ostensibly unlimited; however, Affordable Housing PABs come with some strings attached, one of which is a Code Section 146 requirement to obtain an allocation of volume cap equal to the higher of the issue price or the par amount of the Affordable Housing PABs issued.

The federal government places a cap on the volume of certain types of tax-exempt private activity bonds, such as Affordable Housing PABs, that each state can issue. This limit is based on the population of the state. Each state has its own procedure for the allocation of and certification as to volume cap. Bonds that are subject to a volume cap limit are generally subject to an overall issuance limit each calendar year within each state. Each year, the IRS publishes a revenue procedure promulgating the volume cap applicable to each state. States then further apportion their allocable volume cap among various issuers and types of tax-exempt bonds that require volume cap within the state. As of March 2, 2023, the volume cap in 18 states and Washington, D.C. was oversubscribed for 2023.[1] Oversubscribed volume cap leads to competition for Affordable Housing PABs, which must be issued to receive the 4% LIHTCs to fund development for affordable housing.

After that primer, these authors can finally cut to the chase![2] On Wednesday, January 31, 2024, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill called the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act.

What Would This Legislation Do?

In addition to expanding the child tax credit and loosening restrictions on research and development tax deductions, this new legislation would (1) raise the 9% LIHTC through calendar year 2025 and (2) reduce the amount of Affordable Housing PABs needed for the 4% LIHTC from 50% of a project’s aggregate basis to 30% for a period of time.

For those keeping score at home, that is a 40% reduction in the amount of Affordable Housing PABs needed for the 4% LIHTC! If passed by the Senate, this package would be great news because it would free up bond capacity for more Affordable Housing PABs and for other tax-exempt bonds that require volume cap.[3]

But before you get too excited, note we said for a period of time and the Senate has yet to pass this legislation. How long a period? As drafted, the new legislation provides that the reduction of the Affordable Housing PABs requirement to 30% is applicable to projects, which are financed in part (at least 5% of the aggregate basis of the building and land)[4] by Affordable Housing PABs which have an issue date is in 2024 or 2025. So, the 40% reduction would be much like those endless infomercials we endured during COVID (available for a limited time only!). The reduction would be available from the date that the legislation takes effect for Affordable Housing PABs issued through December 31, 2025 (or for about a year to a year and a half). So, while this is a step in the right direction, this is not a permanent reduction in the amount of Affordable Housing PABs required to obtain the 4% LIHTC.

Recall that Congress has extended programs like this before. For example, the Qualified Zone Academy Bond program was established by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 in order to promote private-sector investment in primary and secondary public education in areas with scarce public resources. Initially authorized only for 1998 and 1999, the program ended up being extended every two years right up through 2017. These types of extensions would make it a lot harder to plan yearly volume cap requests, but the new legislation is still a positive development.

The public policy and municipal bond sectors think this legislation does have a chance in the Senate, but it will likely take a while. Not surprisingly, Congress has other crises to address beyond affordable housing, including the laddered continuing resolutions funding the government that will expire on March 1and March 8. As Brian Egan, the director of government affairs for the National Association of Bond Lawyers said, this “overwhelming House vote demonstrates a momentum that the deal’s advocates will not want to squander. It also proves that members on both sides of the aisle want to get something done on tax before the end of the 118th Congress.”

Stay tuned for more on this and our expanding coverage of affordable and workforce housing in the coming weeks!


[1] https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/population-figures-increase-multiplier-mean-record-pab-cap-2023-small-state-recipients-largely.

[2] You probably would never want to listen to the authors of this blog post tell any sort of suspenseful story. You would be here for days!

[3] Like the 25% volume cap requirement for qualified carbon dioxide capture facilities. We are all still waiting for that guidance on how to implement those provisions of the Code; we are looking at you Internal Revenue Service.

[4] Note that the new legislation also attempts to provide a transition rule for projects that already have some Affordable Housing PABs issued (but not the full 50% required prior to the enactment of this legislation) by permitting the reduced 30% requirement to be applied if at least 5 percent or more of the aggregate basis of the building and land is financed by Affordable Housing PABs with an issue date in 2024 or 2025. See the H. Rept. 118-353 – TAX RELIEF FOR AMERICAN FAMILIES AND WORKERS ACT OF 2024.

Three Individuals Sentenced for $3.5 Million COVID-19 Relief Fraud Scheme

Three Individuals Sentenced for $3.5 Million COVID-19 Relief Fraud Scheme

On February 6, three individuals were sentenced for fraudulently obtaining and misusing Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans that the US Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.

According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, in 2020 and 2021, defendants Khadijah X. Chapman, Daniel C. Labrum, and Eric J.O’Neil submitted falsified documents to financial institutions for fictitious businesses to fraudulently obtain $3.5 million in PPP loans intended for small businesses struggling with the economic impact of COVID-19. Chapman was convicted in November 2023 of bank fraud. Labrum and O’Neil pleaded guilty in 2023 to bank fraud. Following their convictions, Chapman was sentenced to three years and 10 months in prison, Labrum was sentenced to two years in prison, and O’Neil was sentenced to two years and three months in prison.

Read the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) press release here.

False Claims Act Complaint Filed Against Former President and Co-Owner of Mobile Cardiac PET Scan Provider

The DOJ filed a complaint in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Rick Nassenstein, former president, chief financial officer, and co-owner of Illinois-based Cardiac Imaging Inc. (CII), which provides mobile cardiac positron emission tomography (PET) scans.

The complaint alleges that Nassenstein caused CII to pay excessive, above-market fees to doctors who referred patients to CII for cardiac PET scans. The government alleges that the compensation arrangements violated the Stark Law, which prohibits health care providers from billing Medicare for services referred by a physician with whom the provider has a compensation arrangement unless the arrangement meets certain statutory and regulatory requirements. Claims knowingly submitted to Medicare in violation of the Stark Law also violate the federal FCA.

The complaint alleges that CII provided cardiac PET scans on a mobile basis and paid the referring physicians, usually cardiologists, to provide physician supervision as required by Medicare rules. From at least 2017 through June 2023, Nassenstein allegedly caused CII to enter into compensation arrangements with referring cardiologists that provided for payment to the cardiologists as if they were fully occupied supervising CII’s scans, even though they were actually providing care to other patients in their offices or patients who were not even on site. CII’s fees also allegedly compensated the cardiologists for additional services the physicians did not actually provide. The complaint alleges that CII paid over $40 million in unlawful fees to physicians and submitted over 75,000 false claims to Medicare for services provided pursuant to referrals that violated the Stark Law.

The lawsuit was originally a qui tam complaint filed by a former billing manager at CII, and the United States, through the DOJ, filed a complaint in partial intervention to participate in the lawsuit.

The case, captioned US ex rel. Pinto v. Nassenstein, No. 18-cv-2674 (S.D. Tex.), follows an $85.5 million settlement in October 2023 by CII and its current owner, Sam Kancherlapalli, for claims arising from this conduct.

Read the DOJ’s press release here.

San Diego Restaurant Owner Charged with Tax and COVID-19 Relief Fraud Schemes

On February 2, a federal grand jury in San Diego returned a superseding indictment charging a California restaurant owner with wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, tax evasion, filing false tax returns, conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and failing to file tax returns.

According to the indictment, Leronce Suel, the majority owner of Rockstar Dough LLC and Chicken Feed LLC, conspired with a business partner to underreport over $1.7 million in gross receipts on Rockstar Dough LLC’s 2020 federal corporate tax return. From March 2020 to June 2022, Suel and the business partner then allegedly used this fraudulent return to qualify for COVID-19-related loans pursuant to the PPP and Restaurant Revitalization Funding program. In connection with those loans, Suel also allegedly certified falsely that he used the loan money for payroll purposes only. The indictment alleges that Suel and his business partner laundered the fraudulently obtained funds through cash withdrawals from their business bank accounts and stashed more than $2.4 million in cash in their home.

The indictment further charges that Suel failed to report millions of dollars received in cash and personal expenses paid for by his businesses as income, in addition to reporting false depreciable assets and business losses.

If convicted, Suel faces prison sentences up to 30 years for each count of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 10 years for each count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, five years for tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States, three years for each count of filing false tax returns, and one year for each count of failing to file tax returns.

Read the DOJ’s press release here.

WHO Publishes Guidance for Ethics and Governance of AI for Healthcare Sector

The World Health Organization (WHO) recently published “Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence for Health: Guidance on large multi-modal models” (LMMs), which is designed to provide “guidance to assist Member States in mapping the benefits and challenges associated with the use of for health and in developing policies and practices for appropriate development, provision and use. The guidance includes recommendations for governance within companies, by governments, and through international collaboration, aligned with the guiding principles. The principles and recommendations, which account for the unique ways in which humans can use generative AI for health, are the basis of this guidance.”

The guidance focused on one type of generative AI, large multi-modal models (LMMs), “which can accept one or more type of data input and generate diverse outputs that are not limited to the type of data fed into the algorithm.” According to the report, LMMs have “been adopted faster than any consumer application in history.” The report outlines the benefits and risks of LLMs, particularly the risk of using LLMs in the healthcare sector.

The report proposes solutions to address the risks of using LMMs in health care during development, provision, and deployment of LMMs and ethics and governance of LLMs, “what can be done, and by who.”

In the ever-changing world of AI, this is one report that is timely and provides steps and solutions to follow to tackle the risk of using LMMs.

Client Alert: New Reporting Requirements Under the Corporate Transparency Act

On January 1, 2024, the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) took effect. This new federal anti-money laundering law obligates many corporations, limited liability companies and other business entities to report to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), certain information about the entity, the entity’s beneficial owners and the individuals who created or registered the entity to do business. This client alert summarizes the CTA’s key requirements and deadlines. For more detailed information, please review the official “Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting FAQs” and the “Small Entity Compliance Guide” published by FinCEN.

Frequently Asked Questions

WHO MUST REPORT INFORMATION UNDER THE CTA?

The following “reporting companies” are subject to the CTA’s reporting requirements: (a) any U.S. corporation, limited liability company or other entity created by the filing of a document with a state or territorial government office; and (b) any non-U.S. entity that is registered to do business in any U.S. jurisdiction.

The CTA provides for 23 types of entities that are exempt from its reporting requirements, including companies that currently report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, insurance companies and tax-exempt entities, among others. Most notably, a company does not need to comply with the CTA if it has more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts for the previous year (as reflected in filed federal tax returns), at least one physical office in the U.S. and at least 20 employees in the U.S. For a full list of exemptions, including helpful checklists, please see Chapter 1.2, “Is my company exempt from the reporting requirements?”, of the Small Entity Compliance Guide.

A subsidiary of an exempt entity also will enjoy exempt status.

WHAT INFORMATION MUST BE REPORTED?

A reporting company is required to report the following information to FinCEN, and to keep the information current with FinCEN on an ongoing basis:

  1. The reporting company’s full legal name;
  2. Any trade name or “doing business as” (DBA) name of the reporting company;
  3. The reporting company’s principal place of business;
  4. The reporting company’s jurisdiction of formation (and, for non-U.S. reporting companies, the jurisdiction where the company first registered to do business in the U.S.); and
  5. The reporting company’s Employer Identification Number (EIN).

A reporting company also is required to identify its “beneficial owners” and “company applicant.” A beneficial owner is an individual who either: (a) exercises “substantial control” over the reporting company; or (b) owns or controls at least 25 percent of the ownership interests of the reporting company. A company applicant is an individual who directly files or is primarily responsible for filing the document that creates or registers the reporting company.

A reporting company must report and keep current the following information for each beneficial owner and company applicant:

  1. Full legal name;
  2. Date of birth;
  3. Complete current address;
  4. Unique identifying number and issuing jurisdiction from, and image of, one of the following non-expired documents:
    a. U.S. passport;
    b. State driver’s license; or
    c. Identification document issued by a state, local government or tribe.

WHEN ARE REPORTS DUE?

A reporting company that was first formed or registered to do business in the United States before January 1, 2024 will need to file its initial report with FinCEN no later than January 1, 2025.

A reporting company that is first formed or registered to do business in the United States between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025 will need to file its initial report with FinCEN within 90 calendar days after the effective date of its formation or registration to do business.

A reporting company that is first formed or registered to do business in the United States on or after January 1, 2025 will need to file its initial report with FinCEN within 30 calendar days after the effective date of its formation or registration to do business.

HOW DOES MY COMPANY FILE REPORTS WITH FINCEN?

Reports must be filed electronically through the BOI E-Filing System. For additional instructions and other technical guidance, please see the Help & Resources page.

WHAT HAPPENS IF MY COMPANY DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE CTA?

At the time the filing is made, a reporting company is required to certify that its report or application is true, correct, and complete. Therefore, it is the reporting company’s responsibility to identify its beneficial owners and verify the accuracy of all reported information.

A person or reporting company who willfully violates the CTA’s reporting requirements may be subject to civil penalties of up to $500 for each day that the violation continues, plus criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000.

In the case of an accidental violation – for instance, if an initial report inadvertently contained a typo or outdated information – the CTA provides a safe harbor for reporting companies to correct the original report within 90 days after the deadline for the original report. If this safe harbor deadline is missed, the reporting company and individuals providing inaccurate information may be subject to the CTA’s civil and criminal penalties.

OTHER THAN FILING ACCURATE REPORTS, HOW CAN MY COMPANY STAY COMPLIANT?

A reporting company should consider taking the following actions to facilitate compliance with the CTA’s reporting requirements:

  • Amending existing governing documents, such as LLC or stockholder agreements, to require beneficial owners to promptly provide required information and otherwise cooperate in the company’s compliance with the CTA;
  • Designating an officer to oversee the company’s initial and ongoing CTA reporting;
  • Maintaining, reviewing and updating records on a regular cadence to reflect equity transfers, option grants and other transactions that affect ownership interest calculations; and
  • Developing a secure process for collecting and storing a beneficial owner’s photo identification and other sensitive information for CTA reporting purposes.

Employment Tip of the Month – February 2024

Q: Can my company treat employees adversely because of their personal political beliefs? If they wear a shirt of their favorite candidate? Or proselytize about their candidate?

A: The short answer: There exists no “First Amendment Right to freedom of expression” in a private workplace, and that extends to political expression. See Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019) (Only “State actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”)

So, yes, legally a private employer can refuse to hire Democrats or Republicans, and can fire an employee for wearing a shirt of their candidate or vocalizing a particular political position.

On the other hand, other laws can apply, such as the right to “concerted action” under the National Labor Relations Act. Overt adverse action also could be ripe for allegations of selective enforcement, such as “you only selectively enforce this rule against me because I am ___________”, where Title VII covers race, sex, religion, color and national origin; ADA covers disability; ADEA age, etc. Some political positions could easily bleed over into religious beliefs.

Even if legally permissible for a private employer to discriminate against holders of one particular political belief, from a practical management perspective, it cannot be recommended, and would be loaded with risk. Also, it could simply make for bad optics and make it harder to attract and retain the best talent.

Finally, this answer changes entirely for public employers and government employers, where employees do possess First Amendment rights, so long as, in general, they are speaking (1) as a private citizen, (2) about a matter of public concern, and (3) their speech does not interfere with the job. There are exceptions for high-ranking individuals, political appointees or someone trying to release classified information, though in many instances they would still be protected from retaliation.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.